cpsa-3.6.8: tst/dhcr_um.scm
; Unified Model This version used in the paper, tooldev/dh/conf_dh/dh_ebn.tex
; This file models the "Unified Model" method of determining a fresh
; key from long-term and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exponents. We use
; function relation declarations to link names to long-term public
; values.
;;; This file contains the standard version, in which the two
;;; ephemeral are mixed, as are the two static exponents.
; A role is provided in which a party signs a fresh long-term
; Diffie-Hellman value, and then leaks the exponent. The latter step
; is used to test the notion of forward security.
; Two inputs are analyzed. In the first, we model that two
; participants exist that agree on the UM key. The notion of
; "implicit authentication" suggests that if one participant exists
; and another party knows the same key, that party must be either the
; participant or the participant's intended partner.
; In this version, we assume that the long-term keys of the
; participants do not leak.
; The second input checks whether the key can be learned when the key
; is generated honestly. In this version, we do NOT assume that the
; long-term keys of the participants do not leak.
(herald "DHCR: unified model (UM) original" (bound 20) (limit 8000) (algebra diffie-hellman))
(defmacro (kcfa ltxa ltxb x hy)
(hash (exp (gen) (mul ltxa ltxb)) (exp hy x)))
(defmacro (kcfb ltxa ltxb y hx)
(hash (exp (gen) (mul ltxa ltxb)) (exp hx y)))
(defprotocol dhcr-um diffie-hellman
(defrole init
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name) (na nb data))
(trace
(recv (cat (exp (gen) ltxa) (exp (gen) ltxb)))
(send (cat na a b (exp (gen) x)))
(recv (cat (exp (gen) y) (enc na nb a b (kcfa ltxa ltxb x (exp (gen) y)))))
(send nb)
)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (ltxa a) (ltxb b))
("ltx-of" (a ltxa) (b ltxb)))
(uniq-gen x)
(uniq-orig na)
(neq ((exp (gen) y) (gen))))
(defrole resp
(vars (ltxa ltxb y rndx) (x expt) (a b name) (na nb data))
(trace
(recv (cat (exp (gen) ltxa) (exp (gen) ltxb)))
(recv (cat na a b (exp (gen) x)))
(send (cat (exp (gen) y) (enc na nb a b (kcfb ltxa ltxb y (exp (gen) x)))))
(recv nb)
)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (ltxa a) (ltxb b))
("ltx-of" (a ltxa) (b ltxb)))
(uniq-gen y)
(uniq-orig nb)
(neq ((exp (gen) x) (gen))))
(defrole ltx-gen
(vars (self name) (l rndx))
(trace
(send (cat self (exp (gen) l)))
(recv "end-of-protocol")
(send l))
(uniq-gen l)
(fn-of ("principal-of" (l self))
("ltx-of" (self l)))))
; Initiator point of view: both LTX exponents secret
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxb))
(non-orig ltxa ltxb) (neq (a b)))
; Initiator point of view: partner's exponent secret
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxb))
(non-orig ltxb)
(neq (a b)))
; Responder point of view; both exponents secret
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand resp 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxb))
(non-orig ltxa ltxb)
(neq (a b)))
; Responder point of view; partner's exponent secre
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb rndx) (a b name))
(defstrand resp 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (a a) (b b))
(defstrand ltx-gen 1 (l ltxa))
(non-orig ltxa)
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (kcfa ltxa ltxb x (exp (gen) y)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))
;;; Forward secrecy, neither long-term exponent secure
(defskeleton dhcr-um
(vars (ltxa ltxb x rndx) (y expt) (a b name))
(defstrand init 4 (ltxa ltxa) (ltxb ltxb) (x x) (y y) (a a) (b b))
(deflistener (exp (gen) (mul x y)))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxa))
(defstrand ltx-gen 3 (l ltxb))
(precedes ((0 3) (3 1)) ((0 3) (2 1)))
(neq (a b)))