diff --git a/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs b/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,187 +0,0 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} - -module Main where - -import Certificate -import Control.Concurrent.Chan -import Data.Default (def) -import Data.IORef -import Data.X509 -import Data.X509.Validation -import Test.Tasty.Bench -import Network.TLS -import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher -import Session -import Run -import PubKey - -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L - -blockCipher :: Cipher -blockCipher = - Cipher - { cipherID = 0xff12 - , cipherName = "rsa-id-const" - , cipherBulk = - Bulk - { bulkName = "id" - , bulkKeySize = 16 - , bulkIVSize = 16 - , bulkExplicitIV = 0 - , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 - , bulkBlockSize = 16 - , bulkF = BulkBlockF $ \_ _ _ m -> (m, B.empty) - } - , cipherHash = MD5 - , cipherPRFHash = Nothing - , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA - , cipherMinVer = Nothing - } - -getParams :: Version -> Cipher -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) -getParams connectVer cipher = (cParams, sParams) - where - sParams = - def - { serverSupported = supported - , serverShared = - def - { sharedCredentials = - Credentials - [(CertificateChain [simpleX509 $ PubKeyRSA pubKey], PrivKeyRSA privKey)] - } - } - cParams = - (defaultParamsClient "" B.empty) - { clientSupported = supported - , clientShared = - def - { sharedValidationCache = - ValidationCache - { cacheAdd = \_ _ _ -> return () - , cacheQuery = \_ _ _ -> return ValidationCachePass - } - } - } - supported = - def - { supportedCiphers = [cipher] - , supportedVersions = [connectVer] - , supportedGroups = [X25519, FFDHE2048] - } - (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair - -runTLSPipe - :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) - -> (Context -> Chan b -> IO ()) - -> (Chan a -> Context -> IO ()) - -> a - -> IO b -runTLSPipe params tlsServer tlsClient d = do - withDataPipe params tlsServer tlsClient $ \(writeStart, readResult) -> do - writeStart d - readResult - -runTLSPipeSimple - :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> IO B.ByteString -runTLSPipeSimple params = runTLSPipe params tlsServer tlsClient - where - tlsServer ctx queue = do - handshake ctx - d <- recvData ctx - writeChan queue d - bye ctx - tlsClient queue ctx = do - handshake ctx - d <- readChan queue - sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d]) - byeBye ctx - -benchConnection - :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark -benchConnection params !d name = bench name . nfIO $ runTLSPipeSimple params d - -benchResumption - :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark -benchResumption params !d name = env initializeSession runResumption - where - initializeSession = do - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - params1 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params - _ <- runTLSPipeSimple params1 d - - Just sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params1 - newIORef params2 - - runResumption paramsRef = bench name . nfIO $ do - params2 <- readIORef paramsRef - runTLSPipeSimple params2 d - -benchResumption13 - :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark -benchResumption13 params !d name = env initializeSession runResumption - where - initializeSession = do - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - params1 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params - _ <- runTLSPipeSimple params1 d - newIORef (params1, sessionRefs) - - -- with TLS13 the sessionId is constantly changing so we must update - -- our parameters at each iteration unfortunately - runResumption paramsRef = bench name . nfIO $ do - (params1, sessionRefs) <- readIORef paramsRef - Just sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params1 - runTLSPipeSimple params2 d - -benchCiphers :: String -> Version -> B.ByteString -> [Cipher] -> Benchmark -benchCiphers name connectVer d = bgroup name . map doBench - where - doBench cipher = - benchResumption13 (getParams connectVer cipher) d (cipherName cipher) - -main :: IO () -main = - defaultMain - [ bgroup - "connection" - -- not sure the number actually make sense for anything. improve .. - [ benchConnection (getParams TLS12 blockCipher) small "TLS12-256 bytes" - ] - , bgroup - "resumption" - [ benchResumption (getParams TLS12 blockCipher) small "TLS12-256 bytes" - ] - , -- Here we try to measure TLS12 and TLS13 performance with AEAD ciphers. - -- Resumption and a larger message can be a demonstration of the symmetric - -- crypto but for TLS13 this does not work so well because of dhe_psk. - benchCiphers - "TLS12" - TLS12 - large - [ cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 - , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 - ] - , benchCiphers - "TLS13" - TLS13 - large - [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 - , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 - , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 - ] - ] - where - small = B.replicate 256 0 - large = B.replicate 102400 0 diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,7 +1,167 @@ # Change log for "tls" -## Version 2.3.1 +## Version 2.4.12 +* Authenticate a server that rejects the PSK of 0-RTT. + [#590](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/590) +* Require the client Certificate a TLS 1.2 server asked for. + [#591](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/591) +* Refuse a TLS 1.3 alert in clear after the handshake. + [#592](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/592) +* Require Certificate and ServerKeyExchange from a TLS 1.2 server. + [#593](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/593) +* Refuse a TLS 1.2 ChangeCipherSpec before its keys exist. + [#594](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/594) +* Answer an unfit ServerKeyExchange algorithm with an alert. + [#595](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/595) + +## Version 2.4.11 + +* Keep preferring AES-GCM on AArch64 with crypton 2.2, which names the + ARMv8 instructions rather than x86's. + [#584](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/584) +* Sign and verify RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 through crypton's digest-taking + operations, which deprecate the ones used before. crypton >= 2.1.9 is + now required. + [#585](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/585) +* Remove the `tls-bench` benchmark. + +## Version 2.4.10 + +* Support ML-DSA certificates and CertificateVerify, TLS 1.3 only + (draft-ietf-tls-mldsa). + [#583](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/583) +* Take ML-KEM from `crypton` instead of the `mlkem` package. + [#583](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/583) +* `tls-server`: let `-g` choose the TLS 1.3 groups too. + [#583](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/583) + +## Version 2.4.9 + +* Include CertificateRequest in the post-handshake auth transcript. + This breaks PHA with hs-tls 2.4.8 or earlier. + [#565](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/565) +* Send a TLS 1.2 session ticket only to a client that asked for one. + [#575](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/575) +* Fall back to a full handshake when a PSK finds a TLS 1.2 session. + [#576](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/576) +* Refuse SCSV or a missing renegotiation_info in secure renegotiation. + [#566](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/566) +* Reject a hybrid key share whose classical part fails to derive. + [#550](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/550) +* Send no SNI for an empty server name, and refuse a malformed or + invalid server_name. + [#568](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/568) +* Refuse a CertificateVerify algorithm that is not offered or does not + fit the key with illegal_parameter. + [#562](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/562) + [#578](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/578) +* Accept an empty TLS 1.2 client certificate when the hook does. + [#552](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/552) +* Request EdDSA client certificates with ecdsa_sign in TLS 1.2. + [#553](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/553) +* Accept a ClientHello whose legacy_version is above TLS 1.2. + [#564](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/564) +* Answer malformed or misplaced messages with the alerts the RFCs ask for. + [#554](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/554) + [#555](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/555) + [#556](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/556) + [#557](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/557) + [#558](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/558) + [#559](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/559) + [#560](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/560) + [#561](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/561) + [#563](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/563) + [#567](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/567) + [#569](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/569) + [#570](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/570) + [#571](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/571) +* tls-server: new options for tlsfuzzer, which CI runs weekly. + [#551](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/551) + [#572](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/572) + [#573](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/573) + [#574](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/574) + [#577](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/577) + +## Version 2.4.8 + +* Stop printing traffic secrets and the session secret. + [#549](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/549) + +## Version 2.4.7 + +* Use the one-call AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 interfaces of crypton. + This needs crypton 2.1.1 or later. + [#548](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/548) + +## Version 2.4.6 + +* Accept crypton 2.1. + +## Version 2.4.5 + +* Fix the TLS 1.3 0-RTT session tests racing the NewSessionTicket. + [#547](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/547) +* CI: drop macOS with GHC 9.12. + [#546](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/546) +* CI: retry Hackage downloads, keep the cache when a test fails, and run + doctest on one job. + [#545](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/545) +* `extensionDecode` returns `Nothing` instead of calling `error`. + [#544](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/544) +* `getTLSUnique` and `getTLSExporter` return `Nothing` before a handshake. + [#543](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/543) +* Take two timing signals out of the CBC record path. + [#542](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/542) +* Bound the size of a handshake message reassembled from records. + [#541](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/541) +* CI: speed up. + [#540](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/540) +* Limit consecutive TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages with the new + `limitKeyUpdate` parameter. + [#539](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/539) +* Validate the negotiated ALPN protocol. + [#538](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/538) +* Validate the negotiated cipher suite. + [#537](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/537) +* Make the session ticket tests deterministic. + [#536](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/536) + +## Version 2.4.4 + +* Enforce server certificate purpose + [#534](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/534) +* Use dedicated doctest REPL + [#533](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/533) +* Bind early data to ALPN + [#532](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/532) +* Bound certificate decompression + [#531](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/531) +* Fix RecordOverflow race after TLS 1.3 client authentication + [#530](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/530) + +## Version 2.4.3 + +* A server checks clientAuth of ExtendedKeyUsage in a client + certificate on client authentication. + +## Version 2.4.2 + +* The `Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC` module is added. + [#526](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/526) + +## Version 2.4.1 + +* Ensure same `supported_groups` before/after HRR. +* New `clientWantTicket` parameter makes it possible to opt-out of soliciting + session tickets from servers. + +## Version 2.4.0 + +* Identical to v2.3.1 but major version up as v2.3.1 breaks "quic". + +## Version 2.3.1 (deprecated) + * Using ScrubbedBytes for secrets. * Key echange with ML-KEM. [#517](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/517) @@ -81,14 +241,14 @@ This feature is automatically used if the peer supports it. * More tests with `tlsfuzzer` especially for client authentication and 0-RTT. -* Implementing a utility funcation, `validateClientCertificate`, for +* Implementing a utility function, `validateClientCertificate`, for client authentication. * Bug fix for echo back logic of Cookie extension. * More pretty show for the internal `Handshake` structure for debugging. ## Version 2.1.6 -* Testing with "tlsfuzzer" again. Now don't send an alert agaist to +* Testing with "tlsfuzzer" again. Now don't send an alert against to peer's alert. Double locking (aka self dead-lock) is fixed. Sending an alert for known-but-cannot-parse extensions. Other corner cases are also fixed. @@ -352,7 +512,7 @@ API CHANGES: - `SessionManager` implementations need to provide a `sessionResumeOnlyOnce` - function to accomodate resumption scenarios with 0-RTT data. The function is + function to accommodate resumption scenarios with 0-RTT data. The function is called only on the server side. - Data type `SessionData` is extended with four new fields for TLS version 1.3. `SessionManager` implementations that serializes/deserializes `SessionData` diff --git a/Network/TLS.hs b/Network/TLS.hs --- a/Network/TLS.hs +++ b/Network/TLS.hs @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} -- | -- Native Haskell TLS protocol implementation for servers and -- clients. @@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ -- protocol, and support RSA and Ephemeral (Elliptic curve and -- regular) Diffie Hellman key exchanges, and many extensions. -- --- The tipical usage is: +-- The typical usage is: -- -- > socket <- ... -- > ctx <- contextNew socket @@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ clientUseServerNameIndication, clientWantSessionResume, clientWantSessionResumeList, + clientWantTicket, clientShared, clientHooks, clientSupported, @@ -138,6 +140,7 @@ Limit, defaultLimit, limitHandshakeFragment, + limitKeyUpdate, limitRecordSize, -- * Shared parameters @@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ supportedSignatureSchemes, HashAlgorithm (..), SignatureAlgorithm (..), + pattern MLDSA44, + pattern MLDSA65, + pattern MLDSA87, Group (..), supportedNamedGroups, EMSMode (..), @@ -350,6 +356,9 @@ TLSError (..), TLSException (..), supportedSignatureSchemes, + pattern MLDSA44, + pattern MLDSA65, + pattern MLDSA87, ) import Network.TLS.Struct13 (Handshake13) import Network.TLS.Types diff --git a/Network/TLS/Compression.hs b/Network/TLS/Compression.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Compression.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Compression.hs @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ (==) c1 c2 = compressionID c1 == compressionID c2 -- | intersect a list of ids commonly given by the other side with a list of compression --- the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the prefered +-- the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the preferred -- compression. compressionIntersectID :: [Compression] -> [Word8] -> [Compression] compressionIntersectID l ids = filter (\c -> compressionID c `elem` ids) l diff --git a/Network/TLS/Context.hs b/Network/TLS/Context.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Context.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Context.hs @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Context (..), Hooks (..), Established (..), + PendingRecv (..), RecordLayer (..), ctxEOF, ctxEstablished, @@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ updateMeasure, withMeasure, withReadLock, + tryWithReadLock, withWriteLock, withStateLock, withRWLock, @@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ doHandshake :: a -> Context -> IO () doHandshakeWith :: a -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () doRequestCertificate :: a -> Context -> IO Bool - doPostHandshakeAuthWith :: a -> Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () + doPostHandshakeAuthWith :: a -> Context -> Handshake13R -> IO () instance TLSParams ClientParams where getTLSCommonParams cparams = @@ -265,8 +267,11 @@ -- and use the "tls-exporter" channel binding via 'getTLSExporter'. getTLSUnique :: Context -> IO (Maybe ByteString) getTLSUnique ctx = do - ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion - if ver == TLS12 + -- Nothing rather than error before a version has been negotiated: this + -- can be called on a context whose handshake has not run, and it already + -- answers with Maybe. + mver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersionMaybe + if mver == Just TLS12 then do mx <- usingState_ ctx getFirstVerifyData case mx of @@ -278,8 +283,9 @@ -- For TLS 1.2, 'Nothing' is returned. getTLSExporter :: Context -> IO (Maybe ByteString) getTLSExporter ctx = do - ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion - if ver == TLS13 + -- As in 'getTLSUnique'. + mver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersionMaybe + if mver == Just TLS13 then exporter ctx "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" "" 32 else return Nothing diff --git a/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs b/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Hooks (..), Limit (..), Established (..), + PendingRecv (..), PendingRecvAction (..), RecordLayer (..), Locks (..), @@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ updateMeasure, withMeasure, withReadLock, + tryWithReadLock, withWriteLock, withStateLock, withRWLock, @@ -65,6 +67,8 @@ defaultTLS13State, getTLS13State, modifyTLS13State, + incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount, + resetTLS13KeyUpdateCount, CipherChoice (..), makeCipherChoice, @@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ ) where import Control.Concurrent.MVar -import Control.Exception (throwIO) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict import Data.ByteArray (convert) import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA @@ -170,7 +174,7 @@ { doHandshake_ :: Context -> IO () , doHandshakeWith_ :: Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () , doRequestCertificate_ :: Context -> IO Bool - , doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () + , doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ :: Context -> Handshake13R -> IO () } data Locks = Locks @@ -199,11 +203,12 @@ data TLS13State = TLS13State { tls13stRecvNST :: Bool -- client + , tls13stKeyUpdateCount :: Int , tls13stSentClientCert :: Bool -- client , tls13stRecvSF :: Bool -- client , tls13stSentCF :: Bool -- client , tls13stRecvCF :: Bool -- server - , tls13stPendingRecvData :: Maybe ByteString -- client + , tls13stPendingRecv :: PendingRecv -- client , tls13stPendingSentData :: [ByteString] -> [ByteString] -- client , tls13stRTT :: Millisecond , tls13st0RTT :: Bool -- client @@ -211,7 +216,7 @@ , tls13stClientExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] -- client , tls13stChoice :: ~CipherChoice -- client , tls13stHsKey :: Maybe (SecretTriple HandshakeSecret) -- client - -- Actuall session id for TLS 1.2, random value for TLS 1.3 + -- Actual session id for TLS 1.2, random value for TLS 1.3 , tls13stSession :: Session , tls13stSentExtensions :: [ExtensionID] } @@ -220,11 +225,12 @@ defaultTLS13State = TLS13State { tls13stRecvNST = False + , tls13stKeyUpdateCount = 0 , tls13stSentClientCert = False , tls13stRecvSF = False , tls13stSentCF = False , tls13stRecvCF = False - , tls13stPendingRecvData = Nothing + , tls13stPendingRecv = NoPendingRecv , tls13stPendingSentData = id , tls13stRTT = 0 , tls13st0RTT = False @@ -242,6 +248,16 @@ modifyTLS13State :: Context -> (TLS13State -> TLS13State) -> IO () modifyTLS13State Context{..} f = atomicModifyIORef' ctxTLS13State $ \st -> (f st, ()) +incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount :: Context -> IO Int +incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount Context{..} = + atomicModifyIORef' ctxTLS13State $ \st -> + let count = tls13stKeyUpdateCount st + 1 + in (st{tls13stKeyUpdateCount = count}, count) + +resetTLS13KeyUpdateCount :: Context -> IO () +resetTLS13KeyUpdateCount ctx = + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stKeyUpdateCount = 0} + data HandshakeSync = HandshakeSync (Context -> ClientState -> IO ()) @@ -271,6 +287,15 @@ | Established deriving (Eq, Show) +-- | Outcome of a read that was started on behalf of a caller who is no longer +-- waiting for it, held until the next receive hands it over. Reads cannot be +-- abandoned once started -- see 'Network.TLS.Core.handshake' -- so a reader that +-- outlives its caller leaves its result here instead. +data PendingRecv + = NoPendingRecv + | PendingRecvData ByteString + | PendingRecvError E.SomeException + data PendingRecvAction = -- | simple pending action. The first 'Bool' is necessity of alignment. PendingRecvAction Bool (Handshake13 -> IO ()) @@ -367,7 +392,7 @@ withLog ctx f = ctxWithHooks ctx (f . hookLogging) throwCore :: MonadIO m => TLSError -> m a -throwCore = liftIO . throwIO . Uncontextualized +throwCore = liftIO . E.throwIO . Uncontextualized failOnEitherError :: MonadIO m => m (Either TLSError a) -> m a failOnEitherError f = do @@ -387,7 +412,7 @@ usingHState :: MonadIO m => Context -> HandshakeM a -> m a usingHState ctx f = liftIO $ modifyMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ \case - Nothing -> liftIO $ throwIO MissingHandshake + Nothing -> liftIO $ E.throwIO MissingHandshake Just st -> return $ swap (Just <$> runHandshake st f) getHState :: MonadIO m => Context -> m (Maybe HandshakeState) @@ -449,6 +474,26 @@ withReadLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a withReadLock ctx f = withMVar (lockRead $ ctxLocks ctx) (const f) + +-- | Like 'withReadLock', but returns 'Nothing' immediately instead of waiting +-- when another thread already holds the read lock. +-- +-- The read lock is what keeps a single thread reading the connection at a time. +-- Records arrive length-prefixed, so two threads reading in parallel would each +-- take a piece of whatever record the other was in the middle of, and neither +-- would end up with a usable message. +-- +-- Use this instead of 'withReadLock' when the read is optional and skipping it +-- is better than waiting for the current reader, which may hold the lock for +-- arbitrarily long. 'bye' is the only such caller; see the note there. +tryWithReadLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO (Maybe a) +tryWithReadLock ctx f = E.bracket acquire release $ \mlock -> case mlock of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just _ -> Just <$> f + where + lock = lockRead $ ctxLocks ctx + acquire = tryTakeMVar lock + release = mapM_ (putMVar lock) withWriteLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a withWriteLock ctx f = withMVar (lockWrite $ ctxLocks ctx) (const f) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Core.hs b/Network/TLS/Core.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Core.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Core.hs @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ requestCertificate, ) where +import Control.Concurrent (forkIO) +import Control.Concurrent.MVar import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict import qualified Data.ByteString as B @@ -36,6 +38,10 @@ import System.Timeout import Network.TLS.Context +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal ( + incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount, + resetTLS13KeyUpdateCount, + ) import Network.TLS.Extension import Network.TLS.Handshake import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common @@ -72,11 +78,39 @@ sentClientCert <- tls13stSentClientCert <$> getTLS13State ctx when (role == ClientRole && tls13 && sentClientCert) $ do rtt <- getRTT ctx - -- This 'timeout' should work. - mdat <- timeout rtt $ recvData13 ctx - case mdat of - Nothing -> return () - Just dat -> modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecvData = Just dat} + -- We are only willing to wait 'rtt' for the alert, but a receive + -- must not be abandoned once it has started. Records are read + -- length-prefixed and the record layer keeps no receive buffer, so + -- an aborted receive loses the bytes it has already taken off the + -- transport and leaves the stream positioned inside a record. + -- Every later read is then misframed, and the connection is dead + -- with a spurious protocol error. + -- + -- So the receive runs in its own thread and we stop waiting for it + -- rather than interrupting it. It holds the read lock, which keeps + -- it the only reader and makes the next receive wait for it to + -- finish; its outcome is left in 'tls13stPendingRecv' for that + -- receive to pick up. + done <- newEmptyMVar + void $ forkIO $ withReadLock ctx $ do + r <- E.try $ recvData13 ctx + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> + st + { tls13stPendingRecv = case r of + Right dat -> PendingRecvData dat + Left err -> PendingRecvError err + } + putMVar done () + arrived <- timeout rtt $ takeMVar done + -- Still report the authentication failure from 'handshake' itself + -- whenever it did arrive in time. + when (isJust arrived) $ do + pending <- tls13stPendingRecv <$> getTLS13State ctx + case pending of + PendingRecvError err -> do + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecv = NoPendingRecv} + E.throwIO err + _ -> return () rttFactor :: Int rttFactor = 3 @@ -118,7 +152,7 @@ recvNST <- chk unless recvNST $ do rtt <- getRTT ctx - void $ timeout rtt $ recvHS13 ctx chk + tryRecvHS13 rtt chk else do -- receiving Client Finished let chk = tls13stRecvCF <$> getTLS13State ctx @@ -127,8 +161,28 @@ -- no chance to measure RTT before receiving CF -- fixme: 1sec is good enough? let rtt = 1000000 - void $ timeout rtt $ recvHS13 ctx chk + tryRecvHS13 rtt chk bye_ ctx + where + -- Receiving these messages only improves the chances of a later session + -- resumption, so giving up on them costs nothing important. We give up in + -- two different situations, for two different reasons. + -- + -- First, we need the read lock, because only one thread at a time may read + -- the connection, but we take it only if it happens to be free. Another + -- thread can be sitting in 'recvData' waiting for data that never arrives, + -- or the receive that 'handshake' starts can still be running, and either + -- holds the read lock for as long as it lasts. Waiting for the lock would + -- therefore hang 'bye', and closing a connection that a reader is stuck on + -- is exactly what 'bye' is for, so we skip the receive in that case. + -- + -- Second, if we do get the lock, we wait 'rtt' for the message and then + -- abandon the receive. Abandoning it can stop the connection part way + -- through a record, after which nothing can be read from it again -- which + -- is acceptable only because we are closing the connection here anyway. + tryRecvHS13 :: Int -> IO Bool -> IO () + tryRecvHS13 rtt chk = + void $ tryWithReadLock ctx $ timeout rtt $ recvHS13 ctx chk bye_ :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () bye_ ctx = liftIO $ do @@ -188,7 +242,7 @@ -- All chunks are protected with the same write lock because we don't -- want to interleave writes from other threads in the middle of our -- possibly large write. - mlen <- getPeerRecordLimit ctx -- plaintext, dont' adjust for TLS 1.3 + mlen <- getPeerRecordLimit ctx -- plaintext, don't adjust for TLS 1.3 mapM_ (mapChunks_ mlen sendP) (L.toChunks dataToSend) -- | Get data out of Data packet, and automatically renegotiate if a Handshake @@ -240,15 +294,20 @@ recvData13 :: Context -> IO ByteString recvData13 ctx = do - mdat <- tls13stPendingRecvData <$> getTLS13State ctx - case mdat of - Nothing -> do + pending <- tls13stPendingRecv <$> getTLS13State ctx + case pending of + NoPendingRecv -> do pkt <- recvPacket13 ctx either (onError (terminate13 ctx)) process pkt - Just dat -> do - modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecvData = Nothing} + PendingRecvData dat -> do + clearPending return dat + PendingRecvError err -> do + clearPending + E.throwIO err where + clearPending = modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecv = NoPendingRecv} + -- UserCanceled MUST be followed by a CloseNotify. process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, UserCanceled)]) = return B.empty process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)]) = tryBye ctx >> setEOF ctx >> return B.empty @@ -283,7 +342,7 @@ | otherwise -> do let reason = "early data deprotect overflow" terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason - Established -> return x + Established -> resetTLS13KeyUpdateCount ctx >> return x _ -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "data at not-established" UnexpectedMessage process ChangeCipherSpec13 = do established <- ctxEstablished ctx @@ -345,6 +404,13 @@ -- to key update (update_requested) which we sent. if established == Established then do + case limitKeyUpdate $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx of + Just limit | limit > 0 -> do + count <- incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount ctx + when (count > limit) $ do + let reason = "too many consecutive KeyUpdate messages" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + _ -> return () keyUpdate ctx getRxRecordState setRxRecordState -- Write lock wraps both actions because we don't want another -- packet to be sent by another thread before the Tx state is @@ -356,10 +422,16 @@ else do let reason = "received key update before established" terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason - -- Client only - loopHandshake13 ((h@CertRequest13{}, _b) : hbs) = - postHandshakeAuthWith ctx h >> loopHandshake13 hbs - loopHandshake13 (hb@(h, _) : hbs) = do + -- Client only. Before Established, it belongs to the handshake that + -- 0-RTT left to the pending actions. + loopHandshake13 (hb@(CertRequest13{}, _) : hbs) = do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + if established == Established + then postHandshakeAuthWith ctx hb >> loopHandshake13 hbs + else loopPending hb hbs + loopHandshake13 (hb : hbs) = loopPending hb hbs + + loopPending hb@(h, _) hbs = do rtt0 <- tls13st0RTT <$> getTLS13State ctx when rtt0 $ case h of ServerHello13 SH{..} -> diff --git a/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs b/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs @@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ SignatureALG X509.HashSHA512 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519 -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureEd25519) SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448 -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureEd448) + SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA44 -> Just TLS.MLDSA44 + SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA65 -> Just TLS.MLDSA65 + SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA87 -> Just TLS.MLDSA87 _ -> Nothing where convertHash sig X509.HashMD5 = Just (TLS.HashMD5, sig) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs @@ -54,11 +54,12 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.MLDSA as MLDSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS import Crypto.Random -import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding (BER (..), DER (..)) +import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding (DER (..)) import Data.ASN1.Encoding import Data.ASN1.Types import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes, convert) @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ PubKey (..), PubKeyEC (..), SerializedPoint (..), + privkeyMLDSA_key, ) import Data.X509.EC (ecPrivKeyCurveName, ecPubKeyCurveName, unserializePoint) @@ -261,6 +263,13 @@ | ECDSAParams Hash | Ed25519Params | Ed448Params + | -- | Pure ML-DSA with an empty context, which is what + -- draft-ietf-tls-mldsa uses. One constructor per parameter set, + -- since the key fixes it and a signature made under one does not + -- verify under another. + MLDSA44Params + | MLDSA65Params + | MLDSA87Params deriving (Show, Eq) -- Verify that the signature matches the given message, using the @@ -271,38 +280,21 @@ kxVerify (PubKeyRSA pk) (RSAParams alg RSApkcs1) msg sign = rsaVerifyHash alg pk msg sign kxVerify (PubKeyRSA pk) (RSAParams alg RSApss) msg sign = rsapssVerifyHash alg pk msg sign kxVerify (PubKeyDSA pk) DSAParams msg signBS = - case dsaToSignature signBS of - Just sig -> DSA.verify H.SHA1 pk sig msg + case decodeSignatureRS signBS of + Just (r, s) -> DSA.verify H.SHA1 pk DSA.Signature{DSA.sign_r = r, DSA.sign_s = s} msg _ -> False - where - dsaToSignature :: ByteString -> Maybe DSA.Signature - dsaToSignature b = - case decodeASN1' BER b of - Left _ -> Nothing - Right asn1 -> - case asn1 of - Start Sequence : IntVal r : IntVal s : End Sequence : _ -> - Just DSA.Signature{DSA.sign_r = r, DSA.sign_s = s} - _ -> - Nothing kxVerify (PubKeyEC key) (ECDSAParams alg) msg sigBS = fromMaybe False $ join $ withPubKeyEC key verifyProxy verifyClassic Nothing where - decodeSignatureASN1 buildRS = - case decodeASN1' BER sigBS of - Left _ -> Nothing - Right [Start Sequence, IntVal r, IntVal s, End Sequence] -> - Just (buildRS r s) - Right _ -> Nothing verifyProxy prx pubkey = do - rs <- decodeSignatureASN1 (,) + rs <- decodeSignatureRS sigBS signature <- maybeCryptoError $ ECDSA.signatureFromIntegers prx rs verifyF <- withAlg (ECDSA.verify prx) return $ verifyF pubkey signature msg verifyClassic pubkey = do - signature <- decodeSignatureASN1 ECDSA_ECC.Signature + signature <- uncurry ECDSA_ECC.Signature <$> decodeSignatureRS sigBS verifyF <- withAlg ECDSA_ECC.verify return $ verifyF pubkey signature msg withAlg :: (forall hash. H.HashAlgorithm hash => hash -> a) -> Maybe a @@ -322,8 +314,66 @@ case Ed448.signature sigBS of CryptoPassed sig -> Ed448.verify key msg sig _ -> False +-- A signature of the wrong length is refused by the smart constructor, and +-- one of the right length that does not verify returns False. Neither +-- throws, which is what a peer sending a damaged CertificateVerify has to +-- meet with decrypt_error rather than with a crash. +kxVerify (PubKeyMLDSA44 key) MLDSA44Params msg sigBS = mldsaVerify key msg sigBS +kxVerify (PubKeyMLDSA65 key) MLDSA65Params msg sigBS = mldsaVerify key msg sigBS +kxVerify (PubKeyMLDSA87 key) MLDSA87Params msg sigBS = mldsaVerify key msg sigBS kxVerify _ _ _ _ = False +mldsaVerify + :: MLDSA.MLDSA p + => MLDSA.VerificationKey p -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool +mldsaVerify key msg sigBS = case MLDSA.signature sigBS of + CryptoPassed sig -> MLDSA.verify key MLDSA.emptyContext msg sig + _ -> False + +-- | Decode a DSA or ECDSA signature: a DER SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs, r +-- and s (RFC 3279 Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). This is done here rather +-- than with crypton-asn1-encoding, whose 'decodeASN1'' throws on some +-- malformed input rather than returning 'Left'. Only DER is accepted: +-- definite lengths in their shortest form, non-negative INTEGERs in +-- theirs, and nothing after the SEQUENCE. +decodeSignatureRS :: ByteString -> Maybe (Integer, Integer) +decodeSignatureRS bs = do + (0x30, body) <- whole bs + (0x02, rbs, rest) <- tlv body + (0x02, sbs) <- whole rest + (,) <$> derInteger rbs <*> derInteger sbs + where + whole b = do + (t, v, rest) <- tlv b + guard $ B.null rest + return (t, v) + tlv b = do + (t, b1) <- B.uncons b + (l0, b2) <- B.uncons b1 + (len, b3) <- case l0 of + _ | l0 < 0x80 -> Just (fromIntegral l0, b2) + 0x81 -> do + (l1, b3) <- B.uncons b2 + guard $ l1 >= 0x80 + Just (fromIntegral l1, b3) + 0x82 -> do + (l1, b3) <- B.uncons b2 + (l2, b4) <- B.uncons b3 + let n = fromIntegral l1 * 256 + fromIntegral l2 :: Int + guard $ n >= 0x100 + Just (n, b4) + _ -> Nothing + guard $ B.length b3 >= len + let (v, rest) = B.splitAt len b3 + return (t, v, rest) + derInteger v = do + (h, t) <- B.uncons v + guard $ h < 0x80 + case B.uncons t of + Just (h2, _) | h == 0 -> guard $ h2 >= 0x80 + _ -> return () + return $ B.foldl' (\acc w -> acc * 256 + fromIntegral w) 0 v + -- Sign the given message using the private key. -- kxSign @@ -366,6 +416,12 @@ return $ Right $ convert $ Ed25519.sign pk pub msg kxSign (PrivKeyEd448 pk) (PubKeyEd448 pub) Ed448Params msg = return $ Right $ convert $ Ed448.sign pk pub msg +kxSign (PrivKeyMLDSA44 pk) (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) MLDSA44Params msg = + Right . convert <$> MLDSA.sign (privkeyMLDSA_key pk) MLDSA.emptyContext msg +kxSign (PrivKeyMLDSA65 pk) (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) MLDSA65Params msg = + Right . convert <$> MLDSA.sign (privkeyMLDSA_key pk) MLDSA.emptyContext msg +kxSign (PrivKeyMLDSA87 pk) (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) MLDSA87Params msg = + Right . convert <$> MLDSA.sign (privkeyMLDSA_key pk) MLDSA.emptyContext msg kxSign _ _ _ _ = return (Left KxUnsupported) @@ -375,13 +431,17 @@ -> RSA.PrivateKey -> ByteString -> m (Either RSA.Error ByteString) -rsaSignHash SHA1_MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSafer noHash pk msg -rsaSignHash MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.MD5) pk msg -rsaSignHash SHA1 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA1) pk msg -rsaSignHash SHA224 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA224) pk msg -rsaSignHash SHA256 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA256) pk msg -rsaSignHash SHA384 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA384) pk msg -rsaSignHash SHA512 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA512) pk msg +-- SHA1_MD5 arrives already digested -- see buildVerifyData -- and what it +-- carries is MD5 ++ SHA1 with no ASN.1 around it, which is what TLS before +-- 1.2 signs. That is the DigestInfo case: nothing here hashes or encodes. +-- The rest are handed the message and hash it on the way, as signSafer did. +rsaSignHash SHA1_MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigestInfo pk msg +rsaSignHash MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.MD5 msg) +rsaSignHash SHA1 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA1 msg) +rsaSignHash SHA224 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA224 msg) +rsaSignHash SHA256 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA256 msg) +rsaSignHash SHA384 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA384 msg) +rsaSignHash SHA512 pk msg = RSA.signSaferDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA512 msg) rsapssSignHash :: MonadRandom m @@ -395,22 +455,19 @@ rsapssSignHash _ _ _ = error "rsapssSignHash: unsupported hash" rsaVerifyHash :: Hash -> RSA.PublicKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool -rsaVerifyHash SHA1_MD5 = RSA.verify noHash -rsaVerifyHash MD5 = RSA.verify (Just H.MD5) -rsaVerifyHash SHA1 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA1) -rsaVerifyHash SHA224 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA224) -rsaVerifyHash SHA256 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA256) -rsaVerifyHash SHA384 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA384) -rsaVerifyHash SHA512 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA512) +rsaVerifyHash SHA1_MD5 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigestInfo pk msg +rsaVerifyHash MD5 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.MD5 msg) +rsaVerifyHash SHA1 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA1 msg) +rsaVerifyHash SHA224 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA224 msg) +rsaVerifyHash SHA256 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA256 msg) +rsaVerifyHash SHA384 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA384 msg) +rsaVerifyHash SHA512 pk msg = RSA.verifyDigest pk (H.hashWith H.SHA512 msg) rsapssVerifyHash :: Hash -> RSA.PublicKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool rsapssVerifyHash SHA256 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA256) rsapssVerifyHash SHA384 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA384) rsapssVerifyHash SHA512 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA512) rsapssVerifyHash _ = error "rsapssVerifyHash: unsupported hash" - -noHash :: Maybe H.MD5 -noHash = Nothing ecdsaSignHash :: (MonadRandom m, ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ import Crypto.PubKey.DH (PrivateNumber (..), PublicNumber (..)) import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH import Crypto.PubKey.ECIES -import Crypto.PubKey.ML_KEM (ML_KEM_1024, ML_KEM_512, ML_KEM_768) -import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ML_KEM as ML +import Crypto.PubKey.MLKEM (MLKEM1024, MLKEM512, MLKEM768) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.MLKEM as ML import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, convert) import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA import Data.Proxy @@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ | GroupPri_FFDHE4096 PrivateNumber | GroupPri_FFDHE6144 PrivateNumber | GroupPri_FFDHE8192 PrivateNumber - | GroupPri_MLKEM512 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_512) - | GroupPri_MLKEM768 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPri_MLKEM1024 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) - | GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_X25519, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_P256R1, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (Scalar Curve_P384R1, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPri_MLKEM512 (ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM512) + | GroupPri_MLKEM768 (ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPri_MLKEM1024 (ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM1024) + | GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_X25519, ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_P256R1, ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (Scalar Curve_P384R1, ML.DecapsulationKey MLKEM1024) deriving (Eq, Show) {- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} @@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ | GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 PublicNumber | GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 PublicNumber | GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 PublicNumber - | GroupPubA_MLKEM512 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_512) - | GroupPubA_MLKEM768 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) - | GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPubA_MLKEM512 (ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM512) + | GroupPubA_MLKEM768 (ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 (ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM1024) + | GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM768) + | GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.EncapsulationKey MLKEM1024) deriving (Eq, Show) {- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} @@ -100,12 +100,12 @@ | GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 PublicNumber | GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 PublicNumber | GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 PublicNumber - | GroupPubB_MLKEM512 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_512) - | GroupPubB_MLKEM768 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_1024) - | GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) - | GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPubB_MLKEM512 (ML.Ciphertext MLKEM512) + | GroupPubB_MLKEM768 (ML.Ciphertext MLKEM768) + | GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 (ML.Ciphertext MLKEM1024) + | GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.Ciphertext MLKEM768) + | GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.Ciphertext MLKEM768) + | GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.Ciphertext MLKEM1024) deriving (Eq, Show) {- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} @@ -126,13 +126,27 @@ x448 :: Proxy Curve_X448 x448 = Proxy -mlkem512 :: Proxy ML_KEM_512 +mlkem512 :: Proxy MLKEM512 mlkem512 = Proxy -mlkem768 :: Proxy ML_KEM_768 +-- crypton reports a value it will not accept as a 'CryptoFailable' and has a +-- constructor per type rather than one overloaded 'decode'. These two keep +-- the call sites below in the shape they were. +-- +-- 'ML.encapsulationKey' is the stricter of the two: besides the length it +-- runs the check of FIPS 203 section 7.2, so an encapsulation key whose +-- coefficients are out of range is refused here rather than used. +decodeEK + :: ML.MLKEM p => proxy p -> ByteString -> Maybe (ML.EncapsulationKey p) +decodeEK _ = maybeCryptoError . ML.encapsulationKey + +decodeCT :: ML.MLKEM p => proxy p -> ByteString -> Maybe (ML.Ciphertext p) +decodeCT _ = maybeCryptoError . ML.ciphertext + +mlkem768 :: Proxy MLKEM768 mlkem768 = Proxy -mlkem1024 :: Proxy ML_KEM_1024 +mlkem1024 :: Proxy MLKEM1024 mlkem1024 = Proxy dhParamsForGroup :: Group -> Maybe DH.Params @@ -160,25 +174,25 @@ groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE6144 = gen ffdhe6144 exp6144 GroupPri_FFDHE6144 GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE8192 = gen ffdhe8192 exp8192 GroupPri_FFDHE8192 GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM512 = do - (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem512 + (e, d) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem512 return (GroupPri_MLKEM512 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM512 e) groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM768 = do - (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + (e, d) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem768 return (GroupPri_MLKEM768 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM768 e) groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM1024 = do - (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem1024 + (e, d) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem1024 return (GroupPri_MLKEM1024 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 e) groupGenerateKeyPair X25519MLKEM768 = do (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair x25519 - (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem768 return (GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) groupGenerateKeyPair P256MLKEM768 = do (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair p256 - (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem768 return (GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) groupGenerateKeyPair P384MLKEM1024 = do (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair p384 - (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem1024 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generateKeyPair mlkem1024 return (GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (e1, e2)) groupGenerateKeyPair _ = error "groupGenerateKeyPair" @@ -228,6 +242,17 @@ -> r (PrivateNumber, PublicNumber) gen' params expBits = (id &&& DH.calculatePublic params) <$> generatePriv expBits +-- 'ML.encapsulate' takes the parameter set as a proxy and reports a +-- failure, as every KEM in Crypto.KEM does; ML-KEM has none to report. +mlkemEncap + :: (MonadRandom r, ML.MLKEM p) + => proxy p + -> ML.EncapsulationKey p + -> r (Maybe (ML.Ciphertext p, GroupKey)) +mlkemEncap p ek = fmap f <$> fmap maybeCryptoError (ML.encapsulate p ek) + where + f (ct, sec) = (ct, convert sec) + groupEncapsulate :: MonadRandom r => GroupPublicA -> r (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P256 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_P256 p256 pub @@ -240,30 +265,45 @@ groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe4096 exp4096 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe6144 exp6144 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe8192 exp8192 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 pub) = do - (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub - return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 ct, convert sec) -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 pub) = do - (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub - return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 ct, convert sec) -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 pub) = do - (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub - return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 ct, convert sec) -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = do - (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' x25519 e1 - (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 - -- Sec 4.1: Specifically, the order of shares in the concatenation - -- has been reversed. - return $ Just (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (c1, c2), convert k2 <> k1) -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = do - (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' p256 e1 - (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 - return $ Just (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (c1, c2), k1 <> convert k2) -groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (e1, e2)) = do - (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' p384 e1 - (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 - return $ Just (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (c1, c2), k1 <> convert k2) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 pub) = + fmap (\(ct, k) -> (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 ct, k)) <$> mlkemEncap mlkem512 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 pub) = + fmap (\(ct, k) -> (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 ct, k)) <$> mlkemEncap mlkem768 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 pub) = + fmap (\(ct, k) -> (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 ct, k)) <$> mlkemEncap mlkem1024 pub +-- The classical part of a hybrid can fail as the group alone does: an +-- all-zero X25519 public key decodes, but the shared secret derived from +-- it is rejected. Nothing is turned into illegal_parameter by the caller. +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = + hybrid x25519 mlkem768 e1 e2 $ \c1 k1 c2 k2 -> + -- Sec 4.1: Specifically, the order of shares in the concatenation + -- has been reversed. + (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (c1, c2), k2 <> k1) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = + hybrid p256 mlkem768 e1 e2 $ \c1 k1 c2 k2 -> + (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (c1, c2), k1 <> k2) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (e1, e2)) = + hybrid p384 mlkem1024 e1 e2 $ \c1 k1 c2 k2 -> + (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (c1, c2), k1 <> k2) +-- Either half can refuse: the classical one rejects a peer value that would +-- make its secret degenerate, which the caller turns into +-- illegal_parameter. ML-KEM has nothing to refuse, but says so the same +-- way, so both are read alike here. +hybrid + :: (MonadRandom r, EllipticCurveDH curve, ML.MLKEM p) + => Proxy curve + -> Proxy p + -> Point curve + -> ML.EncapsulationKey p + -> (Point curve -> GroupKey -> ML.Ciphertext p -> GroupKey -> (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) + -> r (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) +hybrid pc pk e1 e2 k = do + mx <- getECDHPubShared' pc e1 + case mx of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (c1, k1) -> fmap (\(c2, k2) -> k c1 k1 c2 k2) <$> mlkemEncap pk e2 + dhGroupGetPubShared :: MonadRandom r => Group -> PublicNumber -> r (Maybe (PublicNumber, GroupKey)) dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE2048 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe2048 exp2048 pub @@ -339,22 +379,22 @@ groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE6144 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe6144 pub pri groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE8192 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe8192 pub pri groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM512 s) = - Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p + convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem512 s p) groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM768 s) = - Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p + convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem768 s p) groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM1024 s) = - Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p + convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem1024 s p) groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (s1, s2)) = do bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt x25519 p1 s1 - let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + bs2 <- convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem768 s2 p2) return (bs2 <> bs1) groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (s1, s2)) = do bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p256 p1 s1 - let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + bs2 <- convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem768 s2 p2) return (bs1 <> bs2) groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (s1, s2)) = do bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p384 p1 s1 - let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + bs2 <- convert <$> maybeCryptoError (ML.decapsulate mlkem1024 s2 p2) return (bs1 <> bs2) groupDecapsulate _ _ = Nothing @@ -376,15 +416,15 @@ groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 p) = enc ffdhe4096 p groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 p) = enc ffdhe6144 p groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 p) = enc ffdhe8192 p -groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 p) = ML.encode p -groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 p) = ML.encode p -groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 p) = ML.encode p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 p) = BA.convert p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 p) = BA.convert p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 p) = BA.convert p groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = - ML.encode p2 <> encodePoint x25519 p1 + BA.convert p2 <> encodePoint x25519 p1 groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = - encodePoint p256 p1 <> ML.encode p2 + encodePoint p256 p1 <> BA.convert p2 groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (p1, p2)) = - encodePoint p384 p1 <> ML.encode p2 + encodePoint p384 p1 <> BA.convert p2 groupEncodePublicB :: GroupPublicB -> ByteString groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P256 p) = encodePoint p256 p @@ -421,32 +461,32 @@ groupDecodePublicA FFDHE4096 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs groupDecodePublicA FFDHE6144 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs groupDecodePublicA FFDHE8192 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs -groupDecodePublicA MLKEM512 bs = case ML.decode mlkem512 bs of +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM512 bs = case decodeEK mlkem512 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM512 p -groupDecodePublicA MLKEM768 bs = case ML.decode mlkem768 bs of +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM768 bs = case decodeEK mlkem768 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM768 p -groupDecodePublicA MLKEM1024 bs = case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs of +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM1024 bs = case decodeEK mlkem1024 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 p groupDecodePublicA X25519MLKEM768 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 1184 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs1 of + in case decodeEK mlkem768 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint x25519 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (p2, p1) groupDecodePublicA P256MLKEM768 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 65 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs2 of + in case decodeEK mlkem768 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p256 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (p2, p1) groupDecodePublicA P384MLKEM1024 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 97 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs2 of + in case decodeEK mlkem1024 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p384 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid @@ -464,32 +504,32 @@ groupDecodePublicB FFDHE4096 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs groupDecodePublicB FFDHE6144 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs groupDecodePublicB FFDHE8192 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs -groupDecodePublicB MLKEM512 bs = case ML.decode mlkem512 bs of +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM512 bs = case decodeCT mlkem512 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM512 p -groupDecodePublicB MLKEM768 bs = case ML.decode mlkem768 bs of +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM768 bs = case decodeCT mlkem768 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM768 p -groupDecodePublicB MLKEM1024 bs = case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs of +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM1024 bs = case decodeCT mlkem1024 bs of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 p groupDecodePublicB X25519MLKEM768 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 1088 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs1 of + in case decodeCT mlkem768 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint x25519 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (p2, p1) groupDecodePublicB P256MLKEM768 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 65 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs2 of + in case decodeCT mlkem768 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p256 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (p2, p1) groupDecodePublicB P384MLKEM1024 bs = let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 97 bs - in case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs2 of + in case decodeCT mlkem1024 bs2 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p384 bs1 of Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid diff --git a/Network/TLS/Error.hs b/Network/TLS/Error.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Error.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Error.hs @@ -3,8 +3,7 @@ module Network.TLS.Error where -import Control.Exception (Exception (..)) -import Data.Typeable +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Network.TLS.Imports @@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ | Error_Packet_unexpected String String | Error_Packet_Parsing String | Error_TCP_Terminate - deriving (Eq, Show, Typeable) + deriving (Eq, Show) ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -61,9 +60,9 @@ -- handshake had occurred. -- Indicates that this library has been used incorrectly. MissingHandshake - deriving (Show, Eq, Typeable) + deriving (Show, Eq) -instance Exception TLSException +instance E.Exception TLSException ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extension.hs b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Extension.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs @@ -428,7 +428,22 @@ -- | Extension class to transform bytes to and from a high level Extension type. class Extension a where extensionID :: a -> ExtensionID + + -- | Decode an extension's body as it appears in the given message. + -- + -- 'Nothing' covers both ways this can fail to produce a value: a body + -- that does not parse, and a message the extension is not defined in. + -- Both reach the peer the same way, as the decode_error alert that + -- 'lookupAndDecode' and 'lookupAndDecodeAndDo' raise, which is what + -- either case warrants. + -- + -- So the last clause of an instance is @Nothing@, never @error@: the + -- message type is chosen by this library rather than by the peer, so an + -- unhandled one would be our own bug -- and turning our bug into an + -- ErrorCall thrown from pure code, out through the handshake and into + -- the application, is a worse answer than dropping the one connection. extensionDecode :: MessageType -> ByteString -> Maybe a + extensionEncode :: a -> ByteString data MessageType @@ -438,12 +453,12 @@ | MsgTEncryptedExtensions | MsgTNewSessionTicket | MsgTCertificateRequest - deriving (Eq, Show) + deriving (Eq, Show, Enum, Bounded) ------------------------------------------------------------ -- | Server Name extension including the name type and the associated name. --- the associated name decoding is dependant of its name type. +-- the associated name decoding is dependent of its name type. -- name type = 0 : hostname newtype ServerName = ServerName [ServerNameType] deriving (Show, Eq) @@ -466,21 +481,32 @@ where encodeNameType (ServerNameHostName hn) = putWord8 0 >> putOpaque16 (BC.pack hn) -- FIXME: should be puny code conversion encodeNameType (ServerNameOther (nt, opaque)) = putWord8 nt >> putBytes opaque - extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeServerName + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeServerNameList extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeServerName extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeServerName - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: ServerName" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeServerName :: ByteString -> Maybe ServerName decodeServerName "" = Just $ ServerName [] -- dirty hack for servers -decodeServerName bs = runGetMaybe decode bs +decodeServerName bs = decodeServerNameList bs + +-- RFC 6066 Section 3: server_name_list<1..2^16-1> of +-- HostName<1..2^16-1>, which leaves no room for an empty extension, an +-- empty list, an empty host name nor trailing data. +decodeServerNameList :: ByteString -> Maybe ServerName +decodeServerNameList = runGetMaybe decode where decode = do len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 - ServerName <$> getList len getServerName + names <- getList len getServerName + when (null names) $ fail "empty server_name_list" + r <- remaining + when (r /= 0) $ fail "trailing data in server_name" + return $ ServerName names getServerName = do ty <- getWord8 snameParsed <- getOpaque16 + when (ty == 0 && B.null snameParsed) $ fail "empty host_name" let sname = B.copy snameParsed name = case ty of 0 -> ServerNameHostName $ BC.unpack sname -- FIXME: should be puny code conversion @@ -521,7 +547,7 @@ extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeMaxFragmentLength extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeMaxFragmentLength extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeMaxFragmentLength - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: MaxFragmentLength" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeMaxFragmentLength :: ByteString -> Maybe MaxFragmentLength decodeMaxFragmentLength = runGetMaybe $ toMaxFragmentEnum <$> getWord8 @@ -542,7 +568,7 @@ extensionEncode (SupportedGroups groups) = runPut $ putWords16 $ map (\(Group g) -> g) groups extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSupportedGroups extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeSupportedGroups - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SupportedGroups" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeSupportedGroups :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedGroups decodeSupportedGroups = @@ -577,11 +603,14 @@ extensionEncode (EcPointFormatsSupported formats) = runPut $ putWords8 $ map fromEcPointFormat formats extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeEcPointFormatsSupported extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeEcPointFormatsSupported - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EcPointFormatsSupported" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeEcPointFormatsSupported :: ByteString -> Maybe EcPointFormatsSupported -decodeEcPointFormatsSupported = - runGetMaybe (EcPointFormatsSupported . map EcPointFormat <$> getWords8) +decodeEcPointFormatsSupported = runGetMaybe $ do + formats <- getWords8 + -- RFC 8422 Section 5.1.2: ec_point_format_list<1..2^8-1> + when (null formats) $ fail "empty ec_point_format_list" + return $ EcPointFormatsSupported $ map EcPointFormat formats ------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -596,7 +625,7 @@ >> mapM_ putSignatureHashAlgorithm algs extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSignatureAlgorithms extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeSignatureAlgorithms - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SignatureAlgorithms" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeSignatureAlgorithms :: ByteString -> Maybe SignatureAlgorithms decodeSignatureAlgorithms = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -632,7 +661,7 @@ extensionEncode (HeartBeat mode) = runPut $ putWord8 $ fromHeartBeatMode mode extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeHeartBeat extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeHeartBeat - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: HeartBeat" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeHeartBeat :: ByteString -> Maybe HeartBeat decodeHeartBeat = runGetMaybe $ HeartBeat . HeartBeatMode <$> getWord8 @@ -651,16 +680,23 @@ extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation :: ByteString -> Maybe ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = runGetMaybe $ do len <- getWord16 - ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation <$> getList (fromIntegral len) getALPN + protos <- getList (fromIntegral len) getALPN + -- RFC 7301 Section 3.1: protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> of + -- ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>, with nothing after it. + when (null protos) $ fail "empty protocol_name_list" + r <- remaining + when (r /= 0) $ fail "trailing data in application_layer_protocol_negotiation" + return $ ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation protos where getALPN = do alpnParsed <- getOpaque8 + when (B.null alpnParsed) $ fail "empty ProtocolName" let alpn = B.copy alpnParsed return (B.length alpn + 1, alpn) @@ -674,7 +710,7 @@ extensionEncode ExtendedMainSecret = B.empty extensionDecode MsgTClientHello "" = Just ExtendedMainSecret extensionDecode MsgTServerHello "" = Just ExtendedMainSecret - extensionDecode _ _ = error "extensionDecode: ExtendedMainSecret" + extensionDecode _ _ = Nothing ------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -749,7 +785,7 @@ extensionEncode (SessionTicket ticket) = runPut $ putBytes ticket extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSessionTicket extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeSessionTicket - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SessionTicket" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeSessionTicket :: ByteString -> Maybe SessionTicket decodeSessionTicket = runGetMaybe $ SessionTicket <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) @@ -792,7 +828,7 @@ fromIntegral w16 extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodePreSharedKeyClientHello extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodePreSharedKeyServerHello - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PreShareKey" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodePreSharedKeyClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe PreSharedKey decodePreSharedKeyClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -837,7 +873,7 @@ extensionDecode MsgTNewSessionTicket = runGetMaybe $ EarlyDataIndication . Just <$> getWord32 - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EarlyDataIndication" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing ------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -860,7 +896,7 @@ putBinaryVersion ver extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeSupportedVersionsServerHello - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SupportedVersionsServerHello" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedVersions decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -888,7 +924,7 @@ extensionID _ = EID_Cookie extensionEncode (Cookie opaque) = runPut $ putOpaque16 opaque extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = runGetMaybe (Cookie <$> getOpaque16) - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: Cookie" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing ------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -916,7 +952,7 @@ putWords8 $ map fromPskKexMode pkms extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodePskKeyExchangeModes - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PskKeyExchangeModes" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodePskKeyExchangeModes :: ByteString -> Maybe PskKeyExchangeModes decodePskKeyExchangeModes = @@ -935,7 +971,7 @@ putDNames names extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeCertificateAuthorities extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeCertificateAuthorities - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: CertificateAuthorities" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeCertificateAuthorities :: ByteString -> Maybe CertificateAuthorities decodeCertificateAuthorities = @@ -949,7 +985,7 @@ extensionID _ = EID_PostHandshakeAuth extensionEncode _ = B.empty extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = runGetMaybe $ return PostHandshakeAuth - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PostHandshakeAuth" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing ------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -964,7 +1000,7 @@ >> mapM_ putSignatureHashAlgorithm algs extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SignatureAlgorithmsCert" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert :: ByteString -> Maybe SignatureAlgorithmsCert decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -1021,7 +1057,7 @@ extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeKeyShareClientHello extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeKeyShareServerHello extensionDecode MsgTHelloRetryRequest = decodeKeyShareHRR - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: KeyShare" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeKeyShareClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe KeyShare decodeKeyShareClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -1059,7 +1095,7 @@ putWord8 $ fromIntegral (length ids * 2) mapM_ (putWord16 . fromExtensionID) ids extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeEchOuterExtensions - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EchOuterExtensions" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeEchOuterExtensions :: ByteString -> Maybe EchOuterExtensions decodeEchOuterExtensions = runGetMaybe $ do @@ -1120,7 +1156,7 @@ extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeECHClientHello extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeECHEncryptedExtensions extensionDecode MsgTHelloRetryRequest = decodeECHHelloRetryRequest - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EncryptedClientHello" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing decodeECH :: ByteString -> Maybe EncryptedClientHello decodeECH bs = @@ -1172,4 +1208,4 @@ opaque <- getOpaque8 let (cvd, svd) = B.splitAt (B.length opaque `div` 2) opaque return $ SecureRenegotiation cvd svd - extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SecureRenegotiation" + extensionDecode _ = const Nothing diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} module Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher ( -- * Cipher suite ciphersuite_default, @@ -70,11 +71,12 @@ ) where import Crypto.Cipher.AES -import qualified Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 as ChaChaPoly1305 +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.AES.GCM as GCM +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.ChaCha.Poly1305 as ChaChaOne import Crypto.Cipher.Types hiding (Cipher, cipherName) import Crypto.Error -import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305 import Crypto.System.CPU +import Data.ByteArray (convert) import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Data.Tuple (swap) @@ -572,9 +574,22 @@ sortOptimized :: [CipherSet] -> [Cipher] sortOptimized = concatMap f where + -- crypton 2.2 gives the AArch64 instructions their own names. Before + -- it, the ARMv8 path set the slots Haskell read as AESNI and PCLMUL, so + -- asking for those names answered "is AES fast here" on both + -- architectures; from 2.2 they are x86's names, which an AArch64 machine + -- does not have. hasAESAcceleration and hasGHASHAcceleration ask the + -- question without naming an instruction set. Either spelling compiles + -- against either version -- the names are pattern synonyms now -- so + -- nothing but this guard says which one is right for which. f (SetAead gcm chacha ccm) +#if MIN_VERSION_crypton(2,2,0) + | not hasAESAcceleration = chacha ++ gcm ++ ccm + | not hasGHASHAcceleration = ccm ++ chacha ++ gcm +#else | AESNI `notElem` processorOptions = chacha ++ gcm ++ ccm | PCLMUL `notElem` processorOptions = ccm ++ chacha ++ gcm +#endif | otherwise = gcm ++ ccm ++ chacha f (SetOther ciphers) = ciphers @@ -619,20 +634,40 @@ in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 8 ) +-- The AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers go through the one-call +-- interfaces crypton added for this, not the general AEAD one. Two things +-- are saved on every record. +-- +-- The state the key alone determines -- the AES key schedule and the table of +-- multiples of H -- was rebuilt for each record by aeadInit; newContext +-- builds it once, here, where the key is fixed. +-- +-- And the general interface reaches its cipher through AEADModeImpl, whose +-- fields are @forall ba. ByteArray ba => ...@, so a dictionary is passed at +-- every call and no pragma can remove it. +-- +-- Measured in C on an idle Haswell, against what this did before: 64-byte +-- record 0.169 -> 0.047 microseconds, 1400-byte 0.501 -> 0.301, 16 KiB +-- 3.285 -> 3.207. It is a fixed cost that goes, so it is most of a small +-- record and little of a full one. +aesgcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aesgcm BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (GCM.newContext key) + in \nonce d ad -> + let sealed = GCM.encrypt ctx nonce ad d 16 + (out, tag) = B.splitAt (B.length sealed - 16) sealed + in (out, AuthTag (convert tag)) +aesgcm BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (GCM.newContext key) + in \nonce d ad -> GCM.decryptWithTag ctx nonce ad d 16 + aes128gcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD -aes128gcm BulkEncrypt key = - let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 - in ( \nonce d ad -> - let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) - in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 - ) -aes128gcm BulkDecrypt key = - let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 - in ( \nonce d ad -> - let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) - in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 - ) +aes128gcm = aesgcm +aes256gcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes256gcm = aesgcm + + aes256ccm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD aes256ccm BulkEncrypt key = let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 @@ -665,20 +700,6 @@ in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 8 ) -aes256gcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD -aes256gcm BulkEncrypt key = - let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 - in ( \nonce d ad -> - let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) - in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 - ) -aes256gcm BulkDecrypt key = - let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 - in ( \nonce d ad -> - let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) - in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 - ) - simpleDecrypt :: AEAD cipher -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> (ByteString, AuthTag) simpleDecrypt aeadIni header input taglen = (output, tag) @@ -690,23 +711,23 @@ noFail :: CryptoFailable a -> a noFail = throwCryptoError +-- The one-call interface here too, and for the same two reasons as the AES +-- ciphers above: the step-at-a-time Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 is eight +-- foreign calls and the allocations between them for a message that arrived +-- whole, and the general AEAD interface passes a dictionary a call. +-- +-- Measured through the Haskell interface on an Apple M4: 100 bytes 0.97 -> +-- 0.415 microseconds, 1400 bytes 2.89 -> 2.36. chacha20poly1305 :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD -chacha20poly1305 BulkEncrypt key nonce = - let st = noFail (ChaChaPoly1305.nonce12 nonce >>= ChaChaPoly1305.initialize key) - in ( \input ad -> - let st2 = ChaChaPoly1305.finalizeAAD (ChaChaPoly1305.appendAAD ad st) - (output, st3) = ChaChaPoly1305.encrypt input st2 - Poly1305.Auth tag = ChaChaPoly1305.finalize st3 - in (output, AuthTag tag) - ) -chacha20poly1305 BulkDecrypt key nonce = - let st = noFail (ChaChaPoly1305.nonce12 nonce >>= ChaChaPoly1305.initialize key) - in ( \input ad -> - let st2 = ChaChaPoly1305.finalizeAAD (ChaChaPoly1305.appendAAD ad st) - (output, st3) = ChaChaPoly1305.decrypt input st2 - Poly1305.Auth tag = ChaChaPoly1305.finalize st3 - in (output, AuthTag tag) - ) +chacha20poly1305 BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (ChaChaOne.newContext key) + in \nonce d ad -> + let sealed = noFail (ChaChaOne.encrypt ctx nonce ad d 16) + (out, tag) = B.splitAt (B.length sealed - 16) sealed + in (out, AuthTag (convert tag)) +chacha20poly1305 BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (ChaChaOne.newContext key) + in \nonce d ad -> noFail (ChaChaOne.decryptWithTag ctx nonce ad d 16) ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +module Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC ( + -- * TLS 1.2 CBC ciphers with PFS and SHA2 + ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc, + ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc, + ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc, + + -- ** Individual CBC ciphers + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256, +) where + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES +import Crypto.Cipher.Types hiding (Cipher, cipherName) +import Crypto.Error +-- import Crypto.System.CPU +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types hiding (IV) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with DHE or ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA or RSA +-- authentication and a SHA256 or SHA2384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 + ] + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA or RSA +-- authentication and a SHA256 or SHA2384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + ] + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a +-- SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x0067 + , cipherName = "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 = + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x006B + , cipherName = "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC027 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES128CBC-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC028 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES256CBC-SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xc023 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128CBC-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication and a SHA384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC024 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256CBC-SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +aes128cbc :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkBlock +aes128cbc BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcEncrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 output) + ) +aes128cbc BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcDecrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 input) + ) + +aes256cbc :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkBlock +aes256cbc BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcEncrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 output) + ) +aes256cbc BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcDecrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 input) + ) + +makeIV_ :: BlockCipher a => B.ByteString -> IV a +makeIV_ = fromMaybe (error "makeIV_") . makeIV + +takelast :: Int -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString +takelast i b = B.drop (B.length b - i) b + +noFail :: CryptoFailable a -> a +noFail = throwCryptoError + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +bulk_aes128 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES128" + , bulkKeySize = 16 + , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 + , bulkBlockSize = 16 + , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes128cbc + } + +bulk_aes256 :: Bulk +bulk_aes256 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES256" + , bulkKeySize = 32 + , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 + , bulkBlockSize = 16 + , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes256cbc + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs @@ -3,13 +3,20 @@ badCertificate, rejectOnException, verifyLeafKeyUsage, + verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose, extractCAname, ) where -import Control.Exception (SomeException) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad (unless) import Control.Monad.State.Strict -import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsage (..), ExtKeyUsageFlag, extensionGet) +import Data.X509 ( + ExtExtendedKeyUsage (..), + ExtKeyUsage (..), + ExtKeyUsageFlag, + ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..), + extensionGet, + ) import Network.TLS.Context.Internal import Network.TLS.Struct @@ -31,7 +38,7 @@ badCertificate :: MonadIO m => String -> m a badCertificate msg = throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg BadCertificate -rejectOnException :: SomeException -> IO CertificateUsage +rejectOnException :: E.SomeException -> IO CertificateUsage rejectOnException e = return $ CertificateUsageReject $ CertificateRejectOther $ show e verifyLeafKeyUsage :: MonadIO m => [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> CertificateChain -> m () @@ -46,6 +53,19 @@ case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of Nothing -> True -- unrestricted cert Just (ExtKeyUsage flags) -> any (`elem` validFlags) flags + +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose + :: MonadIO m => ExtKeyUsagePurpose -> CertificateChain -> m () +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose _ (CertificateChain []) = return () +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose validPurpose (CertificateChain (signed : _)) = + unless verified $ + badCertificate $ + "certificate is not allowed for " ++ show validPurpose + where + cert = getCertificate signed + verified = case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of + Nothing -> True + Just (ExtExtendedKeyUsage purposes) -> validPurpose `elem` purposes extractCAname :: SignedCertificate -> DistinguishedName extractCAname cert = certSubjectDN $ getCertificate cert diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ case ver of TLS13 | hrr -> - helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand (grpsSupported \\ grpsSelected) + helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand grpsSupported grpsSelected | otherwise -> do recvServerSecondFlight13 cparams ctx grpsSelected sendClientSecondFlight13 cparams ctx @@ -126,8 +126,9 @@ -> Version -> ClientRandom -> [Group] + -> [Group] -> IO () -helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand groupsSupported = do +helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand groupsSupported groupsSelected = do when (null groupsSupported) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol "no supported groups on the client side" IllegalParameter @@ -137,18 +138,22 @@ mks <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13KeyShare case mks of Just (KeyShareHRR selectedGroup) - | selectedGroup `elem` groupsSupported -> do + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.1.4: the selected_group MUST be in supported_groups + -- and MUST NOT already have been offered in the initial key_share. + | selectedGroup `elem` groupsSupported + && selectedGroup `notElem` groupsSelected -> do usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode HelloRetryRequest clearTxRecordState ctx let cparams' = cparams{clientUseEarlyData = False} runPacketFlight ctx $ sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx clientSession <- tls13stSession <$> getTLS13State ctx - let groupsSupported' = selectedGroup : filter (/= selectedGroup) groupsSupported - groupsSelected' = [selectedGroup] - grps = + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.1.2: the second ClientHello MUST be identical + -- to the first except for the specific listed changes. + -- supported_groups is NOT on that list, so it must be unchanged. + let grps = Groups - { grpsSupported = groupsSupported' - , grpsSelected = groupsSelected' + { grpsSupported = groupsSupported + , grpsSelected = [selectedGroup] } handshake @@ -156,6 +161,11 @@ ctx grps (Just (crand, clientSession, ver)) + | selectedGroup `elem` groupsSelected -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server selected a group already offered in key_share" + IllegalParameter | otherwise -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "server-selected group is not supported" IllegalParameter diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs @@ -215,13 +215,16 @@ -------------------- + -- RFC 6066 Section 3: HostName is <1..2^16-1>, so no server_name + -- is sent for an empty name. sniExt = - if clientUseServerNameIndication cparams + if clientUseServerNameIndication cparams && not (null sni) then do - let sni = fst $ clientServerIdentification cparams usingState_ ctx $ setClientSNI sni return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [ServerNameHostName sni] else return Nothing + where + sni = fst $ clientServerIdentification cparams -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.2.8 says: Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond -- to a group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST @@ -262,11 +265,13 @@ Nothing -> return Nothing Just siz -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ RecordSizeLimit $ fromIntegral siz - sessionTicketExt = do + sessionTicketExt = case clientSessions cparams of (sidOrTkt, _) : _ | isTicket sidOrTkt -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket sidOrTkt - _ -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" + _ + | clientWantTicket cparams -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" + | otherwise -> return $ Nothing earlyDataExt | rtt0 = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw (EarlyDataIndication Nothing) @@ -506,9 +511,13 @@ step2 (sniExtI@(ExtensionRaw EID_ServerName _) : exts) = (sniExtO : os, sniExtI : is) where - sniExtO = toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [ServerNameHostName host] (os, is) = step3 exts id - step2 _ = error "step2" + -- No server_name for an empty name: only the outer one names the + -- public name. + step2 exts = (sniExtO : os, is) + where + (os, is) = step3 exts id + sniExtO = toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [ServerNameHostName host] step3 [] build = ([], [echOuterExt]) where echOuterExt = toExtensionRaw $ EchOuterExtensions $ build [] diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs @@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ clientSessions, ) where -import Control.Exception (SomeException) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict -import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..)) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..), ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..)) import Network.TLS.Cipher import Network.TLS.Context.Internal @@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ ---------------------------------------------------------------- -throwMiscErrorOnException :: String -> SomeException -> IO a +throwMiscErrorOnException :: String -> E.SomeException -> IO a throwMiscErrorOnException msg e = throwCore $ Error_Misc $ msg ++ ": " ++ show e @@ -124,7 +125,9 @@ -- then run certificate validation usage <- catchException (wrapCertificateChecks <$> checkCert) rejectOnException case usage of - CertificateUsageAccept -> checkLeafCertificateKeyUsage + CertificateUsageAccept -> do + verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose KeyUsagePurpose_ServerAuth certs + checkLeafCertificateKeyUsage CertificateUsageReject reason -> certificateRejected reason where shared = clientShared cparams @@ -342,14 +345,28 @@ (return ()) setAlpn where - setAlpn (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [proto]) = usingState_ ctx $ do - mprotos <- getClientALPNSuggest + setAlpn (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [proto]) = do + mprotos <- usingState_ ctx getClientALPNSuggest case mprotos of - Just protos -> when (proto `elem` protos) $ do - setExtensionALPN True - setNegotiatedProtocol proto - _ -> return () - setAlpn _ = return () + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server sent ALPN without a client offer" + UnsupportedExtension + Just protos + | not (B.null proto) && proto `elem` protos -> usingState_ ctx $ do + setExtensionALPN True + setNegotiatedProtocol proto + | otherwise -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server selected an ALPN protocol not offered by the client" + IllegalParameter + setAlpn _ = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server ALPN response did not contain exactly one protocol" + IllegalParameter ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ServerHello ( receiveServerHello, processServerHello13, + processRecordSizeLimit, ) where import Data.ByteArray (convert) @@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + unless (cipherAllowedForVersion ver usedCipher) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server selected a cipher invalid for the negotiated version" + IllegalParameter + when (ver == TLS12) $ setServerHelloParameters12 ctx shVersion shRandom usedCipher compressAlg @@ -173,9 +180,8 @@ then do -- Session is dummy in TLS 1.3. usingState_ ctx $ setSession shSession - processRecordSizeLimit ctx shExtensions True - enableMyRecordLimit ctx - enablePeerRecordLimit ctx + -- RecordSizeLimit comes in EncryptedExtensions in TLS 1.3 + -- (RFC 8449 Section 4), and is processed there. let usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher transitTranscriptHashI ctx "transitI" usedHash isHRR accepted <- checkECHacceptance ctx isHRR usedHash sh @@ -266,6 +272,10 @@ (return ()) (setPeerRecordSizeLimit ctx tls13) ack <- checkPeerRecordLimit ctx + -- RFC 8449 Section 4: a limit that is not negotiated does not + -- bind the peer, so a server that did not send RecordSizeLimit + -- back may send records of any size the protocol permits. + unless ack $ setMyRecordLimit ctx Nothing -- When a client sends RecordSizeLimit, it does not know -- which TLS version the server selects. RecordLimit is -- the length of plaintext. But RecordSizeLimit also diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs @@ -49,13 +49,20 @@ doCertificate cparams ctx certs processCertificate ctx ClientRole certs return $ RecvStateHandshake (expectServerKeyExchange ctx) -expectCertificate _ ctx p = expectServerKeyExchange ctx p +-- Every key exchange the client implements authenticates the server with a +-- certificate; see sendClientKeyXchg. +expectCertificate _ _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server certificate") expectServerKeyExchange :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) expectServerKeyExchange ctx (ServerKeyXchg origSkx) = do doServerKeyExchange ctx origSkx return $ RecvStateHandshake (expectCertificateRequest ctx) -expectServerKeyExchange ctx p = expectCertificateRequest ctx p +expectServerKeyExchange ctx p = do + -- (EC)DHE takes its parameters from ServerKeyExchange. + kx <- cipherKeyExchange <$> usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + unless (kx == CipherKeyExchange_RSA) $ + unexpected (show p) (Just "server key exchange") + expectCertificateRequest ctx p expectCertificateRequest :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) expectCertificateRequest ctx (CertRequest cTypesSent sigAlgs dNames) = do diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ postHandshakeAuthClientWith, ) where -import Control.Exception (bracket) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA import Data.IORef @@ -135,18 +135,28 @@ :: MonadIO m => Context -> Handshake13 -> m () expectEncryptedExtensions ctx (EncryptedExtensions13 eexts) = do liftIO $ do + -- RFC 8449 Section 4: the server's RecordSizeLimit is in + -- EncryptedExtensions. Until it is known, our own limit is not + -- enforced, as the server may not have agreed to it. + processRecordSizeLimit ctx eexts True + enableMyRecordLimit ctx + enablePeerRecordLimit ctx setALPN ctx MsgTEncryptedExtensions eexts modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stClientExtensions = eexts} st13 <- usingHState ctx getTLS13RTT0Status when (st13 == RTT0Sent) $ case extensionLookup EID_EarlyData eexts of Just _ -> do + -- RFC 8446 Section 4.2.10: early data is accepted only + -- with the first PSK. + mode <- usingHState ctx getTLS13HandshakeMode + unless (mode == PreSharedKey) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "early data accepted without PSK" IllegalParameter usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode RTT0 usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Accepted liftIO $ modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13st0RTTAccepted = True} - Nothing -> do - usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey - usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Rejected + Nothing -> usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Rejected expectEncryptedExtensions _ h = unexpected (show h) (Just "encrypted extensions") ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -222,13 +232,19 @@ :: MonadIO m => ClientParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> RecvHandshake13M m () processCertAndVerify cparams ctx cc = do + pubkey <- processServerCertificate cparams ctx cc + recvHandshake13hash ctx "CertVerify" $ expectCertVerify ctx pubkey + +processServerCertificate + :: MonadIO m => ClientParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> m PubKey +processServerCertificate cparams ctx cc = do liftIO $ usingState_ ctx $ setServerCertificateChain cc liftIO $ doCertificate cparams ctx cc let pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate $ getCertificateChainLeaf cc ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion checkDigitalSignatureKey ver pubkey usingHState ctx $ setPublicKey pubkey - recvHandshake13hash ctx "CertVerify" $ expectCertVerify ctx pubkey + return pubkey ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -377,10 +393,13 @@ ---------------------------------------------------------------- postHandshakeAuthClientWith - :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () -postHandshakeAuthClientWith cparams ctx (CertRequest13 certReqCtx exts) = - bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do - -- updateTranscriptHash13 ctx h b + :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13R -> IO () +postHandshakeAuthClientWith cparams ctx hb@(CertRequest13 certReqCtx exts, _) = + E.bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do + -- RFC 8446 Section 4.4: the handshake context of + -- post-handshake authentication is ClientHello ... client + -- Finished + CertificateRequest. + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx hb processCertRequest13 ctx certReqCtx exts (usedHash, _, level, applicationSecretN) <- getTxRecordState ctx unless (level == CryptApplicationSecret) $ @@ -407,16 +426,42 @@ asyncServerHello13 cparams ctx groupSent chSentTime = do setPendingRecvActions ctx - [ PendingRecvActionSelfUpdate True expectServerHello - , PendingRecvAction True (expectEncryptedExtensions ctx) - , PendingRecvActionHash True expectFinishedAndSet - ] + [PendingRecvActionSelfUpdate True expectServerHello] where expectServerHello shb@(sh, _) = do setRTT ctx chSentTime processServerHello13 cparams ctx sh updateTranscriptHash13 ctx shb -- update by myself - void $ prepareSecondFlight13 ctx groupSent + resuming <- prepareSecondFlight13 ctx groupSent + -- Without the PSK, the server authenticates with its certificate, + -- as in recvServerSecondFlight13. + setPendingRecvActions ctx $ + if resuming + then + [ PendingRecvAction True (expectEncryptedExtensions ctx) + , PendingRecvActionHash True expectFinishedAndSet + ] + else + [ PendingRecvAction False (expectEncryptedExtensions ctx) + , PendingRecvAction False expectCertRequestAsync + , PendingRecvActionHash True expectFinishedAndSet + ] + -- The actions below put the next one in front of Finished. + expectCertRequestAsync (CertRequest13 token exts) = do + processCertRequest13 ctx token exts + pushPendingRecvAction ctx $ PendingRecvAction False expectCertAsync + expectCertRequestAsync h = do + usingHState ctx $ do + setCertReqToken Nothing + setCertReqCBdata Nothing + expectCertAsync h + expectCertAsync (Certificate13 _ (CertificateChain_ cc) _) = certAsync cc + expectCertAsync (CompressedCertificate13 _ (CertificateChain_ cc) _) = certAsync cc + expectCertAsync h = unexpected (show h) (Just "server certificate") + certAsync cc = do + pubkey <- processServerCertificate cparams ctx cc + pushPendingRecvAction ctx $ + PendingRecvActionHash False (expectCertVerify ctx pubkey) expectFinishedAndSet h sf = do expectFinished cparams ctx h sf liftIO $ diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ ) where import Control.Concurrent.MVar -import Control.Exception (IOException, fromException, handle, throwIO) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict import Data.ByteArray (convert) import qualified Data.ByteString as B @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ import Network.TLS.X509 handshakeFailed :: TLSError -> IO () -handshakeFailed err = throwIO $ HandshakeFailed err +handshakeFailed err = E.throwIO $ HandshakeFailed err handleException :: Context -> IO () -> IO () handleException ctx f = catchException f $ \exception -> do @@ -77,12 +77,12 @@ -- If the error was an Uncontextualized TLSException, we replace the -- context with HandshakeFailed. If it's anything else, we convert -- it to a string and wrap it with Error_Misc and HandshakeFailed. - let tlserror = case fromException exception of + let tlserror = case E.fromException exception of Just e | Uncontextualized e' <- e -> e' _ -> Error_Misc (show exception) established <- ctxEstablished ctx setEstablished ctx NotEstablished - handle ignoreIOErr $ do + E.handle ignoreIOErr $ do tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx if tls13 then do @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ else sendPacket12 ctx $ Alert [errorToAlert tlserror] handshakeFailed tlserror where - ignoreIOErr :: IOException -> IO () + ignoreIOErr :: E.IOException -> IO () ignoreIOErr _ = return () errorToAlert :: TLSError -> (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) @@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ errorToAlert (Error_Packet_Parsing msg) | "invalid version" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, ProtocolVersion) | "request_update" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, IllegalParameter) + | "cannot be decompressed" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, BadCertificate) + | "unsupported certificate compression algorithm" `isInfixOf` msg = + (AlertLevel_Fatal, IllegalParameter) | otherwise = (AlertLevel_Fatal, DecodeError) errorToAlert _ = (AlertLevel_Fatal, InternalError) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs @@ -175,18 +175,25 @@ -> Signature -> ByteString -> m Bool -checkCertVerify ctx pub hs signature hashValue - | pub `signatureCompatible13` hs = liftIO $ do - role <- usingState_ ctx getRole - let ctxStr - | role == ClientRole = serverContextString -- opposite context - | otherwise = clientContextString - target = makeTarget ctxStr hashValue - sigParams = signatureParams pub hs - checkHashSignatureValid13 hs - checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs - verifyPublic ctx sigParams target signature - | otherwise = return False +-- RFC 8446 Section 6.2: an algorithm that may not be used -- one TLS 1.3 +-- does not allow, one not offered, or one that does not fit the key -- is a +-- field that is incorrect, an illegal_parameter. Only a signature that does +-- not verify is a decrypt_error, which False leads to. +checkCertVerify ctx pub hs signature hashValue = liftIO $ do + checkHashSignatureValid13 hs + checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs + unless (pub `signatureCompatible13` hs) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("signature algorithm " ++ showSignatureScheme hs ++ " does not fit the public key") + IllegalParameter + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + let ctxStr + | role == ClientRole = serverContextString -- opposite context + | otherwise = clientContextString + target = makeTarget ctxStr hashValue + sigParams = signatureParams pub hs + verifyPublic ctx sigParams target signature makeTarget :: ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString makeTarget contextString hashValue = runPut $ do @@ -437,7 +444,7 @@ checkHashSignatureValid13 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> IO () checkHashSignatureValid13 hs = unless (isHashSignatureValid13 hs) $ - let msg = "invalid TLS13 hash and signature algorithm: " ++ show hs + let msg = "invalid TLS13 hash and signature algorithm: " ++ showSignatureScheme hs in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter isHashSignatureValid13 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ NegotiatedProtocol, ) where +import Crypto.Debug (DebugShow (..)) import Network.TLS.Cipher import Network.TLS.Imports import Network.TLS.Struct @@ -19,17 +20,40 @@ type NegotiatedProtocol = ByteString -- | Handshake information generated for traffic at 0-RTT level. +-- +-- 'Show' renders the cipher and @\@ for the key material; a trace +-- of what 'Network.TLS.QUIC.quicInstallKeys' is handed does not write the +-- traffic secrets to a log. 'Crypto.Debug.debugShow' renders them. data EarlySecretInfo = EarlySecretInfo Cipher (ClientTrafficSecret EarlySecret) deriving (Show) +instance DebugShow EarlySecretInfo where + debugShow (EarlySecretInfo c s) = + "EarlySecretInfo " ++ show c ++ " " ++ debugShow s + -- | Handshake information generated for traffic at handshake level. +-- +-- The secrets are not shown; see 'EarlySecretInfo'. data HandshakeSecretInfo = HandshakeSecretInfo Cipher (TrafficSecrets HandshakeSecret) deriving (Show) +instance DebugShow HandshakeSecretInfo where + debugShow (HandshakeSecretInfo c ts) = + "HandshakeSecretInfo " ++ show c ++ " " ++ debugShowPair ts + -- | Handshake information generated for traffic at application level. +-- +-- The secrets are not shown; see 'EarlySecretInfo'. newtype ApplicationSecretInfo = ApplicationSecretInfo (TrafficSecrets ApplicationSecret) deriving (Show) + +instance DebugShow ApplicationSecretInfo where + debugShow (ApplicationSecretInfo ts) = + "ApplicationSecretInfo " ++ debugShowPair ts + +debugShowPair :: TrafficSecrets a -> String +debugShowPair (c, s) = "(" ++ debugShow c ++ "," ++ debugShow s ++ ")" ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs @@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEC _) = True isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEd25519 _) = True isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEd448 _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) = True isDigitalSignatureKey _ = False versionCompatible :: PubKey -> Version -> Bool @@ -99,6 +102,9 @@ versionCompatible (PubKeyEC _) v = v >= TLS10 versionCompatible (PubKeyEd25519 _) v = v >= TLS12 versionCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) v = v >= TLS12 +versionCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) v = v >= TLS13 +versionCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) v = v >= TLS13 +versionCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) v = v >= TLS13 versionCompatible _ _ = False {- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} @@ -128,6 +134,9 @@ (PubKeyEC _, PrivKeyEC k) -> kxSupportedPrivKeyEC k (PubKeyEd25519 _, PrivKeyEd25519 _) -> True (PubKeyEd448 _, PrivKeyEd448 _) -> True + (PubKeyMLDSA44 _, PrivKeyMLDSA44 _) -> True + (PubKeyMLDSA65 _, PrivKeyMLDSA65 _) -> True + (PubKeyMLDSA87 _, PrivKeyMLDSA87 _) -> True _ -> False getLocalPublicKey :: MonadIO m => Context -> m PubKey diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs @@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ -- | Put the server context in handshake mode. -- -- Expect a client hello message as parameter. --- This is useful when the client hello has been already poped from the recv layer to inspect the packet. +-- This is useful when the client hello has been already popped from the recv layer to inspect the packet. -- --- When the function returns, a new handshake has been succesfully negociated. +-- When the function returns, a new handshake has been successfully negotiated. -- On any error, a HandshakeFailed exception is raised. handshake :: ServerParams -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () handshake sparams ctx chb@(ClientHello ch, bs) = do @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ SelectKeyShareHRR g -> do sendHRR ctx g r0 chI $ isJust mcrnd -- Don't reset ctxEstablished since 0-RTT data - -- would be comming, which should be ignored. + -- would be coming, which should be ignored. handshakeServer sparams ctx SelectKeyShareFound cliKeyShare -> do unless (checkClientKeyShareKeyLength cliKeyShare) $ @@ -86,4 +86,4 @@ resumeSessionData <- sendServerHello12 sparams ctx r chI recvClientSecondFlight12 sparams ctx resumeSessionData -handshake _ _ _ = throwCore $ Error_Protocol "client Hello is expected" HandshakeFailure +handshake _ _ (hs, _) = unexpected (show hs) (Just "client hello") diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs @@ -57,7 +57,11 @@ (throwCore $ Error_HandshakePolicy "server: handshake denied") updateMeasure ctx incrementNbHandshakes - when (chVersion /= TLS12) $ + -- A legacy_version below TLS 1.2 is refused. One above it is not: a + -- server negotiates the highest version it supports (RFC 5246 Appendix + -- E.1), and with supported_versions present does not use legacy_version + -- at all (RFC 8446 Section 4.2.1). Both are decided below. + when (chVersion < TLS12) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol (show chVersion ++ " is not supported") ProtocolVersion @@ -170,9 +174,20 @@ Nothing extractServerName where - extractServerName (ServerName ns) = listToMaybe (mapMaybe toHostName ns) + extractServerName (ServerName ns) = case mapMaybe toHostName ns of + [] -> Nothing + [hostName] + | all validChar hostName -> Just hostName + | otherwise -> illegal "invalid host_name in SNI" + _ -> illegal "multiple host_names in SNI" toHostName (ServerNameHostName hostName) = Just hostName toHostName (ServerNameOther _) = Nothing + -- RFC 6066 Section 3: the server_name_list MUST NOT contain more + -- than one name of the same name_type, and HostName is an ASCII + -- DNS host name, so it has no control characters, spaces nor + -- non-ASCII bytes. + validChar c = c > ' ' && c < '\DEL' + illegal msg = E.throw $ Uncontextualized $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter findHighestVersionFrom :: Version -> [Version] -> Maybe Version findHighestVersionFrom clientVersion allowedVersions = diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs @@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import Network.TLS.Crypto import Network.TLS.ErrT import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common (ticketOrSessionID12) import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature import Network.TLS.Imports import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session (SessionManager (..)) import Network.TLS.State import Network.TLS.Struct import Network.TLS.Types (CipherId (..), Role (..)) @@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ processClientHello12 sparams ctx ch = do let secureRenegotiation = supportedSecureRenegotiation $ serverSupported sparams when secureRenegotiation $ checkSecureRenegotiation ctx ch + checkEcPointFormats ch serverName <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI let hooks = serverHooks sparams extraCreds <- onServerNameIndication hooks serverName @@ -40,18 +43,58 @@ -- The shared cipherlist can become empty after filtering for compatible -- creds, check now before calling onCipherChoosing, which does not handle -- empty lists. - when (null ciphersFilteredVersion) $ + when (null ciphersFilteredVersion) $ do + checkResumedCipherOffered ctx ch throwCore $ Error_Protocol "no cipher in common with the TLS 1.2 client" HandshakeFailure - let usedCipher = onCipherChoosing hooks TLS12 ciphersFilteredVersion + usedCipher <- chooseCipher hooks TLS12 ciphersFilteredVersion mcred <- chooseCreds usedCipher creds signatureCreds return (usedCipher, mcred) +-- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.1.2: a client resuming a session MUST offer the +-- cipher suite of that session. validateSession reports its absence with +-- illegal_parameter once a cipher has been chosen; when none can be chosen, +-- the same is reported here before the missing common cipher is. +checkResumedCipherOffered :: Context -> ClientHello -> IO () +checkResumedCipherOffered ctx CH{..} = do + let mticket = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SessionTicket + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + Nothing + (\(SessionTicket ticket) -> Just ticket) + case ticketOrSessionID12 mticket chSession of + Nothing -> return () + Just identity -> do + msd <- sessionResume (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) identity + case msd of + Just sd + | sessionVersion sd <= TLS12 + , CipherId (sessionCipher sd) `notElem` chCiphers -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "new cipher is different from the old one" IllegalParameter + _ -> return () + checkSecureRenegotiation :: Context -> ClientHello -> IO () checkSecureRenegotiation ctx CH{..} = do -- RFC 5746: secure renegotiation -- TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV: {0x00, 0xFF} - when (CipherId 0xff `elem` chCiphers) $ + let hasSCSV = CipherId 0xff `elem` chCiphers + hasExt = isJust $ extensionLookup EID_SecureRenegotiation chExtensions + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + secure <- usingState_ ctx getSecureRenegotiation + -- RFC 5746 Section 3.7: when renegotiating a connection whose + -- secure_renegotiation flag is set, ClientHello MUST NOT contain + -- the SCSV and MUST contain the renegotiation_info extension. + when (established == Established && secure) $ do + when hasSCSV $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "SCSV in renegotiation" HandshakeFailure + unless hasExt $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no renegotiation_info in renegotiation" HandshakeFailure + when hasSCSV $ usingState_ ctx $ setSecureRenegotiation True case extensionLookup EID_SecureRenegotiation chExtensions of @@ -101,7 +144,7 @@ -- Cipher selection is performed in two steps: first server credentials -- are flagged as not suitable for signature if not compatible with - -- negotiated signature parameters. Then ciphers are evalutated from + -- negotiated signature parameters. Then ciphers are evaluated from -- the resulting credentials. supported = serverSupported sparams @@ -129,7 +172,8 @@ -- Build a list of all hash/signature algorithms in common between -- client and server. - hashAndSignatures = supportedHashSignatures supported + -- ML-DSA is TLS 1.3 only (draft-ietf-tls-mldsa). + hashAndSignatures = filter (not . isMLDSA) $ supportedHashSignatures supported possibleHashSigAlgs = hashAndSignaturesInCommon hashAndSignatures chExtensions -- Check that a candidate signature credential will be compatible with @@ -170,6 +214,34 @@ Error_Protocol "key exchange algorithm not implemented" HandshakeFailure ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- RFC 8422 Section 5.1.2: a client that names a curve of RFC 8422 in +-- supported_groups and sends ec_point_formats without the uncompressed +-- format is refused with illegal_parameter. An empty list is refused +-- with decode_error when decoding it. +checkEcPointFormats :: ClientHello -> IO () +checkEcPointFormats CH{..} = + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_EcPointFormats + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + (return ()) + $ \(EcPointFormatsSupported formats) -> + when + ( EcPointFormat_Uncompressed `notElem` formats + && any (`elem` rfc8422Groups) groups + ) + $ throwCore + $ Error_Protocol "uncompressed point format missing" IllegalParameter + where + groups = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SupportedGroups + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + [] + (\(SupportedGroups gs) -> gs) + rfc8422Groups = [P256, P384, P521, X25519, X448] negotiatedGroupsInCommon :: [Group] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> [Group] negotiatedGroupsInCommon serverGroups exts = diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import Network.TLS.Crypto import Network.TLS.Extension import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature import Network.TLS.Handshake.State import Network.TLS.IO.Encode @@ -34,7 +35,8 @@ -> IO ( SelectKeyShareResult , (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 - , (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid + , (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool, Maybe ByteString) + -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid, ticket ALPN ) processClientHello13 sparams ctx ch@CH{..} = do when @@ -48,8 +50,8 @@ when (null ciphersFilteredVersion) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol "no cipher in common with the TLS 1.3 client" HandshakeFailure - let usedCipher = onCipherChoosing (serverHooks sparams) TLS13 ciphersFilteredVersion - usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher + usedCipher <- chooseCipher (serverHooks sparams) TLS13 ciphersFilteredVersion + let usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher rtt0 = lookupAndDecode EID_EarlyData @@ -126,14 +128,15 @@ -> Context -> (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 -> ClientHello - -> IO (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid + -> IO (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool, Maybe ByteString) + -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid, ticket ALPN pskAndEarlySecret sparams ctx (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) CH{..} = do - (psk, binderInfo, is0RTTvalid) <- choosePSK + (psk, binderInfo, is0RTTvalid, ticketALPN) <- choosePSK earlyKey <- calculateEarlySecret ctx choice (Left psk) let earlySecret = pairBase earlyKey authenticated = isJust binderInfo preSharedKeyExt <- checkBinder earlySecret binderInfo - return (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid) + return (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid, ticketALPN) where choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher @@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ EID_PreSharedKey MsgTClientHello chExtensions - (return (zero, Nothing, False)) + (return (zero, Nothing, False, Nothing)) selectPSK selectPSK (PreSharedKeyClientHello (PskIdentity identity obfAge : _) bnds@(bnd : _)) = do @@ -161,18 +164,29 @@ then sessionResumeOnlyOnce mgr identity else sessionResume mgr identity case msdata of - Just sdata -> do - let tinfo = fromJust $ sessionTicketInfo sdata - psk = sessionSecret sdata - isFresh <- checkFreshness tinfo obfAge - (isPSKvalid, is0RTTvalid) <- checkSessionEquality sdata - if isPSKvalid && isFresh - then return (psk, Just (bnd, 0 :: Int, len), is0RTTvalid) - else -- fall back to full handshake - return (zero, Nothing, False) - _ -> return (zero, Nothing, False) - else return (zero, Nothing, False) - selectPSK _ = return (zero, Nothing, False) + -- RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1: only a TLS 1.3 session, which + -- has its ticket information, is resumed with a PSK. A + -- TLS 1.2 one found under the same identity falls back + -- to a full handshake. + Just sdata + | sessionVersion sdata == TLS13 + , Just tinfo <- sessionTicketInfo sdata -> do + let psk = sessionSecret sdata + isFresh <- checkFreshness tinfo obfAge + (isPSKvalid, is0RTTvalid) <- checkSessionEquality sdata + if isPSKvalid && isFresh + then + return + ( psk + , Just (bnd, 0 :: Int, len) + , is0RTTvalid + , sessionALPN sdata + ) + else -- fall back to full handshake + return (zero, Nothing, False, Nothing) + _ -> return (zero, Nothing, False, Nothing) + else return (zero, Nothing, False, Nothing) + selectPSK _ = return (zero, Nothing, False, Nothing) checkBinder _ Nothing = return [] checkBinder earlySecret (Just (binder, n, tlen)) = do @@ -184,9 +198,6 @@ checkSessionEquality sdata = do msni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI - -- ALPN should be checked. - -- But it's an extension in EE, sigh. - -- malpn <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol let isSameSNI = sessionClientSNI sdata == msni isSameCipher = sessionCipher sdata == cipherID usedCipher ciphers = supportedCiphers $ serverSupported sparams @@ -195,9 +206,8 @@ Nothing -> False Just c -> cipherHash c == cipherHash usedCipher isSameVersion = TLS13 == sessionVersion sdata - -- isSameALPN = sessionALPN sdata == malpn isPSKvalid = isSameKDF && isSameSNI -- fixme: SNI is not required - is0RTTvalid = isSameVersion && isSameCipher -- && isSameALPN + is0RTTvalid = isSameVersion && isSameCipher return (isPSKvalid, is0RTTvalid) dhModes = diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common ( applicationProtocol, + chooseCipher, checkValidClientCertChain, clientCertificate, credentialDigitalSignatureKey, @@ -15,8 +16,9 @@ ) where import Control.Monad.State.Strict -import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..)) +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..), ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..)) +import Network.TLS.Cipher import Network.TLS.Context.Internal import Network.TLS.Credentials import Network.TLS.Crypto @@ -32,6 +34,18 @@ import Network.TLS.Util (catchException) import Network.TLS.X509 +chooseCipher :: ServerHooks -> Version -> [Cipher] -> IO Cipher +chooseCipher hooks ver candidates = + case find ((== cipherID selected) . cipherID) candidates of + Just cipher -> return cipher + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "onCipherChoosing selected a cipher outside the candidate list" + InternalError + where + selected = onCipherChoosing hooks ver candidates + checkValidClientCertChain :: MonadIO m => Context -> String -> m CertificateChain checkValidClientCertChain ctx errmsg = do @@ -132,6 +146,11 @@ when (proto == "") $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol "no supported application protocols" NoApplicationProtocol + unless (proto `elem` protos) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "ALPN callback selected a protocol not offered by the client" + NoApplicationProtocol usingState_ ctx $ do setExtensionALPN True setNegotiatedProtocol proto @@ -151,7 +170,9 @@ (onClientCertificate (serverHooks sparams) certs) rejectOnException case usage of - CertificateUsageAccept -> verifyLeafKeyUsage [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] certs + CertificateUsageAccept -> do + verifyLeafKeyUsage [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] certs + verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth certs CertificateUsageReject reason -> certificateRejected reason -- Remember cert chain for later use. @@ -202,4 +223,10 @@ let mysiz = fromIntegral mylim + if tls13 then 1 else 0 rsl = RecordSizeLimit mysiz return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw rsl - else return Nothing + else do + -- RFC 8449 Section 4: a limit that is not negotiated + -- does not bind the peer, so a client that did not send + -- RecordSizeLimit may send records of any size the + -- protocol permits. + setMyRecordLimit ctx Nothing + return Nothing diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ | TLS12 < sessionVersion sd = return Nothing -- fixme | CipherId (sessionCipher sd) `notElem` ciphers = throwCore $ - Error_Protocol "new cipher is diffrent from the old one" IllegalParameter + Error_Protocol "new cipher is different from the old one" IllegalParameter | isJust sni && sessionClientSNI sd /= sni = do usingState_ ctx clearClientSNI return Nothing @@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ if serverWantClientCert then do let (certTypes, hashSigs) = - let as = supportedHashSignatures serverSupported - in (nub $ mapMaybe hashSigToCertType as, as) + let as = filter (not . isMLDSA) $ supportedHashSignatures serverSupported + in (nub $ mapMaybe (fmap certTypeOnWire . hashSigToCertType) as, as) creq = CertRequest certTypes @@ -153,8 +153,18 @@ return $ b2 . (creq :) else return b2 where + -- RFC 8422 Section 3.1: in TLS 1.2, ecdsa_sign asks for a certificate + -- with an ECDSA- or EdDSA-capable public key. The Ed25519 and Ed448 + -- certificate types are synthetic values with no code point. + certTypeOnWire CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign = CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign + certTypeOnWire CertificateType_Ed448_Sign = CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign + certTypeOnWire t = t commonGroups = negotiatedGroupsInCommon (supportedGroups serverSupported) chExts - commonHashSigs = hashAndSignaturesInCommon (supportedHashSignatures serverSupported) chExts + -- ML-DSA is TLS 1.3 only (draft-ietf-tls-mldsa). + commonHashSigs = + hashAndSignaturesInCommon + (filter (not . isMLDSA) $ supportedHashSignatures serverSupported) + chExts setup_DHE = do let possibleFFGroups = commonGroups `intersect` availableFFGroups (dhparams, priv, pub) <- @@ -267,9 +277,13 @@ | ems = Just $ toExtensionRaw ExtendedMainSecret | otherwise = Nothing + -- RFC 5077 Section 3.2: the extension is sent only to a client that + -- sent it. let useTicket = sessionUseTicket $ sharedSessionManager $ serverShared sparams + clientTicket = isJust $ extensionLookup EID_SessionTicket chExts sessionTicketExt - | not resuming && useTicket = Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" + | not resuming && useTicket && clientTicket = + Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" | otherwise = Nothing -- in TLS12, we need to check as well the certificates we are sending if they have in the extension diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ -> Context -> KeyShareEntry -> (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 - -> (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid + -> (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool, Maybe ByteString) + -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid, ticket ALPN -> ClientHello -> Maybe ClientRandom -> IO @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ , Bool -- authenticated , Bool -- rtt0OK ) -sendServerHello13 sparams ctx clientKeyShare (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid) CH{..} mOuterClientRandom = do +sendServerHello13 sparams ctx clientKeyShare (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid, ticketALPN) CH{..} mOuterClientRandom = do let clientEarlySecret = pairClient earlyKey earlySecret = pairBase earlyKey -- parse CompressCertificate to check if it is broken here @@ -69,8 +70,15 @@ setOuterClientRandom mOuterClientRandom hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR alpnExt <- applicationProtocol ctx chExtensions sparams + negotiatedALPN <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol setServerParameter - let rtt0OK = authenticated && not hrr && rtt0 && rtt0accept && is0RTTvalid + let rtt0OK = + authenticated + && not hrr + && rtt0 + && rtt0accept + && is0RTTvalid + && ticketALPN == negotiatedALPN extraCreds <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI >>= onServerNameIndication (serverHooks sparams) let p = makeCredentialPredicate TLS13 chExtensions @@ -86,7 +94,7 @@ usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode RTT0 usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Accepted else do - usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey + when authenticated $ usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Rejected else when authenticated $ usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey -- else : FullHandshake or HelloRetryRequest diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import Network.TLS.Context.Internal import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common @@ -37,11 +38,17 @@ Nothing -> do recvClientCCC sparams ctx mticket <- sessionEstablished ctx + -- RFC 5077 Section 3.3: NewSessionTicket is sent only after + -- the session_ticket extension in ServerHello, which only a + -- client that sent it gets. + clientTicket <- + maybe False (isJust . extensionLookup EID_SessionTicket . chExtensions . fst) + <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello case mticket of - Nothing -> return () - Just ticket -> do + Just ticket | clientTicket -> do let life = adjustLifetime $ serverTicketLifetime sparams sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [NewSessionTicket life ticket] [] + _ -> return () sendCCSandFinished ctx ServerRole Just _ -> do _ <- sessionEstablished ctx @@ -92,8 +99,17 @@ -- matches our request and that we support -- verifying with that certificate. - return $ RecvStateHandshake $ expectClientKeyExchange True - expectClientCertificate p = expectClientKeyExchange False p + -- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.8: CertificateVerify follows only a + -- certificate with signing capability, so not an empty one, + -- which the hook may have accepted. + let followedCertVerify = not $ isNullCertificateChain certs + return $ RecvStateHandshake $ expectClientKeyExchange followedCertVerify + -- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.6: a client asked for a certificate sends the + -- message, empty if it has none. + expectClientCertificate p = do + certReqSent <- usingHState ctx getCertReqSent + when certReqSent $ unexpected (show p) (Just "client certificate") + expectClientKeyExchange False p -- cannot use RecvStateHandshake, as the next message could be a ChangeCipher, -- so we must process any packet, and in case of handshake call processHandshake manually. diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ KeyUpdateRequest (..), ) where -import Control.Exception +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.State.Strict import Data.IORef @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import Network.TLS.IO import Network.TLS.Imports import Network.TLS.KeySchedule +import Network.TLS.Packet13 (encodeHandshake13) import Network.TLS.Parameters import Network.TLS.Session import Network.TLS.State @@ -239,12 +240,16 @@ origCertReqCtx <- newCertReqContext ctx let certReq13 = makeCertRequest sparams ctx origCertReqCtx False _ <- withWriteLock ctx $ do - bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do + E.bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [certReq13] [] withReadLock ctx $ do + baseHState <- saveHState ctx + -- RFC 8446 Section 4.4: the handshake context of + -- post-handshake authentication is ClientHello ... client + -- Finished + CertificateRequest. + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx (certReq13, [encodeHandshake13 certReq13]) (clientCert13, bClientCert13) <- getHandshake ctx ref emptyCert <- expectClientCertificate sparams ctx origCertReqCtx clientCert13 - baseHState <- saveHState ctx updateTranscriptHash13 ctx (clientCert13, bClientCert13) th <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..Cert" unless emptyCert $ do @@ -274,6 +279,13 @@ Error_Protocol "post handshake authenticated" UnexpectedMessage chk [] = getHandshake ctx ref chk ((KeyUpdate13 mode, _) : hbs) = do + case limitKeyUpdate $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx of + Just limit | limit > 0 -> do + count <- incrementTLS13KeyUpdateCount ctx + when (count > limit) $ + terminate ctx $ + Error_Protocol "too many consecutive KeyUpdate messages" UnexpectedMessage + _ -> return () keyUpdate ctx getRxRecordState setRxRecordState -- Write lock wraps both actions because we don't want another -- packet to be sent by another thread before the Tx state is @@ -328,18 +340,18 @@ send = sendPacket13 ctx . Alert13 catchException (send [(level, desc)]) (\_ -> return ()) setEOF ctx - throwIO $ Terminated False reason err + E.throwIO $ Terminated False reason err handleEx :: Context -> IO Bool -> IO Bool handleEx ctx f = catchException f $ \exception -> do -- If the error was an Uncontextualized TLSException, we replace the -- context with HandshakeFailed. If it's anything else, we convert -- it to a string and wrap it with Error_Misc and HandshakeFailed. - let tlserror = case fromException exception of + let tlserror = case E.fromException exception of Just e | Uncontextualized e' <- e -> e' _ -> Error_Misc (show exception) sendPacket13 ctx $ Alert13 [errorToAlert tlserror] - void $ throwIO $ PostHandshake tlserror + void $ E.throwIO $ PostHandshake tlserror return False ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -369,7 +381,7 @@ TwoWay deriving (Eq, Show) --- | Updating appication traffic secrets for TLS 1.3. +-- | Updating application traffic secrets for TLS 1.3. -- If this API is called for TLS 1.3, 'True' is returned. -- Otherwise, 'False' is returned. updateKey :: MonadIO m => Context -> KeyUpdateRequest -> m Bool diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs @@ -44,9 +44,24 @@ certificateCompatible (PubKeyEC _) cTypes = CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign `elem` cTypes certificateCompatible (PubKeyEd25519 _) _ = True certificateCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) _ = True +-- ML-DSA has no CertificateType of its own, as EdDSA does not either; what +-- a client may send is decided by signature_algorithms. +certificateCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) _ = True +certificateCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) _ = True +certificateCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) _ = True certificateCompatible _ _ = False signatureCompatible :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +-- ML-DSA first, and with a refusal for every other kind of key. The RSA +-- equations below ignore the first byte, and ML-DSA's second byte is one +-- RSASSA-PSS also uses, so an ML-DSA scheme reaching them would be answered +-- for as though it were RSASSA-PSS. +signatureCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) MLDSA44 = True +signatureCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) MLDSA65 = True +signatureCompatible (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) MLDSA87 = True +signatureCompatible _ MLDSA44 = False +signatureCompatible _ MLDSA65 = False +signatureCompatible _ MLDSA87 = False signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA1 signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA256 signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA384 @@ -60,6 +75,48 @@ signatureCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) (_, SignatureEd448) = True signatureCompatible _ (_, _) = False +-- Whether the signature algorithm is for the type of the key, whatever +-- its other parameters. +-- +-- This takes the whole scheme and not its second byte alone, because +-- ML-DSA's second byte is one RSASSA-PSS also uses: only the pair says +-- which of the two a scheme is. The ML-DSA equations come first for the +-- same reason -- an ML-DSA scheme fits no other kind of key, and one +-- ML-DSA size does not fit another's key. +keyTypeFits :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +keyTypeFits (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) hs = hs == MLDSA44 +keyTypeFits (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) hs = hs == MLDSA65 +keyTypeFits (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) hs = hs == MLDSA87 +keyTypeFits _ MLDSA44 = False +keyTypeFits _ MLDSA65 = False +keyTypeFits _ MLDSA87 = False +keyTypeFits (PubKeyRSA _) (_, s) = + s + `elem` [ SignatureRSA + , SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256 + , SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384 + , SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA256 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA384 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA512 + ] +keyTypeFits (PubKeyDSA _) (_, s) = s == SignatureDSA +keyTypeFits (PubKeyEC _) (_, s) = s == SignatureECDSA +keyTypeFits (PubKeyEd25519 _) (_, s) = s == SignatureEd25519 +keyTypeFits (PubKeyEd448 _) (_, s) = s == SignatureEd448 +keyTypeFits _ _ = False + +checkKeyTypeFits :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> IO () +checkKeyTypeFits pubKey hs = + unless (pubKey `keyTypeFits` hs) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ( "signature algorithm " + ++ showSignatureScheme hs + ++ " is for another type of key" + ) + IllegalParameter + -- Same as 'signatureCompatible' but for TLS13: for ECDSA this also checks the -- relation between hash in the HashAndSignatureAlgorithm and elliptic curve signatureCompatible13 :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool @@ -118,9 +175,24 @@ -> ByteString -> DigitallySigned -> IO Bool -checkCertificateVerify ctx usedVersion pubKey msgs digSig@(DigitallySigned hashSigAlg _) - | pubKey `signatureCompatible` hashSigAlg = doVerify - | otherwise = return False +-- An algorithm not offered in CertificateRequest (RFC 5246 Section +-- 7.4.8), or one for another type of key, is a field that is incorrect, +-- an illegal_parameter. One for the right type of key that still does +-- not fit it, an RSASSA-PSS one for an rsaEncryption key say, is a +-- signature that does not verify, a decrypt_error, which False leads to. +checkCertificateVerify ctx usedVersion pubKey msgs digSig@(DigitallySigned hashSigAlg _) = do + -- ML-DSA is defined for TLS 1.3 only, so naming one here is a field + -- that is incorrect whatever key the peer holds. + when (usedVersion < TLS13 && isMLDSA hashSigAlg) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("signature algorithm " ++ showSignatureScheme hashSigAlg ++ " is not for " ++ show usedVersion) + IllegalParameter + checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hashSigAlg + checkKeyTypeFits pubKey hashSigAlg + if pubKey `signatureCompatible` hashSigAlg + then doVerify + else return False where doVerify = prepareCertificateVerifySignatureData ctx usedVersion pubKey hashSigAlg msgs @@ -156,6 +228,9 @@ return (signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg, msgs) signatureParams :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> SignatureParams +-- Which of these is used is decided by the key, and signatureCompatible has +-- already refused a scheme that does not fit the key, so an ML-DSA scheme +-- cannot arrive at a clause for another kind of key. signatureParams (PubKeyRSA _) hashSigAlg = case hashSigAlg of (HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) -> RSAParams SHA512 RSApkcs1 @@ -195,6 +270,9 @@ (hsh, SignatureEd448) -> error ("unimplemented Ed448 signature hash type: " ++ show hsh) (_, sigAlg) -> error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with Ed448: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) MLDSA44 = MLDSA44Params +signatureParams (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) MLDSA65 = MLDSA65Params +signatureParams (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) MLDSA87 = MLDSA87Params signatureParams pk _ = error ("signatureParams: " ++ pubkeyType pk ++ " is not supported") signatureCreateWithCertVerifyData @@ -207,19 +285,24 @@ DigitallySigned malg <$> signPrivate ctx role sigParam toSign signatureVerify :: Context -> DigitallySigned -> PubKey -> ByteString -> IO Bool +-- Checked as checkCertificateVerify does: the peer chose the algorithm, so +-- one that does not fit the key is its error, not ours. signatureVerify ctx digSig@(DigitallySigned hashSigAlg _) pubKey toVerifyData = do usedVersion <- usingState_ ctx getVersion - let (sigParam, toVerify) = - case (usedVersion, hashSigAlg) of - (TLS12, hs) - | pubKey `signatureCompatible` hs -> - (signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg, toVerifyData) - | otherwise -> - error "expecting different signature algorithm" - _ -> - error - "not expecting hash and signature algorithm in a < TLS12 digitially signed structure" - signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData ctx digSig (sigParam, toVerify) + unless (usedVersion == TLS12) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("no signature algorithm in a " ++ show usedVersion ++ " digitally-signed") + InternalError + checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hashSigAlg + checkKeyTypeFits pubKey hashSigAlg + if pubKey `signatureCompatible` hashSigAlg + then + signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData + ctx + digSig + (signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg, toVerifyData) + else return False signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData :: Context @@ -301,5 +384,5 @@ :: Context -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> IO () checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs = unless (hs `elem` supportedHashSignatures (ctxSupported ctx)) $ - let msg = "unsupported hash and signature algorithm: " ++ show hs + let msg = "unsupported hash and signature algorithm: " ++ showSignatureScheme hs in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ clearRxRecordState, PendingRecvAction (..), setPendingRecvActions, + pushPendingRecvAction, popPendingRecvAction, ) where @@ -140,6 +141,9 @@ setPendingRecvActions :: Context -> [PendingRecvAction] -> IO () setPendingRecvActions ctx = writeIORef (ctxPendingRecvActions ctx) + +pushPendingRecvAction :: Context -> PendingRecvAction -> IO () +pushPendingRecvAction ctx a = modifyIORef' (ctxPendingRecvActions ctx) (a :) popPendingRecvAction :: Context -> IO (Maybe PendingRecvAction) popPendingRecvAction ctx = do diff --git a/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs b/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs --- a/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ HashSHA256, HashSHA384, HashSHA512, - HashIntrinsic + HashIntrinsic, + HashMLDSA ), SignatureAlgorithm ( .., @@ -31,8 +32,13 @@ SignatureBrainpoolP512 ), HashAndSignatureAlgorithm, + pattern MLDSA44, + pattern MLDSA65, + pattern MLDSA87, supportedSignatureSchemes, signatureSchemesForTLS13, + isMLDSA, + showSignatureScheme, ) where import Network.TLS.Imports @@ -59,6 +65,8 @@ pattern HashSHA512 = HashAlgorithm 6 pattern HashIntrinsic :: HashAlgorithm pattern HashIntrinsic = HashAlgorithm 8 +pattern HashMLDSA :: HashAlgorithm -- not a hash; see MLDSA44 below +pattern HashMLDSA = HashAlgorithm 9 instance Show HashAlgorithm where show HashNone = "None" @@ -69,6 +77,7 @@ show HashSHA384 = "SHA384" show HashSHA512 = "SHA512" show HashIntrinsic = "TLS13" + show HashMLDSA = "MLDSA" show (HashAlgorithm x) = "Hash " ++ show x {- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} @@ -133,11 +142,55 @@ type HashAndSignatureAlgorithm = (HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm) +-- ML-DSA, from draft-ietf-tls-mldsa: mldsa44(0x0904), mldsa65(0x0905) and +-- mldsa87(0x0906). +-- +-- These are named as whole pairs rather than as a new 'SignatureAlgorithm', +-- because neither byte is what it is elsewhere: 0x09 is not a hash, and the +-- second byte repeats numbers RSASSA-PSS already uses. Only the pair +-- identifies the scheme, so only the pair is given a name, and code that +-- decides anything about ML-DSA has to match on both bytes. + +-- | Name a signature scheme. +-- +-- 'show' on the pair cannot do this for ML-DSA. A scheme is a 16-bit +-- number that hs-tls carries as the two bytes it is made of, and for ML-DSA +-- the size is in the second byte, whose values RSASSA-PSS also uses -- so +-- the components alone render mldsa65 as @(MLDSA,RSApssRSAeSHA384)@, which +-- names the wrong algorithm. Use this wherever a scheme is put in front of +-- a person. +showSignatureScheme :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> String +showSignatureScheme MLDSA44 = "mldsa44" +showSignatureScheme MLDSA65 = "mldsa65" +showSignatureScheme MLDSA87 = "mldsa87" +showSignatureScheme hs = show hs + +-- | Is this one of the ML-DSA schemes? They are TLS 1.3 only, so the +-- TLS 1.2 paths filter them out and refuse one that arrives anyway. +isMLDSA :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +isMLDSA MLDSA44 = True +isMLDSA MLDSA65 = True +isMLDSA MLDSA87 = True +isMLDSA _ = False + {- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern MLDSA44 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +pattern MLDSA44 = (HashMLDSA, SignatureAlgorithm 4) +pattern MLDSA65 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +pattern MLDSA65 = (HashMLDSA, SignatureAlgorithm 5) +pattern MLDSA87 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +pattern MLDSA87 = (HashMLDSA, SignatureAlgorithm 6) +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} supportedSignatureSchemes :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] supportedSignatureSchemes = + -- ML-DSA algorithms, TLS 1.3 only + [ MLDSA87 -- mldsa87(0x0906) + , MLDSA65 -- mldsa65(0x0905) + , MLDSA44 -- mldsa44(0x0904) -- EdDSA algorithms - [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) -- ed25519(0x0807) -- ECDSA algorithms , (HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512(0x0603) @@ -162,8 +215,12 @@ signatureSchemesForTLS13 :: [(HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm)] signatureSchemesForTLS13 = + -- ML-DSA algorithms + [ MLDSA87 -- mldsa87(0x0906) + , MLDSA65 -- mldsa65(0x0905) + , MLDSA44 -- mldsa44(0x0904) -- EdDSA algorithms - [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) -- ed25519(0x0807) -- ECDSA algorithms , (HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512(0x0603) diff --git a/Network/TLS/IO.hs b/Network/TLS/IO.hs --- a/Network/TLS/IO.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/IO.hs @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ loadPacket13, ) where -import Control.Exception (finally, throwIO) +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Control.Monad.Reader import Control.Monad.State.Strict import qualified Data.ByteString as B @@ -102,8 +102,15 @@ Left err -> do logPacket ctx $ show err return $ Left err - Right record - | hrr && isCCS record -> loop (count + 1) + Right record@(Record _ _ fragment) + -- the ChangeCipherSpec after a HelloRetryRequest is skipped, + -- but checked like any other + | hrr && isCCS record -> + case checkChangeCipherSpec fragment of + Left err -> do + logPacket ctx $ show err + return $ Left err + Right _ -> loop (count + 1) | otherwise -> do pktRecv <- decodePacket12 ctx record if isEmptyHandshake pktRecv @@ -181,6 +188,9 @@ return $ Right $ Handshake13 hss' bss logPacket ctx $ show pkt return pktRecv' + Right pkt@(AppData13 _) -> do + logPacket ctx $ show pkt + checkNotInterleaved ctx pktRecv Right pkt -> do logPacket ctx $ show pkt return pktRecv @@ -194,6 +204,24 @@ ---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- RFC 8446 Section 5.1: handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with +-- other record types. Application data that arrives while a handshake +-- message is still incomplete is refused with unexpected_message rather +-- than delivered. TLS 1.3 only: RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1 lets TLS 1.2 +-- interleave data of different content types. +checkNotInterleaved :: Context -> Either TLSError a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +checkNotInterleaved ctx pktRecv = do + complete <- isRecvComplete ctx + if complete + then return pktRecv + else do + let err = + Error_Packet_unexpected + "application data" + " expected: the rest of a handshake message" + logPacket ctx $ show err + return $ Left err + isRecvComplete :: Context -> IO Bool isRecvComplete ctx = usingState_ ctx $ do cont12 <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont12 @@ -203,9 +231,9 @@ checkValid :: Context -> IO () checkValid ctx = do established <- ctxEstablished ctx - when (established == NotEstablished) $ throwIO ConnectionNotEstablished + when (established == NotEstablished) $ E.throwIO ConnectionNotEstablished eofed <- ctxEOF ctx - when eofed $ throwIO $ PostHandshake Error_EOF + when eofed $ E.throwIO $ PostHandshake Error_EOF ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -223,7 +251,8 @@ runPacketFlight :: Context -> (forall b. Monoid b => PacketFlightM b a) -> IO a runPacketFlight ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} (PacketFlightM f) = do ref <- newIORef id - runReaderT f (recordLayer, ref) `finally` sendPendingFlight ctx recordLayer ref + runReaderT f (recordLayer, ref) + `E.finally` sendPendingFlight ctx recordLayer ref sendPendingFlight :: Monoid b => Context -> RecordLayer b -> IORef (Builder b) -> IO () diff --git a/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs b/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs --- a/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ module Network.TLS.IO.Decode ( decodePacket12, decodePacket13, + checkChangeCipherSpec, ) where import Control.Concurrent.MVar @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ import Network.TLS.State import Network.TLS.Struct import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types (Role (..)) import Network.TLS.Util import Network.TLS.Wire @@ -27,57 +29,76 @@ decodePacket12 _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData $ fragmentGetBytes fragment decodePacket12 _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return (Alert `fmapEither` decodeAlerts (fragmentGetBytes fragment)) decodePacket12 ctx (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = - case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of + case checkChangeCipherSpec fragment of Left err -> return $ Left err Right _ -> do - switchRxEncryption ctx - return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec + -- ChangeCipherSpec comes between complete handshake messages + -- (RFC 5246 Section 7.1), so not before the first ClientHello + -- of a server, which has no handshake state yet, nor in the + -- middle of a fragmented handshake message (CVE-2004-0079), + -- nor before the keys it switches to are computed. + mhs <- getHState ctx + (mCont, _) <- usingState_ ctx $ gets stHandshakeRecordCont12 + case mhs >>= hstPendingRxState of + Just rx | isNothing mCont -> do + modifyMVar_ (ctxRxRecordState ctx) (\_ -> return rx) + return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec + _ -> + return $ + Left $ + Error_Packet_unexpected "ChangeCipherSpec" " expected: handshake" decodePacket12 ctx (Record ProtocolType_Handshake ver fragment) = do - keyxchg <- - getHState ctx >>= \hs -> return (hs >>= hstPendingCipher >>= Just . cipherKeyExchange) + mhs <- getHState ctx + let keyxchg = mhs >>= hstPendingCipher >>= Just . cipherKeyExchange usingState ctx $ do + role <- getRole let currentParams = CurrentParams { cParamsVersion = ver , cParamsKeyXchgType = keyxchg } + -- A server has no handshake state until its first ClientHello, + -- and that is the only message it may receive then (RFC 8446 + -- Section 4). Any other is answered with unexpected_message + -- before its body is decoded, rather than with whatever decoding + -- the body as that type gives. + expectClientHello = role == ServerRole && isNothing mhs + decode ty content + | expectClientHello && ty /= HandshakeType_ClientHello = + Left $ Error_Packet_unexpected (show ty) " expected: client hello" + | otherwise = decodeHandshake currentParams ty content -- get back the optional continuation, and parse as many handshake record as possible. (mCont, wirebytes) <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont12 modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont12 = (Nothing, [])}) (hss, bss) <- - unzip <$> parseMany currentParams mCont wirebytes (fragmentGetBytes fragment) + unzip <$> parseMany decode mCont wirebytes (fragmentGetBytes fragment) return $ Handshake hss bss where - parseMany currentParams mCont wirebytes bs = + parseMany decode mCont wirebytes bs = case fromMaybe decodeHandshakeRecord mCont bs of GotError err -> throwError err GotPartial cont -> do modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont12 = (Just cont, bs : wirebytes)}) return [] GotSuccess (ty, content) -> - case decodeHandshake currentParams ty content of + case decode ty content of Left err -> throwError err Right h -> return [(h, reverse (bs : wirebytes))] GotSuccessRemaining (ty, content) left -> - case decodeHandshake currentParams ty content of + case decode ty content of Left err -> throwError err Right h -> do - hbs <- parseMany currentParams Nothing [] left + hbs <- parseMany decode Nothing [] left let len = BS.length bs - BS.length left bs' = BS.take len bs return ((h, reverse (bs' : wirebytes)) : hbs) -decodePacket12 _ _ = return $ Left (Error_Packet_Parsing "unknown protocol type") - -switchRxEncryption :: Context -> IO () -switchRxEncryption ctx = - usingHState ctx (gets hstPendingRxState) >>= \rx -> - modifyMVar_ (ctxRxRecordState ctx) (\_ -> return $ fromJust rx) +decodePacket12 _ (Record ty _ _) = return $ Left $ unknownProtocolType ty ---------------------------------------------------------------- decodePacket13 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError Packet13) decodePacket13 _ (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = - case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of + case checkChangeCipherSpec fragment of Left err -> return $ Left err Right _ -> return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec13 decodePacket13 _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData13 $ fragmentGetBytes fragment @@ -106,4 +127,20 @@ let len = BS.length bs - BS.length left bs' = BS.take len bs return ((h, reverse (bs' : wirebytes)) : hbs) -decodePacket13 _ _ = return $ Left (Error_Packet_Parsing "unknown protocol type") +decodePacket13 _ (Record ty _ _) = return $ Left $ unknownProtocolType ty + +-- RFC 8446 Section 5: a record of an unexpected type, including the inner +-- type of a TLS 1.3 record, is answered with unexpected_message. +unknownProtocolType :: ProtocolType -> TLSError +unknownProtocolType ty = Error_Packet_unexpected (show ty) " expected: TLS record type" + +-- | A ChangeCipherSpec is the single byte 1. RFC 8446 Section 5 answers any +-- other value with unexpected_message, and TLS 1.2, which does not say, +-- is answered the same way: a record of two of them included. +checkChangeCipherSpec :: Fragment a -> Either TLSError () +checkChangeCipherSpec fragment = + case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of + Left _ -> + Left $ + Error_Packet_unexpected "ChangeCipherSpec" " expected: the single byte 1" + Right _ -> Right () diff --git a/Network/TLS/Packet.hs b/Network/TLS/Packet.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Packet.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Packet.hs @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ import Network.TLS.Struct import Network.TLS.Types import Network.TLS.Util.ASN1 +import Network.TLS.Util.Serialization (os2ip) import Network.TLS.Wire ---------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -157,12 +158,33 @@ decodeHandshakeRecord :: ByteString -> GetResult (HandshakeType, ByteString) decodeHandshakeRecord = runGet "handshake-record" $ do ty <- getHandshakeType - content <- getOpaque24 + len <- getWord24 + -- Before the bytes, not after: the length is in the first four octets, so + -- refusing here is refusing to hold anything. Reassembly keeps every + -- fragment until the message is whole, and the peer picks the number it + -- announces. + when (len > maxHandshakeSize) $ + fail $ + "handshake message of " + ++ show len + ++ " octets exceeds the limit of " + ++ show maxHandshakeSize + content <- getBytes len return (ty, content) {- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} decodeHandshake :: CurrentParams -> HandshakeType -> ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake +-- A ClientKeyExchange is only expected once a cipher, and with it a key +-- exchange, has been negotiated; one that comes without -- after Finished, +-- say -- is out of order rather than malformed. +decodeHandshake cp HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg + | isNothing (cParamsKeyXchgType cp) = + const $ + Left $ + Error_Packet_unexpected + (show HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg) + " expected: no ClientKeyExchange before a key exchange is negotiated" decodeHandshake cp ty = runGetErr ("handshake[" ++ show ty ++ "]") $ case ty of HandshakeType_HelloRequest -> decodeHelloRequest HandshakeType_ClientHello -> decodeClientHello False @@ -337,8 +359,19 @@ parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA = parseClientECDHPublic parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA = parseClientECDHPublic parseCKE _ = fail "unsupported client key exchange type" - parseClientDHPublic = CKX_DH . dhPublic <$> getInteger16 - parseClientECDHPublic = CKX_ECDH <$> getOpaque8 + -- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.7.2: dh_Yc is <1..2^16-1>, so an empty one is + -- malformed, a decode_error, before it is a public value that is not + -- valid. + parseClientDHPublic = do + bs <- getOpaque16 + when (B.null bs) $ fail "empty DH public key" + return $ CKX_DH $ dhPublic $ os2ip bs + -- RFC 8422 Section 5.7: ecdh_Yc is <1..2^8-1>, so an empty one is + -- malformed, a decode_error, before it is a point that does not decode. + parseClientECDHPublic = do + bs <- getOpaque8 + when (B.null bs) $ fail "empty ECDH public key" + return $ CKX_ECDH bs decodeFinished :: Get Handshake decodeFinished = Finished . VerifyData <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs b/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs @@ -116,7 +116,18 @@ decodeHandshakeRecord13 :: ByteString -> GetResult (HandshakeType, ByteString) decodeHandshakeRecord13 = runGet "handshake-record" $ do ty <- getHandshakeType - content <- getOpaque24 + len <- getWord24 + -- Before the bytes, not after: the length is in the first four octets, so + -- refusing here is refusing to hold anything. Reassembly keeps every + -- fragment until the message is whole, and the peer picks the number it + -- announces. + when (len > maxHandshakeSize) $ + fail $ + "handshake message of " + ++ show len + ++ " octets exceeds the limit of " + ++ show maxHandshakeSize + content <- getBytes len return (ty, content) {- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} @@ -209,25 +220,39 @@ 1 -> return $ KeyUpdate13 UpdateRequested x -> fail $ "Unknown request_update: " ++ show x +-- RFC 8879 Section 4: a certificate that cannot be decompressed, or whose +-- decompressed length is not the declared one, is answered with +-- bad_certificate, and an algorithm that was not offered with +-- illegal_parameter. errorToAlert tells them apart by the messages below. +-- A message that is malformed as a whole -- an empty +-- compressed_certificate_message, which its <1..2^24-1> bound forbids, or +-- bytes beyond the declared length -- is a decode_error, and is found +-- before anything is decompressed. decodeCompressedCertificate13 :: Get Handshake13 decodeCompressedCertificate13 = do algo <- getWord16 - when (algo /= 1) $ fail "comp algo is not supported" -- fixme + when (algo /= 1) $ fail "unsupported certificate compression algorithm" -- fixme len <- getWord24 bs <- getOpaque24 + left <- remaining + when (left /= 0) $ fail "bytes after compressed certificate" if bs == "" then fail "empty compressed certificate" - else case decompressIt bs of - Left e -> fail (show e) + else case decompressIt len bs of + Left e -> fail $ "certificate cannot be decompressed: " ++ show e Right bs' -> do - when (B.length bs' /= len) $ fail "plain length is wrong" + when (B.length bs' /= len) $ + fail "certificate cannot be decompressed: wrong uncompressed_length" case runGetMaybe decodeCertificate13 bs' of Just (Certificate13 reqctx certs ess) -> return $ CompressedCertificate13 reqctx certs ess -- _ -> fail "compressed certificate cannot be parsed" _ -> fail $ "invalid compressed certificate: len = " ++ show len -decompressIt :: ByteString -> Either DecompressError ByteString -decompressIt inp = unsafePerformIO $ E.handle handler $ do - Right . BL.toStrict <$> E.evaluate (decompress (BL.fromStrict inp)) +decompressIt :: Int -> ByteString -> Either DecompressError ByteString +decompressIt limit inp = unsafePerformIO $ E.handle handler $ do + -- One extra byte distinguishes exact-length output from oversized output. + let output = BL.take (fromIntegral limit + 1) $ decompress $ BL.fromStrict inp + Right <$> E.evaluate (BL.toStrict output) where - handler e = return $ Left (e :: DecompressError) + handler :: DecompressError -> IO (Either DecompressError ByteString) + handler e = return $ Left e diff --git a/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs b/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ -- -- Default: 'Nothing' , debugPrintSeed :: Seed -> IO () - -- ^ Add a way to print the seed that was randomly generated. re-using the same seed + -- ^ Add a way to print the seed that was randomly generated. reusing the same seed -- will reproduce the same randomness with 'debugSeed' -- -- Default: no printing @@ -153,6 +153,16 @@ -- specified for TLS 1.2 but only the first entry is used. -- -- Default: '[]' + , clientWantTicket :: Bool + -- ^ Whether to solicit TLS 1.2 session tickets (or TLS 1.3 + -- resumption PSKs) from servers. With a 'False' setting, + -- stateless clients that never do resumption can avoid + -- wasting server and client resources used to generate, + -- transmit and process tickets that will never be used. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + -- + -- @since 2.4.1 , clientShared :: Shared -- ^ See the default value of 'Shared'. , clientHooks :: ClientHooks @@ -192,6 +202,7 @@ , clientUseServerNameIndication = True , clientWantSessionResume = Nothing , clientWantSessionResumeList = [] + , clientWantTicket = True , clientShared = def , clientHooks = def , clientSupported = def @@ -401,8 +412,9 @@ -- -- Default: @[X25519,P256,P384,X448,P521,FFDHE3072,FFDHE4096,FFDHE6144,FFDHE8192,X25519MLKEM768,P256MLKEM768,P384MLKEM1024,MLKEM768,MLKEM1024]@ , supportedGroupsTLS13 :: [[Group]] - -- ^ @[Group]@ contains @Group@s of the same level in preferred order. - -- @[Group]@ is also listed in preferred order. + -- ^ The inside @[Group]@ is the list of @Group@ at the same level + -- in preferred order. The inside @[Group]@s are also listed in + -- preferred order. -- -- TLS 1.3 server: this is used as the 1st argument to -- 'onSelectKeyShare'. @@ -628,10 +640,11 @@ -- "Data.X509.Validation". This can be replaced with a custom -- validation function using different settings. -- - -- The function is not expected to verify the key-usage extension - -- of the end-entity certificate, as this depends on the - -- dynamically-selected cipher and this part should not be cached. - -- Key-usage verification is performed by the library internally. + -- The function is not expected to verify the key-usage or + -- extended-key-usage extensions of the end-entity certificate. + -- Key usage depends on the dynamically-selected cipher and this + -- part should not be cached. Both checks are performed by the + -- library internally after this function accepts the chain. -- -- Default: 'validateDefault' , onSuggestALPN :: IO (Maybe [ByteString]) @@ -657,7 +670,7 @@ -- (3) rejecting unless 1 < dh_p && pub < dh_p - 1 -- (4) rejecting if dh_size < 1024 (to prevent Logjam attack) -- - -- See RFC 7919 section 3.1 for recommandations. + -- See RFC 7919 section 3.1 for recommendations. , onServerFinished :: Information -> IO () -- ^ When a handshake is done, this hook can check `Information`. , onSelectKeyShareGroups :: [Group] -> [Group] @@ -722,7 +735,7 @@ -- of the certificate. This verification is performed by the -- library internally. -- - -- Default: returns the followings: + -- Default: returns the following: -- -- @ -- CertificateUsageReject (CertificateRejectOther "no client certificates expected") @@ -738,7 +751,7 @@ -- client version and the client list of ciphers. -- -- This could be useful with old clients and as a workaround to - -- the BEAST (where RC4 is sometimes prefered with TLS < 1.1) + -- the BEAST (where RC4 is sometimes preferred with TLS < 1.1) -- -- The client cipher list cannot be empty. -- @@ -875,6 +888,14 @@ -- certificate. -- -- Default: 32 + , limitKeyUpdate :: Maybe Int + -- ^ Maximum number of consecutive TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate messages accepted + -- without intervening non-empty application data. This bounds the CPU + -- work and response amplification a peer can trigger while application + -- code is blocked inside 'recvData'. 'Nothing' and non-positive values + -- disable the limit; they do not disable KeyUpdate processing. + -- + -- Default: @Just 32@ } deriving (Eq, Show) @@ -884,4 +905,5 @@ Limit { limitRecordSize = Nothing , limitHandshakeFragment = 32 + , limitKeyUpdate = Just 32 } diff --git a/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs b/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs --- a/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs @@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ -- | Handle a post-handshake authentication flight with TLS 1.3. This -- is called automatically by 'recvData', in a context where the read -- lock is already taken. Client only. -postHandshakeAuthWith :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () -postHandshakeAuthWith ctx hs = +postHandshakeAuthWith :: Context -> Handshake13R -> IO () +postHandshakeAuthWith ctx hb = withWriteLock ctx $ handleException ctx $ - doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx hs + doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx hb diff --git a/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs b/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs --- a/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ { quicSend :: [(CryptLevel, ByteString)] -> IO () -- ^ Called by TLS so that QUIC sends one or more handshake fragments. The -- content transiting on this API is the plaintext of the fragments and - -- QUIC responsability is to encrypt this payload with the key material + -- QUIC responsibility is to encrypt this payload with the key material -- given for the specified level and an appropriate encryption scheme. -- -- The size of the fragments may exceed QUIC datagram limits so QUIC may @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ let qexts = filterQTP exts when (null qexts) $ do throwCore $ - Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are mssing" MissingExtension + Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are missing" MissingExtension quicNotifyExtensions callbacks ctx qexts quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallApplicationKeys appSecInfo) @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ let qexts = filterQTP exts when (null qexts) $ do throwCore $ - Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are mssing" MissingExtension + Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are missing" MissingExtension quicNotifyExtensions callbacks ctx qexts quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallEarlyKeys mEarlySecInfo) quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallHandshakeKeys handSecInfo) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs @@ -42,7 +42,13 @@ Left message -> throwError $ Error_Protocol message UnexpectedMessage Right (ct', d) -> return $ Record ct' ver $ fragmentPlaintext d ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec -> noDecryption - ProtocolType_Alert -> noDecryption + -- A peer that fails before it has keys answers in clear, but after + -- the handshake an alert in clear can only be forged (RFC 8446 + -- Section 5). + ProtocolType_Alert + | stCryptLevel st == CryptApplicationSecret -> + throwError $ Error_Protocol "alert in clear" UnexpectedMessage + | otherwise -> noDecryption _ -> throwError $ Error_Protocol "illegal plain text" UnexpectedMessage @@ -59,25 +65,40 @@ nonEmptyContentTypes = [ProtocolType_Handshake, ProtocolType_Alert] unknownContentType13 c = "unknown TLS 1.3 content type: " ++ show c -getCipherData :: Record a -> CipherData -> RecordM ByteString -getCipherData (Record pt ver _) cdata = do +-- | Check a decrypted record. +-- +-- The first 'Bool' is what the lengths already said: 'False' when the padding +-- length the record claims cannot be one. It is carried in rather than +-- answered where it was found, so that the MAC is computed either way -- see +-- 'decryptData'. +-- +-- Everything is computed before anything is decided, and the verdicts are +-- combined with '&&!', which does not short-circuit. +getCipherData :: Record a -> Bool -> CipherData -> RecordM ByteString +getCipherData (Record pt ver _) lengthValid cdata = do -- check if the MAC is valid. macValid <- case cipherDataMAC cdata of Nothing -> return True Just digest -> do let new_hdr = Header pt ver (fromIntegral $ B.length $ cipherDataContent cdata) expected_digest <- makeDigest new_hdr $ cipherDataContent cdata - return (expected_digest == digest) + -- constEq rather than (==): (==) on ByteString is memcmp, which + -- returns as soon as two octets differ, and how soon is a + -- measurement of how much of the MAC was guessed correctly. + return (expected_digest `BA.constEq` digest) -- check if the padding is filled with the correct pattern if it exists -- (before TLS10 this checks instead that the padding length is minimal) paddingValid <- case cipherDataPadding cdata of Nothing -> return True Just (pad, _blksz) -> do - let b = B.length pad - 1 - return $ B.replicate (B.length pad) (fromIntegral b) == pad + let b = fromIntegral (B.length pad - 1) + -- Every octet, and no allocation of a pattern to compare against: + -- B.all stops at the first wrong octet, and replicating the + -- pattern costs time in proportion to a length the peer chose. + return $ B.foldl' (\acc w -> acc .|. (w `xor` b)) 0 pad == 0 - unless (macValid &&! paddingValid) $ + unless (lengthValid &&! macValid &&! paddingValid) $ throwError $ Error_Protocol "bad record mac Stream/Block" BadRecordMac @@ -115,9 +136,13 @@ blockSize = bulkBlockSize bulk econtentLen = B.length econtent + -- A record too short for the cipher cannot be deprotected: RFC 5246 + -- Section 7.2.2 and RFC 8446 Section 5.2 answer it with bad_record_mac. sanityCheckError = - throwError - (Error_Packet "encrypted content too small for encryption parameters") + throwError $ + Error_Protocol + "encrypted content too small for encryption parameters" + BadRecordMac decryptOf :: BulkState -> RecordM ByteString decryptOf (BulkStateBlock decryptF) = do @@ -134,11 +159,25 @@ let (content', iv') = decryptF iv econtent' modify' $ \txs -> txs{stCryptState = cst{cstIV = iv'}} - let paddinglength = fromIntegral (B.last content') + 1 - let contentlen = B.length content' - paddinglength - macSize + -- The last octet of the plaintext says how much padding there is. + -- It may say more than the record can hold, and that already settles + -- the record -- but answering it here, by splitting the record and + -- failing, would answer it *without computing the MAC*. How long a + -- record takes to reject would then say whether the padding length + -- was plausible, which is the question the attacker is asking. + -- + -- So carry the verdict instead and go on with a length that fits. + -- getCipherData folds it in with the MAC, and the answer is the same + -- BadRecordMac either way. + let plainlen = B.length content' + claimed = fromIntegral (B.last content') + 1 + lengthValid = claimed + macSize <= plainlen + paddinglength = if lengthValid then claimed else 1 + contentlen = plainlen - paddinglength - macSize (content, mac, padding) <- get3i content' (contentlen, macSize, paddinglength) getCipherData record + lengthValid CipherData { cipherDataContent = content , cipherDataMAC = Just mac @@ -155,6 +194,7 @@ modify' $ \txs -> txs{stCryptState = cst{cstKey = BulkStateStream bulkStream'}} getCipherData record + True CipherData { cipherDataContent = content , cipherDataMAC = Just mac @@ -194,9 +234,11 @@ decryptOf BulkStateUninitialized = throwError $ Error_Protocol "decrypt state uninitialized" InternalError - -- handling of outer format can report errors with Error_Packet + -- the outer format of a record that cannot be deprotected is reported + -- as an integrity failure too, i.e. BadRecordMac get3o s ls = - maybe (throwError $ Error_Packet "record bad format") return $ partition3 s ls + maybe (throwError $ Error_Protocol "record bad format" BadRecordMac) return $ + partition3 s ls get2o s (d1, d2) = get3o s (d1, d2, 0) >>= \(r1, r2, _) -> return (r1, r2) -- all format errors related to decrypted content are reported diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ -- ^ TLS context -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) recvRecord12 ctx = - readExactBytes ctx 5 >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . decodeHeader) + readExactBytes ctx 5 + >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . (decodeHeader >=> checkType)) where recvLengthE = either (return . Left) recvLength @@ -69,7 +70,9 @@ >>= either (return . Left) (getRecord ctx header) recvRecord13 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) -recvRecord13 ctx = readExactBytes ctx 5 >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . decodeHeader) +recvRecord13 ctx = + readExactBytes ctx 5 + >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . (decodeHeader >=> checkType)) where recvLengthE = either (return . Left) recvLength recvLength header@(Header _ _ readlen) = do @@ -90,6 +93,24 @@ maximumSizeExceeded :: TLSError maximumSizeExceeded = Error_Protocol "record exceeding maximum size" RecordOverflow + +-- RFC 8446 Section 5: a record of an unexpected type is answered with +-- unexpected_message. Checked on the header, before the body is read, so +-- that what is no TLS record at all -- an SSLv2 ClientHello, say, whose first +-- byte reads as type 0x80 and whose length can ask for bytes that never +-- come -- is answered at once rather than when the peer gives up. +checkType :: Header -> Either TLSError Header +checkType header@(Header ty _ _) + | ty `elem` known = Right header + | otherwise = + Left $ Error_Packet_unexpected (show ty) " expected: TLS record type" + where + known = + [ ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec + , ProtocolType_Alert + , ProtocolType_Handshake + , ProtocolType_AppData + ] ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/State.hs b/Network/TLS/State.hs --- a/Network/TLS/State.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/State.hs @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ setVersion, setVersionIfUnset, getVersion, + getVersionMaybe, getVersionWithDefault, setSecureRenegotiation, getSecureRenegotiation, @@ -231,6 +232,14 @@ getVersion = fromMaybe (error "internal error: version hasn't been set yet") <$> gets stVersion + +-- | The negotiated version, or 'Nothing' before there is one. +-- +-- 'getVersion' calls 'error' in that case, which is the right answer inside +-- the handshake -- reaching it there would be a bug -- and the wrong one for +-- anything a user of the library can call before the handshake has run. +getVersionMaybe :: TLSSt (Maybe Version) +getVersionMaybe = gets stVersion getVersionWithDefault :: Version -> TLSSt Version getVersionWithDefault defaultVer = fromMaybe defaultVer <$> gets stVersion diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types.hs b/Network/TLS/Types.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Types.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Types.hs @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ bigNumToInteger, bigNumFromInteger, defaultRecordSizeLimit, + maxHandshakeSize, TranscriptHash (..), WireBytes, ) where @@ -58,6 +59,22 @@ -- 2^14 + 1 for TLS 1.3 defaultRecordSizeLimit :: Int defaultRecordSizeLimit = 16384 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | The largest handshake message we will reassemble. +-- +-- A handshake message carries a 24-bit length, so a peer may announce close +-- to 16MB and then feed it a record at a time. Records are bounded, but the +-- message they are reassembled into was not, and the fragments are held until +-- it is complete -- before anything has authenticated the peer. +-- +-- The largest legitimate one is a Certificate message. A long chain of +-- post-quantum certificates runs to tens of kilobytes, so this leaves an +-- order of magnitude over anything real while taking two orders of magnitude +-- off what a peer can ask us to hold. +maxHandshakeSize :: Int +maxHandshakeSize = 262144 ---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs @@ -1,5 +1,14 @@ +-- | The secret types of the TLS key schedule. +-- +-- None of these prints its key material: 'Show' renders @\@, since +-- these values reach a QUIC implementation through +-- "Network.TLS.QUIC" and are the kind of thing a handshake trace prints +-- without meaning to. 'Crypto.Debug.debugShow' returns the hexadecimal that +-- 'Show' used to, for a debugging session that wants it. @SSLKEYLOGFILE@ +-- does not go through either: it uses 'Network.TLS.Handshake.Key.LogLabel'. module Network.TLS.Types.Secret where +import Crypto.Debug (DebugShow (..)) import Data.ByteArray (convert) import Network.TLS.Imports import Network.TLS.Types.Cipher @@ -18,27 +27,39 @@ newtype BaseSecret a = BaseSecret Secret instance Show (BaseSecret a) where - show (BaseSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + show _ = "" +instance DebugShow (BaseSecret a) where + debugShow (BaseSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + newtype AnyTrafficSecret a = AnyTrafficSecret Secret instance Show (AnyTrafficSecret a) where - show (AnyTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + show _ = "" +instance DebugShow (AnyTrafficSecret a) where + debugShow (AnyTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + -- | A client traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the -- TLS key schedule. newtype ClientTrafficSecret a = ClientTrafficSecret Secret instance Show (ClientTrafficSecret a) where - show (ClientTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + show _ = "" +instance DebugShow (ClientTrafficSecret a) where + debugShow (ClientTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + -- | A server traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the -- TLS key schedule. newtype ServerTrafficSecret a = ServerTrafficSecret Secret instance Show (ServerTrafficSecret a) where - show (ServerTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + show _ = "" +instance DebugShow (ServerTrafficSecret a) where + debugShow (ServerTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + data SecretTriple a = SecretTriple { triBase :: BaseSecret a , triClient :: ClientTrafficSecret a @@ -59,4 +80,7 @@ newtype MainSecret = MainSecret Secret instance Show MainSecret where - show (MainSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + show _ = "" + +instance DebugShow MainSecret where + debugShow (MainSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ module Network.TLS.Types.Session where import Codec.Serialise +import Crypto.Debug (DebugShow (..)) import qualified Data.ByteString as B import GHC.Generics import Network.Socket (HostName) @@ -46,7 +47,42 @@ , sessionMaxEarlyDataSize :: Int , sessionFlags :: [SessionFlag] } -- sessionFromTicket :: Bool - deriving (Show, Eq, Generic) + deriving (Eq, Generic) + +-- | Everything but @sessionSecret@, which renders as @\@: whoever +-- has it can resume the session. 'Crypto.Debug.debugShow' renders it. +instance Show SessionData where + showsPrec = showsSessionData (showString "") + +instance DebugShow SessionData where + debugShow sd = showsSessionData (shows $ sessionSecret sd) 0 sd "" + +-- | What the two instances above share, so that a field added to +-- 'SessionData' cannot reach one of them and not the other. +showsSessionData :: ShowS -> Int -> SessionData -> ShowS +showsSessionData secret d sd = + showParen (d > 10) $ + showString "SessionData {sessionVersion = " + . shows (sessionVersion sd) + . showString ", sessionCipher = " + . shows (sessionCipher sd) + . showString ", sessionCompression = " + . shows (sessionCompression sd) + . showString ", sessionClientSNI = " + . shows (sessionClientSNI sd) + . showString ", sessionSecret = " + . secret + . showString ", sessionGroup = " + . shows (sessionGroup sd) + . showString ", sessionTicketInfo = " + . shows (sessionTicketInfo sd) + . showString ", sessionALPN = " + . shows (sessionALPN sd) + . showString ", sessionMaxEarlyDataSize = " + . shows (sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sd) + . showString ", sessionFlags = " + . shows (sessionFlags sd) + . showChar '}' is0RTTPossible :: SessionData -> Bool is0RTTPossible sd = sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sd > 0 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Util.hs b/Network/TLS/Util.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Util.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Util.hs @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ ) where import Control.Concurrent.MVar -import Control.Exception (SomeAsyncException (..)) import qualified Control.Exception as E import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes) import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA @@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ where filterExn :: E.SomeException -> Maybe E.SomeException filterExn e = case E.fromException (E.toException e) of - Just (SomeAsyncException _) -> Nothing + Just (E.SomeAsyncException _) -> Nothing Nothing -> Just e forEitherM :: Monad m => [a] -> (a -> m (Either l b)) -> m (Either l [b]) diff --git a/test/Arbitrary.hs b/test/Arbitrary.hs --- a/test/Arbitrary.hs +++ b/test/Arbitrary.hs @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Data.List import Data.Word -import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag) +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag, privkeyMLDSAFromKey) import Network.TLS import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher import Network.TLS.Internal @@ -220,6 +220,22 @@ , (toPubKeyEC curveName ecdsaPub, toPrivKeyEC curveName ecdsaPriv) , (PubKeyEd25519 ed25519Pub, PrivKeyEd25519 ed25519Priv) , (PubKeyEd448 ed448Pub, PrivKeyEd448 ed448Priv) + ] + +-- | One credential per ML-DSA parameter set. +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachMLDSA :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachMLDSA = do + (pub44, priv44) <- arbitraryMLDSA44Pair + (pub65, priv65) <- arbitraryMLDSA65Pair + (pub87, priv87) <- arbitraryMLDSA87Pair + mapM + ( \(pub, priv) -> do + cert <- arbitraryX509WithKey (pub, priv) + return (CertificateChain [cert], priv) + ) + [ (PubKeyMLDSA44 pub44, PrivKeyMLDSA44 (privkeyMLDSAFromKey priv44)) + , (PubKeyMLDSA65 pub65, PrivKeyMLDSA65 (privkeyMLDSAFromKey priv65)) + , (PubKeyMLDSA87 pub87, PrivKeyMLDSA87 (privkeyMLDSAFromKey priv87)) ] arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] diff --git a/test/Certificate.hs b/test/Certificate.hs --- a/test/Certificate.hs +++ b/test/Certificate.hs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ arbitraryX509, arbitraryX509WithKey, arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage, + arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose, arbitraryDN, simpleCertificate, simpleX509, @@ -118,6 +119,25 @@ let (signedExact, ()) = objectToSignedExact (\_ -> (B.pack sig, sigalg, ())) cert return signedExact +arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose + :: ExtKeyUsagePurpose -> Gen (CertificateChain, PrivKey) +arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose purpose = do + let (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair + cert <- arbitraryCertificate knownKeyUsage $ PubKeyRSA pubKey + sig <- resize 40 $ listOf1 arbitrary + let cert' = + cert + { certExtensions = + Extensions $ + Just + [ extensionEncode True $ ExtKeyUsage knownKeyUsage + , extensionEncode False $ ExtExtendedKeyUsage [purpose] + ] + } + sigalg = getSignatureALG $ PubKeyRSA pubKey + (signedExact, ()) = objectToSignedExact (\_ -> (B.pack sig, sigalg, ())) cert' + return (CertificateChain [signedExact], PrivKeyRSA privKey) + arbitraryX509 :: Gen SignedCertificate arbitraryX509 = do let (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair @@ -139,6 +159,9 @@ getSignatureALG (PubKeyEC _) = SignatureALG HashSHA256 PubKeyALG_EC getSignatureALG (PubKeyEd25519 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519 getSignatureALG (PubKeyEd448 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448 +getSignatureALG (PubKeyMLDSA44 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA44 +getSignatureALG (PubKeyMLDSA65 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA65 +getSignatureALG (PubKeyMLDSA87 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_MLDSA87 getSignatureALG pubKey = error $ "getSignatureALG: unsupported public key: " ++ show pubKey diff --git a/test/EncodeSpec.hs b/test/EncodeSpec.hs --- a/test/EncodeSpec.hs +++ b/test/EncodeSpec.hs @@ -1,8 +1,18 @@ module EncodeSpec where +import Codec.Compression.Zlib (compress) +import Control.Exception (bracket_, evaluate) +import Control.Monad (forM_, void) import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as BL +import Data.Either (isLeft) +import Data.Int (Int64) +import Data.Word (Word16) +import GHC.Conc (disableAllocationLimit, enableAllocationLimit, setAllocationCounter) import Network.TLS import Network.TLS.Internal +import Network.TLS.QUIC (errorToAlertDescription) import Test.Hspec import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck @@ -10,6 +20,36 @@ spec :: Spec spec = do + describe "extension decoding" $ do + prop "yields Nothing rather than throwing, for any message type" $ + \ws -> forM_ extensionDecoders $ \(name, decode) -> + forM_ [minBound .. maxBound] $ \mt -> + decode mt (B.pack ws) `shouldReturn` name + describe "handshake record length" $ do + -- A handshake message carries a 24-bit length, and the fragments are + -- held until the message is whole. Refusing at the header means + -- refusing to hold anything: the length arrives in the first four + -- octets, before any of the body. + it "refuses a length past the limit, on its header alone" $ do + let tooBig = maxHandshakeSize + 1 + isGotError (decodeHandshakeRecord (handshakeHeader tooBig)) `shouldBe` True + isGotError (decodeHandshakeRecord13 (handshakeHeader tooBig)) `shouldBe` True + it "refuses the largest a 24-bit length can say" $ do + let header = handshakeHeader 0xffffff + isGotError (decodeHandshakeRecord header) `shouldBe` True + isGotError (decodeHandshakeRecord13 header) `shouldBe` True + -- Still waiting for the body rather than refusing it: at the limit + -- the header alone is not enough to decide anything is wrong. + it "asks for more at the limit itself" $ do + let header = handshakeHeader maxHandshakeSize + isGotPartial (decodeHandshakeRecord header) `shouldBe` True + isGotPartial (decodeHandshakeRecord13 header) `shouldBe` True + it "still decodes a message of an ordinary size" $ do + let body = B.replicate 1000 0 + record = handshakeHeader (B.length body) `B.append` body + gotThisMuch (B.length body) (decodeHandshakeRecord record) `shouldBe` True + gotThisMuch (B.length body) (decodeHandshakeRecord13 record) `shouldBe` True + describe "encoder/decoder" $ do prop "can encode/decode Header" $ \x -> do decodeHeader (encodeHeader x) `shouldBe` Right x @@ -17,7 +57,151 @@ decodeHs (encodeHandshake x) `shouldBe` Right x prop "can encode/decode Handshake13" $ \x -> do decodeHs13 (encodeHandshake13 x) `shouldBe` Right x + it "round trips a valid TLS 1.3 compressed certificate" $ do + let certificate = + CompressedCertificate13 + B.empty + (CertificateChain_ $ CertificateChain []) + [] + decodeHs13 (encodeHandshake13 certificate) `shouldBe` Right certificate + it "rejects decompressed output shorter than its declared size" $ do + let plain = encodeCertificate13 B.empty (CertificateChain []) [] + compressed = BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.fromStrict plain + encoded = runPut $ do + putWord16 1 + putWord24 (B.length plain + 1) + putOpaque24 compressed + decodeHandshake13 HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate encoded + `shouldSatisfy` isLeft + -- RFC 8879 Section 4: a CompressedCertificate that cannot be + -- decompressed, or whose decompressed length is not the one + -- declared, is answered with bad_certificate; one with an algorithm + -- that was not offered breaks no decoding rule but a field value, + -- and is answered with illegal_parameter. One malformed as a whole + -- stays a decode_error. + it "answers a decompressed length mismatch with bad_certificate" $ do + let plain = encodeCertificate13 B.empty (CertificateChain []) [] + compressed = BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.fromStrict plain + compressedCertificateAlert 1 (B.length plain + 1) compressed + `shouldBe` Just BadCertificate + it "answers data that is not zlib with bad_certificate" $ + compressedCertificateAlert 1 16 (B.replicate 16 0xff) + `shouldBe` Just BadCertificate + it "answers an empty compressed certificate with decode_error" $ + compressedCertificateAlert 1 16 B.empty + `shouldBe` Just DecodeError + it "answers bytes after a compressed certificate with decode_error" $ do + let plain = encodeCertificate13 B.empty (CertificateChain []) [] + compressed = BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.fromStrict plain + either (Just . errorToAlertDescription) (const Nothing) + ( decodeHandshake13 HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate $ + runPut $ do + putWord16 1 + putWord24 (B.length plain) + putOpaque24 (B.drop 2 compressed) + putBytes (B.take 2 compressed) + ) + `shouldBe` Just DecodeError + it "answers an unsupported compression algorithm with illegal_parameter" $ do + let plain = encodeCertificate13 B.empty (CertificateChain []) [] + compressed = BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.fromStrict plain + compressedCertificateAlert 2 (B.length plain) compressed + `shouldBe` Just IllegalParameter + -- A ClientKeyExchange is only expected once a cipher, and with it a + -- key exchange, has been negotiated -- not, say, after Finished. + -- One that comes without is out of order: unexpected_message. + it "answers a ClientKeyExchange before a key exchange with unexpected_message" $ + either (Just . errorToAlertDescription) (const Nothing) + ( decodeHandshake + CurrentParams{cParamsVersion = TLS12, cParamsKeyXchgType = Nothing} + HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg + (B.replicate 130 1) + ) + `shouldBe` Just UnexpectedMessage + -- RFC 7301 Section 3.1: protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> of + -- ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>. + it "refuses a malformed application_layer_protocol_negotiation" $ + forM_ + [ B.empty -- empty extension + , B.pack [0, 0] -- empty list + , B.pack [0, 1, 0] -- empty ProtocolName + , B.pack [0, 2, 1, 104, 2, 104, 50] -- trailing data + ] + $ \bs -> + ( extensionDecode MsgTClientHello bs + :: Maybe ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + ) + `shouldBe` Nothing + it "decodes an application_layer_protocol_negotiation" $ + ( extensionDecode MsgTClientHello (B.pack [0, 3, 2, 104, 50]) + :: Maybe ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + ) + `shouldBe` Just (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [B.pack [104, 50]]) + -- RFC 8422 Section 5.7: ecdh_Yc is <1..2^8-1>, so an empty one is + -- malformed -- a decode_error -- rather than a point that does not + -- decode, which is an illegal_parameter. + it "answers an empty ECDH public key with decode_error" $ + either (Just . errorToAlertDescription) (const Nothing) + ( decodeHandshake + CurrentParams + { cParamsVersion = TLS12 + , cParamsKeyXchgType = Just CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + } + HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg + (B.singleton 0) + ) + `shouldBe` Just DecodeError + -- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.7.2: dh_Yc is <1..2^16-1>, so an empty one is + -- malformed -- a decode_error -- rather than a public value that is + -- not valid, which is an illegal_parameter. + -- RFC 6066 Section 3: server_name_list<1..2^16-1> of + -- HostName<1..2^16-1>. + it "refuses a malformed server_name in ClientHello" $ + forM_ + [ B.empty -- empty extension + , B.pack [0, 0] -- empty list + , B.pack [0, 3, 0, 0, 0] -- empty host_name + , B.pack [0, 4, 0, 0, 1, 101, 120] -- trailing data + ] + $ \bs -> + (extensionDecode MsgTClientHello bs :: Maybe ServerName) + `shouldBe` Nothing + it "decodes a server_name in ClientHello" $ + (extensionDecode MsgTClientHello (B.pack [0, 4, 0, 0, 1, 101]) :: Maybe ServerName) + `shouldBe` Just (ServerName [ServerNameHostName "e"]) + it "answers an empty DH public key with decode_error" $ + either (Just . errorToAlertDescription) (const Nothing) + ( decodeHandshake + CurrentParams + { cParamsVersion = TLS12 + , cParamsKeyXchgType = Just CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + } + HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg + (B.pack [0, 0]) + ) + `shouldBe` Just DecodeError + it "bounds TLS 1.3 certificate decompression by the declared size" $ do + let compressed = BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.replicate (32 * 1024 * 1024) 0 + encoded = runPut $ do + putWord16 1 + putWord24 1 + putOpaque24 compressed + _ <- evaluate $ B.length encoded + decoded <- + withinAllocationLimit (8 * 1024 * 1024) $ + evaluate $ + decodeHandshake13 HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate encoded + decoded `shouldSatisfy` isLeft +compressedCertificateAlert :: Word16 -> Int -> ByteString -> Maybe AlertDescription +compressedCertificateAlert algo len compressed = + either (Just . errorToAlertDescription) (const Nothing) $ + decodeHandshake13 HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate $ + runPut $ do + putWord16 algo + putWord24 len + putOpaque24 compressed + decodeHs :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake decodeHs b = verifyResult (decodeHandshake cp) $ decodeHandshakeRecord b where @@ -30,6 +214,28 @@ decodeHs13 :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake13 decodeHs13 b = verifyResult decodeHandshake13 $ decodeHandshakeRecord13 b +-- | A handshake record header: a type octet then a 24-bit length. +handshakeHeader :: Int -> ByteString +handshakeHeader len = + B.pack + [ 1 -- ClientHello + , fromIntegral (len `div` 65536) + , fromIntegral ((len `div` 256) `mod` 256) + , fromIntegral (len `mod` 256) + ] + +isGotError :: GetResult a -> Bool +isGotError (GotError _) = True +isGotError _ = False + +isGotPartial :: GetResult a -> Bool +isGotPartial (GotPartial _) = True +isGotPartial _ = False + +gotThisMuch :: Int -> GetResult (a, ByteString) -> Bool +gotThisMuch n (GotSuccess (_, content)) = B.length content == n +gotThisMuch _ _ = False + verifyResult :: (f -> r -> a) -> GetResult (f, r) -> a verifyResult fn result = case result of @@ -37,3 +243,48 @@ GotError e -> error ("got error: " ++ show e) GotSuccessRemaining _ _ -> error "got remaining byte left" GotSuccess (ty, content) -> fn ty content + +withinAllocationLimit :: Int64 -> IO a -> IO a +withinAllocationLimit limit = + bracket_ + (setAllocationCounter limit >> enableAllocationLimit) + disableAllocationLimit + +-- | Every 'Extension' instance, each wrapped so that the decoded value is +-- forced inside IO. A partial 'extensionDecode' therefore surfaces as a +-- thrown exception the test can see, rather than as a thunk nobody looks at. +-- +-- The name is threaded through as the return value only so that a failure +-- report says which instance it was. +type Decoder a = MessageType -> ByteString -> Maybe a + +extensionDecoders :: [(String, MessageType -> ByteString -> IO String)] +extensionDecoders = + [ + entry "ServerName" (extensionDecode :: Decoder ServerName), + entry "MaxFragmentLength" (extensionDecode :: Decoder MaxFragmentLength), + entry "SecureRenegotiation" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SecureRenegotiation), + entry "ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation" (extensionDecode :: Decoder ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation), + entry "ExtendedMainSecret" (extensionDecode :: Decoder ExtendedMainSecret), + entry "CompressCertificate" (extensionDecode :: Decoder CompressCertificate), + entry "SupportedGroups" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SupportedGroups), + entry "EcPointFormatsSupported" (extensionDecode :: Decoder EcPointFormatsSupported), + entry "RecordSizeLimit" (extensionDecode :: Decoder RecordSizeLimit), + entry "SessionTicket" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SessionTicket), + entry "HeartBeat" (extensionDecode :: Decoder HeartBeat), + entry "SignatureAlgorithms" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SignatureAlgorithms), + entry "SignatureAlgorithmsCert" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SignatureAlgorithmsCert), + entry "SupportedVersions" (extensionDecode :: Decoder SupportedVersions), + entry "KeyShare" (extensionDecode :: Decoder KeyShare), + entry "PostHandshakeAuth" (extensionDecode :: Decoder PostHandshakeAuth), + entry "PskKeyExchangeModes" (extensionDecode :: Decoder PskKeyExchangeModes), + entry "PreSharedKey" (extensionDecode :: Decoder PreSharedKey), + entry "EarlyDataIndication" (extensionDecode :: Decoder EarlyDataIndication), + entry "Cookie" (extensionDecode :: Decoder Cookie), + entry "CertificateAuthorities" (extensionDecode :: Decoder CertificateAuthorities), + entry "EchOuterExtensions" (extensionDecode :: Decoder EchOuterExtensions), + entry "EncryptedClientHello" (extensionDecode :: Decoder EncryptedClientHello) + ] + where + entry name decode = (name, \mt bs -> name <$ evaluate (length (show (decode mt bs)))) + diff --git a/test/HandshakeSpec.hs b/test/HandshakeSpec.hs --- a/test/HandshakeSpec.hs +++ b/test/HandshakeSpec.hs @@ -2,1041 +2,2837 @@ module HandshakeSpec where -import Control.Monad -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L -import Data.IORef -import Data.List -import Data.Maybe -import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..)) -import Network.TLS -import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Internal -import Test.Hspec -import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck -import Test.QuickCheck - -import API -import Arbitrary -import PipeChan -import Run -import Session - -spec :: Spec -spec = do - describe "pipe" $ do - it "can setup a channel" pipe_work - describe "handshake" $ do - prop "can run TLS 1.2" handshake_simple - prop "can run TLS 1.3" handshake13_simple - prop "can update key for TLS 1.3" handshake_update_key - prop "can prevent downgrade attack" handshake13_downgrade - prop "can negotiate hash and signature" handshake_hashsignatures - prop "can negotiate cipher suite" handshake_ciphersuites - prop "can negotiate group" handshake_groups - prop "can negotiate elliptic curve" handshake_ec - prop "can fallback for certificate with cipher" handshake_cert_fallback_cipher - prop - "can fallback for certificate with hash and signature" - handshake_cert_fallback_hs - prop "can handle server key usage" handshake_server_key_usage - prop "can handle client key usage" handshake_client_key_usage - prop "can authenticate client" handshake_client_auth - prop "can receive client authentication failure" handshake_client_auth_fail - prop "can handle extended main secret" handshake_ems - prop "can resume with extended main secret" handshake_resumption_ems - prop "can handle ALPN" handshake_alpn - prop "can handle SNI" handshake_sni - prop "can re-negotiate with TLS 1.2" handshake12_renegotiation - prop "can resume session with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_resumption - prop "can resume session ticket with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_ticket - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Full" handshake13_full - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 HRR" handshake13_hrr - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK" handshake13_psk - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK ticket" handshake13_psk_ticket - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK -> HRR" handshake13_psk_fallback - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT" handshake13_0rtt - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT -> PSK" handshake13_0rtt_fallback - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EE" handshake13_ee_groups - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EC groups" handshake13_ec - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 FFDHE groups" handshake13_ffdhe - prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Post-handshake auth" post_handshake_auth - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -pipe_work :: IO () -pipe_work = do - pipe <- newPipe - _ <- runPipe pipe - - let bSize = 16 - n <- generate (choose (1, 32)) - - let d1 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 40 - let d2 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 45 - - d1' <- writePipeC pipe d1 >> readPipeS pipe (B.length d1) - d1' `shouldBe` d1 - - d2' <- writePipeS pipe d2 >> readPipeC pipe (B.length d2) - d2' `shouldBe` d2 - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_simple :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_simple = runTLSSimple - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -newtype CSP13 = CSP13 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary CSP13 where - arbitrary = CSP13 <$> arbitraryPairParams13 - -handshake13_simple :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_simple (CSP13 params) = runTLSSimple13 params hs - where - cgrps = supportedGroups $ clientSupported $ fst params - sgrps = supportedGroups $ serverSupported $ snd params - hs = if unsafeHead cgrps `elem` sgrps then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake13_downgrade :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake13_downgrade (cparam, sparam) = do - versionForced <- - generate $ elements (supportedVersions $ clientSupported cparam) - let debug' = (serverDebug sparam){debugVersionForced = Just versionForced} - sparam' = sparam{serverDebug = debug'} - params = (cparam, sparam') - downgraded = - (isVersionEnabled TLS13 params && versionForced < TLS13) - || (isVersionEnabled TLS12 params && versionForced < TLS12) - if downgraded - then runTLSFailure params handshake handshake - else runTLSSimple params - -handshake_update_key :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_update_key = runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_hashsignatures - :: ([HashAndSignatureAlgorithm], [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm]) -> IO () -handshake_hashsignatures (clientHashSigs, serverHashSigs) = do - tls13 <- generate arbitrary - let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 - ciphers = - [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ] - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - ([version], [version]) - (ciphers, ciphers) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientSupported = - (clientSupported clientParam) - { supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSigs - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverSupported = - (serverSupported serverParam) - { supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSigs - } - } - commonHashSigs = clientHashSigs `intersect` serverHashSigs - shouldFail - | tls13 = all incompatibleWithDefaultCurve commonHashSigs - | otherwise = null commonHashSigs - if shouldFail - then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake - else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') - where - incompatibleWithDefaultCurve (h, SignatureECDSA) = h /= HashSHA256 - incompatibleWithDefaultCurve _ = False - -handshake_ciphersuites :: ([Cipher], [Cipher]) -> IO () -handshake_ciphersuites (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) = do - tls13 <- generate arbitrary - let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - ([version], [version]) - (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) - let adequate = cipherAllowedForVersion version - shouldSucceed = any adequate (clientCiphers `intersect` serverCiphers) - if shouldSucceed - then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam) - else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam) handshake handshake - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_groups :: GGP -> IO () -handshake_groups (GGP clientGroups serverGroups) = do - tls13 <- generate arbitrary - let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] - ciphers = ciphersuite_strong - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - (versions, versions) - (ciphers, ciphers) - denyCustom <- generate arbitrary - let groupUsage = - if denyCustom - then GroupUsageUnsupported "custom group denied" - else GroupUsageValid - clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientSupported = - (clientSupported clientParam) - { supportedGroups = clientGroups - } - , clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onCustomFFDHEGroup = \_ _ -> return groupUsage - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverSupported = - (serverSupported serverParam) - { supportedGroups = serverGroups - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [serverGroups] - } - } - commonGroups = clientGroups `intersect` serverGroups - shouldFail = null commonGroups - p minfo = isNothing (minfo >>= infoSupportedGroup) == null commonGroups - if shouldFail - then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake - else runTLSPredicate (clientParam', serverParam') p - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -newtype SG = SG [Group] deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary SG where - arbitrary = SG <$> shuffle sigGroups - where - sigGroups = [P256, P521] - -handshake_ec :: SG -> IO () -handshake_ec (SG sigGroups) = do - let versions = [TLS12] - ciphers = - [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - ] - hashSignatures = - [ (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) - ] - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - (versions, versions) - (ciphers, ciphers) - clientGroups <- generate $ shuffle sigGroups - clientHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures - serverHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures - credentials <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientSupported = - (clientSupported clientParam) - { supportedGroups = clientGroups - , supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSignatures - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverSupported = - (serverSupported serverParam) - { supportedGroups = sigGroups - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sigGroups] - , supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSignatures - } - , serverShared = - (serverShared serverParam) - { sharedCredentials = Credentials credentials - } - } - sigAlgs = map snd (clientHashSignatures `intersect` serverHashSignatures) - ecdsaDenied = SignatureECDSA `notElem` sigAlgs - if ecdsaDenied - then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake - else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') - --- Tests ability to use or ignore client "signature_algorithms" extension when --- choosing a server certificate. Here peers allow DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA1 but --- the server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature that the client does not --- support. Server may choose the DSA certificate only when cipher --- DHE_DSA_AES128_SHA1 is allowed. Otherwise it must fallback to the RSA --- certificate. - -data OC = OC [Cipher] [Cipher] deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary OC where - arbitrary = OC <$> sublistOf otherCiphers <*> sublistOf otherCiphers - where - otherCiphers = - [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ] - -handshake_cert_fallback_cipher :: OC -> IO () -handshake_cert_fallback_cipher (OC clientCiphers serverCiphers) = do - let clientVersions = [TLS12] - serverVersions = [TLS12] - commonCiphers = [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - hashSignatures = [(HashSHA256, SignatureRSA), (HashSHA1, SignatureDSA)] - chainRef <- newIORef Nothing - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - (clientVersions, serverVersions) - (clientCiphers ++ commonCiphers, serverCiphers ++ commonCiphers) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientSupported = - (clientSupported clientParam) - { supportedHashSignatures = hashSignatures - } - , clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> - writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] - } - } - runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam) - serverChain <- readIORef chainRef - isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` True - --- Same as above but testing with supportedHashSignatures directly instead of --- ciphers, and thus allowing TLS13. Peers accept RSA with SHA-256 but the --- server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature. When Ed25519 is allowed by --- both client and server, the Ed25519 certificate is selected. Otherwise the --- server fallbacks to RSA. --- --- Note: SHA-1 is supposed to be disallowed in X.509 signatures with TLS13 --- unless client advertises explicit support. Currently this is not enforced by --- the library, which is useful to test this scenario. SHA-1 could be replaced --- by another algorithm. - -data OHS = OHS [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] - deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary OHS where - arbitrary = OHS <$> sublistOf otherHS <*> sublistOf otherHS - where - otherHS = [(HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519)] - -handshake_cert_fallback_hs :: OHS -> IO () -handshake_cert_fallback_hs (OHS clientHS serverHS) = do - tls13 <- generate arbitrary - let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] - ciphers = - [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - ] - commonHS = - [ (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) - , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) - ] - chainRef <- newIORef Nothing - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - (versions, versions) - (ciphers, ciphers) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientSupported = - (clientSupported clientParam) - { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ clientHS - } - , clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> - writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverSupported = - (serverSupported serverParam) - { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ serverHS - } - } - eddsaDisallowed = - (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` clientHS - || (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` serverHS - runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') - serverChain <- readIORef chainRef - isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` eddsaDisallowed - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_server_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () -handshake_server_key_usage usageFlags = do - tls13 <- generate arbitrary - let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] - ciphers = ciphersuite_all - (clientParam, serverParam) <- - generate $ - arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers - (versions, versions) - (ciphers, ciphers) - cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags - let serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverShared = - (serverShared serverParam) - { sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred] - } - } - shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags - if shouldSucceed - then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam') - else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam') handshake handshake - -handshake_client_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () -handshake_client_key_usage usageFlags = do - (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary - cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverWantClientCert = True - , serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept - } - } - shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags - if shouldSucceed - then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') - else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_client_auth :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_client_auth (clientParam, serverParam) = do - let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam - serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam - version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) - cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverWantClientCert = True - , serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred - } - } - runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') - where - validateChain cred chain - | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept - | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) - -handshake_client_auth_fail :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_client_auth_fail (clientParam, serverParam) = do - let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam - serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam - version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) - cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverWantClientCert = True - , serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred - } - } - runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake - where - validateChain _ _ = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_ems :: (EMSMode, EMSMode) -> IO () -handshake_ems (cems, sems) = do - params <- generate arbitrary - let params' = setEMSMode (cems, sems) params - version = getConnectVersion params' - emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 - use = cems /= NoEMS && sems /= NoEMS - require = cems == RequireEMS || sems == RequireEMS - p info = infoExtendedMainSecret info == (emsVersion && use) - if emsVersion && require && not use - then runTLSFailure params' handshake handshake - else runTLSPredicate params' (maybe False p) - -newtype CompatEMS = CompatEMS (EMSMode, EMSMode) deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary CompatEMS where - arbitrary = CompatEMS <$> (arbitrary `suchThat` compatible) - where - compatible (NoEMS, RequireEMS) = False - compatible (RequireEMS, NoEMS) = False - compatible _ = True - -handshake_resumption_ems :: (CompatEMS, CompatEMS) -> IO () -handshake_resumption_ems (CompatEMS ems, CompatEMS ems2) = do - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - plainParams <- generate arbitrary - let params = - setEMSMode ems $ - setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams - - runTLSSimple params - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let params2 = - setEMSMode ems2 $ - setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - - let version = getConnectVersion params2 - emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 - - if emsVersion && use ems && not (use ems2) - then runTLSFailure params2 handshake handshake - else do - runTLSSimple params2 - mSessionParams2 <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - let sameSession = sessionParams == mSessionParams2 - sameUse = use ems == use ems2 - when emsVersion (sameSession `shouldBe` sameUse) - where - use (NoEMS, _) = False - use (_, NoEMS) = False - use _ = True - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake_alpn :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_alpn (clientParam, serverParam) = do - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2", "http/1.1"] - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onALPNClientSuggest = Just alpn - } - } - params' = (clientParam', serverParam') - runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer - where - hsClient ctx = do - handshake ctx - proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx - proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" - hsServer ctx = do - handshake ctx - proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx - proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" - alpn xs - | "h2" `elem` xs = return "h2" - | otherwise = return "http/1.1" - -handshake_sni :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () -handshake_sni (clientParam, serverParam) = do - ref <- newIORef Nothing - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientServerIdentification = (serverName, "") - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onServerNameIndication = onSNI ref - } - } - params' = (clientParam', serverParam') - runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer - receivedName <- readIORef ref - receivedName `shouldBe` Just (Just serverName) - where - hsClient ctx = do - handshake ctx - msni <- getClientSNI ctx - expectMaybe "C: SNI should be Just" serverName msni - hsServer ctx = do - handshake ctx - msni <- getClientSNI ctx - expectMaybe "S: SNI should be Just" serverName msni - onSNI ref name = do - mx <- readIORef ref - mx `shouldBe` Nothing - writeIORef ref (Just name) - return (Credentials []) - serverName = "haskell.org" - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -newtype CSP12 = CSP12 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) - -instance Arbitrary CSP12 where - arbitrary = CSP12 <$> arbitraryPairParams12 - -handshake12_renegotiation :: CSP12 -> IO () -handshake12_renegotiation (CSP12 (cparams, sparams)) = do - renegDisabled <- generate arbitrary - let sparams' = - sparams - { serverSupported = - (serverSupported sparams) - { supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = not renegDisabled - } - } - if renegDisabled - then runTLSFailure (cparams, sparams') hsClient hsServer - else runTLSSimple (cparams, sparams') - where - hsClient ctx = handshake ctx >> handshake ctx - -- recvData receives the alert from the second handshake - hsServer ctx = handshake ctx >> void (recvData ctx) - -handshake12_session_resumption :: CSP12 -> IO () -handshake12_session_resumption (CSP12 plainParams) = do - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams - - runTLSSimple params - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - - runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) - -handshake12_session_ticket :: CSP12 -> IO () -handshake12_session_ticket (CSP12 plainParams) = do - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams - - runTLSSimple params - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - - runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) - --------------------------------------------------------------- - -handshake13_full :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_full (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake - -handshake13_hrr :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_hrr (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest - -handshake13_psk :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_psk (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - params0 = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 - - runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - - runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey - -handshake13_psk_ticket :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_psk_ticket (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - params0 = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 - - runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - - runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey - -handshake13_psk_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_psk_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = - [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 - ] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - params0 = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 - - runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest - - -- resumption fails because GCM cipher is not supported anymore, full - -- handshake is not possible because X25519 has been removed, so we are - -- back with P256 after hello retry - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - let (cli2, srv2) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - srv2' = - srv2{serverSupported = svrSupported'} - svrSupported' = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[P256]] - } - - runTLSSimple13 (cli2, srv2') HelloRetryRequest - -handshake13_0rtt :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_0rtt (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [X25519] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] - } - cliHooks = - defaultClientHooks - { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2"] - } - svrHooks = - defaultServerHooks - { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) - } - params0 = - ( cli - { clientSupported = cliSupported - , clientHooks = cliHooks - } - , srv - { serverSupported = svrSupported - , serverHooks = svrHooks - , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 - } - ) - - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 - - runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest - runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs - runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs - where - runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs = do - -- and resume - sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams - clearClientSessionRef sessionRefs - earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) - let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params - params2 = (pc{clientUseEarlyData = True}, ps) - - runTLS0RTT params2 RTT0 earlyData - -handshake13_0rtt_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_0rtt_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - group0 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] - let cliSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] - } - svrSupported = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [group0] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group0]] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv - { serverSupported = svrSupported - , serverEarlyDataSize = 1024 - } - ) - - sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs - let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs - - let params0 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params - - let mode = if group0 == P256 then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest - runTLSSimple13 params0 mode - - -- and resume - mSessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs - case mSessionParams of - Nothing -> expectationFailure "session params: Just is expected" - Just sessionParams -> do - earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) - group1 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] - let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params0 - svrSupported1 = - defaultSupported - { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] - , supportedGroups = [group1] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group1]] - } - params1 = - ( pc{clientUseEarlyData = True} - , ps - { serverEarlyDataSize = 0 - , serverSupported = svrSupported1 - } - ) - -- C: [P256, X25519] - -- S: [group0] - -- C: [P256, X25519] - -- S: [group1] - if group0 == group1 - -- 0-RTT is not allowed, so fallback to PreSharedKey - then runTLS0RTT params1 PreSharedKey earlyData - -- HRR but not allowed for 0-RTT - else runTLSFailure params1 (tlsClient earlyData) tlsServer - where - tlsClient earlyData ctx = do - handshake ctx - sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData - _ <- recvData ctx - bye ctx - tlsServer ctx = do - handshake ctx - _ <- recvData ctx - bye ctx - -handshake13_ee_groups :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_ee_groups (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - let -- The client prefers P256 - cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = [P256, X25519]} - -- The server prefers X25519 - svrSupported = - (serverSupported srv) - { supportedGroups = [X25519, P256] - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519, P256]] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - (_, serverMessages) <- runTLSCapture13 params - -- The server should tell X25519 in supported_groups in EE to clinet - let isSupportedGroups (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == EID_SupportedGroups - eeMessagesHaveExt = - [ any isSupportedGroups exts - | EncryptedExtensions13 exts <- serverMessages - ] - eeMessagesHaveExt `shouldBe` [True] - -handshake13_ec :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_ec (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - EC cgrps <- generate arbitrary - EC sgrps <- generate arbitrary - let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} - svrSupported = - (serverSupported srv) - { supportedGroups = sgrps - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake - -handshake13_ffdhe :: CSP13 -> IO () -handshake13_ffdhe (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do - FFDHE cgrps <- generate arbitrary - FFDHE sgrps <- generate arbitrary - let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} - svrSupported = - (serverSupported srv) - { supportedGroups = sgrps - , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] - } - params = - ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} - , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} - ) - runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake - -post_handshake_auth :: CSP13 -> IO () -post_handshake_auth (CSP13 (clientParam, serverParam)) = do - cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential TLS13) - let clientParam' = - clientParam - { clientHooks = - (clientHooks clientParam) - { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred - } - } - serverParam' = - serverParam - { serverHooks = - (serverHooks serverParam) - { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred - } - } - if isCredentialDSA cred - then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer - else runTLSSuccess (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer - where - validateChain cred chain - | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept - | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) - hsClient ctx = do - handshake ctx - sendData ctx "request 1" - recvDataAssert ctx "response 1" - sendData ctx "request 2" - recvDataAssert ctx "response 2" - hsServer ctx = do - handshake ctx - recvDataAssert ctx "request 1" - _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- single request - sendData ctx "response 1" - recvDataAssert ctx "request 2" - _ <- requestCertificate ctx - _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- two simultaneously - sendData ctx "response 2" +import Control.Concurrent (threadDelay) +import Control.Concurrent.Async (concurrently_) +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Control.Monad +import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES128) +import Crypto.Cipher.Types (AEADMode (..), AuthTag (..), aeadInit, aeadSimpleEncrypt, cipherInit) +import Crypto.Error (throwCryptoError) +import Data.Bits (shiftR, xor) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.IORef +import Data.List +import Data.Maybe +import Data.Word (Word16, Word64, Word8) +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..), ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..)) +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC +import Network.TLS.Internal +import Network.TLS.QUIC (hkdfExpandLabel) +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck +import System.Timeout (timeout) +import Test.QuickCheck + +import API +import Arbitrary +import Certificate (arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose) +import PipeChan +import Run +import Session + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "pipe" $ do + it "can setup a channel" pipe_work + describe "channel binding" $ do + prop "is unavailable before the handshake" binding_before_handshake + describe "handshake" $ do + prop "can run TLS 1.2" handshake_simple + prop "can run TLS 1.3" handshake13_simple + prop "can update key for TLS 1.3" handshake_update_key + it + "rejects more than 32 consecutive TLS 1.3 KeyUpdates" + handshake_key_update_flood + it + "can disable the consecutive TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate limit" + handshake_key_update_unlimited + it + "does not disable TLS 1.3 KeyUpdates with non-positive limits" + handshake_key_update_non_positive + prop "can prevent downgrade attack" handshake13_downgrade + it "negotiates TLS 1.2 with a ClientHello naming a higher version" $ + handshake_high_legacy_version TLS12 (Version 0x0309) + it "ignores legacy_version when supported_versions is present" $ + handshake_high_legacy_version TLS13 TLS13 + it "keeps to the TLS 1.3 server's record size limit" $ + record_size_limit_negotiated TLS13 False + it "keeps to the TLS 1.3 client's record size limit" $ + record_size_limit_negotiated TLS13 True + it "keeps to the TLS 1.2 server's record size limit" $ + record_size_limit_negotiated TLS12 False + it "keeps to the TLS 1.2 client's record size limit" $ + record_size_limit_negotiated TLS12 True + it "ignores the client's record size limit the TLS 1.3 server does not take" $ + record_size_limit_unnegotiated TLS13 True + it "ignores the server's record size limit the TLS 1.3 client did not offer" $ + record_size_limit_unnegotiated TLS13 False + it "ignores the client's record size limit the TLS 1.2 server does not take" $ + record_size_limit_unnegotiated TLS12 True + it "ignores the server's record size limit the TLS 1.2 client did not offer" $ + record_size_limit_unnegotiated TLS12 False + it "rejects ec_point_formats without uncompressed" $ + handshake12_ec_point_formats + (B.pack [1, 1]) + rejectedAsIllegalParameter + it "rejects an empty ec_point_formats" $ + handshake12_ec_point_formats (B.pack [0]) rejectedAsDecodeError + prop "can negotiate hash and signature" handshake_hashsignatures + prop "can negotiate cipher suite" handshake_ciphersuites + it "rejects a cipher outside the server callback candidates" $ + handshake_rejects_server_cipher_callback_escape + it "rejects a TLS 1.2-only cipher selected for TLS 1.3" $ + handshake_rejects_legacy_cipher_in_tls13 + prop "can negotiate group" handshake_groups + prop "can negotiate elliptic curve" handshake_ec + prop "can fallback for certificate with cipher" handshake_cert_fallback_cipher + prop + "can fallback for certificate with hash and signature" + handshake_cert_fallback_hs + prop "can handle server key usage" handshake_server_key_usage + it "accepts a TLS 1.2 server certificate permitting server auth" $ + handshake_server_key_purpose TLS12 KeyUsagePurpose_ServerAuth True + it "accepts a TLS 1.3 server certificate permitting server auth" $ + handshake_server_key_purpose TLS13 KeyUsagePurpose_ServerAuth True + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 server certificate restricted to client auth" $ + handshake_server_key_purpose TLS12 KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth False + it "rejects a TLS 1.3 server certificate restricted to client auth" $ + handshake_server_key_purpose TLS13 KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth False + prop "can handle client key usage" handshake_client_key_usage + prop "can authenticate client" handshake_client_auth + it "rejects a TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify algorithm unfit for the key" $ + handshake13_client_cert_verify_unfit_sigalg + it "rejects a primitive SEQUENCE as an ECDSA signature" $ + handshake13_client_cert_verify_malformed_ecdsa $ \sig -> + B.cons (B.head sig `xor` 0x20) (B.tail sig) + it "rejects a BIT STRING in an ECDSA signature" $ + handshake13_client_cert_verify_malformed_ecdsa $ \_ -> + B.pack [0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x01, 0x09] + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 CertificateVerify algorithm for another key type" $ + handshake12_client_cert_verify_sigalg + (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + rejectedAsIllegalParameter + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 CertificateVerify that does not fit the RSA key" $ + handshake12_client_cert_verify_sigalg + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA256) + rejectedAsDecryptError + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 ServerKeyExchange algorithm for another key type" $ + handshake12_server_key_xchg_sigalg + (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + rejectedAsIllegalParameter + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 ServerKeyExchange that does not fit the RSA key" $ + handshake12_server_key_xchg_sigalg + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA256) + rejectedAsDecryptError + prop "can receive client authentication failure" handshake_client_auth_fail + it "accepts an empty TLS 1.2 client certificate when the hook does" $ + handshake_client_auth_empty TLS12 + it "accepts an empty TLS 1.3 client certificate when the hook does" $ + handshake_client_auth_empty TLS13 + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 client omitting the requested certificate" $ + handshake12_client_cert_omitted + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 server omitting Certificate" $ + handshake12_server_message_omitted 11 + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 server omitting ServerKeyExchange for ECDHE" $ + handshake12_server_message_omitted 12 + it "requests only defined certificate types in TLS 1.2" $ + handshake12_cert_request_types + prop "can handle extended main secret" handshake_ems + prop "can resume with extended main secret" handshake_resumption_ems + prop "can handle ALPN" handshake_alpn + it "rejects an unoffered ALPN selection from the server hook" $ + handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_server_selection + it "rejects an unoffered ALPN selection received by the client" $ + handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_client_selection + prop "can handle SNI" handshake_sni + it "sends no SNI for an empty server name" handshake_sni_empty + it "rejects multiple host_names in SNI" $ + handshake_sni_illegal ["example.com", "example.org"] + it "rejects a host_name with a control character in SNI" $ + handshake_sni_illegal ["example\0.com"] + it "rejects a non-ASCII host_name in SNI" $ + handshake_sni_illegal ["ex\xc4\x85mple.com"] + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.2 CBC" handshake_cbc + prop "can re-negotiate with TLS 1.2" handshake12_renegotiation + it "rejects SCSV in a secure renegotiation" $ + handshake12_renegotiation_tampered $ \ch -> + ch{chCiphers = chCiphers ch ++ [CipherId 0xff]} + it "rejects a secure renegotiation without renegotiation_info" $ + handshake12_renegotiation_tampered $ \ch -> + ch + { chExtensions = + filter + (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid /= EID_SecureRenegotiation) + (chExtensions ch) + } + prop "can resume session with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_resumption + prop + "rejects resuming a TLS 1.2 session without its cipher" + handshake12_session_resumption_cipher_missing + prop "can resume session ticket with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_ticket + it "sends no session ticket to a TLS 1.2 client that did not ask" $ + handshake12_session_ticket_unoffered + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Full" handshake13_full + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 HRR" handshake13_hrr + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK" handshake13_psk + it "does not resume a TLS 1.2 session with a TLS 1.3 PSK" $ + handshake13_psk_tls12_session + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK ticket" handshake13_psk_ticket + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK -> HRR" handshake13_psk_fallback + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT" handshake13_0rtt + it "rejects TLS 1.3 early data when ALPN changes" $ + handshake13_0rtt_alpn + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT -> PSK" handshake13_0rtt_fallback + it "authenticates a server rejecting the PSK of 0RTT" $ + handshake13_0rtt_psk_rejected False + it "authenticates a server rejecting the PSK of 0RTT, asking a cert" $ + handshake13_0rtt_psk_rejected True + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EE" handshake13_ee_groups + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EC groups" handshake13_ec + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 FFDHE groups" handshake13_ffdhe + mapM_ + ( \grp -> + prop ("can handshake with " ++ show grp) $ + handshake13_kem grp + ) + [ MLKEM512 + , MLKEM768 + , MLKEM1024 + , X25519MLKEM768 + , P256MLKEM768 + , P384MLKEM1024 + ] + mapM_ + ( \(n, nm) -> do + prop ("can handshake with an " ++ nm ++ " server certificate") $ + handshake13_mldsa n + prop ("can handshake with an " ++ nm ++ " client certificate") $ + handshake13_mldsa_client n + ) + [(0, "ML-DSA-44"), (1, "ML-DSA-65"), (2, "ML-DSA-87")] + it "rejects a CertificateVerify whose scheme is not the key's" $ + handshake13_mldsa_wrong_scheme + it "rejects an X25519MLKEM768 key share with a zero X25519 part" $ + handshake13_x25519mlkem768_zero_x25519 + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Post-handshake auth" post_handshake_auth + it + "keeps record alignment when a slow record follows client auth" + handshake13_client_auth_slow_record + it "rejects a too short TLS 1.2 AEAD record with bad_record_mac" $ + short_record_bad_record_mac TLS12 cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + it "rejects a too short TLS 1.2 CBC record with bad_record_mac" $ + short_record_bad_record_mac TLS12 cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + it "rejects a too short TLS 1.3 record with bad_record_mac" $ + short_record_bad_record_mac TLS13 cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + it "rejects a TLS 1.3 alert in clear after the handshake" $ + plaintext_alert13_rejected + it "rejects a TLS 1.2 ChangeCipherSpec before the keys" $ + early_ccs12_rejected + it "rejects a ServerHello as the first client message" $ + server_first_message_unexpected 2 + it "rejects a Finished as the first client message" $ + server_first_message_unexpected 20 + it "rejects an unknown handshake type as the first client message" $ + server_first_message_unexpected 254 + it "rejects a ChangeCipherSpec before the first ClientHello" $ + server_ccs_interleaved 0 + it "rejects a ChangeCipherSpec inside a fragmented ClientHello" $ + server_ccs_interleaved 2 + it "rejects an SSLv2-style record header at once" $ + server_first_record_type_unexpected 0x80 0x3fff + it "rejects an unknown record type" $ + server_first_record_type_unexpected 24 0 + it "rejects application data inside a TLS 1.3 handshake message" $ + handshake13_interleaved_app_data + it "rejects a two-byte TLS 1.2 ChangeCipherSpec" $ + malformed_ccs_unexpected + TLS12 + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + [P256] + [P256] + it "rejects a two-byte TLS 1.3 ChangeCipherSpec" $ + malformed_ccs_unexpected TLS13 cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 [X25519] [X25519] + it "rejects a two-byte TLS 1.3 ChangeCipherSpec after HelloRetryRequest" $ + malformed_ccs_unexpected + TLS13 + cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + [P256, X25519] + [X25519] + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Both channel bindings already answer with 'Maybe', and a caller may +-- reasonably ask for one on a context whose handshake has not run -- or has +-- failed. The answer is that there is no binding, not a crash. +binding_before_handshake :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +binding_before_handshake params = withPairContext params $ \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + forM_ [cCtx, sCtx] $ \ctx -> do + getTLSUnique ctx `shouldReturn` Nothing + getTLSExporter ctx `shouldReturn` Nothing + +pipe_work :: IO () +pipe_work = do + pipe <- newPipe + _ <- runPipe pipe + + let bSize = 16 + n <- generate (choose (1, 32)) + + let d1 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 40 + let d2 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 45 + + d1' <- writePipeC pipe d1 >> readPipeS pipe (B.length d1) + d1' `shouldBe` d1 + + d2' <- writePipeS pipe d2 >> readPipeC pipe (B.length d2) + d2' `shouldBe` d2 + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_simple :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_simple = runTLSSimple + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CSP13 = CSP13 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CSP13 where + arbitrary = CSP13 <$> arbitraryPairParams13 + +handshake13_simple :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_simple (CSP13 params) = runTLSSimple13 params hs + where + cgrps = supportedGroups $ clientSupported $ fst params + sgrps = supportedGroups $ serverSupported $ snd params + hs = if unsafeHead cgrps `elem` sgrps then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest + +handshake_rejects_server_cipher_callback_escape :: IO () +handshake_rejects_server_cipher_callback_escape = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let params = cipherSelectionParams clientParam serverParam selectLegacy + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedCipherEscape) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + where + selectLegacy _ _ = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + +handshake_rejects_legacy_cipher_in_tls13 :: IO () +handshake_rejects_legacy_cipher_in_tls13 = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let params = cipherSelectionParams clientParam serverParam defaultSelection + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv cctx tamperCipher + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` clientRejectedLegacyCipher) + where + defaultSelection _ = unsafeHead + tamperCipher (ServerHello sh) = + pure $ + ServerHello + sh + { shCipher = + CipherId $ cipherID cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + } + tamperCipher hs = pure hs + +cipherSelectionParams + :: ClientParams + -> ServerParams + -> (Version -> [Cipher] -> Cipher) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +cipherSelectionParams clientParam serverParam select = + ( clientParam{clientSupported = supported} + , serverParam + { serverSupported = supported + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onCipherChoosing = select + } + } + ) + where + supported = + defaultSupported + { supportedVersions = [TLS13] + , supportedCiphers = + [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + ] + } + +serverRejectedCipherEscape :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedCipherEscape (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + msg == "onCipherChoosing selected a cipher outside the candidate list" + && alert == InternalError +serverRejectedCipherEscape _ = False + +clientRejectedLegacyCipher :: TLSException -> Bool +clientRejectedLegacyCipher (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + msg == "server selected a cipher invalid for the negotiated version" + && alert == IllegalParameter +clientRejectedLegacyCipher _ = False + +anyTLSException :: TLSException -> Bool +anyTLSException = const True + +handshake_key_update_flood :: IO () +handshake_key_update_flood = do + params <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + recvData sctx `shouldReturn` "after 32 key updates" + recvData sctx `shouldThrow` excessiveKeyUpdate + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + replicateM_ 32 $ void $ updateKey cctx OneWay + sendData cctx "after 32 key updates" + replicateM_ 33 $ void $ updateKey cctx OneWay + sendData cctx "after 33 key updates" + ) + where + excessiveKeyUpdate + (Terminated _ _ (Error_Misc "too many consecutive KeyUpdate messages")) = True + excessiveKeyUpdate _ = False + +handshake_key_update_unlimited :: IO () +handshake_key_update_unlimited = do + (cparams, sparams0) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let shared0 = serverShared sparams0 + limits = (sharedLimit shared0){limitKeyUpdate = Nothing} + sparams = sparams0{serverShared = shared0{sharedLimit = limits}} + withPairContextWith (id, id) (cparams, sparams) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + recvData sctx `shouldReturn` "after 33 key updates" + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + replicateM_ 33 $ void $ updateKey cctx OneWay + sendData cctx "after 33 key updates" + ) + +handshake_key_update_non_positive :: IO () +handshake_key_update_non_positive = + forM_ [0, -1] $ \limit -> do + (cparams, sparams0) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let shared0 = serverShared sparams0 + limits = (sharedLimit shared0){limitKeyUpdate = Just limit} + sparams = sparams0{serverShared = shared0{sharedLimit = limits}} + withPairContextWith (id, id) (cparams, sparams) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + recvData sctx `shouldReturn` "after key update" + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + void $ updateKey cctx OneWay + sendData cctx "after key update" + ) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_cbc :: IO () +handshake_cbc = do + clientCiphers <- generate $ cipherGen >>= shuffle + serverCiphers <- generate $ cipherGen >>= shuffle + clientGroups <- generate $ groupGen >>= shuffle + serverGroups <- generate $ groupGen >>= shuffle + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + let clientParam' = clientParam { + clientSupported = (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups } } + serverParam' = serverParam { + serverSupported = (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = serverGroups } } + let ciphers = clientCiphers `intersect` serverCiphers + groups = clientGroups `intersect` serverGroups + in if compat ciphers groups + then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + where + groupGen :: Gen [Group] + groupGen = sublistOf grps `suchThat` (not . null) + where + grps = [X25519, P256, P384, FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096] + + cipherGen :: Gen [Cipher] + cipherGen = sublistOf ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc `suchThat` (not . null) + + compat :: [Cipher] -> [Group] -> Bool + compat [] _ = False + compat _ [] = False + compat ciphers groups = + let mustdh = all (== CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA) $ map cipherKeyExchange ciphers + mustec = all (/= CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA) $ map cipherKeyExchange ciphers + havedh = any (`elem` [FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096]) groups + haveec = any (`elem` [X25519, P256, P384]) groups + in ((not mustdh || havedh) && (not mustec || haveec)) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake13_downgrade :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake13_downgrade (cparam, sparam) = do + versionForced <- + generate $ elements (supportedVersions $ clientSupported cparam) + let debug' = (serverDebug sparam){debugVersionForced = Just versionForced} + sparam' = sparam{serverDebug = debug'} + params = (cparam, sparam') + downgraded = + (isVersionEnabled TLS13 params && versionForced < TLS13) + || (isVersionEnabled TLS12 params && versionForced < TLS12) + if downgraded + then runTLSFailure params handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple params + +handshake_update_key :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_update_key = runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_hashsignatures + :: ([HashAndSignatureAlgorithm], [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm]) -> IO () +handshake_hashsignatures (clientHashSigs, serverHashSigs) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + (ciphers, ciphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSigs + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSigs + } + } + commonHashSigs = clientHashSigs `intersect` serverHashSigs + shouldFail + | tls13 = all incompatibleWithDefaultCurve commonHashSigs + | otherwise = null commonHashSigs + if shouldFail + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + where + incompatibleWithDefaultCurve (h, SignatureECDSA) = h /= HashSHA256 + incompatibleWithDefaultCurve _ = False + +handshake_ciphersuites :: ([Cipher], [Cipher]) -> IO () +handshake_ciphersuites (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + let adequate = cipherAllowedForVersion version + shouldSucceed = any adequate (clientCiphers `intersect` serverCiphers) + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam) + else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam) handshake handshake + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_groups :: GGP -> IO () +handshake_groups (GGP clientGroups serverGroups) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = ciphersuite_strong + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + denyCustom <- generate arbitrary + let groupUsage = + if denyCustom + then GroupUsageUnsupported "custom group denied" + else GroupUsageValid + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCustomFFDHEGroup = \_ _ -> return groupUsage + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = serverGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [serverGroups] + } + } + commonGroups = clientGroups `intersect` serverGroups + shouldFail = null commonGroups + p minfo = isNothing (minfo >>= infoSupportedGroup) == null commonGroups + if shouldFail + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSPredicate (clientParam', serverParam') p + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype SG = SG [Group] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary SG where + arbitrary = SG <$> shuffle sigGroups + where + sigGroups = [P256, P521] + +handshake_ec :: SG -> IO () +handshake_ec (SG sigGroups) = do + let versions = [TLS12] + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + ] + hashSignatures = + [ (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + ] + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + clientGroups <- generate $ shuffle sigGroups + clientHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures + serverHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures + credentials <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups + , supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSignatures + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = sigGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sigGroups] + , supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSignatures + } + , serverShared = + (serverShared serverParam) + { sharedCredentials = Credentials credentials + } + } + sigAlgs = map snd (clientHashSignatures `intersect` serverHashSignatures) + ecdsaDenied = SignatureECDSA `notElem` sigAlgs + if ecdsaDenied + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + +-- Tests ability to use or ignore client "signature_algorithms" extension when +-- choosing a server certificate. Here peers allow DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA1 but +-- the server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature that the client does not +-- support. Server may choose the DSA certificate only when cipher +-- DHE_DSA_AES128_SHA1 is allowed. Otherwise it must fallback to the RSA +-- certificate. + +data OC = OC [Cipher] [Cipher] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary OC where + arbitrary = OC <$> sublistOf otherCiphers <*> sublistOf otherCiphers + where + otherCiphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + +handshake_cert_fallback_cipher :: OC -> IO () +handshake_cert_fallback_cipher (OC clientCiphers serverCiphers) = do + let clientVersions = [TLS12] + serverVersions = [TLS12] + commonCiphers = [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + hashSignatures = [(HashSHA256, SignatureRSA), (HashSHA1, SignatureDSA)] + chainRef <- newIORef Nothing + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (clientVersions, serverVersions) + (clientCiphers ++ commonCiphers, serverCiphers ++ commonCiphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = hashSignatures + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> + writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] + } + } + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam) + serverChain <- readIORef chainRef + isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` True + +-- Same as above but testing with supportedHashSignatures directly instead of +-- ciphers, and thus allowing TLS13. Peers accept RSA with SHA-256 but the +-- server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature. When Ed25519 is allowed by +-- both client and server, the Ed25519 certificate is selected. Otherwise the +-- server fallbacks to RSA. +-- +-- Note: SHA-1 is supposed to be disallowed in X.509 signatures with TLS13 +-- unless client advertises explicit support. Currently this is not enforced by +-- the library, which is useful to test this scenario. SHA-1 could be replaced +-- by another algorithm. + +data OHS = OHS [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary OHS where + arbitrary = OHS <$> sublistOf otherHS <*> sublistOf otherHS + where + otherHS = [(HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519)] + +handshake_cert_fallback_hs :: OHS -> IO () +handshake_cert_fallback_hs (OHS clientHS serverHS) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + commonHS = + [ (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) + ] + chainRef <- newIORef Nothing + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ clientHS + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> + writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ serverHS + } + } + eddsaDisallowed = + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` clientHS + || (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` serverHS + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + serverChain <- readIORef chainRef + isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` eddsaDisallowed + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_server_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () +handshake_server_key_usage usageFlags = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = ciphersuite_all + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags + let serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverShared = + (serverShared serverParam) + { sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred] + } + } + shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam') handshake handshake + +handshake_server_key_purpose :: Version -> ExtKeyUsagePurpose -> Bool -> IO () +handshake_server_key_purpose version purpose shouldSucceed = do + let cipher + | version == TLS13 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + | otherwise = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose purpose + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ _ -> return [] + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverShared = + (serverShared serverParam) + { sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred] + } + } + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + +handshake_client_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () +handshake_client_key_usage usageFlags = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_client_auth :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_client_auth (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam + serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam + version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + where + validateChain cred chain + | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + +-- A client without a certificate answers CertificateRequest with an empty +-- Certificate and, in TLS 1.2, sends no CertificateVerify. A server whose +-- hook accepts that must go on to ChangeCipherSpec rather than wait for a +-- CertificateVerify. +handshake_client_auth_empty :: Version -> IO () +handshake_client_auth_empty version = do + let cipher + | version == TLS13 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + | otherwise = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return Nothing + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = acceptEmpty + } + } + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + where + acceptEmpty chain + | isNullCertificateChain chain = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + +-- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.6: a client asked for a certificate sends the +-- message even when it has none. Here it is cut out on the wire; the +-- Finished no longer matches, but the server must stop before that. +handshake12_client_cert_omitted :: IO () +handshake12_client_cert_omitted = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return Nothing + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + ccsSent <- newIORef False + let params = (clientParam', serverParam') + withPairContextWith (dropHandshake12 11 ccsSent, id) params $ + \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` rejectedAsUnexpected) + (void (E.try (handshake cctx) :: IO (Either E.SomeException ()))) + +-- A TLS 1.2 client needs the server's Certificate for every key exchange +-- it implements, and ServerKeyExchange for (EC)DHE. One of them is cut +-- out on the wire, and the client must say so rather than fail later. +handshake12_server_message_omitted :: Word8 -> IO () +handshake12_server_message_omitted typ = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + ccsSent <- newIORef False + withPairContextWith (id, dropHandshake12 typ ccsSent) (clientParam, serverParam) $ + \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (void (E.try (handshake sctx) :: IO (Either E.SomeException ()))) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` rejectedAsUnexpected) + +-- | Cut the handshake messages of a type out of what a TLS 1.2 peer sends +-- in clear, that is, before its ChangeCipherSpec. +dropHandshake12 :: Word8 -> IORef Bool -> Backend -> Backend +dropHandshake12 typ ccsSent be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + done <- readIORef ccsSent + when (B.take 1 bs == B.singleton 20) $ writeIORef ccsSent True + backendSend be $ if done then bs else stripRecords bs + } + where + stripRecords bs + | B.length bs < 5 = bs + | otherwise = + let len = fromIntegral (B.index bs 3) * 256 + fromIntegral (B.index bs 4) + (body, rest) = B.splitAt len $ B.drop 5 bs + body' + | B.head bs == 22 = stripMessages body + | otherwise = body + len' = B.length body' + hdr = B.take 3 bs <> B.pack [fromIntegral (len' `div` 256), fromIntegral len'] + in (if B.null body' then "" else hdr <> body') <> stripRecords rest + stripMessages m + | B.length m < 4 = m + | otherwise = + let len = + fromIntegral (B.index m 1) * 65536 + + fromIntegral (B.index m 2) * 256 + + fromIntegral (B.index m 3) + (msg, rest) = B.splitAt (4 + len) m + in (if B.head m == typ then "" else msg) <> stripMessages rest + +-- In TLS 1.2 a client certificate with an Ed25519 or Ed448 key is asked +-- for with ecdsa_sign (RFC 8422 Section 3.1). The Ed25519 and Ed448 +-- certificate types of this library are synthetic and have no code point, +-- so they must not reach the wire. +handshake12_cert_request_types :: IO () +handshake12_cert_request_types = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + ref <- newIORef Nothing + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return Nothing + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = + supportedHashSignatures defaultSupported + } + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + record hs@(CertRequest certTypes _ _) = writeIORef ref (Just certTypes) >> return hs + record hs = return hs + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv cctx record + concurrently_ (handshake sctx) (handshake cctx) + mtypes <- readIORef ref + case mtypes of + Nothing -> expectationFailure "no CertificateRequest received" + Just certTypes -> do + certTypes `shouldSatisfy` all (`elem` defined) + certTypes `shouldContain` [CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign] + where + defined = + [ CertificateType_RSA_Sign + , CertificateType_DSA_Sign + , CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign + ] + +-- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.8: a TLS 1.2 CertificateVerify algorithm for +-- another type of key than the certificate's has a field that is +-- incorrect, an illegal_parameter, even when onUnverifiedClientCert would +-- accept a signature that does not verify. One for an RSA key that still +-- does not fit it, RSASSA-PSS for an rsaEncryption key, is a signature +-- that does not verify, a decrypt_error. The client signs with an +-- rsaEncryption key and the server reads the given algorithm. +handshake12_client_cert_verify_sigalg + :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Selector TLSException -> IO () +handshake12_client_cert_verify_sigalg alg rejected = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + acceptUnverified = alg == (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + , onUnverifiedClientCert = return acceptUnverified + } + } + unfit (CertVerify (DigitallySigned _ sig)) = + pure $ CertVerify (DigitallySigned alg sig) + unfit hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx unfit + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` rejected) + (void (E.try (handshake cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException ()))) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +-- The same for the signature of ServerKeyExchange, which the client used to +-- answer with an ErrorCall and internal_error. +handshake12_server_key_xchg_sigalg + :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Selector TLSException -> IO () +handshake12_server_key_xchg_sigalg alg rejected = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let (HashAlgorithm h, SignatureAlgorithm sa) = alg + unfit (ServerKeyXchg (SKX_ECDHE_RSA params (DigitallySigned _ sig))) = + pure $ ServerKeyXchg (SKX_ECDHE_RSA params (DigitallySigned alg sig)) + -- Arriving with ServerHello, it is decoded before the cipher is + -- known: curve type and group, the point, then the algorithm. + unfit (ServerKeyXchg (SKX_Unparsed bs)) = + let off = 4 + fromIntegral (B.index bs 3) + in pure $ + ServerKeyXchg $ + SKX_Unparsed $ + B.take off bs <> B.pack [h, sa] <> B.drop (off + 2) bs + unfit hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv cctx unfit + concurrently_ + (void (E.try (handshake sctx) :: IO (Either TLSException ()))) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` rejected) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +-- A DER ECDSA signature that does not decode is a signature that does not +-- verify, a decrypt_error. The client's TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify +-- signature is replaced on its way to the server with one that the ASN.1 +-- library used to throw on, which ended the handshake with internal_error. +handshake13_client_cert_verify_malformed_ecdsa + :: (B.ByteString -> B.ByteString) -> IO () +handshake13_client_cert_verify_malformed_ecdsa corrupt = do + let cipher = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS13], [TLS13]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + creds <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType + let cred = head [c | c@(_, PrivKeyEC _) <- creds] + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + malform (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned alg sig)) = + pure $ CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned alg (corrupt sig)) + malform hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv sctx malform + concurrently_ + ((handshake sctx >> recvData sctx) `shouldThrow` rejectedAsDecryptError) + ( void + (E.try (handshake cctx >> recvData cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException B.ByteString)) + ) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +rejectedAsDecryptError :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedAsDecryptError (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol _ DecryptError)) = True +rejectedAsDecryptError _ = False + +-- RFC 8446 Section 6.2: a CertificateVerify whose algorithm may not be used +-- with the certificate's key has a field that is incorrect, which is an +-- illegal_parameter; decrypt_error is for a signature that does not verify. +-- The client signs with RSA-PSS for an rsaEncryption key and the server +-- reads the algorithm as rsa_pss_pss_sha256, which needs an RSASSA-PSS key. +handshake13_client_cert_verify_unfit_sigalg :: IO () +handshake13_client_cert_verify_unfit_sigalg = do + let cipher = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS13], [TLS13]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithPurpose KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + unfit (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned _ sig)) = + pure $ + CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA256) sig) + unfit hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv sctx unfit + concurrently_ + ((handshake sctx >> recvData sctx) `shouldThrow` rejectedAsIllegalParameter) + ( void + (E.try (handshake cctx >> recvData cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException B.ByteString)) + ) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +rejectedAsIllegalParameter :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedAsIllegalParameter (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol _ IllegalParameter)) = True +rejectedAsIllegalParameter (Terminated _ _ (Error_Protocol _ IllegalParameter)) = True +rejectedAsIllegalParameter _ = False + +-- A server that receives a ClientHello whose legacy_version is higher than +-- its own negotiates the highest version it supports (RFC 5246 Appendix +-- E.1); with supported_versions present it does not use legacy_version at +-- all (RFC 8446 Section 4.2.1). The ClientHello's legacy_version is raised +-- on its way to the server, and the handshake must still reach the version +-- both sides support. +handshake_high_legacy_version :: Version -> Version -> IO () +handshake_high_legacy_version version legacy = do + let cipher + | version == TLS13 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + | otherwise = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let raise (ClientHello ch) = pure $ ClientHello ch{chVersion = legacy} + raise hs = pure hs + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx raise + concurrently_ (handshake sctx) (handshake cctx) + info <- contextGetInformation sctx + (infoVersion <$> info) `shouldBe` Just version + +-- RFC 8422 Section 5.1.2: ec_point_format_list is <1..2^8-1>, and a +-- client naming one of its curves in supported_groups must offer the +-- uncompressed format. The ClientHello's ec_point_formats is replaced +-- on its way to the server, which must refuse it. +handshake12_ec_point_formats + :: B.ByteString -> Selector TLSException -> IO () +handshake12_ec_point_formats formats rejected = do + CSP12 (cparams, sparams) <- generate arbitrary + let cparams' = + cparams + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported cparams){supportedGroups = [X25519]} + } + sparams' = + sparams + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported sparams){supportedGroups = [X25519]} + } + replace (ClientHello ch) = + pure $ + ClientHello + ch + { chExtensions = + filter + (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid /= EID_EcPointFormats) + (chExtensions ch) + ++ [ExtensionRaw EID_EcPointFormats formats] + } + replace hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (cparams', sparams') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx replace + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` rejected) + (void (E.try (handshake cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException ()))) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +rejectedAsDecodeError :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedAsDecodeError (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol _ DecodeError)) = True +rejectedAsDecodeError _ = False + +-- RFC 8449 Section 4: a record size limit binds the peer only when the +-- extension is negotiated. Only one side sets limitRecordSize, so the +-- extension is not negotiated, and a record of 2^14 octets from the other +-- side must be received rather than refused with record_overflow. +record_size_limit_unnegotiated :: Version -> Bool -> IO () +record_size_limit_unnegotiated version clientLimited = do + let cipher + | version == TLS13 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + | otherwise = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let limited shared = shared{sharedLimit = (sharedLimit shared){limitRecordSize = Just 1024}} + clientParam' + | clientLimited = clientParam{clientShared = limited $ clientShared clientParam} + | otherwise = clientParam + serverParam' + | clientLimited = serverParam + | otherwise = serverParam{serverShared = limited $ serverShared serverParam} + payload = B.replicate 16384 0x61 + send ctx = handshake ctx >> sendData ctx (L.fromStrict payload) + received <- newIORef B.empty + let recv ctx = do + handshake ctx + let loop acc + | B.length acc >= B.length payload = writeIORef received acc + | otherwise = recvData ctx >>= \bs -> loop (acc <> bs) + loop B.empty + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + if clientLimited + then concurrently_ (send sctx) (recv cctx) + else concurrently_ (recv sctx) (send cctx) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + readIORef received `shouldReturn` payload + +-- RFC 8449 Section 4: with record_size_limit negotiated, each side keeps +-- to the other's limit. Both sides set limitRecordSize, which a TLS 1.3 +-- server returns in EncryptedExtensions, and 2^14 octets sent by one side +-- must reach the other in records within its limit. +record_size_limit_negotiated :: Version -> Bool -> IO () +record_size_limit_negotiated version serverSends = do + let cipher + | version == TLS13 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + | otherwise = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let limited shared = shared{sharedLimit = (sharedLimit shared){limitRecordSize = Just 1024}} + clientParam' = clientParam{clientShared = limited $ clientShared clientParam} + serverParam' = serverParam{serverShared = limited $ serverShared serverParam} + payload = B.replicate 16384 0x61 + send ctx = handshake ctx >> sendData ctx (L.fromStrict payload) + received <- newIORef B.empty + let recv ctx = do + handshake ctx + let loop acc + | B.length acc >= B.length payload = writeIORef received acc + | otherwise = recvData ctx >>= \bs -> loop (acc <> bs) + loop B.empty + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + if serverSends + then concurrently_ (send sctx) (recv cctx) + else concurrently_ (recv sctx) (send cctx) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + readIORef received `shouldReturn` payload + +handshake_client_auth_fail :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_client_auth_fail (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam + serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam + version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + where + validateChain _ _ = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_ems :: (EMSMode, EMSMode) -> IO () +handshake_ems (cems, sems) = do + params <- generate arbitrary + let params' = setEMSMode (cems, sems) params + version = getConnectVersion params' + emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 + use = cems /= NoEMS && sems /= NoEMS + require = cems == RequireEMS || sems == RequireEMS + p info = infoExtendedMainSecret info == (emsVersion && use) + if emsVersion && require && not use + then runTLSFailure params' handshake handshake + else runTLSPredicate params' (maybe False p) + +newtype CompatEMS = CompatEMS (EMSMode, EMSMode) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CompatEMS where + arbitrary = CompatEMS <$> (arbitrary `suchThat` compatible) + where + compatible (NoEMS, RequireEMS) = False + compatible (RequireEMS, NoEMS) = False + compatible _ = True + +handshake_resumption_ems :: (CompatEMS, CompatEMS) -> IO () +handshake_resumption_ems (CompatEMS ems, CompatEMS ems2) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + plainParams <- generate arbitrary + let params = + setEMSMode ems $ + setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = + setEMSMode ems2 $ + setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + let version = getConnectVersion params2 + emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 + + if emsVersion && use ems && not (use ems2) + then runTLSFailure params2 handshake handshake + else do + runTLSSimple params2 + mSessionParams2 <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + let sameSession = sessionParams == mSessionParams2 + sameUse = use ems == use ems2 + when emsVersion (sameSession `shouldBe` sameUse) + where + use (NoEMS, _) = False + use (_, NoEMS) = False + use _ = True + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_alpn :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_alpn (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2", "http/1.1"] + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just alpn + } + } + params' = (clientParam', serverParam') + runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx + proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx + proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" + alpn xs + | "h2" `elem` xs = return "h2" + | otherwise = return "http/1.1" + +handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_server_selection :: IO () +handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_server_selection = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let params = alpnParams clientParam serverParam (const $ pure "h2") + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedUnofferedALPN) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + +handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_client_selection :: IO () +handshake_alpn_rejects_unoffered_client_selection = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let params = alpnParams clientParam serverParam (pure . unsafeHead) + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv cctx tamperALPN + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` clientRejectedUnofferedALPN) + where + tamperALPN (EncryptedExtensions13 exts) = + pure $ EncryptedExtensions13 $ map replaceALPN exts + tamperALPN hs = pure hs + replaceALPN ext@(ExtensionRaw eid _) + | eid == EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = + toExtensionRaw $ ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation ["h2"] + | otherwise = ext + +alpnParams + :: ClientParams + -> ServerParams + -> ([B.ByteString] -> IO B.ByteString) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +alpnParams clientParam serverParam select = + ( clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onSuggestALPN = pure $ Just ["http/1.1"] + } + } + , serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just select + } + } + ) + +serverRejectedUnofferedALPN :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedUnofferedALPN (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + msg == "ALPN callback selected a protocol not offered by the client" + && alert == NoApplicationProtocol +serverRejectedUnofferedALPN _ = False + +clientRejectedUnofferedALPN :: TLSException -> Bool +clientRejectedUnofferedALPN (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + msg == "server selected an ALPN protocol not offered by the client" + && alert == IllegalParameter +clientRejectedUnofferedALPN _ = False + +-- RFC 6066 Section 3: HostName is <1..2^16-1>, so a client with an +-- empty server name sends no server_name, and the server sees none. +handshake_sni_empty :: IO () +handshake_sni_empty = do + CSP12 (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + let clientParam' = clientParam{clientServerIdentification = ("", "")} + runTLSSuccess (clientParam', serverParam) hs hs + where + hs ctx = do + handshake ctx + msni <- getClientSNI ctx + msni `shouldBe` Nothing + +-- RFC 6066 Section 3: the server_name_list MUST NOT contain more than one +-- name of the same name_type, and HostName is an ASCII DNS host name. The +-- ClientHello's server_name is replaced on its way to the server, which +-- must refuse it with illegal_parameter. +handshake_sni_illegal :: [B.ByteString] -> IO () +handshake_sni_illegal names = do + CSP12 (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + let entry name = + B.concat [B.pack [0, len `shiftR` 8, len], name] + where + len = fromIntegral $ B.length name + list = B.concat $ map entry names + listLen = fromIntegral $ B.length list + sni = B.concat [B.pack [listLen `shiftR` 8, listLen], list] + replace (ClientHello ch) = + pure $ + ClientHello + ch + { chExtensions = + ExtensionRaw EID_ServerName sni + : filter + (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid /= EID_ServerName) + (chExtensions ch) + } + replace hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx replace + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` rejectedAsIllegalParameter) + (void (E.try (handshake cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException ()))) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +handshake_sni :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_sni (clientParam, serverParam) = do + ref <- newIORef Nothing + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientServerIdentification = (serverName, "") + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onServerNameIndication = onSNI ref + } + } + params' = (clientParam', serverParam') + runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer + receivedName <- readIORef ref + receivedName `shouldBe` Just (Just serverName) + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + msni <- getClientSNI ctx + expectMaybe "C: SNI should be Just" serverName msni + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + msni <- getClientSNI ctx + expectMaybe "S: SNI should be Just" serverName msni + onSNI ref name = do + mx <- readIORef ref + mx `shouldBe` Nothing + writeIORef ref (Just name) + return (Credentials []) + serverName = "haskell.org" + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CSP12 = CSP12 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CSP12 where + arbitrary = CSP12 <$> arbitraryPairParams12 + +handshake12_renegotiation :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_renegotiation (CSP12 (cparams, sparams)) = do + renegDisabled <- generate arbitrary + let sparams' = + sparams + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported sparams) + { supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = not renegDisabled + } + } + if renegDisabled + then runTLSFailure (cparams, sparams') hsClient hsServer + else runTLSSimple (cparams, sparams') + where + hsClient ctx = handshake ctx >> handshake ctx + -- recvData receives the alert from the second handshake + hsServer ctx = handshake ctx >> void (recvData ctx) + +-- RFC 5746 Section 3.7: when a connection with secure renegotiation is +-- renegotiated, ClientHello must not contain the SCSV and must contain +-- the renegotiation_info extension. The second ClientHello is tampered +-- with on its way to the server, which must abort with handshake_failure. +handshake12_renegotiation_tampered :: (ClientHello -> ClientHello) -> IO () +handshake12_renegotiation_tampered tamper = do + CSP12 (cparams, sparams) <- generate arbitrary + let cparams' = + cparams + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported cparams) + { supportedSecureRenegotiation = True + } + } + sparams' = + sparams + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported sparams) + { supportedSecureRenegotiation = True + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = True + } + } + count <- newIORef (0 :: Int) + let tamperSecond (ClientHello ch) = do + n <- atomicModifyIORef' count $ \i -> (i + 1, i) + pure $ ClientHello $ if n == 0 then ch else tamper ch + tamperSecond hs = pure hs + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (id, id) (cparams', sparams') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx tamperSecond + concurrently_ (handshake sctx) (handshake cctx) + concurrently_ + (recvData sctx `shouldThrow` rejectedAsHandshakeFailure) + ( void + (E.try (handshake cctx >> recvData cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException B.ByteString)) + ) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +rejectedAsHandshakeFailure :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedAsHandshakeFailure (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol _ HandshakeFailure)) = True +rejectedAsHandshakeFailure (Terminated _ _ (Error_Protocol _ HandshakeFailure)) = True +rejectedAsHandshakeFailure _ = False + +handshake12_session_resumption :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_session_resumption (CSP12 plainParams) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) + +-- RFC 5246 Section 7.4.1.2: a client resuming a session MUST offer its +-- cipher suite. When it asks to resume one and offers none the server can +-- use, that is what is reported -- illegal_parameter, as when a cipher could +-- be chosen -- rather than the missing common cipher. +handshake12_session_resumption_cipher_missing :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_session_resumption_cipher_missing (CSP12 plainParams) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + runTLSSimple params + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + -- TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, which the server does not support + nullCiphers (ClientHello ch) = pure $ ClientHello ch{chCiphers = [CipherId 0x0001]} + nullCiphers hs = pure hs + withPairContextWith (id, id) params2 $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx nullCiphers + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedMissingCipher) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + +serverRejectedMissingCipher :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedMissingCipher (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol _ IllegalParameter)) = True +serverRejectedMissingCipher _ = False + +-- RFC 5077 Sections 3.2 and 3.3: a server sends the session_ticket +-- extension and NewSessionTicket only to a client that sent the +-- extension. The client's session_ticket is removed on its way to a +-- server whose session manager uses tickets, and the client must then +-- receive neither. +handshake12_session_ticket_unoffered :: IO () +handshake12_session_ticket_unoffered = do + CSP12 (cparams, sparams) <- generate arbitrary + let sparams' = + sparams + { serverShared = + (serverShared sparams){sharedSessionManager = oneSessionTicket} + } + unoffer (ClientHello ch) = + pure $ + ClientHello + ch + { chExtensions = + filter + (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid /= EID_SessionTicket) + (chExtensions ch) + } + unoffer hs = pure hs + received <- newIORef [] + let record hs = modifyIORef received (hs :) >> pure hs + withPairContextWith (id, id) (cparams, sparams') $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx unoffer + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv cctx record + concurrently_ (handshake sctx) (handshake cctx) + hss <- readIORef received + let ticketExt (ServerHello sh) = + any (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid == EID_SessionTicket) (shExtensions sh) + ticketExt _ = False + newTicket NewSessionTicket{} = True + newTicket _ = False + filter (\h -> ticketExt h || newTicket h) hss `shouldBe` [] + +handshake12_session_ticket :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_session_ticket (CSP12 plainParams) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake13_full :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_full (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +-- A handshake that succeeds, for each group whose key exchange is a KEM. +-- +-- Until this was added the suite had one ML-KEM test and it was a negative +-- one: a zero X25519 part, rejected before any shared secret was computed. +-- Nothing ran encapsulation and decapsulation to the end and checked the two +-- sides reached the same key, which is the one thing a key exchange has to +-- do. An implementation that returned the ciphertext where the secret +-- belongs would have passed everything else here. +handshake13_kem :: Group -> CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_kem grp (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [grp] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [grp] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[grp]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +-- A handshake with an ML-DSA server certificate, and one with an ML-DSA +-- client certificate, for each parameter set. +handshake13_mldsa :: Int -> CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_mldsa n (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + creds <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachMLDSA + let cred = creds !! n + -- one group on both sides, so the mode is a full handshake and not + -- a retry, which is what this is asserting about + cliSupported = + (clientSupported cli) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverShared = + (serverShared srv){sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred]} + } + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +handshake13_mldsa_client :: Int -> CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_mldsa_client n (CSP13 (clientParam, serverParam)) = do + creds <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachMLDSA + let cred = creds !! n + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \chain -> + if chain == fst cred + then return CertificateUsageAccept + else return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + } + , serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + } + clientParam'' = + clientParam' + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + } + runTLSSimple13 (clientParam'', serverParam') FullHandshake + +-- A CertificateVerify naming a scheme the key cannot have made. +-- +-- The second byte of an ML-DSA scheme is one RSASSA-PSS also uses, so code +-- that looks at it alone answers for the wrong algorithm; this is here to +-- catch that, and to pin the alert, which has to be illegal_parameter and +-- not decrypt_error -- the field is wrong, rather than the signature. +handshake13_mldsa_wrong_scheme :: IO () +handshake13_mldsa_wrong_scheme = do + CSP13 (cli, srv) <- generate arbitrary + creds <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachMLDSA + let cred = head creds -- ML-DSA-44 + cliSupported = + (clientSupported cli) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverShared = + (serverShared srv){sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred]} + } + ) + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv cctx relabel + concurrently_ + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` clientRejectedTheScheme) + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + where + -- The signature is the one ML-DSA-44 made; only the scheme is changed, + -- to another ML-DSA size, which the key cannot have signed under. + relabel (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned _ sig)) = + pure $ CertVerify13 $ DigitallySigned MLDSA65 sig + relabel hs = pure hs + +-- The reason as well as the alert. Matching the alert alone would also be +-- satisfied by an illegal_parameter raised for some other reason, which is +-- not what this is asking about. +clientRejectedTheScheme :: TLSException -> Bool +clientRejectedTheScheme (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + alert == IllegalParameter && "does not fit the public key" `isInfixOf` msg +clientRejectedTheScheme _ = False + +handshake13_hrr :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_hrr (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_psk :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey + +-- RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1: a TLS 1.3 PSK resumes only a TLS 1.3 session. +-- The server's session manager answers the client's PSK identity with a +-- TLS 1.2 session, which has no ticket information; the server must +-- fall back to a full handshake rather than fail. +handshake13_psk_tls12_session :: IO () +handshake13_psk_tls12_session = do + CSP12 params12 <- generate arbitrary + refs12 <- twoSessionRefs + runTLSSimple $ setPairParamsSessionManagers (twoSessionManagers refs12) params12 + Just (_, sdata12) <- readIORef (snd refs12) + sessionVersion sdata12 `shouldBe` TLS12 + + CSP13 (cli, srv) <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + refs13 <- twoSessionRefs + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers (twoSessionManagers refs13) params0 + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + Just sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef refs13 + + let tls12Manager = + noSessionManager + { sessionResume = \_ -> return $ Just sdata12 + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = \_ -> return $ Just sdata12 + } + params2 = + setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams $ + setPairParamsSessionManagers (fst (twoSessionManagers refs13), tls12Manager) params0 + -- The key share is for the group of the earlier session, so no + -- HelloRetryRequest, and the PSK is not used. + runTLSSimple13 params2 FullHandshake + +handshake13_psk_ticket :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_ticket (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey + +handshake13_psk_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = + [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + ] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- resumption fails because GCM cipher is not supported anymore, full + -- handshake is not possible because X25519 has been removed, so we are + -- back with P256 after hello retry + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let (cli2, srv2) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + srv2' = + srv2{serverSupported = svrSupported'} + svrSupported' = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[P256]] + } + + runTLSSimple13 (cli2, srv2') HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_0rtt :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + cliHooks = + defaultClientHooks + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2"] + } + svrHooks = + defaultServerHooks + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) + } + params0 = + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientHooks = cliHooks + } + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverHooks = svrHooks + , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + where + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs = do + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + clearClientSessionRef sessionRefs + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + params2 = (pc{clientUseEarlyData = True}, ps) + + runTLS0RTT params2 RTT0 earlyData + +handshake13_0rtt_alpn :: IO () +handshake13_0rtt_alpn = do + (cli, srv) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + cliHooks = + defaultClientHooks + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2"] + } + svrHooks = + defaultServerHooks + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) + } + params0 = + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientHooks = cliHooks + } + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverHooks = svrHooks + , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 + } + ) + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let params = + setPairParamsSessionManagers + (twoSessionManagers sessionRefs) + params0 + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + sessionALPN (snd $ fromJust sessionParams) `shouldBe` Just "h2" + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + pc' = + pc + { clientUseEarlyData = True + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks pc) + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["http/1.1"] + } + } + ps' = + ps + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks ps) + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) + } + } + runTLS0RTT (pc', ps') PreSharedKey "GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n" + +handshake13_0rtt_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + group0 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group0] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group0]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverEarlyDataSize = 1024 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params0 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params + + let mode = if group0 == P256 then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest + runTLSSimple13 params0 mode + + -- and resume + mSessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + case mSessionParams of + Nothing -> expectationFailure "session params: Just is expected" + Just sessionParams -> do + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + group1 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params0 + svrSupported1 = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group1] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group1]] + } + params1 = + ( pc{clientUseEarlyData = True} + , ps + { serverEarlyDataSize = 0 + , serverSupported = svrSupported1 + } + ) + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group0] + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group1] + if group0 == group1 + -- 0-RTT is not allowed, so fallback to PreSharedKey + then runTLS0RTT params1 PreSharedKey earlyData + -- HRR but not allowed for 0-RTT + else runTLSFailure params1 (tlsClient earlyData) tlsServer + where + tlsClient earlyData ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + tlsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + +-- The server has forgotten the session, so it answers 0-RTT with a full +-- handshake, and the client must check its certificate. +handshake13_0rtt_psk_rejected :: Bool -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt_psk_rejected wantCert = do + (cli, srv) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + let supported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = supported} + , srv{serverSupported = supported, serverEarlyDataSize = 2048} + ) + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers (twoSessionManagers sessionRefs) params0 + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + writeIORef (snd sessionRefs) Nothing + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + ps' = + ps + { serverWantClientCert = wantCert + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks ps) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + runTLS0RTT (pc{clientUseEarlyData = True}, ps') FullHandshake earlyData + +handshake13_ee_groups :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ee_groups (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let -- The client prefers P256 + cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = [P256, X25519]} + -- The server prefers X25519 + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = [X25519, P256] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519, P256]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + (_, serverMessages) <- runTLSCapture13 params + -- The server should tell X25519 in supported_groups in EE to client + let isSupportedGroups (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == EID_SupportedGroups + eeMessagesHaveExt = + [ any isSupportedGroups exts + | EncryptedExtensions13 exts <- serverMessages + ] + eeMessagesHaveExt `shouldBe` [True] + +handshake13_ec :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ec (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + EC cgrps <- generate arbitrary + EC sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +handshake13_ffdhe :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ffdhe (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + FFDHE cgrps <- generate arbitrary + FFDHE sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +-- An all-zero X25519 public key decodes, but the shared secret computed +-- from it is all zero and is rejected. The server must answer with +-- illegal_parameter, as it does for X25519 alone, rather than crash. +handshake13_x25519mlkem768_zero_x25519 :: IO () +handshake13_x25519mlkem768_zero_x25519 = do + CSP13 (cli, srv) <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = + (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = [X25519MLKEM768]} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = [X25519MLKEM768] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519MLKEM768]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + withPairContextWith (id, id) params $ \(cctx, sctx) -> do + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv sctx zeroX25519 + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedZeroX25519) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + where + zeroX25519 (ClientHello ch) = + pure $ ClientHello ch{chExtensions = map zeroKeyShare $ chExtensions ch} + zeroX25519 hs = pure hs + zeroKeyShare ext@(ExtensionRaw eid bs) + | eid == EID_KeyShare + , Just (KeyShareClientHello kses) <- extensionDecode MsgTClientHello bs = + toExtensionRaw $ KeyShareClientHello $ map zeroEntry kses + | otherwise = ext + -- The ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key (1184 bytes) is followed by the + -- X25519 public key (32 bytes). + zeroEntry (KeyShareEntry grp key) + | grp == X25519MLKEM768 = + KeyShareEntry grp $ B.take 1184 key <> B.replicate 32 0 + zeroEntry kse = kse + +serverRejectedZeroX25519 :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedZeroX25519 (HandshakeFailed (Error_Protocol msg alert)) = + msg == "invalid client X25519MLKEM768 public key" + && alert == IllegalParameter +serverRejectedZeroX25519 _ = False + +post_handshake_auth :: CSP13 -> IO () +post_handshake_auth (CSP13 (clientParam, serverParam)) = do + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential TLS13) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + if isCredentialDSA cred + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer + else runTLSSuccess (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer + where + validateChain cred chain + | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx "request 1" + recvDataAssert ctx "response 1" + sendData ctx "request 2" + recvDataAssert ctx "response 2" + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + recvDataAssert ctx "request 1" + _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- single request + sendData ctx "response 1" + recvDataAssert ctx "request 2" + _ <- requestCertificate ctx + _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- two simultaneously + sendData ctx "response 2" + +-- | After sending a Certificate message, a TLS 1.3 client peeks for a +-- client-authentication alert with a deadline of a few RTTs. That peek must +-- not abandon a record it has already started reading: the record layer has no +-- receive buffer, so the bytes consumed for the record header would be lost and +-- the caller's next 'recvData' would decode part of a record body as a header. +-- +-- Here the server's first write is one full-size record whose body is made to +-- arrive late, so the peek does hit its deadline with the header already +-- consumed. Before the fix this failed with +-- @Error_Protocol "record exceeding maximum size" RecordOverflow@. +handshake13_client_auth_slow_record :: IO () +handshake13_client_auth_slow_record = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitraryPairParams13 + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential TLS13) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + payload = B.replicate 16384 65 + withPairContextWith (delayBigReads, id) (clientParam', serverParam') $ + \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sCtx + sendData sCtx $ L.fromStrict payload + ) + ( do + handshake cCtx + recvData cCtx `shouldReturn` payload + ) + where + -- Only the body of the big record is held back; every handshake record is + -- far smaller than this threshold and so arrives immediately. + delayBigReads be = + be + { backendRecv = \n -> do + when (n > 4096) $ threadDelay 300000 + backendRecv be n + } + +-- A protected record too short for the cipher cannot be deprotected, which +-- RFC 5246 Section 7.2.2 and RFC 8446 Section 5.2 answer with +-- bad_record_mac. The client's first application data record is cut down +-- to a single byte of ciphertext on its way to the server. +short_record_bad_record_mac :: Version -> Cipher -> IO () +short_record_bad_record_mac version cipher = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + armed <- newIORef False + let truncateRecord be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + cut <- readIORef armed + if cut && B.length bs > 6 && B.head bs == 23 + then do + writeIORef armed False + backendSend be $ B.take 3 bs <> B.pack [0, 1] <> B.take 1 (B.drop 5 bs) + else backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (truncateRecord, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ + \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + recvData sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedShortRecord + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + writeIORef armed True + sendData cctx "hello" + void (E.try (recvData cctx) :: IO (Either E.SomeException B.ByteString)) + ) + +-- RFC 8446 Section 5: once keys are in use, only ChangeCipherSpec may come +-- in clear. An injected close_notify must not read as an orderly close. +plaintext_alert13_rejected :: IO () +plaintext_alert13_rejected = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS13], [TLS13]) + ([cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256], [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256]) + armed <- newIORef False + let injectAlert be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + inject <- readIORef armed + if inject && B.take 1 bs == B.singleton 23 + then do + writeIORef armed False + backendSend be $ B.pack [21, 3, 3, 0, 2, 1, 0] + else backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (injectAlert, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ + \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + recvData sctx `shouldThrow` rejectedPlaintextAlert + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + writeIORef armed True + sendData cctx "hello" + void (E.try (recvData cctx) :: IO (Either E.SomeException B.ByteString)) + ) + +rejectedPlaintextAlert :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedPlaintextAlert (Terminated _ _ (Error_Protocol _ UnexpectedMessage)) = True +rejectedPlaintextAlert _ = False + +-- A ChangeCipherSpec ahead of the client's second flight, before the server +-- has the keys to switch to. The handshake would refuse it anyway; this +-- keeps the record layer from switching to keys that do not exist. +early_ccs12_rejected :: IO () +early_ccs12_rejected = do + let cipher = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + sent <- newIORef (0 :: Int) + let injectCCS be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + n <- readIORef sent + writeIORef sent (n + 1) + -- The first send is ClientHello. + when (n == 1) $ backendSend be $ B.pack [20, 3, 3, 0, 1, 1] + backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (injectCCS, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ + \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` rejectedAsUnexpected) + (void (E.try (handshake cctx) :: IO (Either E.SomeException ()))) + +serverRejectedShortRecord :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedShortRecord (Terminated _ _ (Error_Protocol _ BadRecordMac)) = True +serverRejectedShortRecord _ = False + +-- The first handshake message a server receives must be a ClientHello; any +-- other is out of order and answered with unexpected_message (RFC 8446 +-- Section 4), whatever its body would decode to. The handshake type of the +-- client's first record is replaced on its way to the server. +server_first_message_unexpected :: Word8 -> IO () +server_first_message_unexpected ty = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + armed <- newIORef True + let retype be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + first <- atomicModifyIORef' armed (\a -> (False, a)) + if first && B.length bs > 5 && B.head bs == 22 + then backendSend be $ B.take 5 bs <> B.singleton ty <> B.drop 6 bs + else backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (retype, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + +-- ChangeCipherSpec comes between complete handshake messages (RFC 5246 +-- Section 7.1), and a server has no handshake state before its first +-- ClientHello (CVE-2004-0079). The client's first record is split after +-- the given number of bytes of its body, and a ChangeCipherSpec record is +-- sent in between; with 0 it is sent before the whole ClientHello. +server_ccs_interleaved :: Int -> IO () +server_ccs_interleaved n = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + armed <- newIORef True + let interleave be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + first <- atomicModifyIORef' armed (\a -> (False, a)) + if first && B.length bs > 5 + n && B.head bs == 22 + then do + let (hdr, body) = B.splitAt 5 bs + (body1, body2) = B.splitAt n body + record b = B.take 3 hdr <> encodeWord16 (fromIntegral $ B.length b) <> b + ccs = B.pack [20, 3, 3, 0, 1, 1] + if n == 0 + then backendSend be $ ccs <> bs + else backendSend be $ record body1 <> ccs <> record body2 + else backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (interleave, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + +-- An unknown record type is answered with unexpected_message (RFC 8446 +-- Section 5). The type of the client's first record is replaced; with a +-- length larger than what follows, as an SSLv2 ClientHello reads when taken +-- for a TLS record header, the server must answer from the header alone +-- rather than wait for a body that never comes. A length of 0 keeps the +-- original one. +server_first_record_type_unexpected :: Word8 -> Word16 -> IO () +server_first_record_type_unexpected ty len = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + armed <- newIORef True + let retype be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + first <- atomicModifyIORef' armed (\a -> (False, a)) + if first && B.length bs > 5 && B.head bs == 22 + then do + let lenBytes + | len == 0 = B.take 2 (B.drop 3 bs) + | otherwise = + B.pack [fromIntegral (len `div` 256), fromIntegral (len `mod` 256)] + backendSend be $ + B.singleton ty <> B.take 2 (B.drop 1 bs) <> lenBytes <> B.drop 5 bs + else backendSend be bs + } + r <- timeout 5000000 $ + withPairContextWith (retype, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + (handshake sctx `shouldThrow` serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst) + (handshake cctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + +-- RFC 8446 Section 5.1: handshake messages MUST NOT be interleaved with +-- other record types. After the handshake the client sends, protected under +-- its application traffic secret, a record holding only the first two bytes +-- of a KeyUpdate and then a record of application data. The server must not +-- deliver the data and must answer with unexpected_message. +handshake13_interleaved_app_data :: IO () +handshake13_interleaved_app_data = do + let cipher = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS13], [TLS13]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + secretRef <- newIORef Nothing + sendRef <- newIORef (\_ -> return ()) + let logKey line = case words line of + ["CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0", _, h] -> writeIORef secretRef (Just h) + _ -> return () + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientDebug = (clientDebug clientParam){debugKeyLogger = logKey} + } + -- remember the raw sender so that records can be written by hand + capture be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> do + writeIORef sendRef (backendSend be) + backendSend be bs + } + withPairContextWith (capture, id) (clientParam', serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ( do + handshake sctx + r <- E.try (recvData sctx) :: IO (Either TLSException B.ByteString) + case r of + Right d -> expectationFailure $ "server delivered " ++ show d + Left _ -> return () + ) + ( do + handshake cctx + Just h <- readIORef secretRef + send <- readIORef sendRef + let secret = BA.convert (unhex h) :: BA.ScrubbedBytes + key = hkdfExpandLabel SHA256 secret "key" "" 16 :: B.ByteString + iv = hkdfExpandLabel SHA256 secret "iv" "" 12 :: B.ByteString + -- the first two bytes of KeyUpdate(update_not_requested) + partialKeyUpdate = B.pack [24, 0] + send $ protect13 key iv 0 22 partialKeyUpdate + send $ protect13 key iv 1 23 "hello" + recvData cctx `shouldThrow` peerSentUnexpected + ) + where + unhex [] = B.empty + unhex (a : b : rest) = B.cons (read ['0', 'x', a, b]) (unhex rest) + unhex _ = error "unhex" + +-- A ChangeCipherSpec is the single byte 1; any other value is answered with +-- unexpected_message (RFC 8446 Section 5), and so is one carrying two of +-- them. The client's ChangeCipherSpec record is made two bytes long. The +-- groups are fixed so that a TLS 1.3 handshake goes through a +-- HelloRetryRequest -- after which the client sends its ChangeCipherSpec +-- before the second ClientHello -- or not, as the test asks. +malformed_ccs_unexpected :: Version -> Cipher -> [Group] -> [Group] -> IO () +malformed_ccs_unexpected version cipher cgroups sgroups = do + (clientParam0, serverParam0) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + ([cipher], [cipher]) + let clientParam = + clientParam0 + { clientSupported = (clientSupported clientParam0){supportedGroups = cgroups} + } + serverParam = + serverParam0 + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam0) + { supportedGroups = sgroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgroups] + } + } + seen <- newIORef False + let ccs = B.pack [20, 3, 3, 0, 1, 1] + doubled = B.pack [20, 3, 3, 0, 2, 1, 1] + double be = + be + { backendSend = \bs -> + if ccs `B.isPrefixOf` bs + then do + writeIORef seen True + backendSend be $ doubled <> B.drop 6 bs + else backendSend be bs + } + -- a TLS 1.3 server takes the client's ChangeCipherSpec and Finished in + -- its first recvData, a TLS 1.2 one in handshake + r <- timeout 10000000 $ + withPairContextWith (double, id) (clientParam, serverParam) $ \(cctx, sctx) -> + concurrently_ + ((handshake sctx >> recvData sctx) `shouldThrow` rejectedAsUnexpected) + ( void + (E.try (handshake cctx >> recvData cctx) :: IO (Either TLSException B.ByteString)) + ) + r `shouldSatisfy` isJust + readIORef seen `shouldReturn` True + +rejectedAsUnexpected :: TLSException -> Bool +rejectedAsUnexpected (HandshakeFailed (Error_Packet_unexpected _ _)) = True +rejectedAsUnexpected (Terminated _ _ (Error_Packet_unexpected _ _)) = True +rejectedAsUnexpected _ = False + +-- An AES-128-GCM TLS 1.3 record: content and inner type, protected with the +-- record header as additional data and the sequence number in the nonce. +protect13 :: B.ByteString -> B.ByteString -> Word64 -> Word8 -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString +protect13 key iv sqn innerType content = hdr <> ct <> BA.convert tag + where + len = B.length content + 1 + 16 + hdr = B.pack [23, 3, 3, fromIntegral (len `div` 256), fromIntegral (len `mod` 256)] + sqnBytes = B.pack [fromIntegral (sqn `shiftR` (8 * i)) | i <- [7, 6 .. 0]] + nonce = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor iv (B.replicate 4 0 <> sqnBytes) + aes = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + aead = throwCryptoError (aeadInit AEAD_GCM aes nonce) + (AuthTag tag, ct) = aeadSimpleEncrypt aead hdr (content <> B.singleton innerType) 16 + +peerSentUnexpected :: TLSException -> Bool +peerSentUnexpected (Terminated True _ (Error_Protocol _ UnexpectedMessage)) = True +peerSentUnexpected _ = False + +serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst :: TLSException -> Bool +serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst (HandshakeFailed (Error_Packet_unexpected _ _)) = True +serverRejectedUnexpectedFirst _ = False expectJust :: String -> Maybe a -> Expectation expectJust tag mx = case mx of diff --git a/test/PubKey.hs b/test/PubKey.hs --- a/test/PubKey.hs +++ b/test/PubKey.hs @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ arbitraryECDSAPair, arbitraryEd25519Pair, arbitraryEd448Pair, + arbitraryMLDSA44Pair, + arbitraryMLDSA65Pair, + arbitraryMLDSA87Pair, globalRSAPair, getGlobalRSAPair, knownECCurves, @@ -20,8 +23,10 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.MLDSA as MLDSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import Crypto.Random +import Data.Proxy (Proxy (..)) import qualified Data.ByteString as B import System.IO.Unsafe import Test.QuickCheck @@ -111,6 +116,27 @@ bytes <- vectorOf 32 arbitrary let priv = fromCryptoPassed $ Ed25519.secretKey (B.pack bytes) return (Ed25519.toPublic priv, priv) + +-- ML-DSA, from a seed drawn here, so a run is reproducible from its seed +-- the way the other pairs are. +arbitraryMLDSAPair + :: MLDSA.MLDSA p + => proxy p -> Gen (MLDSA.VerificationKey p, MLDSA.SigningKey p) +arbitraryMLDSAPair p = do + bytes <- vectorOf MLDSA.seedSize arbitrary + return $ fromCryptoPassed $ MLDSA.keyPairFromSeed p (B.pack bytes) + +arbitraryMLDSA44Pair + :: Gen (MLDSA.VerificationKey MLDSA.MLDSA44, MLDSA.SigningKey MLDSA.MLDSA44) +arbitraryMLDSA44Pair = arbitraryMLDSAPair (Proxy :: Proxy MLDSA.MLDSA44) + +arbitraryMLDSA65Pair + :: Gen (MLDSA.VerificationKey MLDSA.MLDSA65, MLDSA.SigningKey MLDSA.MLDSA65) +arbitraryMLDSA65Pair = arbitraryMLDSAPair (Proxy :: Proxy MLDSA.MLDSA65) + +arbitraryMLDSA87Pair + :: Gen (MLDSA.VerificationKey MLDSA.MLDSA87, MLDSA.SigningKey MLDSA.MLDSA87) +arbitraryMLDSA87Pair = arbitraryMLDSAPair (Proxy :: Proxy MLDSA.MLDSA87) arbitraryEd448Pair :: Gen (Ed448.PublicKey, Ed448.SecretKey) arbitraryEd448Pair = do diff --git a/test/Run.hs b/test/Run.hs --- a/test/Run.hs +++ b/test/Run.hs @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ runTLSFailure, expectMaybe, newPairContext, + newPairContextWith, + withPairContext, + withPairContextWith, withDataPipe, byeBye, ) where @@ -156,6 +159,16 @@ handshake ctx sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData _ <- recvData ctx + -- One more exchange, and this one the client starts. Our Finished is + -- not sent by 'handshake' here: 0-RTT defers it, and the receive loop + -- above is what puts it on the wire. The server emits the + -- NewSessionTicket when it reads that Finished, which is after it sent + -- the echo -- so reading the echo is not enough to have seen the + -- ticket, and neither is a byte the server sends straight after it. + -- The server cannot answer this without having read past the Finished + -- first, and records arrive in order. + sendData ctx "x" + recvDataAssert ctx "x" bye ctx mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx expectMaybe "C: mode should be Just" mode mmode @@ -165,6 +178,8 @@ chunks <- replicateM (length ls) $ recvData ctx (map B.length chunks, B.concat chunks) `shouldBe` (ls, earlyData) sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + recvDataAssert ctx "x" + sendData ctx "x" bye ctx mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode @@ -187,6 +202,16 @@ handshake ctx sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData _ <- recvData ctx + -- One more exchange, and this one the client starts. Our Finished is + -- not sent by 'handshake' here: 0-RTT defers it, and the receive loop + -- above is what puts it on the wire. The server emits the + -- NewSessionTicket when it reads that Finished, which is after it sent + -- the echo -- so reading the echo is not enough to have seen the + -- ticket, and neither is a byte the server sends straight after it. + -- The server cannot answer this without having read past the Finished + -- first, and records arrive in order. + sendData ctx "x" + recvDataAssert ctx "x" bye ctx minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx let mmode = minfo >>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode @@ -199,6 +224,8 @@ chunks <- replicateM (length ls) $ recvData ctx (map B.length chunks, B.concat chunks) `shouldBe` (ls, earlyData) sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + recvDataAssert ctx "x" + sendData ctx "x" bye ctx mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode @@ -295,11 +322,15 @@ hsClient ctx d <- readChan queue sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d]) + -- The server writes after any TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket, so waiting for + -- this byte ensures the client session manager received the ticket. + recvDataAssert ctx "x" checkCtxFinished ctx bye ctx tlsServer ctx queue = do hsServer ctx d <- recvData ctx + sendData ctx "x" writeChan queue [d] checkCtxFinished ctx bye ctx @@ -326,16 +357,32 @@ withPairContext :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> ((Context, Context) -> IO ()) -> IO () -withPairContext params body = +withPairContext = withPairContextWith (id, id) + +withPairContextWith + :: (Backend -> Backend, Backend -> Backend) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> ((Context, Context) -> IO ()) + -> IO () +withPairContextWith wrapBackends params body = E.bracket - (newPairContext params) + (newPairContextWith wrapBackends params) (\((t1, t2), _) -> killThread t1 >> killThread t2) (\(_, ctxs) -> body ctxs) newPairContext :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO ((ThreadId, ThreadId), (Context, Context)) -newPairContext (cParams, sParams) = do +newPairContext = newPairContextWith (id, id) + +-- | 'newPairContext' with a hook on each side's 'Backend' -- client first, as +-- with the parameters -- so that a test can control how bytes arrive (delay +-- them, split them). Pass 'id' for a side to leave it alone. +newPairContextWith + :: (Backend -> Backend, Backend -> Backend) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> IO ((ThreadId, ThreadId), (Context, Context)) +newPairContextWith (wrapCBackend, wrapSBackend) (cParams, sParams) = do pipe <- newPipe tids <- runPipe pipe let noFlush = return () @@ -343,8 +390,8 @@ let cBackend = Backend noFlush noClose (writePipeC pipe) (readPipeC pipe) let sBackend = Backend noFlush noClose (writePipeS pipe) (readPipeS pipe) - cCtx' <- contextNew cBackend cParams - sCtx' <- contextNew sBackend sParams + cCtx' <- contextNew (wrapCBackend cBackend) cParams + sCtx' <- contextNew (wrapSBackend sBackend) sParams contextHookSetLogging cCtx' (logging "client: ") contextHookSetLogging sCtx' (logging "server: ") diff --git a/test/SecretSpec.hs b/test/SecretSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/SecretSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module SecretSpec where + +import Crypto.Debug (debugShow) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.List (isInfixOf) +import Network.TLS (Version (TLS13)) +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher (ciphersuite_default) +import Network.TLS.Internal (SessionData (..)) +import Network.TLS.QUIC +import Test.Hspec + +-- | The traffic secrets reach a QUIC implementation through +-- 'quicInstallKeys', so a trace of what it is handed must not write them to a +-- log. 'debugShow' is how a debugging session asks for them on purpose. +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "Show of the QUIC secret types" $ do + it "does not print an early traffic secret" $ + check $ + EarlySecretInfo cipher clientSecret + it "does not print the handshake traffic secrets" $ + check $ + HandshakeSecretInfo cipher (clientSecret, serverSecret) + it "does not print the application traffic secrets" $ + check $ + ApplicationSecretInfo (clientSecret, serverSecret) + describe "Show of a resumable session" $ + it "does not print the session secret" $ do + let shown = show sessionData + show (B.replicate 32 0xa5) `isInfixOf` shown `shouldBe` False + "" `isInfixOf` shown `shouldBe` True + show (B.replicate 32 0xa5) + `isInfixOf` debugShow sessionData + `shouldBe` True + where + sessionData = + SessionData + { sessionVersion = TLS13 + , sessionCipher = 0x1301 + , sessionCompression = 0 + , sessionClientSNI = Just "example.com" + , sessionSecret = B.replicate 32 0xa5 + , sessionGroup = Nothing + , sessionTicketInfo = Nothing + , sessionALPN = Nothing + , sessionMaxEarlyDataSize = 0 + , sessionFlags = [] + } + cipher = case ciphersuite_default of + c : _ -> c + [] -> error "ciphersuite_default is empty" + clientSecret = ClientTrafficSecret $ BA.convert $ B.replicate 32 0xa5 + serverSecret = ServerTrafficSecret $ BA.convert $ B.replicate 32 0x5a + hexOf w = concat $ replicate 32 w + check x = do + let shown = show x + hexOf "a5" `isInfixOf` shown `shouldBe` False + hexOf "5a" `isInfixOf` shown `shouldBe` False + "" `isInfixOf` shown `shouldBe` True + hexOf "a5" `isInfixOf` debugShow x `shouldBe` True diff --git a/tls.cabal b/tls.cabal --- a/tls.cabal +++ b/tls.cabal @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -cabal-version: >=1.10 +cabal-version: 2.0 name: tls -version: 2.3.1 +version: 2.4.12 license: BSD3 license-file: LICENSE copyright: Vincent Hanquez @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ build-type: Simple extra-source-files: test/*.hs + +extra-doc-files: CHANGELOG.md source-repository head @@ -34,6 +36,7 @@ Network.TLS.Internal Network.TLS.Extra Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher + Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE Network.TLS.QUIC @@ -121,23 +124,22 @@ base16-bytestring, bytestring >=0.10 && <0.13, cereal >=0.5.3 && <0.6, - crypton >=1.1.2 && <1.2, + crypton >=2.1.9 && <2.3, crypton-asn1-encoding >= 0.10.0 && < 0.11, crypton-asn1-types >= 0.4.1 && < 0.5, - crypton-x509 >=1.9 && <1.10, - crypton-x509-store >=1.9 && <1.10, - crypton-x509-validation >=1.9 && <1.10, + crypton-x509 >=1.10 && <1.11, + crypton-x509-store >=1.10 && <1.11, + crypton-x509-validation >=1.10 && <1.11, data-default, ech-config, - hpke >=0.1.0 && <0.2, - mlkem >= 0.2.0 && <0.3, + hpke >=0.3.0 && <0.4, mtl >=2.2 && <2.4, network >=3.1, ram >=0.22.0 && <0.23, random >=1.2 && <1.4, serialise >=0.2 && <0.3, transformers >=0.5 && <0.7, - unix-time >=0.4.11 && <0.5, + unix-time >=0.4.11 && <0.6, zlib >=0.7 && <0.8 executable tls-server @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ crypton-x509-system, ech-config, network, - network-run >=0.5, + network-run >=0.6.0 && < 0.7, tls if flag(devel) @@ -213,6 +215,7 @@ PipeChan PubKey Run + SecretSpec Session ThreadSpec @@ -234,46 +237,5 @@ ram, serialise, time-hourglass, - tls - -benchmark tls-bench - type: exitcode-stdio-1.0 - main-is: Benchmarks.hs - hs-source-dirs: Benchmarks test - other-modules: - API - Arbitrary - Certificate - CiphersSpec - ECHSpec - EncodeSpec - HandshakeSpec - PipeChan - PubKey - Run - Session - ThreadSpec - - default-language: Haskell2010 - ghc-options: -Wall - build-depends: - base >=4.9 && <5, - QuickCheck, - async, - base64-bytestring, - bytestring, - containers, - crypton, - crypton-asn1-types, - crypton-x509, - crypton-x509-store, - crypton-x509-validation, - data-default, - ech-config, - hspec, - network, - network-run, - serialise, - tasty-bench, - time-hourglass, - tls + tls, + zlib diff --git a/util/Common.hs b/util/Common.hs --- a/util/Common.hs +++ b/util/Common.hs @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx case minfo of Nothing -> do - putStrLn "Erro: information cannot be obtained" + putStrLn "Error: information cannot be obtained" exitFailure Just info -> return info diff --git a/util/Server.hs b/util/Server.hs --- a/util/Server.hs +++ b/util/Server.hs @@ -28,15 +28,18 @@ where body = "<Hello world!" +-- An HTTP request is answered with HTML, anything else is echoed. +-- tlsfuzzer's test-lengths.py sends "A..A\n", or just "\n", and expects +-- it back. server :: Context -> Bool -> IO () server ctx showRequest = do bs <- recvData ctx case C8.uncons bs of Nothing -> return () - Just ('A', _) -> do + Just ('G', _) -> handleHTML ctx showRequest bs + Just _ -> do sendData ctx $ CL8.fromStrict bs echo ctx - Just _ -> handleHTML ctx showRequest bs echo :: Context -> IO () echo ctx = loop diff --git a/util/tls-server.hs b/util/tls-server.hs --- a/util/tls-server.hs +++ b/util/tls-server.hs @@ -4,12 +4,16 @@ module Main where +import qualified Control.Exception as E import Data.IORef import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M import Data.X509.CertificateStore import Network.Run.TCP import Network.TLS import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC +import Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE import Network.TLS.Internal import System.Console.GetOpt import System.Environment (getArgs) @@ -27,12 +31,14 @@ , optShow :: Bool , optKeyLogFile :: Maybe FilePath , optTrustedAnchor :: Maybe FilePath - , optGroups :: [Group] + , optGroups :: Maybe [Group] , optCertFile :: FilePath , optKeyFile :: FilePath , optECHConfigFile :: Maybe FilePath , optECHKeyFile :: Maybe FilePath , optTraceKey :: Bool + , optUseWeakCiphers :: Bool + , optServerName :: Maybe HostName } deriving (Show) @@ -44,13 +50,14 @@ , optShow = False , optKeyLogFile = Nothing , optTrustedAnchor = Nothing - , -- excluding FFDHE8192 for retry - optGroups = FFDHE8192 `delete` supportedGroups defaultSupported + , optGroups = Nothing , optCertFile = "servercert.pem" , optKeyFile = "serverkey.pem" , optECHConfigFile = Nothing , optECHKeyFile = Nothing , optTraceKey = False + , optUseWeakCiphers = False + , optServerName = Nothing } options :: [OptDescr (Options -> Options)] @@ -78,7 +85,7 @@ , Option ['g'] ["groups"] - (ReqArg (\gs o -> o{optGroups = readGroups gs}) "") + (ReqArg (\gs o -> o{optGroups = Just $ readGroups gs}) "") "groups for key exchange" , Option ['c'] @@ -110,6 +117,16 @@ ["trace-key"] (NoArg (\o -> o{optTraceKey = True})) "Trace transcript hash" + , Option + [] + ["use-weak-ciphers"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optUseWeakCiphers = True})) + "accept deprecated ciphers and relax checks (for tlsfuzzer)" + , Option + [] + ["server-name"] + (ReqArg (\n o -> o{optServerName = Just n}) "") + "refuse other names in SNI with unrecognized_name" ] usage :: String @@ -135,7 +152,16 @@ (host, port) <- case ips of [h, p] -> return (h, p) _ -> showUsageAndExit "cannot recognize and \n" - when (null optGroups) $ do + let groups = fromMaybe defaultGroups optGroups + defaultGroups + | optUseWeakCiphers = supportedGroups defaultSupported + -- excluding FFDHE8192 for retry + | otherwise = FFDHE8192 `delete` supportedGroups defaultSupported + -- A TLS 1.3 server picks a group from supportedGroupsTLS13, so the + -- groups given with -g go there too. Without -g, the default + -- preference stands. + groupsTLS13 = maybe (supportedGroupsTLS13 defaultSupported) (: []) optGroups + when (null groups) $ do putStrLn "Error: unsupported groups" exitFailure smgr <- newSessionManager @@ -169,7 +195,9 @@ let sparams = getServerParams creds - optGroups + optUseWeakCiphers + groups + groupsTLS13 smgr keyLog optClientAuth @@ -177,6 +205,7 @@ ech printError traceKey + optServerName ctx <- contextNew sock sparams when optDebugLog $ contextHookSetLogging @@ -196,7 +225,9 @@ getServerParams :: Credentials + -> Bool -> [Group] + -> [[Group]] -> SessionManager -> (String -> IO ()) -> Bool @@ -204,8 +235,9 @@ -> ([(Word8, ByteString)], ECHConfigList) -> (String -> IO ()) -> (String -> IO ()) + -> Maybe HostName -> ServerParams -getServerParams creds groups sm keyLog clientAuth mstore (ekey, ecnf) printError traceKey = +getServerParams creds weak groups groupsTLS13 sm keyLog clientAuth mstore (ekey, ecnf) printError traceKey mname = defaultParamsServer { serverSupported = supported , serverShared = shared @@ -214,6 +246,7 @@ , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 , serverWantClientCert = clientAuth , serverECHKey = ekey + , serverDHEParams = if weak then Just ffdhe2048 else Nothing } where shared = @@ -231,15 +264,27 @@ } supported = defaultSupported - { supportedGroups = groups + { supportedCiphers = ciphers + , supportedGroups = groups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = groupsTLS13 + , supportedExtendedMainSecret = + if weak then AllowEMS else supportedExtendedMainSecret defaultSupported + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = + weak || supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation defaultSupported } + ciphers + | weak = ciphersuite_default ++ ciphersForFuzzer + | otherwise = ciphersuite_default hooks = defaultServerHooks - { onALPNClientSuggest = Just chooseALPN + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just $ chooseALPN weak , onClientCertificate = case mstore of Nothing -> onClientCertificate defaultServerHooks - Just _ -> - validateClientCertificate (sharedCAStore shared) (sharedValidationCache shared) + Just _ + | weak -> acceptEmptyCertificate + | otherwise -> + validateClientCertificate (sharedCAStore shared) (sharedValidationCache shared) + , onServerNameIndication = checkServerName mname } debug = defaultDebugParams @@ -247,12 +292,122 @@ , debugError = printError , debugTraceKey = traceKey } + acceptEmptyCertificate cc + | isNullCertificateChain cc = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = + validateClientCertificate + (sharedCAStore shared) + (sharedValidationCache shared) + cc -chooseALPN :: [ByteString] -> IO ByteString -chooseALPN protos - | "http/1.1" `elem` protos = return "http/1.1" - | otherwise = return "" +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- Deprecated ciphers, accepted only with --use-weak-ciphers. +-- tlsfuzzer uses them in its TLS 1.2 tests. +ciphersForFuzzer :: [Cipher] +ciphersForFuzzer = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + , cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA + , cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + , cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ] + ++ ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc + +-- CBC with HMAC-SHA1, derived from the SHA-2 ones in CipherCBC. +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA :: Cipher +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x002F + , cipherName = "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" + , cipherHash = SHA1 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just SSL3 + } + +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA :: Cipher +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x0035 + , cipherName = "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA" + , cipherHash = SHA1 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just SSL3 + } + +-- tlsfuzzer's test-atypical-padding.py and test-lengths.py use this one +-- for an HMAC-SHA256 record. +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x003C + , cipherName = "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256" + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + } + +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = + cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + { cipherID = 0x0033 + , cipherName = "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Nothing + } + +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = + cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + { cipherID = 0xC013 + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA" + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS10 + } + +-- AES-GCM with RSA key exchange, derived from the DHE ones. +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = + cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x009C + , cipherName = "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + } + +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = + cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + { cipherID = 0x009D + , cipherName = "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + } + +-- Only HTTP/1.1 is spoken. With --use-weak-ciphers, the names +-- tlsfuzzer's test-alpn-negotiation.py switches to on renegotiation and +-- resumption are accepted too, in the client's order. +chooseALPN :: Bool -> [ByteString] -> IO ByteString +chooseALPN weak protos = return $ fromMaybe "" $ find (`elem` known) protos + where + known + | weak = ["http/1.1", "h2", "http/2"] + | otherwise = ["http/1.1"] + +-- RFC 6066 Section 3: a server that does not recognize the name may +-- abort with a fatal unrecognized_name, a warning one being NOT +-- RECOMMENDED. +checkServerName :: Maybe HostName -> Maybe HostName -> IO Credentials +checkServerName (Just name) (Just sni) + | sni /= name = + E.throwIO $ + Uncontextualized $ + Error_Protocol ("unrecognized name: " ++ sni) UnrecognizedName +checkServerName _ _ = return mempty + newSessionManager :: IO SessionManager newSessionManager = do ref <- newIORef M.empty @@ -262,9 +417,11 @@ M.lookup key <$> readIORef ref , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = \key -> do M.lookup key <$> readIORef ref - , sessionEstablish = \key val -> do - atomicModifyIORef' ref $ \m -> (M.insert key val m, Nothing) + , -- The session ID doubles as the ticket, so the table + -- serves resumption by either. + sessionEstablish = \key val -> do + atomicModifyIORef' ref $ \m -> (M.insert key val m, Just key) , sessionInvalidate = \key -> do atomicModifyIORef' ref $ \m -> (M.delete key m, ()) - , sessionUseTicket = False + , sessionUseTicket = True }