cpsa-3.6.8: tst/nhcr_um.scm
; Unified Model This version used in the paper, tooldev/dh/conf_dh/dh_ebn.tex
; This file models the "Unified Model" method of determining a fresh
; key from long-term and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exponents. We use
; function relation declarations to link names to long-term public
; values.
;;; This file contains the standard version, in which the two
;;; ephemeral are mixed, as are the two static exponents.
; A role is provided in which a party signs a fresh long-term
; Diffie-Hellman value, and then leaks the exponent. The latter step
; is used to test the notion of forward security.
; Two inputs are analyzed. In the first, we model that two
; participants exist that agree on the UM key. The notion of
; "implicit authentication" suggests that if one participant exists
; and another party knows the same key, that party must be either the
; participant or the participant's intended partner.
; In this version, we assume that the long-term keys of the
; participants do not leak.
; The second input checks whether the key can be learned when the key
; is generated honestly. In this version, we do NOT assume that the
; long-term keys of the participants do not leak.
(herald "NHCR: unified model (UM)" (bound 20) (limit 8000) (algebra diffie-hellman))
(defmacro (nh_public k1)
;(exp (gen) x1))
(hash "public" k1))
(defmacro (nh_share k1 k2)
;(hash "share" (nh_public (mul x1 x2))))
(hash "share" (nh_public k1) k2))
; Use this macro to generate the hint
(defmacro (nh_hint k1 k2)
(hash "hint" (nh_share k1 k2)))
(defmacro (nh_key1 k1 k2 h)
(hash "nh_key" (nh_share k1 k2) h))
(defmacro (nh_key2 k1 k2 h)
(hash "nh_key" (nh_share k2 k1) h))
(defmacro (key_hint11 ltk1 ltk2 ek1 ek2 h1 h2)
(hash "key" (nh_key1 ltk1 ltk2 h1) (nh_key1 ek1 ek2 h2)))
(defmacro (key_hint12 ltk1 ltk2 ek1 ek2 h1 h2)
(hash "key" (nh_key1 ltk1 ltk2 h1) (nh_key2 ek1 ek2 h2)))
(defmacro (key_hint21 ltk1 ltk2 ek1 ek2 h1 h2)
(hash "key" (nh_key2 ltk1 ltk2 h1) (nh_key1 ek1 ek2 h2)))
(defmacro (key_hint22 ltk1 ltk2 ek1 ek2 h1 h2)
(hash "key" (nh_key2 ltk1 ltk2 h1) (nh_key2 ek1 ek2 h2)))
;(defmacro (key ltk1 ltk2 ek1 ek2)
; (key_hint ltk1 ltk2 (nh_hint ltk1 ek2) ek1 ek2 (nh_hint ek1 ltk2)))
(defprotocol nhcr-umx diffie-hellman
(defrole init
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name) (na nb data) (hint1 hint2 mesg))
(trace
(recv (cat (nh_public ltxa) (nh_public ltxb)))
(send (cat na a b (nh_public x)))
(recv (cat (nh_public y) hint1 hint2
(enc na nb a b hint1 hint2
(key_hint22 ltxa ltxb x y hint1 hint2))))
(send nb)
)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (ltxa a) (ltxb b))
("ltx-of" (a ltxa) (b ltxb)))
(uniq-gen x)
(uniq-orig na)
(neq ((exp (gen) y) (gen))))
(defrole resp
(vars (ltxa ltxb y rndx) (x expt) (a b name) (na nb data))
(trace
(recv (cat (nh_public ltxa) (nh_public ltxb)))
(recv (cat na a b (nh_public x)))
(send (cat (nh_public y) (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)
(enc na nb a b (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)
(key_hint11 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(enc na nb a b (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)
(key_hint12 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(enc na nb a b (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)
(key_hint21 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(enc na nb a b (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)
(key_hint22 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))))
(recv nb)
)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (ltxa a) (ltxb b))
("ltx-of" (a ltxa) (b ltxb)))
(uniq-gen y)
(uniq-orig nb)
(neq ((exp (gen) x) (gen))))
(defrole ltx-gen
(vars (self name) (l rndx))
(trace
(send (cat self (nh_public l)))
(recv "end-of-protocol")
(send l))
(uniq-gen l)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (l self))
("ltx-of" (self l)))))
; Initiator point of view: partner's exponent secret
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (self b) (l ltxb))
(precedes ((1 0) (0 0)))
(non-orig ltxb)
(neq (a b)))
; Initiator point of view: both LTX exponents secret
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxb))
(non-orig ltxa ltxb) (neq (a b)))
; Responder point of view; both exponents secret
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand resp 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxb))
(non-orig ltxa ltxb)
(neq (a b)))
; Responder point of view; partner's exponent secret
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand resp 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(non-orig ltxa)
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (key_hint11 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (key_hint12 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (key_hint21 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton nhcr-umx
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (key_hint22 ltxa ltxb x y (nh_hint ltxa y) (nh_hint x ltxb)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))