diff --git a/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs b/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Benchmarks/Benchmarks.hs @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} + +module Main where + +import Certificate +import Control.Concurrent.Chan +import Data.Default (def) +import Data.IORef +import Data.X509 +import Data.X509.Validation +import Test.Tasty.Bench +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Session +import Run +import PubKey + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L + +blockCipher :: Cipher +blockCipher = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xff12 + , cipherName = "rsa-id-const" + , cipherBulk = + Bulk + { bulkName = "id" + , bulkKeySize = 16 + , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 + , bulkBlockSize = 16 + , bulkF = BulkBlockF $ \_ _ _ m -> (m, B.empty) + } + , cipherHash = MD5 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Nothing + } + +getParams :: Version -> Cipher -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +getParams connectVer cipher = (cParams, sParams) + where + sParams = + def + { serverSupported = supported + , serverShared = + def + { sharedCredentials = + Credentials + [(CertificateChain [simpleX509 $ PubKeyRSA pubKey], PrivKeyRSA privKey)] + } + } + cParams = + (defaultParamsClient "" B.empty) + { clientSupported = supported + , clientShared = + def + { sharedValidationCache = + ValidationCache + { cacheAdd = \_ _ _ -> return () + , cacheQuery = \_ _ _ -> return ValidationCachePass + } + } + } + supported = + def + { supportedCiphers = [cipher] + , supportedVersions = [connectVer] + , supportedGroups = [X25519, FFDHE2048] + } + (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair + +runTLSPipe + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (Context -> Chan b -> IO ()) + -> (Chan a -> Context -> IO ()) + -> a + -> IO b +runTLSPipe params tlsServer tlsClient d = do + withDataPipe params tlsServer tlsClient $ \(writeStart, readResult) -> do + writeStart d + readResult + +runTLSPipeSimple + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> IO B.ByteString +runTLSPipeSimple params = runTLSPipe params tlsServer tlsClient + where + tlsServer ctx queue = do + handshake ctx + d <- recvData ctx + writeChan queue d + bye ctx + tlsClient queue ctx = do + handshake ctx + d <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d]) + byeBye ctx + +benchConnection + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark +benchConnection params !d name = bench name . nfIO $ runTLSPipeSimple params d + +benchResumption + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark +benchResumption params !d name = env initializeSession runResumption + where + initializeSession = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + params1 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params + _ <- runTLSPipeSimple params1 d + + Just sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params1 + newIORef params2 + + runResumption paramsRef = bench name . nfIO $ do + params2 <- readIORef paramsRef + runTLSPipeSimple params2 d + +benchResumption13 + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> B.ByteString -> String -> Benchmark +benchResumption13 params !d name = env initializeSession runResumption + where + initializeSession = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + params1 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params + _ <- runTLSPipeSimple params1 d + newIORef (params1, sessionRefs) + + -- with TLS13 the sessionId is constantly changing so we must update + -- our parameters at each iteration unfortunately + runResumption paramsRef = bench name . nfIO $ do + (params1, sessionRefs) <- readIORef paramsRef + Just sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params1 + runTLSPipeSimple params2 d + +benchCiphers :: String -> Version -> B.ByteString -> [Cipher] -> Benchmark +benchCiphers name connectVer d = bgroup name . map doBench + where + doBench cipher = + benchResumption13 (getParams connectVer cipher) d (cipherName cipher) + +main :: IO () +main = + defaultMain + [ bgroup + "connection" + -- not sure the number actually make sense for anything. improve .. + [ benchConnection (getParams TLS12 blockCipher) small "TLS12-256 bytes" + ] + , bgroup + "resumption" + [ benchResumption (getParams TLS12 blockCipher) small "TLS12-256 bytes" + ] + , -- Here we try to measure TLS12 and TLS13 performance with AEAD ciphers. + -- Resumption and a larger message can be a demonstration of the symmetric + -- crypto but for TLS13 this does not work so well because of dhe_psk. + benchCiphers + "TLS12" + TLS12 + large + [ cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + ] + , benchCiphers + "TLS13" + TLS13 + large + [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ] + ] + where + small = B.replicate 256 0 + large = B.replicate 102400 0 diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,593 @@ +# Change log for "tls" + +## Version 2.4.3 + +* A server checks clientAuth of ExtendedKeyUsage in a client + certificate on client authentication. + +## Version 2.4.2 + +* The `Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC` module is added. + [#526](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/526) + +## Version 2.4.1 + +* Ensure same `supported_groups` before/after HRR. +* New `clientWantTicket` parameter makes it possible to opt-out of soliciting + session tickets from servers. + +## Version 2.4.0 + +* Identical to v2.3.1 but major version up as v2.3.1 breaks "quic". + +## Version 2.3.1 (deprecated) + +* Using ScrubbedBytes for secrets. +* Key echange with ML-KEM. + [#517](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/517) +* Expose get certificate chain function + [#520](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/520) + +## Version 2.3.0 + +* Using "ram" instead of "memory". + +## Version 2.2.2 + +* A new architecture to calculate receiver's transcript hash with wire + format. + [#515](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/515) +* Enabling compressed certificate on the client side again. + +## Version 2.2.1 + +* Disabling compressed certificate on the client side. + [#514](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/issues/514) + +## Version 2.2.0 + +* Using crypton-asn1-* and time-hourglass. + [#512](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/512) +* Major version up due to re-exports. + +## Version 2.1.14 + +* Supporting P384 and P521 curves. + [#511](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/511) +* Fixing some bugs of `tls-client`. + +## Version 2.1.13 + +* Don't contain early_data if serverEarlyDataSize is 0. + [#510](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/510) + +## Version 2.1.12 + +* Restore benchmarks. + [#509](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/509) +* Supporting random 1.2. + [#508](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/508) +* Add --trusted-anchor cli option to tls-client. + [#505](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/505) + +## Version 2.1.11 + +* Removing OVERLAPS instances. + +## Version 2.1.10 + +* Supporting the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. + [#499](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/499) + +## Version 2.1.9 + +* Providing ECH(Encrypted Client Hello). See `sharedECHConfigList`, + `clientUseECH` and `serverECHKey`. Note that the `ech-gen` command, + `loadECHConfigList` and `loadECHSecretKeys` are provided by the + `ech-config` package. + +## Version 2.1.8 + +* Moving `Limit` to `Shared` to maintain backward compatibility + of `TLSParams` class. +* Deprecating 2.1.7. + +## Version 2.1.7 + +* Introducing `Limit` parameter. +* Implementing "Record Size Limit Extension for TLS" (RFC8449). + Set `limitRecordSize` use it. +* Implementing "TLS Certificate Compression" (RFC 8879). + This feature is automatically used if the peer supports it. +* More tests with `tlsfuzzer` especially for client authentication + and 0-RTT. +* Implementing a utility function, `validateClientCertificate`, for + client authentication. +* Bug fix for echo back logic of Cookie extension. +* More pretty show for the internal `Handshake` structure for debugging. + +## Version 2.1.6 + +* Testing with "tlsfuzzer" again. Now don't send an alert against to + peer's alert. Double locking (aka self dead-lock) is fixed. Sending + an alert for known-but-cannot-parse extensions. Other corner cases + are also fixed. +* `tls-client -d` and `tls-server -d` pretty-prints `Handshake`. + +## Version 2.1.5 + +* Removing the dependency on the async package. +* Restore a few DHE_RSA ciphers. + [#493](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/493) + +## Version 2.1.4 + +* Exporting defaultValidationCache. + +## Version 2.1.3 + +* Remove `data-default` version constraint. + [#492](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/492) +* Exporting default variables. + [#448](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/488) + +## Version 2.1.2 + +* Using data-default instead of data-default-class. + +## Version 2.1.1 + +* `bye` directly calls `timeout recvHS13`, not spawning a thread for + `timeout recvHS13`. So, `bye` can receive an exception if thrown. + +## Version 2.1.0 + +* Breaking change: stop exporting constructors to maintain future + compatibilities. Field names are still exported, and values can be updated + with them using record syntax. Use `def` and `noSessionManager` as initial + values. +* `onServerFinished` is added to `ClientHooks`. +* `clientWantSessionResumeList` is added to `ClientParams` to support + multiple tickets for TLS 1.3. + +## Version 2.0.6 + +* Setting `supportedCiphers` in `defaultSupported` to `ciphersuite_default`. + So, users don't have to override this value anymore by exporting + `Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher`. + [#471](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/471) +* `ciphersuite_default` is the same as `ciphersuite_strong`. + So, the duplicated definition is removed. +* Add missing modules for util/tls-client and util/tls-server. + +## Version 2.0.5 + +* Fixing handshake13_0rtt_fallback +* Client checks if the group of PSK is contained in Supported_Groups. +* HRR is not allowed for 0-RTT. + +## Version 2.0.4 + +* More fix for 0-RTT when application data is available while receiving CF. +* New util/tls-client and util/tls-server. + +## Version 2.0.3 + +* Fixing a bug where `timeout` in `bye` does not work. +* util/client -> util/tls-client +* util/server -> util/tls-server + +## Version 2.0.2 + +* Client checks sessionMaxEarlyDataSize to decide 0-RTT +* Client checks the resumption cipher properly. + +## Version 2.0.1 + +* Fix a leak of pending data to be sent. + +## Version 2.0.0 + +* `tls` now only supports TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 with safe cipher suites. +* Security: BREAKING CHANGE: TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are removed. +* Security: BREAKING CHANGE: all CBC cipher suite are removed. +* Security: BREAKING CHANGE: RC4 and 3DES are removed. +* Security: BREAKING CHANGE: DSS(digital signature standard) is removed. +* Security: BREAKING CHANGE: TLS 1.2 servers require + EMS(extended main secret) by default. + `supportedExtendedMasterSec` is renamed to + `supportedExtendedMainSecret`. +* BREAKING CHANGE: the package is now complied with `Strict` and `StrictData`. +* BREAKING CHANGE: Many data structures are re-defined with + `PatternSynonyms` for extensibility. +* BREAKING CHANGE: the structure of `SessionManager` is changed + to support session tickets. +* API: BREAKING CHANGE: `sendData` can send early data (0-RTT). + `clientEarlyData` is removed. + To send early data via `sendData`, set `clientUseEarlyData` to `True`. + [#466](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/issues/466) +* API: `handshake` can receive an alert of client authentication failure + for TLS 1.3. + [#463](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/463) +* API: `bye` can receive NewSessionTicket for TLS 1.3. +* Channel binding: `getFinished` and `getPeerFinished` are deprecated. + Use `getTLSUnique` instead. + [#462](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/462) +* Channel binding: `getTLSExporter` and `getTLSServerEndPoint` are provided. + [#462](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/462) +* Refactoring: the monolithic `handshake` is divided to follow + the diagram of TLS 1.2 and 1.3 for readability. +* Refactoring: test cases are refactored for maintenability + and readablity. `hspec` is used instead of `tasty`. +* Code format: `fourmolu` is used as an official formatter. +* Catching up RFC8446bis-09. + [#467](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/issues/467) + +## Version 1.9.0 + +* BREAKING CHANGE: The type of the `Error_Protocol` constructor of `TLSError` has changed. + The "warning" case has been split off into a new `Error_Protocol_Warning` constructor. + [#460](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/460) + +## Version 1.8.0 + +* BREAKING CHANGE: Remove `Exception` instance for `TLSError`. + The library now throws `TLSException` only. + If you need to change your code, please refer to + [this example](https://github.com/snoyberg/http-client/commit/73d1a4eb451c089878ba95e96371d0b18287ffb8) first. + [#457](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/457) + +## Version 1.7.1 + +* NOP on UserCanceled event + [#454](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/454) + +## Version 1.7.0 + +* Major version up because "crypton" is used instead of "cryptonite" + +## Version 1.6.0 + +- Major version up because of disabling SSL3 +- Some fixes against tlsfuzzer + +## Version 1.5.8 + +- Require mtl-2.2.1 or newer + [#448](https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls/pull/448) + +## Version 1.5.7 + +- New APIs: getFinished and getPeerFinished + [#445](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/445) + +## Version 1.5.6 + +- Dynamically setting enctypted extensions + [#444](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/444) + +## Version 1.5.5 + +- QUIC support + [#419](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/419) + [#427](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/427) + [#428](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/428) + [#430](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/430) + [#433](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/433) + [#441](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/441) +- Server ECDSA for P-256 + [#436](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/436) +- Sort ciphersuites based on hardware-acceleration support + [#439](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/439) +- Sending no_application_protocol + [#440](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/440) +- Internal improvements + [#426](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/426) + [#431](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/431) + +## Version 1.5.4 + +- Restore interoperability with early Java 6 + [#422](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/422) +- Test cleanups for timeout and async usage + [#416](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/416) + +## Version 1.5.3 + +- Additional verification regarding EC signatures + [#412](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/412) +- Fixing ALPN + [#411](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/411) +- Check SSLv3 padding length + [#410](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/410) +- Exposing getClientCertificateChain + [#407](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/407) +- Extended Master Secret + [#406](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/406) +- Brushing up the documentation + [#404](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/404) + [#408](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/408) +- Improving tests + [#403](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/403) +- Avoid calling onServerNameIndication twice with HRR + [#402](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/402) +- Enable X448 and FFDHE groups + [#401](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/401) +- Refactoring + [#400](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/400) + [#399](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/399) + +## Version 1.5.2 + +- Enabled TLS 1.3 by default [#398](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/398) +- Avoid handshake failure with small RSA keys [#394](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/394) + +NOTES: + +- Starting with tls-1.5.0, the parameter `supportedVersions` contains values + ordered by decreasing preference, so typically the higher versions first. + This departs from code samples previously available. For maximum + interoperability, users overriding the default value should verify and adapt + their code. + +## Version 1.5.1 + +- Post-handshake authentication [#363](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/363) +- Middlebox compatibility [#386](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/386) +- Verification and configuration of session-ticket lifetime [#373](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/373) +- Fixing memory leak [#366](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/366) +- Don't send 0-RTT data when ticket is expired [#370](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/370) +- Handshake packet fragmentation [#371](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/371) +- Fix SSLv2 deprecated header [#383](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/383) +- Other improvements to TLS 1.3 and RFC conformance [#368](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/368) [#372](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/372) [#375](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/375) [#376](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/376) [#377](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/377) [#378](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/378) [#380](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/380) [#382](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/382) [#385](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/385) [#387](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/387) [#388](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/388) + +## Version 1.5.0 + +- Add and enable AES CCM ciphers [#271](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/271) [#287](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/287) +- Verify certificate key usage [#274](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/274) [#301](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/301) +- TLS 1.3 support [#278](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/278) [#279](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/279) [#280](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/280) [#283](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/283) [#298](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/298) [#331](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/331) [#290](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/290) [#314](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/314) +- Enable RSASSA-PSS [#280](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/280) [#353](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/353) +- Add and enable ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers [#287](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/287) [#340](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/340) +- Certificate selection with extension "signature_algorithms_cert" [#302](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/302) +- Preventing Logjam attack [#300](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/300) +- Downgrade protection [#308](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/308) +- Support for EdDSA certificates [#328](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/328) [#353](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/353) +- Key logging [#317](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/317) +- Thread safety for writes [#329](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/329) +- Verify signature schemes and (EC)DHE groups received [#337](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/337) [#338](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/338) +- Throw BadRecordMac when the decrypted record has invalid format [#347](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/347) +- Improve documentation format [#341](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/341) [#343](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/343) +- Fix recvClientData with single Handshake packet [#352](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/352) +- Decrease memory footprint of SessionData values [#354](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/354) + +FEATURES: + +- TLS version 1.3 is available with most features but is not enabled by default. + One notable omission is post-handshake authentication. Scenarios where + servers previously used renegotiation to conditionally request a certificate + are not possible yet when `TLS13` is negotiated. Users may enable the version + in `supportedVersions` only when sure post-handshake authentication is not + required. + +API CHANGES: + +- `SessionManager` implementations need to provide a `sessionResumeOnlyOnce` + function to accommodate resumption scenarios with 0-RTT data. The function is + called only on the server side. +- Data type `SessionData` is extended with four new fields for TLS version 1.3. + `SessionManager` implementations that serializes/deserializes `SessionData` + values must deal with the new fields. +- New configuration parameters and constructors are added for TLS version 1.3 + but the API change should be backward compatible for most use-cases. +- Function `cipherExchangeNeedMoreData` has been removed. + +## Version 1.4.1 + +- Enable X25519 in default parameters [#265](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/265) +- Checking EOF in bye [#262](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/262) +- Improving validation in DH key exchange [#256](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/256) +- Handle TCP reset during handshake [#251](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/251) +- Accepting hlint suggestions. + +## Version 1.4.0 + +- Wrap renegotiation failures with HandshakeFailed [#237](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/237) +- Improve selection of server certificate and use "signature_algorithms" extension [#236](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/236) +- Change Bytes to ByteString and deprecate the Bytes type alias [#230](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/230) +- Session compression and SNI [#223](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/223) +- Deprecating ciphersuite_medium. Putting WARNING to ciphersuite_all since this includes RC4 [#153](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/153) [#222](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/222) +- Removing NPN [#214](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/214) +- Supporting RSAPSS defined in TLS 1.3 [#207](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/207) +- Supporting X25519 and X448 in the IES style. [#205](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/205) +- Strip leading zeros in DHE premaster secret [#201](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/201) + +FEATURES: + +- RSASSA-PSS signatures can be enabled with `supportedHashSignatures`. This + uses assignments from TLS 1.3, for example `(HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssSHA256)`. +- Diffie-Hellman with elliptic curves X25519 and X448: This can be enabled with + `supportedGroups`, which also gives control over curve preference. +- ECDH with curve P-256 now uses optimized C implementation from package `cryptonite`. + +API CHANGES: + +- Cipher list `ciphersuite_medium` is now deprecated, users are advised to use + `ciphersuite_default` or `ciphersuite_strong`. List `ciphersuite_all` is kept + for compatibility with old servers but this is discouraged and generates a + warning (this includes RC4 ciphers, see [#153](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/153) + for reference). +- Support for NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation) has been removed. The replacement + is ALPN (Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation). +- Data type `SessionData` now contains fields for compression algorithm and + client SNI. A `SessionManager` implementation that serializes/deserializes + `SessionData` values must deal with the new fields. +- Module `Network.TLS` exports a type alias named `Bytes` which is now deprecated. + The replacement is to use strict `ByteString` directly. + +## Version 1.3.11 + +- Using reliable versions of dependent libraries. + +## Version 1.3.10 + +- Selecting a cipher based on "signature_algorithms" [#193](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/193) +- Respecting the "signature_algorithms" extension [#137](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/137) +- Fix RSA signature in CertificateVerify with TLS < 1.2 [#189](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/189) +- Fix ECDSA with TLS 1.0 / TLS 1.1 [#187](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/187) +- Sending an empty server name from a server if necessary. [#175](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/175) +- `Network.TLS.Extra` provides Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters in RFC 7919 [#174](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/174) +- Restore ability to renegotiate[#164](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/164) + +## Version 1.3.9 + +- Drop support for old GHC. +- Enable sha384 ciphers and provide `ciphersuite_default` as default set of ciphers for common needs [#168](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/168) +- SNI late checks [#147](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/147) +- Expose the HasBackend(..) class fully, so that developers can use TLS over their own channels [#149](https://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls/pull/149) + +## Version 1.3.8 + +- Fix older GHC builds + +## Version 1.3.7 + +- Disable SHA384 based cipher, as they don't work properly yet. + +## Version 1.3.6 + +- Add new ciphers +- Improve some debugging and outputs + +## Version 1.3.5 + +- Fix a bug with ECDHE based cipher where serialization +- Debugging: Add a way to print random seed and a way to side-load a seed for replayability +- Improve tests + +## Version 1.3.4 + +- Fix tests on 32 bits `time_t` machines (time not within bound) +- VirtualHost: Add a way to load credentials related to the hostname used by the client (Julian Beaumont) +- VirtualHost: Expose an API to query which hostname the client has contacted (Julian Beaumont) +- Add a way to disable empty packet that are use for security when + using old versions + old CBC based cipher (Anton Dessiatov) + +## Version 1.3.3 + +- Add support for Hans (Haskell Network Stack) (Adam Wick) +- Add support for ECDSA signature +- Add support for ECDSA-ECDHE Cipher +- Improve parsing of ECC related structure + +## Version 1.3.2 + +- Add cipher suites for forward secrecy on more clients (Aaron Friel) +- Maintain more handshake information to be queried by protocol (Adam Wick) +- handle SCSV on client and server side (Kazu Yamamoto) +- Cleanup renegotiation logic (Kazu Yamamoto) +- Various testing improvements with the openssl test parts +- Cleanup AEAD handling for future support of other ciphers + +## Version 1.3.1 + +- Repair DHE RSA handling on the cipher by creating signature properly + +## Version 1.3.0 + +- modernize the crypto stack by using cryptonite. + +## Version 1.2.18 + +- add more tests (network, local) +- cleanup cipher / bulk code, certificate verify / creation, and digitall signed handling +- fix handling of DHE ciphers with MS SSL stack that serialize leading zero. + +## Version 1.2.17 + +- Fix an issue of type of key / hash that prevented connection with SChannel. + +## Version 1.2.16 + +- Fix an issue with stream cipher not correctly calculating the internal state, + resulting systematically in bad record mac failure during handshake + +## Version 1.2.15 + +- support chain certificate in credentials + +## Version 1.2.14 + +- adding ALPN extension +- adding support for AEAD, and particularly AES128-GCM +- Adding support for ECDH +- Do not support SSL3 by default for security reason. +- add EnumSafe8 and 16 for specific sized Enum instance that are safer +- export signatureAndHash parser/encoder +- add a "known" list of extensions +- add SignatureAlgorithms extension +- add Heartbeat extension +- add support for EC curves and point format extensions +- add preliminary SessionTicket extension +- Debug: Add the ability to choose arbitrary cipher in the client hello. + +## Version 1.2.13 + +- Fix compilation with old mtl version + +## Version 1.2.12 + +- Propagate asynchronous exception + +## Version 1.2.11 + +- use hourglass instead of time +- use tasty instead of test-framework +- add travis file +- remove old de-optimisation flag as the bytestring bug is old now and it conflict with cabal check + +## Version 1.2.10 + +- Update x509 dependencies + +## Version 1.2.9 + +- Export TLSParams and HasBackend type names +- Added FlexibleContexts flag required by ghc-7.9 +- debug: add support for specifying the timeout length in milliseconds. +- debug: add support for 3DES in simple client + +## Version 1.2.8 + +- add support for 3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA1 (cipher 0xa) + +## Version 1.2.7 + +- repair retrieve certificate validation, and improve fingerprints +- remove groom from dependency +- make RecordM an instance of Applicative +- Fixes the Error_EOF partial pattern match error in exception handling + +## Version 1.2.6 (23 Mar 2014) + +- Fixed socket backend endless loop when the server does not close connection + properly at the TLS level with the close notify alert. +- Catch Error_EOF in recvData and return empty data. + +## Version 1.2.5 (23 Mar 2014) + +- Fixed Server key exchange data being parsed without the correct + context, leading to not knowing how to parse the structure. + The bug happens on efficient server that happens to send the ServerKeyXchg + message together with the ServerHello in the same handshake packet. + This trigger parsing of all the messages without having set the pending cipher. + Delay parsing, when this happen, until we know what to do with it. + +## Version 1.2.4 (23 Mar 2014) + +- Fixed unrecognized name non-fatal alert after client hello. +- Add SSL3 to the supported list of version by default. +- Fix cereal lower bound to 0.4.0 minimum + +## Version 1.2.3 (22 Mar 2014) + +- Fixed handshake records not being able to span multiples records. diff --git a/LICENSE b/LICENSE --- a/LICENSE +++ b/LICENSE @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Vincent Hanquez +Copyright (c) 2010-2015 Vincent Hanquez All rights reserved. diff --git a/Network/TLS.hs b/Network/TLS.hs --- a/Network/TLS.hs +++ b/Network/TLS.hs @@ -1,62 +1,377 @@ -- | --- Module : Network.TLS --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown +-- Native Haskell TLS protocol implementation for servers and +-- clients. -- -module Network.TLS - ( - -- * Context configuration - TLSParams(..) - , TLSLogging(..) - , TLSCertificateUsage(..) - , TLSCertificateRejectReason(..) - , defaultParams - , defaultLogging - , SessionID - , SessionData(..) +-- This provides a high-level implementation of a sensitive security +-- protocol, eliminating a common set of security issues through the +-- use of the advanced type system, high level constructions and +-- common Haskell features. +-- +-- Currently implement the TLS1.2 and TLS 1.3 +-- protocol, and support RSA and Ephemeral (Elliptic curve and +-- regular) Diffie Hellman key exchanges, and many extensions. +-- +-- The typical usage is: +-- +-- > socket <- ... +-- > ctx <- contextNew socket +-- > handshake ctx +-- > ... (using recvData and sendData) +-- > bye +module Network.TLS ( + -- * Basic APIs + Context, + contextNew, + handshake, + sendData, + recvData, + bye, - -- * Context object - , TLSCtx - , ctxConnection + -- * Exceptions + -- $exceptions - -- * Creating a context - , client - , server - , clientWith - , serverWith + -- * Backend abstraction + HasBackend (..), + Backend (..), - -- * Initialisation and Termination of context - , bye - , handshake + -- * Parameters - -- * High level API - , sendData - , recvData - , recvData' + -- intentionally hide the internal methods even haddock warns. + TLSParams, - -- * Crypto Key - , PrivateKey(..) - -- * Compressions & Predefined compressions - , CompressionC(..) - , Compression(..) - , nullCompression - -- * Ciphers & Predefined ciphers - , Cipher(..) - , Bulk(..) - -- * Versions - , Version(..) - -- * Errors - , TLSError(..) - -- * Exceptions - , HandshakeFailed(..) - , ConnectionNotEstablished(..) - ) where + -- ** Client parameters + ClientParams, + defaultParamsClient, + clientServerIdentification, + clientUseServerNameIndication, + clientWantSessionResume, + clientWantSessionResumeList, + clientWantTicket, + clientShared, + clientHooks, + clientSupported, + clientDebug, + clientUseEarlyData, + clientUseECH, -import Network.TLS.Struct (Version(..), TLSError(..), SessionID) -import Network.TLS.Crypto (PrivateKey(..)) -import Network.TLS.Cipher (Cipher(..), Bulk(..)) -import Network.TLS.Compression (CompressionC(..), Compression(..), nullCompression) + -- ** Server parameters + ServerParams, + defaultParamsServer, + serverWantClientCert, + serverCACertificates, + serverDHEParams, + serverHooks, + serverShared, + serverSupported, + serverDebug, + serverEarlyDataSize, + serverTicketLifetime, + serverECHKey, + + -- ** Shared + Shared, + defaultShared, + sharedCredentials, + sharedSessionManager, + sharedCAStore, + sharedValidationCache, + sharedHelloExtensions, + sharedECHConfigList, + sharedLimit, + + -- ** Client hooks + ClientHooks, + defaultClientHooks, + OnCertificateRequest, + onCertificateRequest, + OnServerCertificate, + onServerCertificate, + onSuggestALPN, + onCustomFFDHEGroup, + onServerFinished, + onSelectKeyShareGroups, + + -- ** Server hooks + ServerHooks, + defaultServerHooks, + onClientCertificate, + validateClientCertificate, + onUnverifiedClientCert, + onCipherChoosing, + onServerNameIndication, + onNewHandshake, + onALPNClientSuggest, + onEncryptedExtensionsCreating, + onSelectKeyShare, + Measurement, + nbHandshakes, + bytesReceived, + bytesSent, + + -- ** Supported + Supported, + defaultSupported, + supportedVersions, + supportedCiphers, + supportedCompressions, + supportedHashSignatures, + supportedSecureRenegotiation, + supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation, + supportedExtendedMainSecret, + supportedSession, + supportedFallbackScsv, + supportedEmptyPacket, + supportedGroups, + supportedGroupsTLS13, + + -- ** Debug parameters + DebugParams, + defaultDebugParams, + debugSeed, + debugPrintSeed, + debugVersionForced, + debugKeyLogger, + defaultKeyLogger, + debugError, + debugTraceKey, + + -- ** Limit parameters + Limit, + defaultLimit, + limitHandshakeFragment, + limitRecordSize, + + -- * Shared parameters + + -- ** Credentials + Credentials (..), + Credential, + credentialLoadX509, + credentialLoadX509FromMemory, + credentialLoadX509Chain, + credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemory, + + -- ** Session manager + SessionManager, + noSessionManager, + sessionResume, + sessionResumeOnlyOnce, + sessionEstablish, + sessionInvalidate, + sessionUseTicket, + SessionID, + SessionIDorTicket, + Ticket, + + -- ** Session data + SessionData, + sessionVersion, + sessionCipher, + sessionCompression, + sessionClientSNI, + sessionSecret, + sessionGroup, + sessionTicketInfo, + sessionALPN, + sessionMaxEarlyDataSize, + sessionFlags, + SessionFlag (..), + TLS13TicketInfo, + is0RTTPossible, + + -- ** Validation Cache + ValidationCache (..), + defaultValidationCache, + ValidationCacheQueryCallback, + ValidationCacheAddCallback, + ValidationCacheResult (..), + exceptionValidationCache, + + -- * Types + + -- ** For 'Supported' + Version (..), + Compression (..), + nullCompression, + HashAndSignatureAlgorithm, + supportedSignatureSchemes, + HashAlgorithm (..), + SignatureAlgorithm (..), + Group (..), + supportedNamedGroups, + EMSMode (..), + + -- ** For parameters and hooks + DHParams, + DHPublic, + GroupUsage (..), + CertificateUsage (..), + CertificateRejectReason (..), + CertificateType (..), + CertificateChain (..), + HostName, + MaxFragmentEnum (..), + + -- * Advanced APIs + + -- ** Backend + ctxBackend, + contextFlush, + contextClose, + + -- ** Information gathering + Information, + contextGetInformation, + infoVersion, + infoCipher, + infoCompression, + infoMainSecret, + infoExtendedMainSecret, + infoClientRandom, + infoServerRandom, + infoSupportedGroup, + infoTLS12Resumption, + infoTLS13HandshakeMode, + infoIsEarlyDataAccepted, + infoIsECHAccepted, + ClientRandom, + ServerRandom, + unClientRandom, + unServerRandom, + HandshakeMode13 (..), + getClientCertificateChain, + getServerCertificateChain, + + -- ** Negotiated + getNegotiatedProtocol, + getClientSNI, + + -- ** Post-handshake actions + updateKey, + KeyUpdateRequest (..), + requestCertificate, + getTLSUnique, + getTLSExporter, + getTLSServerEndPoint, + getFinished, + getPeerFinished, + + -- ** Modifying hooks in context + Hooks, + defaultHooks, + hookRecvHandshake, + hookRecvHandshake13, + hookRecvCertificates, + hookLogging, + contextModifyHooks, + Handshake, + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv, + Handshake13, + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv, + contextHookSetCertificateRecv, + Logging, + defaultLogging, + loggingPacketSent, + loggingPacketRecv, + loggingIOSent, + loggingIORecv, + Header (..), + ProtocolType (..), + contextHookSetLogging, + + -- * Errors and exceptions + + -- ** Errors + TLSError (..), + KxError (..), + AlertDescription (..), + + -- ** Exceptions + TLSException (..), + + -- * Raw types + + -- ** Compressions class + CompressionC (..), + CompressionID, + + -- ** Crypto Key + PubKey (..), + PrivKey (..), + + -- ** Ciphers & Predefined ciphers + module Network.TLS.Cipher, + + -- * Deprecated + recvData', + Bytes, + ValidationChecks (..), + ValidationHooks (..), + clientUseMaxFragmentLength, +) where + +import Data.X509 (PrivKey (..), PubKey (..)) +import Data.X509.Validation hiding (HostName, defaultHooks) + +import Network.TLS.Backend (Backend (..), HasBackend (..)) +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression ( + Compression (..), + CompressionC (..), + nullCompression, + ) import Network.TLS.Context import Network.TLS.Core +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto ( + DHParams, + DHPublic, + KxError (..), + supportedNamedGroups, + ) +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State (HandshakeMode13 (..)) +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import qualified Network.TLS.State as S +import Network.TLS.Struct ( + AlertDescription (..), + CertificateType (..), + ClientRandom (..), + Handshake, + HashAlgorithm (..), + HashAndSignatureAlgorithm, + Header (..), + ProtocolType (..), + ServerRandom (..), + SignatureAlgorithm (..), + TLSError (..), + TLSException (..), + supportedSignatureSchemes, + ) +import Network.TLS.Struct13 (Handshake13) +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 + +{-# DEPRECATED Bytes "Use Data.ByteString.Bytestring instead of Bytes." #-} +type Bytes = ByteString + +-- | Getting certificates from a client, if any. +-- Note that the certificates are not sent by a client +-- on resumption even if client authentication is required. +-- So, this API would be replaced by the one which can treat +-- both cases of full-negotiation and resumption. +getClientCertificateChain :: Context -> IO (Maybe CertificateChain) +getClientCertificateChain ctx = usingState_ ctx S.getClientCertificateChain + +getServerCertificateChain :: Context -> IO (Maybe CertificateChain) +getServerCertificateChain ctx = usingState_ ctx S.getServerCertificateChain + +-- $exceptions +-- Since 1.8.0, this library only throws exceptions of type 'TLSException'. +-- In the common case where the chosen backend is socket, 'IOException' +-- may be thrown as well. This happens because the backend for sockets, +-- opaque to most modules in the @tls@ library, throws those exceptions. diff --git a/Network/TLS/Backend.hs b/Network/TLS/Backend.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Backend.hs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +-- | A Backend represents a unified way to do IO on different +-- types without burdening our calling API with multiple +-- ways to initialize a new context. +-- +-- Typically, a backend provides: +-- * a way to read data +-- * a way to write data +-- * a way to close the stream +-- * a way to flush the stream +module Network.TLS.Backend ( + HasBackend (..), + Backend (..), +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Network.Socket as Network +import qualified Network.Socket.ByteString as Network +import System.IO (BufferMode (..), Handle, hClose, hFlush, hSetBuffering) + +import Network.TLS.Imports + +-- | Connection IO backend +data Backend = Backend + { backendFlush :: IO () + -- ^ Flush the connection sending buffer, if any. + , backendClose :: IO () + -- ^ Close the connection. + , backendSend :: ByteString -> IO () + -- ^ Send a bytestring through the connection. + , backendRecv :: Int -> IO ByteString + -- ^ Receive specified number of bytes from the connection. + } + +class HasBackend a where + initializeBackend :: a -> IO () + getBackend :: a -> Backend + +instance HasBackend Backend where + initializeBackend _ = return () + getBackend = id + +safeRecv :: Network.Socket -> Int -> IO ByteString +safeRecv = Network.recv + +instance HasBackend Network.Socket where + initializeBackend _ = return () + getBackend sock = + Backend + { backendFlush = return () + , backendClose = Network.close sock + , backendSend = Network.sendAll sock + , backendRecv = recvAll + } + where + recvAll n = B.concat <$> loop n + where + loop 0 = return [] + loop left = do + r <- safeRecv sock left + if B.null r + then return [] + else (r :) <$> loop (left - B.length r) + +instance HasBackend Handle where + initializeBackend handle = hSetBuffering handle NoBuffering + getBackend handle = + Backend + { backendFlush = hFlush handle + , backendClose = hClose handle + , backendSend = B.hPut handle + , backendRecv = B.hGet handle + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/Cap.hs b/Network/TLS/Cap.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Network/TLS/Cap.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Cap --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- - -module Network.TLS.Cap - ( hasHelloExtensions - , hasExplicitBlockIV - ) where - -import Network.TLS.Struct - -hasHelloExtensions, hasExplicitBlockIV :: Version -> Bool - -hasHelloExtensions ver = ver >= SSL3 -hasExplicitBlockIV ver = ver >= TLS11 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs b/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs @@ -1,96 +1,84 @@ -{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Cipher --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Cipher - ( BulkFunctions(..) - , CipherKeyExchangeType(..) - , Bulk(..) - , Hash(..) - , Cipher(..) - , cipherKeyBlockSize - , Key - , IV - , cipherExchangeNeedMoreData - ) where +{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} -import Data.Word -import Network.TLS.Struct (Version(..)) +module Network.TLS.Cipher ( + CipherKeyExchangeType (..), + Bulk (..), + BulkFunctions (..), + BulkDirection (..), + BulkState (..), + BulkStream (..), + BulkBlock, + BulkAEAD, + bulkInit, + Hash (..), + Cipher (..), + CipherID, + cipherKeyBlockSize, + BulkKey, + BulkIV, + BulkNonce, + BulkAdditionalData, + cipherAllowedForVersion, + hasMAC, + hasRecordIV, + elemCipher, + intersectCiphers, + findCipher, +) where -import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Network.TLS.Crypto (Hash (..), hashDigestSize) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types --- FIXME convert to newtype -type Key = B.ByteString -type IV = B.ByteString +data BulkState + = BulkStateStream BulkStream + | BulkStateBlock BulkBlock + | BulkStateAEAD BulkAEAD + | BulkStateUninitialized -data BulkFunctions = - BulkNoneF -- special value for 0 - | BulkBlockF (Key -> IV -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString) - (Key -> IV -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString) - | BulkStreamF (Key -> IV) - (IV -> B.ByteString -> (B.ByteString, IV)) - (IV -> B.ByteString -> (B.ByteString, IV)) +instance Show BulkState where + show (BulkStateStream _) = "BulkStateStream" + show (BulkStateBlock _) = "BulkStateBlock" + show (BulkStateAEAD _) = "BulkStateAEAD" + show BulkStateUninitialized = "BulkStateUninitialized" -data CipherKeyExchangeType = - CipherKeyExchange_RSA - | CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon - | CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA - | CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA - | CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSS - | CipherKeyExchange_DH_DSS - | CipherKeyExchange_DH_RSA - | CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSA - | CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSA - | CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA - deriving (Show,Eq) +bulkInit :: Bulk -> BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkState +bulkInit bulk direction key = + case bulkF bulk of + BulkBlockF ini -> BulkStateBlock (ini direction key) + BulkStreamF ini -> BulkStateStream (ini direction key) + BulkAeadF ini -> BulkStateAEAD (ini direction key) -data Bulk = Bulk - { bulkName :: String - , bulkKeySize :: Int - , bulkIVSize :: Int - , bulkBlockSize :: Int - , bulkF :: BulkFunctions - } +hasMAC, hasRecordIV :: BulkFunctions -> Bool +hasMAC (BulkBlockF _) = True +hasMAC (BulkStreamF _) = True +hasMAC (BulkAeadF _) = False +hasRecordIV = hasMAC -data Hash = Hash - { hashName :: String - , hashSize :: Int - , hashF :: B.ByteString -> B.ByteString - } +cipherKeyBlockSize :: Cipher -> Int +cipherKeyBlockSize cipher = 2 * (hashDigestSize (cipherHash cipher) + bulkIVSize bulk + bulkKeySize bulk) + where + bulk = cipherBulk cipher --- | Cipher algorithm -data Cipher = Cipher - { cipherID :: Word16 - , cipherName :: String - , cipherHash :: Hash - , cipherBulk :: Bulk - , cipherKeyExchange :: CipherKeyExchangeType - , cipherMinVer :: Maybe Version - } +-- | Check if a specific 'Cipher' is allowed to be used +-- with the version specified +cipherAllowedForVersion :: Version -> Cipher -> Bool +cipherAllowedForVersion ver cipher = + case cipherMinVer cipher of + Nothing -> ver < TLS13 + Just cVer -> cVer <= ver && (ver < TLS13 || cVer >= TLS13) -cipherKeyBlockSize :: Cipher -> Int -cipherKeyBlockSize cipher = 2 * (hashSize (cipherHash cipher) + bulkIVSize bulk + bulkKeySize bulk) - where bulk = cipherBulk cipher +eqCipher :: CipherID -> Cipher -> Bool +eqCipher cid c = cipherID c == cid -instance Show Cipher where - show c = cipherName c +elemCipher :: [CipherId] -> Cipher -> Bool +elemCipher cids c = cid `elem` cids + where + cid = CipherId $ cipherID c -instance Eq Cipher where - (==) c1 c2 = cipherID c1 == cipherID c2 +intersectCiphers :: [CipherId] -> [Cipher] -> [Cipher] +intersectCiphers peerCiphers myCiphers = filter (elemCipher peerCiphers) myCiphers -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData :: CipherKeyExchangeType -> Bool -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_RSA = False -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSS = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_DH_DSS = False -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_DH_RSA = False -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSA = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSA = True -cipherExchangeNeedMoreData CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA = True +findCipher :: CipherID -> [Cipher] -> Maybe Cipher +findCipher cid = find $ eqCipher cid diff --git a/Network/TLS/Compression.hs b/Network/TLS/Compression.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Compression.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Compression.hs @@ -1,41 +1,38 @@ -{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Compression --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Compression - ( CompressionC(..) - , Compression(..) - , nullCompression +{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} - -- * member redefined for the class abstraction - , compressionID - , compressionDeflate - , compressionInflate +module Network.TLS.Compression ( + CompressionC (..), + Compression (..), + CompressionID, + nullCompression, + NullCompression, - -- * helper - , compressionIntersectID - ) where + -- * member redefined for the class abstraction + compressionID, + compressionDeflate, + compressionInflate, -import Data.Word -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) + -- * helper + compressionIntersectID, +) where + import Control.Arrow (first) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types (CompressionID) + -- | supported compression algorithms need to be part of this class class CompressionC a where - compressionCID :: a -> Word8 - compressionCDeflate :: a -> ByteString -> (a, ByteString) - compressionCInflate :: a -> ByteString -> (a, ByteString) + compressionCID :: a -> CompressionID + compressionCDeflate :: a -> ByteString -> (a, ByteString) + compressionCInflate :: a -> ByteString -> (a, ByteString) -- | every compression need to be wrapped in this, to fit in structure -data Compression = forall a . CompressionC a => Compression a +data Compression = forall a. CompressionC a => Compression a -- | return the associated ID for this algorithm -compressionID :: Compression -> Word8 +compressionID :: Compression -> CompressionID compressionID (Compression c) = compressionCID c -- | deflate (compress) a bytestring using a compression context and return the result @@ -49,20 +46,23 @@ compressionInflate bytes (Compression c) = first Compression $ compressionCInflate c bytes instance Show Compression where - show = show . compressionID + show = show . compressionID +instance Eq Compression where + (==) c1 c2 = compressionID c1 == compressionID c2 -- | intersect a list of ids commonly given by the other side with a list of compression --- the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the prefered +-- the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the preferred -- compression. compressionIntersectID :: [Compression] -> [Word8] -> [Compression] -compressionIntersectID l ids = filter (\c -> elem (compressionID c) ids) l +compressionIntersectID l ids = filter (\c -> compressionID c `elem` ids) l +-- | This is the default compression which is a NOOP. data NullCompression = NullCompression instance CompressionC NullCompression where - compressionCID _ = 0 - compressionCDeflate s b = (s, b) - compressionCInflate s b = (s, b) + compressionCID _ = 0 + compressionCDeflate s b = (s, b) + compressionCInflate s b = (s, b) -- | default null compression nullCompression :: Compression diff --git a/Network/TLS/Context.hs b/Network/TLS/Context.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Context.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Context.hs @@ -1,231 +1,311 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Context --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Context - ( - -- * Context configuration - TLSParams(..) - , TLSLogging(..) - , SessionData(..) - , Measurement(..) - , TLSCertificateUsage(..) - , TLSCertificateRejectReason(..) - , defaultLogging - , defaultParams +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} - -- * Context object and accessor - , TLSCtx - , ctxParams - , ctxConnection - , ctxEOF - , ctxEstablished - , ctxLogging - , setEOF - , setEstablished - , connectionFlush - , connectionSend - , connectionRecv - , updateMeasure - , withMeasure +module Network.TLS.Context ( + -- * Context configuration + TLSParams, - -- * New contexts - , newCtxWith - , newCtx + -- * Context object and accessor + Context (..), + Hooks (..), + Established (..), + RecordLayer (..), + ctxEOF, + ctxEstablished, + withLog, + ctxWithHooks, + contextModifyHooks, + setEOF, + setEstablished, + contextFlush, + contextClose, + contextSend, + contextRecv, + updateMeasure, + withMeasure, + withReadLock, + withWriteLock, + withStateLock, + withRWLock, - -- * Using context states - , throwCore - , usingState - , usingState_ - , getStateRNG - ) where + -- * information + Information (..), + contextGetInformation, -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Compression -import Network.TLS.Crypto -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Measurement -import Data.Certificate.X509 -import Data.List (intercalate) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B + -- * New contexts + contextNew, -import Control.Concurrent.MVar -import Control.Monad.State -import Control.Exception (throwIO, Exception()) -import Data.IORef -import System.IO (Handle, hSetBuffering, BufferMode(..), hFlush) + -- * Context hooks + contextHookSetHandshakeRecv, + contextHookSetHandshake13Recv, + contextHookSetCertificateRecv, + contextHookSetLogging, -#if !MIN_VERSION_base(4,6,0) -import Prelude hiding (catch) -#endif + -- * Using context states + throwCore, + usingState, + usingState_, + runTxRecordState, + runRxRecordState, + usingHState, + getHState, + getStateRNG, + tls13orLater, + getTLSUnique, + getTLSExporter, + getTLSServerEndPoint, + getFinished, + getPeerFinished, + TLS13State (..), + getTLS13State, + modifyTLS13State, + setMyRecordLimit, + enableMyRecordLimit, + getMyRecordLimit, + checkMyRecordLimit, + setPeerRecordLimit, + enablePeerRecordLimit, + getPeerRecordLimit, + checkPeerRecordLimit, + newRecordLimitRef, +) where -data TLSLogging = TLSLogging - { loggingPacketSent :: String -> IO () - , loggingPacketRecv :: String -> IO () - , loggingIOSent :: B.ByteString -> IO () - , loggingIORecv :: Header -> B.ByteString -> IO () - } +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.IORef -data TLSParams = TLSParams - { pConnectVersion :: Version -- ^ version to use on client connection. - , pAllowedVersions :: [Version] -- ^ allowed versions that we can use. - , pCiphers :: [Cipher] -- ^ all ciphers supported ordered by priority. - , pCompressions :: [Compression] -- ^ all compression supported ordered by priority. - , pWantClientCert :: Bool -- ^ request a certificate from client. - -- use by server only. - , pUseSecureRenegotiation :: Bool -- notify that we want to use secure renegotation - , pUseSession :: Bool -- generate new session if specified - , pCertificates :: [(X509, Maybe PrivateKey)] -- ^ the cert chain for this context with the associated keys if any. - , pLogging :: TLSLogging -- ^ callback for logging - , onHandshake :: Measurement -> IO Bool -- ^ callback on a beggining of handshake - , onCertificatesRecv :: [X509] -> IO TLSCertificateUsage -- ^ callback to verify received cert chain. - , onSessionResumption :: SessionID -> IO (Maybe SessionData) -- ^ callback to maybe resume session on server. - , onSessionEstablished :: SessionID -> SessionData -> IO () -- ^ callback when session have been established - , onSessionInvalidated :: SessionID -> IO () -- ^ callback when session is invalidated by error - , sessionResumeWith :: Maybe (SessionID, SessionData) -- ^ try to establish a connection using this session. - } +import Network.TLS.Backend +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake ( + handshakeClient, + handshakeClientWith, + handshakeServer, + handshakeServerWith, + ) +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.KeySchedule +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.PostHandshake ( + postHandshakeAuthClientWith, + requestCertificateServer, + ) +import Network.TLS.RNG +import Network.TLS.Record.Recv +import Network.TLS.Record.Send +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types ( + Role (..), + TranscriptHash (..), + defaultRecordSizeLimit, + ) +import Network.TLS.X509 -defaultLogging :: TLSLogging -defaultLogging = TLSLogging - { loggingPacketSent = (\_ -> return ()) - , loggingPacketRecv = (\_ -> return ()) - , loggingIOSent = (\_ -> return ()) - , loggingIORecv = (\_ _ -> return ()) - } +class TLSParams a where + getTLSCommonParams :: a -> CommonParams + getTLSRole :: a -> Role + doHandshake :: a -> Context -> IO () + doHandshakeWith :: a -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () + doRequestCertificate :: a -> Context -> IO Bool + doPostHandshakeAuthWith :: a -> Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () -defaultParams :: TLSParams -defaultParams = TLSParams - { pConnectVersion = TLS10 - , pAllowedVersions = [TLS10,TLS11,TLS12] - , pCiphers = [] - , pCompressions = [nullCompression] - , pWantClientCert = False - , pUseSecureRenegotiation = True - , pUseSession = True - , pCertificates = [] - , pLogging = defaultLogging - , onHandshake = (\_ -> return True) - , onCertificatesRecv = (\_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept) - , onSessionResumption = (\_ -> return Nothing) - , onSessionEstablished = (\_ _ -> return ()) - , onSessionInvalidated = (\_ -> return ()) - , sessionResumeWith = Nothing - } +instance TLSParams ClientParams where + getTLSCommonParams cparams = + ( clientSupported cparams + , clientShared cparams + , clientDebug cparams + ) + getTLSRole _ = ClientRole + doHandshake = handshakeClient + doHandshakeWith = handshakeClientWith + doRequestCertificate _ _ = return False + doPostHandshakeAuthWith = postHandshakeAuthClientWith -instance Show TLSParams where - show p = "TLSParams { " ++ (intercalate "," $ map (\(k,v) -> k ++ "=" ++ v) - [ ("connectVersion", show $ pConnectVersion p) - , ("allowedVersions", show $ pAllowedVersions p) - , ("ciphers", show $ pCiphers p) - , ("compressions", show $ pCompressions p) - , ("want-client-cert", show $ pWantClientCert p) - , ("certificates", show $ length $ pCertificates p) - ]) ++ " }" +instance TLSParams ServerParams where + getTLSCommonParams sparams = + ( serverSupported sparams + , serverShared sparams + , serverDebug sparams + ) + getTLSRole _ = ServerRole + doHandshake = handshakeServer + doHandshakeWith = handshakeServerWith + doRequestCertificate = requestCertificateServer + doPostHandshakeAuthWith = \_ _ _ -> return () --- | Certificate and Chain rejection reason -data TLSCertificateRejectReason = - CertificateRejectExpired - | CertificateRejectRevoked - | CertificateRejectUnknownCA - | CertificateRejectOther String - deriving (Show,Eq) +-- | create a new context using the backend and parameters specified. +contextNew + :: (MonadIO m, HasBackend backend, TLSParams params) + => backend + -- ^ Backend abstraction with specific method to interact with the connection type. + -> params + -- ^ Parameters of the context. + -> m Context +contextNew backend params = liftIO $ do + initializeBackend backend --- | Certificate Usage callback possible returns values. -data TLSCertificateUsage = - CertificateUsageAccept -- ^ usage of certificate accepted - | CertificateUsageReject TLSCertificateRejectReason -- ^ usage of certificate rejected - deriving (Show,Eq) + let (supported, shared, debug) = getTLSCommonParams params --- | A TLS Context is a handle augmented by tls specific state and parameters -data TLSCtx a = TLSCtx - { ctxConnection :: a -- ^ return the connection object associated with this context - , ctxParams :: TLSParams - , ctxState :: MVar TLSState - , ctxMeasurement :: IORef Measurement - , ctxEOF_ :: IORef Bool -- ^ has the handle EOFed or not. - , ctxEstablished_ :: IORef Bool -- ^ has the handshake been done and been successful. - , ctxConnectionFlush :: IO () - , ctxConnectionSend :: Bytes -> IO () - , ctxConnectionRecv :: Int -> IO Bytes - } + seed <- case debugSeed debug of + Nothing -> do + seed <- seedNew + debugPrintSeed debug seed + return seed + Just determ -> return determ + let rng = newStateRNG seed -updateMeasure :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> (Measurement -> Measurement) -> m () -updateMeasure ctx f = liftIO $ do - x <- readIORef (ctxMeasurement ctx) - writeIORef (ctxMeasurement ctx) $! f x + let role = getTLSRole params + st = newTLSState rng role -withMeasure :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> (Measurement -> IO a) -> m a -withMeasure ctx f = liftIO (readIORef (ctxMeasurement ctx) >>= f) + tlsstate <- newMVar st + eof <- newIORef False + established <- newIORef NotEstablished + stats <- newIORef newMeasurement + needEmptyPacket <- newIORef False + hooks <- newIORef defaultHooks + tx <- newMVar newRecordState + rx <- newMVar newRecordState + hs <- newMVar Nothing + recvActionsRef <- newIORef [] + sendActionRef <- newIORef Nothing + locks <- Locks <$> newMVar () <*> newMVar () <*> newMVar () + st13ref <- newIORef defaultTLS13State + mylimref <- newRecordLimitRef $ Just defaultRecordSizeLimit + peerlimref <- newRecordLimitRef $ Just defaultRecordSizeLimit + hpkeref <- newIORef Nothing + let roleParams = + RoleParams + { doHandshake_ = doHandshake params + , doHandshakeWith_ = doHandshakeWith params + , doRequestCertificate_ = doRequestCertificate params + , doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ = doPostHandshakeAuthWith params + } -connectionFlush :: TLSCtx c -> IO () -connectionFlush c = ctxConnectionFlush c + let ctx = + Context + { ctxBackend = getBackend backend + , ctxShared = shared + , ctxSupported = supported + , ctxDebug = debug + , ctxTLSState = tlsstate + , ctxMyRecordLimit = mylimref + , ctxPeerRecordLimit = peerlimref + , ctxTxRecordState = tx + , ctxRxRecordState = rx + , ctxHandshakeState = hs + , ctxRoleParams = roleParams + , ctxMeasurement = stats + , ctxEOF_ = eof + , ctxEstablished_ = established + , ctxNeedEmptyPacket = needEmptyPacket + , ctxHooks = hooks + , ctxLocks = locks + , ctxPendingRecvActions = recvActionsRef + , ctxPendingSendAction = sendActionRef + , ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer + , ctxHandshakeSync = HandshakeSync syncNoOp syncNoOp + , ctxQUICMode = False + , ctxTLS13State = st13ref + , ctxHPKE = hpkeref + } -connectionSend :: TLSCtx c -> Bytes -> IO () -connectionSend c b = updateMeasure c (addBytesSent $ B.length b) >> (ctxConnectionSend c) b + syncNoOp _ _ = return () -connectionRecv :: TLSCtx c -> Int -> IO Bytes -connectionRecv c sz = updateMeasure c (addBytesReceived sz) >> (ctxConnectionRecv c) sz + recordLayer = + RecordLayer + { recordEncode12 = encodeRecord12 + , recordEncode13 = encodeRecord13 + , recordSendBytes = sendBytes + , recordRecv12 = recvRecord12 + , recordRecv13 = recvRecord13 + } -ctxEOF :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx a -> m Bool -ctxEOF ctx = liftIO (readIORef $ ctxEOF_ ctx) + return ctx -setEOF :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -setEOF ctx = liftIO $ writeIORef (ctxEOF_ ctx) True +contextHookSetHandshakeRecv :: Context -> (Handshake -> IO Handshake) -> IO () +contextHookSetHandshakeRecv context f = + contextModifyHooks context (\hooks -> hooks{hookRecvHandshake = f}) -ctxEstablished :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx a -> m Bool -ctxEstablished ctx = liftIO $ readIORef $ ctxEstablished_ ctx +contextHookSetHandshake13Recv + :: Context -> (Handshake13 -> IO Handshake13) -> IO () +contextHookSetHandshake13Recv context f = + contextModifyHooks context (\hooks -> hooks{hookRecvHandshake13 = f}) -setEstablished :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Bool -> m () -setEstablished ctx v = liftIO $ writeIORef (ctxEstablished_ ctx) v +contextHookSetCertificateRecv :: Context -> (CertificateChain -> IO ()) -> IO () +contextHookSetCertificateRecv context f = + contextModifyHooks context (\hooks -> hooks{hookRecvCertificates = f}) -ctxLogging :: TLSCtx a -> TLSLogging -ctxLogging = pLogging . ctxParams +contextHookSetLogging :: Context -> Logging -> IO () +contextHookSetLogging context loggingCallbacks = + contextModifyHooks context (\hooks -> hooks{hookLogging = loggingCallbacks}) -newCtxWith :: c -> IO () -> (Bytes -> IO ()) -> (Int -> IO Bytes) -> TLSParams -> TLSState -> IO (TLSCtx c) -newCtxWith c flushF sendF recvF params st = do - stvar <- newMVar st - eof <- newIORef False - established <- newIORef False - stats <- newIORef newMeasurement - return $ TLSCtx - { ctxConnection = c - , ctxParams = params - , ctxState = stvar - , ctxMeasurement = stats - , ctxEOF_ = eof - , ctxEstablished_ = established - , ctxConnectionFlush = flushF - , ctxConnectionSend = sendF - , ctxConnectionRecv = recvF - } +{-# DEPRECATED getFinished "Use getTLSUnique instead" #-} -newCtx :: Handle -> TLSParams -> TLSState -> IO (TLSCtx Handle) -newCtx handle params st = do - hSetBuffering handle NoBuffering - newCtxWith handle (hFlush handle) (B.hPut handle) (B.hGet handle) params st +-- | Getting TLS Finished sent to peer. +getFinished :: Context -> IO (Maybe VerifyData) +getFinished ctx = usingState_ ctx getMyVerifyData -throwCore :: (MonadIO m, Exception e) => e -> m a -throwCore = liftIO . throwIO +{-# DEPRECATED getPeerFinished "Use getTLSUnique instead" #-} +-- | Getting TLS Finished received from peer. +getPeerFinished :: Context -> IO (Maybe VerifyData) +getPeerFinished ctx = usingState_ ctx getPeerVerifyData -usingState :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> TLSSt a -> m (Either TLSError a) -usingState ctx f = - liftIO $ modifyMVar (ctxState ctx) $ \st -> - let (a, newst) = runTLSState f st - in newst `seq` return (newst, a) +-- | Getting the "tls-unique" channel binding for TLS 1.2 (RFC5929). +-- For TLS 1.3, 'Nothing' is returned. +-- 'supportedExtendedMainSecret' must be 'RequireEMS' +-- But in general, it is highly recommended to upgrade to TLS 1.3 +-- and use the "tls-exporter" channel binding via 'getTLSExporter'. +getTLSUnique :: Context -> IO (Maybe ByteString) +getTLSUnique ctx = do + ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion + if ver == TLS12 + then do + mx <- usingState_ ctx getFirstVerifyData + case mx of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (VerifyData verifyData) -> return $ Just verifyData + else return Nothing -usingState_ :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> TLSSt a -> m a -usingState_ ctx f = do - ret <- usingState ctx f - case ret of - Left err -> throwCore err - Right r -> return r +-- | Getting the "tls-exporter" channel binding for TLS 1.3 (RFC9266). +-- For TLS 1.2, 'Nothing' is returned. +getTLSExporter :: Context -> IO (Maybe ByteString) +getTLSExporter ctx = do + ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion + if ver == TLS13 + then exporter ctx "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" "" 32 + else return Nothing -getStateRNG :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Int -> m Bytes -getStateRNG ctx n = usingState_ ctx (genTLSRandom n) +exporter :: Context -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> IO (Maybe ByteString) +exporter ctx label context outlen = do + msecret <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13ExporterSecret + mcipher <- failOnEitherError $ runRxRecordState ctx $ gets stCipher + return $ case (msecret, mcipher) of + (Just secret, Just cipher) -> + let h = cipherHash cipher + secret' = deriveSecret h secret label $ TranscriptHash "" + label' = "exporter" + value' = hash h context + key = hkdfExpandLabel h secret' label' value' outlen + in Just key + _ -> Nothing +-- | Getting the "tls-server-end-point" channel binding for TLS 1.2 +-- (RFC5929). For 1.3, there is no specifications for how to create +-- it. In this implementation, a certificate chain without +-- extensions is hashed like TLS 1.2. +getTLSServerEndPoint :: Context -> IO (Maybe ByteString) +getTLSServerEndPoint ctx = do + mcc <- usingState_ ctx getServerCertificateChain + case mcc of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just cc -> do + (usedHash, _, _, _) <- getRxRecordState ctx + return $ Just $ hash usedHash $ encodeCertificate cc diff --git a/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs b/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} +{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Context.Internal ( + -- * Context configuration + ClientParams (..), + ServerParams (..), + defaultParamsClient, + SessionID, + SessionData (..), + MaxFragmentEnum (..), + Measurement (..), + + -- * Context object and accessor + Context (..), + Hooks (..), + Limit (..), + Established (..), + PendingRecvAction (..), + RecordLayer (..), + Locks (..), + RoleParams (..), + ctxEOF, + ctxEstablished, + withLog, + ctxWithHooks, + contextModifyHooks, + setEOF, + setEstablished, + contextFlush, + contextClose, + contextSend, + contextRecv, + updateRecordLayer, + updateMeasure, + withMeasure, + withReadLock, + withWriteLock, + withStateLock, + withRWLock, + + -- * information + Information (..), + contextGetInformation, + + -- * Using context states + throwCore, + failOnEitherError, + usingState, + usingState_, + runTxRecordState, + runRxRecordState, + usingHState, + getHState, + saveHState, + restoreHState, + getStateRNG, + tls13orLater, + decideRecordVersion, + + -- * Misc + HandshakeSync (..), + TLS13State (..), + defaultTLS13State, + getTLS13State, + modifyTLS13State, + CipherChoice (..), + makeCipherChoice, + + -- * RecordLimit + setMyRecordLimit, + enableMyRecordLimit, + getMyRecordLimit, + checkMyRecordLimit, + setPeerRecordLimit, + enablePeerRecordLimit, + getPeerRecordLimit, + checkPeerRecordLimit, + newRecordLimitRef, + + -- * ECH + HPKEF, + getTLS13HPKE, + setTLS13HPKE, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Exception (throwIO) +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.IORef +import Data.Tuple + +import Network.TLS.Backend +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util + +-- | A TLS Context keep tls specific state, parameters and backend information. +data Context + = forall a. + Monoid a => + Context + { ctxBackend :: Backend + -- ^ return the backend object associated with this context + , ctxSupported :: Supported + , ctxShared :: Shared + , ctxDebug :: DebugParams + , ctxTLSState :: MVar TLSState + , ctxMeasurement :: IORef Measurement + , ctxEOF_ :: IORef Bool + -- ^ has the handle EOFed or not. + , ctxEstablished_ :: IORef Established + -- ^ has the handshake been done and been successful. + , ctxTxRecordState :: MVar RecordState + -- ^ current TX record state + , ctxRxRecordState :: MVar RecordState + -- ^ current RX record state + , ctxHandshakeState :: MVar (Maybe HandshakeState) + -- ^ optional handshake state + , ctxRoleParams :: RoleParams + -- ^ hooks for this context + , ctxLocks :: Locks + , ctxHooks :: IORef Hooks + , -- TLS 1.3 + ctxTLS13State :: IORef TLS13State + , ctxPendingRecvActions :: IORef [PendingRecvAction] + , ctxPendingSendAction :: IORef (Maybe (Context -> IO ())) + -- ^ pending post handshake authentication requests + , -- QUIC + ctxRecordLayer :: RecordLayer a + , ctxHandshakeSync :: HandshakeSync + , ctxQUICMode :: Bool + , -- Misc + ctxNeedEmptyPacket :: IORef Bool + -- ^ empty packet workaround for CBC guessability. + , ctxMyRecordLimit :: IORef RecordLimit + -- ^ maximum size of plaintext fragments, val + 1 is used for TLS 1.3 + , ctxPeerRecordLimit :: IORef RecordLimit + -- ^ maximum size of plaintext fragments, val + 1 is used for TLS 1.3 + , ctxHPKE :: IORef (Maybe (HPKEF, Int)) + } + +type HPKEF = ByteString -> ByteString -> IO ByteString + +data RecordLimit + = NoRecordLimit -- for QUIC + | RecordLimit + Int -- effective + (Maybe Int) -- pending + deriving (Eq, Show) + +data RoleParams = RoleParams + { doHandshake_ :: Context -> IO () + , doHandshakeWith_ :: Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () + , doRequestCertificate_ :: Context -> IO Bool + , doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () + } + +data Locks = Locks + { lockWrite :: MVar () + -- ^ lock to use for writing data (including updating the state) + , lockRead :: MVar () + -- ^ lock to use for reading data (including updating the state) + , lockState :: MVar () + -- ^ lock used during read/write when receiving and sending packet. + -- it is usually nested in a write or read lock. + } + +data CipherChoice = CipherChoice + { cVersion :: Version + , cCipher :: Cipher + , cHash :: Hash + , cZero :: Secret + } + deriving (Show) + +makeCipherChoice :: Version -> Cipher -> CipherChoice +makeCipherChoice ver cipher = CipherChoice ver cipher h zero + where + h = cipherHash cipher + zero = BA.replicate (hashDigestSize h) 0 + +data TLS13State = TLS13State + { tls13stRecvNST :: Bool -- client + , tls13stSentClientCert :: Bool -- client + , tls13stRecvSF :: Bool -- client + , tls13stSentCF :: Bool -- client + , tls13stRecvCF :: Bool -- server + , tls13stPendingRecvData :: Maybe ByteString -- client + , tls13stPendingSentData :: [ByteString] -> [ByteString] -- client + , tls13stRTT :: Millisecond + , tls13st0RTT :: Bool -- client + , tls13st0RTTAccepted :: Bool -- client + , tls13stClientExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] -- client + , tls13stChoice :: ~CipherChoice -- client + , tls13stHsKey :: Maybe (SecretTriple HandshakeSecret) -- client + -- Actual session id for TLS 1.2, random value for TLS 1.3 + , tls13stSession :: Session + , tls13stSentExtensions :: [ExtensionID] + } + +defaultTLS13State :: TLS13State +defaultTLS13State = + TLS13State + { tls13stRecvNST = False + , tls13stSentClientCert = False + , tls13stRecvSF = False + , tls13stSentCF = False + , tls13stRecvCF = False + , tls13stPendingRecvData = Nothing + , tls13stPendingSentData = id + , tls13stRTT = 0 + , tls13st0RTT = False + , tls13st0RTTAccepted = False + , tls13stClientExtensions = [] + , tls13stChoice = undefined + , tls13stHsKey = Nothing + , tls13stSession = Session Nothing + , tls13stSentExtensions = [] + } + +getTLS13State :: Context -> IO TLS13State +getTLS13State Context{..} = readIORef ctxTLS13State + +modifyTLS13State :: Context -> (TLS13State -> TLS13State) -> IO () +modifyTLS13State Context{..} f = atomicModifyIORef' ctxTLS13State $ \st -> (f st, ()) + +data HandshakeSync + = HandshakeSync + (Context -> ClientState -> IO ()) + (Context -> ServerState -> IO ()) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +data RecordLayer a = RecordLayer + { -- Writing.hs + recordEncode12 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError a) + , recordEncode13 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError a) + , recordSendBytes :: Context -> a -> IO () + , -- Reading.hs + recordRecv12 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) + , recordRecv13 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) + } +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +updateRecordLayer :: Monoid a => RecordLayer a -> Context -> Context +updateRecordLayer recordLayer Context{..} = + Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer, ..} + +data Established + = NotEstablished + | EarlyDataAllowed Int -- server: remaining 0-RTT bytes allowed + | EarlyDataNotAllowed Int -- sever: remaining 0-RTT packets allowed to skip + | EarlyDataSending + | Established + deriving (Eq, Show) + +data PendingRecvAction + = -- | simple pending action. The first 'Bool' is necessity of alignment. + PendingRecvAction Bool (Handshake13 -> IO ()) + | PendingRecvActionSelfUpdate Bool (Handshake13R -> IO ()) + | -- | pending action taking transcript hash up to preceding message + -- The first 'Bool' is necessity of alignment. + PendingRecvActionHash + Bool + (TranscriptHash -> Handshake13 -> IO ()) + +updateMeasure :: Context -> (Measurement -> Measurement) -> IO () +updateMeasure ctx = modifyIORef' (ctxMeasurement ctx) + +withMeasure :: Context -> (Measurement -> IO a) -> IO a +withMeasure ctx f = readIORef (ctxMeasurement ctx) >>= f + +-- | A shortcut for 'backendFlush . ctxBackend'. +contextFlush :: Context -> IO () +contextFlush = backendFlush . ctxBackend + +-- | A shortcut for 'backendClose . ctxBackend'. +contextClose :: Context -> IO () +contextClose = backendClose . ctxBackend + +-- | Information about the current context +contextGetInformation :: Context -> IO (Maybe Information) +contextGetInformation ctx = do + ver <- usingState_ ctx $ gets stVersion + hstate <- getHState ctx + let (ms, ems, cr, sr, hm13, grp, ech) = + case hstate of + Just st -> + ( hstMainSecret st + , hstExtendedMainSecret st + , Just (hstClientRandom st) + , hstServerRandom st + , if ver == Just TLS13 then Just (hstTLS13HandshakeMode st) else Nothing + , hstSupportedGroup st + , hstTLS13ECHAccepted st + ) + Nothing -> (Nothing, False, Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, False) + (cipher, comp) <- + readMVar (ctxRxRecordState ctx) <&> \st -> (stCipher st, stCompression st) + let accepted = case hstate of + Just st -> hstTLS13RTT0Status st == RTT0Accepted + Nothing -> False + tls12resumption <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionResuming + case (ver, cipher) of + (Just v, Just c) -> + return $ + Just $ + Information + { infoVersion = v + , infoCipher = c + , infoCompression = comp + , infoMainSecret = convert <$> ms + , infoExtendedMainSecret = ems + , infoClientRandom = cr + , infoServerRandom = sr + , infoSupportedGroup = grp + , infoTLS12Resumption = tls12resumption + , infoTLS13HandshakeMode = hm13 + , infoIsEarlyDataAccepted = accepted + , infoIsECHAccepted = ech + } + _ -> return Nothing + +contextSend :: Context -> ByteString -> IO () +contextSend c b = + updateMeasure c (addBytesSent $ B.length b) >> (backendSend $ ctxBackend c) b + +contextRecv :: Context -> Int -> IO ByteString +contextRecv c sz = updateMeasure c (addBytesReceived sz) >> (backendRecv $ ctxBackend c) sz + +ctxEOF :: Context -> IO Bool +ctxEOF ctx = readIORef $ ctxEOF_ ctx + +setEOF :: Context -> IO () +setEOF ctx = writeIORef (ctxEOF_ ctx) True + +ctxEstablished :: Context -> IO Established +ctxEstablished ctx = readIORef $ ctxEstablished_ ctx + +ctxWithHooks :: Context -> (Hooks -> IO a) -> IO a +ctxWithHooks ctx f = readIORef (ctxHooks ctx) >>= f + +contextModifyHooks :: Context -> (Hooks -> Hooks) -> IO () +contextModifyHooks ctx = modifyIORef' (ctxHooks ctx) + +setEstablished :: Context -> Established -> IO () +setEstablished ctx = writeIORef (ctxEstablished_ ctx) + +withLog :: Context -> (Logging -> IO ()) -> IO () +withLog ctx f = ctxWithHooks ctx (f . hookLogging) + +throwCore :: MonadIO m => TLSError -> m a +throwCore = liftIO . throwIO . Uncontextualized + +failOnEitherError :: MonadIO m => m (Either TLSError a) -> m a +failOnEitherError f = do + ret <- f + case ret of + Left err -> throwCore err + Right r -> return r + +usingState :: Context -> TLSSt a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +usingState ctx f = + modifyMVar (ctxTLSState ctx) $ \st -> + let (a, newst) = runTLSState f st + in newst `seq` return (newst, a) + +usingState_ :: Context -> TLSSt a -> IO a +usingState_ ctx f = failOnEitherError $ usingState ctx f + +usingHState :: MonadIO m => Context -> HandshakeM a -> m a +usingHState ctx f = liftIO $ modifyMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ \case + Nothing -> liftIO $ throwIO MissingHandshake + Just st -> return $ swap (Just <$> runHandshake st f) + +getHState :: MonadIO m => Context -> m (Maybe HandshakeState) +getHState ctx = liftIO $ readMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) + +saveHState :: Context -> IO (Saved (Maybe HandshakeState)) +saveHState ctx = saveMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) + +restoreHState + :: Context + -> Saved (Maybe HandshakeState) + -> IO (Saved (Maybe HandshakeState)) +restoreHState ctx = restoreMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) + +decideRecordVersion :: Context -> IO (Version, Bool) +decideRecordVersion ctx = usingState_ ctx $ do + ver <- getVersionWithDefault (maximum $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx) + hrr <- getTLS13HRR + -- For TLS 1.3, ver' is only used in ClientHello. + -- The record version of the first ClientHello SHOULD be TLS 1.0. + -- The record version of the second ClientHello MUST be TLS 1.2. + let ver' + | ver >= TLS13 = if hrr then TLS12 else TLS10 + | otherwise = ver + return (ver', ver >= TLS13) + +runTxRecordState :: Context -> RecordM a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +runTxRecordState ctx f = do + (ver, tls13) <- decideRecordVersion ctx + let opt = + RecordOptions + { recordVersion = ver + , recordTLS13 = tls13 + } + modifyMVar (ctxTxRecordState ctx) $ \st -> + case runRecordM f opt st of + Left err -> return (st, Left err) + Right (a, newSt) -> return (newSt, Right a) + +runRxRecordState :: Context -> RecordM a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +runRxRecordState ctx f = do + ver <- + usingState_ + ctx + (getVersionWithDefault $ maximum $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx) + -- For 1.3, ver is just ignored. So, it is not necessary to convert ver. + let opt = + RecordOptions + { recordVersion = ver + , recordTLS13 = ver >= TLS13 + } + modifyMVar (ctxRxRecordState ctx) $ \st -> + case runRecordM f opt st of + Left err -> return (st, Left err) + Right (a, newSt) -> return (newSt, Right a) + +getStateRNG :: Context -> Int -> IO ByteString +getStateRNG ctx n = usingState_ ctx $ genRandom n + +withReadLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a +withReadLock ctx f = withMVar (lockRead $ ctxLocks ctx) (const f) + +withWriteLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a +withWriteLock ctx f = withMVar (lockWrite $ ctxLocks ctx) (const f) + +withRWLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a +withRWLock ctx f = withReadLock ctx $ withWriteLock ctx f + +withStateLock :: Context -> IO a -> IO a +withStateLock ctx f = withMVar (lockState $ ctxLocks ctx) (const f) + +tls13orLater :: MonadIO m => Context -> m Bool +tls13orLater ctx = do + ev <- liftIO $ usingState ctx $ getVersionWithDefault TLS12 + return $ case ev of + Left _ -> False + Right v -> v >= TLS13 + +-------------------------------- + +setMyRecordLimit :: Context -> Maybe Int -> IO () +setMyRecordLimit ctx msiz = modifyIORef' (ctxMyRecordLimit ctx) change + where + change (RecordLimit n _) = RecordLimit n msiz + change x = x + +enableMyRecordLimit :: Context -> IO () +enableMyRecordLimit ctx = modifyIORef' (ctxMyRecordLimit ctx) change + where + change (RecordLimit _ (Just n)) = RecordLimit n Nothing + change x = x + +getMyRecordLimit :: Context -> IO (Maybe Int) +getMyRecordLimit ctx = change <$> readIORef (ctxMyRecordLimit ctx) + where + change NoRecordLimit = Nothing + change (RecordLimit n _) = Just n + +checkMyRecordLimit :: Context -> IO Bool +checkMyRecordLimit ctx = chk <$> readIORef (ctxMyRecordLimit ctx) + where + chk NoRecordLimit = False + chk (RecordLimit _ mx) = isJust mx + +-------------------------------- + +setPeerRecordLimit :: Context -> Maybe Int -> IO () +setPeerRecordLimit ctx msiz = modifyIORef' (ctxPeerRecordLimit ctx) change + where + change (RecordLimit n _) = RecordLimit n msiz + change x = x + +enablePeerRecordLimit :: Context -> IO () +enablePeerRecordLimit ctx = modifyIORef' (ctxPeerRecordLimit ctx) change + where + change (RecordLimit _ (Just n)) = RecordLimit n Nothing + change x = x + +getPeerRecordLimit :: Context -> IO (Maybe Int) +getPeerRecordLimit ctx = change <$> readIORef (ctxPeerRecordLimit ctx) + where + change NoRecordLimit = Nothing + change (RecordLimit n _) = Just n + +checkPeerRecordLimit :: Context -> IO Bool +checkPeerRecordLimit ctx = chk <$> readIORef (ctxPeerRecordLimit ctx) + where + chk NoRecordLimit = False + chk (RecordLimit _ mx) = isJust mx + +newRecordLimitRef :: Maybe Int -> IO (IORef RecordLimit) +newRecordLimitRef Nothing = newIORef NoRecordLimit +newRecordLimitRef (Just n) = newIORef $ RecordLimit n Nothing + +-------------------------------- + +setTLS13HPKE :: Context -> HPKEF -> Int -> IO () +setTLS13HPKE ctx func nenc = writeIORef (ctxHPKE ctx) $ Just (func, nenc) + +getTLS13HPKE :: Context -> IO (Maybe (HPKEF, Int)) +getTLS13HPKE ctx = readIORef $ ctxHPKE ctx diff --git a/Network/TLS/Core.hs b/Network/TLS/Core.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Core.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Core.hs @@ -1,539 +1,512 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} {-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} -{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} -{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Core --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Core - ( - -- * Internal packet sending and receiving - sendPacket - , recvPacket - -- * Creating a client or server context - , client - , clientWith - , server - , serverWith - - -- * Initialisation and Termination of context - , bye - , handshake - , HandshakeFailed(..) - , ConnectionNotEstablished(..) - - -- * High level API - , sendData - , recvData - , recvData' - ) where - -import Network.TLS.Context -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Record -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Compression -import Network.TLS.Packet -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Sending -import Network.TLS.Receiving -import Network.TLS.Measurement -import Network.TLS.Wire (encodeWord16) -import Data.Maybe -import Data.Data -import Data.List (intersect, find) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L - -import Crypto.Random -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad.State -import Control.Exception (throwIO, Exception(), fromException, catch, SomeException) -import System.IO (Handle) -import System.IO.Error (mkIOError, eofErrorType) -#if !MIN_VERSION_base(4,6,0) -import Prelude hiding (catch) -#endif - -data HandshakeFailed = HandshakeFailed TLSError - deriving (Show,Eq,Typeable) - -data ConnectionNotEstablished = ConnectionNotEstablished - deriving (Show,Eq,Typeable) - -instance Exception HandshakeFailed -instance Exception ConnectionNotEstablished - -errorToAlert :: TLSError -> Packet -errorToAlert (Error_Protocol (_, _, ad)) = Alert [(AlertLevel_Fatal, ad)] -errorToAlert _ = Alert [(AlertLevel_Fatal, InternalError)] - -handshakeFailed :: TLSError -> IO () -handshakeFailed err = throwIO $ HandshakeFailed err - -checkValid :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -checkValid ctx = do - established <- ctxEstablished ctx - unless established $ liftIO $ throwIO ConnectionNotEstablished - eofed <- ctxEOF ctx - when eofed $ liftIO $ throwIO $ mkIOError eofErrorType "data" Nothing Nothing - -readExact :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Int -> m Bytes -readExact ctx sz = do - hdrbs <- liftIO $ connectionRecv ctx sz - when (B.length hdrbs < sz) $ do - setEOF ctx - if B.null hdrbs - then throwCore Error_EOF - else throwCore (Error_Packet ("partial packet: expecting " ++ show sz ++ " bytes, got: " ++ (show $B.length hdrbs))) - return hdrbs - -recvRecord :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) -recvRecord ctx = readExact ctx 5 >>= either (return . Left) recvLength . decodeHeader - where recvLength header@(Header _ _ readlen) - | readlen > 16384 + 2048 = return $ Left $ Error_Protocol ("record exceeding maximum size", True, RecordOverflow) - | otherwise = do - content <- readExact ctx (fromIntegral readlen) - liftIO $ (loggingIORecv $ ctxLogging ctx) header content - usingState ctx $ disengageRecord $ rawToRecord header (fragmentCiphertext content) - - --- | receive one packet from the context that contains 1 or --- many messages (many only in case of handshake). if will returns a --- TLSError if the packet is unexpected or malformed -recvPacket :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m (Either TLSError Packet) -recvPacket ctx = do - erecord <- recvRecord ctx - case erecord of - Left err -> return $ Left err - Right record -> do - pkt <- usingState ctx $ processPacket record - case pkt of - Right p -> liftIO $ (loggingPacketRecv $ ctxLogging ctx) $ show p - _ -> return () - return pkt - -recvPacketHandshake :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m [Handshake] -recvPacketHandshake ctx = do - pkts <- recvPacket ctx - case pkts of - Right (Handshake l) -> return l - Right x -> fail ("unexpected type received. expecting handshake and got: " ++ show x) - Left err -> throwCore err - -data RecvState m = - RecvStateNext (Packet -> m (RecvState m)) - | RecvStateHandshake (Handshake -> m (RecvState m)) - | RecvStateDone - -runRecvState :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx a -> RecvState m -> m () -runRecvState _ (RecvStateDone) = return () -runRecvState ctx (RecvStateNext f) = recvPacket ctx >>= either throwCore f >>= runRecvState ctx -runRecvState ctx iniState = recvPacketHandshake ctx >>= loop iniState >>= runRecvState ctx - where - loop :: MonadIO m => RecvState m -> [Handshake] -> m (RecvState m) - loop recvState [] = return recvState - loop (RecvStateHandshake f) (x:xs) = do - nstate <- f x - usingState_ ctx $ processHandshake x - loop nstate xs - loop _ _ = unexpected "spurious handshake" Nothing - -sendChangeCipherAndFinish :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Bool -> m () -sendChangeCipherAndFinish ctx isClient = do - sendPacket ctx ChangeCipherSpec - liftIO $ connectionFlush ctx - cf <- usingState_ ctx $ getHandshakeDigest isClient - sendPacket ctx (Handshake [Finished cf]) - liftIO $ connectionFlush ctx +module Network.TLS.Core ( + -- * Internal packet sending and receiving + sendPacket12, + recvPacket12, -recvChangeCipherAndFinish :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -recvChangeCipherAndFinish ctx = runRecvState ctx (RecvStateNext expectChangeCipher) - where - expectChangeCipher ChangeCipherSpec = return $ RecvStateHandshake expectFinish - expectChangeCipher p = unexpected (show p) (Just "change cipher") - expectFinish (Finished _) = return RecvStateDone - expectFinish p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished") + -- * Initialisation and Termination of context + bye, + handshake, -unexpected :: MonadIO m => String -> Maybe [Char] -> m a -unexpected msg expected = throwCore $ Error_Packet_unexpected msg (maybe "" (" expected: " ++) expected) + -- * Application Layer Protocol Negotiation + getNegotiatedProtocol, -newSession :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m Session -newSession ctx - | pUseSession $ ctxParams ctx = getStateRNG ctx 32 >>= return . Session . Just - | otherwise = return $ Session Nothing + -- * Server Name Indication + getClientSNI, --- | Send one packet to the context -sendPacket :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Packet -> m () -sendPacket ctx pkt = do - -- in ver <= TLS1.0, block ciphers using CBC are using CBC residue as IV, which can be guessed - -- by an attacker. Hence, an empty packet is sent before a normal data packet, to - -- prevent guessability. - withEmptyPacket <- usingState_ ctx needEmptyPacket - when (isNonNullAppData pkt && withEmptyPacket) $ sendPacket ctx $ AppData B.empty + -- * High level API + sendData, + recvData, + recvData', + updateKey, + KeyUpdateRequest (..), + requestCertificate, +) where - liftIO $ (loggingPacketSent $ ctxLogging ctx) (show pkt) - dataToSend <- usingState_ ctx $ writePacket pkt - liftIO $ (loggingIOSent $ ctxLogging ctx) dataToSend - liftIO $ connectionSend ctx dataToSend - where - isNonNullAppData (AppData b) = not $ B.null b - isNonNullAppData _ = False +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as C8 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.IORef +import System.Timeout --- | Create a new Client context with a configuration, a RNG, a generic connection and the connection operation. -clientWith :: (MonadIO m, CryptoRandomGen g) - => TLSParams -- ^ Parameters to use for this context - -> g -- ^ Random number generator associated - -> c -- ^ An abstract connection type - -> IO () -- ^ A method for the connection buffer to be flushed - -> (B.ByteString -> IO ()) -- ^ A method for sending bytes through the connection - -> (Int -> IO B.ByteString) -- ^ A method for receiving bytes through the connection - -> m (TLSCtx c) -clientWith params rng connection flushF sendF recvF = - liftIO $ newCtxWith connection flushF sendF recvF params st - where st = (newTLSState rng) { stClientContext = True } +import Network.TLS.Context +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.PostHandshake +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State (getRole, getSession) +import qualified Network.TLS.State as S +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types ( + HostName, + Role (..), + ) +import Network.TLS.Util (catchException, mapChunks_) --- | Create a new Client context with a configuration, a RNG, and a Handle. --- It reconfigures the handle's 'System.IO.BufferMode' to @NoBuffering@. -client :: (MonadIO m, CryptoRandomGen g) - => TLSParams -- ^ parameters to use for this context - -> g -- ^ random number generator associated with the context - -> Handle -- ^ handle to use - -> m (TLSCtx Handle) -client params rng handle = liftIO $ newCtx handle params st - where st = (newTLSState rng) { stClientContext = True } +-- | Handshake for a new TLS connection +-- This is to be called at the beginning of a connection, and during renegotiation. +-- Don't use this function as the acquire resource of 'bracket'. +handshake :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () +handshake ctx = do + handshake_ ctx + -- Trying to receive an alert of client authentication failure + liftIO $ do + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + sentClientCert <- tls13stSentClientCert <$> getTLS13State ctx + when (role == ClientRole && tls13 && sentClientCert) $ do + rtt <- getRTT ctx + -- This 'timeout' should work. + mdat <- timeout rtt $ recvData13 ctx + case mdat of + Nothing -> return () + Just dat -> modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecvData = Just dat} --- | Create a new Server context with a configuration, a RNG, a generic connection and the connection operation. -serverWith :: (MonadIO m, CryptoRandomGen g) => TLSParams -> g -> c -> IO () -> (B.ByteString -> IO ()) -> (Int -> IO B.ByteString) -> m (TLSCtx c) -serverWith params rng connection flushF sendF recvF = - liftIO $ newCtxWith connection flushF sendF recvF params st - where st = (newTLSState rng) { stClientContext = False } +rttFactor :: Int +rttFactor = 3 --- | Create a new Server context with a configuration, a RNG, and a Handle. --- It reconfigures the handle's 'System.IO.BufferMode' to @NoBuffering@. -server :: (MonadIO m, CryptoRandomGen g) => TLSParams -> g -> Handle -> m (TLSCtx Handle) -server params rng handle = liftIO $ newCtx handle params st - where st = (newTLSState rng) { stClientContext = False } +getRTT :: Context -> IO Int +getRTT ctx = do + rtt <- tls13stRTT <$> getTLS13State ctx + let rtt' = max (fromIntegral rtt) 10 + return (rtt' * rttFactor * 1000) -- ms to us --- | notify the context that this side wants to close connection. --- this is important that it is called before closing the handle, otherwise +-- | Notify the context that this side wants to close connection. +-- This is important that it is called before closing the handle, otherwise -- the session might not be resumable (for version < TLS1.2). +-- This doesn't actually close the handle. -- --- this doesn't actually close the handle -bye :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -bye ctx = sendPacket ctx $ Alert [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)] - --- | when a new handshake is done, wrap up & clean up. -handshakeTerminate :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -handshakeTerminate ctx = do - session <- usingState_ ctx getSession - -- only callback the session established if we have a session - case session of - Session (Just sessionId) -> do - sessionData <- usingState_ ctx getSessionData - liftIO $ (onSessionEstablished $ ctxParams ctx) sessionId (fromJust sessionData) - _ -> return () - -- forget all handshake data now and reset bytes counters. - usingState_ ctx endHandshake - updateMeasure ctx resetBytesCounters - -- mark the secure connection up and running. - setEstablished ctx True - return () - --- client part of handshake. send a bunch of handshake of client --- values intertwined with response from the server. -handshakeClient :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -handshakeClient ctx = do - updateMeasure ctx incrementNbHandshakes - sendClientHello - recvServerHello - sessionResuming <- usingState_ ctx isSessionResuming - if sessionResuming - then sendChangeCipherAndFinish ctx True - else do - sendCertificate >> sendClientKeyXchg >> sendCertificateVerify - sendChangeCipherAndFinish ctx True - recvChangeCipherAndFinish ctx - handshakeTerminate ctx - where - params = ctxParams ctx - ver = pConnectVersion params - allowedvers = pAllowedVersions params - ciphers = pCiphers params - compressions = pCompressions params - clientCerts = map fst $ pCertificates params - getExtensions = - if pUseSecureRenegotiation params - then usingState_ ctx (getVerifiedData True) >>= \vd -> return [ (0xff01, encodeExtSecureRenegotiation vd Nothing) ] - else return [] - - sendClientHello = do - crand <- getStateRNG ctx 32 >>= return . ClientRandom - let clientSession = Session . maybe Nothing (Just . fst) $ sessionResumeWith params - extensions <- getExtensions - usingState_ ctx (startHandshakeClient ver crand) - sendPacket ctx $ Handshake - [ ClientHello ver crand clientSession (map cipherID ciphers) - (map compressionID compressions) extensions - ] - - expectChangeCipher ChangeCipherSpec = return $ RecvStateHandshake expectFinish - expectChangeCipher p = unexpected (show p) (Just "change cipher") - expectFinish (Finished _) = return RecvStateDone - expectFinish p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished") - - sendCertificate = do - -- Send Certificate if requested. XXX disabled for now. - certRequested <- return False - when certRequested (sendPacket ctx $ Handshake [Certificates clientCerts]) - - sendCertificateVerify = - {- maybe send certificateVerify -} - {- FIXME not implemented yet -} - return () - - recvServerHello = runRecvState ctx (RecvStateHandshake onServerHello) - - onServerHello :: MonadIO m => Handshake -> m (RecvState m) - onServerHello sh@(ServerHello rver _ serverSession cipher _ _) = do - when (rver == SSL2) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("ssl2 is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) - case find ((==) rver) allowedvers of - Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("version " ++ show ver ++ "is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) - Just _ -> usingState_ ctx $ setVersion ver - case find ((==) cipher . cipherID) ciphers of - Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("no cipher in common with the server", True, HandshakeFailure) - Just c -> usingState_ ctx $ setCipher c - - let resumingSession = case sessionResumeWith params of - Just (sessionId, sessionData) -> if serverSession == Session (Just sessionId) then Just sessionData else Nothing - Nothing -> Nothing - usingState_ ctx $ setSession serverSession (isJust resumingSession) - usingState_ ctx $ processServerHello sh - case resumingSession of - Nothing -> return $ RecvStateHandshake processCertificate - Just sessionData -> do - usingState_ ctx (setMasterSecret $ sessionSecret sessionData) - return $ RecvStateNext expectChangeCipher - onServerHello p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server hello") - - processCertificate :: MonadIO m => Handshake -> m (RecvState m) - processCertificate (Certificates certs) = do - usage <- liftIO $ catch (onCertificatesRecv params $ certs) rejectOnException - case usage of - CertificateUsageAccept -> return () - CertificateUsageReject reason -> certificateRejected reason - return $ RecvStateHandshake processServerKeyExchange - where - rejectOnException :: SomeException -> IO TLSCertificateUsage - rejectOnException e = return $ CertificateUsageReject $ CertificateRejectOther $ show e - processCertificate p = processServerKeyExchange p - - processServerKeyExchange :: MonadIO m => Handshake -> m (RecvState m) - processServerKeyExchange (ServerKeyXchg _) = return $ RecvStateHandshake processCertificateRequest - processServerKeyExchange p = processCertificateRequest p - - processCertificateRequest (CertRequest _ _ _) = do - --modify (\sc -> sc { scCertRequested = True }) - return $ RecvStateHandshake processServerHelloDone - processCertificateRequest p = processServerHelloDone p - - processServerHelloDone ServerHelloDone = return RecvStateDone - processServerHelloDone p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server hello data") - - sendClientKeyXchg = do - encryptedPreMaster <- usingState_ ctx $ do - xver <- stVersion <$> get - prerand <- genTLSRandom 46 - let premaster = encodePreMasterSecret xver prerand - setMasterSecretFromPre premaster +-- Proper usage is as follows: +-- +-- > ctx <- contextNew +-- > handshake ctx +-- > ... +-- > bye +-- +-- The following code ensures nothing but is no harm. +-- +-- > bracket (contextNew ) bye $ \ctx -> do +-- > handshake ctx +-- > ... +bye :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () +bye ctx = liftIO $ do + eof <- ctxEOF ctx + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + when (tls13 && not eof) $ do + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + if role == ClientRole + then do + withWriteLock ctx $ sendCFifNecessary ctx + -- receiving NewSessionTicket + let chk = tls13stRecvNST <$> getTLS13State ctx + recvNST <- chk + unless recvNST $ do + rtt <- getRTT ctx + void $ timeout rtt $ recvHS13 ctx chk + else do + -- receiving Client Finished + let chk = tls13stRecvCF <$> getTLS13State ctx + recvCF <- chk + unless recvCF $ do + -- no chance to measure RTT before receiving CF + -- fixme: 1sec is good enough? + let rtt = 1000000 + void $ timeout rtt $ recvHS13 ctx chk + bye_ ctx - -- SSL3 implementation generally forget this length field since it's redundant, - -- however TLS10 make it clear that the length field need to be present. - e <- encryptRSA premaster - let extra = if xver < TLS10 - then B.empty - else encodeWord16 $ fromIntegral $ B.length e - return $ extra `B.append` e - sendPacket ctx $ Handshake [ClientKeyXchg encryptedPreMaster] +bye_ :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () +bye_ ctx = liftIO $ do + -- Although setEOF is always protected by the read lock, here we don't try + -- to wrap ctxEOF with it, so that function bye can still be called + -- concurrently to a blocked recvData. + eof <- ctxEOF ctx + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + unless eof $ + withWriteLock ctx $ + if tls13 + then sendPacket13 ctx $ Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)] + else sendPacket12 ctx $ Alert [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)] - -- on certificate reject, throw an exception with the proper protocol alert error. - certificateRejected CertificateRejectRevoked = - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("certificate is revoked", True, CertificateRevoked) - certificateRejected CertificateRejectExpired = - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("certificate has expired", True, CertificateExpired) - certificateRejected CertificateRejectUnknownCA = - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("certificate has unknown CA", True, UnknownCa) - certificateRejected (CertificateRejectOther s) = - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("certificate rejected: " ++ s, True, CertificateUnknown) +-- | If the ALPN extensions have been used, this will +-- return get the protocol agreed upon. +getNegotiatedProtocol :: MonadIO m => Context -> m (Maybe ByteString) +getNegotiatedProtocol ctx = liftIO $ usingState_ ctx S.getNegotiatedProtocol -handshakeServerWith :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> Handshake -> m () -handshakeServerWith ctx clientHello@(ClientHello ver _ clientSession ciphers compressions _) = do - -- check if policy allow this new handshake to happens - handshakeAuthorized <- withMeasure ctx (onHandshake $ ctxParams ctx) - unless handshakeAuthorized (throwCore $ Error_HandshakePolicy "server: handshake denied") - updateMeasure ctx incrementNbHandshakes +-- | If the Server Name Indication extension has been used, return the +-- hostname specified by the client. +getClientSNI :: MonadIO m => Context -> m (Maybe HostName) +getClientSNI ctx = liftIO $ usingState_ ctx S.getClientSNI - -- Handle Client hello - usingState_ ctx $ processHandshake clientHello - when (ver == SSL2) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("ssl2 is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) - when (not $ elem ver (pAllowedVersions params)) $ - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("version " ++ show ver ++ "is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) - when (commonCiphers == []) $ - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("no cipher in common with the client", True, HandshakeFailure) - when (null commonCompressions) $ - throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("no compression in common with the client", True, HandshakeFailure) - usingState_ ctx $ modify (\st -> st - { stVersion = ver - , stCipher = Just usedCipher - , stCompression = usedCompression - }) +sendCFifNecessary :: Context -> IO () +sendCFifNecessary ctx = do + st <- getTLS13State ctx + let recvSF = tls13stRecvSF st + sentCF = tls13stSentCF st + when (recvSF && not sentCF) $ do + msend <- readIORef (ctxPendingSendAction ctx) + case msend of + Nothing -> return () + Just sendAction -> do + sendAction ctx + writeIORef (ctxPendingSendAction ctx) Nothing - resumeSessionData <- case clientSession of - (Session (Just clientSessionId)) -> liftIO $ onSessionResumption params $ clientSessionId - (Session Nothing) -> return Nothing - case resumeSessionData of - Nothing -> do - handshakeSendServerData - liftIO $ connectionFlush ctx +-- | sendData sends a bunch of data. +-- It will automatically chunk data to acceptable packet size +sendData :: MonadIO m => Context -> L.ByteString -> m () +sendData _ "" = return () +sendData ctx dataToSend = liftIO $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + let sendP bs + | tls13 = do + sendPacket13 ctx $ AppData13 bs + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + sentCF <- tls13stSentCF <$> getTLS13State ctx + rtt0 <- tls13st0RTT <$> getTLS13State ctx + when (role == ClientRole && rtt0 && not sentCF) $ + modifyTLS13State ctx $ + \st -> st{tls13stPendingSentData = tls13stPendingSentData st . (bs :)} + | otherwise = sendPacket12 ctx $ AppData bs + when tls13 $ withWriteLock ctx $ sendCFifNecessary ctx + withWriteLock ctx $ do + checkValid ctx + -- All chunks are protected with the same write lock because we don't + -- want to interleave writes from other threads in the middle of our + -- possibly large write. + mlen <- getPeerRecordLimit ctx -- plaintext, don't adjust for TLS 1.3 + mapM_ (mapChunks_ mlen sendP) (L.toChunks dataToSend) - -- Receive client info until client Finished. - recvClientData - sendChangeCipherAndFinish ctx False - Just sessionData -> do - usingState_ ctx (setSession clientSession True) - serverhello <- makeServerHello clientSession - sendPacket ctx $ Handshake [serverhello] - usingState_ ctx $ setMasterSecret $ sessionSecret sessionData - sendChangeCipherAndFinish ctx False - recvChangeCipherAndFinish ctx - handshakeTerminate ctx - where - params = ctxParams ctx - commonCiphers = intersect ciphers (map cipherID $ pCiphers params) - usedCipher = fromJust $ find (\c -> cipherID c == head commonCiphers) (pCiphers params) - commonCompressions = compressionIntersectID (pCompressions params) compressions - usedCompression = head commonCompressions - srvCerts = map fst $ pCertificates params - privKeys = map snd $ pCertificates params - needKeyXchg = cipherExchangeNeedMoreData $ cipherKeyExchange usedCipher +-- | Get data out of Data packet, and automatically renegotiate if a Handshake +-- ClientHello is received. An empty result means EOF. +recvData :: MonadIO m => Context -> m ByteString +recvData ctx = liftIO $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + withReadLock ctx $ do + checkValid ctx + -- We protect with a read lock both reception and processing of the + -- packet, because don't want another thread to receive a new packet + -- before this one has been fully processed. + -- + -- Even when recvData12/recvData13 loops, we only need to call function + -- checkValid once. Since we hold the read lock, no concurrent call + -- will impact the validity of the context. + if tls13 then recvData13 ctx else recvData12 ctx - --- - recvClientData = runRecvState ctx (RecvStateHandshake $ processClientCertificate) +recvData12 :: Context -> IO ByteString +recvData12 ctx = do + pkt <- recvPacket12 ctx + either (onError terminate12) process pkt + where + process (Handshake [ch@ClientHello{}] [b]) = + handshakeWith ctx (ch, b) >> recvData12 ctx + process (Handshake [hr@HelloRequest] [b]) = + handshakeWith ctx (hr, b) >> recvData12 ctx + -- UserCanceled should be followed by a close_notify. + -- fixme: is it safe to call recvData12? + process (Alert [(AlertLevel_Warning, UserCanceled)]) = return B.empty + process (Alert [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)]) = tryBye ctx >> setEOF ctx >> return B.empty + process (Alert [(AlertLevel_Fatal, desc)]) = do + setEOF ctx + E.throwIO + ( Terminated + True + ("received fatal error: " ++ show desc) + (Error_Protocol "remote side fatal error" desc) + ) - processClientCertificate (Certificates _) = return $ RecvStateHandshake processClientKeyExchange - processClientCertificate p = processClientKeyExchange p + -- when receiving empty appdata, we just retry to get some data. + process (AppData "") = recvData12 ctx + process (AppData x) = return x + process p = do + let reason = "unexpected message " ++ show p + terminate12 (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason - processClientKeyExchange (ClientKeyXchg _) = return $ RecvStateNext processCertificateVerify - processClientKeyExchange p = unexpected (show p) (Just "client key exchange") + terminate12 = terminateWithWriteLock ctx (sendPacket12 ctx . Alert) - processCertificateVerify (Handshake [CertVerify _]) = return $ RecvStateNext expectChangeCipher - processCertificateVerify p = expectChangeCipher p +recvData13 :: Context -> IO ByteString +recvData13 ctx = do + mdat <- tls13stPendingRecvData <$> getTLS13State ctx + case mdat of + Nothing -> do + pkt <- recvPacket13 ctx + either (onError (terminate13 ctx)) process pkt + Just dat -> do + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingRecvData = Nothing} + return dat + where + -- UserCanceled MUST be followed by a CloseNotify. + process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, UserCanceled)]) = return B.empty + process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)]) = tryBye ctx >> setEOF ctx >> return B.empty + process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Fatal, desc)]) = do + setEOF ctx + E.throwIO + ( Terminated + True + ("received fatal error: " ++ show desc) + (Error_Protocol "remote side fatal error" desc) + ) + process (Handshake13 hs bs) = do + loopHandshake13 $ zip hs bs + recvData13 ctx + -- when receiving empty appdata, we just retry to get some data. + process (AppData13 "") = recvData13 ctx + process (AppData13 x) = do + let chunkLen = C8.length x + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + case established of + EarlyDataAllowed maxSize + | chunkLen <= maxSize -> do + setEstablished ctx $ EarlyDataAllowed (maxSize - chunkLen) + return x + | otherwise -> + let reason = "early data overflow" + in terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + EarlyDataNotAllowed n + | n > 0 -> do + setEstablished ctx $ EarlyDataNotAllowed (n - 1) + recvData13 ctx -- ignore "x" + | otherwise -> do + let reason = "early data deprotect overflow" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + Established -> return x + _ -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "data at not-established" UnexpectedMessage + process ChangeCipherSpec13 = do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + if established /= Established + then recvData13 ctx + else do + let reason = "CSS after Finished" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + process p = do + let reason = "unexpected message " ++ show p + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason - expectChangeCipher ChangeCipherSpec = return $ RecvStateHandshake expectFinish - expectChangeCipher p = unexpected (show p) (Just "change cipher") + loopHandshake13 [] = return () + -- fixme: some implementations send multiple NST at the same time. + -- Only the first one is used at this moment. + loopHandshake13 ((NewSessionTicket13 life add nonce (SessionIDorTicket_ ticket) exts, _b) : hbs) = do + role <- usingState_ ctx S.getRole + unless (role == ClientRole) $ do + let reason = "Session ticket is allowed for client only" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + -- This part is similar to handshake code, so protected with + -- read+write locks (which is also what we use for all calls to the + -- session manager). + withWriteLock ctx $ do + Just resumptionSecret <- usingHState ctx getTLS13ResumptionSecret + (_, usedCipher, _, _) <- getTxRecordState ctx + -- mMaxSize is always Just, but anyway + let extract (EarlyDataIndication mMaxSize) = + maybe 0 (fromIntegral . safeNonNegative32) mMaxSize + let choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher + psk = derivePSK choice resumptionSecret nonce + maxSize = + lookupAndDecode + EID_EarlyData + MsgTNewSessionTicket + exts + 0 + extract + life7d = min life 604800 -- 7 days max + tinfo <- createTLS13TicketInfo life7d (Right add) Nothing + sdata <- getSessionData13 ctx usedCipher tinfo maxSize psk + let ticket' = B.copy ticket + void $ sessionEstablish (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) ticket' sdata + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stRecvNST = True} + loopHandshake13 hbs + loopHandshake13 ((KeyUpdate13 mode, _b) : hbs) = do + let multipleKeyUpdate = any (\(h, _) -> isKeyUpdate13 h) hbs + when multipleKeyUpdate $ do + let reason = "Multiple KeyUpdate is not allowed in one record" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + when (ctxQUICMode ctx) $ do + let reason = "KeyUpdate is not allowed for QUIC" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + checkAlignment ctx + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + -- Though RFC 8446 Sec 4.6.3 does not clearly says, + -- unidirectional key update is legal. + -- So, we don't have to check if this key update is corresponding + -- to key update (update_requested) which we sent. + if established == Established + then do + keyUpdate ctx getRxRecordState setRxRecordState + -- Write lock wraps both actions because we don't want another + -- packet to be sent by another thread before the Tx state is + -- updated. + when (mode == UpdateRequested) $ withWriteLock ctx $ do + sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [KeyUpdate13 UpdateNotRequested] [] + keyUpdate ctx getTxRecordState setTxRecordState + loopHandshake13 hbs + else do + let reason = "received key update before established" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + -- Client only + loopHandshake13 ((h@CertRequest13{}, _b) : hbs) = + postHandshakeAuthWith ctx h >> loopHandshake13 hbs + loopHandshake13 (hb@(h, _) : hbs) = do + rtt0 <- tls13st0RTT <$> getTLS13State ctx + when rtt0 $ case h of + ServerHello13 SH{..} -> + when (isHelloRetryRequest shRandom) $ do + clearTxRecordState ctx + let reason = "HRR is not allowed for 0-RTT" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + _ -> return () + cont <- popAction ctx hb + when cont $ loopHandshake13 hbs - expectFinish (Finished _) = return RecvStateDone - expectFinish p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished") - --- +recvHS13 :: Context -> IO Bool -> IO () +recvHS13 ctx breakLoop = do + pkt <- recvPacket13 ctx + -- fixme: Left + either (\_ -> return ()) process pkt + where + -- UserCanceled MUST be followed by a CloseNotify. + process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)]) = tryBye ctx >> setEOF ctx + process (Alert13 [(AlertLevel_Fatal, _desc)]) = setEOF ctx + process (Handshake13 hs bs) = do + loopHandshake13 $ zip hs bs + stop <- breakLoop + unless stop $ recvHS13 ctx breakLoop + process _ = recvHS13 ctx breakLoop - makeServerHello session = do - srand <- getStateRNG ctx 32 >>= return . ServerRandom - case privKeys of - (Just privkey : _) -> usingState_ ctx $ setPrivateKey privkey - _ -> return () -- return a sensible error + loopHandshake13 [] = return () + -- fixme: some implementations send multiple NST at the same time. + -- Only the first one is used at this moment. + loopHandshake13 ((NewSessionTicket13 life add nonce (SessionIDorTicket_ ticket) exts, _b) : hbs) = do + role <- usingState_ ctx S.getRole + unless (role == ClientRole) $ do + let reason = "Session ticket is allowed for client only" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason + -- This part is similar to handshake code, so protected with + -- read+write locks (which is also what we use for all calls to the + -- session manager). + withWriteLock ctx $ do + Just resumptionSecret <- usingHState ctx getTLS13ResumptionSecret + (_, usedCipher, _, _) <- getTxRecordState ctx + let choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher + psk = derivePSK choice resumptionSecret nonce + maxSize = + lookupAndDecode + EID_EarlyData + MsgTNewSessionTicket + exts + 0 + (\(EarlyDataIndication mms) -> fromIntegral $ safeNonNegative32 $ fromJust mms) + life7d = min life 604800 -- 7 days max + tinfo <- createTLS13TicketInfo life7d (Right add) Nothing + sdata <- getSessionData13 ctx usedCipher tinfo maxSize psk + let ticket' = B.copy ticket + void $ sessionEstablish (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) ticket' sdata + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stRecvNST = True} + loopHandshake13 hbs + loopHandshake13 (hb : hbs) = do + cont <- popAction ctx hb + when cont $ loopHandshake13 hbs - -- in TLS12, we need to check as well the certificates we are sending if they have in the extension - -- the necessary bits set. - secReneg <- usingState_ ctx getSecureRenegotiation - extensions <- if secReneg - then do - vf <- usingState_ ctx $ do - cvf <- getVerifiedData True - svf <- getVerifiedData False - return $ encodeExtSecureRenegotiation cvf (Just svf) - return [ (0xff01, vf) ] - else return [] - usingState_ ctx (setVersion ver >> setServerRandom srand) - return $ ServerHello ver srand session (cipherID usedCipher) - (compressionID usedCompression) extensions +terminate13 + :: Context -> TLSError -> AlertLevel -> AlertDescription -> String -> IO a +terminate13 ctx = terminateWithWriteLock ctx (sendPacket13 ctx . Alert13) - handshakeSendServerData = do - serverSession <- newSession ctx - usingState_ ctx (setSession serverSession False) - serverhello <- makeServerHello serverSession - -- send ServerHello & Certificate & ServerKeyXchg & CertReq - sendPacket ctx $ Handshake [ serverhello, Certificates srvCerts ] - when needKeyXchg $ do - let skg = SKX_RSA Nothing - sendPacket ctx (Handshake [ServerKeyXchg skg]) - -- FIXME we don't do this on a Anonymous server - when (pWantClientCert params) $ do - let certTypes = [ CertificateType_RSA_Sign ] - let creq = CertRequest certTypes Nothing [0,0,0] - sendPacket ctx (Handshake [creq]) - -- Send HelloDone - sendPacket ctx (Handshake [ServerHelloDone]) +popAction :: Context -> Handshake13R -> IO Bool +popAction ctx hb@(h, _b) = do + mPendingRecvAction <- popPendingRecvAction ctx + case mPendingRecvAction of + Nothing -> return False + Just action -> do + -- Pending actions are executed with read+write locks, just + -- like regular handshake code. + withWriteLock ctx $ + handleException ctx $ do + case action of + PendingRecvAction needAligned pa -> do + when needAligned $ checkAlignment ctx + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx hb + pa h + PendingRecvActionSelfUpdate needAligned pa -> do + when needAligned $ checkAlignment ctx + pa hb + PendingRecvActionHash needAligned pa -> do + when needAligned $ checkAlignment ctx + d <- transcriptHash ctx "Pending action" + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx hb + pa d h + -- Client: after receiving SH, app data is coming. + -- this loop tries to receive it. + -- App key must be installed before receiving + -- the app data. + sendCFifNecessary ctx + return True -handshakeServerWith _ _ = fail "unexpected handshake type received. expecting client hello" +checkAlignment :: Context -> IO () +checkAlignment ctx = do + complete <- isRecvComplete ctx + unless complete $ do + let reason = "received message not aligned with record boundary" + terminate13 ctx (Error_Misc reason) AlertLevel_Fatal UnexpectedMessage reason --- after receiving a client hello, we need to redo a handshake -handshakeServer :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -handshakeServer ctx = do - hss <- recvPacketHandshake ctx - case hss of - [ch] -> handshakeServerWith ctx ch - _ -> fail ("unexpected handshake received, excepting client hello and received " ++ show hss) +-- the other side could have close the connection already, so wrap +-- this in a try and ignore all exceptions +tryBye :: Context -> IO () +tryBye ctx = catchException (bye_ ctx) (\_ -> return ()) --- | Handshake for a new TLS connection --- This is to be called at the beginning of a connection, and during renegotiation -handshake :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m () -handshake ctx = do - cc <- usingState_ ctx (stClientContext <$> get) - liftIO $ handleException $ if cc then handshakeClient ctx else handshakeServer ctx - where - handleException f = catch f $ \exception -> do - let tlserror = maybe (Error_Misc $ show exception) id $ fromException exception - setEstablished ctx False - sendPacket ctx (errorToAlert tlserror) - handshakeFailed tlserror +onError + :: Monad m + => (TLSError -> AlertLevel -> AlertDescription -> String -> m ByteString) + -> TLSError + -> m ByteString +onError _ Error_EOF = + -- Not really an error. + return B.empty +onError terminate err = terminate err lvl ad reason + where + (lvl, ad) = errorToAlert err + reason = errorToAlertMessage err --- | sendData sends a bunch of data. --- It will automatically chunk data to acceptable packet size -sendData :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> L.ByteString -> m () -sendData ctx dataToSend = checkValid ctx >> mapM_ sendDataChunk (L.toChunks dataToSend) - where sendDataChunk d - | B.length d > 16384 = do - let (sending, remain) = B.splitAt 16384 d - sendPacket ctx $ AppData sending - sendDataChunk remain - | otherwise = sendPacket ctx $ AppData d +terminateWithWriteLock + :: Context + -> ([(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] -> IO ()) + -> TLSError + -> AlertLevel + -> AlertDescription + -> String + -> IO a +terminateWithWriteLock ctx send err level desc reason = withWriteLock ctx $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + unless tls13 $ do + -- TLS 1.2 uses the same session ID and session data + -- for all resumed sessions. + -- + -- TLS 1.3 changes session data for every resumed session. + session <- usingState_ ctx getSession + case session of + Session Nothing -> return () + Session (Just sid) -> + -- calling even session ticket manager anyway + sessionInvalidate (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) sid + catchException (send [(level, desc)]) (\_ -> return ()) + setEOF ctx + debugError (ctxDebug ctx) reason + E.throwIO (Terminated False reason err) --- | recvData get data out of Data packet, and automatically renegotiate if --- a Handshake ClientHello is received -recvData :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m B.ByteString -recvData ctx = do - checkValid ctx - pkt <- recvPacket ctx - case pkt of - -- on server context receiving a client hello == renegotiation - Right (Handshake [ch@(ClientHello _ _ _ _ _ _)]) -> - handshakeServerWith ctx ch >> recvData ctx - -- on client context, receiving a hello request == renegotiation - Right (Handshake [HelloRequest]) -> - handshakeClient ctx >> recvData ctx - Right (Alert [(AlertLevel_Fatal, _)]) -> do - setEOF ctx - return B.empty - Right (Alert [(AlertLevel_Warning, CloseNotify)]) -> do - setEOF ctx - return B.empty - Right (AppData x) -> return x - Right p -> error ("error unexpected packet: " ++ show p) - Left err -> error ("error received: " ++ show err) +{-# DEPRECATED recvData' "use recvData that returns strict bytestring" #-} -recvData' :: MonadIO m => TLSCtx c -> m L.ByteString -recvData' ctx = recvData ctx >>= return . L.fromChunks . (:[]) +-- | same as recvData but returns a lazy bytestring. +recvData' :: MonadIO m => Context -> m L.ByteString +recvData' ctx = L.fromChunks . (: []) <$> recvData ctx diff --git a/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs b/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Credentials.hs @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-} + +module Network.TLS.Credentials ( + Credential, + Credentials (..), + credentialLoadX509, + credentialLoadX509FromMemory, + credentialLoadX509Chain, + credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemory, + credentialsFindForSigning, + credentialsFindForDecrypting, + credentialsListSigningAlgorithms, + credentialPublicPrivateKeys, + credentialMatchesHashSignatures, +) where + +import Data.X509 +import qualified Data.X509 as X509 +import Data.X509.File +import Data.X509.Memory + +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Imports +import qualified Network.TLS.Struct as TLS +import Network.TLS.X509 + +type Credential = (CertificateChain, PrivKey) + +newtype Credentials = Credentials [Credential] deriving (Show) + +instance Semigroup Credentials where + Credentials l1 <> Credentials l2 = Credentials (l1 ++ l2) + +instance Monoid Credentials where + mempty = Credentials [] +#if !(MIN_VERSION_base(4,11,0)) + mappend (Credentials l1) (Credentials l2) = Credentials (l1 ++ l2) +#endif + +-- | try to create a new credential object from a public certificate +-- and the associated private key that are stored on the filesystem +-- in PEM format. +credentialLoadX509 + :: FilePath + -- ^ public certificate (X.509 format) + -> FilePath + -- ^ private key associated + -> IO (Either String Credential) +credentialLoadX509 certFile = credentialLoadX509Chain certFile [] + +-- | similar to 'credentialLoadX509' but take the certificate +-- and private key from memory instead of from the filesystem. +credentialLoadX509FromMemory + :: ByteString + -> ByteString + -> Either String Credential +credentialLoadX509FromMemory certData = + credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemory certData [] + +-- | similar to 'credentialLoadX509' but also allow specifying chain +-- certificates. +credentialLoadX509Chain + :: FilePath + -- ^ public certificate (X.509 format) + -> [FilePath] + -- ^ chain certificates (X.509 format) + -> FilePath + -- ^ private key associated + -> IO (Either String Credential) +credentialLoadX509Chain certFile chainFiles privateFile = do + x509 <- readSignedObject certFile + chains <- mapM readSignedObject chainFiles + keys <- readKeyFile privateFile + case keys of + [] -> return $ Left "no keys found" + (k : _) -> return $ Right (CertificateChain . concat $ x509 : chains, k) + +-- | similar to 'credentialLoadX509FromMemory' but also allow +-- specifying chain certificates. +credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemory + :: ByteString + -> [ByteString] + -> ByteString + -> Either String Credential +credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemory certData chainData privateData = + let x509 = readSignedObjectFromMemory certData + chains = map readSignedObjectFromMemory chainData + keys = readKeyFileFromMemory privateData + in case keys of + [] -> Left "no keys found" + (k : _) -> Right (CertificateChain . concat $ x509 : chains, k) + +credentialsListSigningAlgorithms :: Credentials -> [KeyExchangeSignatureAlg] +credentialsListSigningAlgorithms (Credentials l) = mapMaybe credentialCanSign l + +credentialsFindForSigning + :: KeyExchangeSignatureAlg -> Credentials -> Maybe Credential +credentialsFindForSigning kxsAlg (Credentials l) = find forSigning l + where + forSigning cred = case credentialCanSign cred of + Nothing -> False + Just kxs -> kxs == kxsAlg + +credentialsFindForDecrypting :: Credentials -> Maybe Credential +credentialsFindForDecrypting (Credentials l) = find forEncrypting l + where + forEncrypting cred = Just () == credentialCanDecrypt cred + +-- here we assume that only RSA is supported for key encipherment (encryption/decryption) +-- we keep the same construction as 'credentialCanSign', returning a Maybe of () in case +-- this change in future. +credentialCanDecrypt :: Credential -> Maybe () +credentialCanDecrypt (chain, priv) = + case (pub, priv) of + (PubKeyRSA _, PrivKeyRSA _) -> + case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of + Nothing -> Just () + Just (ExtKeyUsage flags) + | KeyUsage_keyEncipherment `elem` flags -> Just () + | otherwise -> Nothing + _ -> Nothing + where + cert = getCertificate signed + pub = certPubKey cert + signed = getCertificateChainLeaf chain + +credentialCanSign :: Credential -> Maybe KeyExchangeSignatureAlg +credentialCanSign (chain, priv) = + case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of + Nothing -> findKeyExchangeSignatureAlg (pub, priv) + Just (ExtKeyUsage flags) + | KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` flags -> + findKeyExchangeSignatureAlg (pub, priv) + | otherwise -> Nothing + where + cert = getCertificate signed + pub = certPubKey cert + signed = getCertificateChainLeaf chain + +credentialPublicPrivateKeys :: Credential -> (PubKey, PrivKey) +credentialPublicPrivateKeys (chain, priv) = pub `seq` (pub, priv) + where + cert = getCertificate signed + pub = certPubKey cert + signed = getCertificateChainLeaf chain + +getHashSignature :: SignedCertificate -> Maybe TLS.HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +getHashSignature signed = + case signedAlg $ getSigned signed of + SignatureALG hashAlg PubKeyALG_RSA -> convertHash TLS.SignatureRSA hashAlg + SignatureALG hashAlg PubKeyALG_DSA -> convertHash TLS.SignatureDSA hashAlg + SignatureALG hashAlg PubKeyALG_EC -> convertHash TLS.SignatureECDSA hashAlg + SignatureALG X509.HashSHA256 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) + SignatureALG X509.HashSHA384 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) + SignatureALG X509.HashSHA512 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) + SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519 -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureEd25519) + SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448 -> Just (TLS.HashIntrinsic, TLS.SignatureEd448) + _ -> Nothing + where + convertHash sig X509.HashMD5 = Just (TLS.HashMD5, sig) + convertHash sig X509.HashSHA1 = Just (TLS.HashSHA1, sig) + convertHash sig X509.HashSHA224 = Just (TLS.HashSHA224, sig) + convertHash sig X509.HashSHA256 = Just (TLS.HashSHA256, sig) + convertHash sig X509.HashSHA384 = Just (TLS.HashSHA384, sig) + convertHash sig X509.HashSHA512 = Just (TLS.HashSHA512, sig) + convertHash _ _ = Nothing + +-- | Checks whether certificate signatures in the chain comply with a list of +-- hash/signature algorithm pairs. Currently the verification applies only to +-- the signature of the leaf certificate, and when not self-signed. This may +-- be extended to additional chain elements in the future. +credentialMatchesHashSignatures + :: [TLS.HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] -> Credential -> Bool +credentialMatchesHashSignatures hashSigs (chain, _) = + case chain of + CertificateChain [] -> True + CertificateChain (leaf : _) -> isSelfSigned leaf || matchHashSig leaf + where + matchHashSig signed = case getHashSignature signed of + Nothing -> False + Just hs -> hs `elem` hashSigs + + isSelfSigned signed = + let cert = getCertificate signed + in certSubjectDN cert == certIssuerDN cert diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto.hs @@ -1,105 +1,502 @@ -{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} -module Network.TLS.Crypto - ( HashCtx(..) - , hashInit - , hashUpdate - , hashUpdateSSL - , hashFinal +{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-} +{-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} - -- * constructor - , hashMD5SHA1 - , hashSHA256 +module Network.TLS.Crypto ( + HashContext, + HashCtx, + hashInit, + hashUpdate, + hashUpdates, + hashUpdateSSL, + hashFinal, + module Network.TLS.Crypto.DH, + module Network.TLS.Crypto.IES, + module Network.TLS.Crypto.Types, - -- * key exchange generic interface - , PublicKey(..) - , PrivateKey(..) - , kxEncrypt - , kxDecrypt - , KxError(..) - ) where + -- * Hash + hash, + hashChunks, + Hash (..), + hashName, + hashDigestSize, + hashBlockSize, -import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA256 as SHA256 -import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA1 as SHA1 -import qualified Crypto.Hash.MD5 as MD5 + -- * key exchange generic interface + PubKey (..), + PrivKey (..), + PublicKey, + PrivateKey, + SignatureParams (..), + isKeyExchangeSignatureKey, + findKeyExchangeSignatureAlg, + findFiniteFieldGroup, + findEllipticCurveGroup, + kxEncrypt, + kxDecrypt, + kxSign, + kxVerify, + kxCanUseRSApkcs1, + kxCanUseRSApss, + kxSupportedPrivKeyEC, + KxError (..), + RSAEncoding (..), +) where + +import qualified Crypto.ECC as ECDSA +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Crypto.Hash as H +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DSA as DSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECDSA_ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS +import Crypto.Random +import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding (BER (..), DER (..)) +import Data.ASN1.Encoding +import Data.ASN1.Types +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes, convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Crypto.Cipher.RSA as RSA -import Crypto.Random (CryptoRandomGen) +import Data.Proxy +import Data.X509 ( + PrivKey (..), + PrivKeyEC (..), + PubKey (..), + PubKeyEC (..), + SerializedPoint (..), + ) +import Data.X509.EC (ecPrivKeyCurveName, ecPubKeyCurveName, unserializePoint) -data PublicKey = PubRSA RSA.PublicKey +import Network.TLS.Crypto.DH +import Network.TLS.Crypto.IES +import Network.TLS.Crypto.Types +import Network.TLS.Imports -data PrivateKey = PrivRSA RSA.PrivateKey +---------------------------------------------------------------- -instance Show PublicKey where - show (_) = "PublicKey(..)" +{-# DEPRECATED PublicKey "use PubKey" #-} +type PublicKey = PubKey +{-# DEPRECATED PrivateKey "use PrivKey" #-} +type PrivateKey = PrivKey -instance Show PrivateKey where - show (_) = "privateKey(..)" +data KxError + = RSAError RSA.Error + | KxUnsupported + deriving (Show) -data KxError = RSAError RSA.Error - deriving (Show) +isKeyExchangeSignatureKey :: KeyExchangeSignatureAlg -> PubKey -> Bool +isKeyExchangeSignatureKey = f + where + f KX_RSA (PubKeyRSA _) = True + f KX_DSA (PubKeyDSA _) = True + f KX_ECDSA (PubKeyEC _) = True + f KX_ECDSA (PubKeyEd25519 _) = True + f KX_ECDSA (PubKeyEd448 _) = True + f _ _ = False -data KeyXchg = - KxRSA RSA.PublicKey RSA.PrivateKey - deriving (Show) +findKeyExchangeSignatureAlg + :: (PubKey, PrivKey) -> Maybe KeyExchangeSignatureAlg +findKeyExchangeSignatureAlg keyPair = + case keyPair of + (PubKeyRSA _, PrivKeyRSA _) -> Just KX_RSA + (PubKeyDSA _, PrivKeyDSA _) -> Just KX_DSA + (PubKeyEC _, PrivKeyEC _) -> Just KX_ECDSA + (PubKeyEd25519 _, PrivKeyEd25519 _) -> Just KX_ECDSA + (PubKeyEd448 _, PrivKeyEd448 _) -> Just KX_ECDSA + _ -> Nothing -class HashCtxC a where - hashCName :: a -> String - hashCInit :: a -> a - hashCUpdate :: a -> B.ByteString -> a - hashCUpdateSSL :: a -> (B.ByteString,B.ByteString) -> a - hashCFinal :: a -> B.ByteString +findFiniteFieldGroup :: DH.Params -> Maybe Group +findFiniteFieldGroup params = lookup (pg params) table + where + pg (DH.Params p g _) = (p, g) -data HashCtx = forall h . HashCtxC h => HashCtx h + table = + [ (pg prms, grp) + | grp <- availableFFGroups + , let prms = fromJust $ dhParamsForGroup grp + ] -instance Show HashCtx where - show (HashCtx c) = hashCName c +findEllipticCurveGroup :: PubKeyEC -> Maybe Group +findEllipticCurveGroup ecPub = + case ecPubKeyCurveName ecPub of + Just ECC.SEC_p256r1 -> Just P256 + Just ECC.SEC_p384r1 -> Just P384 + Just ECC.SEC_p521r1 -> Just P521 + _ -> Nothing -{- MD5 & SHA1 joined -} -data HashMD5SHA1 = HashMD5SHA1 SHA1.Ctx MD5.Ctx +-- functions to use the hidden class. +hashInit :: Hash -> HashContext +hashInit MD5 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.MD5) +hashInit SHA1 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.SHA1) +hashInit SHA224 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.SHA224) +hashInit SHA256 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.SHA256) +hashInit SHA384 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.SHA384) +hashInit SHA512 = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashInit :: H.Context H.SHA512) +hashInit SHA1_MD5 = HashContextSSL H.hashInit H.hashInit -instance HashCtxC HashMD5SHA1 where - hashCName _ = "MD5-SHA1" - hashCInit _ = HashMD5SHA1 SHA1.init MD5.init - hashCUpdate (HashMD5SHA1 sha1ctx md5ctx) b = HashMD5SHA1 (SHA1.update sha1ctx b) (MD5.update md5ctx b) - hashCUpdateSSL (HashMD5SHA1 sha1ctx md5ctx) (b1,b2) = HashMD5SHA1 (SHA1.update sha1ctx b2) (MD5.update md5ctx b1) - hashCFinal (HashMD5SHA1 sha1ctx md5ctx) = B.concat [MD5.finalize md5ctx, SHA1.finalize sha1ctx] +hashUpdate :: HashContext -> ByteString -> HashCtx +hashUpdate (HashContext (ContextSimple h)) b = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashUpdate h b) +hashUpdate (HashContextSSL sha1Ctx md5Ctx) b = + HashContextSSL (H.hashUpdate sha1Ctx b) (H.hashUpdate md5Ctx b) -data HashSHA256 = HashSHA256 SHA256.Ctx +hashUpdates :: HashContext -> [ByteString] -> HashCtx +hashUpdates (HashContext (ContextSimple h)) xs = HashContext $ ContextSimple (H.hashUpdates h xs) +hashUpdates (HashContextSSL sha1Ctx md5Ctx) xs = + HashContextSSL (H.hashUpdates sha1Ctx xs) (H.hashUpdates md5Ctx xs) -instance HashCtxC HashSHA256 where - hashCName _ = "SHA256" - hashCInit _ = HashSHA256 SHA256.init - hashCUpdate (HashSHA256 ctx) b = HashSHA256 (SHA256.update ctx b) - hashCUpdateSSL _ _ = undefined - hashCFinal (HashSHA256 ctx) = SHA256.finalize ctx +hashChunks :: Hash -> [ByteString] -> ByteString +hashChunks h xs = hashFinal $ hashUpdates (hashInit h) xs --- functions to use the hidden class. -hashInit :: HashCtx -> HashCtx -hashInit (HashCtx h) = HashCtx $ hashCInit h +hashUpdateSSL + :: HashCtx + -> (ByteString, ByteString) + -- ^ (for the md5 context, for the sha1 context) + -> HashCtx +hashUpdateSSL (HashContext _) _ = error "internal error: update SSL without a SSL Context" +hashUpdateSSL (HashContextSSL sha1Ctx md5Ctx) (b1, b2) = + HashContextSSL (H.hashUpdate sha1Ctx b2) (H.hashUpdate md5Ctx b1) -hashUpdate :: HashCtx -> B.ByteString -> HashCtx -hashUpdate (HashCtx h) b = HashCtx $ hashCUpdate h b +hashFinal :: HashCtx -> ByteString +hashFinal (HashContext (ContextSimple h)) = convert $ H.hashFinalize h +hashFinal (HashContextSSL sha1Ctx md5Ctx) = + B.concat [convert (H.hashFinalize md5Ctx), convert (H.hashFinalize sha1Ctx)] -hashUpdateSSL :: HashCtx -> (B.ByteString,B.ByteString) -> HashCtx -hashUpdateSSL (HashCtx h) bs = HashCtx $ hashCUpdateSSL h bs +data Hash = MD5 | SHA1 | SHA224 | SHA256 | SHA384 | SHA512 | SHA1_MD5 + deriving (Show, Eq) -hashFinal :: HashCtx -> B.ByteString -hashFinal (HashCtx h) = hashCFinal h +data HashContext + = HashContext ContextSimple + | HashContextSSL (H.Context H.SHA1) (H.Context H.MD5) --- real hash constructors -hashMD5SHA1, hashSHA256 :: HashCtx -hashMD5SHA1 = HashCtx (HashMD5SHA1 SHA1.init MD5.init) -hashSHA256 = HashCtx (HashSHA256 SHA256.init) +instance Show HashContext where + show _ = "hash-context" +data ContextSimple + = forall alg. H.HashAlgorithm alg => ContextSimple (H.Context alg) + +type HashCtx = HashContext + +hash :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Hash -> ba -> ba +hash MD5 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.MD5) +hash SHA1 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.SHA1) +hash SHA224 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.SHA224) +hash SHA256 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.SHA256) +hash SHA384 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.SHA384) +hash SHA512 b = convert (H.hash b :: H.Digest H.SHA512) +hash SHA1_MD5 b = BA.concat [hash MD5 b, hash SHA1 b] + +hashName :: Hash -> String +hashName = show + +-- | Digest size in bytes. +hashDigestSize :: Hash -> Int +hashDigestSize MD5 = 16 +hashDigestSize SHA1 = 20 +hashDigestSize SHA224 = 28 +hashDigestSize SHA256 = 32 +hashDigestSize SHA384 = 48 +hashDigestSize SHA512 = 64 +hashDigestSize SHA1_MD5 = 36 + +hashBlockSize :: Hash -> Int +hashBlockSize MD5 = 64 +hashBlockSize SHA1 = 64 +hashBlockSize SHA224 = 64 +hashBlockSize SHA256 = 64 +hashBlockSize SHA384 = 128 +hashBlockSize SHA512 = 128 +hashBlockSize SHA1_MD5 = 64 + {- key exchange methods encrypt and decrypt for each supported algorithm -} + generalizeRSAError :: Either RSA.Error a -> Either KxError a -generalizeRSAError (Left e) = Left (RSAError e) +generalizeRSAError (Left e) = Left (RSAError e) generalizeRSAError (Right x) = Right x -kxEncrypt :: CryptoRandomGen g => g -> PublicKey -> ByteString -> Either KxError (ByteString, g) -kxEncrypt g (PubRSA pk) b = generalizeRSAError $ RSA.encrypt g pk b +kxEncrypt + :: MonadRandom r => PublicKey -> ScrubbedBytes -> r (Either KxError ByteString) +kxEncrypt (PubKeyRSA pk) b = generalizeRSAError <$> RSA.encrypt pk b +kxEncrypt _ _ = return (Left KxUnsupported) -kxDecrypt :: PrivateKey -> ByteString -> Either KxError ByteString -kxDecrypt (PrivRSA pk) b = generalizeRSAError $ RSA.decrypt pk b +kxDecrypt + :: MonadRandom r => PrivateKey -> ByteString -> r (Either KxError ScrubbedBytes) +kxDecrypt (PrivKeyRSA pk) b = generalizeRSAError <$> RSA.decryptSafer pk b +kxDecrypt _ _ = return (Left KxUnsupported) + +data RSAEncoding = RSApkcs1 | RSApss deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Test the RSASSA-PKCS1 length condition described in RFC 8017 section 9.2, +-- i.e. @emLen >= tLen + 11@. Lengths are in bytes. +kxCanUseRSApkcs1 :: RSA.PublicKey -> Hash -> Bool +kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk h = RSA.public_size pk >= tLen + 11 + where + tLen = prefixSize h + hashDigestSize h + + prefixSize MD5 = 18 + prefixSize SHA1 = 15 + prefixSize SHA224 = 19 + prefixSize SHA256 = 19 + prefixSize SHA384 = 19 + prefixSize SHA512 = 19 + prefixSize _ = error (show h ++ " is not supported for RSASSA-PKCS1") + +-- | Test the RSASSA-PSS length condition described in RFC 8017 section 9.1.1, +-- i.e. @emBits >= 8hLen + 8sLen + 9@. Lengths are in bits. +kxCanUseRSApss :: RSA.PublicKey -> Hash -> Bool +kxCanUseRSApss pk h = numBits (RSA.public_n pk) >= 16 * hashDigestSize h + 10 + +-- Signature algorithm and associated parameters. +-- +-- FIXME add RSAPSSParams +data SignatureParams + = RSAParams Hash RSAEncoding + | DSAParams + | ECDSAParams Hash + | Ed25519Params + | Ed448Params + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- Verify that the signature matches the given message, using the +-- public key. +-- + +kxVerify :: PublicKey -> SignatureParams -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool +kxVerify (PubKeyRSA pk) (RSAParams alg RSApkcs1) msg sign = rsaVerifyHash alg pk msg sign +kxVerify (PubKeyRSA pk) (RSAParams alg RSApss) msg sign = rsapssVerifyHash alg pk msg sign +kxVerify (PubKeyDSA pk) DSAParams msg signBS = + case dsaToSignature signBS of + Just sig -> DSA.verify H.SHA1 pk sig msg + _ -> False + where + dsaToSignature :: ByteString -> Maybe DSA.Signature + dsaToSignature b = + case decodeASN1' BER b of + Left _ -> Nothing + Right asn1 -> + case asn1 of + Start Sequence : IntVal r : IntVal s : End Sequence : _ -> + Just DSA.Signature{DSA.sign_r = r, DSA.sign_s = s} + _ -> + Nothing +kxVerify (PubKeyEC key) (ECDSAParams alg) msg sigBS = + fromMaybe False $ + join $ + withPubKeyEC key verifyProxy verifyClassic Nothing + where + decodeSignatureASN1 buildRS = + case decodeASN1' BER sigBS of + Left _ -> Nothing + Right [Start Sequence, IntVal r, IntVal s, End Sequence] -> + Just (buildRS r s) + Right _ -> Nothing + verifyProxy prx pubkey = do + rs <- decodeSignatureASN1 (,) + signature <- maybeCryptoError $ ECDSA.signatureFromIntegers prx rs + verifyF <- withAlg (ECDSA.verify prx) + return $ verifyF pubkey signature msg + verifyClassic pubkey = do + signature <- decodeSignatureASN1 ECDSA_ECC.Signature + verifyF <- withAlg ECDSA_ECC.verify + return $ verifyF pubkey signature msg + withAlg :: (forall hash. H.HashAlgorithm hash => hash -> a) -> Maybe a + withAlg f = case alg of + MD5 -> Just (f H.MD5) + SHA1 -> Just (f H.SHA1) + SHA224 -> Just (f H.SHA224) + SHA256 -> Just (f H.SHA256) + SHA384 -> Just (f H.SHA384) + SHA512 -> Just (f H.SHA512) + _ -> Nothing +kxVerify (PubKeyEd25519 key) Ed25519Params msg sigBS = + case Ed25519.signature sigBS of + CryptoPassed sig -> Ed25519.verify key msg sig + _ -> False +kxVerify (PubKeyEd448 key) Ed448Params msg sigBS = + case Ed448.signature sigBS of + CryptoPassed sig -> Ed448.verify key msg sig + _ -> False +kxVerify _ _ _ _ = False + +-- Sign the given message using the private key. +-- +kxSign + :: MonadRandom r + => PrivateKey + -> PublicKey + -> SignatureParams + -> ByteString + -> r (Either KxError ByteString) +kxSign (PrivKeyRSA pk) (PubKeyRSA _) (RSAParams hashAlg RSApkcs1) msg = + generalizeRSAError <$> rsaSignHash hashAlg pk msg +kxSign (PrivKeyRSA pk) (PubKeyRSA _) (RSAParams hashAlg RSApss) msg = + generalizeRSAError <$> rsapssSignHash hashAlg pk msg +kxSign (PrivKeyDSA pk) (PubKeyDSA _) DSAParams msg = do + sign <- DSA.sign pk H.SHA1 msg + return (Right $ encodeASN1' DER $ dsaSequence sign) + where + dsaSequence sign = + [ Start Sequence + , IntVal (DSA.sign_r sign) + , IntVal (DSA.sign_s sign) + , End Sequence + ] +kxSign (PrivKeyEC pk) (PubKeyEC _) (ECDSAParams hashAlg) msg = + case withPrivKeyEC pk doSign (const unsupported) unsupported of + Nothing -> unsupported + Just run -> fmap encode <$> run + where + encode (r, s) = + encodeASN1' + DER + [Start Sequence, IntVal r, IntVal s, End Sequence] + doSign prx privkey = do + msig <- ecdsaSignHash prx hashAlg privkey msg + return $ case msig of + Nothing -> Left KxUnsupported + Just sign -> Right (ECDSA.signatureToIntegers prx sign) + unsupported = return $ Left KxUnsupported +kxSign (PrivKeyEd25519 pk) (PubKeyEd25519 pub) Ed25519Params msg = + return $ Right $ convert $ Ed25519.sign pk pub msg +kxSign (PrivKeyEd448 pk) (PubKeyEd448 pub) Ed448Params msg = + return $ Right $ convert $ Ed448.sign pk pub msg +kxSign _ _ _ _ = + return (Left KxUnsupported) + +rsaSignHash + :: MonadRandom m + => Hash + -> RSA.PrivateKey + -> ByteString + -> m (Either RSA.Error ByteString) +rsaSignHash SHA1_MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSafer noHash pk msg +rsaSignHash MD5 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.MD5) pk msg +rsaSignHash SHA1 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA1) pk msg +rsaSignHash SHA224 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA224) pk msg +rsaSignHash SHA256 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA256) pk msg +rsaSignHash SHA384 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA384) pk msg +rsaSignHash SHA512 pk msg = RSA.signSafer (Just H.SHA512) pk msg + +rsapssSignHash + :: MonadRandom m + => Hash + -> RSA.PrivateKey + -> ByteString + -> m (Either RSA.Error ByteString) +rsapssSignHash SHA256 pk msg = PSS.signSafer (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA256) pk msg +rsapssSignHash SHA384 pk msg = PSS.signSafer (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA384) pk msg +rsapssSignHash SHA512 pk msg = PSS.signSafer (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA512) pk msg +rsapssSignHash _ _ _ = error "rsapssSignHash: unsupported hash" + +rsaVerifyHash :: Hash -> RSA.PublicKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool +rsaVerifyHash SHA1_MD5 = RSA.verify noHash +rsaVerifyHash MD5 = RSA.verify (Just H.MD5) +rsaVerifyHash SHA1 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA1) +rsaVerifyHash SHA224 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA224) +rsaVerifyHash SHA256 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA256) +rsaVerifyHash SHA384 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA384) +rsaVerifyHash SHA512 = RSA.verify (Just H.SHA512) + +rsapssVerifyHash :: Hash -> RSA.PublicKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool +rsapssVerifyHash SHA256 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA256) +rsapssVerifyHash SHA384 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA384) +rsapssVerifyHash SHA512 = PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams H.SHA512) +rsapssVerifyHash _ = error "rsapssVerifyHash: unsupported hash" + +noHash :: Maybe H.MD5 +noHash = Nothing + +ecdsaSignHash + :: (MonadRandom m, ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve) + => proxy curve + -> Hash + -> ECDSA.Scalar curve + -> ByteString + -> m (Maybe (ECDSA.Signature curve)) +ecdsaSignHash prx SHA1 pk msg = Just <$> ECDSA.sign prx pk H.SHA1 msg +ecdsaSignHash prx SHA224 pk msg = Just <$> ECDSA.sign prx pk H.SHA224 msg +ecdsaSignHash prx SHA256 pk msg = Just <$> ECDSA.sign prx pk H.SHA256 msg +ecdsaSignHash prx SHA384 pk msg = Just <$> ECDSA.sign prx pk H.SHA384 msg +ecdsaSignHash prx SHA512 pk msg = Just <$> ECDSA.sign prx pk H.SHA512 msg +ecdsaSignHash _ _ _ _ = return Nothing + +-- Currently we generate ECDSA signatures in constant time for P256 only. +kxSupportedPrivKeyEC :: PrivKeyEC -> Bool +kxSupportedPrivKeyEC privkey = + case ecPrivKeyCurveName privkey of + Just ECC.SEC_p256r1 -> True + Just ECC.SEC_p384r1 -> True + Just ECC.SEC_p521r1 -> True + _ -> False + +-- Perform a public-key operation with a parameterized ECC implementation when +-- available, otherwise fallback to the classic ECC implementation. +withPubKeyEC + :: PubKeyEC + -> ( forall curve + . ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => Proxy curve + -> ECDSA.PublicKey curve + -> a + ) + -> (ECDSA_ECC.PublicKey -> a) + -> a + -> Maybe a +withPubKeyEC pubkey withProxy withClassic whenUnknown = + case ecPubKeyCurveName pubkey of + Nothing -> Just whenUnknown + Just ECC.SEC_p256r1 -> + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p256 <$> ECDSA.decodePublic p256 bs + Just ECC.SEC_p384r1 -> + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p384 <$> ECDSA.decodePublic p384 bs + Just ECC.SEC_p521r1 -> + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p521 <$> ECDSA.decodePublic p521 bs + Just curveName -> + let curve = ECC.getCurveByName curveName + pub = unserializePoint curve pt + in withClassic . ECDSA_ECC.PublicKey curve <$> pub + where + pt@(SerializedPoint bs) = pubkeyEC_pub pubkey + +-- Perform a private-key operation with a parameterized ECC implementation when +-- available. Calls for an unsupported curve can be prevented with +-- kxSupportedEcPrivKey. +withPrivKeyEC + :: PrivKeyEC + -> ( forall curve + . ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => Proxy curve + -> ECDSA.PrivateKey curve + -> a + ) + -> (ECC.CurveName -> a) + -> a + -> Maybe a +withPrivKeyEC privkey withProxy withUnsupported whenUnknown = + case ecPrivKeyCurveName privkey of + Nothing -> Just whenUnknown + Just ECC.SEC_p256r1 -> + -- Private key should rather be stored as bytearray and converted + -- using ECDSA.decodePrivate, unfortunately the data type chosen in + -- x509 was Integer. + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p256 <$> ECDSA.scalarFromInteger p256 d + Just ECC.SEC_p384r1 -> + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p384 <$> ECDSA.scalarFromInteger p384 d + Just ECC.SEC_p521r1 -> + maybeCryptoError $ withProxy p521 <$> ECDSA.scalarFromInteger p521 d + Just curveName -> Just $ withUnsupported curveName + where + d = privkeyEC_priv privkey + +p256 :: Proxy ECDSA.Curve_P256R1 +p256 = Proxy +p384 :: Proxy ECDSA.Curve_P384R1 +p384 = Proxy +p521 :: Proxy ECDSA.Curve_P521R1 +p521 = Proxy diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto/DH.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto/DH.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto/DH.hs @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +module Network.TLS.Crypto.DH ( + -- * DH types + DHParams, + DHPublic, + DHPrivate, + DHKey, + + -- * DH methods + dhPublic, + dhPrivate, + dhParams, + dhParamsGetP, + dhParamsGetG, + dhParamsGetBits, + dhGenerateKeyPair, + dhGetShared, + dhValid, + dhUnwrap, + dhUnwrapPublic, +) where + +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH +import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA + +import Network.TLS.RNG + +type DHPublic = DH.PublicNumber +type DHPrivate = DH.PrivateNumber +type DHParams = DH.Params +type DHKey = ScrubbedBytes + +dhPublic :: Integer -> DHPublic +dhPublic = DH.PublicNumber + +dhPrivate :: Integer -> DHPrivate +dhPrivate = DH.PrivateNumber + +dhParams :: Integer -> Integer -> DHParams +dhParams p g = DH.Params p g (numBits p) + +dhGenerateKeyPair :: MonadRandom r => DHParams -> r (DHPrivate, DHPublic) +dhGenerateKeyPair params = do + priv <- DH.generatePrivate params + let pub = DH.calculatePublic params priv + return (priv, pub) + +dhGetShared :: DHParams -> DHPrivate -> DHPublic -> DHKey +dhGetShared params priv pub = stripLeadingZeros sec + where + DH.SharedKey sec = DH.getShared params priv pub + -- strips leading zeros from the result of DH.getShared, as required + -- for DH(E) pre-main secret in SSL/TLS before version 1.3. + stripLeadingZeros sb = snd $ BA.span (== 0) sb + +-- Check that group element in not in the 2-element subgroup { 1, p - 1 }. +-- See RFC 7919 section 3 and NIST SP 56A rev 2 section 5.6.2.3.1. +-- This verification is enough when using a safe prime. +dhValid :: DHParams -> Integer -> Bool +dhValid (DH.Params p _ _) y = 1 < y && y < p - 1 + +dhUnwrap :: DHParams -> DHPublic -> [Integer] +dhUnwrap (DH.Params p g _) (DH.PublicNumber y) = [p, g, y] + +dhParamsGetP :: DHParams -> Integer +dhParamsGetP (DH.Params p _ _) = p + +dhParamsGetG :: DHParams -> Integer +dhParamsGetG (DH.Params _ g _) = g + +dhParamsGetBits :: DHParams -> Int +dhParamsGetBits (DH.Params _ _ b) = b + +dhUnwrapPublic :: DHPublic -> Integer +dhUnwrapPublic (DH.PublicNumber y) = y diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto/IES.hs @@ -0,0 +1,525 @@ +-- | (Elliptic Curve) Integrated Encryption Scheme +-- KEM(Key Encapsulation Mechanism) based APIs +-- +-- Module : Network.TLS.Crypto.IES +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Kazu Yamamoto +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +module Network.TLS.Crypto.IES ( + GroupPublicA, + GroupPublicB, + GroupPrivate, + GroupKey, + + -- * Group methods + groupGenerateKeyPair, + groupEncapsulate, + groupDecapsulate, + groupEncodePublicA, + groupDecodePublicA, + groupEncodePublicB, + groupDecodePublicB, + + -- * Compatibility with 'Network.TLS.Crypto.DH' + dhParamsForGroup, + dhGroupGenerateKeyPair, + dhGroupGetPubShared, +) where + +import Control.Arrow +import Crypto.ECC as ECC +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Number.Generate +import Crypto.PubKey.DH (PrivateNumber (..), PublicNumber (..)) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH +import Crypto.PubKey.ECIES +import Crypto.PubKey.ML_KEM (ML_KEM_1024, ML_KEM_512, ML_KEM_768) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ML_KEM as ML +import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import Data.Proxy + +import Network.TLS.Crypto.Types +import Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.RNG +import Network.TLS.Util.Serialization (i2ospOf_, os2ip) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +data GroupPrivate + = GroupPri_P256 (Scalar Curve_P256R1) + | GroupPri_P384 (Scalar Curve_P384R1) + | GroupPri_P521 (Scalar Curve_P521R1) + | GroupPri_X255 (Scalar Curve_X25519) + | GroupPri_X448 (Scalar Curve_X448) + | GroupPri_FFDHE2048 PrivateNumber + | GroupPri_FFDHE3072 PrivateNumber + | GroupPri_FFDHE4096 PrivateNumber + | GroupPri_FFDHE6144 PrivateNumber + | GroupPri_FFDHE8192 PrivateNumber + | GroupPri_MLKEM512 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_512) + | GroupPri_MLKEM768 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPri_MLKEM1024 (ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_X25519, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (Scalar Curve_P256R1, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (Scalar Curve_P384R1, ML.DecapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + deriving (Eq, Show) +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +data GroupPublicA + = GroupPubA_P256 (Point Curve_P256R1) + | GroupPubA_P384 (Point Curve_P384R1) + | GroupPubA_P521 (Point Curve_P521R1) + | GroupPubA_X255 (Point Curve_X25519) + | GroupPubA_X448 (Point Curve_X448) + | GroupPubA_FFDHE2048 PublicNumber + | GroupPubA_FFDHE3072 PublicNumber + | GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 PublicNumber + | GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 PublicNumber + | GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 PublicNumber + | GroupPubA_MLKEM512 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_512) + | GroupPubA_MLKEM768 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 (ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.EncapsulationKey ML_KEM_1024) + deriving (Eq, Show) +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +data GroupPublicB + = GroupPubB_P256 (Point Curve_P256R1) + | GroupPubB_P384 (Point Curve_P384R1) + | GroupPubB_P521 (Point Curve_P521R1) + | GroupPubB_X255 (Point Curve_X25519) + | GroupPubB_X448 (Point Curve_X448) + | GroupPubB_FFDHE2048 PublicNumber + | GroupPubB_FFDHE3072 PublicNumber + | GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 PublicNumber + | GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 PublicNumber + | GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 PublicNumber + | GroupPubB_MLKEM512 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_512) + | GroupPubB_MLKEM768 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 (ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_1024) + | GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (Point Curve_X25519, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (Point Curve_P256R1, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_768) + | GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (Point Curve_P384R1, ML.Ciphertext ML_KEM_1024) + deriving (Eq, Show) +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +type GroupKey = ScrubbedBytes + +p256 :: Proxy Curve_P256R1 +p256 = Proxy + +p384 :: Proxy Curve_P384R1 +p384 = Proxy + +p521 :: Proxy Curve_P521R1 +p521 = Proxy + +x25519 :: Proxy Curve_X25519 +x25519 = Proxy + +x448 :: Proxy Curve_X448 +x448 = Proxy + +mlkem512 :: Proxy ML_KEM_512 +mlkem512 = Proxy + +mlkem768 :: Proxy ML_KEM_768 +mlkem768 = Proxy + +mlkem1024 :: Proxy ML_KEM_1024 +mlkem1024 = Proxy + +dhParamsForGroup :: Group -> Maybe DH.Params +dhParamsForGroup FFDHE2048 = Just ffdhe2048 +dhParamsForGroup FFDHE3072 = Just ffdhe3072 +dhParamsForGroup FFDHE4096 = Just ffdhe4096 +dhParamsForGroup FFDHE6144 = Just ffdhe6144 +dhParamsForGroup FFDHE8192 = Just ffdhe8192 +dhParamsForGroup _ = Nothing + +groupGenerateKeyPair :: MonadRandom r => Group -> r (GroupPrivate, GroupPublicA) +groupGenerateKeyPair P256 = + (GroupPri_P256, GroupPubA_P256) `fs` curveGenerateKeyPair p256 +groupGenerateKeyPair P384 = + (GroupPri_P384, GroupPubA_P384) `fs` curveGenerateKeyPair p384 +groupGenerateKeyPair P521 = + (GroupPri_P521, GroupPubA_P521) `fs` curveGenerateKeyPair p521 +groupGenerateKeyPair X25519 = + (GroupPri_X255, GroupPubA_X255) `fs` curveGenerateKeyPair x25519 +groupGenerateKeyPair X448 = + (GroupPri_X448, GroupPubA_X448) `fs` curveGenerateKeyPair x448 +groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE2048 = gen ffdhe2048 exp2048 GroupPri_FFDHE2048 GroupPubA_FFDHE2048 +groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE3072 = gen ffdhe3072 exp3072 GroupPri_FFDHE3072 GroupPubA_FFDHE3072 +groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE4096 = gen ffdhe4096 exp4096 GroupPri_FFDHE4096 GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 +groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE6144 = gen ffdhe6144 exp6144 GroupPri_FFDHE6144 GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 +groupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE8192 = gen ffdhe8192 exp8192 GroupPri_FFDHE8192 GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 +groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM512 = do + (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem512 + return (GroupPri_MLKEM512 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM512 e) +groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM768 = do + (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + return (GroupPri_MLKEM768 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM768 e) +groupGenerateKeyPair MLKEM1024 = do + (e, d) <- ML.generate mlkem1024 + return (GroupPri_MLKEM1024 d, GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 e) +groupGenerateKeyPair X25519MLKEM768 = do + (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair x25519 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + return (GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) +groupGenerateKeyPair P256MLKEM768 = do + (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair p256 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem768 + return (GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) +groupGenerateKeyPair P384MLKEM1024 = do + (d1, e1) <- fs' $ curveGenerateKeyPair p384 + (e2, d2) <- ML.generate mlkem1024 + return (GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (d1, d2), GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (e1, e2)) +groupGenerateKeyPair _ = error "groupGenerateKeyPair" + +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair + :: MonadRandom r => Group -> r (DH.Params, PrivateNumber, PublicNumber) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE2048 = addParams ffdhe2048 (gen' ffdhe2048 exp2048) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE3072 = addParams ffdhe3072 (gen' ffdhe3072 exp3072) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE4096 = addParams ffdhe4096 (gen' ffdhe4096 exp4096) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE6144 = addParams ffdhe6144 (gen' ffdhe6144 exp6144) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair FFDHE8192 = addParams ffdhe8192 (gen' ffdhe8192 exp8192) +dhGroupGenerateKeyPair grp = error ("invalid FFDHE group: " ++ show grp) + +addParams :: Functor f => DH.Params -> f (a, b) -> f (DH.Params, a, b) +addParams params = fmap $ \(a, b) -> (params, a, b) + +fs + :: MonadRandom r + => (Scalar a -> GroupPrivate, Point a -> GroupPublicA) + -> r (KeyPair a) + -> r (GroupPrivate, GroupPublicA) +(t1, t2) `fs` action = do + keypair <- action + let pub = keypairGetPublic keypair + pri = keypairGetPrivate keypair + return (t1 pri, t2 pub) + +fs' :: Monad m => m (KeyPair curve) -> m (Scalar curve, Point curve) +fs' action = do + keypair <- action + let pub = keypairGetPublic keypair + pri = keypairGetPrivate keypair + return (pri, pub) + +gen + :: MonadRandom r + => DH.Params + -> Int + -> (PrivateNumber -> GroupPrivate) + -> (PublicNumber -> GroupPublicA) + -> r (GroupPrivate, GroupPublicA) +gen params expBits priTag pubTag = (priTag *** pubTag) <$> gen' params expBits + +gen' + :: MonadRandom r + => DH.Params + -> Int + -> r (PrivateNumber, PublicNumber) +gen' params expBits = (id &&& DH.calculatePublic params) <$> generatePriv expBits + +groupEncapsulate + :: MonadRandom r => GroupPublicA -> r (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P256 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_P256 p256 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P384 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_P384 p384 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P521 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_P521 p521 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_X255 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_X255 x25519 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_X448 pub) = getECDHPubShared GroupPubB_X448 x448 pub +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE2048 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe2048 exp2048 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE2048 +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE3072 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe3072 exp3072 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE3072 +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe4096 exp4096 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe6144 exp6144 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 pub) = getDHPubShared ffdhe8192 exp8192 pub GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 pub) = do + (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub + return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 ct, convert sec) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 pub) = do + (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub + return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 ct, convert sec) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 pub) = do + (sec, ct) <- ML.encapsulate pub + return $ Just (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 ct, convert sec) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = do + (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' x25519 e1 + (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 + -- Sec 4.1: Specifically, the order of shares in the concatenation + -- has been reversed. + return $ Just (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (c1, c2), convert k2 <> k1) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (e1, e2)) = do + (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' p256 e1 + (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 + return $ Just (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (c1, c2), k1 <> convert k2) +groupEncapsulate (GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (e1, e2)) = do + (c1, k1) <- fromJust <$> getECDHPubShared' p384 e1 + (k2, c2) <- ML.encapsulate e2 + return $ Just (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (c1, c2), k1 <> convert k2) + +dhGroupGetPubShared + :: MonadRandom r => Group -> PublicNumber -> r (Maybe (PublicNumber, GroupKey)) +dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE2048 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe2048 exp2048 pub +dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE3072 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe3072 exp3072 pub +dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE4096 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe4096 exp4096 pub +dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE6144 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe6144 exp6144 pub +dhGroupGetPubShared FFDHE8192 pub = getDHPubShared' ffdhe8192 exp8192 pub +dhGroupGetPubShared _ _ = return Nothing + +getECDHPubShared + :: (MonadRandom m, EllipticCurveDH curve) + => (Point curve -> GroupPublicB) + -> proxy curve + -> Point curve + -> m (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) +getECDHPubShared tag proxy pub = do + mx <- maybeCryptoError <$> deriveEncrypt proxy pub + case mx of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (p, ECC.SharedSecret s) -> return $ Just (tag p, s) + +getECDHPubShared' + :: (MonadRandom m, EllipticCurveDH curve) + => proxy curve + -> Point curve + -> m (Maybe (Point curve, GroupKey)) +getECDHPubShared' proxy pub = do + mx <- maybeCryptoError <$> deriveEncrypt proxy pub + case mx of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (p, ECC.SharedSecret s) -> return $ Just (p, s) + +getDHPubShared + :: MonadRandom r + => DH.Params + -> Int + -> PublicNumber + -> (PublicNumber -> GroupPublicB) + -> r (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) +getDHPubShared params expBits pub pubTag + | not (valid params pub) = return Nothing + | otherwise = do + mypri <- generatePriv expBits + let mypub = DH.calculatePublic params mypri + DH.SharedKey share = DH.getShared params mypri pub + return $ Just (pubTag mypub, share) + +getDHPubShared' + :: MonadRandom r + => DH.Params + -> Int + -> PublicNumber + -> r (Maybe (PublicNumber, GroupKey)) +getDHPubShared' params expBits pub + | not (valid params pub) = return Nothing + | otherwise = do + mypri <- generatePriv expBits + let share = stripLeadingZeros (DH.getShared params mypri pub) + return $ Just (DH.calculatePublic params mypri, convert share) + +unwrap :: SharedSecret -> GroupKey +unwrap (ECC.SharedSecret sec) = sec + +groupDecapsulate :: GroupPublicB -> GroupPrivate -> Maybe GroupKey +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P256 pub) (GroupPri_P256 pri) = (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p256 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P384 pub) (GroupPri_P384 pri) = (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p384 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P521 pub) (GroupPri_P521 pri) = (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p521 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_X255 pub) (GroupPri_X255 pri) = (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt x25519 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_X448 pub) (GroupPri_X448 pri) = (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt x448 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE2048 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE2048 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe2048 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE3072 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE3072 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe3072 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE4096 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe4096 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE6144 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe6144 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 pub) (GroupPri_FFDHE8192 pri) = calcDHShared ffdhe8192 pub pri +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM512 s) = + Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM768 s) = + Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 p) (GroupPri_MLKEM1024 s) = + Just $ convert $ ML.decapsulate s p +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_X25519MLKEM768 (s1, s2)) = do + bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt x25519 p1 s1 + let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + return (bs2 <> bs1) +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_P256MLKEM768 (s1, s2)) = do + bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p256 p1 s1 + let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + return (bs1 <> bs2) +groupDecapsulate (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (p1, p2)) (GroupPri_P384MLKEM1024 (s1, s2)) = do + bs1 <- (unwrap <$>) . maybeCryptoError $ deriveDecrypt p384 p1 s1 + let bs2 = convert $ ML.decapsulate s2 p2 + return (bs1 <> bs2) +groupDecapsulate _ _ = Nothing + +calcDHShared :: DH.Params -> PublicNumber -> PrivateNumber -> Maybe GroupKey +calcDHShared params pub pri + | valid params pub = Just $ convert share + | otherwise = Nothing + where + share = DH.getShared params pri pub + +groupEncodePublicA :: GroupPublicA -> ByteString +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P256 p) = encodePoint p256 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P384 p) = encodePoint p384 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P521 p) = encodePoint p521 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_X255 p) = encodePoint x25519 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_X448 p) = encodePoint x448 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE2048 p) = enc ffdhe2048 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE3072 p) = enc ffdhe3072 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 p) = enc ffdhe4096 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 p) = enc ffdhe6144 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 p) = enc ffdhe8192 p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM512 p) = ML.encode p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM768 p) = ML.encode p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 p) = ML.encode p +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = + ML.encode p2 <> encodePoint x25519 p1 +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = + encodePoint p256 p1 <> ML.encode p2 +groupEncodePublicA (GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (p1, p2)) = + encodePoint p384 p1 <> ML.encode p2 + +groupEncodePublicB :: GroupPublicB -> ByteString +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P256 p) = encodePoint p256 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P384 p) = encodePoint p384 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P521 p) = encodePoint p521 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_X255 p) = encodePoint x25519 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_X448 p) = encodePoint x448 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_FFDHE2048 p) = enc ffdhe2048 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_FFDHE3072 p) = enc ffdhe3072 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 p) = enc ffdhe4096 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 p) = enc ffdhe6144 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 p) = enc ffdhe8192 p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_MLKEM512 p) = convert p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_MLKEM768 p) = convert p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 p) = convert p +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = + convert p2 <> encodePoint x25519 p1 +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (p1, p2)) = + encodePoint p256 p1 <> convert p2 +groupEncodePublicB (GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (p1, p2)) = + encodePoint p384 p1 <> convert p2 + +enc :: DH.Params -> PublicNumber -> ByteString +enc params (PublicNumber p) = i2ospOf_ ((DH.params_bits params + 7) `div` 8) p + +groupDecodePublicA :: Group -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError GroupPublicA +groupDecodePublicA P256 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubA_P256 <$> decodePoint p256 bs +groupDecodePublicA P384 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubA_P384 <$> decodePoint p384 bs +groupDecodePublicA P521 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubA_P521 <$> decodePoint p521 bs +groupDecodePublicA X25519 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubA_X255 <$> decodePoint x25519 bs +groupDecodePublicA X448 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubA_X448 <$> decodePoint x448 bs +groupDecodePublicA FFDHE2048 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE2048 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicA FFDHE3072 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE3072 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicA FFDHE4096 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE4096 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicA FFDHE6144 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE6144 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicA FFDHE8192 bs = Right . GroupPubA_FFDHE8192 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM512 bs = case ML.decode mlkem512 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM512 p +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM768 bs = case ML.decode mlkem768 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM768 p +groupDecodePublicA MLKEM1024 bs = case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubA_MLKEM1024 p +groupDecodePublicA X25519MLKEM768 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 1184 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint x25519 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubA_X25519MLKEM768 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicA P256MLKEM768 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 65 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p256 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubA_P256MLKEM768 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicA P384MLKEM1024 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 97 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p384 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubA_P384MLKEM1024 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicA _ _ = error "groupDecodePublicA" + +groupDecodePublicB :: Group -> ByteString -> Either CryptoError GroupPublicB +groupDecodePublicB P256 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubB_P256 <$> decodePoint p256 bs +groupDecodePublicB P384 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubB_P384 <$> decodePoint p384 bs +groupDecodePublicB P521 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubB_P521 <$> decodePoint p521 bs +groupDecodePublicB X25519 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubB_X255 <$> decodePoint x25519 bs +groupDecodePublicB X448 bs = eitherCryptoError $ GroupPubB_X448 <$> decodePoint x448 bs +groupDecodePublicB FFDHE2048 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE2048 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicB FFDHE3072 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE3072 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicB FFDHE4096 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE4096 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicB FFDHE6144 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE6144 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicB FFDHE8192 bs = Right . GroupPubB_FFDHE8192 . PublicNumber $ os2ip bs +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM512 bs = case ML.decode mlkem512 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM512 p +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM768 bs = case ML.decode mlkem768 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM768 p +groupDecodePublicB MLKEM1024 bs = case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p -> Right $ GroupPubB_MLKEM1024 p +groupDecodePublicB X25519MLKEM768 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 1088 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint x25519 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubB_X25519MLKEM768 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicB P256MLKEM768 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 65 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem768 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p256 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubB_P256MLKEM768 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicB P384MLKEM1024 bs = + let (bs1, bs2) = BA.splitAt 97 bs + in case ML.decode mlkem1024 bs2 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p1 -> case maybeCryptoError $ decodePoint p384 bs1 of + Nothing -> Left CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + Just p2 -> Right $ GroupPubB_P384MLKEM1024 (p2, p1) +groupDecodePublicB _ _ = error "groupDecodePublicB" + +-- Check that group element in not in the 2-element subgroup { 1, p - 1 }. +-- See RFC 7919 section 3 and NIST SP 56A rev 2 section 5.6.2.3.1. +valid :: DH.Params -> PublicNumber -> Bool +valid (DH.Params p _ _) (PublicNumber y) = 1 < y && y < p - 1 + +-- strips leading zeros from the result of getShared, as required +-- for DH(E) pre-main secret in SSL/TLS before version 1.3. +stripLeadingZeros :: DH.SharedKey -> ScrubbedBytes +stripLeadingZeros (DH.SharedKey sb) = snd $ BA.span (== 0) sb + +-- Use short exponents as optimization, see RFC 7919 section 5.2. +generatePriv :: MonadRandom r => Int -> r PrivateNumber +generatePriv e = PrivateNumber <$> generateParams e (Just SetHighest) False + +-- Short exponent bit sizes from RFC 7919 appendix A, rounded to next +-- multiple of 16 bits, i.e. going through a function like: +-- let shortExp n = head [ e | i <- [1..], let e = n + i, e `mod` 16 == 0 ] +exp2048 :: Int +exp3072 :: Int +exp4096 :: Int +exp6144 :: Int +exp8192 :: Int +exp2048 = 240 -- shortExp 225 +exp3072 = 288 -- shortExp 275 +exp4096 = 336 -- shortExp 325 +exp6144 = 384 -- shortExp 375 +exp8192 = 416 -- shortExp 400 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Crypto/Types.hs b/Network/TLS/Crypto/Types.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Crypto/Types.hs @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} + +-- | +-- Module : Network.TLS.Crypto.Types +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Kazu Yamamoto +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +module Network.TLS.Crypto.Types ( + Group ( + Group, + P256, + P384, + P521, + X25519, + X448, + FFDHE2048, + FFDHE3072, + FFDHE4096, + FFDHE6144, + FFDHE8192, + MLKEM512, + MLKEM768, + MLKEM1024, + X25519MLKEM768, + P256MLKEM768, + P384MLKEM1024 + ), + availableFFGroups, + availableECGroups, + availableHybridGroups, + supportedNamedGroups, + supportedNamedGroupsTLS13, + KeyExchangeSignatureAlg (..), +) where + +import Codec.Serialise +import Data.Word +import GHC.Generics + +newtype Group = Group Word16 deriving (Eq, Generic) +instance Serialise Group + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern P256 :: Group +pattern P256 = Group 23 +pattern P384 :: Group +pattern P384 = Group 24 +pattern P521 :: Group +pattern P521 = Group 25 +pattern X25519 :: Group +pattern X25519 = Group 29 +pattern X448 :: Group +pattern X448 = Group 30 +pattern FFDHE2048 :: Group +pattern FFDHE2048 = Group 256 +pattern FFDHE3072 :: Group +pattern FFDHE3072 = Group 257 +pattern FFDHE4096 :: Group +pattern FFDHE4096 = Group 258 +pattern FFDHE6144 :: Group +pattern FFDHE6144 = Group 259 +pattern FFDHE8192 :: Group +pattern FFDHE8192 = Group 260 +pattern MLKEM512 :: Group +pattern MLKEM512 = Group 512 +pattern MLKEM768 :: Group +pattern MLKEM768 = Group 513 +pattern MLKEM1024 :: Group +pattern MLKEM1024 = Group 514 +pattern X25519MLKEM768 :: Group +pattern X25519MLKEM768 = Group 4588 +pattern P256MLKEM768 :: Group +pattern P256MLKEM768 = Group 4587 +pattern P384MLKEM1024 :: Group +pattern P384MLKEM1024 = Group 4589 + +instance Show Group where + show P256 = "P256" + show P384 = "P384" + show P521 = "P521" + show X25519 = "X25519" + show X448 = "X448" + show FFDHE2048 = "FFDHE2048" + show FFDHE3072 = "FFDHE3072" + show FFDHE4096 = "FFDHE4096" + show FFDHE6144 = "FFDHE6144" + show FFDHE8192 = "FFDHE8192" + show MLKEM512 = "MLKEM512" + show MLKEM768 = "MLKEM768" + show MLKEM1024 = "MLKEM1024" + show X25519MLKEM768 = "X25519MLKEM768" + show P256MLKEM768 = "P256MLKEM768" + show P384MLKEM1024 = "P384MLKEM1024" + show (Group x) = "Group " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +availableFFGroups :: [Group] +availableFFGroups = [FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096, FFDHE6144, FFDHE8192] + +availableECGroups :: [Group] +availableECGroups = [P256, P384, P521, X25519, X448] + +availableHybridGroups :: [Group] +availableHybridGroups = [X25519MLKEM768, P256MLKEM768, P384MLKEM1024] + +-- | A list for named groups. The ordering is for client preference +-- because server preference is not used in our server +-- implementation. +supportedNamedGroups :: [Group] +supportedNamedGroups = + [ X25519 -- 128 bits security + , P256 -- 128 bits security + , P384 -- 192 bits security + , X448 -- 224 bits security + , P521 -- 256 bits security + -- , FFDHE2048 -- 103 bits security + , FFDHE3072 -- 125 bits security + , FFDHE4096 -- 150 bits security + , FFDHE6144 -- 175 bits security + , FFDHE8192 -- 192 bits security + , X25519MLKEM768 + , P256MLKEM768 + , P384MLKEM1024 + , -- , MLKEM512 + MLKEM768 + , MLKEM1024 + ] + +supportedNamedGroupsTLS13 :: [[Group]] +supportedNamedGroupsTLS13 = + [ [X25519MLKEM768, P256MLKEM768, P384MLKEM1024] + , [X25519, P256] + , [P384, X448, P521] + , [FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096, FFDHE6144, FFDHE8192] + , [MLKEM768, MLKEM1024] + ] + +-- Key-exchange signature algorithm, in close relation to ciphers +-- (before TLS 1.3). +data KeyExchangeSignatureAlg = KX_RSA | KX_DSA | KX_ECDSA + deriving (Show, Eq) diff --git a/Network/TLS/ErrT.hs b/Network/TLS/ErrT.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/ErrT.hs @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} + +-- | A simple compat ErrorT and other error stuff +module Network.TLS.ErrT ( + runErrT, + ErrT, + MonadError (..), +) where + +import Control.Monad.Except (MonadError (..)) +import Control.Monad.Trans.Except (ExceptT, runExceptT) + +runErrT :: ExceptT e m a -> m (Either e a) +runErrT = runExceptT +type ErrT = ExceptT diff --git a/Network/TLS/Error.hs b/Network/TLS/Error.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Error.hs @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} + +module Network.TLS.Error where + +import Control.Exception (Exception (..)) +import Data.Typeable + +import Network.TLS.Imports + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLSError that might be returned through the TLS stack. +-- +-- Prior to version 1.8.0, this type had an @Exception@ instance. +-- In version 1.8.0, this instance was removed, and functions in +-- this library now only throw 'TLSException'. +data TLSError + = -- | mainly for instance of Error + Error_Misc String + | -- | A fatal error condition was encountered at a low level. The + -- elements of the tuple give (freeform text description, structured + -- error description). + Error_Protocol String AlertDescription + | -- | A non-fatal error condition was encountered at a low level at a low + -- level. The elements of the tuple give (freeform text description, + -- structured error description). + Error_Protocol_Warning String AlertDescription + | Error_Certificate String + | -- | handshake policy failed. + Error_HandshakePolicy String + | Error_EOF + | Error_Packet String + | Error_Packet_unexpected String String + | Error_Packet_Parsing String + | Error_TCP_Terminate + deriving (Eq, Show, Typeable) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS Exceptions. Some of the data constructors indicate incorrect use of +-- the library, and the documentation for those data constructors calls +-- this out. The others wrap 'TLSError' with some kind of context to explain +-- when the exception occurred. +data TLSException + = -- | Early termination exception with the reason and the error associated + Terminated Bool String TLSError + | -- | Handshake failed for the reason attached. + HandshakeFailed TLSError + | -- | Failure occurred while sending or receiving data after the + -- TLS handshake succeeded. + PostHandshake TLSError + | -- | Lifts a 'TLSError' into 'TLSException' without provided any context + -- around when the error happened. + Uncontextualized TLSError + | -- | Usage error when the connection has not been established + -- and the user is trying to send or receive data. + -- Indicates that this library has been used incorrectly. + ConnectionNotEstablished + | -- | Expected that a TLS handshake had already taken place, but no TLS + -- handshake had occurred. + -- Indicates that this library has been used incorrectly. + MissingHandshake + deriving (Show, Eq, Typeable) + +instance Exception TLSException + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype AlertLevel = AlertLevel {fromAlertLevel :: Word8} deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern AlertLevel_Warning :: AlertLevel +pattern AlertLevel_Warning = AlertLevel 1 +pattern AlertLevel_Fatal :: AlertLevel +pattern AlertLevel_Fatal = AlertLevel 2 + +instance Show AlertLevel where + show AlertLevel_Warning = "AlertLevel_Warning" + show AlertLevel_Fatal = "AlertLevel_Fatal" + show (AlertLevel x) = "AlertLevel " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype AlertDescription = AlertDescription {fromAlertDescription :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern CloseNotify :: AlertDescription +pattern CloseNotify = AlertDescription 0 +pattern UnexpectedMessage :: AlertDescription +pattern UnexpectedMessage = AlertDescription 10 +pattern BadRecordMac :: AlertDescription +pattern BadRecordMac = AlertDescription 20 +pattern DecryptionFailed :: AlertDescription +pattern DecryptionFailed = AlertDescription 21 +pattern RecordOverflow :: AlertDescription +pattern RecordOverflow = AlertDescription 22 +pattern DecompressionFailure :: AlertDescription +pattern DecompressionFailure = AlertDescription 30 +pattern HandshakeFailure :: AlertDescription +pattern HandshakeFailure = AlertDescription 40 +pattern BadCertificate :: AlertDescription +pattern BadCertificate = AlertDescription 42 +pattern UnsupportedCertificate :: AlertDescription +pattern UnsupportedCertificate = AlertDescription 43 +pattern CertificateRevoked :: AlertDescription +pattern CertificateRevoked = AlertDescription 44 +pattern CertificateExpired :: AlertDescription +pattern CertificateExpired = AlertDescription 45 +pattern CertificateUnknown :: AlertDescription +pattern CertificateUnknown = AlertDescription 46 +pattern IllegalParameter :: AlertDescription +pattern IllegalParameter = AlertDescription 47 +pattern UnknownCa :: AlertDescription +pattern UnknownCa = AlertDescription 48 +pattern AccessDenied :: AlertDescription +pattern AccessDenied = AlertDescription 49 +pattern DecodeError :: AlertDescription +pattern DecodeError = AlertDescription 50 +pattern DecryptError :: AlertDescription +pattern DecryptError = AlertDescription 51 +pattern ExportRestriction :: AlertDescription +pattern ExportRestriction = AlertDescription 60 +pattern ProtocolVersion :: AlertDescription +pattern ProtocolVersion = AlertDescription 70 +pattern InsufficientSecurity :: AlertDescription +pattern InsufficientSecurity = AlertDescription 71 +pattern InternalError :: AlertDescription +pattern InternalError = AlertDescription 80 +pattern InappropriateFallback :: AlertDescription +pattern InappropriateFallback = AlertDescription 86 -- RFC7507 +pattern UserCanceled :: AlertDescription +pattern UserCanceled = AlertDescription 90 +pattern NoRenegotiation :: AlertDescription +pattern NoRenegotiation = AlertDescription 100 +pattern MissingExtension :: AlertDescription +pattern MissingExtension = AlertDescription 109 +pattern UnsupportedExtension :: AlertDescription +pattern UnsupportedExtension = AlertDescription 110 +pattern CertificateUnobtainable :: AlertDescription +pattern CertificateUnobtainable = AlertDescription 111 +pattern UnrecognizedName :: AlertDescription +pattern UnrecognizedName = AlertDescription 112 +pattern BadCertificateStatusResponse :: AlertDescription +pattern BadCertificateStatusResponse = AlertDescription 113 +pattern BadCertificateHashValue :: AlertDescription +pattern BadCertificateHashValue = AlertDescription 114 +pattern UnknownPskIdentity :: AlertDescription +pattern UnknownPskIdentity = AlertDescription 115 +pattern CertificateRequired :: AlertDescription +pattern CertificateRequired = AlertDescription 116 +pattern GeneralError :: AlertDescription +pattern GeneralError = AlertDescription 117 +pattern NoApplicationProtocol :: AlertDescription +pattern NoApplicationProtocol = AlertDescription 120 -- RFC7301 +pattern EchRequired :: AlertDescription +pattern EchRequired = AlertDescription 121 -- draft + +instance Show AlertDescription where + show CloseNotify = "CloseNotify" + show UnexpectedMessage = "UnexpectedMessage" + show BadRecordMac = "BadRecordMac" + show DecryptionFailed = "DecryptionFailed" + show RecordOverflow = "RecordOverflow" + show DecompressionFailure = "DecompressionFailure" + show HandshakeFailure = "HandshakeFailure" + show BadCertificate = "BadCertificate" + show UnsupportedCertificate = "UnsupportedCertificate" + show CertificateRevoked = "CertificateRevoked" + show CertificateExpired = "CertificateExpired" + show CertificateUnknown = "CertificateUnknown" + show IllegalParameter = "IllegalParameter" + show UnknownCa = "UnknownCa" + show AccessDenied = "AccessDenied" + show DecodeError = "DecodeError" + show DecryptError = "DecryptError" + show ExportRestriction = "ExportRestriction" + show ProtocolVersion = "ProtocolVersion" + show InsufficientSecurity = "InsufficientSecurity" + show InternalError = "InternalError" + show InappropriateFallback = "InappropriateFallback" + show UserCanceled = "UserCanceled" + show NoRenegotiation = "NoRenegotiation" + show MissingExtension = "MissingExtension" + show UnsupportedExtension = "UnsupportedExtension" + show CertificateUnobtainable = "CertificateUnobtainable" + show UnrecognizedName = "UnrecognizedName" + show BadCertificateStatusResponse = "BadCertificateStatusResponse" + show BadCertificateHashValue = "BadCertificateHashValue" + show UnknownPskIdentity = "UnknownPskIdentity" + show CertificateRequired = "CertificateRequired" + show GeneralError = "GeneralError" + show NoApplicationProtocol = "NoApplicationProtocol" + show EchRequired = "EchRequired" + show (AlertDescription x) = "AlertDescription " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extension.hs b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs @@ -0,0 +1,1175 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +-- | Basic extensions are defined in RFC 6066 +module Network.TLS.Extension ( + -- * Extension identifiers + ExtensionID ( + .., + EID_ServerName, + EID_MaxFragmentLength, + EID_ClientCertificateUrl, + EID_TrustedCAKeys, + EID_TruncatedHMAC, + EID_StatusRequest, + EID_UserMapping, + EID_ClientAuthz, + EID_ServerAuthz, + EID_CertType, + EID_SupportedGroups, + EID_EcPointFormats, + EID_SRP, + EID_SignatureAlgorithms, + EID_SRTP, + EID_Heartbeat, + EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation, + EID_StatusRequestv2, + EID_SignedCertificateTimestamp, + EID_ClientCertificateType, + EID_ServerCertificateType, + EID_Padding, + EID_EncryptThenMAC, + EID_ExtendedMainSecret, + EID_CompressCertificate, + EID_RecordSizeLimit, + EID_SessionTicket, + EID_PreSharedKey, + EID_EarlyData, + EID_SupportedVersions, + EID_Cookie, + EID_PskKeyExchangeModes, + EID_CertificateAuthorities, + EID_OidFilters, + EID_PostHandshakeAuth, + EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert, + EID_KeyShare, + EID_QuicTransportParameters, + EID_EchOuterExtensions, + EID_EncryptedClientHello, + EID_SecureRenegotiation + ), + definedExtensions, + supportedExtensions, + + -- * Extension raw + ExtensionRaw (..), + toExtensionRaw, + extensionLookup, + lookupAndDecode, + lookupAndDecodeAndDo, + + -- * Class + Extension (..), + + -- * Extensions + ServerNameType (..), + ServerName (..), + MaxFragmentLength (..), + MaxFragmentEnum (..), + SecureRenegotiation (..), + ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation (..), + ExtendedMainSecret (..), + CertificateCompressionAlgorithm (.., CCA_Zlib, CCA_Brotli, CCA_Zstd), + CompressCertificate (..), + SupportedGroups (..), + Group (..), + EcPointFormatsSupported (..), + EcPointFormat ( + EcPointFormat, + EcPointFormat_Uncompressed, + EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime, + EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2 + ), + RecordSizeLimit (..), + SessionTicket (..), + HeartBeat (..), + HeartBeatMode ( + HeartBeatMode, + HeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSend, + HeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend + ), + SignatureAlgorithms (..), + SignatureAlgorithmsCert (..), + SupportedVersions (..), + KeyShare (..), + KeyShareEntry (..), + MessageType (..), + PostHandshakeAuth (..), + PskKexMode (PskKexMode, PSK_KE, PSK_DHE_KE), + PskKeyExchangeModes (..), + PskIdentity (..), + PreSharedKey (..), + EarlyDataIndication (..), + Cookie (..), + CertificateAuthorities (..), + EchOuterExtensions (..), + EncryptedClientHello (..), +) where + +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Crypto.HPKE +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as BC +import Data.X509 (DistinguishedName) + +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config + +import Network.TLS.Crypto.Types +import Network.TLS.Error +import Network.TLS.HashAndSignature +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet ( + getBinaryVersion, + getDNames, + getSignatureHashAlgorithm, + putBinaryVersion, + putDNames, + putSignatureHashAlgorithm, + ) +import Network.TLS.Types (HostName, Ticket, Version) +import Network.TLS.Wire + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- Extension identifiers + +-- | Identifier of a TLS extension. +-- +newtype ExtensionID = ExtensionID {fromExtensionID :: Word16} deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern EID_ServerName :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_ServerName = ExtensionID 0x0 +pattern EID_MaxFragmentLength :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_MaxFragmentLength = ExtensionID 0x1 +pattern EID_ClientCertificateUrl :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_ClientCertificateUrl = ExtensionID 0x2 +pattern EID_TrustedCAKeys :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_TrustedCAKeys = ExtensionID 0x3 +pattern EID_TruncatedHMAC :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_TruncatedHMAC = ExtensionID 0x4 +pattern EID_StatusRequest :: ExtensionID -- RFC6066 +pattern EID_StatusRequest = ExtensionID 0x5 +pattern EID_UserMapping :: ExtensionID -- RFC4681 +pattern EID_UserMapping = ExtensionID 0x6 +pattern EID_ClientAuthz :: ExtensionID -- RFC5878 +pattern EID_ClientAuthz = ExtensionID 0x7 +pattern EID_ServerAuthz :: ExtensionID -- RFC5878 +pattern EID_ServerAuthz = ExtensionID 0x8 +pattern EID_CertType :: ExtensionID -- RFC6091 +pattern EID_CertType = ExtensionID 0x9 +pattern EID_SupportedGroups :: ExtensionID -- RFC8422,8446 +pattern EID_SupportedGroups = ExtensionID 0xa +pattern EID_EcPointFormats :: ExtensionID -- RFC4492 +pattern EID_EcPointFormats = ExtensionID 0xb +pattern EID_SRP :: ExtensionID -- RFC5054 +pattern EID_SRP = ExtensionID 0xc +pattern EID_SignatureAlgorithms :: ExtensionID -- RFC5246,8446 +pattern EID_SignatureAlgorithms = ExtensionID 0xd +pattern EID_SRTP :: ExtensionID -- RFC5764 +pattern EID_SRTP = ExtensionID 0xe +pattern EID_Heartbeat :: ExtensionID -- RFC6520 +pattern EID_Heartbeat = ExtensionID 0xf +pattern EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation :: ExtensionID -- RFC7301 +pattern EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = ExtensionID 0x10 +pattern EID_StatusRequestv2 :: ExtensionID -- RFC6961 +pattern EID_StatusRequestv2 = ExtensionID 0x11 +pattern EID_SignedCertificateTimestamp :: ExtensionID -- RFC6962 +pattern EID_SignedCertificateTimestamp = ExtensionID 0x12 +pattern EID_ClientCertificateType :: ExtensionID -- RFC7250 +pattern EID_ClientCertificateType = ExtensionID 0x13 +pattern EID_ServerCertificateType :: ExtensionID -- RFC7250 +pattern EID_ServerCertificateType = ExtensionID 0x14 +pattern EID_Padding :: ExtensionID -- RFC5246 +pattern EID_Padding = ExtensionID 0x15 +pattern EID_EncryptThenMAC :: ExtensionID -- RFC7366 +pattern EID_EncryptThenMAC = ExtensionID 0x16 +pattern EID_ExtendedMainSecret :: ExtensionID -- REF7627 +pattern EID_ExtendedMainSecret = ExtensionID 0x17 +pattern EID_CompressCertificate :: ExtensionID -- RFC8879 +pattern EID_CompressCertificate = ExtensionID 0x1b +pattern EID_RecordSizeLimit :: ExtensionID -- RFC8449 +pattern EID_RecordSizeLimit = ExtensionID 0x1c +pattern EID_SessionTicket :: ExtensionID -- RFC4507 +pattern EID_SessionTicket = ExtensionID 0x23 +pattern EID_PreSharedKey :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_PreSharedKey = ExtensionID 0x29 +pattern EID_EarlyData :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_EarlyData = ExtensionID 0x2a +pattern EID_SupportedVersions :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_SupportedVersions = ExtensionID 0x2b +pattern EID_Cookie :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_Cookie = ExtensionID 0x2c +pattern EID_PskKeyExchangeModes :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_PskKeyExchangeModes = ExtensionID 0x2d +pattern EID_CertificateAuthorities :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_CertificateAuthorities = ExtensionID 0x2f +pattern EID_OidFilters :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_OidFilters = ExtensionID 0x30 +pattern EID_PostHandshakeAuth :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_PostHandshakeAuth = ExtensionID 0x31 +pattern EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert = ExtensionID 0x32 +pattern EID_KeyShare :: ExtensionID -- RFC8446 +pattern EID_KeyShare = ExtensionID 0x33 +pattern EID_QuicTransportParameters :: ExtensionID -- RFC9001 +pattern EID_QuicTransportParameters = ExtensionID 0x39 +pattern EID_EchOuterExtensions :: ExtensionID -- draft +pattern EID_EchOuterExtensions = ExtensionID 0xfd00 +pattern EID_EncryptedClientHello :: ExtensionID -- draft +pattern EID_EncryptedClientHello = ExtensionID 0xfe0d +pattern EID_SecureRenegotiation :: ExtensionID -- RFC5746 +pattern EID_SecureRenegotiation = ExtensionID 0xff01 + +instance Show ExtensionID where + show EID_ServerName = "ServerName" + show EID_MaxFragmentLength = "MaxFragmentLength" + show EID_ClientCertificateUrl = "ClientCertificateUrl" + show EID_TrustedCAKeys = "TrustedCAKeys" + show EID_TruncatedHMAC = "TruncatedHMAC" + show EID_StatusRequest = "StatusRequest" + show EID_UserMapping = "UserMapping" + show EID_ClientAuthz = "ClientAuthz" + show EID_ServerAuthz = "ServerAuthz" + show EID_CertType = "CertType" + show EID_SupportedGroups = "SupportedGroups" + show EID_EcPointFormats = "EcPointFormats" + show EID_SRP = "SRP" + show EID_SignatureAlgorithms = "SignatureAlgorithms" + show EID_SRTP = "SRTP" + show EID_Heartbeat = "Heartbeat" + show EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = "ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation" + show EID_StatusRequestv2 = "StatusRequestv2" + show EID_SignedCertificateTimestamp = "SignedCertificateTimestamp" + show EID_ClientCertificateType = "ClientCertificateType" + show EID_ServerCertificateType = "ServerCertificateType" + show EID_Padding = "Padding" + show EID_EncryptThenMAC = "EncryptThenMAC" + show EID_ExtendedMainSecret = "ExtendedMainSecret" + show EID_CompressCertificate = "CompressCertificate" + show EID_RecordSizeLimit = "RecordSizeLimit" + show EID_SessionTicket = "SessionTicket" + show EID_PreSharedKey = "PreSharedKey" + show EID_EarlyData = "EarlyData" + show EID_SupportedVersions = "SupportedVersions" + show EID_Cookie = "Cookie" + show EID_PskKeyExchangeModes = "PskKeyExchangeModes" + show EID_CertificateAuthorities = "CertificateAuthorities" + show EID_OidFilters = "OidFilters" + show EID_PostHandshakeAuth = "PostHandshakeAuth" + show EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert = "SignatureAlgorithmsCert" + show EID_KeyShare = "KeyShare" + show EID_QuicTransportParameters = "QuicTransportParameters" + show EID_EchOuterExtensions = "EchOuterExtensions" + show EID_EncryptedClientHello = "EncryptedClientHello" + show EID_SecureRenegotiation = "SecureRenegotiation" + show (ExtensionID x) = "ExtensionID " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +definedExtensions :: [ExtensionID] +definedExtensions = + [ EID_ServerName + , EID_MaxFragmentLength + , EID_ClientCertificateUrl + , EID_TrustedCAKeys + , EID_TruncatedHMAC + , EID_StatusRequest + , EID_UserMapping + , EID_ClientAuthz + , EID_ServerAuthz + , EID_CertType + , EID_SupportedGroups + , EID_EcPointFormats + , EID_SRP + , EID_SignatureAlgorithms + , EID_SRTP + , EID_Heartbeat + , EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + , EID_StatusRequestv2 + , EID_SignedCertificateTimestamp + , EID_ClientCertificateType + , EID_ServerCertificateType + , EID_Padding + , EID_EncryptThenMAC + , EID_ExtendedMainSecret + , EID_CompressCertificate + , EID_RecordSizeLimit + , EID_SessionTicket + , EID_PreSharedKey + , EID_EarlyData + , EID_SupportedVersions + , EID_Cookie + , EID_PskKeyExchangeModes + , EID_CertificateAuthorities + , EID_OidFilters + , EID_PostHandshakeAuth + , EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert + , EID_KeyShare + , EID_QuicTransportParameters + , EID_EchOuterExtensions + , EID_EncryptedClientHello + , EID_SecureRenegotiation + ] + +-- | all supported extensions by the implementation +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +supportedExtensions :: [ExtensionID] +supportedExtensions = + [ EID_ServerName -- 0x00 + , EID_SupportedGroups -- 0x0a + , EID_EcPointFormats -- 0x0b + , EID_SignatureAlgorithms -- 0x0d + , EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation -- 0x10 + , EID_ExtendedMainSecret -- 0x17 + , EID_CompressCertificate -- 0x1b + , EID_RecordSizeLimit -- 0x1c + , EID_SessionTicket -- 0x23 + , EID_PreSharedKey -- 0x29 + , EID_EarlyData -- 0x2a + , EID_SupportedVersions -- 0x2b + , EID_Cookie -- 0x2c + , EID_PskKeyExchangeModes -- 0x2d + , EID_CertificateAuthorities -- 0x2f + , EID_PostHandshakeAuth -- 0x31 + , EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert -- 0x32 + , EID_KeyShare -- 0x33 + , EID_QuicTransportParameters -- 0x39 + , EID_EchOuterExtensions -- 0xfd00 + , EID_EncryptedClientHello -- 0xfe0d + , EID_SecureRenegotiation -- 0xff01 + ] +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | The raw content of a TLS extension. +data ExtensionRaw = ExtensionRaw ExtensionID ByteString + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show ExtensionRaw where + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_ServerName bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeServerName + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_MaxFragmentLength bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeMaxFragmentLength + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SupportedGroups bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeSupportedGroups + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_EcPointFormats bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeEcPointFormatsSupported + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SignatureAlgorithms bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeSignatureAlgorithms + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_Heartbeat bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeHeartBeat + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_ExtendedMainSecret _) = show eid + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_CompressCertificate bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeCompressCertificate + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_RecordSizeLimit bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeRecordSizeLimit + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SessionTicket bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeSessionTicket + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_PreSharedKey bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodePreSharedKey + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_EarlyData _) = show eid + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SupportedVersions bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeSupportedVersions + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_Cookie bs) = show eid ++ " " ++ showBytesHex bs + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_PskKeyExchangeModes bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodePskKeyExchangeModes + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_CertificateAuthorities bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeCertificateAuthorities + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_PostHandshakeAuth _) = show eid + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_KeyShare bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeKeyShare + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_EchOuterExtensions bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeEchOuterExtensions + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_EncryptedClientHello bs) = showExtensionRaw eid bs decodeECH + show (ExtensionRaw eid@EID_SecureRenegotiation bs) = show eid ++ " " ++ showBytesHex bs + show (ExtensionRaw eid bs) = "ExtensionRaw " ++ show eid ++ " " ++ showBytesHex bs + +showExtensionRaw + :: Show a => ExtensionID -> ByteString -> (ByteString -> Maybe a) -> String +showExtensionRaw eid bs decode = case decode bs of + Nothing -> show eid ++ " broken" + Just x -> show x + +toExtensionRaw :: Extension e => e -> ExtensionRaw +toExtensionRaw ext = ExtensionRaw (extensionID ext) (extensionEncode ext) + +extensionLookup :: ExtensionID -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe ByteString +extensionLookup toFind exts = extract <$> find idEq exts + where + extract (ExtensionRaw _ content) = content + idEq (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == toFind + +lookupAndDecode + :: Extension e + => ExtensionID + -> MessageType + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> a + -> (e -> a) + -> a +lookupAndDecode eid msgtyp exts defval conv = case extensionLookup eid exts of + Nothing -> defval + Just bs -> case extensionDecode msgtyp bs of + Nothing -> + E.throw $ + Uncontextualized $ + Error_Protocol ("Illegal " ++ show eid) DecodeError + Just val -> conv val + +lookupAndDecodeAndDo + :: Extension a + => ExtensionID + -> MessageType + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> IO b + -> (a -> IO b) + -> IO b +lookupAndDecodeAndDo eid msgtyp exts defAction action = case extensionLookup eid exts of + Nothing -> defAction + Just bs -> case extensionDecode msgtyp bs of + Nothing -> + E.throwIO $ + Uncontextualized $ + Error_Protocol ("Illegal " ++ show eid) DecodeError + Just val -> action val + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Extension class to transform bytes to and from a high level Extension type. +class Extension a where + extensionID :: a -> ExtensionID + extensionDecode :: MessageType -> ByteString -> Maybe a + extensionEncode :: a -> ByteString + +data MessageType + = MsgTClientHello + | MsgTServerHello + | MsgTHelloRetryRequest + | MsgTEncryptedExtensions + | MsgTNewSessionTicket + | MsgTCertificateRequest + deriving (Eq, Show) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Server Name extension including the name type and the associated name. +-- the associated name decoding is dependent of its name type. +-- name type = 0 : hostname +newtype ServerName = ServerName [ServerNameType] deriving (Show, Eq) + +data ServerNameType + = ServerNameHostName HostName + | ServerNameOther (Word8, ByteString) + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show ServerNameType where + show (ServerNameHostName host) = "\"" ++ host ++ "\"" + show (ServerNameOther (w, _)) = "(" ++ show w ++ ", )" + +instance Extension ServerName where + extensionID _ = EID_ServerName + + -- dirty hack for servers + extensionEncode (ServerName []) = "" + -- for clients + extensionEncode (ServerName l) = runPut $ putOpaque16 (runPut $ mapM_ encodeNameType l) + where + encodeNameType (ServerNameHostName hn) = putWord8 0 >> putOpaque16 (BC.pack hn) -- FIXME: should be puny code conversion + encodeNameType (ServerNameOther (nt, opaque)) = putWord8 nt >> putBytes opaque + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeServerName + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeServerName + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeServerName + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: ServerName" + +decodeServerName :: ByteString -> Maybe ServerName +decodeServerName "" = Just $ ServerName [] -- dirty hack for servers +decodeServerName bs = runGetMaybe decode bs + where + decode = do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + ServerName <$> getList len getServerName + getServerName = do + ty <- getWord8 + snameParsed <- getOpaque16 + let sname = B.copy snameParsed + name = case ty of + 0 -> ServerNameHostName $ BC.unpack sname -- FIXME: should be puny code conversion + _ -> ServerNameOther (ty, sname) + return (1 + 2 + B.length sname, name) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Max fragment extension with length from 512 bytes to 4096 bytes +-- +-- RFC 6066 defines: +-- If a server receives a maximum fragment length negotiation request +-- for a value other than the allowed values, it MUST abort the +-- handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. +-- +-- So, if a server receives MaxFragmentLengthOther, it must send the alert. +data MaxFragmentLength + = MaxFragmentLength MaxFragmentEnum + | MaxFragmentLengthOther Word8 + deriving (Show, Eq) + +data MaxFragmentEnum + = MaxFragment512 + | MaxFragment1024 + | MaxFragment2048 + | MaxFragment4096 + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension MaxFragmentLength where + extensionID _ = EID_MaxFragmentLength + extensionEncode (MaxFragmentLength l) = runPut $ putWord8 $ fromMaxFragmentEnum l + where + fromMaxFragmentEnum MaxFragment512 = 1 + fromMaxFragmentEnum MaxFragment1024 = 2 + fromMaxFragmentEnum MaxFragment2048 = 3 + fromMaxFragmentEnum MaxFragment4096 = 4 + extensionEncode (MaxFragmentLengthOther l) = runPut $ putWord8 l + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeMaxFragmentLength + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeMaxFragmentLength + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeMaxFragmentLength + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: MaxFragmentLength" + +decodeMaxFragmentLength :: ByteString -> Maybe MaxFragmentLength +decodeMaxFragmentLength = runGetMaybe $ toMaxFragmentEnum <$> getWord8 + where + toMaxFragmentEnum 1 = MaxFragmentLength MaxFragment512 + toMaxFragmentEnum 2 = MaxFragmentLength MaxFragment1024 + toMaxFragmentEnum 3 = MaxFragmentLength MaxFragment2048 + toMaxFragmentEnum 4 = MaxFragmentLength MaxFragment4096 + toMaxFragmentEnum n = MaxFragmentLengthOther n + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype SupportedGroups = SupportedGroups [Group] deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- on decode, filter all unknown curves +instance Extension SupportedGroups where + extensionID _ = EID_SupportedGroups + extensionEncode (SupportedGroups groups) = runPut $ putWords16 $ map (\(Group g) -> g) groups + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSupportedGroups + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeSupportedGroups + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SupportedGroups" + +decodeSupportedGroups :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedGroups +decodeSupportedGroups = + runGetMaybe (SupportedGroups . map Group <$> getWords16) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype EcPointFormatsSupported = EcPointFormatsSupported [EcPointFormat] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +newtype EcPointFormat = EcPointFormat {fromEcPointFormat :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern EcPointFormat_Uncompressed :: EcPointFormat +pattern EcPointFormat_Uncompressed = EcPointFormat 0 +pattern EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime :: EcPointFormat +pattern EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime = EcPointFormat 1 +pattern EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2 :: EcPointFormat +pattern EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2 = EcPointFormat 2 + +instance Show EcPointFormat where + show EcPointFormat_Uncompressed = "EcPointFormat_Uncompressed" + show EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime = "EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime" + show EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2 = "EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2" + show (EcPointFormat x) = "EcPointFormat " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +-- on decode, filter all unknown formats +instance Extension EcPointFormatsSupported where + extensionID _ = EID_EcPointFormats + extensionEncode (EcPointFormatsSupported formats) = runPut $ putWords8 $ map fromEcPointFormat formats + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeEcPointFormatsSupported + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeEcPointFormatsSupported + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EcPointFormatsSupported" + +decodeEcPointFormatsSupported :: ByteString -> Maybe EcPointFormatsSupported +decodeEcPointFormatsSupported = + runGetMaybe (EcPointFormatsSupported . map EcPointFormat <$> getWords8) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype SignatureAlgorithms = SignatureAlgorithms [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension SignatureAlgorithms where + extensionID _ = EID_SignatureAlgorithms + extensionEncode (SignatureAlgorithms algs) = + runPut $ + putWord16 (fromIntegral (length algs * 2)) + >> mapM_ putSignatureHashAlgorithm algs + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSignatureAlgorithms + extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeSignatureAlgorithms + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SignatureAlgorithms" + +decodeSignatureAlgorithms :: ByteString -> Maybe SignatureAlgorithms +decodeSignatureAlgorithms = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- getWord16 + sas <- + getList (fromIntegral len) (getSignatureHashAlgorithm >>= \sh -> return (2, sh)) + leftoverLen <- remaining + when (leftoverLen /= 0) $ fail "decodeSignatureAlgorithms: broken length" + when (null sas) $ fail "signature algorithms are empty" + return $ SignatureAlgorithms sas + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype HeartBeat = HeartBeat HeartBeatMode deriving (Show, Eq) + +newtype HeartBeatMode = HeartBeatMode {fromHeartBeatMode :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern HeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSend :: HeartBeatMode +pattern HeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSend = HeartBeatMode 1 +pattern HeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend :: HeartBeatMode +pattern HeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend = HeartBeatMode 2 + +instance Show HeartBeatMode where + show HeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSend = "HeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSend" + show HeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend = "HeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend" + show (HeartBeatMode x) = "HeartBeatMode " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +instance Extension HeartBeat where + extensionID _ = EID_Heartbeat + extensionEncode (HeartBeat mode) = runPut $ putWord8 $ fromHeartBeatMode mode + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeHeartBeat + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeHeartBeat + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: HeartBeat" + +decodeHeartBeat :: ByteString -> Maybe HeartBeat +decodeHeartBeat = runGetMaybe $ HeartBeat . HeartBeatMode <$> getWord8 + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) +newtype ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + = ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [ByteString] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation where + extensionID _ = EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + extensionEncode (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation bytes) = + runPut $ putOpaque16 $ runPut $ mapM_ putOpaque8 bytes + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation" + +decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + :: ByteString -> Maybe ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation +decodeApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- getWord16 + ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation <$> getList (fromIntegral len) getALPN + where + getALPN = do + alpnParsed <- getOpaque8 + let alpn = B.copy alpnParsed + return (B.length alpn + 1, alpn) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Extended Main Secret +data ExtendedMainSecret = ExtendedMainSecret deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension ExtendedMainSecret where + extensionID _ = EID_ExtendedMainSecret + extensionEncode ExtendedMainSecret = B.empty + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello "" = Just ExtendedMainSecret + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello "" = Just ExtendedMainSecret + extensionDecode _ _ = error "extensionDecode: ExtendedMainSecret" + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype CertificateCompressionAlgorithm + = CertificateCompressionAlgorithm Word16 + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern CCA_Zlib :: CertificateCompressionAlgorithm +pattern CCA_Zlib = CertificateCompressionAlgorithm 1 +pattern CCA_Brotli :: CertificateCompressionAlgorithm +pattern CCA_Brotli = CertificateCompressionAlgorithm 2 +pattern CCA_Zstd :: CertificateCompressionAlgorithm +pattern CCA_Zstd = CertificateCompressionAlgorithm 3 + +instance Show CertificateCompressionAlgorithm where + show CCA_Zlib = "zlib" + show CCA_Brotli = "brotli" + show CCA_Zstd = "zstd" + show (CertificateCompressionAlgorithm n) = "CertificateCompressionAlgorithm " ++ show n +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +newtype CompressCertificate = CompressCertificate [CertificateCompressionAlgorithm] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension CompressCertificate where + extensionID _ = EID_CompressCertificate + extensionEncode (CompressCertificate cs) = runPut $ do + putWord8 $ fromIntegral (length cs * 2) + mapM_ putCCA cs + where + putCCA (CertificateCompressionAlgorithm n) = putWord16 n + extensionDecode _ = decodeCompressCertificate + +decodeCompressCertificate :: ByteString -> Maybe CompressCertificate +decodeCompressCertificate = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + cs <- getList len getCCA + when (null cs) $ fail "empty list of CertificateCompressionAlgorithm" + leftoverLen <- remaining + when (leftoverLen /= 0) $ fail "decodeCompressCertificate: broken length" + return $ CompressCertificate cs + where + getCCA = do + cca <- CertificateCompressionAlgorithm <$> getWord16 + return (2, cca) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype RecordSizeLimit = RecordSizeLimit Word16 deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension RecordSizeLimit where + extensionID _ = EID_RecordSizeLimit + extensionEncode (RecordSizeLimit n) = runPut $ putWord16 n + extensionDecode _ = decodeRecordSizeLimit + +decodeRecordSizeLimit :: ByteString -> Maybe RecordSizeLimit +decodeRecordSizeLimit = runGetMaybe $ do + r <- RecordSizeLimit <$> getWord16 + leftoverLen <- remaining + when (leftoverLen /= 0) $ fail "decodeRecordSizeLimit: broken length" + return r + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype SessionTicket = SessionTicket Ticket + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5077#appendix-A +instance Extension SessionTicket where + extensionID _ = EID_SessionTicket + extensionEncode (SessionTicket ticket) = runPut $ putBytes ticket + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSessionTicket + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeSessionTicket + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SessionTicket" + +decodeSessionTicket :: ByteString -> Maybe SessionTicket +decodeSessionTicket = runGetMaybe $ SessionTicket <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +data PskIdentity = PskIdentity ByteString Word32 deriving (Eq) + +instance Show PskIdentity where + show (PskIdentity bs n) = "PskId " ++ showBytesHex bs ++ " " ++ show n + +data PreSharedKey + = PreSharedKeyClientHello [PskIdentity] [ByteString] + | PreSharedKeyServerHello Int + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show PreSharedKey where + show (PreSharedKeyClientHello ids bndrs) = + "PreSharedKey " + ++ show ids + ++ " " + ++ "[" + ++ intercalate ", " (map showBytesHex bndrs) + ++ "]" + show (PreSharedKeyServerHello n) = "PreSharedKey " ++ show n + +instance Extension PreSharedKey where + extensionID _ = EID_PreSharedKey + extensionEncode (PreSharedKeyClientHello ids bds) = runPut $ do + putOpaque16 $ runPut (mapM_ putIdentity ids) + putOpaque16 $ runPut (mapM_ putBinder bds) + where + putIdentity (PskIdentity bs w) = do + putOpaque16 bs + putWord32 w + putBinder = putOpaque8 + extensionEncode (PreSharedKeyServerHello w16) = + runPut $ + putWord16 $ + fromIntegral w16 + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodePreSharedKeyClientHello + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodePreSharedKeyServerHello + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PreShareKey" + +decodePreSharedKeyClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe PreSharedKey +decodePreSharedKeyClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do + len1 <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + identities <- getList len1 getIdentity + len2 <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + binders <- getList len2 getBinder + return $ PreSharedKeyClientHello identities binders + where + getIdentity = do + identity <- getOpaque16 + age <- getWord32 + let len = 2 + B.length identity + 4 + return (len, PskIdentity identity age) + getBinder = do + l <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + binder <- getBytes l + let len = l + 1 + return (len, binder) + +decodePreSharedKeyServerHello :: ByteString -> Maybe PreSharedKey +decodePreSharedKeyServerHello = + runGetMaybe $ + PreSharedKeyServerHello . fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + +decodePreSharedKey :: ByteString -> Maybe PreSharedKey +decodePreSharedKey bs = + decodePreSharedKeyClientHello bs + <|> decodePreSharedKeyServerHello bs + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype EarlyDataIndication = EarlyDataIndication (Maybe Word32) + deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension EarlyDataIndication where + extensionID _ = EID_EarlyData + extensionEncode (EarlyDataIndication Nothing) = runPut $ putBytes B.empty + extensionEncode (EarlyDataIndication (Just w32)) = runPut $ putWord32 w32 + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = return $ Just (EarlyDataIndication Nothing) + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = return $ Just (EarlyDataIndication Nothing) + extensionDecode MsgTNewSessionTicket = + runGetMaybe $ + EarlyDataIndication . Just <$> getWord32 + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EarlyDataIndication" + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +data SupportedVersions + = SupportedVersionsClientHello [Version] + | SupportedVersionsServerHello Version + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show SupportedVersions where + show (SupportedVersionsClientHello vers) = "Versions " ++ show vers + show (SupportedVersionsServerHello ver) = "Versions " ++ show ver + +instance Extension SupportedVersions where + extensionID _ = EID_SupportedVersions + extensionEncode (SupportedVersionsClientHello vers) = runPut $ do + putWord8 (fromIntegral (length vers * 2)) + mapM_ putBinaryVersion vers + extensionEncode (SupportedVersionsServerHello ver) = + runPut $ + putBinaryVersion ver + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeSupportedVersionsServerHello + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SupportedVersionsServerHello" + +decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedVersions +decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + SupportedVersionsClientHello <$> getList len getVer + where + getVer = do + ver <- getBinaryVersion + return (2, ver) + +decodeSupportedVersionsServerHello :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedVersions +decodeSupportedVersionsServerHello = + runGetMaybe (SupportedVersionsServerHello <$> getBinaryVersion) + +decodeSupportedVersions :: ByteString -> Maybe SupportedVersions +decodeSupportedVersions bs = + decodeSupportedVersionsClientHello bs + <|> decodeSupportedVersionsServerHello bs + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype Cookie = Cookie ByteString deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension Cookie where + extensionID _ = EID_Cookie + extensionEncode (Cookie opaque) = runPut $ putOpaque16 opaque + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = runGetMaybe (Cookie <$> getOpaque16) + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: Cookie" + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype PskKexMode = PskKexMode {fromPskKexMode :: Word8} deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern PSK_KE :: PskKexMode +pattern PSK_KE = PskKexMode 0 +pattern PSK_DHE_KE :: PskKexMode +pattern PSK_DHE_KE = PskKexMode 1 + +instance Show PskKexMode where + show PSK_KE = "PSK_KE" + show PSK_DHE_KE = "PSK_DHE_KE" + show (PskKexMode x) = "PskKexMode " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +newtype PskKeyExchangeModes = PskKeyExchangeModes [PskKexMode] + deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension PskKeyExchangeModes where + extensionID _ = EID_PskKeyExchangeModes + extensionEncode (PskKeyExchangeModes pkms) = + runPut $ + putWords8 $ + map fromPskKexMode pkms + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodePskKeyExchangeModes + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PskKeyExchangeModes" + +decodePskKeyExchangeModes :: ByteString -> Maybe PskKeyExchangeModes +decodePskKeyExchangeModes = + runGetMaybe $ + PskKeyExchangeModes . map PskKexMode <$> getWords8 + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype CertificateAuthorities = CertificateAuthorities [DistinguishedName] + deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension CertificateAuthorities where + extensionID _ = EID_CertificateAuthorities + extensionEncode (CertificateAuthorities names) = + runPut $ + putDNames names + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeCertificateAuthorities + extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeCertificateAuthorities + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: CertificateAuthorities" + +decodeCertificateAuthorities :: ByteString -> Maybe CertificateAuthorities +decodeCertificateAuthorities = + runGetMaybe (CertificateAuthorities <$> getDNames) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +data PostHandshakeAuth = PostHandshakeAuth deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension PostHandshakeAuth where + extensionID _ = EID_PostHandshakeAuth + extensionEncode _ = B.empty + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = runGetMaybe $ return PostHandshakeAuth + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: PostHandshakeAuth" + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype SignatureAlgorithmsCert = SignatureAlgorithmsCert [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension SignatureAlgorithmsCert where + extensionID _ = EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert + extensionEncode (SignatureAlgorithmsCert algs) = + runPut $ + putWord16 (fromIntegral (length algs * 2)) + >> mapM_ putSignatureHashAlgorithm algs + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert + extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest = decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SignatureAlgorithmsCert" + +decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert :: ByteString -> Maybe SignatureAlgorithmsCert +decodeSignatureAlgorithmsCert = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- getWord16 + SignatureAlgorithmsCert + <$> getList (fromIntegral len) (getSignatureHashAlgorithm >>= \sh -> return (2, sh)) + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +data KeyShareEntry = KeyShareEntry + { keyShareEntryGroup :: Group + , keyShareEntryKeyExchange :: ByteString + } + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show KeyShareEntry where + show kse = show $ keyShareEntryGroup kse + +getKeyShareEntry :: Get (Int, Maybe KeyShareEntry) +getKeyShareEntry = do + grp <- Group <$> getWord16 + l <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + key <- getBytes l + let len = l + 4 + return (len, Just $ KeyShareEntry grp key) + +putKeyShareEntry :: KeyShareEntry -> Put +putKeyShareEntry (KeyShareEntry (Group grp) key) = do + putWord16 grp + putWord16 $ fromIntegral $ B.length key + putBytes key + +data KeyShare + = KeyShareClientHello [KeyShareEntry] + | KeyShareServerHello KeyShareEntry + | KeyShareHRR Group + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +instance Show KeyShare where + show (KeyShareClientHello kses) = "KeyShare " ++ show kses + show (KeyShareServerHello kse) = "KeyShare " ++ show kse + show (KeyShareHRR g) = "KeyShareHRR " ++ show g +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +instance Extension KeyShare where + extensionID _ = EID_KeyShare + extensionEncode (KeyShareClientHello kses) = runPut $ do + let len = sum [B.length key + 4 | KeyShareEntry _ key <- kses] + putWord16 $ fromIntegral len + mapM_ putKeyShareEntry kses + extensionEncode (KeyShareServerHello kse) = runPut $ putKeyShareEntry kse + extensionEncode (KeyShareHRR (Group grp)) = runPut $ putWord16 grp + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeKeyShareClientHello + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = decodeKeyShareServerHello + extensionDecode MsgTHelloRetryRequest = decodeKeyShareHRR + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: KeyShare" + +decodeKeyShareClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe KeyShare +decodeKeyShareClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + -- len == 0 allows for HRR + grps <- getList len getKeyShareEntry + return $ KeyShareClientHello $ catMaybes grps + +decodeKeyShareServerHello :: ByteString -> Maybe KeyShare +decodeKeyShareServerHello = runGetMaybe $ do + (_, ment) <- getKeyShareEntry + case ment of + Nothing -> fail "decoding KeyShare for ServerHello" + Just ent -> return $ KeyShareServerHello ent + +decodeKeyShareHRR :: ByteString -> Maybe KeyShare +decodeKeyShareHRR = + runGetMaybe $ + KeyShareHRR . Group <$> getWord16 + +decodeKeyShare :: ByteString -> Maybe KeyShare +decodeKeyShare bs = + decodeKeyShareClientHello bs + <|> decodeKeyShareServerHello bs + <|> decodeKeyShareHRR bs + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype EchOuterExtensions = EchOuterExtensions [ExtensionID] + deriving (Eq, Show) + +instance Extension EchOuterExtensions where + extensionID _ = EID_EchOuterExtensions + extensionEncode (EchOuterExtensions ids) = runPut $ do + putWord8 $ fromIntegral (length ids * 2) + mapM_ (putWord16 . fromExtensionID) ids + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeEchOuterExtensions + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EchOuterExtensions" + +decodeEchOuterExtensions :: ByteString -> Maybe EchOuterExtensions +decodeEchOuterExtensions = runGetMaybe $ do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + eids <- getList len $ do + eid <- ExtensionID <$> getWord16 + return (2, eid) + return $ EchOuterExtensions eids + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Encrypted Client Hello +data EncryptedClientHello + = ECHClientHelloInner + | ECHClientHelloOuter + { echCipherSuite :: (KDF_ID, AEAD_ID) + , echConfigId :: ConfigId + , echEnc :: EncodedPublicKey + , echPayload :: ByteString + } + | ECHEncryptedExtensions ECHConfigList + | ECHHelloRetryRequest ByteString + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show EncryptedClientHello where + show ECHClientHelloInner = "ECHClientHelloInner" + show ECHClientHelloOuter{..} = + "ECHClientHelloOuter {" + ++ show (fst echCipherSuite) + ++ " " + ++ show (snd echCipherSuite) + ++ " " + ++ show echConfigId + ++ " " + ++ showBytesHex enc + ++ " " + ++ showBytesHex echPayload + ++ "}" + where + EncodedPublicKey enc = echEnc + show (ECHEncryptedExtensions cnflst) = "ECHEncryptedExtensions " ++ show cnflst + show (ECHHelloRetryRequest cnfm) = "ECHHelloRetryRequest " ++ showBytesHex cnfm + +instance Extension EncryptedClientHello where + extensionID _ = EID_EncryptedClientHello + extensionEncode ECHClientHelloInner = runPut $ putWord8 1 + extensionEncode ECHClientHelloOuter{..} = runPut $ do + putWord8 0 + let (kdfid, aeadid) = echCipherSuite + putWord16 $ fromKDF_ID kdfid + putWord16 $ fromAEAD_ID aeadid + putWord8 echConfigId + let EncodedPublicKey enc = echEnc + putOpaque16 enc + putOpaque16 echPayload + extensionEncode (ECHEncryptedExtensions cnflist) = encodeECHConfigList cnflist + extensionEncode (ECHHelloRetryRequest cnfm) = runPut $ putBytes cnfm + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = decodeECHClientHello + extensionDecode MsgTEncryptedExtensions = decodeECHEncryptedExtensions + extensionDecode MsgTHelloRetryRequest = decodeECHHelloRetryRequest + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: EncryptedClientHello" + +decodeECH :: ByteString -> Maybe EncryptedClientHello +decodeECH bs = + decodeECHClientHello bs + <|> decodeECHEncryptedExtensions bs + <|> decodeECHHelloRetryRequest bs + +decodeECHClientHello :: ByteString -> Maybe EncryptedClientHello +decodeECHClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do + typ <- getWord8 + if typ == 1 + then return ECHClientHelloInner + else do + kdfid <- KDF_ID <$> getWord16 + aeadid <- AEAD_ID <$> getWord16 + cnfid <- getWord8 + enc <- EncodedPublicKey <$> getOpaque16 + payload <- getOpaque16 + return $ + ECHClientHelloOuter + { echCipherSuite = (kdfid, aeadid) + , echConfigId = cnfid + , echEnc = enc + , echPayload = payload + } + +decodeECHEncryptedExtensions :: ByteString -> Maybe EncryptedClientHello +decodeECHEncryptedExtensions bs = + ECHEncryptedExtensions <$> decodeECHConfigList bs + +decodeECHHelloRetryRequest :: ByteString -> Maybe EncryptedClientHello +decodeECHHelloRetryRequest = runGetMaybe $ do + ECHHelloRetryRequest <$> getBytes 8 + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | Secure Renegotiation +data SecureRenegotiation = SecureRenegotiation ByteString ByteString + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Extension SecureRenegotiation where + extensionID _ = EID_SecureRenegotiation + extensionEncode (SecureRenegotiation cvd svd) = + runPut $ putOpaque8 (cvd `B.append` svd) + extensionDecode MsgTClientHello = runGetMaybe $ do + opaque <- getOpaque8 + return $ SecureRenegotiation opaque "" + extensionDecode MsgTServerHello = runGetMaybe $ do + opaque <- getOpaque8 + let (cvd, svd) = B.splitAt (B.length opaque `div` 2) opaque + return $ SecureRenegotiation cvd svd + extensionDecode _ = error "extensionDecode: SecureRenegotiation" diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extension.hs-boot b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs-boot new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extension.hs-boot @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +-- This is a breaker for cyclic imports: +-- +-- - Network.TLS.Extension imports Network.TLS.Struct +-- - Network.TLS.Extension imports Network.TLS.Packet +-- +-- - Network.TLS.Struct imports Network.TLS.Extension +-- +-- - Network.TLS.Packet imports Network.TLS.Struct +-- +-- Originally, ExtensionRaw was defined in Network.TLS.Struct and no +-- cyclic imports exist. It is moved into Network.TLS.Extension for +-- pretty-printing, so the cyclic imports happen. +module Network.TLS.Extension where + +import Data.ByteString +import Data.Word + +data ExtensionRaw = ExtensionRaw ExtensionID ByteString +instance Eq ExtensionRaw +instance Show ExtensionRaw + +newtype ExtensionID = ExtensionID {fromExtensionID :: Word16} diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra.hs @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-- | Default values and ciphers +module Network.TLS.Extra ( + module Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher, + module Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs @@ -0,0 +1,808 @@ +module Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher ( + -- * Cipher suite + ciphersuite_default, + ciphersuite_default_det, + ciphersuite_all, + ciphersuite_all_det, + ciphersuite_strong, + ciphersuite_strong_det, + ciphersuite_dhe_rsa, + + -- * Individual ciphers + + -- ** RFC 5288 + cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + + -- ** RFC 8446 + cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, + + -- ** RFC 5289 + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + + -- ** RFC 7251 + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + -- ** RFC 7905 + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + + -- * Deprecated names + + -- ** RFC 5288 + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384, + + -- ** RFC 8446 + cipher_TLS13_AES128GCM_SHA256, + cipher_TLS13_AES256GCM_SHA384, + cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM_SHA256, + cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM8_SHA256, + + -- ** RFC 5289 + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384, + + -- ** RFC 7251 + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM8_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256, + + -- ** RFC 7905 + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256, +) where + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 as ChaChaPoly1305 +import Crypto.Cipher.Types hiding (Cipher, cipherName) +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305 +import Crypto.System.CPU +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.Tuple (swap) + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | All AES and ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers supported ordered from strong to +-- weak. This choice of ciphersuites should satisfy most normal needs. For +-- otherwise strong ciphers we make little distinction between AES128 and +-- AES256, and list each but the weakest of the AES128 ciphers ahead of the +-- corresponding AES256 ciphers. +-- +-- AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU +-- hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not +-- desired, use 'ciphersuite_default_det' instead. +ciphersuite_default :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_default = ciphersuite_strong + +-- | Same as 'ciphersuite_default', but using deterministic preference not +-- influenced by the CPU. +ciphersuite_default_det :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_default_det = ciphersuite_strong_det + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | The default ciphersuites + some not recommended last resort ciphers. +-- +-- AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU +-- hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not +-- desired, use 'ciphersuite_all_det' instead. +ciphersuite_all :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_all = ciphersuite_default ++ complement_all + +-- | Same as 'ciphersuite_all', but using deterministic preference not +-- influenced by the CPU. +ciphersuite_all_det :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_all_det = ciphersuite_default_det ++ complement_all + +complement_all :: [Cipher] +complement_all = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 + ] + +-- | The strongest ciphers supported. For ciphers with PFS, AEAD and SHA2, we +-- list each AES128 variant after the corresponding AES256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 +-- variants. For weaker constructs, we use just the AES256 form. +-- +-- AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU +-- hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not +-- desired, use 'ciphersuite_strong_det' instead. +ciphersuite_strong :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_strong = sortOptimized sets_strong + +-- | Same as 'ciphersuite_strong', but using deterministic preference not +-- influenced by the CPU. +ciphersuite_strong_det :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_strong_det = sortDeterministic sets_strong + +sets_strong :: [CipherSet] +sets_strong = + [ -- If we have PFS + AEAD + SHA2, then allow AES128, else just 256 + SetAead + [cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384] + [cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256] + [cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM] + , SetAead + [cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + [] + [cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM] + , SetAead + [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384] + [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256] + [] + , SetAead + [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + [] + [] + , -- TLS13 (listed at the end but version is negotiated first) + SetAead + [cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384] + [cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256] + [] + , SetAead + [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + [] + [cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256] + ] + +-- | DHE-RSA cipher suite. This only includes ciphers bound specifically to +-- DHE-RSA so TLS 1.3 ciphers must be added separately. +-- +-- @since 2.1.5 +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa = + [ cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- A list of cipher suite is found from: +-- https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- RFC 5288 + +-- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x009E + , cipherName = "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128gcm + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 instead" + #-} +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 = cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + +-- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x009F + , cipherName = "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256gcm + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 + } + +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 + "Use cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 instead" + #-} +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 = cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- RFC 8446 + +-- TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x1301 + , cipherName = "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128gcm_13 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS13 + } + +cipher_TLS13_AES128GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_TLS13_AES128GCM_SHA256 = cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_TLS13_AES128GCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x1302 + , cipherName = "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256gcm_13 + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS13 + } + +cipher_TLS13_AES256GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_TLS13_AES256GCM_SHA384 = cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_TLS13_AES256GCM_SHA384 + "Use cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x1303 + , cipherName = "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_chacha20poly1305 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS13 + } + +cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 = cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 + "Use cipher13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 +cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x1304 + , cipherName = "TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128ccm_13 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS13 + } + +cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM_SHA256 = cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 +cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x1305 + , cipherName = "TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128ccm8_13 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Nothing + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS13 + } + +cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM8_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM8_SHA256 = cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM8_SHA256 + "Use cipher13_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- GCM: RFC 5289 + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC02B + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128gcm + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC02C + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256gcm + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC02F + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128gcm + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC030 + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256gcm + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 instead" + #-} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- CCM/ECC: RFC 7251 + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC0AC + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128ccm + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 7251 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM_SHA256 + "User cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC0AD + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256ccm + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 7251 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC0AE + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128ccm8 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 7251 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM8_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM8_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM8_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC0AF + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256ccm8 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 7251 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 instead" + #-} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- RFC 7905 + +-- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xCCA8 + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_chacha20poly1305 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xCCA9 + , cipherName = "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_chacha20poly1305 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 = cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 + "Use cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +-- TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xCCAA + , cipherName = "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_chacha20poly1305 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 + } + +cipher_DHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 = cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 +{-# DEPRECATED + cipher_DHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256 + "Use cipher_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 instead" + #-} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data CipherSet + = SetAead [Cipher] [Cipher] [Cipher] -- gcm, chacha, ccm + | SetOther [Cipher] + +-- Preference between AEAD ciphers having equivalent properties is based on +-- hardware-acceleration support in the crypton implementation. +sortOptimized :: [CipherSet] -> [Cipher] +sortOptimized = concatMap f + where + f (SetAead gcm chacha ccm) + | AESNI `notElem` processorOptions = chacha ++ gcm ++ ccm + | PCLMUL `notElem` processorOptions = ccm ++ chacha ++ gcm + | otherwise = gcm ++ ccm ++ chacha + f (SetOther ciphers) = ciphers + +-- Order which is deterministic but not optimized for the CPU. +sortDeterministic :: [CipherSet] -> [Cipher] +sortDeterministic = concatMap f + where + f (SetAead gcm chacha ccm) = gcm ++ chacha ++ ccm + f (SetOther ciphers) = ciphers + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +aes128ccm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes128ccm BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M16 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) +aes128ccm BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M16 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) + +aes128ccm8 :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes128ccm8 BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M8 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 8 + ) +aes128ccm8 BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M8 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 8 + ) + +aes128gcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes128gcm BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) +aes128gcm BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) + +aes256ccm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes256ccm BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M16 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) +aes256ccm BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M16 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) + +aes256ccm8 :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes256ccm8 BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M8 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 8 + ) +aes256ccm8 BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let mode = AEAD_CCM (B.length d) CCM_M8 CCM_L3 + aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit mode ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 8 + ) + +aes256gcm :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +aes256gcm BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) + in swap $ aeadSimpleEncrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) +aes256gcm BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \nonce d ad -> + let aeadIni = noFail (aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce) + in simpleDecrypt aeadIni ad d 16 + ) + +simpleDecrypt + :: AEAD cipher -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> (ByteString, AuthTag) +simpleDecrypt aeadIni header input taglen = (output, tag) + where + aead = aeadAppendHeader aeadIni header + (output, aeadFinal) = aeadDecrypt aead input + tag = aeadFinalize aeadFinal taglen + +noFail :: CryptoFailable a -> a +noFail = throwCryptoError + +chacha20poly1305 :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD +chacha20poly1305 BulkEncrypt key nonce = + let st = noFail (ChaChaPoly1305.nonce12 nonce >>= ChaChaPoly1305.initialize key) + in ( \input ad -> + let st2 = ChaChaPoly1305.finalizeAAD (ChaChaPoly1305.appendAAD ad st) + (output, st3) = ChaChaPoly1305.encrypt input st2 + Poly1305.Auth tag = ChaChaPoly1305.finalize st3 + in (output, AuthTag tag) + ) +chacha20poly1305 BulkDecrypt key nonce = + let st = noFail (ChaChaPoly1305.nonce12 nonce >>= ChaChaPoly1305.initialize key) + in ( \input ad -> + let st2 = ChaChaPoly1305.finalizeAAD (ChaChaPoly1305.appendAAD ad st) + (output, st3) = ChaChaPoly1305.decrypt input st2 + Poly1305.Auth tag = ChaChaPoly1305.finalize st3 + in (output, AuthTag tag) + ) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +bulk_aes128ccm :: Bulk +bulk_aes128ccm = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES128CCM" + , bulkKeySize = 16 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 6655 CCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes128ccm + } + +bulk_aes128ccm8 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128ccm8 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES128CCM8" + , bulkKeySize = 16 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 6655 CCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 8 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes128ccm8 + } + +bulk_aes128gcm :: Bulk +bulk_aes128gcm = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES128GCM" + , bulkKeySize = 16 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 5288 GCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes128gcm + } + +bulk_aes256ccm :: Bulk +bulk_aes256ccm = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES256CCM" + , bulkKeySize = 32 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 6655 CCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes256ccm + } + +bulk_aes256ccm8 :: Bulk +bulk_aes256ccm8 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES256CCM8" + , bulkKeySize = 32 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 6655 CCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 8 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes256ccm8 + } + +bulk_aes256gcm :: Bulk +bulk_aes256gcm = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES256GCM" + , bulkKeySize = 32 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN + , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 5288 GCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes256gcm + } + +bulk_chacha20poly1305 :: Bulk +bulk_chacha20poly1305 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "CHACHA20POLY1305" + , bulkKeySize = 32 + , bulkIVSize = 12 -- RFC 7905 section 2, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 + , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used + , bulkF = BulkAeadF chacha20poly1305 + } + +-- TLS13 bulks are same as TLS12 except they never have explicit IV +bulk_aes128gcm_13 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128gcm_13 = bulk_aes128gcm{bulkIVSize = 12, bulkExplicitIV = 0} + +bulk_aes256gcm_13 :: Bulk +bulk_aes256gcm_13 = bulk_aes256gcm{bulkIVSize = 12, bulkExplicitIV = 0} + +bulk_aes128ccm_13 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128ccm_13 = bulk_aes128ccm{bulkIVSize = 12, bulkExplicitIV = 0} + +bulk_aes128ccm8_13 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128ccm8_13 = bulk_aes128ccm8{bulkIVSize = 12, bulkExplicitIV = 0} diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra/CipherCBC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +module Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC ( + -- * TLS 1.2 CBC ciphers with PFS and SHA2 + ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc, + ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc, + ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc, + + -- ** Individual CBC ciphers + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256, + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256, + cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384, + cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256, +) where + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES +import Crypto.Cipher.Types hiding (Cipher, cipherName) +import Crypto.Error +-- import Crypto.System.CPU +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types hiding (IV) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with DHE or ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA or RSA +-- authentication and a SHA256 or SHA2384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 + ] + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA or RSA +-- authentication and a SHA256 or SHA2384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_ecdhe_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 + ] + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES CBC ciphers with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a +-- SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc :: [Cipher] +ciphersuite_dhe_rsa_sha2_cbc = + [ cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 + , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0x0067 + , cipherName = "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with DHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256 = + cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256 + { cipherID = 0x006B + , cipherName = "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC027 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES128CBC-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, RSA authentication and a SHA384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC028 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES256CBC-SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES128 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication and a SHA256 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xc023 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128CBC-SHA256" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +-- | TLS 1.2 AES256 CBC, with ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA authentication and a SHA384 MAC. +-- For legacy applications only, deprecated in HTTPS. +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384 = + Cipher + { cipherID = 0xC024 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256CBC-SHA384" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes256 + , cipherHash = SHA384 + , cipherPRFHash = Just SHA384 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5289 + } + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +aes128cbc :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkBlock +aes128cbc BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcEncrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 output) + ) +aes128cbc BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES128 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcDecrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 input) + ) + +aes256cbc :: BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkBlock +aes256cbc BulkEncrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcEncrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 output) + ) +aes256cbc BulkDecrypt key = + let ctx = noFail (cipherInit key) :: AES256 + in ( \iv input -> + let output = cbcDecrypt ctx (makeIV_ iv) input in (output, takelast 16 input) + ) + +makeIV_ :: BlockCipher a => B.ByteString -> IV a +makeIV_ = fromMaybe (error "makeIV_") . makeIV + +takelast :: Int -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString +takelast i b = B.drop (B.length b - i) b + +noFail :: CryptoFailable a -> a +noFail = throwCryptoError + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +bulk_aes128 :: Bulk +bulk_aes128 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES128" + , bulkKeySize = 16 + , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 + , bulkBlockSize = 16 + , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes128cbc + } + +bulk_aes256 :: Bulk +bulk_aes256 = + Bulk + { bulkName = "AES256" + , bulkKeySize = 32 + , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 + , bulkBlockSize = 16 + , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes256cbc + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/Extra/FFDHE.hs b/Network/TLS/Extra/FFDHE.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Extra/FFDHE.hs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Network.TLS.Extra +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Kazu Yamamoto +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters defined in RFC 7919. +module Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE where + +import Crypto.PubKey.DH +import Network.TLS.Crypto.DH (DHParams) + +-- | 2048 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters +-- defined in RFC 7919. +-- The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 103 bits. +ffdhe2048 :: DHParams +ffdhe2048 = + Params + { params_p = + 0x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params_g = 2 + , params_bits = 2048 + } + +-- | 3072 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters +-- defined in RFC 7919. +-- The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 125 bits. +ffdhe3072 :: DHParams +ffdhe3072 = + Params + { params_p = + 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params_g = 2 + , params_bits = 3072 + } + +-- | 4096 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters +-- defined in RFC 7919. +-- The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 150 bits. +ffdhe4096 :: DHParams +ffdhe4096 = + Params + { params_p = + 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params_g = 2 + , params_bits = 4096 + } + +-- | 6144 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters +-- defined in RFC 7919. +-- The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 175 bits. +ffdhe6144 :: DHParams +ffdhe6144 = + Params + { params_p = + 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params_g = 2 + , params_bits = 6144 + } + +-- | 8192 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters +-- defined in RFC 7919. +-- The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 192 bits. +ffdhe8192 :: DHParams +ffdhe8192 = + Params + { params_p = + 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params_g = 2 + , params_bits = 8192 + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake.hs @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +module Network.TLS.Handshake ( + handshake_, + handshakeWith, + handshakeClientWith, + handshakeServerWith, + handshakeClient, + handshakeServer, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server +import Network.TLS.Struct + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict + +handshake_ :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () +handshake_ ctx = + liftIO $ + withRWLock ctx $ + handleException ctx (doHandshake_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx) + +-- Handshake when requested by the remote end +-- This is called automatically by 'recvData', in a context where the read lock +-- is already taken. So contrary to 'handshake' above, here we only need to +-- call withWriteLock. +handshakeWith :: MonadIO m => Context -> HandshakeR -> m () +handshakeWith ctx hsr = + liftIO $ + withWriteLock ctx $ + handleException ctx $ + doHandshakeWith_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx hsr diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Certificate.hs @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate ( + certificateRejected, + badCertificate, + rejectOnException, + verifyLeafKeyUsage, + verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose, + extractCAname, +) where + +import Control.Exception (SomeException) +import Control.Monad (unless) +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.X509 ( + ExtExtendedKeyUsage (..), + ExtKeyUsage (..), + ExtKeyUsageFlag, + ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..), + extensionGet, + ) + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.X509 + +-- on certificate reject, throw an exception with the proper protocol alert error. +certificateRejected :: MonadIO m => CertificateRejectReason -> m a +certificateRejected CertificateRejectRevoked = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "certificate is revoked" CertificateRevoked +certificateRejected CertificateRejectExpired = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "certificate has expired" CertificateExpired +certificateRejected CertificateRejectUnknownCA = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "certificate has unknown CA" UnknownCa +certificateRejected CertificateRejectAbsent = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "certificate is missing" CertificateRequired +certificateRejected (CertificateRejectOther s) = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("certificate rejected: " ++ s) CertificateUnknown + +badCertificate :: MonadIO m => String -> m a +badCertificate msg = throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg BadCertificate + +rejectOnException :: SomeException -> IO CertificateUsage +rejectOnException e = return $ CertificateUsageReject $ CertificateRejectOther $ show e + +verifyLeafKeyUsage :: MonadIO m => [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> CertificateChain -> m () +verifyLeafKeyUsage _ (CertificateChain []) = return () +verifyLeafKeyUsage validFlags (CertificateChain (signed : _)) = + unless verified $ + badCertificate $ + "certificate is not allowed for any of " ++ show validFlags + where + cert = getCertificate signed + verified = + case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of + Nothing -> True -- unrestricted cert + Just (ExtKeyUsage flags) -> any (`elem` validFlags) flags + +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose + :: MonadIO m => ExtKeyUsagePurpose -> CertificateChain -> m () +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose _ (CertificateChain []) = return () +verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose validPurpose (CertificateChain (signed : _)) = + unless verified $ + badCertificate $ + "certificate is not allowed for " ++ show validPurpose + where + cert = getCertificate signed + verified = case extensionGet (certExtensions cert) of + Nothing -> True + Just (ExtExtendedKeyUsage purposes) -> validPurpose `elem` purposes + +extractCAname :: SignedCertificate -> DistinguishedName +extractCAname cert = certSubjectDN $ getCertificate cert diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client.hs @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client ( + handshakeClient, + handshakeClientWith, + postHandshakeAuthClientWith, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ClientHello +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ServerHello +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS12 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshakeClientWith + :: ClientParams -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () +handshakeClientWith cparams ctx (HelloRequest, _b) = handshakeClient cparams ctx -- xxx +handshakeClientWith _ _ _ = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "unexpected handshake message received in handshakeClientWith" + HandshakeFailure + +-- client part of handshake. send a bunch of handshake of client +-- values intertwined with response from the server. +handshakeClient :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +handshakeClient cparams ctx = do + grps <- case clientSessions cparams of + [] -> + return $ + Groups + { grpsSupported = groupsSupported + , grpsSelected = groupsSelected + } + (_, sdata) : _ -> case sessionGroup sdata of + Nothing -> + -- TLS 1.2 or earlier + return $ + Groups + { grpsSupported = groupsSupported -- for ciphers + , grpsSelected = [] + } + Just grp + | grp `elem` groupsSupported -> do + let supported = grp : filter (/= grp) groupsSupported + return $ + Groups + { grpsSupported = supported + , grpsSelected = [grp] + } + | otherwise -> throwCore $ Error_Misc "groupsSupported is incorrect" + handshake cparams ctx grps Nothing + where + groupsSupported = supportedGroups (ctxSupported ctx) + groupsSelected = onSelectKeyShareGroups (clientHooks cparams) groupsSupported + +-- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.1.2 says: +-- "The client will also send a +-- ClientHello when the server has responded to its ClientHello with a +-- HelloRetryRequest. In that case, the client MUST send the same +-- ClientHello without modification, except as follows:" +-- +-- So, the ClientRandom in the first client hello is necessary. +handshake + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> Groups + -> Maybe (ClientRandom, Session, Version) + -> IO () +handshake cparams ctx grps@Groups{..} mparams = do + -------------------------------- + -- Sending ClientHello + pskinfo@(_, _, rtt0) <- getPreSharedKeyInfo cparams ctx + when rtt0 $ modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13st0RTT = True} + let async = rtt0 && not (ctxQUICMode ctx) + when async $ do + chSentTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + asyncServerHello13 cparams ctx grpsSelected chSentTime + updateMeasure ctx incrementNbHandshakes + crand <- + sendClientHello cparams ctx grps mparams pskinfo + -------------------------------- + -- Receiving ServerHello + unless async $ do + (ver, hbs, hrr) <- receiveServerHello cparams ctx mparams + -- Switching to HRR, TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 + case ver of + TLS13 + | hrr -> + helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand grpsSupported grpsSelected + | otherwise -> do + recvServerSecondFlight13 cparams ctx grpsSelected + sendClientSecondFlight13 cparams ctx + _ + | rtt0 -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server denied TLS 1.3 when connecting with early data" + HandshakeFailure + | otherwise -> do + recvServerFirstFlight12 cparams ctx hbs + sendClientSecondFlight12 cparams ctx + recvServerSecondFlight12 cparams ctx + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +helloRetry + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> Maybe a + -> Version + -> ClientRandom + -> [Group] + -> [Group] + -> IO () +helloRetry cparams ctx mparams ver crand groupsSupported groupsSelected = do + when (null groupsSupported) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no supported groups on the client side" IllegalParameter + when (isJust mparams) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "server sent too many hello retries" UnexpectedMessage + mks <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13KeyShare + case mks of + Just (KeyShareHRR selectedGroup) + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.1.4: the selected_group MUST be in supported_groups + -- and MUST NOT already have been offered in the initial key_share. + | selectedGroup `elem` groupsSupported + && selectedGroup `notElem` groupsSelected -> do + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode HelloRetryRequest + clearTxRecordState ctx + let cparams' = cparams{clientUseEarlyData = False} + runPacketFlight ctx $ sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx + clientSession <- tls13stSession <$> getTLS13State ctx + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.1.2: the second ClientHello MUST be identical + -- to the first except for the specific listed changes. + -- supported_groups is NOT on that list, so it must be unchanged. + let grps = + Groups + { grpsSupported = groupsSupported + , grpsSelected = [selectedGroup] + } + + handshake + cparams' + ctx + grps + (Just (crand, clientSession, ver)) + | selectedGroup `elem` groupsSelected -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server selected a group already offered in key_share" + IllegalParameter + | otherwise -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "server-selected group is not supported" IllegalParameter + Just _ -> error "handshake: invalid KeyShare value" + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "key exchange not implemented in HRR, expected key_share extension" + HandshakeFailure diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ClientHello.hs @@ -0,0 +1,610 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ClientHello ( + sendClientHello, + getPreSharedKeyInfo, + Groups (..), +) where + +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Crypto.HPKE hiding (CipherText, PlainText) +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import System.Random + +#if !MIN_VERSION_random(1,3,0) +import Data.ByteString.Internal (unsafeCreate) +import Foreign.Ptr +import Foreign.Storable +#endif + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Random +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet hiding (getExtensions) +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data Groups = Groups + { grpsSupported :: [Group] + -- ^ For supported_group, head is identical to key_share + , grpsSelected :: [Group] + -- ^ For key_share + } + deriving (Eq, Show) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendClientHello + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> Groups + -> Maybe (ClientRandom, Session, Version) + -> PreSharedKeyInfo + -> IO ClientRandom +sendClientHello cparams ctx grps mparams pskinfo = do + crand <- generateClientHelloParams mparams -- Inner for ECH + sendClientHello' cparams ctx grps crand pskinfo + return crand + where + highestVer = maximum $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + tls13 = highestVer >= TLS13 + ems = supportedExtendedMainSecret $ ctxSupported ctx + + -- Client random and session in the second client hello for + -- retry must be the same as the first one. + generateClientHelloParams (Just (crand, clientSession, _)) = do + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stSession = clientSession} + return crand + generateClientHelloParams Nothing = do + crand <- clientRandom ctx + let paramSession = case clientSessions cparams of + [] -> Session Nothing + (sidOrTkt, sdata) : _ + | sessionVersion sdata >= TLS13 -> Session Nothing + | ems == RequireEMS && noSessionEMS -> Session Nothing + | isTicket sidOrTkt -> Session $ Just $ toSessionID sidOrTkt + | otherwise -> Session (Just sidOrTkt) + where + noSessionEMS = SessionEMS `notElem` sessionFlags sdata + -- In compatibility mode a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 + -- session MUST generate a new 32-byte value + if tls13 && paramSession == Session Nothing && not (ctxQUICMode ctx) + then do + randomSession <- newSession ctx + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stSession = randomSession} + return crand + else do + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stSession = paramSession} + return crand + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendClientHello' + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> Groups + -> ClientRandom + -> ( Maybe ([ByteString], SessionData, CipherChoice, Word32) + , Maybe CipherChoice + , Bool + ) + -> IO () +sendClientHello' cparams ctx Groups{..} crand (pskInfo, rtt0info, rtt0) = do + let ver = if tls13 then TLS12 else highestVer + clientSession <- tls13stSession <$> getTLS13State ctx + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + unless hrr $ startHandshake ctx ver crand + usingState_ ctx $ setVersionIfUnset highestVer + let cipherIds = map (CipherId . cipherID) ciphers + mkClientHello exts = + CH + { chVersion = ver + , chRandom = crand + , chSession = clientSession + , chCiphers = cipherIds + , chComps = [0] + , chExtensions = exts + } + setMyRecordLimit ctx $ limitRecordSize $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx + extensions0 <- catMaybes <$> getExtensions + let extensions1 = sharedHelloExtensions (clientShared cparams) ++ extensions0 + extensions <- adjustPreSharedKeyExt extensions1 $ mkClientHello extensions1 + let ch0 = mkClientHello extensions + updateTranscriptHashI ctx "ClientHelloI" $ encodeHandshake $ ClientHello ch0 + let nhpks = supportedHPKE $ clientSupported cparams + echcnfs = sharedECHConfigList $ clientShared cparams + mEchParams = lookupECHConfigList nhpks echcnfs + ch <- + if clientUseECH cparams + then case mEchParams of + Nothing -> do + if hrr + then do + (chI, _) <- fromJust <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello + let ch0' = ch0{chExtensions = take 1 (chExtensions chI) ++ drop 1 (chExtensions ch0)} + -- [] will be overridden via + -- encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello ch0' [] + return ch0' + else do + gEchExt <- greasingEchExt + let ch0' = ch0{chExtensions = gEchExt : drop 1 (chExtensions ch0)} + -- [] will be overridden via + -- encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello ch0' [] + return ch0' + Just echParams -> do + let encoded = encodeHandshake $ ClientHello ch0 + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello ch0 [encoded] + mcrandO <- usingHState ctx getOuterClientRandom + crandO <- case mcrandO of + Nothing -> clientRandom ctx + Just x -> return x + usingHState ctx $ do + setClientRandom crandO + setOuterClientRandom $ Just crandO + mpskExt <- randomPreSharedKeyExt + createEncryptedClientHello ctx ch0 echParams crandO mpskExt + else do + -- [] will be overridden via + -- encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello ch0 [] + return ch0 + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [ClientHello ch] [] + mEarlySecInfo <- case rtt0info of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just info -> Just <$> getEarlySecretInfo info + unless hrr $ contextSync ctx $ SendClientHello mEarlySecInfo + let sentExtensions = map (\(ExtensionRaw i _) -> i) extensions + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stSentExtensions = sentExtensions} + where + ciphers = supportedCiphers $ ctxSupported ctx + highestVer = maximum $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + tls13 = highestVer >= TLS13 + ems = supportedExtendedMainSecret $ ctxSupported ctx + + -- List of extensions to send in ClientHello, ordered such that we never + -- terminate with a zero-length extension. Some buggy implementations + -- are allergic to an extension with empty data at final position. + -- + -- Without TLS 1.3, the list ends with extension "signature_algorithms" + -- with length >= 2 bytes. When TLS 1.3 is enabled, extensions + -- "psk_key_exchange_modes" (currently always sent) and "pre_shared_key" + -- (not always present) have length > 0. + getExtensions = + sequence + [ {- 0xfe0d -} echExt + , {- 0x00 -} sniExt + , {- 0x0a -} groupExt + , {- 0x0b -} ecPointExt + , {- 0x0d -} signatureAlgExt + , {- 0x10 -} alpnExt + , {- 0x17 -} emsExt + , {- 0x1b -} compCertExt + , {- 0x1c -} recordSizeLimitExt + , {- 0x23 -} sessionTicketExt + , {- 0x2a -} earlyDataExt + , {- 0x2b -} versionExt + , {- 0x2c -} cookieExt + , {- 0x2d -} pskExchangeModeExt + , {- 0x31 -} postHandshakeAuthExt + , {- 0x33 -} keyShareExt + , {- 0xff01 -} secureRenegExt + , {- 0x29 -} preSharedKeyExt -- MUST be last (RFC 8446) + ] + + -------------------- + + sniExt = + if clientUseServerNameIndication cparams + then do + let sni = fst $ clientServerIdentification cparams + usingState_ ctx $ setClientSNI sni + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [ServerNameHostName sni] + else return Nothing + + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.2.8 says: Each KeyShareEntry value MUST correspond + -- to a group offered in the "supported_groups" extension and MUST + -- appear in the same order. + groupExt = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SupportedGroups grpsSupported + + ecPointExt = + return $ + Just $ + toExtensionRaw $ + EcPointFormatsSupported [EcPointFormat_Uncompressed] + + signatureAlgExt = + return $ + Just $ + toExtensionRaw $ + SignatureAlgorithms $ + supportedHashSignatures $ + clientSupported cparams + + alpnExt = do + mprotos <- onSuggestALPN $ clientHooks cparams + case mprotos of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just protos -> do + usingState_ ctx $ setClientALPNSuggest protos + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation protos + + emsExt = + return $ + if ems == NoEMS || all (>= TLS13) (supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx) + then Nothing + else Just $ toExtensionRaw ExtendedMainSecret + + compCertExt = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw (CompressCertificate [CCA_Zlib]) + + recordSizeLimitExt = case limitRecordSize $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just siz -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ RecordSizeLimit $ fromIntegral siz + + sessionTicketExt = + case clientSessions cparams of + (sidOrTkt, _) : _ + | isTicket sidOrTkt -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket sidOrTkt + _ | clientWantTicket cparams -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" + | otherwise -> return $ Nothing + + earlyDataExt + | rtt0 = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw (EarlyDataIndication Nothing) + | otherwise = return Nothing + + versionExt + | clientUseECH cparams = do + let vers = supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + if TLS13 `elem` vers + then + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SupportedVersionsClientHello [TLS13] + else + throwCore $ Error_Misc "TLS 1.3 must be specified for Encrypted Client Hello" + | tls13 = do + let vers = filter (>= TLS12) $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SupportedVersionsClientHello vers + | otherwise = return Nothing + + cookieExt = do + mcookie <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13Cookie + case mcookie of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just cookie -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw cookie + + pskExchangeModeExt + | tls13 = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ PskKeyExchangeModes [PSK_DHE_KE] + | otherwise = return Nothing + + postHandshakeAuthExt + | ctxQUICMode ctx = return Nothing + | tls13 = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw PostHandshakeAuth + | otherwise = return Nothing + + keyShareExt + | tls13 = do + (grpCpris, ents) <- unzip <$> mapM (makeClientKeyShare ctx) grpsSelected + usingHState ctx $ setGroupPrivate grpCpris + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ KeyShareClientHello ents + | otherwise = return Nothing + + secureRenegExt = + if supportedSecureRenegotiation $ ctxSupported ctx + then do + VerifyData cvd <- usingState_ ctx $ getVerifyData ClientRole + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SecureRenegotiation cvd "" + else return Nothing + + -- ECHClientHelloInner should be replaced if ECHConfigList is not available. + echExt + | clientUseECH cparams = return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw ECHClientHelloInner + | otherwise = return Nothing + + preSharedKeyExt = + case pskInfo of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (identities, _, choice, obfAge) -> do + let zero = cZero choice + pskIdentities = map (\x -> PskIdentity x obfAge) identities + -- [zero] is a place holds. + -- adjustPreSharedKeyExt will replace them. + binders = replicate (length pskIdentities) $ convert zero + offeredPsks = PreSharedKeyClientHello pskIdentities binders + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw offeredPsks + + randomPreSharedKeyExt :: IO (Maybe ExtensionRaw) + randomPreSharedKeyExt = + case pskInfo of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (identities, _, choice, _) -> do + let zero = cZero choice + zeroR <- getStdRandom $ uniformByteString $ BA.length zero + obfAgeR <- getStdRandom genWord32 + let genPskId x = do + xR <- getStdRandom $ uniformByteString $ B.length x + return $ PskIdentity xR obfAgeR + pskIdentitiesR <- mapM genPskId identities + let bindersR = replicate (length pskIdentitiesR) zeroR + offeredPsksR = PreSharedKeyClientHello pskIdentitiesR bindersR + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw offeredPsksR + + ---------------------------------------- + + adjustPreSharedKeyExt exts ch = + case pskInfo of + Nothing -> return exts + Just (identities, sdata, choice, _) -> do + let psk = sessionSecret sdata + earlySecret = initEarlySecret choice (Just psk) + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13EarlySecret earlySecret + let ech = encodeHandshake $ ClientHello ch + h = cHash choice + siz = (hashDigestSize h + 1) * length identities + 2 + binder = makePSKBinder earlySecret h siz ech + -- PSK is shared by the previous TLS session. + -- So, PSK is unique for identities. + let binders = replicate (length identities) binder + let exts' = init exts ++ [adjust (last exts)] + adjust (ExtensionRaw eid withoutBinders) = ExtensionRaw eid withBinders + where + withBinders = replacePSKBinder withoutBinders binders + return exts' + + getEarlySecretInfo choice = do + let usedCipher = cCipher choice + usedHash = cHash choice + Just earlySecret <- usingHState ctx getTLS13EarlySecret + earlyKey <- calculateEarlySecret ctx choice (Right earlySecret) + let clientEarlySecret = pairClient earlyKey + unless (ctxQUICMode ctx) $ do + runPacketFlight ctx $ sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx + setTxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientEarlySecret + setEstablished ctx EarlyDataSending + -- We set RTT0Sent even in quicMode + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Sent + return $ EarlySecretInfo usedCipher clientEarlySecret + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +type PreSharedKeyInfo = + ( Maybe ([SessionIDorTicket], SessionData, CipherChoice, Second) + , Maybe CipherChoice + , Bool + ) + +getPreSharedKeyInfo + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> IO PreSharedKeyInfo +getPreSharedKeyInfo cparams ctx = do + pskInfo <- getPskInfo + let rtt0info = pskInfo >>= get0RTTinfo + rtt0 = isJust rtt0info + return (pskInfo, rtt0info, rtt0) + where + ciphers = supportedCiphers $ ctxSupported ctx + highestVer = maximum $ supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + tls13 = highestVer >= TLS13 + + sessions = case clientSessions cparams of + [] -> Nothing + (sid, sdata) : xs -> do + guard tls13 + guard (sessionVersion sdata >= TLS13) + let cid = sessionCipher sdata + sids = map fst xs + sCipher <- findCipher cid ciphers + Just (sid : sids, sdata, sCipher) + + getPskInfo = case sessions of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (identity, sdata, sCipher) -> do + let tinfo = fromJust $ sessionTicketInfo sdata + age <- getAge tinfo + return $ + if isAgeValid age tinfo + then + Just + ( identity + , sdata + , makeCipherChoice TLS13 sCipher + , ageToObfuscatedAge age tinfo + ) + else Nothing + + get0RTTinfo (_, sdata, choice, _) + | clientUseEarlyData cparams && sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sdata > 0 = Just choice + | otherwise = Nothing + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +createEncryptedClientHello + :: Context + -> ClientHello + -> (KDF_ID, AEAD_ID, ECHConfig) + -> ClientRandom + -> Maybe ExtensionRaw + -> IO ClientHello +createEncryptedClientHello ctx ch0@CH{..} echParams@(kdfid, aeadid, conf) crO mpskExt = E.handle hpkeHandler $ do + let (chExtsO, chExtsI) = dupCompExts (cnfPublicName conf) mpskExt chExtensions + chI = + ch0 + { chSession = Session Nothing + , chExtensions = chExtsI + } + Just (func, enc, taglen) <- getHPKE ctx echParams + let bsI = encodeHandshake' $ ClientHello chI + padLen = 32 - (B.length bsI .&. 31) + bsI' = bsI <> B.replicate padLen 0 + let outerZ = + ECHClientHelloOuter + { echCipherSuite = (kdfid, aeadid) + , echConfigId = cnfConfigId conf + , echEnc = enc + , echPayload = B.replicate (B.length bsI' + taglen) 0 + } + echOZ = extensionEncode outerZ + chExtsOTail = drop 1 chExtsO + chOZ = + ch0 + { chRandom = crO + , chExtensions = + ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello echOZ : chExtsOTail + } + aad = encodeHandshake' $ ClientHello chOZ + bsO <- func aad bsI' + let outer = + ECHClientHelloOuter + { echCipherSuite = (kdfid, aeadid) + , echConfigId = cnfConfigId conf + , echEnc = enc + , echPayload = bsO + } + echO = extensionEncode outer + chO = + chOZ + { chExtensions = + ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello echO : chExtsOTail + } + return chO + where + hpkeHandler :: HPKEError -> IO ClientHello + hpkeHandler _ = return ch0 + +dupCompExts + :: HostName + -> Maybe ExtensionRaw + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> ([ExtensionRaw], [ExtensionRaw]) -- Outer, inner +dupCompExts host mpskExt chExts = step1 chExts + where + step1 (echExtI@(ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello _) : exts) = + (echExtO : os, echExtI : is) + where + echExtO = ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello "" + (os, is) = step2 exts + step1 _ = error "step1" + step2 (sniExtI@(ExtensionRaw EID_ServerName _) : exts) = + (sniExtO : os, sniExtI : is) + where + sniExtO = toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [ServerNameHostName host] + (os, is) = step3 exts id + step2 _ = error "step2" + step3 [] build = ([], [echOuterExt]) + where + echOuterExt = toExtensionRaw $ EchOuterExtensions $ build [] + step3 [pskExtI@(ExtensionRaw EID_PreSharedKey _)] build = + ([pskExtO], [echOuterExt, pskExtI]) + where + echOuterExt = toExtensionRaw $ EchOuterExtensions $ build [] + pskExtO = fromJust mpskExt + step3 (i@(ExtensionRaw eid _) : is) build = (i : os', is') + where + (os', is') = step3 is (build . (eid :)) + +getHPKE + :: Context + -> (KDF_ID, AEAD_ID, ECHConfig) + -> IO (Maybe (AAD -> PlainText -> IO CipherText, EncodedPublicKey, Int)) +getHPKE ctx (kdfid, aeadid, conf) = do + mfunc <- getTLS13HPKE ctx + case mfunc of + Nothing -> do + let encodedConfig = encodeECHConfig conf + info = "tls ech\x00" <> encodedConfig + (pkSm, ctxS) <- setupBaseS kemid kdfid aeadid Nothing Nothing mpkR info + let func = seal ctxS + setTLS13HPKE ctx func 0 + return $ Just (func, pkSm, nT) + Just (func, _) -> return $ Just (func, EncodedPublicKey "", nT) + where + mpkR = cnfEncodedPublicKey conf + kemid = cnfKemId conf + nT = nTag aeadid + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +lookupECHConfigList + :: [(KEM_ID, KDF_ID, AEAD_ID)] + -> ECHConfigList + -> Maybe (KDF_ID, AEAD_ID, ECHConfig) +lookupECHConfigList [] _ = Nothing +lookupECHConfigList ((kemid, kdfid, aeadid) : xs) cnfs = + case find (\cnf -> cnfKemId cnf == kemid) cnfs of + Nothing -> lookupECHConfigList xs cnfs + Just cnf + | (kdfid, aeadid) `elem` cnfCipherSuite cnf -> + Just (kdfid, aeadid, cnf) + | otherwise -> lookupECHConfigList xs cnfs + +cnfKemId :: ECHConfig -> KEM_ID +cnfKemId ECHConfig{..} = KEM_ID $ kem_id $ key_config contents + +cnfCipherSuite :: ECHConfig -> [(KDF_ID, AEAD_ID)] +cnfCipherSuite ECHConfig{..} = map conv $ cipher_suites $ key_config contents + where + conv HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite{..} = (KDF_ID kdf_id, AEAD_ID aead_id) + +cnfEncodedPublicKey :: ECHConfig -> EncodedPublicKey +cnfEncodedPublicKey ECHConfig{..} = EncodedPublicKey pk + where + EncodedServerPublicKey pk = public_key $ key_config contents + +cnfPublicName :: ECHConfig -> HostName +cnfPublicName ECHConfig{..} = public_name contents + +cnfConfigId :: ECHConfig -> ConfigId +cnfConfigId ECHConfig{..} = config_id $ key_config contents + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- Pretending X25519 is used because it is the de-facto and +-- its public key is easily created. +greasingEchExt :: IO ExtensionRaw +greasingEchExt = do + cid <- getStdRandom genWord8 + enc <- getStdRandom $ uniformByteString 32 + n <- getStdRandom $ randomR (4, 6) + payload <- getStdRandom $ uniformByteString (n * 32 + 16) + let outer = + ECHClientHelloOuter + { echCipherSuite = (HKDF_SHA256, AES_128_GCM) + , echConfigId = cid + , echEnc = EncodedPublicKey enc + , echPayload = payload + } + return $ toExtensionRaw outer + +#if !MIN_VERSION_random(1,3,0) +uniformByteString :: RandomGen g => Int -> g -> (ByteString, g) +uniformByteString l g0 = (bs, g2) + where + (g1, g2) = split g0 + bs = unsafeCreate l $ go 0 g1 + go n g ptr + | n == l = return () + | otherwise = do + let (w, g') = genWord8 g + poke ptr w + go (n + 1) g' (plusPtr ptr 1) +#endif diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/Common.hs @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common ( + throwMiscErrorOnException, + doServerKeyExchange, + doCertificate, + getLocalHashSigAlg, + clientChain, + sigAlgsToCertTypes, + setALPN, + contextSync, + clientSessions, +) where + +import Control.Exception (SomeException) +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..)) + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet hiding (getExtensions) +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Util (catchException) +import Network.TLS.X509 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +throwMiscErrorOnException :: String -> SomeException -> IO a +throwMiscErrorOnException msg e = + throwCore $ Error_Misc $ msg ++ ": " ++ show e + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +doServerKeyExchange :: Context -> ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData -> IO () +doServerKeyExchange ctx origSkx = do + cipher <- usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + processWithCipher cipher origSkx + where + processWithCipher cipher skx = + case (cipherKeyExchange cipher, skx) of + (CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA, SKX_DHE_RSA dhparams signature) -> + doDHESignature dhparams signature KX_RSA + (CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA, SKX_DHE_DSA dhparams signature) -> + doDHESignature dhparams signature KX_DSA + (CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA, SKX_ECDHE_RSA ecdhparams signature) -> + doECDHESignature ecdhparams signature KX_RSA + (CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA, SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA ecdhparams signature) -> + doECDHESignature ecdhparams signature KX_ECDSA + (cke, SKX_Unparsed bytes) -> do + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + case decodeReallyServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData ver cke bytes of + Left _ -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("unknown server key exchange received, expecting: " ++ show cke) + HandshakeFailure + Right realSkx -> processWithCipher cipher realSkx + -- we need to resolve the result. and recall processWithCipher .. + (c, _) -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("unknown server key exchange received, expecting: " ++ show c) + HandshakeFailure + doDHESignature dhparams signature kxsAlg = do + -- FF group selected by the server is verified when generating CKX + publicKey <- getSignaturePublicKey kxsAlg + verified <- digitallySignDHParamsVerify ctx dhparams publicKey signature + unless verified $ + decryptError + ("bad " ++ pubkeyType publicKey ++ " signature for dhparams " ++ show dhparams) + usingHState ctx $ setServerDHParams dhparams + + doECDHESignature ecdhparams signature kxsAlg = do + -- EC group selected by the server is verified when generating CKX + publicKey <- getSignaturePublicKey kxsAlg + verified <- digitallySignECDHParamsVerify ctx ecdhparams publicKey signature + unless verified $ + decryptError ("bad " ++ pubkeyType publicKey ++ " signature for ecdhparams") + usingHState ctx $ setServerECDHParams ecdhparams + + getSignaturePublicKey kxsAlg = do + publicKey <- usingHState ctx getRemotePublicKey + unless (isKeyExchangeSignatureKey kxsAlg publicKey) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("server public key algorithm is incompatible with " ++ show kxsAlg) + HandshakeFailure + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + unless (publicKey `versionCompatible` ver) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + (show ver ++ " has no support for " ++ pubkeyType publicKey) + IllegalParameter + let groups = supportedGroups (ctxSupported ctx) + unless (satisfiesEcPredicate (`elem` groups) publicKey) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "server public key has unsupported elliptic curve" + IllegalParameter + return publicKey + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +doCertificate :: ClientParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> IO () +doCertificate cparams ctx certs = do + when (isNullCertificateChain certs) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "server certificate missing" DecodeError + -- run certificate recv hook + ctxWithHooks ctx (`hookRecvCertificates` certs) + -- then run certificate validation + usage <- catchException (wrapCertificateChecks <$> checkCert) rejectOnException + case usage of + CertificateUsageAccept -> checkLeafCertificateKeyUsage + CertificateUsageReject reason -> certificateRejected reason + where + shared = clientShared cparams + checkCert = + onServerCertificate + (clientHooks cparams) + (sharedCAStore shared) + (sharedValidationCache shared) + (clientServerIdentification cparams) + certs + -- also verify that the certificate optional key usage is compatible + -- with the intended key-exchange. This check is not delegated to + -- x509-validation 'checkLeafKeyUsage' because it depends on negotiated + -- cipher, which is not available from onServerCertificate parameters. + -- Additionally, with only one shared ValidationCache, x509-validation + -- would cache validation result based on a key usage and reuse it with + -- another key usage. + checkLeafCertificateKeyUsage = do + cipher <- usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + case requiredCertKeyUsage cipher of + [] -> return () + flags -> verifyLeafKeyUsage flags certs + +-- Unless result is empty, server certificate must be allowed for at least one +-- of the returned values. Constraints for RSA-based key exchange are relaxed +-- to avoid rejecting certificates having incomplete extension. +requiredCertKeyUsage :: Cipher -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag] +requiredCertKeyUsage cipher = + case cipherKeyExchange cipher of + CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> rsaCompatibility + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> [] -- unrestricted + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> rsaCompatibility + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> rsaCompatibility + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] + CipherKeyExchange_DH_DSA -> [KeyUsage_keyAgreement] + CipherKeyExchange_DH_RSA -> rsaCompatibility + CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSA -> [KeyUsage_keyAgreement] + CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSA -> rsaCompatibility + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] + CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 -> [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] + where + rsaCompatibility = + [ KeyUsage_digitalSignature + , KeyUsage_keyEncipherment + , KeyUsage_keyAgreement + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Return the supported 'CertificateType' values that are +-- compatible with at least one supported signature algorithm. +supportedCtypes + :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -> [CertificateType] +supportedCtypes hashAlgs = + nub $ foldr ctfilter [] hashAlgs + where + ctfilter x acc = case hashSigToCertType x of + Just cType + | cType <= lastSupportedCertificateType -> + cType : acc + _ -> acc + +clientSupportedCtypes + :: Context + -> [CertificateType] +clientSupportedCtypes ctx = + supportedCtypes $ supportedHashSignatures $ ctxSupported ctx + +sigAlgsToCertTypes + :: Context + -> [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -> [CertificateType] +sigAlgsToCertTypes ctx hashSigs = + filter (`elem` supportedCtypes hashSigs) $ clientSupportedCtypes ctx + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | When the server requests a client certificate, we try to +-- obtain a suitable certificate chain and private key via the +-- callback in the client parameters. It is OK for the callback +-- to return an empty chain, in many cases the client certificate +-- is optional. If the client wishes to abort the handshake for +-- lack of a suitable certificate, it can throw an exception in +-- the callback. +-- +-- The return value is 'Nothing' when no @CertificateRequest@ was +-- received and no @Certificate@ message needs to be sent. An empty +-- chain means that an empty @Certificate@ message needs to be sent +-- to the server, naturally without a @CertificateVerify@. A non-empty +-- 'CertificateChain' is the chain to send to the server along with +-- a corresponding 'CertificateVerify'. +-- +-- With TLS < 1.2 the server's @CertificateRequest@ does not carry +-- a signature algorithm list. It has a list of supported public +-- key signing algorithms in the @certificate_types@ field. The +-- hash is implicit. It is 'SHA1' for DSA and 'SHA1_MD5' for RSA. +-- +-- With TLS == 1.2 the server's @CertificateRequest@ always has a +-- @supported_signature_algorithms@ list, as a fixed component of +-- the structure. This list is (wrongly) overloaded to also limit +-- X.509 signatures in the client's certificate chain. The BCP +-- strategy is to find a compatible chain if possible, but else +-- ignore the constraint, and let the server verify the chain as it +-- sees fit. The @supported_signature_algorithms@ field is only +-- obligatory with respect to signatures on TLS messages, in this +-- case the @CertificateVerify@ message. The @certificate_types@ +-- field is still included. +-- +-- With TLS 1.3 the server's @CertificateRequest@ has a mandatory +-- @signature_algorithms@ extension, the @signature_algorithms_cert@ +-- extension, which is optional, carries a list of algorithms the +-- server promises to support in verifying the certificate chain. +-- As with TLS 1.2, the client's makes a /best-effort/ to deliver +-- a compatible certificate chain where all the CA signatures are +-- known to be supported, but it should not abort the connection +-- just because the chain might not work out, just send the best +-- chain you have and let the server worry about the rest. The +-- supported public key algorithms are now inferred from the +-- @signature_algorithms@ extension and @certificate_types@ is +-- gone. +-- +-- With TLS 1.3, we synthesize and store a @certificate_types@ +-- field at the time that the server's @CertificateRequest@ +-- message is received. This is then present across all the +-- protocol versions, and can be used to determine whether +-- a @CertificateRequest@ was received or not. +-- +-- If @signature_algorithms@ is 'Nothing', then we're doing +-- TLS 1.0 or 1.1. The @signature_algorithms_cert@ extension +-- is optional in TLS 1.3, and so the application callback +-- will not be able to distinguish between TLS 1.[01] and +-- TLS 1.3 with no certificate algorithm hints, but this +-- just simplifies the chain selection process, all CA +-- signatures are OK. +clientChain :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO (Maybe CertificateChain) +clientChain cparams ctx = + usingHState ctx getCertReqCBdata >>= \case + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just cbdata -> do + let callback = onCertificateRequest $ clientHooks cparams + chain <- + liftIO $ + callback cbdata + `catchException` throwMiscErrorOnException "certificate request callback failed" + case chain of + Nothing -> + return $ Just $ CertificateChain [] + Just (CertificateChain [], _) -> + return $ Just $ CertificateChain [] + Just cred@(cc, _) -> + do + let (cTypes, _, _) = cbdata + storePrivInfoClient ctx cTypes cred + return $ Just cc + +-- | Store the keypair and check that it is compatible with the current protocol +-- version and a list of 'CertificateType' values. +storePrivInfoClient + :: Context + -> [CertificateType] + -> Credential + -> IO () +storePrivInfoClient ctx cTypes (cc, privkey) = do + pubkey <- storePrivInfo ctx cc privkey + unless (certificateCompatible pubkey cTypes) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + (pubkeyType pubkey ++ " credential does not match allowed certificate types") + InternalError + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + unless (pubkey `versionCompatible` ver) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + (pubkeyType pubkey ++ " credential is not supported at version " ++ show ver) + InternalError + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Return a most preferred 'HandAndSignatureAlgorithm' that is compatible with +-- the local key and server's signature algorithms (both already saved). Must +-- only be called for TLS versions 1.2 and up, with compatibility function +-- 'signatureCompatible' or 'signatureCompatible13' based on version. +-- +-- The values in the server's @signature_algorithms@ extension are +-- in descending order of preference. However here the algorithms +-- are selected by client preference in @cHashSigs@. +getLocalHashSigAlg + :: Context + -> (PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool) + -> [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -> PubKey + -> IO HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +getLocalHashSigAlg ctx isCompatible cHashSigs pubKey = do + -- Must be present with TLS 1.2 and up. + (Just (_, Just hashSigs, _)) <- usingHState ctx getCertReqCBdata + let want = + (&&) + <$> isCompatible pubKey + <*> flip elem hashSigs + case find want cHashSigs of + Just best -> return best + Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol (keyerr pubKey) HandshakeFailure + where + keyerr k = "no " ++ pubkeyType k ++ " hash algorithm in common with the server" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +setALPN :: Context -> MessageType -> [ExtensionRaw] -> IO () +setALPN ctx msgt exts = + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + msgt + exts + (return ()) + setAlpn + where + setAlpn (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [proto]) = usingState_ ctx $ do + mprotos <- getClientALPNSuggest + case mprotos of + Just protos -> when (proto `elem` protos) $ do + setExtensionALPN True + setNegotiatedProtocol proto + _ -> return () + setAlpn _ = return () + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +contextSync :: Context -> ClientState -> IO () +contextSync ctx ctl = case ctxHandshakeSync ctx of + HandshakeSync sync _ -> sync ctx ctl + +clientSessions :: ClientParams -> [(SessionID, SessionData)] +clientSessions ClientParams{..} = case clientWantSessionResume of + Nothing -> clientWantSessionResumeList + Just ent -> clientWantSessionResumeList ++ [ent] diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/ServerHello.hs @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ServerHello ( + receiveServerHello, + processServerHello13, +) where + +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Random +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +receiveServerHello + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> Maybe (ClientRandom, Session, Version) + -> IO (Version, [HandshakeR], Bool) +receiveServerHello cparams ctx mparams = do + chSentTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + (shb@(sh, _), hbs) <- recvSH + processServerHello cparams ctx sh + updateTranscriptHash12 ctx shb + setRTT ctx chSentTime + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + unless (maybe True (\(_, _, v) -> v == ver) mparams) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "version changed after hello retry" IllegalParameter + -- recvServerHello sets TLS13HRR according to the server random. + -- For 1st server hello, getTLS13HR returns True if it is HRR and + -- False otherwise. For 2nd server hello, getTLS13HR returns + -- False since it is NOT HRR. + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + return (ver, hbs, hrr) + where + recvSH = do + epkt <- recvPacket12 ctx + case epkt of + Left e -> throwCore e + Right pkt -> case pkt of + Alert a -> throwAlert a + Handshake (h : hs) (b : bs) -> return ((h, b), zip hs bs) + _ -> unexpected (show pkt) (Just "handshake") + throwAlert a = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("expecting server hello, got alert : " ++ show a) + HandshakeFailure + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +processServerHello13 + :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () +processServerHello13 cparams ctx (ServerHello13 sh13) = do + let sh12 = ServerHello sh13 + processServerHello cparams ctx sh12 +processServerHello13 _ _ h = unexpected (show h) (Just "server hello") + +-- | processServerHello processes the ServerHello message on the client. +-- +-- 1) check the version chosen by the server is one allowed by +-- parameters. +-- 2) check that our compression and cipher algorithms are part of the +-- list we sent +-- 3) check extensions received are part of the one we sent +-- 4) process the session parameter to see if the server want to start +-- a new session or can resume +processServerHello + :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake -> IO () +processServerHello cparams ctx (ServerHello sh@SH{..}) = do + -- A server which receives a legacy_version value not equal to + -- 0x0303 MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + -- alert. + when (shVersion /= TLS12) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol (show shVersion ++ " is not supported") IllegalParameter + -- find the compression and cipher methods that the server want to use. + clientSession <- tls13stSession <$> getTLS13State ctx + chExts <- tls13stSentExtensions <$> getTLS13State ctx + let clientCiphers = supportedCiphers $ ctxSupported ctx + usedCipher <- case findCipher (fromCipherId shCipher) clientCiphers of + Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "server choose unknown cipher" IllegalParameter + Just alg -> return alg + compressAlg <- case find + ((==) shComp . compressionID) + (supportedCompressions $ ctxSupported ctx) of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "server choose unknown compression" IllegalParameter + Just alg -> return alg + ensureNullCompression shComp + + -- intersect sent extensions in client and the received extensions + -- from server. if server returns extensions that we didn't + -- request, fail. + let checkExt (ExtensionRaw i _) + | i == EID_Cookie = False -- for HRR + | otherwise = i `notElem` chExts + when (any checkExt shExtensions) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "spurious extensions received" UnsupportedExtension + + let isHRR = isHelloRetryRequest shRandom + usingState_ ctx $ do + setTLS13HRR isHRR + when isHRR $ + setTLS13Cookie $ + lookupAndDecode + EID_Cookie + MsgTServerHello + shExtensions + Nothing + (\cookie@(Cookie _) -> Just cookie) + setVersion shVersion -- must be before processing supportedVersions ext + mapM_ processServerExtension shExtensions + + setALPN ctx MsgTServerHello shExtensions + + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + + when (ver == TLS12) $ + setServerHelloParameters12 ctx shVersion shRandom usedCipher compressAlg + + let supportedVers = supportedVersions $ clientSupported cparams + + when (ver == TLS13) $ do + -- TLS 1.3 server MUST echo the session id + when (clientSession /= shSession) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "session is not matched in compatibility mode" + IllegalParameter + when (ver `notElem` supportedVers) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("server version " ++ show ver ++ " is not supported") + ProtocolVersion + + -- Some servers set TLS 1.2 as the legacy server hello version, + -- and TLS 1.3 in the supported_versions extension, *AND ALSO* set + -- the TLS 1.2 downgrade signal in the server random. If we + -- support TLS 1.3 and actually negotiate TLS 1.3, we must ignore + -- the server random downgrade signal. Therefore, 'isDowngraded' + -- needs to take into account the negotiated version and the + -- server random, as well as the list of client-side enabled + -- protocol versions. + -- + when (isDowngraded ver supportedVers shRandom) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "version downgrade detected" IllegalParameter + + if ver == TLS13 + then do + -- Session is dummy in TLS 1.3. + usingState_ ctx $ setSession shSession + processRecordSizeLimit ctx shExtensions True + enableMyRecordLimit ctx + enablePeerRecordLimit ctx + let usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher + transitTranscriptHashI ctx "transitI" usedHash isHRR + accepted <- checkECHacceptance ctx isHRR usedHash sh + when accepted $ do + (CH{..}, _b) <- fromJust <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello + usingHState ctx $ setClientRandom chRandom -- inner random + when (accepted && not isHRR) $ do + copyTranscriptHash ctx "copy" + usingHState ctx $ setECHAccepted True + updateContext13 ctx usedCipher isHRR + updateTranscriptHashI ctx "ServerHelloI" $ encodeHandshake $ ServerHello sh + else do + let resumingSession = case clientSessions cparams of + (_, sessionData) : _ -> + if shSession == clientSession then Just sessionData else Nothing + _ -> Nothing + + usingState_ ctx $ do + setSession shSession + setTLS12SessionResuming $ isJust resumingSession + processRecordSizeLimit ctx shExtensions False + updateContext12 ctx shExtensions resumingSession +processServerHello _ _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server hello") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +processServerExtension :: ExtensionRaw -> TLSSt () +processServerExtension (ExtensionRaw extID content) + | extID == EID_SecureRenegotiation = do + VerifyData cvd <- getVerifyData ClientRole + VerifyData svd <- getVerifyData ServerRole + let bs = extensionEncode $ SecureRenegotiation cvd svd + unless (bs == content) $ + throwError $ + Error_Protocol "server secure renegotiation data not matching" HandshakeFailure + | extID == EID_SupportedVersions = case extensionDecode MsgTServerHello content of + Just (SupportedVersionsServerHello ver) -> setVersion ver + _ -> return () + | extID == EID_KeyShare = do + hrr <- getTLS13HRR + let msgt = if hrr then MsgTHelloRetryRequest else MsgTServerHello + setTLS13KeyShare $ extensionDecode msgt content + | extID == EID_PreSharedKey = + setTLS13PreSharedKey $ extensionDecode MsgTServerHello content + | extID == EID_SessionTicket = setTLS12SessionTicket "" -- empty ticket +processServerExtension _ = return () + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +updateContext13 :: Context -> Cipher -> Bool -> IO () +updateContext13 ctx usedCipher isHRR = do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + eof <- ctxEOF ctx + when (established == Established && not eof) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "renegotiation to TLS 1.3 or later is not allowed" + ProtocolVersion + failOnEitherError $ setServerHelloParameters13 ctx usedCipher isHRR + +updateContext12 :: Context -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe SessionData -> IO () +updateContext12 ctx shExtensions resumingSession = do + ems <- processExtendedMainSecret ctx TLS12 MsgTServerHello shExtensions + case resumingSession of + Nothing -> return () + Just sessionData -> do + let emsSession = SessionEMS `elem` sessionFlags sessionData + when (ems /= emsSession) $ + let err = "server resumes a session which is not EMS consistent" + in throwCore $ Error_Protocol err HandshakeFailure + let mainSecret = convert $ sessionSecret sessionData + usingHState ctx $ setMainSecret TLS12 ClientRole mainSecret + logKey ctx (MainSecret mainSecret) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +processRecordSizeLimit + :: Context -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Bool -> IO () +processRecordSizeLimit ctx shExtensions tls13 = do + let mmylim = limitRecordSize $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx + case mmylim of + Nothing -> return () + Just mylim -> do + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_RecordSizeLimit + MsgTClientHello + shExtensions + (return ()) + (setPeerRecordSizeLimit ctx tls13) + ack <- checkPeerRecordLimit ctx + -- When a client sends RecordSizeLimit, it does not know + -- which TLS version the server selects. RecordLimit is + -- the length of plaintext. But RecordSizeLimit also + -- includes CT: and padding for TLS 1.3. To convert + -- RecordSizeLimit to RecordLimit, we should reduce the + -- value by 1, which is the length of CT:. + when (ack && tls13) $ setMyRecordLimit ctx $ Just (mylim - 1) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +checkECHacceptance :: Context -> Bool -> Hash -> ServerHello -> IO Bool +checkECHacceptance ctx False usedHash sh@SH{..} = do + let (prefix, confirm) = B.splitAt 24 $ unServerRandom shRandom + sr' = ServerRandom (prefix <> "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00") + verified <- + computeConfirm ctx usedHash sh{shRandom = sr'} "ech accept confirmation" + return (confirm == verified) +checkECHacceptance ctx True usedHash sh@SH{..} = do + case replace shExtensions of + Nothing -> return False + Just (confirm, shExts') -> do + verified <- + computeConfirm + ctx + usedHash + sh{shExtensions = shExts'} + "hrr ech accept confirmation" + return (confirm == verified) + where + replace [] = Nothing + replace (ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello confirm : es) = + Just + ( confirm + , ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" : es + ) + replace (e : es) = case replace es of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just (confirm, es') -> Just (confirm, e : es') diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS12.hs @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS12 ( + recvServerFirstFlight12, + sendClientSecondFlight12, + recvServerSecondFlight12, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet hiding (getExtensions, getSession) +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util (catchException) +import Network.TLS.Wire +import Network.TLS.X509 hiding (Certificate) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvServerFirstFlight12 + :: ClientParams -> Context -> [HandshakeR] -> IO () +recvServerFirstFlight12 cparams ctx hbs = do + resuming <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionResuming + if resuming + then recvNSTandCCSandFinished ctx + else do + let st = RecvStateHandshake (expectCertificate cparams ctx) + runRecvStateHS ctx st hbs + +expectCertificate :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) +expectCertificate cparams ctx (Certificate (CertificateChain_ certs)) = do + usingState_ ctx $ setServerCertificateChain certs + doCertificate cparams ctx certs + processCertificate ctx ClientRole certs + return $ RecvStateHandshake (expectServerKeyExchange ctx) +expectCertificate _ ctx p = expectServerKeyExchange ctx p + +expectServerKeyExchange :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) +expectServerKeyExchange ctx (ServerKeyXchg origSkx) = do + doServerKeyExchange ctx origSkx + return $ RecvStateHandshake (expectCertificateRequest ctx) +expectServerKeyExchange ctx p = expectCertificateRequest ctx p + +expectCertificateRequest :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) +expectCertificateRequest ctx (CertRequest cTypesSent sigAlgs dNames) = do + let cTypes = filter (<= lastSupportedCertificateType) cTypesSent + usingHState ctx $ setCertReqCBdata $ Just (cTypes, Just sigAlgs, dNames) + return $ RecvStateHandshake (expectServerHelloDone ctx) +expectCertificateRequest ctx p = do + usingHState ctx $ setCertReqCBdata Nothing + expectServerHelloDone ctx p + +expectServerHelloDone :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState m) +expectServerHelloDone _ ServerHelloDone = return RecvStateDone +expectServerHelloDone _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server hello data") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendClientSecondFlight12 :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +sendClientSecondFlight12 cparams ctx = do + sessionResuming <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionResuming + if sessionResuming + then sendCCSandFinished ctx ClientRole + else do + sendClientCCC cparams ctx + sendCCSandFinished ctx ClientRole + +recvServerSecondFlight12 :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +recvServerSecondFlight12 cparams ctx = do + sessionResuming <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionResuming + unless sessionResuming $ recvNSTandCCSandFinished ctx + mticket <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionTicket + session <- usingState_ ctx getSession + let midentity = ticketOrSessionID12 mticket session + case midentity of + Nothing -> return () + Just identity -> do + sessionData <- getSessionData ctx + void $ + sessionEstablish + (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) + identity + (fromJust sessionData) + finishHandshake12 ctx + liftIO $ do + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + case minfo of + Nothing -> return () + Just info -> onServerFinished (clientHooks cparams) info + +recvNSTandCCSandFinished :: Context -> IO () +recvNSTandCCSandFinished ctx = do + st <- isJust <$> usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionTicket + if st + then runRecvState ctx $ RecvStateHandshake expectNewSessionTicket + else do runRecvState ctx $ RecvStatePacket expectChangeCipher + where + expectNewSessionTicket (NewSessionTicket _ ticket) = do + usingState_ ctx $ setTLS12SessionTicket ticket + return $ RecvStatePacket expectChangeCipher + expectNewSessionTicket p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished") + + expectChangeCipher ChangeCipherSpec = do + enableMyRecordLimit ctx + return $ RecvStateHandshake $ expectFinished ctx + expectChangeCipher p = unexpected (show p) (Just "change cipher") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | TLS 1.2 and below. Send the client handshake messages that +-- follow the @ServerHello@, etc. except for @CCS@ and @Finished@. +-- +-- XXX: Is any buffering done here to combined these messages into +-- a single TCP packet? Otherwise we're prone to Nagle delays, or +-- in any case needlessly generate multiple small packets, where +-- a single larger packet will do. The TLS 1.3 code path seems +-- to separating record generation and transmission and sending +-- multiple records in a single packet. +-- +-- -> [certificate] +-- -> client key exchange +-- -> [cert verify] +sendClientCCC :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +sendClientCCC cparams ctx = do + sendCertificate cparams ctx + sendClientKeyXchg cparams ctx + sendCertificateVerify ctx + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendCertificate :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +sendCertificate cparams ctx = do + usingHState ctx $ setClientCertSent False + clientChain cparams ctx >>= \case + Nothing -> return () + Just cc@(CertificateChain certs) -> do + unless (null certs) $ + usingHState ctx $ + setClientCertSent True + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [Certificate (CertificateChain_ cc)] [] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendClientKeyXchg :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +sendClientKeyXchg cparams ctx = do + cipher <- usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + (ckx, setMainSec) <- case cipherKeyExchange cipher of + CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> getCKX_RSA ctx + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> getCKX_DHE cparams ctx + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> getCKX_DHE cparams ctx + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> getCKX_ECDHE ctx + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> getCKX_ECDHE ctx + _ -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "client key exchange unsupported type" HandshakeFailure + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [ClientKeyXchg ckx] [] + mainSecret <- usingHState ctx setMainSec + logKey ctx (MainSecret mainSecret) + +-------------------------------- + +getCKX_RSA + :: Context -> IO (ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData, HandshakeM Secret) +getCKX_RSA ctx = do + clientVersion <- usingHState ctx $ gets hstClientVersion + (xver, prerand) <- usingState_ ctx $ (,) <$> getVersion <*> genRandom 46 + + let preMain = convert $ encodePreMainSecret clientVersion prerand + setMainSec = setMainSecretFromPre xver ClientRole preMain + encryptedPreMain <- do + -- SSL3 implementation generally forget this length field since it's redundant, + -- however TLS10 make it clear that the length field need to be present. + e <- encryptRSA ctx preMain + let extra = encodeWord16 $ fromIntegral $ B.length e + return $ extra `B.append` e + return (CKX_RSA encryptedPreMain, setMainSec) + +-------------------------------- + +getCKX_DHE + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> IO (ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData, HandshakeM Secret) +getCKX_DHE cparams ctx = do + xver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + serverParams <- usingHState ctx getServerDHParams + + let params = serverDHParamsToParams serverParams + ffGroup = findFiniteFieldGroup params + srvpub = serverDHParamsToPublic serverParams + + unless (maybe False (isSupportedGroup ctx) ffGroup) $ do + groupUsage <- + onCustomFFDHEGroup (clientHooks cparams) params srvpub + `catchException` throwMiscErrorOnException "custom group callback failed" + case groupUsage of + GroupUsageInsecure -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "FFDHE group is not secure enough" InsufficientSecurity + GroupUsageUnsupported reason -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol ("unsupported FFDHE group: " ++ reason) HandshakeFailure + GroupUsageInvalidPublic -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "invalid server public key" IllegalParameter + GroupUsageValid -> return () + + -- When grp is known but not in the supported list we use it + -- anyway. This provides additional validation and a more + -- efficient implementation. + (clientDHPub, preMain) <- + case ffGroup of + Nothing -> do + (clientDHPriv, clientDHPub) <- generateDHE ctx params + let preMain = dhGetShared params clientDHPriv srvpub + return (clientDHPub, preMain) + Just grp -> do + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup grp + dhePair <- generateFFDHEShared ctx grp srvpub + case dhePair of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol ("invalid server " ++ show grp ++ " public key") IllegalParameter + Just pair -> return pair + + let setMainSec = setMainSecretFromPre xver ClientRole preMain + return (CKX_DH clientDHPub, setMainSec) + +-------------------------------- + +getCKX_ECDHE + :: Context -> IO (ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData, HandshakeM Secret) +getCKX_ECDHE ctx = do + ServerECDHParams grp srvpub <- usingHState ctx getServerECDHParams + checkSupportedGroup ctx grp + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup grp + ecdhePair <- encapsulateGroup ctx srvpub + case ecdhePair of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol ("invalid server " ++ show grp ++ " public key") IllegalParameter + Just (clipub, preMain) -> do + xver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + let setMainSec = setMainSecretFromPre xver ClientRole preMain + return (CKX_ECDH $ groupEncodePublicB clipub, setMainSec) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- In order to send a proper certificate verify message, +-- we have to do the following: +-- +-- 1. Determine which signing algorithm(s) the server supports +-- (we currently only support RSA). +-- 2. Get the current handshake hash from the handshake state. +-- 3. Sign the handshake hash +-- 4. Send it to the server. +-- +sendCertificateVerify :: Context -> IO () +sendCertificateVerify ctx = do + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + + -- Only send a certificate verify message when we + -- have sent a non-empty list of certificates. + -- + certSent <- usingHState ctx getClientCertSent + when certSent $ do + pubKey <- getLocalPublicKey ctx + mhashSig <- + let cHashSigs = supportedHashSignatures $ ctxSupported ctx + in getLocalHashSigAlg ctx signatureCompatible cHashSigs pubKey + -- Fetch all handshake messages up to now. + msgs <- usingHState ctx $ B.concat <$> getHandshakeMessages + sigDig <- createCertificateVerify ctx ver pubKey mhashSig msgs + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [CertVerify sigDig] [] diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Client/TLS13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,425 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS13 ( + recvServerSecondFlight13, + sendClientSecondFlight13, + asyncServerHello13, + postHandshakeAuthClientWith, +) where + +import Control.Exception (bracket) +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Error +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ServerHello +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common hiding (expectFinished) +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvServerSecondFlight13 :: ClientParams -> Context -> [Group] -> IO () +recvServerSecondFlight13 cparams ctx groupSent = do + resuming <- prepareSecondFlight13 ctx groupSent + runRecvHandshake13 $ do + recvHandshake13 ctx $ expectEncryptedExtensions ctx + unless resuming $ recvHandshake13 ctx $ expectCertRequest cparams ctx + recvHandshake13hash ctx "Finished" $ expectFinished cparams ctx + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +prepareSecondFlight13 + :: Context -> [Group] -> IO Bool +prepareSecondFlight13 ctx groupSent = do + choice <- makeCipherChoice TLS13 <$> usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + prepareSecondFlight13' ctx groupSent choice + +prepareSecondFlight13' + :: Context + -> [Group] + -> CipherChoice + -> IO Bool +prepareSecondFlight13' ctx groupSent choice = do + (_, hkey, resuming) <- switchToHandshakeSecret + let clientHandshakeSecret = triClient hkey + serverHandshakeSecret = triServer hkey + handSecInfo = HandshakeSecretInfo usedCipher (clientHandshakeSecret, serverHandshakeSecret) + contextSync ctx $ RecvServerHello handSecInfo + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> + st + { tls13stChoice = choice + , tls13stHsKey = Just hkey + } + return resuming + where + usedCipher = cCipher choice + usedHash = cHash choice + + hashSize = hashDigestSize usedHash + + switchToHandshakeSecret = do + ensureRecvComplete ctx + ecdhe <- calcSharedKey + (earlySecret, resuming) <- makeEarlySecret + handKey <- calculateHandshakeSecret ctx choice earlySecret ecdhe + let serverHandshakeSecret = triServer handKey + setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher serverHandshakeSecret + return (usedCipher, handKey, resuming) + + calcSharedKey = do + serverKeyShare <- do + mks <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13KeyShare + case mks of + Just (KeyShareServerHello ks) -> return ks + Just _ -> + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "invalid key_share value" IllegalParameter + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "key exchange not implemented, expected key_share extension" + HandshakeFailure + let grp = keyShareEntryGroup serverKeyShare + unless (checkServerKeyShareKeyLength serverKeyShare) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "broken key_share" IllegalParameter + unless (grp `elem` groupSent) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "received incompatible group for (EC)DHE" IllegalParameter + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup grp + usingHState ctx getGroupPrivate >>= fromServerKeyShare serverKeyShare + + makeEarlySecret = do + mEarlySecretPSK <- usingHState ctx getTLS13EarlySecret + case mEarlySecretPSK of + Nothing -> return (initEarlySecret choice Nothing, False) + Just earlySecretPSK@(BaseSecret sec) -> do + mSelectedIdentity <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13PreSharedKey + case mSelectedIdentity of + Nothing -> + return (initEarlySecret choice Nothing, False) + Just (PreSharedKeyServerHello 0) -> do + unless (BA.length sec == hashSize) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "selected cipher is incompatible with selected PSK" + IllegalParameter + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey + return (earlySecretPSK, True) + Just _ -> + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "selected identity out of range" IllegalParameter + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +expectEncryptedExtensions + :: MonadIO m => Context -> Handshake13 -> m () +expectEncryptedExtensions ctx (EncryptedExtensions13 eexts) = do + liftIO $ do + setALPN ctx MsgTEncryptedExtensions eexts + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stClientExtensions = eexts} + st13 <- usingHState ctx getTLS13RTT0Status + when (st13 == RTT0Sent) $ + case extensionLookup EID_EarlyData eexts of + Just _ -> do + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode RTT0 + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Accepted + liftIO $ modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13st0RTTAccepted = True} + Nothing -> do + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Rejected +expectEncryptedExtensions _ h = unexpected (show h) (Just "encrypted extensions") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- not used in 0-RTT +expectCertRequest + :: MonadIO m + => ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> RecvHandshake13M m () +expectCertRequest cparams ctx (CertRequest13 token exts) = do + processCertRequest13 ctx token exts + recvHandshake13 ctx $ expectCertAndVerify cparams ctx +expectCertRequest cparams ctx other = do + usingHState ctx $ do + setCertReqToken Nothing + setCertReqCBdata Nothing + -- setCertReqSigAlgsCert Nothing + expectCertAndVerify cparams ctx other + +processCertRequest13 + :: MonadIO m => Context -> CertReqContext -> [ExtensionRaw] -> m () +processCertRequest13 ctx token exts = do + let hsextID = EID_SignatureAlgorithms + -- caextID = EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert + dNames <- canames + -- The @signature_algorithms@ extension is mandatory. + hsAlgs <- extalgs hsextID unsighash + cTypes <- case hsAlgs of + Just as -> + let validAs = filter isHashSignatureValid13 as + in return $ sigAlgsToCertTypes ctx validAs + Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "invalid certificate request" HandshakeFailure + -- Unused: + -- caAlgs <- extalgs caextID uncertsig + let zlib = + lookupAndDecode + EID_CompressCertificate + MsgTClientHello + exts + False + (\(CompressCertificate ccas) -> CCA_Zlib `elem` ccas) + usingHState ctx $ do + setCertReqToken $ Just token + setCertReqCBdata $ Just (cTypes, hsAlgs, dNames) + setTLS13CertComp zlib + where + -- setCertReqSigAlgsCert caAlgs + + canames = case extensionLookup EID_CertificateAuthorities exts of + Nothing -> return [] + Just ext -> case extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest ext of + Just (CertificateAuthorities names) -> return names + _ -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "invalid certificate request" HandshakeFailure + extalgs extID decons = case extensionLookup extID exts of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just ext -> case extensionDecode MsgTCertificateRequest ext of + Just e -> + return $ decons e + _ -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "invalid certificate request" HandshakeFailure + unsighash + :: SignatureAlgorithms + -> Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + unsighash (SignatureAlgorithms a) = Just a + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- not used in 0-RTT +expectCertAndVerify + :: MonadIO m + => ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> RecvHandshake13M m () +expectCertAndVerify cparams ctx (Certificate13 _ (CertificateChain_ cc) _) = processCertAndVerify cparams ctx cc +expectCertAndVerify cparams ctx (CompressedCertificate13 _ (CertificateChain_ cc) _) = processCertAndVerify cparams ctx cc +expectCertAndVerify _ _ h = unexpected (show h) (Just "server certificate") + +processCertAndVerify + :: MonadIO m + => ClientParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> RecvHandshake13M m () +processCertAndVerify cparams ctx cc = do + liftIO $ usingState_ ctx $ setServerCertificateChain cc + liftIO $ doCertificate cparams ctx cc + let pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate $ getCertificateChainLeaf cc + ver <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getVersion + checkDigitalSignatureKey ver pubkey + usingHState ctx $ setPublicKey pubkey + recvHandshake13hash ctx "CertVerify" $ expectCertVerify ctx pubkey + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +expectCertVerify + :: MonadIO m + => Context -> PubKey -> TranscriptHash -> Handshake13 -> m () +expectCertVerify ctx pubkey (TranscriptHash hChSc) (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned sigAlg sig)) = do + ok <- checkCertVerify ctx pubkey sigAlg sig hChSc + unless ok $ decryptError "cannot verify CertificateVerify" +expectCertVerify _ _ _ h = unexpected (show h) (Just "certificate verify") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +expectFinished + :: MonadIO m + => ClientParams + -> Context + -> TranscriptHash + -> Handshake13 + -> m () +expectFinished cparams ctx hashValue (Finished13 verifyData) = do + st <- liftIO $ getTLS13State ctx + let usedHash = cHash $ tls13stChoice st + ServerTrafficSecret baseKey = triServer $ fromJust $ tls13stHsKey st + checkFinished ctx usedHash baseKey hashValue verifyData + liftIO $ do + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + case minfo of + Nothing -> return () + Just info -> onServerFinished (clientHooks cparams) info + liftIO $ modifyTLS13State ctx $ \s -> s{tls13stRecvSF = True} +expectFinished _ _ _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "server finished") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendClientSecondFlight13 :: ClientParams -> Context -> IO () +sendClientSecondFlight13 cparams ctx = do + st <- getTLS13State ctx + let choice = tls13stChoice st + hkey = fromJust $ tls13stHsKey st + rtt0accepted = tls13st0RTTAccepted st + eexts = tls13stClientExtensions st + sendClientSecondFlight13' cparams ctx choice hkey rtt0accepted eexts + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \s -> s{tls13stSentCF = True} + echAccepted <- usingHState ctx getECHAccepted + when (clientUseECH cparams && not echAccepted) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "ECH is not accepted" EchRequired + +sendClientSecondFlight13' + :: ClientParams + -> Context + -> CipherChoice + -> SecretTriple HandshakeSecret + -> Bool + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> IO () +sendClientSecondFlight13' cparams ctx choice hkey rtt0accepted eexts = do + hChSf <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..SF" + unless (ctxQUICMode ctx) $ + runPacketFlight ctx $ + sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx + when (rtt0accepted && not (ctxQUICMode ctx)) $ + sendPacket13 ctx (Handshake13 [EndOfEarlyData13] []) + let clientHandshakeSecret = triClient hkey + setTxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientHandshakeSecret + sendClientFlight13 cparams ctx usedHash clientHandshakeSecret + appKey <- switchToApplicationSecret hChSf + let applicationSecret = triBase appKey + setResumptionSecret applicationSecret + let appSecInfo = ApplicationSecretInfo (triClient appKey, triServer appKey) + contextSync ctx $ SendClientFinished eexts appSecInfo + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stHsKey = Nothing} + finishHandshake13 ctx + rtt0 <- tls13st0RTT <$> getTLS13State ctx + when rtt0 $ do + builder <- tls13stPendingSentData <$> getTLS13State ctx + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stPendingSentData = id} + unless rtt0accepted $ + mapM_ (sendPacket13 ctx . AppData13) $ + builder [] + where + usedCipher = cCipher choice + usedHash = cHash choice + + switchToApplicationSecret hChSf = do + ensureRecvComplete ctx + let handshakeSecret = triBase hkey + appKey <- calculateApplicationSecret ctx choice handshakeSecret hChSf + let serverApplicationSecret0 = triServer appKey + let clientApplicationSecret0 = triClient appKey + setTxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientApplicationSecret0 + setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher serverApplicationSecret0 + return appKey + + setResumptionSecret applicationSecret = do + resumptionSecret <- calculateResumptionSecret ctx choice applicationSecret + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13ResumptionSecret resumptionSecret + +{- Unused for now +uncertsig :: SignatureAlgorithmsCert + -> Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] +uncertsig (SignatureAlgorithmsCert a) = Just a +-} + +sendClientFlight13 + :: ClientParams -> Context -> Hash -> ClientTrafficSecret a -> IO () +sendClientFlight13 cparams ctx usedHash (ClientTrafficSecret baseKey) = do + mcc <- clientChain cparams ctx + runPacketFlight ctx $ do + case mcc of + Nothing -> return () + Just cc -> do + reqtoken <- usingHState ctx getCertReqToken + certComp <- usingHState ctx getTLS13CertComp + loadClientData13 cc reqtoken certComp + rawFinished <- makeFinished ctx usedHash baseKey + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [rawFinished] [] + when (isJust mcc) $ + modifyTLS13State ctx $ + \st -> st{tls13stSentClientCert = True} + where + loadClientData13 chain (Just token) certComp = do + let (CertificateChain certs) = chain + certExts = replicate (length certs) [] + cHashSigs = filter isHashSignatureValid13 $ supportedHashSignatures $ ctxSupported ctx + let certtag = if certComp then CompressedCertificate13 else Certificate13 + loadPacket13 ctx $ + Handshake13 [certtag token (CertificateChain_ chain) certExts] [] + case certs of + [] -> return () + _ -> do + hChSc <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..SC" + pubKey <- getLocalPublicKey ctx + sigAlg <- + liftIO $ getLocalHashSigAlg ctx signatureCompatible13 cHashSigs pubKey + vfy <- makeCertVerify ctx pubKey sigAlg hChSc + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [vfy] [] + -- + loadClientData13 _ _ _ = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "missing TLS 1.3 certificate request context token" InternalError + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +postHandshakeAuthClientWith + :: ClientParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () +postHandshakeAuthClientWith cparams ctx (CertRequest13 certReqCtx exts) = + bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do + -- updateTranscriptHash13 ctx h b + processCertRequest13 ctx certReqCtx exts + (usedHash, _, level, applicationSecretN) <- getTxRecordState ctx + unless (level == CryptApplicationSecret) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "unexpected post-handshake authentication request" + UnexpectedMessage + sendClientFlight13 + cparams + ctx + usedHash + (ClientTrafficSecret applicationSecretN) +postHandshakeAuthClientWith _ _ _ = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "unexpected handshake message received in postHandshakeAuthClientWith" + UnexpectedMessage + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +asyncServerHello13 + :: ClientParams -> Context -> [Group] -> Millisecond -> IO () +asyncServerHello13 cparams ctx groupSent chSentTime = do + setPendingRecvActions + ctx + [ PendingRecvActionSelfUpdate True expectServerHello + , PendingRecvAction True (expectEncryptedExtensions ctx) + , PendingRecvActionHash True expectFinishedAndSet + ] + where + expectServerHello shb@(sh, _) = do + setRTT ctx chSentTime + processServerHello13 cparams ctx sh + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx shb -- update by myself + void $ prepareSecondFlight13 ctx groupSent + expectFinishedAndSet h sf = do + expectFinished cparams ctx h sf + liftIO $ + writeIORef (ctxPendingSendAction ctx) $ + Just $ + sendClientSecondFlight13 cparams diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs @@ -0,0 +1,442 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Common ( + handshakeFailed, + handleException, + unexpected, + newSession, + ensureNullCompression, + ticketOrSessionID12, + + -- * sending packets + sendCCSandFinished, + + -- * receiving packets + RecvState (..), + runRecvState, + runRecvStateHS, + recvPacketHandshake, + onRecvStateHandshake, + ensureRecvComplete, + processExtendedMainSecret, + getSessionData, + storePrivInfo, + isSupportedGroup, + checkSupportedGroup, + errorToAlert, + errorToAlertMessage, + expectFinished, + processCertificate, + -- + setPeerRecordSizeLimit, + generateFinished, + encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12, + updateTranscriptHash12, + -- + startHandshake, + finishHandshake12, + setServerHelloParameters12, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Exception (IOException, fromException, handle, throwIO) +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.IO.Encode +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util +import Network.TLS.X509 + +handshakeFailed :: TLSError -> IO () +handshakeFailed err = throwIO $ HandshakeFailed err + +handleException :: Context -> IO () -> IO () +handleException ctx f = catchException f $ \exception -> do + debugError (ctxDebug ctx) $ show exception + -- If the error was an Uncontextualized TLSException, we replace the + -- context with HandshakeFailed. If it's anything else, we convert + -- it to a string and wrap it with Error_Misc and HandshakeFailed. + let tlserror = case fromException exception of + Just e | Uncontextualized e' <- e -> e' + _ -> Error_Misc (show exception) + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + setEstablished ctx NotEstablished + handle ignoreIOErr $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + if tls13 + then do + when (established == EarlyDataSending) $ clearTxRecordState ctx + when (tlserror /= Error_TCP_Terminate) $ + sendPacket13 ctx $ + Alert13 [errorToAlert tlserror] + else sendPacket12 ctx $ Alert [errorToAlert tlserror] + handshakeFailed tlserror + where + ignoreIOErr :: IOException -> IO () + ignoreIOErr _ = return () + +errorToAlert :: TLSError -> (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) +errorToAlert (Error_Protocol _ ad) = (AlertLevel_Fatal, ad) +errorToAlert (Error_Protocol_Warning _ ad) = (AlertLevel_Warning, ad) +errorToAlert (Error_Packet_unexpected _ _) = (AlertLevel_Fatal, UnexpectedMessage) +errorToAlert (Error_Packet_Parsing msg) + | "invalid version" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, ProtocolVersion) + | "request_update" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, IllegalParameter) + | otherwise = (AlertLevel_Fatal, DecodeError) +errorToAlert _ = (AlertLevel_Fatal, InternalError) + +-- | Return the message that a TLS endpoint can add to its local log for the +-- specified library error. +errorToAlertMessage :: TLSError -> String +errorToAlertMessage (Error_Protocol msg _) = msg +errorToAlertMessage (Error_Protocol_Warning msg _) = msg +errorToAlertMessage (Error_Packet_unexpected msg _) = msg +errorToAlertMessage (Error_Packet_Parsing msg) = msg +errorToAlertMessage e = show e + +unexpected :: MonadIO m => String -> Maybe String -> m a +unexpected msg expected = + throwCore $ Error_Packet_unexpected msg (maybe "" (" expected: " ++) expected) + +newSession :: Context -> IO Session +newSession ctx + | supportedSession $ ctxSupported ctx = Session . Just <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + | otherwise = return $ Session Nothing + +sendCCSandFinished + :: Context + -> Role + -> IO () +sendCCSandFinished ctx role = do + sendPacket12 ctx ChangeCipherSpec + contextFlush ctx + enablePeerRecordLimit ctx + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + verifyData <- VerifyData <$> generateFinished ctx ver role + sendPacket12 ctx (Handshake [Finished verifyData] []) + usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForSend verifyData + contextFlush ctx + +data RecvState m + = RecvStatePacket (Packet -> m (RecvState m)) -- CCS is not Handshake + | RecvStateHandshake (Handshake -> m (RecvState m)) + | RecvStateDone + +recvPacketHandshake :: Context -> IO [HandshakeR] +recvPacketHandshake ctx = do + pkts <- recvPacket12 ctx + case pkts of + Right (Handshake hss bss) -> return $ zip hss bss + Right x@(AppData _) -> do + -- If a TLS13 server decides to reject RTT0 data, the server should + -- skip records for RTT0 data up to the maximum limit. + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + case established of + EarlyDataNotAllowed n + | n > 0 -> do + setEstablished ctx $ EarlyDataNotAllowed (n - 1) + recvPacketHandshake ctx + _ -> unexpected (show x) (Just "handshake") + Right x -> unexpected (show x) (Just "handshake") + Left err -> throwCore err + +-- | process a list of handshakes message in the recv state machine. +onRecvStateHandshake + :: Context -> RecvState IO -> [HandshakeR] -> IO (RecvState IO) +onRecvStateHandshake _ recvState [] = return recvState +onRecvStateHandshake _ (RecvStatePacket f) hbs = do + let (hss, bss) = unzip hbs + f (Handshake hss bss) +onRecvStateHandshake ctx (RecvStateHandshake f) (hb@(h, _) : hbs) = do + let finished = isFinished h + unless finished $ void $ updateTranscriptHash12 ctx hb + nstate <- f h + when finished $ void $ updateTranscriptHash12 ctx hb + onRecvStateHandshake ctx nstate hbs +onRecvStateHandshake _ _ _ = unexpected "spurious handshake" Nothing + +isFinished :: Handshake -> Bool +isFinished Finished{} = True +isFinished _ = False + +runRecvState :: Context -> RecvState IO -> IO () +runRecvState _ RecvStateDone = return () +runRecvState ctx (RecvStatePacket f) = recvPacket12 ctx >>= either throwCore f >>= runRecvState ctx +runRecvState ctx iniState = + recvPacketHandshake ctx + >>= onRecvStateHandshake ctx iniState + >>= runRecvState ctx + +runRecvStateHS + :: Context -> RecvState IO -> [HandshakeR] -> IO () +runRecvStateHS ctx iniState hbs = onRecvStateHandshake ctx iniState hbs >>= runRecvState ctx + +ensureRecvComplete :: MonadIO m => Context -> m () +ensureRecvComplete ctx = do + complete <- liftIO $ isRecvComplete ctx + unless complete $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "received incomplete message at key change" UnexpectedMessage + +processExtendedMainSecret + :: MonadIO m => Context -> Version -> MessageType -> [ExtensionRaw] -> m Bool +processExtendedMainSecret ctx ver msgt exts + | ver < TLS10 = return False + | ver > TLS12 = error "EMS processing is not compatible with TLS 1.3" + | ems == NoEMS = return False + | otherwise = + liftIO $ + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_ExtendedMainSecret + msgt + exts + nonExistAction + existAction + where + ems = supportedExtendedMainSecret $ ctxSupported ctx + err = "peer does not support Extended Main Secret" + nonExistAction = + if ems == RequireEMS + then throwCore $ Error_Protocol err HandshakeFailure + else return False + existAction ExtendedMainSecret = do + usingHState ctx $ setExtendedMainSecret True + return True + +getSessionData :: Context -> IO (Maybe SessionData) +getSessionData ctx = do + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + sni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + mms <- usingHState ctx $ gets hstMainSecret + ems <- usingHState ctx getExtendedMainSecret + cipher <- cipherID <$> usingHState ctx getPendingCipher + alpn <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol + let compression = 0 + flags = [SessionEMS | ems] + case mms of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just ms -> + return $ + Just + SessionData + { sessionVersion = ver + , sessionCipher = cipher + , sessionCompression = compression + , sessionClientSNI = sni + , sessionSecret = convert ms + , sessionGroup = Nothing + , sessionTicketInfo = Nothing + , sessionALPN = alpn + , sessionMaxEarlyDataSize = 0 + , sessionFlags = flags + } + +-- | Store the specified keypair. Whether the public key and private key +-- actually match is left for the peer to discover. We're not presently +-- burning CPU to detect that misconfiguration. We verify only that the +-- types of keys match and that it does not include an algorithm that would +-- not be safe. +storePrivInfo + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> CertificateChain + -> PrivKey + -> m PubKey +storePrivInfo ctx cc privkey = do + let c = fromCC cc + pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate c + unless (isDigitalSignaturePair (pubkey, privkey)) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "mismatched or unsupported private key pair" InternalError + usingHState ctx $ setPublicPrivateKeys (pubkey, privkey) + return pubkey + where + fromCC (CertificateChain (c : _)) = c + fromCC _ = error "fromCC" + +-- verify that the group selected by the peer is supported in the local +-- configuration +checkSupportedGroup :: Context -> Group -> IO () +checkSupportedGroup ctx grp = + unless (isSupportedGroup ctx grp) $ + let msg = "unsupported (EC)DHE group: " ++ show grp + in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter + +isSupportedGroup :: Context -> Group -> Bool +isSupportedGroup ctx grp = grp `elem` supportedGroups (ctxSupported ctx) + +ensureNullCompression :: MonadIO m => CompressionID -> m () +ensureNullCompression compression = + when (compression /= compressionID nullCompression) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "compression is not allowed in TLS 1.3" IllegalParameter + +expectFinished :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO) +expectFinished ctx (Finished verifyData) = do + processFinished ctx verifyData + return RecvStateDone +expectFinished _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished") + +processFinished :: Context -> VerifyData -> IO () +processFinished ctx verifyData = do + (cc, ver) <- usingState_ ctx $ (,) <$> getRole <*> getVersion + expected <- VerifyData <$> generateFinished ctx ver (invertRole cc) + when (expected /= verifyData) $ decryptError "finished verification failed" + usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForRecv verifyData + +processCertificate :: Context -> Role -> CertificateChain -> IO () +processCertificate _ ServerRole (CertificateChain []) = return () +processCertificate _ ClientRole (CertificateChain []) = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "server certificate missing" HandshakeFailure +processCertificate ctx _ (CertificateChain (c : _)) = + usingHState ctx $ setPublicKey pubkey + where + pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate c + +-- TLS 1.2 distinguishes session ID and session ticket. session +-- ticket. Session ticket is prioritized over session ID. +ticketOrSessionID12 + :: Maybe Ticket -> Session -> Maybe SessionIDorTicket +ticketOrSessionID12 (Just ticket) _ + | ticket /= "" = Just $ B.copy ticket +ticketOrSessionID12 _ (Session (Just sessionId)) = Just $ B.copy sessionId +ticketOrSessionID12 _ _ = Nothing + +setPeerRecordSizeLimit :: Context -> Bool -> RecordSizeLimit -> IO () +setPeerRecordSizeLimit ctx tls13 (RecordSizeLimit n0) = do + when (n0 < 64) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol ("too small recode size limit: " ++ show n0) IllegalParameter + + -- RFC 8449 Section 4: + -- Even if a larger record size limit is provided by a peer, an + -- endpoint MUST NOT send records larger than the protocol-defined + -- limit, unless explicitly allowed by a future TLS version or + -- extension. + let n1 = fromIntegral n0 + n2 + | n1 > protolim = protolim + | otherwise = n1 + -- Even if peer's value is larger than the protocol-defined + -- limitation, call "setPeerRecordLimit" to send + -- "record_size_limit" as ACK. In this case, the protocol-defined + -- limitation is used. + let lim = if tls13 then n2 - 1 else n2 + setPeerRecordLimit ctx $ Just lim + where + protolim + | tls13 = defaultRecordSizeLimit + 1 + | otherwise = defaultRecordSizeLimit + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +generateFinished :: Context -> Version -> Role -> IO ByteString +generateFinished ctx ver role = do + thash <- transcriptHash ctx "generateFinished" + (mainSecret, cipher) <- usingHState ctx $ gets $ \hst -> + (fromJust $ hstMainSecret hst, fromJust $ hstPendingCipher hst) + return $ + if role == ClientRole + then + generateClientFinished ver cipher mainSecret thash + else + generateServerFinished ver cipher mainSecret thash + +generateFinished' + :: PRF -> ByteString -> Secret -> TranscriptHash -> ByteString +generateFinished' prf label mainSecret (TranscriptHash thash) = convert $ prf mainSecret seed 12 + where + seed = label <> thash + +generateClientFinished + :: Version + -> Cipher + -> Secret + -> TranscriptHash + -> ByteString +generateClientFinished ver ciph = + generateFinished' (getPRF ver ciph) "client finished" + +generateServerFinished + :: Version + -> Cipher + -> Secret + -> TranscriptHash + -> ByteString +generateServerFinished ver ciph = + generateFinished' (getPRF ver ciph) "server finished" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- initialize a new Handshake context (initial handshake or renegotiations) +startHandshake :: Context -> Version -> ClientRandom -> IO () +startHandshake ctx ver crand = + void $ swapMVar (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ Just hs + where + hs = newEmptyHandshake ver crand + +setServerHelloParameters12 + :: Context + -> Version + -- ^ chosen version + -> ServerRandom + -> Cipher + -> Compression + -> IO () +setServerHelloParameters12 ctx ver sran cipher compression = do + usingHState ctx $ + modify' $ \hst -> + hst + { hstServerRandom = Just sran + , hstPendingCipher = Just cipher + , hstPendingCompression = compression + } + transitTranscriptHash ctx "transit" (getHash ver cipher) False + +-- The TLS12 Hash is cipher specific, and some TLS12 algorithms use SHA384 +-- instead of the default SHA256. +getHash :: Version -> Cipher -> Hash +getHash ver ciph + | ver < TLS12 = SHA1_MD5 + | maybe True (< TLS12) (cipherMinVer ciph) = SHA256 + | otherwise = cipherHash ciph + +-- | when a new handshake is done, wrap up & clean up. +finishHandshake12 :: Context -> IO () +finishHandshake12 ctx = do + -- forget most handshake data and reset bytes counters. + modifyMVar_ (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ \case + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just hshake -> + return $ + Just + (newEmptyHandshake (hstClientVersion hshake) (hstClientRandom hshake)) + { hstServerRandom = hstServerRandom hshake + , hstMainSecret = hstMainSecret hshake + , hstExtendedMainSecret = hstExtendedMainSecret hshake + , hstSupportedGroup = hstSupportedGroup hshake + } + updateMeasure ctx resetBytesCounters + -- mark the secure connection up and running. + setEstablished ctx Established diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,693 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 ( + makeFinished, + checkFinished, + makeServerKeyShare, + makeClientKeyShare, + fromServerKeyShare, + makeCertVerify, + checkCertVerify, + makePSKBinder, + replacePSKBinder, + sendChangeCipherSpec13, + makeCertRequest, + createTLS13TicketInfo, + ageToObfuscatedAge, + isAgeValid, + getAge, + checkFreshness, + getCurrentTimeFromBase, + getSessionData13, + isHashSignatureValid13, + safeNonNegative32, + RecvHandshake13M, + runRecvHandshake13, + recvHandshake13, + recvHandshake13hash, + CipherChoice (..), + makeCipherChoice, + initEarlySecret, + calculateEarlySecret, + calculateHandshakeSecret, + calculateApplicationSecret, + calculateResumptionSecret, + derivePSK, + checkClientKeyShareKeyLength, + checkServerKeyShareKeyLength, + setRTT, + computeConfirm, + updateTranscriptHash13, + setServerHelloParameters13, + finishHandshake13, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.UnixTime +import Foreign.C.Types (CTime (..)) +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import qualified Network.TLS.Crypto.IES as IES + +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate (extractCAname) +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common (unexpected) +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.IO.Encode +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.KeySchedule +import Network.TLS.MAC +import Network.TLS.Packet13 +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +makeFinished :: MonadIO m => Context -> Hash -> Secret -> m Handshake13 +makeFinished ctx usedHash baseKey = do + verifyData <- + VerifyData . makeVerifyData usedHash baseKey + <$> transcriptHash ctx "makeFinished" + liftIO $ usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForSend verifyData + pure $ Finished13 verifyData + +checkFinished + :: MonadIO m + => Context -> Hash -> Secret -> TranscriptHash -> VerifyData -> m () +checkFinished ctx usedHash baseKey (TranscriptHash hashValue) vd@(VerifyData verifyData) = do + let verifyData' = makeVerifyData usedHash baseKey $ TranscriptHash hashValue + when (B.length verifyData /= B.length verifyData') $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "broken Finished" DecodeError + unless (verifyData' == verifyData) $ decryptError "finished verification failed" + liftIO $ usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForRecv vd + +makeVerifyData :: Hash -> Secret -> TranscriptHash -> ByteString +makeVerifyData usedHash baseKey (TranscriptHash th) = + hmac usedHash finishedKey th + where + hashSize = hashDigestSize usedHash + finishedKey = hkdfExpandLabel usedHash baseKey "finished" "" hashSize + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +makeClientKeyShare + :: Context -> Group -> IO ((Group, IES.GroupPrivate), KeyShareEntry) +makeClientKeyShare ctx grp = do + (cpri, cpub) <- generateGroup ctx grp + let wcpub = IES.groupEncodePublicA cpub + clientKeyShare = KeyShareEntry grp wcpub + return ((grp, cpri), clientKeyShare) + +makeServerKeyShare :: Context -> KeyShareEntry -> IO (Secret, KeyShareEntry) +makeServerKeyShare ctx (KeyShareEntry grp wcpub) = case ecpub of + Left e -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol (show e) IllegalParameter + Right cpub -> do + ecdhePair <- encapsulateGroup ctx cpub + case ecdhePair of + Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol msgInvalidPublic IllegalParameter + Just (spub, share) -> + let wspub = IES.groupEncodePublicB spub + serverKeyShare = KeyShareEntry grp wspub + in return (share, serverKeyShare) + where + ecpub = IES.groupDecodePublicA grp wcpub + msgInvalidPublic = "invalid client " ++ show grp ++ " public key" + +fromServerKeyShare + :: KeyShareEntry -> [(Group, IES.GroupPrivate)] -> IO Secret +fromServerKeyShare (KeyShareEntry grp wspub) grpCpris = case espub of + Left e -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol (show e) IllegalParameter + Right spub -> case lookup grp grpCpris of + Nothing -> throwCore err + Just cpri -> case IES.groupDecapsulate spub cpri of + Just shared -> return shared + Nothing -> throwCore err + where + err = Error_Protocol "cannot generate a shared secret on (EC)DH" IllegalParameter + espub = IES.groupDecodePublicB grp wspub + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +serverContextString :: ByteString +serverContextString = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify" + +clientContextString :: ByteString +clientContextString = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" + +makeCertVerify + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm + -> TranscriptHash + -> m Handshake13 +makeCertVerify ctx pub hs (TranscriptHash hashValue) = do + role <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getRole + let ctxStr + | role == ClientRole = clientContextString + | otherwise = serverContextString + target = makeTarget ctxStr hashValue + CertVerify13 . DigitallySigned hs <$> sign ctx pub hs target + +checkCertVerify + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm + -> Signature + -> ByteString + -> m Bool +checkCertVerify ctx pub hs signature hashValue + | pub `signatureCompatible13` hs = liftIO $ do + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + let ctxStr + | role == ClientRole = serverContextString -- opposite context + | otherwise = clientContextString + target = makeTarget ctxStr hashValue + sigParams = signatureParams pub hs + checkHashSignatureValid13 hs + checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs + verifyPublic ctx sigParams target signature + | otherwise = return False + +makeTarget :: ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString +makeTarget contextString hashValue = runPut $ do + putBytes $ B.replicate 64 32 + putBytes contextString + putWord8 0 + putBytes hashValue + +sign + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm + -> ByteString + -> m Signature +sign ctx pub hs target = liftIO $ do + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + let sigParams = signatureParams pub hs + signPrivate ctx role sigParams target + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +makePSKBinder + :: BaseSecret EarlySecret + -> Hash + -> Int + -> ByteString + -- ^ Encoded client hello + -> ByteString +makePSKBinder (BaseSecret sec) usedHash truncLen ech = + makeVerifyData usedHash binderKey hChTruncated + where + hChTruncated = TranscriptHash $ hash usedHash $ trunc ech + th = TranscriptHash $ hash usedHash "" + binderKey = deriveSecret usedHash sec "res binder" th + trunc x = B.take takeLen x + where + totalLen = B.length x + takeLen = totalLen - truncLen + +replacePSKBinder :: ByteString -> [ByteString] -> ByteString +replacePSKBinder pskz bds = tLidentities <> binders + where + tLidentities = B.take (B.length pskz - B.length binders) pskz + -- See instance Extension PreSharedKey + binders = runPut $ putOpaque16 $ runPut (mapM_ putBinder bds) + putBinder = putOpaque8 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendChangeCipherSpec13 :: Monoid b => Context -> PacketFlightM b () +sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx = do + sent <- usingHState ctx $ do + b <- getCCS13Sent + unless b $ setCCS13Sent True + return b + unless sent $ loadPacket13 ctx ChangeCipherSpec13 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +makeCertRequest + :: ServerParams -> Context -> CertReqContext -> Bool -> Handshake13 +makeCertRequest sparams ctx certReqCtx zlib = + let sigAlgs = SignatureAlgorithms $ supportedHashSignatures $ ctxSupported ctx + signatureAlgExt = Just $ toExtensionRaw sigAlgs + + compCertExt + | zlib = Just $ toExtensionRaw $ CompressCertificate [CCA_Zlib] + | otherwise = Nothing + + caDns = map extractCAname $ serverCACertificates sparams + caExt + | null caDns = Nothing + | otherwise = Just $ toExtensionRaw $ CertificateAuthorities caDns + + crexts = + catMaybes + [ {- 0x0d -} signatureAlgExt + , {- 0x1b -} compCertExt + , {- 0x2f -} caExt + ] + in CertRequest13 certReqCtx crexts + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +createTLS13TicketInfo + :: Second -> Either Context Second -> Maybe Millisecond -> IO TLS13TicketInfo +createTLS13TicketInfo life ecw mrtt = do + -- Left: serverSendTime + -- Right: clientReceiveTime + bTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + add <- case ecw of + Left ctx -> B.foldl' (*+) 0 <$> getStateRNG ctx 4 + Right ad -> return ad + return $ + TLS13TicketInfo + { lifetime = life + , ageAdd = add + , txrxTime = bTime + , estimatedRTT = mrtt + } + where + x *+ y = x * 256 + fromIntegral y + +ageToObfuscatedAge :: Second -> TLS13TicketInfo -> Second +ageToObfuscatedAge age TLS13TicketInfo{..} = obfage + where + obfage = age + ageAdd + +obfuscatedAgeToAge :: Second -> TLS13TicketInfo -> Second +obfuscatedAgeToAge obfage TLS13TicketInfo{..} = age + where + age = obfage - ageAdd + +isAgeValid :: Second -> TLS13TicketInfo -> Bool +isAgeValid age TLS13TicketInfo{..} = age <= lifetime * 1000 + +getAge :: TLS13TicketInfo -> IO Second +getAge TLS13TicketInfo{..} = do + let clientReceiveTime = txrxTime + clientSendTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + return $ fromIntegral (clientSendTime - clientReceiveTime) -- milliseconds + +checkFreshness :: TLS13TicketInfo -> Second -> IO Bool +checkFreshness tinfo@TLS13TicketInfo{..} obfAge = do + serverReceiveTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + let freshness = + if expectedArrivalTime > serverReceiveTime + then expectedArrivalTime - serverReceiveTime + else serverReceiveTime - expectedArrivalTime + -- Some implementations round age up to second. + -- We take max of 2000 and rtt in the case where rtt is too small. + let tolerance = max 2000 rtt + isFresh = freshness < tolerance + return $ isAlive && isFresh + where + serverSendTime = txrxTime + rtt = fromJust estimatedRTT + age = obfuscatedAgeToAge obfAge tinfo + expectedArrivalTime = serverSendTime + rtt + fromIntegral age + isAlive = isAgeValid age tinfo + +getCurrentTimeFromBase :: IO Millisecond +getCurrentTimeFromBase = millisecondsFromBase <$> getUnixTime + +millisecondsFromBase :: UnixTime -> Millisecond +millisecondsFromBase (UnixTime (CTime s) us) = + fromIntegral ((s - base) * 1000) + fromIntegral (us `div` 1000) + where + base = 1483228800 + +-- UnixTime (CTime base) _= parseUnixTimeGMT webDateFormat "Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 GMT" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +getSessionData13 + :: Context -> Cipher -> TLS13TicketInfo -> Int -> ByteString -> IO SessionData +getSessionData13 ctx usedCipher tinfo maxSize psk = do + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + malpn <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol + sni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + mgrp <- usingHState ctx getSupportedGroup + return + SessionData + { sessionVersion = ver + , sessionCipher = cipherID usedCipher + , sessionCompression = 0 + , sessionClientSNI = sni + , sessionSecret = psk + , sessionGroup = mgrp + , sessionTicketInfo = Just tinfo + , sessionALPN = malpn + , sessionMaxEarlyDataSize = maxSize + , sessionFlags = [] + } + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- Word32 is used in TLS 1.3 protocol. +-- Int is used for API for Haskell TLS because it is natural. +-- If Int is 64 bits, users can specify bigger number than Word32. +-- If Int is 32 bits, 2^31 or larger may be converted into minus numbers. +safeNonNegative32 :: (Num a, Ord a, FiniteBits a) => a -> a +safeNonNegative32 x + | x <= 0 = 0 + | finiteBitSize x <= 32 = x + | otherwise = x `min` fromIntegral (maxBound :: Word32) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype RecvHandshake13M m a + = RecvHandshake13M (StateT [Handshake13R] m a) + deriving (Functor, Applicative, Monad, MonadIO) + +recvHandshake13 + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> (Handshake13 -> RecvHandshake13M m a) + -> RecvHandshake13M m a +recvHandshake13 ctx f = getHandshake13 ctx >>= \(h, _b) -> f h + +recvHandshake13hash + :: MonadIO m + => Context + -> String + -> (TranscriptHash -> Handshake13 -> RecvHandshake13M m a) + -> RecvHandshake13M m a +recvHandshake13hash ctx label f = do + d <- transcriptHash ctx label + getHandshake13 ctx >>= \(h, _b) -> f d h + +getHandshake13 + :: MonadIO m => Context -> RecvHandshake13M m Handshake13R +getHandshake13 ctx = RecvHandshake13M $ do + currentState <- get + case currentState of + hb : hbs -> found hb hbs + _ -> recvLoop + where + found hb hbs = liftIO (updateTranscriptHash13 ctx hb) >> put hbs >> return hb + recvLoop = do + epkt <- liftIO (recvPacket13 ctx) + case epkt of + Right (Handshake13 [] _) -> error "invalid recvPacket13 result" + Right (Handshake13 (h : hs) (b : bs)) -> found (h, b) $ zip hs bs + Right ChangeCipherSpec13 -> do + alreadyReceived <- liftIO $ usingHState ctx getCCS13Recv + if alreadyReceived + then + liftIO $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol "multiple CSS in TLS 1.3" UnexpectedMessage + else do + liftIO $ usingHState ctx $ setCCS13Recv True + recvLoop + Right (Alert13 _) -> throwCore Error_TCP_Terminate + Right x -> unexpected (show x) (Just "handshake 13") + Left err -> throwCore err + +runRecvHandshake13 :: MonadIO m => RecvHandshake13M m a -> m a +runRecvHandshake13 (RecvHandshake13M f) = do + (result, new) <- runStateT f [] + unless (null new) $ unexpected "spurious handshake 13" Nothing + return result + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- some hash/signature combinations have been deprecated in TLS13 and should +-- not be used +checkHashSignatureValid13 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> IO () +checkHashSignatureValid13 hs = + unless (isHashSignatureValid13 hs) $ + let msg = "invalid TLS13 hash and signature algorithm: " ++ show hs + in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter + +isHashSignatureValid13 :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +isHashSignatureValid13 hs = hs `elem` signatureSchemesForTLS13 + +{- +isHashSignatureValid13 (HashIntrinsic, s) = + s + `elem` [ SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256 + , SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384 + , SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512 + , SignatureEd25519 + , SignatureEd448 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA256 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA384 + , SignatureRSApsspssSHA512 + ] +isHashSignatureValid13 (h, SignatureECDSA) = + h `elem` [HashSHA256, HashSHA384, HashSHA512] +isHashSignatureValid13 _ = False +-} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +calculateEarlySecret + :: Context + -> CipherChoice + -> Either ByteString (BaseSecret EarlySecret) + -> IO (SecretPair EarlySecret) +calculateEarlySecret ctx choice maux = do + (_ch, b) <- fromJust <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello + let hCh = TranscriptHash $ hashChunks usedHash b + let earlySecret = case maux of + Right (BaseSecret sec) -> sec + Left psk -> hkdfExtract usedHash zero (convert psk) + clientEarlySecret = deriveSecret usedHash earlySecret "c e traffic" hCh + cets = ClientTrafficSecret clientEarlySecret :: ClientTrafficSecret EarlySecret + logKey ctx cets + return $ SecretPair (BaseSecret earlySecret) cets + where + usedHash = cHash choice + zero = cZero choice + +initEarlySecret :: CipherChoice -> Maybe ByteString -> BaseSecret EarlySecret +initEarlySecret choice mpsk = BaseSecret sec + where + sec = hkdfExtract usedHash zero zeroOrPSK + usedHash = cHash choice + zero = cZero choice + zeroOrPSK = fromMaybe zero (convert <$> mpsk) + +calculateHandshakeSecret + :: Context + -> CipherChoice + -> BaseSecret EarlySecret + -> Secret + -> IO (SecretTriple HandshakeSecret) +calculateHandshakeSecret ctx choice (BaseSecret sec) ecdhe = do + hChSh <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..SH" + let th = TranscriptHash $ hash usedHash "" + handshakeSecret = + hkdfExtract + usedHash + (deriveSecret usedHash sec "derived" th) + ecdhe + let clientHandshakeSecret = deriveSecret usedHash handshakeSecret "c hs traffic" hChSh + serverHandshakeSecret = deriveSecret usedHash handshakeSecret "s hs traffic" hChSh + let shts = + ServerTrafficSecret serverHandshakeSecret :: ServerTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + chts = + ClientTrafficSecret clientHandshakeSecret :: ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + logKey ctx shts + logKey ctx chts + return $ SecretTriple (BaseSecret handshakeSecret) chts shts + where + usedHash = cHash choice + +calculateApplicationSecret + :: Context + -> CipherChoice + -> BaseSecret HandshakeSecret + -> TranscriptHash + -> IO (SecretTriple ApplicationSecret) +calculateApplicationSecret ctx choice (BaseSecret sec) hChSf = do + let th = TranscriptHash $ hash usedHash "" + applicationSecret = + hkdfExtract + usedHash + (deriveSecret usedHash sec "derived" th) + zero + let clientApplicationSecret0 = deriveSecret usedHash applicationSecret "c ap traffic" hChSf + serverApplicationSecret0 = deriveSecret usedHash applicationSecret "s ap traffic" hChSf + exporterSecret = deriveSecret usedHash applicationSecret "exp master" hChSf + usingState_ ctx $ setTLS13ExporterSecret exporterSecret + let sts0 = + ServerTrafficSecret serverApplicationSecret0 + :: ServerTrafficSecret ApplicationSecret + let cts0 = + ClientTrafficSecret clientApplicationSecret0 + :: ClientTrafficSecret ApplicationSecret + logKey ctx sts0 + logKey ctx cts0 + return $ SecretTriple (BaseSecret applicationSecret) cts0 sts0 + where + usedHash = cHash choice + zero = cZero choice + +calculateResumptionSecret + :: Context + -> CipherChoice + -> BaseSecret ApplicationSecret + -> IO (BaseSecret ResumptionSecret) +calculateResumptionSecret ctx choice (BaseSecret sec) = do + hChCf <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..CF" + let resumptionSecret = deriveSecret usedHash sec "res master" hChCf + return $ BaseSecret resumptionSecret + where + usedHash = cHash choice + +derivePSK + :: CipherChoice -> BaseSecret ResumptionSecret -> TicketNonce -> ByteString +derivePSK choice (BaseSecret sec) (TicketNonce nonce) = + hkdfExpandLabel usedHash sec "resumption" nonce hashSize + where + usedHash = cHash choice + hashSize = hashDigestSize usedHash + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +checkClientKeyShareKeyLength :: KeyShareEntry -> Bool +checkClientKeyShareKeyLength ks = clientKeyShareKeyLength grp == B.length key + where + grp = keyShareEntryGroup ks + key = keyShareEntryKeyExchange ks + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +clientKeyShareKeyLength :: Group -> Int +clientKeyShareKeyLength P256 = 65 -- 32 * 2 + 1 +clientKeyShareKeyLength P384 = 97 -- 48 * 2 + 1 +clientKeyShareKeyLength P521 = 133 -- 66 * 2 + 1 +clientKeyShareKeyLength X25519 = 32 +clientKeyShareKeyLength X448 = 56 +clientKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE2048 = 256 +clientKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE3072 = 384 +clientKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE4096 = 512 +clientKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE6144 = 768 +clientKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE8192 = 1024 +clientKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM512 = 800 +clientKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM768 = 1184 +clientKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM1024 = 1568 +clientKeyShareKeyLength X25519MLKEM768 = 1216 +clientKeyShareKeyLength P256MLKEM768 = 1249 +clientKeyShareKeyLength P384MLKEM1024 = 1665 +clientKeyShareKeyLength _ = error "clientKeyShareKeyLength" +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +checkServerKeyShareKeyLength :: KeyShareEntry -> Bool +checkServerKeyShareKeyLength ks = serverKeyShareKeyLength grp == B.length key + where + grp = keyShareEntryGroup ks + key = keyShareEntryKeyExchange ks + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +serverKeyShareKeyLength :: Group -> Int +serverKeyShareKeyLength P256 = 65 -- 32 * 2 + 1 +serverKeyShareKeyLength P384 = 97 -- 48 * 2 + 1 +serverKeyShareKeyLength P521 = 133 -- 66 * 2 + 1 +serverKeyShareKeyLength X25519 = 32 +serverKeyShareKeyLength X448 = 56 +serverKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE2048 = 256 +serverKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE3072 = 384 +serverKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE4096 = 512 +serverKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE6144 = 768 +serverKeyShareKeyLength FFDHE8192 = 1024 +serverKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM512 = 768 +serverKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM768 = 1088 +serverKeyShareKeyLength MLKEM1024 = 1568 +serverKeyShareKeyLength X25519MLKEM768 = 1120 +serverKeyShareKeyLength P256MLKEM768 = 1153 +serverKeyShareKeyLength P384MLKEM1024 = 1665 +serverKeyShareKeyLength _ = error "clientKeyShareKeyLength" +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +setRTT :: Context -> Millisecond -> IO () +setRTT ctx chSentTime = do + shRecvTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + let rtt' = shRecvTime - chSentTime + rtt = if rtt' == 0 then 10 else rtt' + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stRTT = rtt} + +computeConfirm + :: (MonadFail m, MonadIO m) + => Context -> Hash -> ServerHello -> ByteString -> m ByteString +computeConfirm ctx usedHash sh label = do + (CH{..}, _b) <- fromJust <$> liftIO (usingHState ctx getClientHello) + TranscriptHash echConf <- + transcriptHashWith ctx "ECH acceptance" $ encodeHandshake13 $ ServerHello13 sh + let prk = hkdfExtract usedHash "" $ unClientRandom chRandom + return $ hkdfExpandLabel usedHash (convert prk) label echConf 8 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +setServerHelloParameters13 + :: Context -> Cipher -> Bool -> IO (Either TLSError ()) +setServerHelloParameters13 ctx cipher isHRR = do + transitTranscriptHash ctx "transit" (cipherHash cipher) isHRR + usingHState ctx $ do + hst <- get + case hstPendingCipher hst of + Nothing -> do + put + hst + { hstPendingCipher = Just cipher + , hstPendingCompression = nullCompression + } + return $ Right () + Just oldcipher + | cipher == oldcipher -> return $ Right () + | otherwise -> + return $ + Left $ + Error_Protocol "TLS 1.3 cipher changed after hello retry" IllegalParameter + +-- | TLS13 handshake wrap up & clean up. Contrary to +-- @finishHandshake12@, this does not handle session, which is managed +-- separately for TLS 1.3. This does not reset byte counters because +-- renegotiation is not allowed. And a few more state attributes are +-- preserved, necessary for TLS13 handshake modes, session tickets and +-- post-handshake authentication. +finishHandshake13 :: Context -> IO () +finishHandshake13 ctx = do + -- forget most handshake data + modifyMVar_ (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ \case + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just hshake -> + return $ + Just + (newEmptyHandshake (hstClientVersion hshake) (hstClientRandom hshake)) + { hstServerRandom = hstServerRandom hshake + , hstMainSecret = hstMainSecret hshake + , hstSupportedGroup = hstSupportedGroup hshake + , hstTransHashState = hstTransHashState hshake + , hstTLS13HandshakeMode = hstTLS13HandshakeMode hshake + , hstTLS13RTT0Status = hstTLS13RTT0Status hshake + , hstTLS13ResumptionSecret = hstTLS13ResumptionSecret hshake + , hstTLS13ECHAccepted = hstTLS13ECHAccepted hshake + } + -- forget handshake data stored in TLS state + usingState_ ctx $ do + setTLS13KeyShare Nothing + setTLS13PreSharedKey Nothing + -- mark the secure connection up and running. + setEstablished ctx Established diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Control.hs @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Control ( + ClientState (..), + ServerState (..), + EarlySecretInfo (..), + HandshakeSecretInfo (..), + ApplicationSecretInfo (..), + NegotiatedProtocol, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | ID of the application-level protocol negotiated between client and server. +-- See values listed in the . +type NegotiatedProtocol = ByteString + +-- | Handshake information generated for traffic at 0-RTT level. +data EarlySecretInfo = EarlySecretInfo Cipher (ClientTrafficSecret EarlySecret) + deriving (Show) + +-- | Handshake information generated for traffic at handshake level. +data HandshakeSecretInfo + = HandshakeSecretInfo Cipher (TrafficSecrets HandshakeSecret) + deriving (Show) + +-- | Handshake information generated for traffic at application level. +newtype ApplicationSecretInfo = ApplicationSecretInfo (TrafficSecrets ApplicationSecret) + deriving (Show) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data ClientState + = SendClientHello (Maybe EarlySecretInfo) + | RecvServerHello HandshakeSecretInfo + | SendClientFinished [ExtensionRaw] ApplicationSecretInfo + +data ServerState + = SendServerHello [ExtensionRaw] (Maybe EarlySecretInfo) HandshakeSecretInfo + | SendServerFinished ApplicationSecretInfo diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Key.hs @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-} + +-- | Functions for RSA operations +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Key ( + encryptRSA, + signPrivate, + decryptRSA, + verifyPublic, + generateDHE, + generateGroup, + encapsulateGroup, + generateFFDHE, + generateFFDHEShared, + versionCompatible, + isDigitalSignaturePair, + checkDigitalSignatureKey, + getLocalPublicKey, + satisfiesEcPredicate, + logKey, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State (withRNG) +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 + +{- if the RSA encryption fails we just return an empty bytestring, and let the protocol + - fail by itself; however it would be probably better to just report it since it's an internal problem. + -} +encryptRSA :: Context -> Secret -> IO ByteString +encryptRSA ctx content = do + publicKey <- usingHState ctx getRemotePublicKey + usingState_ ctx $ do + v <- withRNG $ kxEncrypt publicKey content + case v of + Left err -> error ("rsa encrypt failed: " ++ show err) + Right econtent -> return econtent + +signPrivate :: Context -> Role -> SignatureParams -> ByteString -> IO ByteString +signPrivate ctx _ params content = do + (publicKey, privateKey) <- usingHState ctx getLocalPublicPrivateKeys + usingState_ ctx $ do + r <- withRNG $ kxSign privateKey publicKey params content + case r of + Left err -> error ("sign failed: " ++ show err) + Right econtent -> return econtent + +decryptRSA :: Context -> ByteString -> IO (Either KxError Secret) +decryptRSA ctx econtent = do + (_, privateKey) <- usingHState ctx getLocalPublicPrivateKeys + usingState_ ctx $ do + let cipher = B.drop 2 econtent + withRNG $ kxDecrypt privateKey cipher + +verifyPublic + :: Context -> SignatureParams -> ByteString -> ByteString -> IO Bool +verifyPublic ctx params econtent sign = do + publicKey <- usingHState ctx getRemotePublicKey + return $ kxVerify publicKey params econtent sign + +generateDHE :: Context -> DHParams -> IO (DHPrivate, DHPublic) +generateDHE ctx dhp = usingState_ ctx $ withRNG $ dhGenerateKeyPair dhp + +generateGroup :: Context -> Group -> IO (GroupPrivate, GroupPublicA) +generateGroup ctx grp = usingState_ ctx $ withRNG $ groupGenerateKeyPair grp + +encapsulateGroup + :: Context -> GroupPublicA -> IO (Maybe (GroupPublicB, GroupKey)) +encapsulateGroup ctx pub = usingState_ ctx $ withRNG $ groupEncapsulate pub + +generateFFDHE :: Context -> Group -> IO (DHParams, DHPrivate, DHPublic) +generateFFDHE ctx grp = usingState_ ctx $ withRNG $ dhGroupGenerateKeyPair grp + +generateFFDHEShared + :: Context -> Group -> DHPublic -> IO (Maybe (DHPublic, DHKey)) +generateFFDHEShared ctx grp pub = usingState_ ctx $ withRNG $ dhGroupGetPubShared grp pub + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +isDigitalSignatureKey :: PubKey -> Bool +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyRSA _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyDSA _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEC _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEd25519 _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey (PubKeyEd448 _) = True +isDigitalSignatureKey _ = False + +versionCompatible :: PubKey -> Version -> Bool +versionCompatible (PubKeyRSA _) _ = True +versionCompatible (PubKeyDSA _) v = v <= TLS12 +versionCompatible (PubKeyEC _) v = v >= TLS10 +versionCompatible (PubKeyEd25519 _) v = v >= TLS12 +versionCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) v = v >= TLS12 +versionCompatible _ _ = False +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +-- | Test whether the argument is a public key supported for signature at the +-- specified TLS version. This also accepts a key for RSA encryption. This +-- test is performed by clients or servers before verifying a remote +-- Certificate Verify. +checkDigitalSignatureKey :: MonadIO m => Version -> PubKey -> m () +checkDigitalSignatureKey usedVersion key = do + unless (isDigitalSignatureKey key) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "unsupported remote public key type" HandshakeFailure + unless (key `versionCompatible` usedVersion) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + (show usedVersion ++ " has no support for " ++ pubkeyType key) + IllegalParameter + +-- | Test whether the argument is matching key pair supported for signature. +-- This also accepts material for RSA encryption. This test is performed by +-- servers or clients before using a credential from the local configuration. +isDigitalSignaturePair :: (PubKey, PrivKey) -> Bool +isDigitalSignaturePair keyPair = + case keyPair of + (PubKeyRSA _, PrivKeyRSA _) -> True + (PubKeyDSA _, PrivKeyDSA _) -> True + (PubKeyEC _, PrivKeyEC k) -> kxSupportedPrivKeyEC k + (PubKeyEd25519 _, PrivKeyEd25519 _) -> True + (PubKeyEd448 _, PrivKeyEd448 _) -> True + _ -> False + +getLocalPublicKey :: MonadIO m => Context -> m PubKey +getLocalPublicKey ctx = + usingHState ctx (fst <$> getLocalPublicPrivateKeys) + +-- | Test whether the public key satisfies a predicate about the elliptic curve. +-- When the public key is not suitable for ECDSA, like RSA for instance, the +-- predicate is not used and the result is 'True'. +satisfiesEcPredicate :: (Group -> Bool) -> PubKey -> Bool +satisfiesEcPredicate p (PubKeyEC ecPub) = + maybe False p $ findEllipticCurveGroup ecPub +satisfiesEcPredicate _ _ = True + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +class LogLabel a where + labelAndKey :: a -> (String, Secret) + +instance LogLabel MainSecret where + labelAndKey (MainSecret key) = ("CLIENT_RANDOM", key) + +instance LogLabel (ClientTrafficSecret EarlySecret) where + labelAndKey (ClientTrafficSecret key) = ("CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET", key) + +instance LogLabel (ServerTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret) where + labelAndKey (ServerTrafficSecret key) = ("SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", key) + +instance LogLabel (ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret) where + labelAndKey (ClientTrafficSecret key) = ("CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", key) + +instance LogLabel (ServerTrafficSecret ApplicationSecret) where + labelAndKey (ServerTrafficSecret key) = ("SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0", key) + +instance LogLabel (ClientTrafficSecret ApplicationSecret) where + labelAndKey (ClientTrafficSecret key) = ("CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0", key) + +-- NSS Key Log Format +-- See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format +logKey :: LogLabel a => Context -> a -> IO () +logKey ctx logkey = do + mhst <- getHState ctx + case mhst of + Nothing -> return () + Just hst -> do + let crm = fromMaybe (hstClientRandom hst) (hstTLS13OuterClientRandom hst) + cr = unClientRandom crm + (label, key) = labelAndKey logkey + debugKeyLogger (ctxDebug ctx) $ + label ++ " " ++ dump cr ++ " " ++ dump (convert key) + where + dump = init . drop 1 . showBytesHex diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Random.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Random.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Random.hs @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternGuards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Random ( + serverRandom, + serverRandomECH, + replaceServerRandomECH, + clientRandom, + isDowngraded, +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Struct + +-- | Generate a server random suitable for the version selected by the server +-- and its supported versions. We use an 8-byte downgrade suffix when the +-- selected version is lowered because of incomplete client support, but also +-- when a version downgrade has been forced with 'debugVersionForced'. This +-- second part allows to test that the client implementation correctly detects +-- downgrades. The suffix is not used when forcing TLS13 to a server not +-- officially supporting TLS13 (this is not a downgrade scenario but only the +-- consequence of our debug API allowing this). +serverRandom :: Context -> Version -> [Version] -> IO ServerRandom +serverRandom ctx chosenVer suppVers + | TLS13 `elem` suppVers = case chosenVer of + TLS13 -> ServerRandom <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + TLS12 -> ServerRandom <$> genServRand suffix12 + _ -> ServerRandom <$> genServRand suffix11 + | TLS12 `elem` suppVers = case chosenVer of + TLS13 -> ServerRandom <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + TLS12 -> ServerRandom <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + _ -> ServerRandom <$> genServRand suffix11 + | otherwise = ServerRandom <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + where + genServRand suff = do + pref <- getStateRNG ctx 24 + return (pref `B.append` suff) + +serverRandomECH :: Context -> IO ServerRandom +serverRandomECH ctx = do + rnd <- getStateRNG ctx 24 + let zeros = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + return $ ServerRandom (rnd <> zeros) + +replaceServerRandomECH :: ServerRandom -> ByteString -> ServerRandom +replaceServerRandomECH (ServerRandom rnd) bs = ServerRandom (rnd' <> bs) + where + rnd' = B.take 24 rnd + +-- | Test if the negotiated version was artificially downgraded (that is, for +-- other reason than the versions supported by the client). +isDowngraded :: Version -> [Version] -> ServerRandom -> Bool +isDowngraded ver suppVers (ServerRandom sr) + | ver <= TLS12 + , TLS13 `elem` suppVers = + suffix12 `B.isSuffixOf` sr + || suffix11 `B.isSuffixOf` sr + | ver <= TLS11 + , TLS12 `elem` suppVers = + suffix11 `B.isSuffixOf` sr + | otherwise = False + +suffix12 :: ByteString +suffix12 = "\x44\x4F\x57\x4E\x47\x52\x44\x01" + +suffix11 :: ByteString +suffix11 = "\x44\x4F\x57\x4E\x47\x52\x44\x00" + +clientRandom :: Context -> IO ClientRandom +clientRandom ctx = ClientRandom <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server ( + handshakeServer, + handshakeServerWith, + requestCertificateServer, + keyUpdate, + updateKey, + KeyUpdateRequest (..), +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.Maybe + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello12 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello12 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS12 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS13 +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Struct + +-- Put the server context in handshake mode. +-- +-- Expect to receive as first packet a client hello handshake message +-- +-- This is just a helper to pop the next message from the recv layer, +-- and call handshakeServerWith. +handshakeServer :: ServerParams -> Context -> IO () +handshakeServer sparams ctx = liftIO $ do + hbs <- recvPacketHandshake ctx + case hbs of + chb : _ -> handshake sparams ctx chb + _ -> unexpected (show $ fst $ unzip hbs) (Just "client hello") + +handshakeServerWith + :: ServerParams -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () +handshakeServerWith = handshake + +-- | Put the server context in handshake mode. +-- +-- Expect a client hello message as parameter. +-- This is useful when the client hello has been already popped from the recv layer to inspect the packet. +-- +-- When the function returns, a new handshake has been successfully negotiated. +-- On any error, a HandshakeFailed exception is raised. +handshake :: ServerParams -> Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () +handshake sparams ctx chb@(ClientHello ch, bs) = do + (chosenVersion, chI, mcrnd) <- processClientHello sparams ctx ch bs + if chosenVersion == TLS13 + then do + -- fixme: we should check if the client random is the same as + -- that in the first client hello in the case of hello retry. + -- r0 :: Cipher, Hash, Bool + (keyShareResult, r0, r1) <- + processClientHello13 sparams ctx chI + case keyShareResult of + SelectKeyShareNotFound -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no group in common with the client for HRR" HandshakeFailure + SelectKeyShareHRR g -> do + sendHRR ctx g r0 chI $ isJust mcrnd + -- Don't reset ctxEstablished since 0-RTT data + -- would be coming, which should be ignored. + handshakeServer sparams ctx + SelectKeyShareFound cliKeyShare -> do + unless (checkClientKeyShareKeyLength cliKeyShare) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "broken key_share" IllegalParameter + -- r2 :: ( SecretTriple ApplicationSecret + -- , ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + -- , Bool -- authenticated + -- , Bool) -- rtt0OK + r2 <- + sendServerHello13 sparams ctx cliKeyShare r0 r1 chI mcrnd + recvClientSecondFlight13 sparams ctx r2 chI + else do + r <- + processClientHello12 sparams ctx chI + updateTranscriptHash12 ctx chb + resumeSessionData <- + sendServerHello12 sparams ctx r chI + recvClientSecondFlight12 sparams ctx resumeSessionData +handshake _ _ _ = throwCore $ Error_Protocol "client Hello is expected" HandshakeFailure diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello.hs @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TupleSections #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello ( + processClientHello, +) where + +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Crypto.HPKE +import qualified Data.ByteString as BS + +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config + +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +processClientHello + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> ClientHello + -> [ByteString] + -> IO + ( Version + , ClientHello + , Maybe ClientRandom -- Just for ECH to keep the outer one for key log + ) +processClientHello sparams ctx ch@CH{..} b = do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + -- renego is not allowed in TLS 1.3 + when (established /= NotEstablished) $ do + ver <- usingState_ ctx (getVersionWithDefault TLS12) + when (ver == TLS13) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "renegotiation is not allowed in TLS 1.3" UnexpectedMessage + -- rejecting client initiated renegotiation to prevent DOS. + eof <- ctxEOF ctx + let renegotiation = established == Established && not eof + when + (renegotiation && not (supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation $ ctxSupported ctx)) + $ throwCore + $ Error_Protocol_Warning "renegotiation is not allowed" NoRenegotiation + -- check if policy allow this new handshake to happens + handshakeAuthorized <- withMeasure ctx (onNewHandshake $ serverHooks sparams) + unless + handshakeAuthorized + (throwCore $ Error_HandshakePolicy "server: handshake denied") + updateMeasure ctx incrementNbHandshakes + + when (chVersion /= TLS12) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol (show chVersion ++ " is not supported") ProtocolVersion + + -- Fallback SCSV: RFC7507 + -- TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV: {0x56, 0x00} + when + ( supportedFallbackScsv (ctxSupported ctx) + && (CipherId 0x5600 `elem` chCiphers) + && chVersion < TLS12 + ) + $ throwCore + $ Error_Protocol "fallback is not allowed" InappropriateFallback + + -- choosing TLS version + let extract (SupportedVersionsClientHello vers) = vers -- fixme: vers == [] + extract _ = [] + clientVersions = + lookupAndDecode EID_SupportedVersions MsgTClientHello chExtensions [] extract + clientVersion = min TLS12 chVersion + serverVersions + | renegotiation = filter (< TLS13) (supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx) + | otherwise = supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx + mVersion = debugVersionForced $ serverDebug sparams + chosenVersion <- case mVersion of + Just cver -> return cver + Nothing -> + if (TLS13 `elem` serverVersions) && clientVersions /= [] + then case findHighestVersionFrom13 clientVersions serverVersions of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("client versions " ++ show clientVersions ++ " is not supported") + ProtocolVersion + Just v -> return v + else case findHighestVersionFrom clientVersion serverVersions of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + ("client version " ++ show clientVersion ++ " is not supported") + ProtocolVersion + Just v -> return v + + -- Checking compression + let nullComp = compressionID nullCompression + case chosenVersion of + TLS13 -> + when (chComps /= [nullComp]) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "compression is not allowed in TLS 1.3" IllegalParameter + _ -> case find (== nullComp) chComps of + Nothing -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "compressions must include nullCompression in TLS 1.2" + IllegalParameter + _ -> return () + + -- Processing encrypted client hello + (mClientHello', receivedECH) <- + if chosenVersion == TLS13 && not (null (serverECHKey sparams)) + then do + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_EncryptedClientHello + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + (return (Nothing, False)) + (\bs -> (,True) <$> decryptECH sparams ctx ch bs) + else return (Nothing, False) + case mClientHello' of + Just chI -> do + -- chI is created from diff. + -- encodeHandshake is a MUST. + setupI ctx chI $ [encodeHandshake $ ClientHello chI] + return (chosenVersion, chI, Just chRandom) + _ -> do + setupO ctx ch b + when (chosenVersion == TLS13) $ do + let hasECHConf = not (null (sharedECHConfigList (serverShared sparams))) + when (hasECHConf && not receivedECH) $ + usingHState ctx $ + setECHEE True + when receivedECH $ + usingHState ctx $ + setECHEE True + return (chosenVersion, ch, Nothing) + +setupI :: Context -> ClientHello -> [ByteString] -> IO () +setupI ctx chI@CH{..} b = do + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + unless hrr $ startHandshake ctx TLS13 chRandom + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello chI b + let serverName = getServerName chExtensions + maybe (return ()) (usingState_ ctx . setClientSNI) serverName + +setupO :: Context -> ClientHello -> [ByteString] -> IO () +setupO ctx ch@CH{..} b = do + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + unless hrr $ startHandshake ctx chVersion chRandom + usingHState ctx $ setClientHello ch b + let serverName = getServerName chExtensions + maybe (return ()) (usingState_ ctx . setClientSNI) serverName + +-- SNI (Server Name Indication) +getServerName :: [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe HostName +getServerName chExts = + lookupAndDecode + EID_ServerName + MsgTClientHello + chExts + Nothing + extractServerName + where + extractServerName (ServerName ns) = listToMaybe (mapMaybe toHostName ns) + toHostName (ServerNameHostName hostName) = Just hostName + toHostName (ServerNameOther _) = Nothing + +findHighestVersionFrom :: Version -> [Version] -> Maybe Version +findHighestVersionFrom clientVersion allowedVersions = + case filter (clientVersion >=) $ sortOn Down allowedVersions of + [] -> Nothing + v : _ -> Just v + +findHighestVersionFrom13 :: [Version] -> [Version] -> Maybe Version +findHighestVersionFrom13 clientVersions serverVersions = case svs `intersect` cvs of + [] -> Nothing + v : _ -> Just v + where + svs = sortOn Down serverVersions + cvs = sortOn Down $ filter (>= TLS12) clientVersions + +decryptECH + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> ClientHello + -> EncryptedClientHello + -> IO (Maybe ClientHello) +decryptECH _ _ _ ECHClientHelloInner = return Nothing +decryptECH sparams ctx chO ech@ECHClientHelloOuter{..} = E.handle hpkeHandler $ do + mfunc <- getHPKE sparams ctx ech + case mfunc of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just (func, nenc) -> do + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + let nenc' = if hrr then 0 else nenc + let aad = encodeHandshake' $ ClientHello $ fill0ClientHello nenc' chO + plaintext <- func aad echPayload + case decodeClientHello' plaintext of + Right (ClientHello chI) -> do + case expandClientHello chI chO of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just chI' -> return $ Just chI' + _ -> return Nothing + where + hpkeHandler :: HPKEError -> IO (Maybe ClientHello) + hpkeHandler _ = return Nothing +decryptECH _ _ _ _ = return Nothing + +fill0ClientHello :: Int -> ClientHello -> ClientHello +fill0ClientHello nenc ch@CH{..} = + ch{chExtensions = fill0Exts nenc chExtensions} + +fill0Exts :: Int -> [ExtensionRaw] -> [ExtensionRaw] +fill0Exts nenc xs0 = loop xs0 + where + loop [] = [] + loop (ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello bs : xs) = x' : loop xs + where + (prefix, payload) = BS.splitAt (10 + nenc) bs + bs' = prefix <> BS.replicate (BS.length payload) 0 + x' = ExtensionRaw EID_EncryptedClientHello bs' + loop (x : xs) = x : loop xs + +expandClientHello :: ClientHello -> ClientHello -> Maybe ClientHello +expandClientHello inner outer = + case expand (chExtensions inner) (chExtensions outer) of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just exts -> + Just $ + inner + { chSession = chSession outer + , chExtensions = exts + } + where + expand :: [ExtensionRaw] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe [ExtensionRaw] + expand [] _ = Just [] + expand iis [] = chk iis + expand (i : is) oos = do + (rs, oos') <- case i of + ExtensionRaw EID_EchOuterExtensions bs -> + case extensionDecode MsgTClientHello bs of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just (EchOuterExtensions eids) -> expd eids oos + _ -> Just ([i], oos) + (rs ++) <$> expand is oos' + expd + :: [ExtensionID] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe ([ExtensionRaw], [ExtensionRaw]) + expd [] oos = Just ([], oos) + expd _ [] = Nothing + expd (i : is) oos = case fnd i oos of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just (ext, oos') -> do + (exts, oos'') <- expd is oos' + Just (ext : exts, oos'') + fnd :: ExtensionID -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe (ExtensionRaw, [ExtensionRaw]) + fnd _ [] = Nothing + fnd EID_EncryptedClientHello _ = Nothing + fnd i (o@(ExtensionRaw eid _) : os) + | i == eid = Just (o, os) + | otherwise = fnd i os + chk :: [ExtensionRaw] -> Maybe [ExtensionRaw] + chk [] = Just [] + chk (ExtensionRaw EID_EchOuterExtensions _ : _) = Nothing + chk (i : is) = (i :) <$> chk is + +getHPKE + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> EncryptedClientHello + -> IO (Maybe (HPKEF, Int)) +getHPKE ServerParams{..} ctx ECHClientHelloOuter{..} = do + mfunc <- getTLS13HPKE ctx + case mfunc of + Nothing -> do + let mconfig = findECHConfigById echConfigId $ sharedECHConfigList serverShared + mskR = lookup echConfigId serverECHKey + case (mconfig, mskR) of + (Just config, Just skR') -> do + let kemid = KEM_ID $ kem_id $ key_config $ contents config + skR = EncodedSecretKey skR' + encodedConfig = encodeECHConfig config + let info = "tls ech\x00" <> encodedConfig + (kdfid, aeadid) = echCipherSuite + ctxR <- setupBaseR kemid kdfid aeadid skR Nothing echEnc info + let nenc = nEnc kemid + func = open ctxR + setTLS13HPKE ctx func nenc + return $ Just (func, nenc) + _ -> return Nothing + _ -> return mfunc +getHPKE _ _ _ = return Nothing + +findECHConfigById :: ConfigId -> ECHConfigList -> Maybe ECHConfig +findECHConfigById cnfId echConfigList = find eqCfgId echConfigList + where + eqCfgId cnf = config_id (key_config (contents cnf)) == cnfId diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello12.hs @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello12 ( + processClientHello12, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types (CipherId (..), Role (..)) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- serverSupported sparams == ctxSupported ctx + +-- TLS 1.2 or earlier +processClientHello12 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> ClientHello + -> IO (Cipher, Maybe Credential) +processClientHello12 sparams ctx ch = do + let secureRenegotiation = supportedSecureRenegotiation $ serverSupported sparams + when secureRenegotiation $ checkSecureRenegotiation ctx ch + serverName <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + let hooks = serverHooks sparams + extraCreds <- onServerNameIndication hooks serverName + let (creds, signatureCreds, ciphersFilteredVersion) = + credsTriple sparams ch extraCreds + -- The shared cipherlist can become empty after filtering for compatible + -- creds, check now before calling onCipherChoosing, which does not handle + -- empty lists. + when (null ciphersFilteredVersion) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no cipher in common with the TLS 1.2 client" HandshakeFailure + let usedCipher = onCipherChoosing hooks TLS12 ciphersFilteredVersion + mcred <- chooseCreds usedCipher creds signatureCreds + return (usedCipher, mcred) + +checkSecureRenegotiation :: Context -> ClientHello -> IO () +checkSecureRenegotiation ctx CH{..} = do + -- RFC 5746: secure renegotiation + -- TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV: {0x00, 0xFF} + when (CipherId 0xff `elem` chCiphers) $ + usingState_ ctx $ + setSecureRenegotiation True + case extensionLookup EID_SecureRenegotiation chExtensions of + Just content -> usingState_ ctx $ do + VerifyData cvd <- getVerifyData ClientRole + let bs = extensionEncode (SecureRenegotiation cvd "") + unless (bs == content) $ + throwError $ + Error_Protocol + ("client verified data not matching: " ++ show cvd ++ ":" ++ show content) + HandshakeFailure + + setSecureRenegotiation True + _ -> return () + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +credsTriple + :: ServerParams + -> ClientHello + -> Credentials + -> (Credentials, Credentials, [Cipher]) +credsTriple sparams CH{..} extraCreds + | cipherListCredentialFallback cltCiphers = (allCreds, sigAllCreds, allCiphers) + | otherwise = (cltCreds, sigCltCreds, cltCiphers) + where + ciphers = supportedCiphers $ serverSupported sparams + + commonCiphers creds sigCreds = intersectCiphers chCiphers availableCiphers + where + availableCiphers = getCiphers ciphers creds sigCreds + + p = makeCredentialPredicate TLS12 chExtensions + allCreds = + filterCredentials (isCredentialAllowed TLS12 p) $ + extraCreds `mappend` sharedCredentials (serverShared sparams) + + -- When selecting a cipher we must ensure that it is allowed for the + -- TLS version but also that all its key-exchange requirements + -- will be met. + + -- Some ciphers require a signature and a hash. With TLS 1.2 the hash + -- algorithm is selected from a combination of server configuration and + -- the client "supported_signatures" extension. So we cannot pick + -- such a cipher if no hash is available for it. It's best to skip this + -- cipher and pick another one (with another key exchange). + + -- Cipher selection is performed in two steps: first server credentials + -- are flagged as not suitable for signature if not compatible with + -- negotiated signature parameters. Then ciphers are evaluated from + -- the resulting credentials. + + supported = serverSupported sparams + groups = supportedGroups supported + possibleGroups = negotiatedGroupsInCommon groups chExtensions + possibleECGroups = possibleGroups `intersect` availableECGroups + possibleFFGroups = possibleGroups `intersect` availableFFGroups + hasCommonGroupForECDHE = not (null possibleECGroups) + hasCommonGroupForFFDHE = not (null possibleFFGroups) + hasCustomGroupForFFDHE = isJust (serverDHEParams sparams) + canFFDHE = hasCustomGroupForFFDHE || hasCommonGroupForFFDHE + hasCommonGroup cipher = + case cipherKeyExchange cipher of + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> canFFDHE + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> canFFDHE + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> canFFDHE + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> hasCommonGroupForECDHE + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> hasCommonGroupForECDHE + _ -> True -- group not used + + -- Ciphers are selected according to TLS version, availability of + -- (EC)DHE group and credential depending on key exchange. + cipherAllowed cipher = cipherAllowedForVersion TLS12 cipher && hasCommonGroup cipher + selectCipher credentials signatureCredentials = filter cipherAllowed (commonCiphers credentials signatureCredentials) + + -- Build a list of all hash/signature algorithms in common between + -- client and server. + hashAndSignatures = supportedHashSignatures supported + possibleHashSigAlgs = hashAndSignaturesInCommon hashAndSignatures chExtensions + + -- Check that a candidate signature credential will be compatible with + -- client & server hash/signature algorithms. This returns Just Int + -- in order to sort credentials according to server hash/signature + -- preference. When the certificate has no matching hash/signature in + -- 'possibleHashSigAlgs' the result is Nothing, and the credential will + -- not be used to sign. This avoids a failure later in 'decideHashSig'. + signingRank cred = + case credentialDigitalSignatureKey cred of + Just pub -> findIndex (pub `signatureCompatible`) possibleHashSigAlgs + Nothing -> Nothing + + -- Finally compute credential lists and resulting cipher list. + -- + -- We try to keep certificates supported by the client, but + -- fallback to all credentials if this produces no suitable result + -- (see RFC 5246 section 7.4.2 and RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2). + -- The condition is based on resulting (EC)DHE ciphers so that + -- filtering credentials does not give advantage to a less secure + -- key exchange like CipherKeyExchange_RSA or CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon. + cltCreds = filterCredentialsWithHashSignatures chExtensions allCreds + sigCltCreds = filterSortCredentials signingRank cltCreds + sigAllCreds = filterSortCredentials signingRank allCreds + cltCiphers = selectCipher cltCreds sigCltCreds + allCiphers = selectCipher allCreds sigAllCreds + +chooseCreds :: Cipher -> Credentials -> Credentials -> IO (Maybe Credential) +chooseCreds usedCipher creds signatureCreds = case cipherKeyExchange usedCipher of + CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> return $ credentialsFindForDecrypting creds + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> return Nothing + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> return $ credentialsFindForSigning KX_RSA signatureCreds + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> return $ credentialsFindForSigning KX_DSA signatureCreds + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> return $ credentialsFindForSigning KX_RSA signatureCreds + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> return $ credentialsFindForSigning KX_ECDSA signatureCreds + _ -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "key exchange algorithm not implemented" HandshakeFailure + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +negotiatedGroupsInCommon :: [Group] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> [Group] +negotiatedGroupsInCommon serverGroups exts = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SupportedGroups + MsgTClientHello + exts + [] + (\(SupportedGroups clientGroups) -> serverGroups `intersect` clientGroups) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +filterSortCredentials + :: Ord a => (Credential -> Maybe a) -> Credentials -> Credentials +filterSortCredentials rankFun (Credentials creds) = + let orderedPairs = sortOn fst [(rankFun cred, cred) | cred <- creds] + in Credentials [cred | (Just _, cred) <- orderedPairs] + +-- returns True if certificate filtering with "signature_algorithms_cert" / +-- "signature_algorithms" produced no ephemeral D-H nor TLS13 cipher (so +-- handshake with lower security) +cipherListCredentialFallback :: [Cipher] -> Bool +cipherListCredentialFallback = all nonDH + where + nonDH x = case cipherKeyExchange x of + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 -> False + _ -> True + +-- We filter our allowed ciphers here according to dynamic credential lists. +-- Credentials 'creds' come from server parameters but also SNI callback. +-- When the key exchange requires a signature, we use a +-- subset of this list named 'sigCreds'. This list has been filtered in order +-- to remove certificates that are not compatible with hash/signature +-- restrictions (TLS 1.2). +getCiphers :: [Cipher] -> Credentials -> Credentials -> [Cipher] +getCiphers ciphers creds sigCreds = filter authorizedCKE ciphers + where + authorizedCKE cipher = + case cipherKeyExchange cipher of + CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> canEncryptRSA + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> True + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> canSignRSA + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> canSignDSA + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> canSignRSA + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> canSignECDSA + -- unimplemented: non ephemeral DH & ECDH. + -- Note, these *should not* be implemented, and have + -- (for example) been removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0 + -- + CipherKeyExchange_DH_DSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_DH_RSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSA -> False + CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 -> False -- not reached + canSignDSA = KX_DSA `elem` signingAlgs + canSignRSA = KX_RSA `elem` signingAlgs + canSignECDSA = KX_ECDSA `elem` signingAlgs + canEncryptRSA = isJust $ credentialsFindForDecrypting creds + signingAlgs = credentialsListSigningAlgorithms sigCreds diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ClientHello13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello13 ( + processClientHello13, + SelectKeyShareResult (..), +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.IO.Encode +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +limitSupportedGroups :: Int +limitSupportedGroups = 64 + +-- TLS 1.3 or later +processClientHello13 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> ClientHello + -> IO + ( SelectKeyShareResult + , (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 + , (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid + ) +processClientHello13 sparams ctx ch@CH{..} = do + when + (any (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid == EID_PreSharedKey) $ init chExtensions) + $ throwCore + $ Error_Protocol "extension pre_shared_key must be last" IllegalParameter + -- Deciding cipher. + -- The shared cipherlist can become empty after filtering for compatible + -- creds, check now before calling onCipherChoosing, which does not handle + -- empty lists. + when (null ciphersFilteredVersion) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no cipher in common with the TLS 1.3 client" HandshakeFailure + let usedCipher = onCipherChoosing (serverHooks sparams) TLS13 ciphersFilteredVersion + usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher + rtt0 = + lookupAndDecode + EID_EarlyData + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + False + (\(EarlyDataIndication _) -> True) + if rtt0 + then + -- mark a 0-RTT attempt before a possible HRR, and before updating the + -- status again if 0-RTT successful + setEstablished ctx (EarlyDataNotAllowed 3) -- hardcoding + else + -- In the case of HRR, EarlyDataNotAllowed is already set. + -- It should be cleared here. + setEstablished ctx NotEstablished + -- Deciding key exchange from key shares + let require = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "key exchange not implemented, expected key_share extension" + MissingExtension + extract (KeyShareClientHello kses) = return kses + extract _ = require + keyShares <- + lookupAndDecodeAndDo EID_KeyShare MsgTClientHello chExtensions require extract + let clientGroups = + take limitSupportedGroups $ + lookupAndDecode + EID_SupportedGroups + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + [] + (\(SupportedGroups gs) -> gs) + (mgroup, doHRR) <- + onSelectKeyShare + (serverHooks sparams) + serverGroups + clientGroups + $ map keyShareEntryGroup keyShares + keyshareResult <- case mgroup of + Nothing -> return SelectKeyShareNotFound + Just g + | doHRR -> return $ SelectKeyShareHRR g + | otherwise -> case filter (\e -> keyShareEntryGroup e == g) keyShares of + [] -> return SelectKeyShareNotFound + [x] -> return $ SelectKeyShareFound x + _ -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "duplicated key_share" IllegalParameter + + let triple = (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) + pskEarlySecret <- pskAndEarlySecret sparams ctx triple ch + (ich, b) <- fromJust <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello + updateTranscriptHash12 ctx (ClientHello ich, b) + return (keyshareResult, triple, pskEarlySecret) + where + ciphersFilteredVersion = intersectCiphers chCiphers serverCiphers + serverCiphers = + filter + (cipherAllowedForVersion TLS13) + (supportedCiphers $ serverSupported sparams) + serverGroups = supportedGroupsTLS13 $ serverSupported sparams + +data SelectKeyShareResult + = -- | Negotiation failure + SelectKeyShareNotFound + | -- | Send a hello retry request with this group + SelectKeyShareHRR Group + | -- | Use this key share + SelectKeyShareFound KeyShareEntry + deriving (Eq, Show) + +pskAndEarlySecret + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 + -> ClientHello + -> IO (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid +pskAndEarlySecret sparams ctx (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) CH{..} = do + (psk, binderInfo, is0RTTvalid) <- choosePSK + earlyKey <- calculateEarlySecret ctx choice (Left psk) + let earlySecret = pairBase earlyKey + authenticated = isJust binderInfo + preSharedKeyExt <- checkBinder earlySecret binderInfo + return (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid) + where + choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher + + choosePSK = + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_PreSharedKey + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + (return (zero, Nothing, False)) + selectPSK + + selectPSK (PreSharedKeyClientHello (PskIdentity identity obfAge : _) bnds@(bnd : _)) = do + when (null dhModes) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no psk_key_exchange_modes extension" MissingExtension + if PSK_DHE_KE `elem` dhModes + then do + let len = sum (map (\x -> B.length x + 1) bnds) + 2 + mgr = sharedSessionManager $ serverShared sparams + -- sessionInvalidate is not used for TLS 1.3 + -- because PSK is always changed. + -- So, identity is not stored in Context. + msdata <- + if rtt0 + then sessionResumeOnlyOnce mgr identity + else sessionResume mgr identity + case msdata of + Just sdata -> do + let tinfo = fromJust $ sessionTicketInfo sdata + psk = sessionSecret sdata + isFresh <- checkFreshness tinfo obfAge + (isPSKvalid, is0RTTvalid) <- checkSessionEquality sdata + if isPSKvalid && isFresh + then return (psk, Just (bnd, 0 :: Int, len), is0RTTvalid) + else -- fall back to full handshake + return (zero, Nothing, False) + _ -> return (zero, Nothing, False) + else return (zero, Nothing, False) + selectPSK _ = return (zero, Nothing, False) + + checkBinder _ Nothing = return [] + checkBinder earlySecret (Just (binder, n, tlen)) = do + (_, b) <- fromJust <$> usingHState ctx getClientHello + let binder' = makePSKBinder earlySecret usedHash tlen $ B.concat b --- xxx + unless (binder == binder') $ + decryptError "PSK binder validation failed" + return [toExtensionRaw $ PreSharedKeyServerHello $ fromIntegral n] + + checkSessionEquality sdata = do + msni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + -- ALPN should be checked. + -- But it's an extension in EE, sigh. + -- malpn <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol + let isSameSNI = sessionClientSNI sdata == msni + isSameCipher = sessionCipher sdata == cipherID usedCipher + ciphers = supportedCiphers $ serverSupported sparams + scid = sessionCipher sdata + isSameKDF = case findCipher scid ciphers of + Nothing -> False + Just c -> cipherHash c == cipherHash usedCipher + isSameVersion = TLS13 == sessionVersion sdata + -- isSameALPN = sessionALPN sdata == malpn + isPSKvalid = isSameKDF && isSameSNI -- fixme: SNI is not required + is0RTTvalid = isSameVersion && isSameCipher -- && isSameALPN + return (isPSKvalid, is0RTTvalid) + + dhModes = + lookupAndDecode + EID_PskKeyExchangeModes + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + [] + (\(PskKeyExchangeModes ms) -> ms) + + hashSize = hashDigestSize usedHash + zero = B.replicate hashSize 0 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/Common.hs @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common ( + applicationProtocol, + checkValidClientCertChain, + clientCertificate, + credentialDigitalSignatureKey, + filterCredentials, + filterCredentialsWithHashSignatures, + makeCredentialPredicate, + isCredentialAllowed, + storePrivInfoServer, + hashAndSignaturesInCommon, + processRecordSizeLimit, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..), ExtKeyUsagePurpose (..)) + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Util (catchException) +import Network.TLS.X509 + +checkValidClientCertChain + :: MonadIO m => Context -> String -> m CertificateChain +checkValidClientCertChain ctx errmsg = do + chain <- usingHState ctx getClientCertChain + let throwerror = Error_Protocol errmsg UnexpectedMessage + case chain of + Nothing -> throwCore throwerror + Just cc + | isNullCertificateChain cc -> throwCore throwerror + | otherwise -> return cc + +credentialDigitalSignatureKey :: Credential -> Maybe PubKey +credentialDigitalSignatureKey cred + | isDigitalSignaturePair keys = Just pubkey + | otherwise = Nothing + where + keys@(pubkey, _) = credentialPublicPrivateKeys cred + +filterCredentials :: (Credential -> Bool) -> Credentials -> Credentials +filterCredentials p (Credentials l) = Credentials (filter p l) + +-- ECDSA keys are tested against supported elliptic curves until TLS12 but +-- not after. With TLS13, the curve is linked to the signature algorithm +-- and client support is tested with signatureCompatible13. +makeCredentialPredicate :: Version -> [ExtensionRaw] -> (Group -> Bool) +makeCredentialPredicate ver exts + | ver >= TLS13 = const True + | otherwise = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SupportedGroups + MsgTClientHello + exts + (const True) + (\(SupportedGroups sg) -> (`elem` sg)) + +isCredentialAllowed :: Version -> (Group -> Bool) -> Credential -> Bool +isCredentialAllowed ver p cred = + pubkey `versionCompatible` ver && satisfiesEcPredicate p pubkey + where + (pubkey, _) = credentialPublicPrivateKeys cred + +-- Filters a list of candidate credentials with credentialMatchesHashSignatures. +-- +-- Algorithms to filter with are taken from "signature_algorithms_cert" +-- extension when it exists, else from "signature_algorithms" when clients do +-- not implement the new extension (see RFC 8446 section 4.2.3). +-- +-- Resulting credential list can be used as input to the hybrid cipher-and- +-- certificate selection for TLS12, or to the direct certificate selection +-- simplified with TLS13. As filtering credential signatures with client- +-- advertised algorithms is not supposed to cause negotiation failure, in case +-- of dead end with the subsequent selection process, this process should always +-- be restarted with the unfiltered credential list as input (see fallback +-- certificate chains, described in same RFC section). +-- +-- Calling code should not forget to apply constraints of extension +-- "signature_algorithms" to any signature-based key exchange derived from the +-- output credentials. Respecting client constraints on KX signatures is +-- mandatory but not implemented by this function. +filterCredentialsWithHashSignatures + :: [ExtensionRaw] -> Credentials -> Credentials +filterCredentialsWithHashSignatures exts = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SignatureAlgorithmsCert + MsgTClientHello + exts + lookupSignatureAlgorithms + (\(SignatureAlgorithmsCert sas) -> withAlgs sas) + where + lookupSignatureAlgorithms = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SignatureAlgorithms + MsgTClientHello + exts + id + (\(SignatureAlgorithms sas) -> withAlgs sas) + withAlgs sas = filterCredentials (credentialMatchesHashSignatures sas) + +storePrivInfoServer :: MonadIO m => Context -> Credential -> m () +storePrivInfoServer ctx (cc, privkey) = void (storePrivInfo ctx cc privkey) + +-- ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) +applicationProtocol + :: Context -> [ExtensionRaw] -> ServerParams -> IO (Maybe ExtensionRaw) +applicationProtocol ctx exts sparams = case onALPN of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just io -> + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation + MsgTClientHello + exts + (return Nothing) + $ select io + where + onALPN = onALPNClientSuggest $ serverHooks sparams + select io (ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation protos) = do + proto <- io protos + when (proto == "") $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "no supported application protocols" NoApplicationProtocol + usingState_ ctx $ do + setExtensionALPN True + setNegotiatedProtocol proto + let alpn = ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation [proto] + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw alpn + +clientCertificate :: ServerParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> IO () +clientCertificate sparams ctx certs = do + -- run certificate recv hook + ctxWithHooks ctx (`hookRecvCertificates` certs) + -- Call application callback to see whether the + -- certificate chain is acceptable. + -- + usage <- + liftIO $ + catchException + (onClientCertificate (serverHooks sparams) certs) + rejectOnException + case usage of + CertificateUsageAccept -> do + verifyLeafKeyUsage [KeyUsage_digitalSignature] certs + verifyLeafKeyUsagePurpose KeyUsagePurpose_ClientAuth certs + CertificateUsageReject reason -> certificateRejected reason + + -- Remember cert chain for later use. + -- + usingHState ctx $ setClientCertChain certs + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- The values in the "signature_algorithms" extension +-- are in descending order of preference. +-- However here the algorithms are selected according +-- to server preference in 'supportedHashSignatures'. +hashAndSignaturesInCommon + :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] +hashAndSignaturesInCommon sHashSigs exts = sHashSigs `intersect` cHashSigs + where + -- See Section 7.4.1.4.1 of RFC 5246. + defVal = + [ (HashSHA1, SignatureECDSA) + , (HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) + , (HashSHA1, SignatureDSA) + ] + cHashSigs = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SignatureAlgorithms + MsgTClientHello + exts + defVal + (\(SignatureAlgorithms sas) -> sas) + +processRecordSizeLimit + :: Context -> [ExtensionRaw] -> Bool -> IO (Maybe ExtensionRaw) +processRecordSizeLimit ctx chExts tls13 = do + let mmylim = limitRecordSize $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx + setMyRecordLimit ctx mmylim + case mmylim of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just mylim -> do + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_RecordSizeLimit + MsgTClientHello + chExts + (return ()) + (setPeerRecordSizeLimit ctx tls13) + peerSentRSL <- checkPeerRecordLimit ctx + if peerSentRSL + then do + let mysiz = fromIntegral mylim + if tls13 then 1 else 0 + rsl = RecordSizeLimit mysiz + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw rsl + else return Nothing diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello12.hs @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello12 ( + sendServerHello12, +) where + +import Data.ByteArray (convert) + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Random +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 hiding (Certificate) + +sendServerHello12 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> (Cipher, Maybe Credential) + -> ClientHello + -> IO (Maybe SessionData) +sendServerHello12 sparams ctx (usedCipher, mcred) ch@CH{..} = do + resumeSessionData <- recoverSessionData ctx ch + case resumeSessionData of + Nothing -> do + serverSession <- newSession ctx + usingState_ ctx $ setSession serverSession + sh <- makeServerHello sparams ctx usedCipher mcred chExtensions serverSession + build <- sendServerFirstFlight sparams ctx usedCipher mcred chExtensions + let ff = ServerHello sh : build [ServerHelloDone] + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake ff [] + contextFlush ctx + Just sessionData -> do + usingState_ ctx $ do + setSession chSession + setTLS12SessionResuming True + sh <- + makeServerHello sparams ctx usedCipher mcred chExtensions chSession + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [ServerHello sh] [] + let mainSecret = convert $ sessionSecret sessionData + usingHState ctx $ setMainSecret TLS12 ServerRole mainSecret + logKey ctx $ MainSecret mainSecret + sendCCSandFinished ctx ServerRole + return resumeSessionData + +recoverSessionData :: Context -> ClientHello -> IO (Maybe SessionData) +recoverSessionData ctx CH{..} = do + serverName <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + ems <- processExtendedMainSecret ctx TLS12 MsgTClientHello chExtensions + let mticket = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SessionTicket + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + Nothing + (\(SessionTicket ticket) -> Just ticket) + midentity = ticketOrSessionID12 mticket chSession + case midentity of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just identity -> do + sd <- sessionResume (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) identity + validateSession ctx chCiphers serverName ems sd + +validateSession + :: Context + -> [CipherId] + -> Maybe HostName + -> Bool + -> Maybe SessionData + -> IO (Maybe SessionData) +validateSession _ _ _ _ Nothing = return Nothing +validateSession ctx ciphers sni ems m@(Just sd) + -- SessionData parameters are assumed to match the local server configuration + -- so we need to compare only to ClientHello inputs. Abbreviated handshake + -- uses the same server_name than full handshake so the same + -- credentials (and thus ciphers) are available. + | TLS12 < sessionVersion sd = return Nothing -- fixme + | CipherId (sessionCipher sd) `notElem` ciphers = + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "new cipher is different from the old one" IllegalParameter + | isJust sni && sessionClientSNI sd /= sni = do + usingState_ ctx clearClientSNI + return Nothing + | ems && not emsSession = return Nothing + | not ems && emsSession = + let err = "client resumes an EMS session without EMS" + in throwCore $ Error_Protocol err HandshakeFailure + | otherwise = return m + where + emsSession = SessionEMS `elem` sessionFlags sd + +sendServerFirstFlight + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> Cipher + -> Maybe Credential + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> IO ([Handshake] -> [Handshake]) +sendServerFirstFlight ServerParams{..} ctx usedCipher mcred chExts = do + let b0 = id + let cc = case mcred of + Just (srvCerts, _) -> srvCerts + _ -> CertificateChain [] + let b1 = b0 . (Certificate (CertificateChain_ cc) :) + usingState_ ctx $ setServerCertificateChain cc + + -- send server key exchange if needed + skx <- case cipherKeyExchange usedCipher of + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> Just <$> generateSKX_DH_Anon + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> Just <$> generateSKX_DHE KX_RSA + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> Just <$> generateSKX_DHE KX_DSA + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> Just <$> generateSKX_ECDHE KX_RSA + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> Just <$> generateSKX_ECDHE KX_ECDSA + _ -> return Nothing + let b2 = case skx of + Nothing -> b1 + Just kx -> b1 . (ServerKeyXchg kx :) + + -- FIXME we don't do this on a Anonymous server + + -- When configured, send a certificate request with the DNs of all + -- configured CA certificates. + -- + -- Client certificates MUST NOT be accepted if not requested. + -- + if serverWantClientCert + then do + let (certTypes, hashSigs) = + let as = supportedHashSignatures serverSupported + in (nub $ mapMaybe hashSigToCertType as, as) + creq = + CertRequest + certTypes + hashSigs + (map extractCAname serverCACertificates) + usingHState ctx $ setCertReqSent True + return $ b2 . (creq :) + else return b2 + where + commonGroups = negotiatedGroupsInCommon (supportedGroups serverSupported) chExts + commonHashSigs = hashAndSignaturesInCommon (supportedHashSignatures serverSupported) chExts + setup_DHE = do + let possibleFFGroups = commonGroups `intersect` availableFFGroups + (dhparams, priv, pub) <- + case possibleFFGroups of + [] -> + let dhparams = fromJust serverDHEParams + in case findFiniteFieldGroup dhparams of + Just g -> do + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup g + generateFFDHE ctx g + Nothing -> do + (priv, pub) <- generateDHE ctx dhparams + return (dhparams, priv, pub) + g : _ -> do + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup g + generateFFDHE ctx g + + let serverParams = serverDHParamsFrom dhparams pub + + usingHState ctx $ setServerDHParams serverParams + usingHState ctx $ setDHPrivate priv + return serverParams + + -- Choosing a hash algorithm to sign (EC)DHE parameters + -- in ServerKeyExchange. Hash algorithm is not suggested by + -- the chosen cipher suite. So, it should be selected based on + -- the "signature_algorithms" extension in a client hello. + -- If RSA is also used for key exchange, this function is + -- not called. + decideHashSig pubKey = do + case filter (pubKey `signatureCompatible`) commonHashSigs of + [] -> error ("no hash signature for " ++ pubkeyType pubKey) + x : _ -> return x + + generateSKX_DHE kxsAlg = do + serverParams <- setup_DHE + pubKey <- getLocalPublicKey ctx + mhashSig <- decideHashSig pubKey + signed <- digitallySignDHParams ctx serverParams pubKey mhashSig + case kxsAlg of + KX_RSA -> return $ SKX_DHE_RSA serverParams signed + KX_DSA -> return $ SKX_DHE_DSA serverParams signed + _ -> + error ("generate skx_dhe unsupported key exchange signature: " ++ show kxsAlg) + + generateSKX_DH_Anon = SKX_DH_Anon <$> setup_DHE + + setup_ECDHE grp = do + usingHState ctx $ setSupportedGroup grp + (srvpri, srvpub) <- generateGroup ctx grp + let serverParams = ServerECDHParams grp srvpub + usingHState ctx $ setServerECDHParams serverParams + usingHState ctx $ setGroupPrivate [(grp, srvpri)] + return serverParams + + generateSKX_ECDHE kxsAlg = do + let possibleECGroups = commonGroups `intersect` availableECGroups + grp <- case possibleECGroups of + [] -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "no common group" HandshakeFailure + g : _ -> return g + serverParams <- setup_ECDHE grp + pubKey <- getLocalPublicKey ctx + mhashSig <- decideHashSig pubKey + signed <- digitallySignECDHParams ctx serverParams pubKey mhashSig + case kxsAlg of + KX_RSA -> return $ SKX_ECDHE_RSA serverParams signed + KX_ECDSA -> return $ SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA serverParams signed + _ -> + error ("generate skx_ecdhe unsupported key exchange signature: " ++ show kxsAlg) + +--- +-- When the client sends a certificate, check whether +-- it is acceptable for the application. +-- +--- +makeServerHello + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> Cipher + -> Maybe Credential + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> Session + -> IO ServerHello +makeServerHello sparams ctx usedCipher mcred chExts session = do + resuming <- usingState_ ctx getTLS12SessionResuming + case mcred of + Just cred -> storePrivInfoServer ctx cred + _ -> return () -- return a sensible error + sniExt <- do + if resuming + then return Nothing + else do + msni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + case msni of + -- RFC6066: In this event, the server SHALL include + -- an extension of type "server_name" in the + -- (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" + -- field of this extension SHALL be empty. + Just _ -> return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [] + Nothing -> return Nothing + + let ecPointExt = case extensionLookup EID_EcPointFormats chExts of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just _ -> Just $ toExtensionRaw $ EcPointFormatsSupported [EcPointFormat_Uncompressed] + + alpnExt <- applicationProtocol ctx chExts sparams + + ems <- usingHState ctx getExtendedMainSecret + let emsExt + | ems = Just $ toExtensionRaw ExtendedMainSecret + | otherwise = Nothing + + let useTicket = sessionUseTicket $ sharedSessionManager $ serverShared sparams + sessionTicketExt + | not resuming && useTicket = Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SessionTicket "" + | otherwise = Nothing + + -- in TLS12, we need to check as well the certificates we are sending if they have in the extension + -- the necessary bits set. + secReneg <- usingState_ ctx getSecureRenegotiation + secureRenegExt <- + if secReneg + then do + vd <- usingState_ ctx $ do + VerifyData cvd <- getVerifyData ClientRole + VerifyData svd <- getVerifyData ServerRole + return $ SecureRenegotiation cvd svd + return $ Just $ toExtensionRaw vd + else return Nothing + + recodeSizeLimitExt <- processRecordSizeLimit ctx chExts False + + srand <- + serverRandom ctx TLS12 $ supportedVersions $ serverSupported sparams + + let shExts = + sharedHelloExtensions (serverShared sparams) + ++ catMaybes + [ {- 0x00 -} sniExt + , {- 0x0b -} ecPointExt + , {- 0x10 -} alpnExt + , {- 0x17 -} emsExt + , {- 0x1c -} recodeSizeLimitExt + , {- 0x23 -} sessionTicketExt + , {- 0xff01 -} secureRenegExt + ] + usingState_ ctx $ setVersion TLS12 + setServerHelloParameters12 ctx TLS12 srand usedCipher nullCompression + return $ + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = srand + , shSession = session + , shCipher = CipherId (cipherID usedCipher) + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = shExts + } + +negotiatedGroupsInCommon :: [Group] -> [ExtensionRaw] -> [Group] +negotiatedGroupsInCommon serverGroups chExts = + lookupAndDecode + EID_SupportedGroups + MsgTClientHello + chExts + [] + common + where + common (SupportedGroups clientGroups) = serverGroups `intersect` clientGroups diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/ServerHello13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,367 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello13 ( + sendServerHello13, + sendHRR, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Random +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 + +sendServerHello13 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> KeyShareEntry + -> (Cipher, Hash, Bool) -- rtt0 + -> (SecretPair EarlySecret, [ExtensionRaw], Bool, Bool) -- authenticated, is0RTTvalid + -> ClientHello + -> Maybe ClientRandom + -> IO + ( SecretTriple ApplicationSecret + , ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + , Bool -- authenticated + , Bool -- rtt0OK + ) +sendServerHello13 sparams ctx clientKeyShare (usedCipher, usedHash, rtt0) (earlyKey, preSharedKeyExt, authenticated, is0RTTvalid) CH{..} mOuterClientRandom = do + let clientEarlySecret = pairClient earlyKey + earlySecret = pairBase earlyKey + -- parse CompressCertificate to check if it is broken here + let zlib = + lookupAndDecode + EID_CompressCertificate + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + False + (\(CompressCertificate ccas) -> CCA_Zlib `elem` ccas) + + recodeSizeLimitExt <- processRecordSizeLimit ctx chExtensions True + enableMyRecordLimit ctx + + newSession ctx >>= \ss -> usingState_ ctx $ do + setSession ss + setTLS13ClientSupportsPHA supportsPHA + usingHState ctx $ do + setSupportedGroup $ keyShareEntryGroup clientKeyShare + setOuterClientRandom mOuterClientRandom + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + alpnExt <- applicationProtocol ctx chExtensions sparams + setServerParameter + let rtt0OK = authenticated && not hrr && rtt0 && rtt0accept && is0RTTvalid + extraCreds <- + usingState_ ctx getClientSNI >>= onServerNameIndication (serverHooks sparams) + let p = makeCredentialPredicate TLS13 chExtensions + allCreds = + filterCredentials (isCredentialAllowed TLS13 p) $ + extraCreds `mappend` sharedCredentials (ctxShared ctx) + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + if established /= NotEstablished + then + if rtt0OK + then do + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode RTT0 + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Accepted + else do + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13RTT0Status RTT0Rejected + else when authenticated $ usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode PreSharedKey + -- else : FullHandshake or HelloRetryRequest + mCredInfo <- + if authenticated then return Nothing else decideCredentialInfo allCreds + (ecdhe, keyShare) <- makeServerKeyShare ctx clientKeyShare + ensureRecvComplete ctx + (clientHandshakeSecret, handSecret) <- runPacketFlight ctx $ do + sendServerHello keyShare + sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + handKey <- liftIO $ calculateHandshakeSecret ctx choice earlySecret ecdhe + let serverHandshakeSecret = triServer handKey + clientHandshakeSecret = triClient handKey + handSecret = triBase handKey + liftIO $ do + if rtt0OK && not (ctxQUICMode ctx) + then setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientEarlySecret + else setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientHandshakeSecret + setTxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher serverHandshakeSecret + let mEarlySecInfo + | rtt0OK = Just $ EarlySecretInfo usedCipher clientEarlySecret + | otherwise = Nothing + handSecInfo = HandshakeSecretInfo usedCipher (clientHandshakeSecret, serverHandshakeSecret) + contextSync ctx $ SendServerHello chExtensions mEarlySecInfo handSecInfo + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + liftIO $ enablePeerRecordLimit ctx + sendExtensions rtt0OK alpnExt recodeSizeLimitExt + case mCredInfo of + Nothing -> return () + Just (cred, hashSig) -> sendCertAndVerify cred hashSig zlib + let ServerTrafficSecret shs = serverHandshakeSecret + rawFinished <- makeFinished ctx usedHash shs + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [rawFinished] [] + return (clientHandshakeSecret, handSecret) + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + hChSf <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..SF" + appKey <- calculateApplicationSecret ctx choice handSecret hChSf + let clientApplicationSecret0 = triClient appKey + serverApplicationSecret0 = triServer appKey + setTxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher serverApplicationSecret0 + let appSecInfo = ApplicationSecretInfo (clientApplicationSecret0, serverApplicationSecret0) + contextSync ctx $ SendServerFinished appSecInfo + ---------------------------------------------------------------- + when rtt0OK $ setEstablished ctx (EarlyDataAllowed rtt0max) + return (appKey, clientHandshakeSecret, authenticated, rtt0OK) + where + choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher + + setServerParameter = do + usingState_ ctx $ setVersion TLS13 + failOnEitherError $ setServerHelloParameters13 ctx usedCipher False + + supportsPHA = + lookupAndDecode + EID_PostHandshakeAuth + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + False + (\PostHandshakeAuth -> True) + + rtt0max = safeNonNegative32 $ serverEarlyDataSize sparams + rtt0accept = serverEarlyDataSize sparams > 0 + + decideCredentialInfo allCreds = do + let err = + throwCore $ Error_Protocol "broken signature_algorithms extension" DecodeError + cHashSigs <- + lookupAndDecodeAndDo + EID_SignatureAlgorithms + MsgTClientHello + chExtensions + err + (\(SignatureAlgorithms sas) -> return sas) + -- When deciding signature algorithm and certificate, we try to keep + -- certificates supported by the client, but fallback to all credentials + -- if this produces no suitable result (see RFC 5246 section 7.4.2 and + -- RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2). + let sHashSigs = filter isHashSignatureValid13 $ supportedHashSignatures $ ctxSupported ctx + hashSigs = sHashSigs `intersect` cHashSigs + cltCreds = filterCredentialsWithHashSignatures chExtensions allCreds + case credentialsFindForSigning13 hashSigs cltCreds of + Nothing -> + case credentialsFindForSigning13 hashSigs allCreds of + Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "credential not found" HandshakeFailure + mcs -> return mcs + mcs -> return mcs + + sendServerHello keyShare = do + let keyShareExt = toExtensionRaw $ KeyShareServerHello keyShare + versionExt = toExtensionRaw $ SupportedVersionsServerHello TLS13 + shExts = keyShareExt : versionExt : preSharedKeyExt + if isJust mOuterClientRandom + then do + srand <- liftIO $ serverRandomECH ctx + let cipherId = CipherId (cipherID usedCipher) + sh = + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = srand + , shSession = chSession + , shCipher = cipherId + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = shExts + } + suffix <- computeConfirm ctx usedHash sh "ech accept confirmation" + let srand' = replaceServerRandomECH srand suffix + sh' = + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = srand' + , shSession = chSession + , shCipher = cipherId + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = shExts + } + usingHState ctx $ setECHAccepted True + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [ServerHello13 sh'] [] + else do + srand <- + liftIO $ + serverRandom ctx TLS13 $ + supportedVersions $ + serverSupported sparams + let sh = + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = srand + , shSession = chSession + , shCipher = CipherId (cipherID usedCipher) + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = shExts + } + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [ServerHello13 sh] [] + + sendCertAndVerify cred@(certChain, _) hashSig zlib = do + storePrivInfoServer ctx cred + when (serverWantClientCert sparams) $ do + let certReqCtx = "" -- this must be zero length here. + certReq = makeCertRequest sparams ctx certReqCtx True + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [certReq] [] + usingHState ctx $ setCertReqSent True + + let CertificateChain cs = certChain + ess = replicate (length cs) [] + let certtag = if zlib then CompressedCertificate13 else Certificate13 + loadPacket13 ctx $ + Handshake13 [certtag "" (CertificateChain_ certChain) ess] [] + liftIO $ usingState_ ctx $ setServerCertificateChain certChain + hChSc <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..SC" + pubkey <- getLocalPublicKey ctx + vrfy <- makeCertVerify ctx pubkey hashSig hChSc + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [vrfy] [] + + sendExtensions rtt0OK alpnExt recodeSizeLimitExt = do + msni <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getClientSNI + let sniExt = case msni of + -- RFC6066: In this event, the server SHALL include + -- an extension of type "server_name" in the + -- (extended) server hello. The "extension_data" + -- field of this extension SHALL be empty. + Just _ -> Just $ toExtensionRaw $ ServerName [] + Nothing -> Nothing + + mgroup <- usingHState ctx getSupportedGroup + let serverGroups = supportedGroups (ctxSupported ctx) + groupExt = case serverGroups of + [] -> Nothing + rg : _ -> case mgroup of + Nothing -> Nothing + Just grp + | grp == rg -> Nothing + | otherwise -> Just $ toExtensionRaw $ SupportedGroups serverGroups + let earlyDataExt + | rtt0OK = Just $ toExtensionRaw $ EarlyDataIndication Nothing + | otherwise = Nothing + + sendECH <- usingHState ctx getECHEE + let echExt + | sendECH = + Just $ + toExtensionRaw $ + ECHEncryptedExtensions $ + sharedECHConfigList $ + serverShared sparams + | otherwise = Nothing + let eeExtensions = + sharedHelloExtensions (serverShared sparams) + ++ catMaybes + [ {- 0x00 -} sniExt + , {- 0x0a -} groupExt + , {- 0x10 -} alpnExt + , {- 0x1c -} recodeSizeLimitExt + , {- 0x2a -} earlyDataExt + , {- 0xfe0d -} echExt + ] + eeExtensions' <- + liftIO $ onEncryptedExtensionsCreating (serverHooks sparams) eeExtensions + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [EncryptedExtensions13 eeExtensions'] [] + +credentialsFindForSigning13 + :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -> Credentials + -> Maybe (Credential, HashAndSignatureAlgorithm) +credentialsFindForSigning13 hss0 creds = loop hss0 + where + loop [] = Nothing + loop (hs : hss) = case credentialsFindForSigning13' hs creds of + Nothing -> loop hss + Just cred -> Just (cred, hs) + +-- See credentialsFindForSigning. +credentialsFindForSigning13' + :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Credentials -> Maybe Credential +credentialsFindForSigning13' sigAlg (Credentials l) = find forSigning l + where + forSigning cred = case credentialDigitalSignatureKey cred of + Nothing -> False + Just pub -> pub `signatureCompatible13` sigAlg + +contextSync :: Context -> ServerState -> IO () +contextSync ctx ctl = case ctxHandshakeSync ctx of + HandshakeSync _ sync -> sync ctx ctl + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendHRR :: Context -> Group -> (Cipher, Hash, c) -> ClientHello -> Bool -> IO () +sendHRR ctx g (usedCipher, usedHash, _) CH{..} isEch = do + twice <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + when twice $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "Hello retry not allowed again" HandshakeFailure + usingState_ ctx $ setTLS13HRR True + failOnEitherError $ setServerHelloParameters13 ctx usedCipher True + hrr <- makeHRR ctx usedCipher usedHash chSession g isEch + usingHState ctx $ setTLS13HandshakeMode HelloRetryRequest + runPacketFlight ctx $ do + loadPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [ServerHello13 hrr] [] + sendChangeCipherSpec13 ctx + +makeHRR + :: Context -> Cipher -> Hash -> Session -> Group -> Bool -> IO ServerHello +makeHRR _ usedCipher _ session g False = return hrr + where + keyShareExt = toExtensionRaw $ KeyShareHRR g + versionExt = toExtensionRaw $ SupportedVersionsServerHello TLS13 + extensions = [keyShareExt, versionExt] + cipherId = CipherId $ cipherID usedCipher + hrr = + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = hrrRandom + , shSession = session + , shCipher = cipherId + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = extensions + } +makeHRR ctx usedCipher usedHash session g True = do + suffix <- computeConfirm ctx usedHash hrr "hrr ech accept confirmation" + let echExt' = toExtensionRaw $ ECHHelloRetryRequest suffix + extensions' = [keyShareExt, versionExt, echExt'] + hrr' = hrr{shExtensions = extensions'} + return hrr' + where + keyShareExt = toExtensionRaw $ KeyShareHRR g + versionExt = toExtensionRaw $ SupportedVersionsServerHello TLS13 + echExt = toExtensionRaw $ ECHHelloRetryRequest "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + extensions = [keyShareExt, versionExt, echExt] + cipherId = CipherId $ cipherID usedCipher + hrr = + SH + { shVersion = TLS12 + , shRandom = hrrRandom + , shSession = session + , shCipher = cipherId + , shComp = 0 + , shExtensions = extensions + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS12.hs @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS12 ( + recvClientSecondFlight12, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict (gets) +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet hiding (getSession) +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.X509 hiding (Certificate) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvClientSecondFlight12 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> Maybe SessionData + -> IO () +recvClientSecondFlight12 sparams ctx resumeSessionData = do + case resumeSessionData of + Nothing -> do + recvClientCCC sparams ctx + mticket <- sessionEstablished ctx + case mticket of + Nothing -> return () + Just ticket -> do + let life = adjustLifetime $ serverTicketLifetime sparams + sendPacket12 ctx $ Handshake [NewSessionTicket life ticket] [] + sendCCSandFinished ctx ServerRole + Just _ -> do + _ <- sessionEstablished ctx + recvCCSandFinished ctx + finishHandshake12 ctx + where + adjustLifetime i + | i < 0 = 0 + | i > 604800 = 604800 + | otherwise = fromIntegral i + +sessionEstablished :: Context -> IO (Maybe Ticket) +sessionEstablished ctx = do + session <- usingState_ ctx getSession + -- only callback the session established if we have a session + case session of + Session (Just sessionId) -> do + sessionData <- getSessionData ctx + let sessionId' = B.copy sessionId + -- SessionID method: SessionID is used as key to store + -- SessionData. Nothing is returned. + -- + -- Session ticket method: SessionID is ignored. SessionData + -- is encrypted and returned. + sessionEstablish + (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) + sessionId' + (fromJust sessionData) + _ -> return Nothing -- never reach + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | receive Client data in handshake until the Finished handshake. +-- +-- <- [certificate] +-- <- client key xchg +-- <- [cert verify] +-- <- change cipher +-- <- finish +recvClientCCC :: ServerParams -> Context -> IO () +recvClientCCC sparams ctx = runRecvState ctx (RecvStateHandshake expectClientCertificate) + where + expectClientCertificate (Certificate (CertificateChain_ certs)) = do + clientCertificate sparams ctx certs + processCertificate ctx ServerRole certs + + -- FIXME: We should check whether the certificate + -- matches our request and that we support + -- verifying with that certificate. + + return $ RecvStateHandshake $ expectClientKeyExchange True + expectClientCertificate p = expectClientKeyExchange False p + + -- cannot use RecvStateHandshake, as the next message could be a ChangeCipher, + -- so we must process any packet, and in case of handshake call processHandshake manually. + expectClientKeyExchange followedCertVerify (ClientKeyXchg ckx) = do + processClientKeyXchg ctx ckx + if followedCertVerify + then return $ RecvStateHandshake expectCertificateVerify + else return $ RecvStatePacket $ expectChangeCipherSpec ctx + expectClientKeyExchange _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "client key exchange") + + expectCertificateVerify (CertVerify dsig) = do + certs <- checkValidClientCertChain ctx "change cipher message expected" + + usedVersion <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + -- Fetch all handshake messages up to now. + msgs <- usingHState ctx $ B.concat <$> getHandshakeMessages + + pubKey <- usingHState ctx getRemotePublicKey + checkDigitalSignatureKey usedVersion pubKey + + verif <- checkCertificateVerify ctx usedVersion pubKey msgs dsig + processClientCertVerify sparams ctx certs verif + return $ RecvStatePacket $ expectChangeCipherSpec ctx + expectCertificateVerify p = unexpected (show p) (Just "client certificate verify") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +expectChangeCipherSpec :: Context -> Packet -> IO (RecvState IO) +expectChangeCipherSpec ctx ChangeCipherSpec = do + enableMyRecordLimit ctx + return $ RecvStateHandshake $ expectFinished ctx +expectChangeCipherSpec _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "change cipher") + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- process the client key exchange message. the protocol expects the initial +-- client version received in ClientHello, not the negotiated version. +-- in case the version mismatch, generate a random main secret +processClientKeyXchg :: Context -> ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData -> IO () +processClientKeyXchg ctx (CKX_RSA encryptedPreMain) = do + (rver, role, random) <- usingState_ ctx $ do + (,,) <$> getVersion <*> getRole <*> genRandom 48 + ePreMain <- decryptRSA ctx encryptedPreMain + expectedVer <- usingHState ctx $ gets hstClientVersion + mainSecret <- case ePreMain of + Left _ -> + -- BadRecordMac is nonsense but for tlsfuzzer + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "invalid client public key" BadRecordMac + Right preMain -> case decodePreMainSecret $ convert preMain of + Left _ -> usingHState ctx $ setMainSecretFromPre rver role $ convert random + Right (ver, _) + | ver /= expectedVer -> + usingHState ctx $ setMainSecretFromPre rver role $ convert random + | otherwise -> usingHState ctx $ setMainSecretFromPre rver role preMain + logKey ctx (MainSecret mainSecret) +processClientKeyXchg ctx (CKX_DH clientDHValue) = do + rver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + + serverParams <- usingHState ctx getServerDHParams + let params = serverDHParamsToParams serverParams + unless (dhValid params $ dhUnwrapPublic clientDHValue) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "invalid client public key" IllegalParameter + + dhpriv <- usingHState ctx getDHPrivate + let preMain = dhGetShared params dhpriv clientDHValue + mainSecret <- usingHState ctx $ setMainSecretFromPre rver role preMain + logKey ctx (MainSecret mainSecret) +processClientKeyXchg ctx (CKX_ECDH bytes) = do + ServerECDHParams grp _ <- usingHState ctx getServerECDHParams + case groupDecodePublicB grp bytes of + Left _ -> + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "client public key cannot be decoded" IllegalParameter + Right clipub -> do + grpSpris <- usingHState ctx getGroupPrivate + case lookup grp grpSpris of + Nothing -> throwCore err + Just srvpri -> case groupDecapsulate clipub srvpri of + Just preMain -> do + rver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + mainSecret <- usingHState ctx $ setMainSecretFromPre rver role preMain + logKey ctx (MainSecret mainSecret) + Nothing -> throwCore err + where + err = Error_Protocol "cannot generate a shared secret on ECDH" IllegalParameter + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +processClientCertVerify + :: ServerParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> Bool -> IO () +processClientCertVerify _sparams ctx certs True = do + -- When verification succeeds, commit the + -- client certificate chain to the context. + -- + usingState_ ctx $ setClientCertificateChain certs + return () +processClientCertVerify sparams ctx certs False = do + -- Either verification failed because of an + -- invalid format (with an error message), or + -- the signature is wrong. In either case, + -- ask the application if it wants to + -- proceed, we will do that. + res <- onUnverifiedClientCert (serverHooks sparams) + if res + then do + -- When verification fails, but the + -- application callbacks accepts, we + -- also commit the client certificate + -- chain to the context. + usingState_ ctx $ setClientCertificateChain certs + else decryptError "verification failed" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvCCSandFinished :: Context -> IO () +recvCCSandFinished ctx = runRecvState ctx $ RecvStatePacket $ expectChangeCipherSpec ctx diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server/TLS13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,387 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS13 ( + recvClientSecondFlight13, + requestCertificateServer, + keyUpdate, + updateKey, + KeyUpdateRequest (..), +) where + +import Control.Exception +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common hiding (expectFinished) +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.KeySchedule +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util +import Network.TLS.X509 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvClientSecondFlight13 + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> ( SecretTriple ApplicationSecret + , ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + , Bool + , Bool + ) + -> ClientHello + -> IO () +recvClientSecondFlight13 sparams ctx (appKey, clientHandshakeSecret, authenticated, rtt0OK) CH{..} = do + sfSentTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + let expectFinished' = + expectFinished sparams ctx chExtensions appKey clientHandshakeSecret sfSentTime + if not authenticated && serverWantClientCert sparams + then runRecvHandshake13 $ do + -- RFC 8446 Sec 4.4.3: Clients MUST send this message + -- whenever authenticating via a certificate (i.e., when the + -- Certificate message is non-empty). When sent, this message MUST + -- appear immediately after the Certificate message and immediately + -- prior to the Finished message. + skip <- recvHandshake13 ctx $ expectCertificate sparams ctx + unless skip $ + recvHandshake13hash ctx "CertVerify" (expectCertVerify sparams ctx) + recvHandshake13hash ctx "Finished" expectFinished' + ensureRecvComplete ctx + else + if rtt0OK && not (ctxQUICMode ctx) + then + setPendingRecvActions + ctx + [ PendingRecvAction True $ expectEndOfEarlyData ctx clientHandshakeSecret + , PendingRecvActionHash True $ + expectFinished sparams ctx chExtensions appKey clientHandshakeSecret sfSentTime + ] + else runRecvHandshake13 $ do + recvHandshake13hash ctx "Finished" expectFinished' + ensureRecvComplete ctx + +expectFinished + :: MonadIO m + => ServerParams + -> Context + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> SecretTriple ApplicationSecret + -> ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + -> Word64 + -> TranscriptHash + -> Handshake13 + -> m () +expectFinished sparams ctx exts appKey clientHandshakeSecret sfSentTime hChBeforeCf (Finished13 verifyData) = liftIO $ do + modifyTLS13State ctx $ \st -> st{tls13stRecvCF = True} + (usedHash, usedCipher, _, _) <- getRxRecordState ctx + let ClientTrafficSecret chs = clientHandshakeSecret + checkFinished ctx usedHash chs hChBeforeCf verifyData + finishHandshake13 ctx + setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientApplicationSecret0 + sendNewSessionTicket sparams ctx usedCipher exts applicationSecret sfSentTime + where + applicationSecret = triBase appKey + clientApplicationSecret0 = triClient appKey +expectFinished _ _ _ _ _ _ _ hs = unexpected (show hs) (Just "finished 13") + +expectEndOfEarlyData + :: Context + -> ClientTrafficSecret HandshakeSecret + -> Handshake13 + -> IO () +expectEndOfEarlyData ctx clientHandshakeSecret EndOfEarlyData13 = do + (usedHash, usedCipher, _, _) <- getRxRecordState ctx + setRxRecordState ctx usedHash usedCipher clientHandshakeSecret +expectEndOfEarlyData _ _ hs = unexpected (show hs) (Just "end of early data") + +expectCertificate + :: MonadIO m => ServerParams -> Context -> Handshake13 -> m Bool +expectCertificate sparams ctx (Certificate13 certCtx (CertificateChain_ certs) _ext) = liftIO $ do + when (certCtx /= "") $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "certificate request context MUST be empty" IllegalParameter + -- fixme checking _ext + clientCertificate sparams ctx certs + return $ isNullCertificateChain certs +expectCertificate sparams ctx (CompressedCertificate13 certCtx (CertificateChain_ certs) _ext) = liftIO $ do + when (certCtx /= "") $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "certificate request context MUST be empty" IllegalParameter + -- fixme checking _ext + clientCertificate sparams ctx certs + return $ isNullCertificateChain certs +expectCertificate _ _ hs = unexpected (show hs) (Just "certificate 13") + +sendNewSessionTicket + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> Cipher + -> [ExtensionRaw] + -> BaseSecret ApplicationSecret + -> Word64 + -> IO () +sendNewSessionTicket sparams ctx usedCipher exts applicationSecret sfSentTime = when sendNST $ do + cfRecvTime <- getCurrentTimeFromBase + let rtt = cfRecvTime - sfSentTime + nonce <- TicketNonce <$> getStateRNG ctx 32 + resumptionSecret <- calculateResumptionSecret ctx choice applicationSecret + let life = adjustLifetime $ serverTicketLifetime sparams + psk = derivePSK choice resumptionSecret nonce + (identity, add) <- generateSession life psk rtt0max rtt + let nst = createNewSessionTicket life add nonce identity rtt0max + sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [nst] [] + where + choice = makeCipherChoice TLS13 usedCipher + rtt0max = safeNonNegative32 $ serverEarlyDataSize sparams + sendNST = PSK_DHE_KE `elem` dhModes + + dhModes = case extensionLookup EID_PskKeyExchangeModes exts + >>= extensionDecode MsgTClientHello of + Just (PskKeyExchangeModes ms) -> ms + Nothing -> [] + + generateSession life psk maxSize rtt = do + Session (Just sessionId) <- newSession ctx + tinfo <- createTLS13TicketInfo life (Left ctx) (Just rtt) + sdata <- getSessionData13 ctx usedCipher tinfo maxSize psk + let mgr = sharedSessionManager $ serverShared sparams + mticket <- sessionEstablish mgr sessionId sdata + let identity = SessionIDorTicket_ $ fromMaybe sessionId mticket + return (identity, ageAdd tinfo) + + createNewSessionTicket life add nonce identity maxSize = + NewSessionTicket13 life add nonce identity nstExtensions + where + nstExtensions + | maxSize == 0 = [] + | otherwise = [earlyDataExt] + where + earlyDataExt = toExtensionRaw $ EarlyDataIndication $ Just $ fromIntegral maxSize + adjustLifetime i + | i < 0 = 0 + | i > 604800 = 604800 + | otherwise = fromIntegral i + +expectCertVerify + :: MonadIO m + => ServerParams -> Context -> TranscriptHash -> Handshake13 -> m () +expectCertVerify sparams ctx (TranscriptHash hChCc) (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned sigAlg sig)) = liftIO $ do + certs@(CertificateChain cc) <- + checkValidClientCertChain ctx "invalid client certificate chain" + pubkey <- case cc of + [] -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol "client certificate missing" HandshakeFailure + c : _ -> return $ certPubKey $ getCertificate c + ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + checkDigitalSignatureKey ver pubkey + usingHState ctx $ setPublicKey pubkey + verif <- checkCertVerify ctx pubkey sigAlg sig hChCc + clientCertVerify sparams ctx certs verif +expectCertVerify _ _ _ hs = unexpected (show hs) (Just "certificate verify 13") + +clientCertVerify :: ServerParams -> Context -> CertificateChain -> Bool -> IO () +clientCertVerify sparams ctx certs verif = do + if verif + then do + -- When verification succeeds, commit the + -- client certificate chain to the context. + -- + usingState_ ctx $ setClientCertificateChain certs + return () + else do + -- Either verification failed because of an + -- invalid format (with an error message), or + -- the signature is wrong. In either case, + -- ask the application if it wants to + -- proceed, we will do that. + res <- liftIO $ onUnverifiedClientCert (serverHooks sparams) + if res + then do + -- When verification fails, but the + -- application callbacks accepts, we + -- also commit the client certificate + -- chain to the context. + usingState_ ctx $ setClientCertificateChain certs + else decryptError "verification failed" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newCertReqContext :: Context -> IO CertReqContext +newCertReqContext ctx = getStateRNG ctx 32 + +requestCertificateServer :: ServerParams -> Context -> IO Bool +requestCertificateServer sparams ctx = handleEx ctx $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + supportsPHA <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13ClientSupportsPHA + let ok = tls13 && supportsPHA + if ok + then newIORef [] >>= sendCertReqAndRecv + else return ok + where + sendCertReqAndRecv ref = do + origCertReqCtx <- newCertReqContext ctx + let certReq13 = makeCertRequest sparams ctx origCertReqCtx False + _ <- withWriteLock ctx $ do + bracket (saveHState ctx) (restoreHState ctx) $ \_ -> do + sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [certReq13] [] + withReadLock ctx $ do + (clientCert13, bClientCert13) <- getHandshake ctx ref + emptyCert <- expectClientCertificate sparams ctx origCertReqCtx clientCert13 + baseHState <- saveHState ctx + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx (clientCert13, bClientCert13) + th <- transcriptHash ctx "CH..Cert" + unless emptyCert $ do + (certVerify13, bCertVerify13) <- getHandshake ctx ref + expectCertVerify sparams ctx th certVerify13 + updateTranscriptHash13 ctx (certVerify13, bCertVerify13) + (finished13, _bFinished13) <- getHandshake ctx ref + expectClientFinished ctx finished13 + void $ restoreHState ctx baseHState -- fixme + return True + +-- saving appdata and key update? +-- error handling +getHandshake + :: Context -> IORef [Handshake13R] -> IO Handshake13R +getHandshake ctx ref = do + hhs <- readIORef ref + if null hhs + then do + ex <- recvPacket13 ctx + either (terminate ctx) process ex + else chk hhs + where + process (Handshake13 hss bss) = chk $ zip hss bss + process _ = + terminate ctx $ + Error_Protocol "post handshake authenticated" UnexpectedMessage + chk [] = getHandshake ctx ref + chk ((KeyUpdate13 mode, _) : hbs) = do + keyUpdate ctx getRxRecordState setRxRecordState + -- Write lock wraps both actions because we don't want another + -- packet to be sent by another thread before the Tx state is + -- updated. + when (mode == UpdateRequested) $ withWriteLock ctx $ do + sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [KeyUpdate13 UpdateNotRequested] [] + keyUpdate ctx getTxRecordState setTxRecordState + chk hbs + chk (hb : hbs) = do + writeIORef ref hbs + return hb + +expectClientCertificate + :: ServerParams -> Context -> CertReqContext -> Handshake13 -> IO Bool +expectClientCertificate sparams ctx origCertReqCtx (Certificate13 certReqCtx (CertificateChain_ certs) _ext) = do + expectClientCertificate' sparams ctx origCertReqCtx certReqCtx certs + return $ isNullCertificateChain certs +expectClientCertificate sparams ctx origCertReqCtx (CompressedCertificate13 certReqCtx (CertificateChain_ certs) _ext) = do + expectClientCertificate' sparams ctx origCertReqCtx certReqCtx certs + return $ isNullCertificateChain certs +expectClientCertificate _ _ _ h = unexpected "Certificate" $ Just $ show h + +expectClientCertificate' + :: ServerParams + -> Context + -> CertReqContext + -> CertReqContext + -> CertificateChain + -> IO () +expectClientCertificate' sparams ctx origCertReqCtx certReqCtx certs = do + when (origCertReqCtx /= certReqCtx) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "certificate context is wrong" IllegalParameter + void $ clientCertificate sparams ctx certs + +expectClientFinished :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () +expectClientFinished ctx (Finished13 verifyData) = do + (usedHash, _, level, applicationSecretN) <- getRxRecordState ctx + unless (level == CryptApplicationSecret) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "tried post-handshake authentication without application traffic secret" + InternalError + hChBeforeCf <- transcriptHash ctx "CH.. TLSError -> IO a +terminate ctx err = do + let (level, desc) = errorToAlert err + reason = errorToAlertMessage err + send = sendPacket13 ctx . Alert13 + catchException (send [(level, desc)]) (\_ -> return ()) + setEOF ctx + throwIO $ Terminated False reason err + +handleEx :: Context -> IO Bool -> IO Bool +handleEx ctx f = catchException f $ \exception -> do + -- If the error was an Uncontextualized TLSException, we replace the + -- context with HandshakeFailed. If it's anything else, we convert + -- it to a string and wrap it with Error_Misc and HandshakeFailed. + let tlserror = case fromException exception of + Just e | Uncontextualized e' <- e -> e' + _ -> Error_Misc (show exception) + sendPacket13 ctx $ Alert13 [errorToAlert tlserror] + void $ throwIO $ PostHandshake tlserror + return False + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +keyUpdate + :: Context + -> (Context -> IO (Hash, Cipher, CryptLevel, Secret)) + -> (Context -> Hash -> Cipher -> AnyTrafficSecret ApplicationSecret -> IO ()) + -> IO () +keyUpdate ctx getState setState = do + (usedHash, usedCipher, level, applicationSecretN) <- getState ctx + unless (level == CryptApplicationSecret) $ + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol + "tried key update without application traffic secret" + InternalError + let applicationSecretN1 = + hkdfExpandLabel usedHash applicationSecretN "traffic upd" "" $ + hashDigestSize usedHash + setState ctx usedHash usedCipher (AnyTrafficSecret applicationSecretN1) + +-- | How to update keys in TLS 1.3 +data KeyUpdateRequest + = -- | Unidirectional key update + OneWay + | -- | Bidirectional key update (normal case) + TwoWay + deriving (Eq, Show) + +-- | Updating application traffic secrets for TLS 1.3. +-- If this API is called for TLS 1.3, 'True' is returned. +-- Otherwise, 'False' is returned. +updateKey :: MonadIO m => Context -> KeyUpdateRequest -> m Bool +updateKey ctx way = liftIO $ do + tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx + when tls13 $ do + let req = case way of + OneWay -> UpdateNotRequested + TwoWay -> UpdateRequested + -- Write lock wraps both actions because we don't want another packet to + -- be sent by another thread before the Tx state is updated. + withWriteLock ctx $ do + sendPacket13 ctx $ Handshake13 [KeyUpdate13 req] [] + keyUpdate ctx getTxRecordState setTxRecordState + return tls13 diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/Signature.hs @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature ( + createCertificateVerify, + checkCertificateVerify, + digitallySignDHParams, + digitallySignECDHParams, + digitallySignDHParamsVerify, + digitallySignECDHParamsVerify, + checkSupportedHashSignature, + certificateCompatible, + signatureCompatible, + signatureCompatible13, + hashSigToCertType, + signatureParams, + decryptError, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet ( + encodeSignedDHParams, + encodeSignedECDHParams, + ) +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.X509 + +decryptError :: MonadIO m => String -> m a +decryptError msg = throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg DecryptError + +-- | Check that the key is compatible with a list of 'CertificateType' values. +-- Ed25519 and Ed448 have no assigned code point and are checked with extension +-- "signature_algorithms" only. +certificateCompatible :: PubKey -> [CertificateType] -> Bool +certificateCompatible (PubKeyRSA _) cTypes = CertificateType_RSA_Sign `elem` cTypes +certificateCompatible (PubKeyDSA _) cTypes = CertificateType_DSA_Sign `elem` cTypes +certificateCompatible (PubKeyEC _) cTypes = CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign `elem` cTypes +certificateCompatible (PubKeyEd25519 _) _ = True +certificateCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) _ = True +certificateCompatible _ _ = False + +signatureCompatible :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA1 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA256 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA384 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) = kxCanUseRSApkcs1 pk SHA512 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (_, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) = kxCanUseRSApss pk SHA256 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (_, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) = kxCanUseRSApss pk SHA384 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyRSA pk) (_, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) = kxCanUseRSApss pk SHA512 +signatureCompatible (PubKeyDSA _) (_, SignatureDSA) = True +signatureCompatible (PubKeyEC _) (_, SignatureECDSA) = True +signatureCompatible (PubKeyEd25519 _) (_, SignatureEd25519) = True +signatureCompatible (PubKeyEd448 _) (_, SignatureEd448) = True +signatureCompatible _ (_, _) = False + +-- Same as 'signatureCompatible' but for TLS13: for ECDSA this also checks the +-- relation between hash in the HashAndSignatureAlgorithm and elliptic curve +signatureCompatible13 :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Bool +signatureCompatible13 (PubKeyEC ecPub) (h, SignatureECDSA) = + maybe False (\g -> findEllipticCurveGroup ecPub == Just g) (hashCurve h) + where + hashCurve HashSHA256 = Just P256 + hashCurve HashSHA384 = Just P384 + hashCurve HashSHA512 = Just P521 + hashCurve _ = Nothing +signatureCompatible13 pub hs = signatureCompatible pub hs + +-- | Translate a 'HashAndSignatureAlgorithm' to an acceptable 'CertificateType'. +-- Perhaps this needs to take supported groups into account, so that, for +-- example, if we don't support any shared ECDSA groups with the server, we +-- return 'Nothing' rather than 'CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign'. +-- +-- Therefore, this interface is preliminary. It gets us moving in the right +-- direction. The interplay between all the various TLS extensions and +-- certificate selection is rather complex. +-- +-- The goal is to ensure that the client certificate request callback only sees +-- 'CertificateType' values that are supported by the library and also +-- compatible with the server signature algorithms extension. +-- +-- Since we don't yet support ECDSA private keys, the caller will use +-- 'lastSupportedCertificateType' to filter those out for now, leaving just +-- @RSA@ as the only supported client certificate algorithm for TLS 1.3. +-- +-- FIXME: Add RSA_PSS_PSS signatures when supported. +hashSigToCertType :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Maybe CertificateType +-- +hashSigToCertType (_, SignatureRSA) = Just CertificateType_RSA_Sign +-- +hashSigToCertType (_, SignatureDSA) = Just CertificateType_DSA_Sign +-- +hashSigToCertType (_, SignatureECDSA) = Just CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign +-- +hashSigToCertType (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) = + Just CertificateType_RSA_Sign +hashSigToCertType (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) = + Just CertificateType_RSA_Sign +hashSigToCertType (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) = + Just CertificateType_RSA_Sign +hashSigToCertType (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) = + Just CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign +hashSigToCertType (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) = + Just CertificateType_Ed448_Sign +-- +hashSigToCertType _ = Nothing + +checkCertificateVerify + :: Context + -> Version + -> PubKey + -> ByteString + -> DigitallySigned + -> IO Bool +checkCertificateVerify ctx usedVersion pubKey msgs digSig@(DigitallySigned hashSigAlg _) + | pubKey `signatureCompatible` hashSigAlg = doVerify + | otherwise = return False + where + doVerify = + prepareCertificateVerifySignatureData ctx usedVersion pubKey hashSigAlg msgs + >>= signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData ctx digSig + +createCertificateVerify + :: Context + -> Version + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -- TLS12 only + -> ByteString + -> IO DigitallySigned +createCertificateVerify ctx usedVersion pubKey hashSigAlg msgs = + prepareCertificateVerifySignatureData ctx usedVersion pubKey hashSigAlg msgs + >>= signatureCreateWithCertVerifyData ctx hashSigAlg + +type CertVerifyData = (SignatureParams, ByteString) + +-- in the case of TLS < 1.2, RSA signing, then the data need to be hashed first, as +-- the SHA1_MD5 algorithm expect an already digested data +buildVerifyData :: SignatureParams -> ByteString -> CertVerifyData +buildVerifyData (RSAParams SHA1_MD5 enc) bs = (RSAParams SHA1_MD5 enc, hashFinal $ hashUpdate (hashInit SHA1_MD5) bs) +buildVerifyData sigParam bs = (sigParam, bs) + +prepareCertificateVerifySignatureData + :: Context + -> Version + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -- TLS12 only + -> ByteString + -> IO CertVerifyData +prepareCertificateVerifySignatureData _ctx _usedVersion pubKey hashSigAlg msgs = + return (signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg, msgs) + +signatureParams :: PubKey -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> SignatureParams +signatureParams (PubKeyRSA _) hashSigAlg = + case hashSigAlg of + (HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) -> RSAParams SHA512 RSApkcs1 + (HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) -> RSAParams SHA384 RSApkcs1 + (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) -> RSAParams SHA256 RSApkcs1 + (HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) -> RSAParams SHA1 RSApkcs1 + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) -> RSAParams SHA512 RSApss + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) -> RSAParams SHA384 RSApss + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) -> RSAParams SHA256 RSApss + (hsh, SignatureRSA) -> error ("unimplemented RSA signature hash type: " ++ show hsh) + (_, sigAlg) -> + error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with RSA: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams (PubKeyDSA _) hashSigAlg = + case hashSigAlg of + (HashSHA1, SignatureDSA) -> DSAParams + (_, SignatureDSA) -> error "invalid DSA hash choice, only SHA1 allowed" + (_, sigAlg) -> + error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with DSA: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams (PubKeyEC _) hashSigAlg = + case hashSigAlg of + (HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) -> ECDSAParams SHA512 + (HashSHA384, SignatureECDSA) -> ECDSAParams SHA384 + (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) -> ECDSAParams SHA256 + (HashSHA1, SignatureECDSA) -> ECDSAParams SHA1 + (hsh, SignatureECDSA) -> error ("unimplemented ECDSA signature hash type: " ++ show hsh) + (_, sigAlg) -> + error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with ECDSA: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams (PubKeyEd25519 _) hashSigAlg = + case hashSigAlg of + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) -> Ed25519Params + (hsh, SignatureEd25519) -> error ("unimplemented Ed25519 signature hash type: " ++ show hsh) + (_, sigAlg) -> + error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with Ed25519: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams (PubKeyEd448 _) hashSigAlg = + case hashSigAlg of + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -> Ed448Params + (hsh, SignatureEd448) -> error ("unimplemented Ed448 signature hash type: " ++ show hsh) + (_, sigAlg) -> + error ("signature algorithm is incompatible with Ed448: " ++ show sigAlg) +signatureParams pk _ = error ("signatureParams: " ++ pubkeyType pk ++ " is not supported") + +signatureCreateWithCertVerifyData + :: Context + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm + -> CertVerifyData + -> IO DigitallySigned +signatureCreateWithCertVerifyData ctx malg (sigParam, toSign) = do + role <- usingState_ ctx getRole + DigitallySigned malg <$> signPrivate ctx role sigParam toSign + +signatureVerify :: Context -> DigitallySigned -> PubKey -> ByteString -> IO Bool +signatureVerify ctx digSig@(DigitallySigned hashSigAlg _) pubKey toVerifyData = do + usedVersion <- usingState_ ctx getVersion + let (sigParam, toVerify) = + case (usedVersion, hashSigAlg) of + (TLS12, hs) + | pubKey `signatureCompatible` hs -> + (signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg, toVerifyData) + | otherwise -> + error "expecting different signature algorithm" + _ -> + error + "not expecting hash and signature algorithm in a < TLS12 digitially signed structure" + signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData ctx digSig (sigParam, toVerify) + +signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData + :: Context + -> DigitallySigned + -> CertVerifyData + -> IO Bool +signatureVerifyWithCertVerifyData ctx (DigitallySigned hs bs) (sigParam, toVerify) = do + checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs + verifyPublic ctx sigParam toVerify bs + +digitallySignParams + :: Context + -> ByteString + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm + -> IO DigitallySigned +digitallySignParams ctx signatureData pubKey hashSigAlg = + let sigParam = signatureParams pubKey hashSigAlg + in signatureCreateWithCertVerifyData + ctx + hashSigAlg + (buildVerifyData sigParam signatureData) + +digitallySignDHParams + :: Context + -> ServerDHParams + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -- TLS12 only + -> IO DigitallySigned +digitallySignDHParams ctx serverParams pubKey mhash = do + dhParamsData <- + withClientAndServerRandom ctx $ encodeSignedDHParams serverParams + digitallySignParams ctx dhParamsData pubKey mhash + +digitallySignECDHParams + :: Context + -> ServerECDHParams + -> PubKey + -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -- TLS12 only + -> IO DigitallySigned +digitallySignECDHParams ctx serverParams pubKey mhash = do + ecdhParamsData <- + withClientAndServerRandom ctx $ encodeSignedECDHParams serverParams + digitallySignParams ctx ecdhParamsData pubKey mhash + +digitallySignDHParamsVerify + :: Context + -> ServerDHParams + -> PubKey + -> DigitallySigned + -> IO Bool +digitallySignDHParamsVerify ctx dhparams pubKey signature = do + expectedData <- withClientAndServerRandom ctx $ encodeSignedDHParams dhparams + signatureVerify ctx signature pubKey expectedData + +digitallySignECDHParamsVerify + :: Context + -> ServerECDHParams + -> PubKey + -> DigitallySigned + -> IO Bool +digitallySignECDHParamsVerify ctx dhparams pubKey signature = do + expectedData <- withClientAndServerRandom ctx $ encodeSignedECDHParams dhparams + signatureVerify ctx signature pubKey expectedData + +withClientAndServerRandom + :: Context -> (ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> b) -> IO b +withClientAndServerRandom ctx f = do + (cran, sran) <- + usingHState ctx $ + (,) + <$> gets hstClientRandom + <*> (fromJust <$> gets hstServerRandom) + return $ f cran sran + +-- verify that the hash and signature selected by the peer is supported in +-- the local configuration +checkSupportedHashSignature + :: Context -> HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> IO () +checkSupportedHashSignature ctx hs = + unless (hs `elem` supportedHashSignatures (ctxSupported ctx)) $ + let msg = "unsupported hash and signature algorithm: " ++ show hs + in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/State.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State.hs @@ -0,0 +1,569 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.State ( + HandshakeState (..), + TransHashState (..), + HandshakeMode13 (..), + RTT0Status (..), + CertReqCBdata, + HandshakeM, + newEmptyHandshake, + runHandshake, + + -- * key accessors + setPublicKey, + setPublicPrivateKeys, + getLocalPublicPrivateKeys, + getRemotePublicKey, + setServerDHParams, + getServerDHParams, + setServerECDHParams, + getServerECDHParams, + setDHPrivate, + getDHPrivate, + setGroupPrivate, + getGroupPrivate, + + -- * cert accessors + setClientRandom, + getClientRandom, + setOuterClientRandom, + getOuterClientRandom, + setClientHello, + getClientHello, + setECHEE, + getECHEE, + setECHAccepted, + getECHAccepted, + setClientCertSent, + getClientCertSent, + setCertReqSent, + getCertReqSent, + setClientCertChain, + getClientCertChain, + setCertReqToken, + getCertReqToken, + setCertReqCBdata, + getCertReqCBdata, + setCertReqSigAlgsCert, + getCertReqSigAlgsCert, + + -- * digest accessors + addHandshakeMessage, + getHandshakeMessages, + + -- * main secret + setMainSecret, + setMainSecretFromPre, + + -- * misc accessor + getPendingCipher, + setExtendedMainSecret, + getExtendedMainSecret, + setSupportedGroup, + getSupportedGroup, + setTLS13HandshakeMode, + getTLS13HandshakeMode, + setTLS13RTT0Status, + getTLS13RTT0Status, + setTLS13EarlySecret, + getTLS13EarlySecret, + setTLS13ResumptionSecret, + getTLS13ResumptionSecret, + setTLS13CertComp, + getTLS13CertComp, + setCCS13Sent, + getCCS13Sent, + setCCS13Recv, + getCCS13Recv, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import Data.X509 (CertificateChain) + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util + +data HandshakeKeyState = HandshakeKeyState + { hksRemotePublicKey :: Maybe PubKey + , hksLocalPublicPrivateKeys :: Maybe (PubKey, PrivKey) + } + deriving (Show) + +data TransHashState + = -- | Initial state + TransHashState0 + | -- | A raw CH is stored since hash algo is not chosen yet. + TransHashState1 [ByteString] + | -- | Hashed + TransHashState2 HashCtx + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +instance Show TransHashState where + show TransHashState0 = "State0 " + show (TransHashState1 _) = "State1 CH" + show (TransHashState2 hctx) = showBytesHex $ hashFinal hctx +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +data HandshakeState = HandshakeState + { hstClientVersion :: Version + , hstClientRandom :: ClientRandom + -- ^ For ECH, inner client random. + , hstServerRandom :: Maybe ServerRandom + , hstMainSecret :: Maybe Secret + , hstKeyState :: HandshakeKeyState + , hstServerDHParams :: Maybe ServerDHParams + , hstDHPrivate :: Maybe DHPrivate + , hstServerECDHParams :: Maybe ServerECDHParams + , hstGroupPrivate :: [(Group, GroupPrivate)] + , hstTransHashState :: TransHashState + , hstTransHashStateI :: TransHashState -- Inner CH for client ECH + , hstHandshakeMessages :: [ByteString] + -- ^ To create certificate verify for TLS 1.2. + -- This should be removed when TLS 1.2 is dropped. + , hstCertReqToken :: Maybe ByteString + -- ^ Set to Just-value when a TLS13 certificate request is received + , hstCertReqCBdata :: Maybe CertReqCBdata + -- ^ Set to Just-value when a certificate request is received + , hstCertReqSigAlgsCert :: Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -- ^ In TLS 1.3, these are separate from the certificate + -- issuer signature algorithm hints in the callback data. + -- In TLS 1.2 the same list is overloaded for both purposes. + -- Not present in TLS 1.1 and earlier + , hstClientCertSent :: Bool + -- ^ Set to true when a client certificate chain was sent + , hstCertReqSent :: Bool + -- ^ Set to true when a certificate request was sent. This applies + -- only to requests sent during handshake (not post-handshake). + , hstClientCertChain :: Maybe CertificateChain + , hstPendingTxState :: Maybe RecordState + , hstPendingRxState :: Maybe RecordState + , hstPendingCipher :: Maybe Cipher + , hstPendingCompression :: Compression + , hstExtendedMainSecret :: Bool + , hstSupportedGroup :: Maybe Group + , hstTLS13HandshakeMode :: HandshakeMode13 + , hstTLS13RTT0Status :: RTT0Status + , hstTLS13EarlySecret :: Maybe (BaseSecret EarlySecret) -- xxx + , hstTLS13ResumptionSecret :: Maybe (BaseSecret ResumptionSecret) + , hstTLS13CertComp :: Bool + , hstCCS13Sent :: Bool + , hstCCS13Recv :: Bool + , hstTLS13OuterClientRandom :: Maybe ClientRandom + -- ^ Used for key logging in the case of ECH. + , hstTLS13ClientHello :: Maybe (ClientHello, [ByteString]) + -- ^ Inner client hello in the case of ECH. + , hstTLS13ECHAccepted :: Bool + , hstTLS13ECHEE :: Bool + } + deriving (Show) + +-- | When we receive a CertificateRequest from a server, a just-in-time +-- callback is issued to the application to obtain a suitable certificate. +-- Somewhat unfortunately, the callback parameters don't abstract away the +-- details of the TLS 1.2 Certificate Request message, which combines the +-- legacy @certificate_types@ and new @supported_signature_algorithms@ +-- parameters is a rather subtle way. +-- +-- TLS 1.2 also (again unfortunately, in the opinion of the author of this +-- comment) overloads the signature algorithms parameter to constrain not only +-- the algorithms used in TLS, but also the algorithms used by issuing CAs in +-- the X.509 chain. Best practice is to NOT treat such that restriction as a +-- MUST, but rather take it as merely a preference, when a choice exists. If +-- the best chain available does not match the provided signature algorithm +-- list, go ahead and use it anyway, it will probably work, and the server may +-- not even care about the issuer CAs at all, it may be doing DANE or have +-- explicit mappings for the client's public key, ... +-- +-- The TLS 1.3 @CertificateRequest@ message, drops @certificate_types@ and no +-- longer overloads @supported_signature_algorithms@ to cover X.509. It also +-- includes a new opaque context token that the client must echo back, which +-- makes certain client authentication replay attacks more difficult. We will +-- store that context separately, it does not need to be presented in the user +-- callback. The certificate signature algorithms preferred by the peer are +-- now in the separate @signature_algorithms_cert@ extension, but we cannot +-- report these to the application callback without an API change. The good +-- news is that filtering the X.509 signature types is generally unnecessary, +-- unwise and difficult. So we just ignore this extension. +-- +-- As a result, the information we provide to the callback is no longer a +-- verbatim copy of the certificate request payload. In the case of TLS 1.3 +-- The 'CertificateType' list is synthetically generated from the server's +-- @signature_algorithms@ extension, and the @signature_algorithms_certs@ +-- extension is ignored. +-- +-- Since the original TLS 1.2 'CertificateType' has no provision for the newer +-- certificate types that have appeared in TLS 1.3 we're adding some synthetic +-- values that have no equivalent values in the TLS 1.2 'CertificateType' as +-- defined in the IANA +-- registry. These values are inferred +-- from the TLS 1.3 @signature_algorithms@ extension, and will allow clients to +-- present Ed25519 and Ed448 certificates when these become supported. +type CertReqCBdata = + ( [CertificateType] + , Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + , [DistinguishedName] + ) + +newtype HandshakeM a = HandshakeM {runHandshakeM :: State HandshakeState a} + deriving (Functor, Applicative, Monad) + +instance MonadState HandshakeState HandshakeM where + put x = HandshakeM (put x) + get = HandshakeM get + state f = HandshakeM (state f) + +-- create a new empty handshake state +newEmptyHandshake :: Version -> ClientRandom -> HandshakeState +newEmptyHandshake ver crand = + HandshakeState + { hstClientVersion = ver + , hstClientRandom = crand + , hstServerRandom = Nothing + , hstMainSecret = Nothing + , hstKeyState = HandshakeKeyState Nothing Nothing + , hstServerDHParams = Nothing + , hstDHPrivate = Nothing + , hstServerECDHParams = Nothing + , hstGroupPrivate = [] + , hstTransHashState = TransHashState0 + , hstTransHashStateI = TransHashState0 + , hstHandshakeMessages = [] + , hstCertReqToken = Nothing + , hstCertReqCBdata = Nothing + , hstCertReqSigAlgsCert = Nothing + , hstClientCertSent = False + , hstCertReqSent = False + , hstClientCertChain = Nothing + , hstPendingTxState = Nothing + , hstPendingRxState = Nothing + , hstPendingCipher = Nothing + , hstPendingCompression = nullCompression + , hstExtendedMainSecret = False + , hstSupportedGroup = Nothing + , hstTLS13HandshakeMode = FullHandshake + , hstTLS13RTT0Status = RTT0None + , hstTLS13EarlySecret = Nothing + , hstTLS13ResumptionSecret = Nothing + , hstTLS13CertComp = False + , hstCCS13Sent = False + , hstCCS13Recv = False + , hstTLS13OuterClientRandom = Nothing + , hstTLS13ClientHello = Nothing + , hstTLS13ECHAccepted = False + , hstTLS13ECHEE = False + } + +runHandshake :: HandshakeState -> HandshakeM a -> (a, HandshakeState) +runHandshake hst f = runState (runHandshakeM f) hst + +setPublicKey :: PubKey -> HandshakeM () +setPublicKey pk = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstKeyState = setPK (hstKeyState hst)}) + where + setPK hks = hks{hksRemotePublicKey = Just pk} + +setPublicPrivateKeys :: (PubKey, PrivKey) -> HandshakeM () +setPublicPrivateKeys keys = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstKeyState = setKeys (hstKeyState hst)}) + where + setKeys hks = hks{hksLocalPublicPrivateKeys = Just keys} + +getRemotePublicKey :: HandshakeM PubKey +getRemotePublicKey = fromJust <$> gets (hksRemotePublicKey . hstKeyState) + +getLocalPublicPrivateKeys :: HandshakeM (PubKey, PrivKey) +getLocalPublicPrivateKeys = + fromJust <$> gets (hksLocalPublicPrivateKeys . hstKeyState) + +setServerDHParams :: ServerDHParams -> HandshakeM () +setServerDHParams shp = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstServerDHParams = Just shp}) + +getServerDHParams :: HandshakeM ServerDHParams +getServerDHParams = fromJust <$> gets hstServerDHParams + +setServerECDHParams :: ServerECDHParams -> HandshakeM () +setServerECDHParams shp = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstServerECDHParams = Just shp}) + +getServerECDHParams :: HandshakeM ServerECDHParams +getServerECDHParams = fromJust <$> gets hstServerECDHParams + +setDHPrivate :: DHPrivate -> HandshakeM () +setDHPrivate shp = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstDHPrivate = Just shp}) + +getDHPrivate :: HandshakeM DHPrivate +getDHPrivate = fromJust <$> gets hstDHPrivate + +getGroupPrivate :: HandshakeM [(Group, GroupPrivate)] +getGroupPrivate = gets hstGroupPrivate + +setGroupPrivate :: [(Group, GroupPrivate)] -> HandshakeM () +setGroupPrivate shp = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstGroupPrivate = shp}) + +setExtendedMainSecret :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setExtendedMainSecret b = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstExtendedMainSecret = b}) + +getExtendedMainSecret :: HandshakeM Bool +getExtendedMainSecret = gets hstExtendedMainSecret + +setSupportedGroup :: Group -> HandshakeM () +setSupportedGroup g = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstSupportedGroup = Just g}) + +getSupportedGroup :: HandshakeM (Maybe Group) +getSupportedGroup = gets hstSupportedGroup + +-- | Type to show which handshake mode is used in TLS 1.3. +data HandshakeMode13 + = -- | Full handshake is used. + FullHandshake + | -- | Full handshake is used with hello retry request. + HelloRetryRequest + | -- | Server authentication is skipped. + PreSharedKey + | -- | Server authentication is skipped and early data is sent. + RTT0 + deriving (Show, Eq) + +setTLS13HandshakeMode :: HandshakeMode13 -> HandshakeM () +setTLS13HandshakeMode s = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13HandshakeMode = s}) + +getTLS13HandshakeMode :: HandshakeM HandshakeMode13 +getTLS13HandshakeMode = gets hstTLS13HandshakeMode + +data RTT0Status + = RTT0None + | RTT0Sent + | RTT0Accepted + | RTT0Rejected + deriving (Show, Eq) + +setTLS13RTT0Status :: RTT0Status -> HandshakeM () +setTLS13RTT0Status s = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13RTT0Status = s}) + +getTLS13RTT0Status :: HandshakeM RTT0Status +getTLS13RTT0Status = gets hstTLS13RTT0Status + +setTLS13EarlySecret :: BaseSecret EarlySecret -> HandshakeM () +setTLS13EarlySecret secret = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13EarlySecret = Just secret}) + +getTLS13EarlySecret :: HandshakeM (Maybe (BaseSecret EarlySecret)) +getTLS13EarlySecret = gets hstTLS13EarlySecret + +setTLS13ResumptionSecret :: BaseSecret ResumptionSecret -> HandshakeM () +setTLS13ResumptionSecret secret = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13ResumptionSecret = Just secret}) + +getTLS13ResumptionSecret :: HandshakeM (Maybe (BaseSecret ResumptionSecret)) +getTLS13ResumptionSecret = gets hstTLS13ResumptionSecret + +setTLS13CertComp :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setTLS13CertComp comp = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13CertComp = comp}) + +getTLS13CertComp :: HandshakeM Bool +getTLS13CertComp = gets hstTLS13CertComp + +setCCS13Sent :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setCCS13Sent sent = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstCCS13Sent = sent}) + +getCCS13Sent :: HandshakeM Bool +getCCS13Sent = gets hstCCS13Sent + +setCCS13Recv :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setCCS13Recv sent = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstCCS13Recv = sent}) + +getCCS13Recv :: HandshakeM Bool +getCCS13Recv = gets hstCCS13Recv + +setCertReqSent :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setCertReqSent b = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstCertReqSent = b}) + +getCertReqSent :: HandshakeM Bool +getCertReqSent = gets hstCertReqSent + +setClientCertSent :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setClientCertSent b = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstClientCertSent = b}) + +getClientRandom :: HandshakeM ClientRandom +getClientRandom = gets hstClientRandom + +setClientRandom :: ClientRandom -> HandshakeM () +setClientRandom cr = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstClientRandom = cr} + +getOuterClientRandom :: HandshakeM (Maybe ClientRandom) +getOuterClientRandom = gets hstTLS13OuterClientRandom + +setOuterClientRandom :: Maybe ClientRandom -> HandshakeM () +setOuterClientRandom mcr = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstTLS13OuterClientRandom = mcr}) + +getClientHello :: HandshakeM (Maybe (ClientHello, [ByteString])) +getClientHello = gets hstTLS13ClientHello + +setClientHello :: ClientHello -> [ByteString] -> HandshakeM () +setClientHello ch b = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstTLS13ClientHello = Just (ch, b)} + +getECHAccepted :: HandshakeM Bool +getECHAccepted = gets hstTLS13ECHAccepted + +setECHAccepted :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setECHAccepted b = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstTLS13ECHAccepted = b} + +getECHEE :: HandshakeM Bool +getECHEE = gets hstTLS13ECHEE + +setECHEE :: Bool -> HandshakeM () +setECHEE b = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstTLS13ECHEE = b} + +getClientCertSent :: HandshakeM Bool +getClientCertSent = gets hstClientCertSent + +setClientCertChain :: CertificateChain -> HandshakeM () +setClientCertChain b = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstClientCertChain = Just b}) + +getClientCertChain :: HandshakeM (Maybe CertificateChain) +getClientCertChain = gets hstClientCertChain + +-- +setCertReqToken :: Maybe ByteString -> HandshakeM () +setCertReqToken token = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstCertReqToken = token} + +getCertReqToken :: HandshakeM (Maybe ByteString) +getCertReqToken = gets hstCertReqToken + +-- +setCertReqCBdata :: Maybe CertReqCBdata -> HandshakeM () +setCertReqCBdata d = modify' (\hst -> hst{hstCertReqCBdata = d}) + +getCertReqCBdata :: HandshakeM (Maybe CertReqCBdata) +getCertReqCBdata = gets hstCertReqCBdata + +-- Dead code, until we find some use for the extension +setCertReqSigAlgsCert :: Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] -> HandshakeM () +setCertReqSigAlgsCert as = modify' $ \hst -> hst{hstCertReqSigAlgsCert = as} + +getCertReqSigAlgsCert :: HandshakeM (Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm]) +getCertReqSigAlgsCert = gets hstCertReqSigAlgsCert + +-- +getPendingCipher :: HandshakeM Cipher +getPendingCipher = fromJust <$> gets hstPendingCipher + +addHandshakeMessage :: ByteString -> HandshakeM () +addHandshakeMessage content = modify' $ \hs -> hs{hstHandshakeMessages = content : hstHandshakeMessages hs} + +getHandshakeMessages :: HandshakeM [ByteString] +getHandshakeMessages = gets (reverse . hstHandshakeMessages) + +-- | Generate the main secret from the pre-main secret. +setMainSecretFromPre + :: Version + -- ^ chosen transmission version + -> Role + -- ^ the role (Client or Server) of the generating side + -> Secret + -- ^ the pre-main secret + -> HandshakeM Secret +setMainSecretFromPre ver role preMainSecret = do + ems <- getExtendedMainSecret + secret <- if ems then get >>= genExtendedSecret else genSecret <$> get + setMainSecret ver role secret + return secret + where + genSecret hst = + generateMainSecret + ver + (fromJust $ hstPendingCipher hst) + preMainSecret + (hstClientRandom hst) + (fromJust $ hstServerRandom hst) + genExtendedSecret hst = + generateExtendedMainSecret + ver + (fromJust $ hstPendingCipher hst) + preMainSecret + <$> getSessionHash + +getSessionHash :: HandshakeM ByteString +getSessionHash = gets $ \hst -> + case hstTransHashState hst of + TransHashState2 hashCtx -> hashFinal hashCtx + _ -> error "un-initialized session hash" + +-- | Set main secret and as a side effect generate the key block +-- with all the right parameters, and setup the pending tx/rx state. +setMainSecret :: Version -> Role -> Secret -> HandshakeM () +setMainSecret ver role mainSecret = modify' $ \hst -> + let (pendingTx, pendingRx) = computeKeyBlock hst mainSecret ver role + in hst + { hstMainSecret = Just mainSecret + , hstPendingTxState = Just pendingTx + , hstPendingRxState = Just pendingRx + } + +computeKeyBlock + :: HandshakeState -> Secret -> Version -> Role -> (RecordState, RecordState) +computeKeyBlock hst mainSecret ver cc = (pendingTx, pendingRx) + where + cipher = fromJust $ hstPendingCipher hst + keyblockSize = cipherKeyBlockSize cipher + + bulk = cipherBulk cipher + digestSize = + if hasMAC (bulkF bulk) + then hashDigestSize (cipherHash cipher) + else 0 + keySize = bulkKeySize bulk + ivSize = bulkIVSize bulk + kb = + generateKeyBlock + ver + cipher + (hstClientRandom hst) + (fromJust $ hstServerRandom hst) + mainSecret + keyblockSize + + (cMACSecret, sMACSecret, cWriteKey, sWriteKey, cWriteIV, sWriteIV) = + fromJust $ + partition6 kb (digestSize, digestSize, keySize, keySize, ivSize, ivSize) + + cstClient = + CryptState + { cstKey = bulkInit bulk (BulkEncrypt `orOnServer` BulkDecrypt) cWriteKey + , cstIV = convert $ cWriteIV + , cstMacSecret = cMACSecret + } + cstServer = + CryptState + { cstKey = bulkInit bulk (BulkDecrypt `orOnServer` BulkEncrypt) sWriteKey + , cstIV = convert $ sWriteIV + , cstMacSecret = sMACSecret + } + msClient = MacState{msSequence = 0} + msServer = MacState{msSequence = 0} + + pendingTx = + RecordState + { stCryptState = if cc == ClientRole then cstClient else cstServer + , stMacState = if cc == ClientRole then msClient else msServer + , stCryptLevel = CryptMainSecret + , stCipher = Just cipher + , stCompression = hstPendingCompression hst + } + pendingRx = + RecordState + { stCryptState = if cc == ClientRole then cstServer else cstClient + , stMacState = if cc == ClientRole then msServer else msClient + , stCryptLevel = CryptMainSecret + , stCipher = Just cipher + , stCompression = hstPendingCompression hst + } + + orOnServer f g = if cc == ClientRole then f else g diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/State13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 ( + CryptLevel ( + CryptEarlySecret, + CryptHandshakeSecret, + CryptApplicationSecret + ), + TrafficSecret, + getTxRecordState, + getRxRecordState, + setTxRecordState, + setRxRecordState, + getTxLevel, + getRxLevel, + clearTxRecordState, + clearRxRecordState, + PendingRecvAction (..), + setPendingRecvActions, + popPendingRecvAction, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.KeySchedule (hkdfExpandLabel) +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Types + +getTxRecordState :: Context -> IO (Hash, Cipher, CryptLevel, Secret) +getTxRecordState ctx = getXState ctx ctxTxRecordState + +getRxRecordState :: Context -> IO (Hash, Cipher, CryptLevel, Secret) +getRxRecordState ctx = getXState ctx ctxRxRecordState + +getXState + :: Context + -> (Context -> MVar RecordState) + -> IO (Hash, Cipher, CryptLevel, Secret) +getXState ctx func = do + tx <- readMVar (func ctx) + let usedCipher = fromJust $ stCipher tx + usedHash = cipherHash usedCipher + level = stCryptLevel tx + secret = cstMacSecret $ stCryptState tx + return (usedHash, usedCipher, level, secret) + +-- In the case of QUIC, stCipher is Nothing. +-- So, fromJust causes an error. +getTxLevel :: Context -> IO CryptLevel +getTxLevel ctx = getXLevel ctx ctxTxRecordState + +getRxLevel :: Context -> IO CryptLevel +getRxLevel ctx = getXLevel ctx ctxRxRecordState + +getXLevel + :: Context + -> (Context -> MVar RecordState) + -> IO CryptLevel +getXLevel ctx func = do + tx <- readMVar (func ctx) + return $ stCryptLevel tx + +class TrafficSecret ty where + fromTrafficSecret :: ty -> (CryptLevel, Secret) + +instance HasCryptLevel a => TrafficSecret (AnyTrafficSecret a) where + fromTrafficSecret prx@(AnyTrafficSecret s) = (getCryptLevel prx, s) + +instance HasCryptLevel a => TrafficSecret (ClientTrafficSecret a) where + fromTrafficSecret prx@(ClientTrafficSecret s) = (getCryptLevel prx, s) + +instance HasCryptLevel a => TrafficSecret (ServerTrafficSecret a) where + fromTrafficSecret prx@(ServerTrafficSecret s) = (getCryptLevel prx, s) + +setTxRecordState :: TrafficSecret ty => Context -> Hash -> Cipher -> ty -> IO () +setTxRecordState = setXState ctxTxRecordState BulkEncrypt + +setRxRecordState :: TrafficSecret ty => Context -> Hash -> Cipher -> ty -> IO () +setRxRecordState = setXState ctxRxRecordState BulkDecrypt + +setXState + :: TrafficSecret ty + => (Context -> MVar RecordState) + -> BulkDirection + -> Context + -> Hash + -> Cipher + -> ty + -> IO () +setXState func encOrDec ctx h cipher ts = + let (lvl, secret) = fromTrafficSecret ts + in setXState' func encOrDec ctx h cipher lvl secret + +setXState' + :: (Context -> MVar RecordState) + -> BulkDirection + -> Context + -> Hash + -> Cipher + -> CryptLevel + -> Secret + -> IO () +setXState' func encOrDec ctx h cipher lvl secret = + modifyMVar_ (func ctx) (\_ -> return rt) + where + bulk = cipherBulk cipher + keySize = bulkKeySize bulk + ivSize = max 8 (bulkIVSize bulk + bulkExplicitIV bulk) + key = hkdfExpandLabel h secret "key" "" keySize + iv = hkdfExpandLabel h secret "iv" "" ivSize + cst = + CryptState + { cstKey = bulkInit bulk encOrDec key + , cstIV = iv + , cstMacSecret = secret + } + rt = + RecordState + { stCryptState = cst + , stMacState = MacState{msSequence = 0} + , stCryptLevel = lvl + , stCipher = Just cipher + , stCompression = nullCompression + } + +clearTxRecordState :: Context -> IO () +clearTxRecordState = clearXState ctxTxRecordState + +clearRxRecordState :: Context -> IO () +clearRxRecordState = clearXState ctxRxRecordState + +clearXState :: (Context -> MVar RecordState) -> Context -> IO () +clearXState func ctx = + modifyMVar_ (func ctx) (\rt -> return rt{stCipher = Nothing}) + +setPendingRecvActions :: Context -> [PendingRecvAction] -> IO () +setPendingRecvActions ctx = writeIORef (ctxPendingRecvActions ctx) + +popPendingRecvAction :: Context -> IO (Maybe PendingRecvAction) +popPendingRecvAction ctx = do + let ref = ctxPendingRecvActions ctx + actions <- readIORef ref + case actions of + bs : bss -> writeIORef ref bss >> return (Just bs) + [] -> return Nothing diff --git a/Network/TLS/Handshake/TranscriptHash.hs b/Network/TLS/Handshake/TranscriptHash.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Handshake/TranscriptHash.hs @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash ( + transcriptHash, + transcriptHashWith, + transitTranscriptHashI, + updateTranscriptHash, + updateTranscriptHashI, + transitTranscriptHash, + copyTranscriptHash, + TranscriptHash (..), +) where + +import Control.Monad.State +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +transitTranscriptHash :: Context -> String -> Hash -> Bool -> IO () +transitTranscriptHash ctx label hashAlg isHRR = do + usingHState ctx $ modify' $ \hst -> + hst{hstTransHashState = transit label hashAlg isHRR $ hstTransHashState hst} + traceTranscriptHash ctx label hstTransHashState + +transitTranscriptHashI :: Context -> String -> Hash -> Bool -> IO () +transitTranscriptHashI ctx label hashAlg isHRR = do + usingHState ctx $ modify' $ \hst -> + hst{hstTransHashStateI = transit label hashAlg isHRR $ hstTransHashStateI hst} + traceTranscriptHash ctx label hstTransHashStateI + +transit :: String -> Hash -> Bool -> TransHashState -> TransHashState +transit label _ _ st0@TransHashState0 = error $ "transitTranscriptHash " ++ label ++ " " ++ show st0 +transit _ _ _ st2@(TransHashState2 _) = st2 +transit _ hashAlg isHRR (TransHashState1 chs) + | isHRR = TransHashState2 $ hashUpdate (hashInit hashAlg) hsMsg + | otherwise = TransHashState2 $ hashUpdates (hashInit hashAlg) ch + where + ch = reverse chs + hsMsg = + -- Handshake message: + -- typ <-len-> body + -- 254 0 0 len hash(CH1) + B.concat + [ "\254\0\0" + , B.singleton len + , hashedCH + ] + where + hashedCH = hashChunks hashAlg ch + len = fromIntegral $ B.length hashedCH + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +updateTranscriptHash :: Context -> String -> ByteString -> IO () +updateTranscriptHash ctx label eh = do + usingHState ctx $ modify' $ \hst -> + hst{hstTransHashState = update eh label $ hstTransHashState hst} + traceTranscriptHash ctx label hstTransHashState + +updateTranscriptHashI :: Context -> String -> ByteString -> IO () +updateTranscriptHashI ctx label eh = do + usingHState ctx $ modify' $ \hst -> + hst{hstTransHashStateI = update eh label $ hstTransHashStateI hst} + traceTranscriptHash ctx label hstTransHashStateI + +update :: ByteString -> String -> TransHashState -> TransHashState +update eh _ TransHashState0 = TransHashState1 [eh] +update eh _ (TransHashState1 bss) = TransHashState1 (eh : bss) +update eh _ (TransHashState2 hctx) = TransHashState2 $ hashUpdate hctx eh + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +transcriptHash :: MonadIO m => Context -> String -> m TranscriptHash +transcriptHash ctx label = do + hst <- fromJust <$> getHState ctx + let th = calc label $ hstTransHashState hst + liftIO $ debugTraceKey (ctxDebug ctx) $ adjustLabel label ++ showBytesHex th + return $ TranscriptHash th + +calc :: String -> TransHashState -> ByteString +calc _ (TransHashState2 hashCtx) = hashFinal hashCtx +calc label st = error $ "transcriptHash " ++ label ++ " " ++ show st + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +transcriptHashWith + :: MonadIO m => Context -> String -> ByteString -> m TranscriptHash +transcriptHashWith ctx label bs = do + role <- liftIO $ usingState_ ctx getRole + let isClient = role == ClientRole + hst <- fromJust <$> getHState ctx + let st + | isClient = hstTransHashStateI hst + | otherwise = hstTransHashState hst + let th = calcWith bs label st + liftIO $ debugTraceKey (ctxDebug ctx) $ adjustLabel label ++ showBytesHex th + return $ TranscriptHash th + +calcWith :: ByteString -> String -> TransHashState -> ByteString +calcWith bs _ (TransHashState2 hashCtx) = hashFinal $ hashUpdate hashCtx bs +calcWith _ label st = error $ "transcriptHashWith " ++ label ++ " " ++ show st + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +copyTranscriptHash :: Context -> String -> IO () +copyTranscriptHash ctx label = do + usingHState ctx $ modify' $ \hst -> + hst + { hstTransHashState = hstTransHashStateI hst + } + traceTranscriptHash ctx label hstTransHashState + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +traceTranscriptHash + :: Context -> String -> (HandshakeState -> TransHashState) -> IO () +traceTranscriptHash ctx label getField = do + hst <- fromJust <$> getHState ctx + debugTraceKey (ctxDebug ctx) $ adjustLabel label ++ show (getField hst) + +adjustLabel :: String -> String +adjustLabel label = take 24 (label ++ " ") diff --git a/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs b/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/HashAndSignature.hs @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} + +module Network.TLS.HashAndSignature ( + HashAlgorithm ( + .., + HashNone, + HashMD5, + HashSHA1, + HashSHA224, + HashSHA256, + HashSHA384, + HashSHA512, + HashIntrinsic + ), + SignatureAlgorithm ( + .., + SignatureAnonymous, + SignatureRSA, + SignatureDSA, + SignatureECDSA, + SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256, + SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384, + SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512, + SignatureEd25519, + SignatureEd448, + SignatureRSApsspssSHA256, + SignatureRSApsspssSHA384, + SignatureRSApsspssSHA512, + SignatureBrainpoolP256, + SignatureBrainpoolP384, + SignatureBrainpoolP512 + ), + HashAndSignatureAlgorithm, + supportedSignatureSchemes, + signatureSchemesForTLS13, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Imports + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype HashAlgorithm = HashAlgorithm {fromHashAlgorithm :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern HashNone :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashNone = HashAlgorithm 0 +pattern HashMD5 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashMD5 = HashAlgorithm 1 +pattern HashSHA1 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashSHA1 = HashAlgorithm 2 +pattern HashSHA224 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashSHA224 = HashAlgorithm 3 +pattern HashSHA256 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashSHA256 = HashAlgorithm 4 +pattern HashSHA384 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashSHA384 = HashAlgorithm 5 +pattern HashSHA512 :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashSHA512 = HashAlgorithm 6 +pattern HashIntrinsic :: HashAlgorithm +pattern HashIntrinsic = HashAlgorithm 8 + +instance Show HashAlgorithm where + show HashNone = "None" + show HashMD5 = "MD5" + show HashSHA1 = "SHA1" + show HashSHA224 = "SHA224" + show HashSHA256 = "SHA256" + show HashSHA384 = "SHA384" + show HashSHA512 = "SHA512" + show HashIntrinsic = "TLS13" + show (HashAlgorithm x) = "Hash " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +newtype SignatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm {fromSignatureAlgorithm :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern SignatureAnonymous :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureAnonymous = SignatureAlgorithm 0 +pattern SignatureRSA :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSA = SignatureAlgorithm 1 +pattern SignatureDSA :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureDSA = SignatureAlgorithm 2 +pattern SignatureECDSA :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureECDSA = SignatureAlgorithm 3 +-- TLS 1.3 from here +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256 = SignatureAlgorithm 4 +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384 = SignatureAlgorithm 5 +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512 = SignatureAlgorithm 6 +pattern SignatureEd25519 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureEd25519 = SignatureAlgorithm 7 +pattern SignatureEd448 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureEd448 = SignatureAlgorithm 8 +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA256 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA256 = SignatureAlgorithm 9 +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA384 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA384 = SignatureAlgorithm 10 +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA512 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureRSApsspssSHA512 = SignatureAlgorithm 11 +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP256 :: SignatureAlgorithm -- RFC8734 +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP256 = SignatureAlgorithm 26 +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP384 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP384 = SignatureAlgorithm 27 +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP512 :: SignatureAlgorithm +pattern SignatureBrainpoolP512 = SignatureAlgorithm 28 + +instance Show SignatureAlgorithm where + show SignatureAnonymous = "Anonymous" + show SignatureRSA = "RSA" + show SignatureDSA = "DSA" + show SignatureECDSA = "ECDSA" + show SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256 = "RSApssRSAeSHA256" + show SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384 = "RSApssRSAeSHA384" + show SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512 = "RSApssRSAeSHA512" + show SignatureEd25519 = "Ed25519" + show SignatureEd448 = "Ed448" + show SignatureRSApsspssSHA256 = "RSApsspssSHA256" + show SignatureRSApsspssSHA384 = "RSApsspssSHA384" + show SignatureRSApsspssSHA512 = "RSApsspssSHA512" + show SignatureBrainpoolP256 = "BrainpoolP256" + show SignatureBrainpoolP384 = "BrainpoolP384" + show SignatureBrainpoolP512 = "BrainpoolP512" + show (SignatureAlgorithm x) = "Signature " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +type HashAndSignatureAlgorithm = (HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +supportedSignatureSchemes :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] +supportedSignatureSchemes = + -- EdDSA algorithms + [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) -- ed25519(0x0807) + -- ECDSA algorithms + , (HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512(0x0603) + , (HashSHA384, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384(0x0503) + , (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256(0x0403) + -- RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha512(0x0806) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha384(0x0805) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha256(0x0804) + -- RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms with + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA512) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha512(0x080b) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA384) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha384(0x080a) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA256) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha256(0x0809) + -- RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms + , (HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) -- rsa_pkcs1_sha512(0x0601) + , (HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) -- rsa_pkcs1_sha384(0x0501) + , (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) -- rsa_pkcs1_sha256(0x0401) + -- Legacy algorithms + , (HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) -- rsa_pkcs1_sha1 (0x0201) + , (HashSHA1, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_sha1 (0x0203) + ] + +signatureSchemesForTLS13 :: [(HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm)] +signatureSchemesForTLS13 = + -- EdDSA algorithms + [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) -- ed448 (0x0808) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) -- ed25519(0x0807) + -- ECDSA algorithms + , (HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp512r1_sha512(0x0603) + , (HashSHA384, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384(0x0503) + , (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) -- ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256(0x0403) + -- RSASSA-PSS RSAE algorithms + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha512(0x0806) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha384(0x0805) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) -- rsa_pss_rsae_sha256(0x0804) + -- RSASSA-PSS PSS algorithms with + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA512) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha512(0x080b) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA384) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha384(0x080a) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApsspssSHA256) -- rsa_pss_pss_sha256(0x0809) + ] +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} diff --git a/Network/TLS/Hooks.hs b/Network/TLS/Hooks.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Hooks.hs @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +module Network.TLS.Hooks ( + Logging (..), + defaultLogging, + Hooks (..), + defaultHooks, +) where + +import Data.Default (Default (def)) + +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Struct (Handshake, Header) +import Network.TLS.Struct13 (Handshake13) +import Network.TLS.X509 (CertificateChain) + +-- | Hooks for logging +-- +-- This is called when sending and receiving packets and IO +data Logging = Logging + { loggingPacketSent :: String -> IO () + , loggingPacketRecv :: String -> IO () + , loggingIOSent :: ByteString -> IO () + , loggingIORecv :: Header -> ByteString -> IO () + } + +defaultLogging :: Logging +defaultLogging = + Logging + { loggingPacketSent = \_ -> return () + , loggingPacketRecv = \_ -> return () + , loggingIOSent = \_ -> return () + , loggingIORecv = \_ _ -> return () + } + +instance Default Logging where + def = defaultLogging + +-- | A collection of hooks actions. +data Hooks = Hooks + { hookRecvHandshake :: Handshake -> IO Handshake + -- ^ called at each handshake message received + , hookRecvHandshake13 :: Handshake13 -> IO Handshake13 + -- ^ called at each handshake message received for TLS 1.3 + , hookRecvCertificates :: CertificateChain -> IO () + -- ^ called at each certificate chain message received + , hookLogging :: Logging + -- ^ hooks on IO and packets, receiving and sending. + } + +defaultHooks :: Hooks +defaultHooks = + Hooks + { hookRecvHandshake = return + , hookRecvHandshake13 = return + , hookRecvCertificates = return . const () + , hookLogging = def + } + +instance Default Hooks where + def = defaultHooks diff --git a/Network/TLS/IO.hs b/Network/TLS/IO.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/IO.hs @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-} + +module Network.TLS.IO ( + sendPacket12, + sendPacket13, + recvPacket12, + recvPacket13, + -- + isRecvComplete, + checkValid, + + -- * Grouping multiple packets in the same flight + PacketFlightM, + runPacketFlight, + loadPacket13, +) where + +import Control.Exception (finally, throwIO) +import Control.Monad.Reader +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.IO.Decode +import Network.TLS.IO.Encode +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Send one packet to the context +sendPacket12 :: Context -> Packet -> IO () +sendPacket12 ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} pkt = do + -- in ver <= TLS1.0, block ciphers using CBC are using CBC residue + -- as IV, which can be guessed by an attacker. Hence, an empty + -- packet is sent before a normal data packet, to prevent + -- guessability. + when (isNonNullAppData pkt) $ do + withEmptyPacket <- readIORef $ ctxNeedEmptyPacket ctx + when withEmptyPacket $ + writePacketBytes12 ctx recordLayer (AppData B.empty) + >>= recordSendBytes recordLayer ctx + + writePacketBytes12 ctx recordLayer pkt >>= recordSendBytes recordLayer ctx + where + isNonNullAppData (AppData b) = not $ B.null b + isNonNullAppData _ = False + +writePacketBytes12 + :: Monoid bytes + => Context + -> RecordLayer bytes + -> Packet + -> IO bytes +writePacketBytes12 ctx recordLayer pkt = do + withLog ctx $ \logging -> loggingPacketSent logging (show pkt) + edataToSend <- encodePacket12 ctx recordLayer pkt + either throwCore return edataToSend + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendPacket13 :: Context -> Packet13 -> IO () +sendPacket13 ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} pkt = + writePacketBytes13 ctx recordLayer pkt >>= recordSendBytes recordLayer ctx + +writePacketBytes13 + :: Monoid bytes + => Context + -> RecordLayer bytes + -> Packet13 + -> IO bytes +writePacketBytes13 ctx recordLayer pkt = do + withLog ctx $ \logging -> loggingPacketSent logging (show pkt) + edataToSend <- encodePacket13 ctx recordLayer pkt + either throwCore return edataToSend + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | receive one packet from the context that contains 1 or +-- many messages (many only in case of handshake). if will returns a +-- TLSError if the packet is unexpected or malformed +recvPacket12 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError Packet) +recvPacket12 ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} = loop 0 + where + lim = limitHandshakeFragment $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx + loop count + | count > lim = do + let err = Error_Packet "too many handshake fragment" + logPacket ctx $ show err + return $ Left err + loop count = do + hrr <- usingState_ ctx getTLS13HRR + erecord <- recordRecv12 recordLayer ctx + case erecord of + Left err -> do + logPacket ctx $ show err + return $ Left err + Right record + | hrr && isCCS record -> loop (count + 1) + | otherwise -> do + pktRecv <- decodePacket12 ctx record + if isEmptyHandshake pktRecv + then do + logPacket ctx "Handshake fragment" + -- When a handshake record is fragmented + -- we continue receiving in order to feed + -- stHandshakeRecordCont + loop (count + 1) + else case pktRecv of + Right (Handshake hss bss) -> do + pktRecv'@(Right pkt) <- ctxWithHooks ctx $ \hooks -> do + hss' <- mapM (hookRecvHandshake hooks) hss + return $ Right $ Handshake hss' bss + logPacket ctx $ show pkt + return pktRecv' + Right pkt -> do + logPacket ctx $ show pkt + return pktRecv + Left err -> do + logPacket ctx $ show err + return pktRecv + +isCCS :: Record a -> Bool +isCCS (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ _) = True +isCCS _ = False + +isEmptyHandshake :: Either TLSError Packet -> Bool +isEmptyHandshake (Right (Handshake [] _)) = True +isEmptyHandshake _ = False + +logPacket :: Context -> String -> IO () +logPacket ctx msg = withLog ctx $ \logging -> loggingPacketRecv logging msg + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +recvPacket13 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError Packet13) +recvPacket13 ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} = loop 0 + where + lim = limitHandshakeFragment $ sharedLimit $ ctxShared ctx + loop count + | count > lim = + return $ Left $ Error_Packet "too many handshake fragment" + loop count = do + erecord <- recordRecv13 recordLayer ctx + case erecord of + Left err@(Error_Protocol _ BadRecordMac) -> do + -- If the server decides to reject RTT0 data but accepts RTT1 + -- data, the server should skip all records for RTT0 data. + logPacket ctx $ show err + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + case established of + EarlyDataNotAllowed n + | n > 0 -> do + setEstablished ctx $ EarlyDataNotAllowed (n - 1) + loop (count + 1) + _ -> return $ Left err + Left err -> do + logPacket ctx $ show err + return $ Left err + Right record -> do + pktRecv <- decodePacket13 ctx record + if isEmptyHandshake13 pktRecv + then do + logPacket ctx "Handshake fragment" + -- When a handshake record is fragmented we + -- continue receiving in order to feed + -- stHandshakeRecordCont13 + loop (count + 1) + else do + case pktRecv of + Right (Handshake13 hss bss) -> do + pktRecv'@(Right pkt) <- ctxWithHooks ctx $ \hooks -> do + hss' <- mapM (hookRecvHandshake13 hooks) hss + return $ Right $ Handshake13 hss' bss + logPacket ctx $ show pkt + return pktRecv' + Right pkt -> do + logPacket ctx $ show pkt + return pktRecv + Left err -> do + logPacket ctx $ show err + return pktRecv + +isEmptyHandshake13 :: Either TLSError Packet13 -> Bool +isEmptyHandshake13 (Right (Handshake13 [] _)) = True +isEmptyHandshake13 _ = False + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +isRecvComplete :: Context -> IO Bool +isRecvComplete ctx = usingState_ ctx $ do + cont12 <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont12 + cont13 <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont13 + return $ isNothing (fst cont12) && isNothing (fst cont13) + +checkValid :: Context -> IO () +checkValid ctx = do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + when (established == NotEstablished) $ throwIO ConnectionNotEstablished + eofed <- ctxEOF ctx + when eofed $ throwIO $ PostHandshake Error_EOF + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +type Builder b = [b] -> [b] + +-- | State monad used to group several packets together and send them on wire as +-- single flight. When packets are loaded in the monad, they are logged +-- immediately, update the context digest and transcript, but actual sending is +-- deferred. Packets are sent all at once when the monadic computation ends +-- (normal termination but also if interrupted by an exception). +newtype PacketFlightM b a + = PacketFlightM (ReaderT (RecordLayer b, IORef (Builder b)) IO a) + deriving (Functor, Applicative, Monad, MonadFail, MonadIO) + +runPacketFlight :: Context -> (forall b. Monoid b => PacketFlightM b a) -> IO a +runPacketFlight ctx@Context{ctxRecordLayer = recordLayer} (PacketFlightM f) = do + ref <- newIORef id + runReaderT f (recordLayer, ref) `finally` sendPendingFlight ctx recordLayer ref + +sendPendingFlight + :: Monoid b => Context -> RecordLayer b -> IORef (Builder b) -> IO () +sendPendingFlight ctx recordLayer ref = do + build <- readIORef ref + let bss = build [] + unless (null bss) $ recordSendBytes recordLayer ctx $ mconcat bss + +loadPacket13 :: Monoid b => Context -> Packet13 -> PacketFlightM b () +loadPacket13 ctx pkt = PacketFlightM $ do + (recordLayer, ref) <- ask + liftIO $ do + bs <- writePacketBytes13 ctx recordLayer pkt + modifyIORef' ref (. (bs :)) diff --git a/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs b/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/IO/Decode.hs @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} + +module Network.TLS.IO.Decode ( + decodePacket12, + decodePacket13, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteString as BS + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Packet13 +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Util +import Network.TLS.Wire + +decodePacket12 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError Packet) +decodePacket12 _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData $ fragmentGetBytes fragment +decodePacket12 _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return (Alert `fmapEither` decodeAlerts (fragmentGetBytes fragment)) +decodePacket12 ctx (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = + case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of + Left err -> return $ Left err + Right _ -> do + switchRxEncryption ctx + return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec +decodePacket12 ctx (Record ProtocolType_Handshake ver fragment) = do + keyxchg <- + getHState ctx >>= \hs -> return (hs >>= hstPendingCipher >>= Just . cipherKeyExchange) + usingState ctx $ do + let currentParams = + CurrentParams + { cParamsVersion = ver + , cParamsKeyXchgType = keyxchg + } + -- get back the optional continuation, and parse as many handshake record as possible. + (mCont, wirebytes) <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont12 + modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont12 = (Nothing, [])}) + (hss, bss) <- + unzip <$> parseMany currentParams mCont wirebytes (fragmentGetBytes fragment) + return $ Handshake hss bss + where + parseMany currentParams mCont wirebytes bs = + case fromMaybe decodeHandshakeRecord mCont bs of + GotError err -> throwError err + GotPartial cont -> do + modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont12 = (Just cont, bs : wirebytes)}) + return [] + GotSuccess (ty, content) -> + case decodeHandshake currentParams ty content of + Left err -> throwError err + Right h -> return [(h, reverse (bs : wirebytes))] + GotSuccessRemaining (ty, content) left -> + case decodeHandshake currentParams ty content of + Left err -> throwError err + Right h -> do + hbs <- parseMany currentParams Nothing [] left + let len = BS.length bs - BS.length left + bs' = BS.take len bs + return ((h, reverse (bs' : wirebytes)) : hbs) +decodePacket12 _ _ = return $ Left (Error_Packet_Parsing "unknown protocol type") + +switchRxEncryption :: Context -> IO () +switchRxEncryption ctx = + usingHState ctx (gets hstPendingRxState) >>= \rx -> + modifyMVar_ (ctxRxRecordState ctx) (\_ -> return $ fromJust rx) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +decodePacket13 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError Packet13) +decodePacket13 _ (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = + case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of + Left err -> return $ Left err + Right _ -> return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec13 +decodePacket13 _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData13 $ fragmentGetBytes fragment +decodePacket13 _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return (Alert13 `fmapEither` decodeAlerts (fragmentGetBytes fragment)) +decodePacket13 ctx (Record ProtocolType_Handshake _ fragment) = usingState ctx $ do + (mCont, wirebytes) <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont13 + modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont13 = (Nothing, [])}) + (hss, bss) <- unzip <$> parseMany mCont wirebytes (fragmentGetBytes fragment) + return $ Handshake13 hss bss + where + parseMany mCont wirebytes bs = + case fromMaybe decodeHandshakeRecord13 mCont bs of + GotError err -> throwError err + GotPartial cont -> do + modify' (\st -> st{stHandshakeRecordCont13 = (Just cont, bs : wirebytes)}) + return [] + GotSuccess (ty, content) -> + case decodeHandshake13 ty content of + Left err -> throwError err + Right h -> return [(h, reverse (bs : wirebytes))] + GotSuccessRemaining (ty, content) left -> + case decodeHandshake13 ty content of + Left err -> throwError err + Right h -> do + hbs <- parseMany Nothing [] left + let len = BS.length bs - BS.length left + bs' = BS.take len bs + return ((h, reverse (bs' : wirebytes)) : hbs) +decodePacket13 _ _ = return $ Left (Error_Packet_Parsing "unknown protocol type") diff --git a/Network/TLS/IO/Encode.hs b/Network/TLS/IO/Encode.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/IO/Encode.hs @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +module Network.TLS.IO.Encode ( + encodePacket12, + encodePacket13, + updateTranscriptHash12, + encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12, + updateTranscriptHash13, + encodeUpdateTranscriptHash13, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Packet13 +import Network.TLS.Parameters +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types (Role (..)) +import Network.TLS.Util + +-- | encodePacket transform a packet into marshalled data related to current state +-- and updating state on the go +encodePacket12 + :: Monoid bytes + => Context + -> RecordLayer bytes + -> Packet + -> IO (Either TLSError bytes) +encodePacket12 ctx recordLayer pkt = do + (ver, _) <- decideRecordVersion ctx + let pt = packetType pkt + mkRecord bs = Record pt ver (fragmentPlaintext bs) + mlen <- getPeerRecordLimit ctx + records <- map mkRecord <$> packetToFragments12 ctx mlen pkt + bs <- fmap mconcat <$> forEitherM records (recordEncode12 recordLayer ctx) + when (pkt == ChangeCipherSpec) $ switchTxEncryption ctx + return bs + +-- Decompose handshake packets into fragments of the specified length. AppData +-- packets are not fragmented here but by callers of sendPacket, so that the +-- empty-packet countermeasure may be applied to each fragment independently. +packetToFragments12 :: Context -> Maybe Int -> Packet -> IO [ByteString] +packetToFragments12 ctx mlen (Handshake hss _) = + getChunks mlen . B.concat <$> mapM (encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 ctx) hss +packetToFragments12 _ _ (Alert a) = return [encodeAlerts a] +packetToFragments12 _ _ ChangeCipherSpec = return [encodeChangeCipherSpec] +packetToFragments12 _ _ (AppData x) = return [x] + +switchTxEncryption :: Context -> IO () +switchTxEncryption ctx = do + tx <- usingHState ctx (fromJust <$> gets hstPendingTxState) + (ver, role) <- usingState_ ctx $ do + v <- getVersion + r <- getRole + return (v, r) + liftIO $ modifyMVar_ (ctxTxRecordState ctx) (\_ -> return tx) + -- set empty packet counter measure if condition are met + when + ( ver <= TLS10 + && role == ClientRole + && isCBC tx + && supportedEmptyPacket (ctxSupported ctx) + ) + $ liftIO + $ writeIORef (ctxNeedEmptyPacket ctx) True + where + isCBC tx = maybe False (\c -> bulkBlockSize (cipherBulk c) > 0) (stCipher tx) + +encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 :: Context -> Handshake -> IO ByteString +encodeUpdateTranscriptHash12 ctx hs = do + when (certVerifyHandshakeMaterial hs) $ + usingHState ctx $ + addHandshakeMessage encoded + let label = show $ typeOfHandshake hs + when (finishedHandshakeMaterial hs) $ updateTranscriptHash ctx label encoded + when (isClientHello hs) $ do + usingHState ctx $ do + (ch, b) <- fromJust <$> getClientHello + when (null b) $ setClientHello ch [encoded] + return encoded + where + encoded = encodeHandshake hs + isClientHello (ClientHello _) = True + isClientHello _ = False + +updateTranscriptHash12 :: Context -> HandshakeR -> IO () +updateTranscriptHash12 ctx (hs, bss) = do + when (certVerifyHandshakeMaterial hs) $ + usingHState ctx $ + mapM_ addHandshakeMessage bss + let label = show $ typeOfHandshake hs + when (finishedHandshakeMaterial hs) $ do + mapM_ (updateTranscriptHash ctx label) bss + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +encodePacket13 + :: Monoid bytes + => Context + -> RecordLayer bytes + -> Packet13 + -> IO (Either TLSError bytes) +encodePacket13 ctx recordLayer pkt = do + let pt = contentType pkt + mkRecord bs = Record pt TLS12 (fragmentPlaintext bs) + mlen <- getPeerRecordLimit ctx + records <- map mkRecord <$> packetToFragments13 ctx mlen pkt + fmap mconcat <$> forEitherM records (recordEncode13 recordLayer ctx) + +packetToFragments13 :: Context -> Maybe Int -> Packet13 -> IO [ByteString] +packetToFragments13 ctx mlen (Handshake13 hss _) = + getChunks mlen . B.concat <$> mapM (encodeUpdateTranscriptHash13 ctx) hss +packetToFragments13 _ _ (Alert13 a) = return [encodeAlerts a] +packetToFragments13 _ _ (AppData13 x) = return [x] +packetToFragments13 _ _ ChangeCipherSpec13 = return [encodeChangeCipherSpec] + +encodeUpdateTranscriptHash13 :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO ByteString +encodeUpdateTranscriptHash13 ctx hs + | isIgnored hs = return encoded + | otherwise = do + let label = show $ typeOfHandshake13 hs + updateTranscriptHash ctx label encoded + usingHState ctx $ addHandshakeMessage encoded + return encoded + where + encoded = encodeHandshake13 hs + +updateTranscriptHash13 :: Context -> Handshake13R -> IO () +updateTranscriptHash13 ctx (hs, bss) + | isIgnored hs = return () + | otherwise = do + let label = show $ typeOfHandshake13 hs + mapM_ (updateTranscriptHash ctx label) bss + usingHState ctx $ mapM_ addHandshakeMessage bss + +isIgnored :: Handshake13 -> Bool +isIgnored NewSessionTicket13{} = True +isIgnored KeyUpdate13{} = True +isIgnored _ = False diff --git a/Network/TLS/Imports.hs b/Network/TLS/Imports.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Imports.hs @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE NoImplicitPrelude #-} + +module Network.TLS.Imports ( + -- generic exports + ByteString, + (<&>), + module Control.Applicative, + module Control.Monad, + module Data.Bits, + module Data.List, + module Data.Maybe, + module Data.Semigroup, + module Data.Ord, + module Data.Word, + -- project definition + showBytesHex, +) where + +import Control.Applicative +import Control.Monad +import Data.Bits +import Data.ByteArray.Encoding as B +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import Data.ByteString.Char8 () +import Data.Functor +import Data.List +import Data.Maybe +import Data.Ord +import Data.Semigroup +import Data.Word +import qualified Prelude as P + +showBytesHex :: ByteString -> P.String +showBytesHex bs = P.show (B.convertToBase B.Base16 bs :: ByteString) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Internal.hs b/Network/TLS/Internal.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Internal.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Internal.hs @@ -1,22 +1,37 @@ {-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Internal --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Internal - ( module Network.TLS.Struct - , module Network.TLS.Packet - , module Network.TLS.Receiving - , module Network.TLS.Sending - , sendPacket - , recvPacket - ) where -import Network.TLS.Struct +module Network.TLS.Internal ( + module Network.TLS.Extension, + module Network.TLS.IO.Decode, + module Network.TLS.IO.Encode, + module Network.TLS.Packet, + module Network.TLS.Packet13, + module Network.TLS.Struct, + module Network.TLS.Struct13, + module Network.TLS.Types, + module Network.TLS.Wire, + module Network.TLS.X509, + sendPacket12, + recvPacket12, + makeCipherShowPretty, +) where + +import Data.IORef + +import Network.TLS.Core (recvPacket12, sendPacket12) +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.IO.Decode +import Network.TLS.IO.Encode import Network.TLS.Packet -import Network.TLS.Receiving -import Network.TLS.Sending -import Network.TLS.Core (sendPacket, recvPacket) +import Network.TLS.Packet13 +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire +import Network.TLS.X509 hiding (Certificate) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +makeCipherShowPretty :: IO () +makeCipherShowPretty = writeIORef globalCipherDict ciphersuite_all diff --git a/Network/TLS/KeySchedule.hs b/Network/TLS/KeySchedule.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/KeySchedule.hs @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Network.TLS.KeySchedule ( + hkdfExtract, + hkdfExpandLabel, + deriveSecret, +) where + +import qualified Crypto.Hash as H +import Crypto.KDF.HKDF +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as BS + +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | @HKDF-Extract@ function. Returns the pseudorandom key (PRK) from salt and +-- input keying material (IKM). +hkdfExtract + :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Hash -> ba -> ba -> ba +hkdfExtract SHA1 salt ikm = convert (extract salt ikm :: PRK H.SHA1) +hkdfExtract SHA256 salt ikm = convert (extract salt ikm :: PRK H.SHA256) +hkdfExtract SHA384 salt ikm = convert (extract salt ikm :: PRK H.SHA384) +hkdfExtract SHA512 salt ikm = convert (extract salt ikm :: PRK H.SHA512) +hkdfExtract _ _ _ = error "hkdfExtract: unsupported hash" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +deriveSecret :: Hash -> Secret -> ByteString -> TranscriptHash -> Secret +deriveSecret h secret label (TranscriptHash hashedMsgs) = + hkdfExpandLabel h secret label hashedMsgs outlen + where + outlen = hashDigestSize h + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | @HKDF-Expand-Label@ function. Returns output keying material of the +-- specified length from the PRK, customized for a TLS label and context. +hkdfExpandLabel + :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => Hash + -> Secret + -> ByteString + -> ByteString + -> Int + -> ba +hkdfExpandLabel h secret label ctx outlen = expand' h secret hkdfLabel outlen + where + hkdfLabel = runPut $ do + putWord16 $ fromIntegral outlen + putOpaque8 ("tls13 " `BS.append` label) + putOpaque8 ctx + +expand' + :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Hash -> Secret -> ByteString -> Int -> ba +expand' SHA1 secret label len = expand (extractSkip secret :: PRK H.SHA1) label len +expand' SHA256 secret label len = expand (extractSkip secret :: PRK H.SHA256) label len +expand' SHA384 secret label len = expand (extractSkip secret :: PRK H.SHA384) label len +expand' SHA512 secret label len = expand (extractSkip secret :: PRK H.SHA512) label len +expand' _ _ _ _ = error "expand'" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/Network/TLS/MAC.hs b/Network/TLS/MAC.hs --- a/Network/TLS/MAC.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/MAC.hs @@ -1,74 +1,83 @@ -module Network.TLS.MAC - ( hmacMD5 - , hmacSHA1 - , hmacSHA256 - , macSSL - , hmac - , prf_MD5 - , prf_SHA1 - , prf_SHA256 - , prf_MD5SHA1 - ) where - -import qualified Crypto.Hash.MD5 as MD5 -import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA1 as SHA1 -import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA256 as SHA256 -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import Data.Bits (xor) +module Network.TLS.MAC ( + macSSL, + hmac, + prf_MD5, + prf_SHA1, + prf_SHA256, + prf_TLS, + prf_MD5SHA1, + PRF, +) where -type HMAC = ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA -macSSL :: (ByteString -> ByteString) -> HMAC -macSSL f secret msg = f $! B.concat [ secret, B.replicate padlen 0x5c, - f $! B.concat [ secret, B.replicate padlen 0x36, msg ] ] - where - -- get the type of algorithm out of the digest length by using the hash fct. - padlen = if (B.length $ f B.empty) == 16 then 48 else 40 +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types -hmac :: (ByteString -> ByteString) -> Int -> HMAC -hmac f bl secret msg = - f $! B.append opad (f $! B.append ipad msg) - where - opad = B.map (xor 0x5c) k' - ipad = B.map (xor 0x36) k' +type HMAC = Secret -> ByteString -> Secret - k' = B.append kt pad - where - kt = if B.length secret > fromIntegral bl then f secret else secret - pad = B.replicate (fromIntegral bl - B.length kt) 0 +macSSL :: Hash -> HMAC +macSSL alg secret msg = + f $ + BA.concat + [ secret + , BA.replicate padLen 0x5c + , f $ BA.concat [secret, BA.replicate padLen 0x36, BA.convert msg] + ] + where + padLen = case alg of + MD5 -> 48 + SHA1 -> 40 + _ -> error ("internal error: macSSL called with " ++ show alg) + f = hash alg -hmacMD5 :: HMAC -hmacMD5 secret msg = hmac MD5.hash 64 secret msg +hmac :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Hash -> ba -> ByteString -> ba +hmac alg secret msg = f $ BA.append opad (f $ BA.append ipad $ BA.convert msg) + where + opad = BA.map (0x5c `xor`) k' + ipad = BA.map (0x36 `xor`) k' -hmacSHA1 :: HMAC -hmacSHA1 secret msg = hmac SHA1.hash 64 secret msg + f = hash alg + bl = hashBlockSize alg -hmacSHA256 :: HMAC -hmacSHA256 secret msg = hmac SHA256.hash 64 secret msg + k' = BA.append kt pad + where + kt = if BA.length secret > fromIntegral bl then f secret else secret + pad = BA.replicate (fromIntegral bl - BA.length kt) 0 -hmacIter :: HMAC -> ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> [ByteString] +hmacIter + :: HMAC -> Secret -> ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> [Secret] hmacIter f secret seed aprev len = - let an = f secret aprev in - let out = f secret (B.concat [an, seed]) in - let digestsize = fromIntegral $ B.length out in - if digestsize >= len - then [ B.take (fromIntegral len) out ] - else out : hmacIter f secret seed an (len - digestsize) + let an = f secret aprev + in let out = f secret (BA.concat [an, BA.convert seed]) + in let digestsize = BA.length out + in if digestsize >= len + then [BA.take (fromIntegral len) out] + else out : hmacIter f secret seed (BA.convert an) (len - digestsize) -prf_SHA1 :: ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString -prf_SHA1 secret seed len = B.concat $ hmacIter hmacSHA1 secret seed seed len +type PRF = Secret -> ByteString -> Int -> Secret -prf_MD5 :: ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString -prf_MD5 secret seed len = B.concat $ hmacIter hmacMD5 secret seed seed len +prf_SHA1 :: PRF +prf_SHA1 secret seed len = BA.concat $ hmacIter (hmac SHA1) secret seed seed len -prf_MD5SHA1 :: ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString +prf_MD5 :: PRF +prf_MD5 secret seed len = BA.concat $ hmacIter (hmac MD5) secret seed seed len + +prf_MD5SHA1 :: PRF prf_MD5SHA1 secret seed len = - B.pack $ B.zipWith xor (prf_MD5 s1 seed len) (prf_SHA1 s2 seed len) - where - slen = B.length secret - s1 = B.take (slen `div` 2 + slen `mod` 2) secret - s2 = B.drop (slen `div` 2) secret + BA.xor (prf_MD5 s1 seed len) (prf_SHA1 s2 seed len) + where + slen = BA.length secret + s1 = BA.take (slen `div` 2 + slen `mod` 2) secret + s2 = BA.drop (slen `div` 2) secret -prf_SHA256 :: ByteString -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString -prf_SHA256 secret seed len = B.concat $ hmacIter hmacSHA256 secret seed seed len +prf_SHA256 :: PRF +prf_SHA256 secret seed len = BA.concat $ hmacIter (hmac SHA256) secret seed seed len + +-- | For now we ignore the version, but perhaps some day the PRF will depend +-- not only on the cipher PRF algorithm, but also on the protocol version. +prf_TLS :: Version -> Hash -> PRF +prf_TLS _ halg secret seed len = + BA.concat $ hmacIter (hmac halg) secret seed seed len diff --git a/Network/TLS/Measurement.hs b/Network/TLS/Measurement.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Measurement.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Measurement.hs @@ -1,46 +1,44 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Measurement --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- -module Network.TLS.Measurement - ( Measurement(..) - , newMeasurement - , addBytesReceived - , addBytesSent - , resetBytesCounters - , incrementNbHandshakes - ) where +module Network.TLS.Measurement ( + Measurement (..), + newMeasurement, + addBytesReceived, + addBytesSent, + resetBytesCounters, + incrementNbHandshakes, +) where -import Data.Word +import Network.TLS.Imports -- | record some data about this connection. data Measurement = Measurement - { nbHandshakes :: !Word32 -- ^ number of handshakes on this context - , bytesReceived :: !Word32 -- ^ bytes received since last handshake - , bytesSent :: !Word32 -- ^ bytes sent since last handshake - } deriving (Show,Eq) + { nbHandshakes :: Word32 + -- ^ number of handshakes on this context + , bytesReceived :: Word32 + -- ^ bytes received since last handshake + , bytesSent :: Word32 + -- ^ bytes sent since last handshake + } + deriving (Show, Eq) newMeasurement :: Measurement -newMeasurement = Measurement - { nbHandshakes = 0 - , bytesReceived = 0 - , bytesSent = 0 - } +newMeasurement = + Measurement + { nbHandshakes = 0 + , bytesReceived = 0 + , bytesSent = 0 + } addBytesReceived :: Int -> Measurement -> Measurement addBytesReceived sz measure = - measure { bytesReceived = bytesReceived measure + fromIntegral sz } + measure{bytesReceived = bytesReceived measure + fromIntegral sz} addBytesSent :: Int -> Measurement -> Measurement addBytesSent sz measure = - measure { bytesSent = bytesSent measure + fromIntegral sz } + measure{bytesSent = bytesSent measure + fromIntegral sz} resetBytesCounters :: Measurement -> Measurement -resetBytesCounters measure = measure { bytesReceived = 0, bytesSent = 0 } +resetBytesCounters measure = measure{bytesReceived = 0, bytesSent = 0} incrementNbHandshakes :: Measurement -> Measurement incrementNbHandshakes measure = - measure { nbHandshakes = nbHandshakes measure + 1 } + measure{nbHandshakes = nbHandshakes measure + 1} diff --git a/Network/TLS/Packet.hs b/Network/TLS/Packet.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Packet.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Packet.hs @@ -1,340 +1,441 @@ {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Packet --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the Packet module contains everything necessary to serialize and deserialize things --- with only explicit parameters, no TLS state is involved here. --- -module Network.TLS.Packet - ( - -- * params for encoding and decoding - CurrentParams(..) - -- * marshall functions for header messages - , decodeHeader - , encodeHeader - , encodeHeaderNoVer -- use for SSL3 +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} - -- * marshall functions for alert messages - , decodeAlert - , decodeAlerts - , encodeAlerts +-- | The Packet module contains everything necessary to serialize and +-- deserialize things with only explicit parameters, no TLS state is +-- involved here. +module Network.TLS.Packet ( + -- * params for encoding and decoding + CurrentParams (..), - -- * marshall functions for handshake messages - , decodeHandshakes - , decodeHandshake - , encodeHandshake - , encodeHandshakes - , encodeHandshakeHeader - , encodeHandshakeContent + -- * marshall functions for header messages + decodeHeader, + encodeHeader, - -- * marshall functions for change cipher spec message - , decodeChangeCipherSpec - , encodeChangeCipherSpec + -- * marshall functions for alert messages + decodeAlert, + decodeAlerts, + encodeAlerts, - , decodePreMasterSecret - , encodePreMasterSecret + -- * marshall functions for handshake messages + decodeHandshakeRecord, + decodeHandshake, + encodeHandshake, + encodeHandshake', + encodeCertificate, + decodeClientHello', - -- * marshall extensions - , decodeExtSecureRenegotiation - , encodeExtSecureRenegotiation + -- * marshall functions for change cipher spec message + decodeChangeCipherSpec, + encodeChangeCipherSpec, + decodePreMainSecret, + encodePreMainSecret, + encodeSignedDHParams, + encodeSignedECDHParams, + decodeReallyServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData, - -- * generate things for packet content - , generateMasterSecret - , generateKeyBlock - , generateClientFinished - , generateServerFinished - ) where + -- * generate things for packet content + generateMainSecret, + generateExtendedMainSecret, + generateKeyBlock, -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Wire -import Network.TLS.Cap -import Data.Either (partitionEithers) -import Data.Maybe (fromJust) -import Data.Bits ((.|.)) -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad -import Data.Certificate.X509 (decodeCertificate, encodeCertificate, X509) + -- * for extensions parsing + getSignatureHashAlgorithm, + putSignatureHashAlgorithm, + getBinaryVersion, + putBinaryVersion, + getClientRandom32, + putClientRandom32, + getServerRandom32, + putServerRandom32, + getExtensions, + putExtension, + getSession, + putSession, + putDNames, + getDNames, + getHandshakeType, + + -- * PRF + PRF, + getPRF, +) where + +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, convert) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.X509 ( + CertificateChain, + CertificateChainRaw (..), + decodeCertificateChain, + encodeCertificateChain, + ) + import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Imports import Network.TLS.MAC -import Network.TLS.Cipher (CipherKeyExchangeType(..)) -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as BC -import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util.ASN1 +import Network.TLS.Wire -import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA1 as SHA1 -import qualified Crypto.Hash.MD5 as MD5 +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- Header data CurrentParams = CurrentParams - { cParamsVersion :: Version -- ^ current protocol version - , cParamsKeyXchgType :: CipherKeyExchangeType -- ^ current key exchange type - } deriving (Show,Eq) - -runGetErr :: String -> Get a -> ByteString -> Either TLSError a -runGetErr lbl f = either (Left . Error_Packet_Parsing) Right . runGet lbl f + { cParamsVersion :: Version + -- ^ current protocol version + , cParamsKeyXchgType :: Maybe CipherKeyExchangeType + -- ^ current key exchange type + } + deriving (Show, Eq) -{- marshall helpers -} -getVersion :: Get Version -getVersion = do - major <- getWord8 - minor <- getWord8 - case verOfNum (major, minor) of - Nothing -> fail ("invalid version : " ++ show major ++ "," ++ show minor) - Just v -> return v +-- marshall helpers +getBinaryVersion :: Get Version +getBinaryVersion = Version <$> getWord16 -putVersion :: Version -> Put -putVersion ver = putWord8 major >> putWord8 minor - where (major, minor) = numericalVer ver +putBinaryVersion :: Version -> Put +putBinaryVersion (Version ver) = putWord16 ver getHeaderType :: Get ProtocolType -getHeaderType = do - ty <- getWord8 - case valToType ty of - Nothing -> fail ("invalid header type: " ++ show ty) - Just t -> return t +getHeaderType = ProtocolType <$> getWord8 putHeaderType :: ProtocolType -> Put -putHeaderType = putWord8 . valOfType +putHeaderType (ProtocolType pt) = putWord8 pt getHandshakeType :: Get HandshakeType -getHandshakeType = do - ty <- getWord8 - case valToType ty of - Nothing -> fail ("invalid handshake type: " ++ show ty) - Just t -> return t +getHandshakeType = HandshakeType <$> getWord8 -{- - - decode and encode headers - -} +-- decode and encode headers decodeHeader :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Header -decodeHeader = runGetErr "header" $ liftM3 Header getHeaderType getVersion getWord16 +decodeHeader = + runGetErr "header" $ Header <$> getHeaderType <*> getBinaryVersion <*> getWord16 encodeHeader :: Header -> ByteString -encodeHeader (Header pt ver len) = runPut (putHeaderType pt >> putVersion ver >> putWord16 len) - {- FIXME check len <= 2^14 -} +encodeHeader (Header pt ver len) = runPut (putHeaderType pt >> putBinaryVersion ver >> putWord16 len) -encodeHeaderNoVer :: Header -> ByteString -encodeHeaderNoVer (Header pt _ len) = runPut (putHeaderType pt >> putWord16 len) - {- FIXME check len <= 2^14 -} +-- FIXME check len <= 2^14 -{- - - decode and encode ALERT - -} +------------------------------------------------------------ +-- CCS + +decodeChangeCipherSpec :: ByteString -> Either TLSError () +decodeChangeCipherSpec = runGetErr "changecipherspec" $ do + x <- getWord8 + when (x /= 1) $ fail "unknown change cipher spec content" + len <- remaining + when (len /= 0) $ fail "the length of CSS must be 1" + +encodeChangeCipherSpec :: ByteString +encodeChangeCipherSpec = runPut (putWord8 1) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- Alert + decodeAlert :: Get (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) decodeAlert = do - al <- getWord8 - ad <- getWord8 - case (valToType al, valToType ad) of - (Just a, Just d) -> return (a, d) - (Nothing, _) -> fail "cannot decode alert level" - (_, Nothing) -> fail "cannot decode alert description" + al <- AlertLevel <$> getWord8 + ad <- AlertDescription <$> getWord8 + return (al, ad) decodeAlerts :: ByteString -> Either TLSError [(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] -decodeAlerts = runGetErr "alerts" $ loop - where loop = do - r <- remaining - if r == 0 - then return [] - else liftM2 (:) decodeAlert loop +decodeAlerts = runGetErr "alerts" loop + where + loop = do + r <- remaining + if r == 0 + then return [] + else (:) <$> decodeAlert <*> loop encodeAlerts :: [(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] -> ByteString encodeAlerts l = runPut $ mapM_ encodeAlert l - where encodeAlert (al, ad) = putWord8 (valOfType al) >> putWord8 (valOfType ad) + where + encodeAlert (al, ad) = putWord8 (fromAlertLevel al) >> putWord8 (fromAlertDescription ad) -{- decode and encode HANDSHAKE -} -decodeHandshakeHeader :: Get (HandshakeType, Bytes) -decodeHandshakeHeader = do - ty <- getHandshakeType - content <- getOpaque24 - return (ty, content) +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- decode HANDSHAKE -decodeHandshakes :: ByteString -> Either TLSError [(HandshakeType, Bytes)] -decodeHandshakes b = runGetErr "handshakes" getAll b where - getAll = do - x <- decodeHandshakeHeader - empty <- isEmpty - if empty - then return [x] - else getAll >>= \l -> return (x : l) +decodeHandshakeRecord :: ByteString -> GetResult (HandshakeType, ByteString) +decodeHandshakeRecord = runGet "handshake-record" $ do + ty <- getHandshakeType + content <- getOpaque24 + return (ty, content) -decodeHandshake :: CurrentParams -> HandshakeType -> ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake -decodeHandshake cp ty = runGetErr "handshake" $ case ty of - HandshakeType_HelloRequest -> decodeHelloRequest - HandshakeType_ClientHello -> decodeClientHello - HandshakeType_ServerHello -> decodeServerHello - HandshakeType_Certificate -> decodeCertificates - HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg -> decodeServerKeyXchg cp - HandshakeType_CertRequest -> decodeCertRequest cp - HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone -> decodeServerHelloDone - HandshakeType_CertVerify -> decodeCertVerify - HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg -> decodeClientKeyXchg - HandshakeType_Finished -> decodeFinished +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +decodeHandshake + :: CurrentParams -> HandshakeType -> ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake +decodeHandshake cp ty = runGetErr ("handshake[" ++ show ty ++ "]") $ case ty of + HandshakeType_HelloRequest -> decodeHelloRequest + HandshakeType_ClientHello -> decodeClientHello False + HandshakeType_ServerHello -> decodeServerHello + HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket -> decodeNewSessionTicket + HandshakeType_Certificate -> decodeCertificate + HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg -> decodeServerKeyXchg cp + HandshakeType_CertRequest -> decodeCertRequest cp + HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone -> decodeServerHelloDone + HandshakeType_CertVerify -> decodeCertVerify cp + HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg -> decodeClientKeyXchg cp + HandshakeType_Finished -> decodeFinished + x -> fail $ "Unsupported HandshakeType " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} decodeHelloRequest :: Get Handshake decodeHelloRequest = return HelloRequest -decodeClientHello :: Get Handshake -decodeClientHello = do - ver <- getVersion - random <- getClientRandom32 - session <- getSession - ciphers <- getWords16 - compressions <- getWords8 - r <- remaining - exts <- if hasHelloExtensions ver && r > 0 - then fmap fromIntegral getWord16 >>= getExtensions - else return [] - return $ ClientHello ver random session ciphers compressions exts +decodeClientHello' :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake +decodeClientHello' = runGetErr "decodeClientHello'" $ decodeClientHello True +decodeClientHello :: Bool -> Get Handshake +decodeClientHello inner = do + ver <- getBinaryVersion + random <- getClientRandom32 + session <- getSession + ciphers <- map CipherId <$> getWords16 + compressions <- getWords8 + r <- remaining + exts <- + if r > 0 + then getWord16 >>= getExtensions . fromIntegral + else return [] + r1 <- remaining + if inner + then + checkAndSkip r1 + else when (r1 /= 0) $ fail "Client hello has garbage" + return $ + ClientHello $ + CH + { chVersion = ver + , chRandom = random + , chSession = session + , chCiphers = ciphers + , chComps = compressions + , chExtensions = exts + } + where + checkAndSkip 0 = return () + checkAndSkip r = do + zero <- getWord8 + when (zero /= 0) $ fail "Inner client hello has garbage" + checkAndSkip (r - 1) + decodeServerHello :: Get Handshake decodeServerHello = do - ver <- getVersion - random <- getServerRandom32 - session <- getSession - cipherid <- getWord16 - compressionid <- getWord8 - r <- remaining - exts <- if hasHelloExtensions ver && r > 0 - then fmap fromIntegral getWord16 >>= getExtensions - else return [] - return $ ServerHello ver random session cipherid compressionid exts - -decodeServerHelloDone :: Get Handshake -decodeServerHelloDone = return ServerHelloDone - -decodeCertificates :: Get Handshake -decodeCertificates = do - certs <- getWord24 >>= getCerts >>= return . map (decodeCertificate . L.fromChunks . (:[])) - let (l, r) = partitionEithers certs - if length l > 0 - then fail ("error certificate parsing: " ++ show l) - else return $ Certificates r - -decodeFinished :: Get Handshake -decodeFinished = Finished <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) - -getSignatureHashAlgorithm :: Get (HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm) -getSignatureHashAlgorithm = do - h <- fromJust . valToType <$> getWord8 - s <- fromJust . valToType <$> getWord8 - return (h,s) - -getSignatureHashAlgorithms :: Int -> Get [ (HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm) ] -getSignatureHashAlgorithms 0 = return [] -getSignatureHashAlgorithms len = liftM2 (:) getSignatureHashAlgorithm (getSignatureHashAlgorithms (len-2)) + ver <- getBinaryVersion + random <- getServerRandom32 + session <- getSession + cipherid <- CipherId <$> getWord16 + compressionid <- getWord8 + r <- remaining + exts <- + if r > 0 + then getWord16 >>= getExtensions . fromIntegral + else return [] + return $ + ServerHello $ + SH + { shVersion = ver + , shRandom = random + , shSession = session + , shCipher = cipherid + , shComp = compressionid + , shExtensions = exts + } -decodeCertRequest :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake -decodeCertRequest cp = do - certTypes <- map (fromJust . valToType . fromIntegral) <$> getWords8 +decodeNewSessionTicket :: Get Handshake +decodeNewSessionTicket = NewSessionTicket <$> getWord32 <*> getOpaque16 - sigHashAlgs <- if cParamsVersion cp >= TLS12 - then do - sighashlen <- getWord16 - Just <$> getSignatureHashAlgorithms (fromIntegral sighashlen) - else return Nothing - dNameLen <- getWord16 - when (cParamsVersion cp < TLS12 && dNameLen < 3) $ fail "certrequest distinguishname not of the correct size" - dName <- getBytes $ fromIntegral dNameLen - return $ CertRequest certTypes sigHashAlgs (B.unpack dName) +decodeCertificate :: Get Handshake +decodeCertificate = do + certsRaw <- + CertificateChainRaw + <$> (getWord24 >>= \len -> getList (fromIntegral len) getCertRaw) + case decodeCertificateChain certsRaw of + Left (i, s) -> fail ("error certificate parsing " ++ show i ++ ":" ++ s) + Right cc -> return $ Certificate $ CertificateChain_ cc + where + getCertRaw = getOpaque24 >>= \cert -> return (3 + B.length cert, cert) -decodeCertVerify :: Get Handshake -decodeCertVerify = - {- FIXME -} - return $ CertVerify [] +---- -decodeClientKeyXchg :: Get Handshake -decodeClientKeyXchg = ClientKeyXchg <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) +decodeServerKeyXchg :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake +decodeServerKeyXchg cp = + case cParamsKeyXchgType cp of + Just cke -> ServerKeyXchg <$> decodeServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData (cParamsVersion cp) cke + Nothing -> ServerKeyXchg . SKX_Unparsed <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) -os2ip :: ByteString -> Integer -os2ip = B.foldl' (\a b -> (256 * a) .|. (fromIntegral b)) 0 +decodeServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData + :: Version + -> CipherKeyExchangeType + -> Get ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData +decodeServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData ver cke = toCKE + where + toCKE = case cke of + CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> SKX_RSA . Just <$> decodeServerKeyXchg_RSA + CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> SKX_DH_Anon <$> decodeServerKeyXchg_DH + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> do + dhparams <- getServerDHParams + signature <- getDigitallySigned ver + return $ SKX_DHE_RSA dhparams signature + CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA -> do + dhparams <- getServerDHParams + signature <- getDigitallySigned ver + return $ SKX_DHE_DSA dhparams signature + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA -> do + ecdhparams <- getServerECDHParams + signature <- getDigitallySigned ver + return $ SKX_ECDHE_RSA ecdhparams signature + CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA -> do + ecdhparams <- getServerECDHParams + signature <- getDigitallySigned ver + return $ SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA ecdhparams signature + _ -> do + bs <- remaining >>= getBytes + return $ SKX_Unknown bs decodeServerKeyXchg_DH :: Get ServerDHParams -decodeServerKeyXchg_DH = do - p <- getOpaque16 - g <- getOpaque16 - y <- getOpaque16 - return $ ServerDHParams { dh_p = os2ip p, dh_g = os2ip g, dh_Ys = os2ip y } +decodeServerKeyXchg_DH = getServerDHParams +-- We don't support ECDH_Anon at this moment +-- decodeServerKeyXchg_ECDH :: Get ServerECDHParams + decodeServerKeyXchg_RSA :: Get ServerRSAParams -decodeServerKeyXchg_RSA = do - modulus <- getOpaque16 - expo <- getOpaque16 - return $ ServerRSAParams { rsa_modulus = os2ip modulus, rsa_exponent = os2ip expo } +decodeServerKeyXchg_RSA = + ServerRSAParams + <$> getInteger16 -- modulus + <*> getInteger16 -- exponent -decodeServerKeyXchg :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake -decodeServerKeyXchg cp = ServerKeyXchg <$> case cParamsKeyXchgType cp of - CipherKeyExchange_RSA -> SKX_RSA . Just <$> decodeServerKeyXchg_RSA - CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon -> SKX_DH_Anon <$> decodeServerKeyXchg_DH - CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA -> do - dhparams <- decodeServerKeyXchg_DH - signature <- getOpaque16 - return $ SKX_DHE_RSA dhparams (B.unpack signature) - CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSS -> do - dhparams <- decodeServerKeyXchg_DH - signature <- getOpaque16 - return $ SKX_DHE_DSS dhparams (B.unpack signature) - _ -> do - bs <- remaining >>= getBytes - return $ SKX_Unknown bs +---- -encodeHandshake :: Handshake -> ByteString -encodeHandshake o = - let content = runPut $ encodeHandshakeContent o in - let len = fromIntegral $ B.length content in - let header = runPut $ encodeHandshakeHeader (typeOfHandshake o) len in - B.concat [ header, content ] +decodeCertRequest :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake +decodeCertRequest _cp = do + certTypes <- map CertificateType <$> getWords8 + sigHashAlgs <- getWord16 >>= getSignatureHashAlgorithms + CertRequest certTypes sigHashAlgs <$> getDNames + where + getSignatureHashAlgorithms len = + getList (fromIntegral len) (getSignatureHashAlgorithm >>= \sh -> return (2, sh)) -encodeHandshakes :: [Handshake] -> ByteString -encodeHandshakes hss = B.concat $ map encodeHandshake hss +---- -encodeHandshakeHeader :: HandshakeType -> Int -> Put -encodeHandshakeHeader ty len = putWord8 (valOfType ty) >> putWord24 len +decodeServerHelloDone :: Get Handshake +decodeServerHelloDone = return ServerHelloDone -encodeHandshakeContent :: Handshake -> Put +decodeCertVerify :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake +decodeCertVerify cp = CertVerify <$> getDigitallySigned (cParamsVersion cp) -encodeHandshakeContent (ClientHello version random session cipherIDs compressionIDs exts) = do - putVersion version - putClientRandom32 random - putSession session - putWords16 cipherIDs - putWords8 compressionIDs - putExtensions exts - return () +decodeClientKeyXchg :: CurrentParams -> Get Handshake +decodeClientKeyXchg cp = + -- case ClientKeyXchg <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) + case cParamsKeyXchgType cp of + Nothing -> fail "no client key exchange type" + Just cke -> ClientKeyXchg <$> parseCKE cke + where + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_RSA = CKX_RSA <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA = parseClientDHPublic + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA = parseClientDHPublic + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon = parseClientDHPublic + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA = parseClientECDHPublic + parseCKE CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA = parseClientECDHPublic + parseCKE _ = fail "unsupported client key exchange type" + parseClientDHPublic = CKX_DH . dhPublic <$> getInteger16 + parseClientECDHPublic = CKX_ECDH <$> getOpaque8 -encodeHandshakeContent (ServerHello version random session cipherID compressionID exts) = - putVersion version >> putServerRandom32 random >> putSession session - >> putWord16 cipherID >> putWord8 compressionID - >> putExtensions exts >> return () +decodeFinished :: Get Handshake +decodeFinished = Finished . VerifyData <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) -encodeHandshakeContent (Certificates certs) = putOpaque24 (runPut $ mapM_ putCert certs) +---------------------------------------------------------------- +-- encode HANDSHAKE -encodeHandshakeContent (ClientKeyXchg content) = do - putBytes content +encodeHandshake :: Handshake -> ByteString +encodeHandshake o = + let content = encodeHandshake' o + in let len = B.length content + in let header = runPut $ encodeHandshakeHeader (typeOfHandshake o) len + in B.concat [header, content] -encodeHandshakeContent (ServerKeyXchg _) = do - -- FIXME - return () +encodeHandshakeHeader :: HandshakeType -> Int -> Put +encodeHandshakeHeader ty len = putWord8 (fromHandshakeType ty) >> putWord24 len -encodeHandshakeContent (HelloRequest) = return () -encodeHandshakeContent (ServerHelloDone) = return () +encodeHandshake' :: Handshake -> ByteString +encodeHandshake' HelloRequest = "" +encodeHandshake' (ClientHello CH{..}) = runPut $ do + putBinaryVersion chVersion + putClientRandom32 chRandom + putSession chSession + putWords16 $ map fromCipherId chCiphers + putWords8 chComps + putExtensions chExtensions +encodeHandshake' (ServerHello SH{..}) = runPut $ do + putBinaryVersion shVersion + putServerRandom32 shRandom + putSession shSession + putWord16 $ fromCipherId shCipher + putWord8 shComp + putExtensions shExtensions +encodeHandshake' (NewSessionTicket life ticket) = runPut $ do + putWord32 life + putOpaque16 ticket +encodeHandshake' (Certificate (CertificateChain_ cc)) = encodeCertificate cc +encodeHandshake' (ServerKeyXchg skg) = runPut $ + case skg of + SKX_RSA _ -> error "encodeHandshake' SKX_RSA not implemented" + SKX_DH_Anon params -> putServerDHParams params + SKX_DHE_RSA params sig -> putServerDHParams params >> putDigitallySigned sig + SKX_DHE_DSA params sig -> putServerDHParams params >> putDigitallySigned sig + SKX_ECDHE_RSA params sig -> putServerECDHParams params >> putDigitallySigned sig + SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA params sig -> putServerECDHParams params >> putDigitallySigned sig + SKX_Unparsed bytes -> putBytes bytes + _ -> error ("encodeHandshake': cannot handle: " ++ show skg) +encodeHandshake' (CertRequest certTypes sigAlgs certAuthorities) = runPut $ do + putWords8 (map fromCertificateType certTypes) + putWords16 $ + map + ( \(HashAlgorithm x, SignatureAlgorithm y) -> fromIntegral x * 256 + fromIntegral y + ) + sigAlgs + putDNames certAuthorities +encodeHandshake' ServerHelloDone = "" +encodeHandshake' (CertVerify digitallySigned) = runPut $ putDigitallySigned digitallySigned +encodeHandshake' (ClientKeyXchg ckx) = runPut $ do + case ckx of + CKX_RSA encryptedPreMain -> putBytes encryptedPreMain + CKX_DH clientDHPublic -> putInteger16 $ dhUnwrapPublic clientDHPublic + CKX_ECDH bytes -> putOpaque8 bytes +encodeHandshake' (Finished (VerifyData opaque)) = runPut $ putBytes opaque -encodeHandshakeContent (CertRequest certTypes sigAlgs certAuthorities) = do - putWords8 (map valOfType certTypes) - case sigAlgs of - Nothing -> return () - Just l -> putWords16 $ map (\(x,y) -> (fromIntegral $ valOfType x) * 256 + (fromIntegral $ valOfType y)) l - putBytes $ B.pack certAuthorities +------------------------------------------------------------ +-- CA distinguished names -encodeHandshakeContent (CertVerify _) = undefined +-- | Decode a list CA distinguished names +getDNames :: Get [DistinguishedName] +getDNames = do + dNameLen <- getWord16 + -- FIXME: Decide whether to remove this check completely or to make it an option. + -- when (cParamsVersion cp < TLS12 && dNameLen < 3) $ fail "certrequest distinguishname not of the correct size" + getList (fromIntegral dNameLen) getDName + where + getDName = do + dName <- getOpaque16 + when (B.length dName == 0) $ fail "certrequest: invalid DN length" + dn <- + either fail return $ decodeASN1Object "cert request DistinguishedName" dName + return (2 + B.length dName, dn) -encodeHandshakeContent (Finished opaque) = putBytes opaque +-- | Encode a list of distinguished names. +putDNames :: [DistinguishedName] -> Put +putDNames dnames = do + enc <- mapM encodeCA dnames + let totLength = sum $ map ((+) 2 . B.length) enc + putWord16 (fromIntegral totLength) + mapM_ (\b -> putWord16 (fromIntegral (B.length b)) >> putBytes b) enc + where + -- Convert a distinguished name to its DER encoding. + encodeCA dn = return $ encodeASN1Object dn +------------------------------------------------------------ + {- FIXME make sure it return error if not 32 available -} -getRandom32 :: Get Bytes +getRandom32 :: Get ByteString getRandom32 = getBytes 32 getServerRandom32 :: Get ServerRandom @@ -343,7 +444,7 @@ getClientRandom32 :: Get ClientRandom getClientRandom32 = ClientRandom <$> getRandom32 -putRandom32 :: Bytes -> Put +putRandom32 :: ByteString -> Put putRandom32 = putBytes putClientRandom32 :: ClientRandom -> Put @@ -352,152 +453,199 @@ putServerRandom32 :: ServerRandom -> Put putServerRandom32 (ServerRandom r) = putRandom32 r +------------------------------------------------------------ + getSession :: Get Session getSession = do - len8 <- getWord8 - case fromIntegral len8 of - 0 -> return $ Session Nothing - len -> Session . Just <$> getBytes len + len8 <- getWord8 + case fromIntegral len8 of + 0 -> return $ Session Nothing + len + | len > 32 -> fail "the length of session id must be <= 32" + | otherwise -> Session . Just <$> getBytes len putSession :: Session -> Put -putSession (Session Nothing) = putWord8 0 +putSession (Session Nothing) = putWord8 0 putSession (Session (Just s)) = putOpaque8 s -getCerts :: Int -> Get [Bytes] -getCerts 0 = return [] -getCerts len = do - certlen <- getWord24 - cert <- getBytes certlen - certxs <- getCerts (len - certlen - 3) - return (cert : certxs) - -putCert :: X509 -> Put -putCert cert = putOpaque24 (B.concat $ L.toChunks $ encodeCertificate cert) +------------------------------------------------------------ -getExtensions :: Int -> Get [Extension] -getExtensions 0 = return [] +getExtensions :: Int -> Get [ExtensionRaw] +getExtensions 0 = return [] getExtensions len = do - extty <- getWord16 - extdatalen <- getWord16 - extdata <- getBytes $ fromIntegral extdatalen - extxs <- getExtensions (len - fromIntegral extdatalen - 4) - return $ (extty, extdata) : extxs + extty <- ExtensionID <$> getWord16 + extdatalen <- getWord16 + extdata <- getBytes $ fromIntegral extdatalen + extxs <- getExtensions (len - fromIntegral extdatalen - 4) + return $ ExtensionRaw extty extdata : extxs -putExtension :: Extension -> Put -putExtension (ty, l) = putWord16 ty >> putOpaque16 l +putExtension :: ExtensionRaw -> Put +putExtension (ExtensionRaw (ExtensionID ty) l) = putWord16 ty >> putOpaque16 l -putExtensions :: [Extension] -> Put +putExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] -> Put putExtensions [] = return () putExtensions es = putOpaque16 (runPut $ mapM_ putExtension es) -{- - - decode and encode ALERT - -} +------------------------------------------------------------ -decodeChangeCipherSpec :: ByteString -> Either TLSError () -decodeChangeCipherSpec = runGetErr "changecipherspec" $ do - x <- getWord8 - when (x /= 1) (fail "unknown change cipher spec content") +getSignatureHashAlgorithm :: Get HashAndSignatureAlgorithm +getSignatureHashAlgorithm = do + h <- HashAlgorithm <$> getWord8 + s <- SignatureAlgorithm <$> getWord8 + return (h, s) -encodeChangeCipherSpec :: ByteString -encodeChangeCipherSpec = runPut (putWord8 1) +putSignatureHashAlgorithm :: HashAndSignatureAlgorithm -> Put +putSignatureHashAlgorithm (HashAlgorithm h, SignatureAlgorithm s) = + putWord8 h >> putWord8 s +------------------------------------------------------------ -{- - - decode and encode various extensions - -} -decodeExtSecureRenegotiation :: Bool -> Bytes -> Either TLSError (Bytes, Maybe Bytes) -decodeExtSecureRenegotiation isServerHello = runGetErr "ext-secure-renegotiation" $ do - l <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 - if isServerHello - then do - cvd <- getBytes (l `div` 2) - svd <- getBytes (l `div` 2) - return (cvd, Just svd) - else getBytes (l `div` 2) >>= \cvd -> return (cvd, Nothing) +getServerDHParams :: Get ServerDHParams +getServerDHParams = ServerDHParams <$> getBigNum16 <*> getBigNum16 <*> getBigNum16 -encodeExtSecureRenegotiation :: Bytes -> Maybe Bytes -> Bytes -encodeExtSecureRenegotiation cvd msvd = runPut $ do - let svd = maybe B.empty id msvd - putOpaque8 (cvd `B.append` svd) +putServerDHParams :: ServerDHParams -> Put +putServerDHParams (ServerDHParams p g y) = mapM_ putBigNum16 [p, g, y] --- rsa pre master secret -decodePreMasterSecret :: Bytes -> Either TLSError (Version, Bytes) -decodePreMasterSecret = runGetErr "pre-master-secret" $ do - liftM2 (,) getVersion (getBytes 46) +------------------------------------------------------------ -encodePreMasterSecret :: Version -> Bytes -> Bytes -encodePreMasterSecret version bytes = runPut (putVersion version >> putBytes bytes) +-- RFC 4492 Section 5.4 Server Key Exchange +getServerECDHParams :: Get ServerECDHParams +getServerECDHParams = do + curveType <- getWord8 + case curveType of + 3 -> do + -- ECParameters ECCurveType: curve name type + grp <- Group <$> getWord16 -- ECParameters NamedCurve + mxy <- getOpaque8 -- ECPoint + case groupDecodePublicA grp mxy of + Left e -> fail $ "getServerECDHParams: " ++ show e + Right grppub -> return $ ServerECDHParams grp grppub + _ -> fail "getServerECDHParams: unknown type for ECDH Params" -{- - - generate things for packet content - -} -type PRF = Bytes -> Bytes -> Int -> Bytes +-- RFC 4492 Section 5.4 Server Key Exchange +putServerECDHParams :: ServerECDHParams -> Put +putServerECDHParams (ServerECDHParams (Group grp) grppub) = do + putWord8 3 -- ECParameters ECCurveType + putWord16 grp -- ECParameters NamedCurve + putOpaque8 $ groupEncodePublicA grppub -- ECPoint -generateMasterSecret_SSL :: Bytes -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -generateMasterSecret_SSL premasterSecret (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) = - B.concat $ map (computeMD5) ["A","BB","CCC"] - where - computeMD5 label = MD5.hash $ B.concat [ premasterSecret, computeSHA1 label ] - computeSHA1 label = SHA1.hash $ B.concat [ label, premasterSecret, c, s ] +------------------------------------------------------------ -generateMasterSecret_TLS :: PRF -> Bytes -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -generateMasterSecret_TLS prf premasterSecret (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) = - prf premasterSecret seed 48 - where - seed = B.concat [ "master secret", c, s ] +getDigitallySigned :: Version -> Get DigitallySigned +getDigitallySigned _ver = + DigitallySigned + <$> getSignatureHashAlgorithm + <*> getOpaque16 -generateMasterSecret :: Version -> Bytes -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -generateMasterSecret SSL2 = generateMasterSecret_SSL -generateMasterSecret SSL3 = generateMasterSecret_SSL -generateMasterSecret TLS10 = generateMasterSecret_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 -generateMasterSecret TLS11 = generateMasterSecret_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 -generateMasterSecret TLS12 = generateMasterSecret_TLS prf_SHA256 +putDigitallySigned :: DigitallySigned -> Put +putDigitallySigned (DigitallySigned h sig) = + putSignatureHashAlgorithm h >> putOpaque16 sig -generateKeyBlock_TLS :: PRF -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -> Int -> Bytes -generateKeyBlock_TLS prf (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) mastersecret kbsize = - prf mastersecret seed kbsize where seed = B.concat [ "key expansion", s, c ] +------------------------------------------------------------ -generateKeyBlock_SSL :: ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -> Int -> Bytes -generateKeyBlock_SSL (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) mastersecret kbsize = - B.concat $ map computeMD5 $ take ((kbsize `div` 16) + 1) labels - where - labels = [ uncurry BC.replicate x | x <- zip [1..] ['A'..'Z'] ] - computeMD5 label = MD5.hash $ B.concat [ mastersecret, computeSHA1 label ] - computeSHA1 label = SHA1.hash $ B.concat [ label, mastersecret, s, c ] +-- RSA pre-main secret +decodePreMainSecret :: ByteString -> Either TLSError (Version, ByteString) +decodePreMainSecret = + runGetErr "pre-main-secret" $ + (,) <$> getBinaryVersion <*> getBytes 46 -generateKeyBlock :: Version -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Bytes -> Int -> Bytes -generateKeyBlock SSL2 = generateKeyBlock_SSL -generateKeyBlock SSL3 = generateKeyBlock_SSL -generateKeyBlock TLS10 = generateKeyBlock_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 -generateKeyBlock TLS11 = generateKeyBlock_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 -generateKeyBlock TLS12 = generateKeyBlock_TLS prf_SHA256 +encodePreMainSecret :: Version -> ByteString -> ByteString +encodePreMainSecret version bytes = runPut (putBinaryVersion version >> putBytes bytes) -generateFinished_TLS :: PRF -> Bytes -> Bytes -> HashCtx -> Bytes -generateFinished_TLS prf label mastersecret hashctx = prf mastersecret seed 12 - where - seed = B.concat [ label, hashFinal hashctx ] +------------------------------------------------------------ +-- generate things for packet content -generateFinished_SSL :: Bytes -> Bytes -> HashCtx -> Bytes -generateFinished_SSL sender mastersecret hashctx = B.concat [md5hash, sha1hash] - where - md5hash = MD5.hash $ B.concat [ mastersecret, pad2, md5left ] - sha1hash = SHA1.hash $ B.concat [ mastersecret, B.take 40 pad2, sha1left ] +-- | The TLS12 PRF is cipher specific, and some TLS12 algorithms use SHA384 +-- instead of the default SHA256. +getPRF :: Version -> Cipher -> PRF +getPRF ver ciph + | ver < TLS12 = prf_MD5SHA1 + | maybe True (< TLS12) (cipherMinVer ciph) = prf_SHA256 + | otherwise = prf_TLS ver $ fromMaybe SHA256 $ cipherPRFHash ciph - lefthash = hashFinal $ flip hashUpdateSSL (pad1, B.take 40 pad1) - $ foldl hashUpdate hashctx [sender,mastersecret] - (md5left,sha1left) = B.splitAt 16 lefthash - pad2 = B.replicate 48 0x5c - pad1 = B.replicate 48 0x36 +generateMainSecret_TLS + :: PRF + -> Secret + -> ClientRandom + -> ServerRandom + -> Secret +generateMainSecret_TLS prf preMainSecret (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) = + prf preMainSecret seed 48 + where + seed = B.concat ["master secret", c, s] -generateClientFinished :: Version -> Bytes -> HashCtx -> Bytes -generateClientFinished ver - | ver < TLS10 = generateFinished_SSL "CLNT" - | ver < TLS12 = generateFinished_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 "client finished" - | otherwise = generateFinished_TLS prf_SHA256 "client finished" +generateMainSecret + :: Version + -> Cipher + -> Secret + -> ClientRandom + -> ServerRandom + -> Secret +generateMainSecret v c = generateMainSecret_TLS $ getPRF v c -generateServerFinished :: Version -> Bytes -> HashCtx -> Bytes -generateServerFinished ver - | ver < TLS10 = generateFinished_SSL "SRVR" - | ver < TLS12 = generateFinished_TLS prf_MD5SHA1 "server finished" - | otherwise = generateFinished_TLS prf_SHA256 "server finished" +generateExtendedMainSecret + :: ByteArrayAccess preMain + => Version + -> Cipher + -> preMain + -> ByteString + -> Secret +generateExtendedMainSecret v c preMainSecret sessionHash = + getPRF v c (convert preMainSecret) seed 48 + where + seed = B.append "extended master secret" sessionHash + +generateKeyBlock_TLS + :: PRF -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> Secret -> Int -> Secret +generateKeyBlock_TLS prf (ClientRandom c) (ServerRandom s) mainSecret kbsize = + prf mainSecret seed kbsize + where + seed = B.concat ["key expansion", s, c] + +generateKeyBlock + :: Version + -> Cipher + -> ClientRandom + -> ServerRandom + -> Secret + -> Int + -> Secret +generateKeyBlock v c = generateKeyBlock_TLS $ getPRF v c + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +encodeSignedDHParams + :: ServerDHParams -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> ByteString +encodeSignedDHParams dhparams cran sran = + runPut $ + putClientRandom32 cran >> putServerRandom32 sran >> putServerDHParams dhparams + +-- Combination of RFC 5246 and 4492 is ambiguous. +-- Let's assume ecdhe_rsa and ecdhe_dss are identical to +-- dhe_rsa and dhe_dss. +encodeSignedECDHParams + :: ServerECDHParams -> ClientRandom -> ServerRandom -> ByteString +encodeSignedECDHParams dhparams cran sran = + runPut $ + putClientRandom32 cran >> putServerRandom32 sran >> putServerECDHParams dhparams + +encodeCertificate :: CertificateChain -> ByteString +encodeCertificate cc = runPut $ putOpaque24 (runPut $ mapM_ putOpaque24 certs) + where + (CertificateChainRaw certs) = encodeCertificateChain cc + +------------------------------------------------------------ + +-- | in certain cases, we haven't manage to decode ServerKeyExchange properly, +-- because the decoding was too eager and the cipher wasn't been set yet. +-- we keep the Server Key Exchange in it unparsed format, and this function is +-- able to really decode the server key xchange if it's unparsed. +decodeReallyServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData + :: Version + -> CipherKeyExchangeType + -> ByteString + -> Either TLSError ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData +decodeReallyServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData ver cke = + runGetErr + "server-key-xchg-algorithm-data" + (decodeServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData ver cke) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs b/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Packet13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Network.TLS.Packet13 ( + encodeHandshake13, + decodeHandshakeRecord13, + decodeHandshake13, + decodeHandshakes13, + encodeCertificate13, +) where + +import Codec.Compression.Zlib +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as BL +import Data.X509 ( + CertificateChain, + CertificateChainRaw (..), + decodeCertificateChain, + encodeCertificateChain, + ) +import System.IO.Unsafe + +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Struct13 +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +encodeHandshake13 :: Handshake13 -> ByteString +encodeHandshake13 hdsk = pkt + where + tp = typeOfHandshake13 hdsk + content = encodeHandshake13' hdsk + len = B.length content + header = encodeHandshakeHeader13 tp len + pkt = B.concat [header, content] + +-- TLS 1.3 does not use "select (extensions_present)". +putExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] -> Put +putExtensions es = putOpaque16 (runPut $ mapM_ putExtension es) + +encodeHandshake13' :: Handshake13 -> ByteString +encodeHandshake13' (ServerHello13 SH{..}) = runPut $ do + putBinaryVersion shVersion + putServerRandom32 shRandom + putSession shSession + putWord16 $ fromCipherId shCipher + putWord8 shComp + putExtensions shExtensions +encodeHandshake13' + ( NewSessionTicket13 + life + ageadd + (TicketNonce nonce) + (SessionIDorTicket_ label) + exts + ) = runPut $ do + putWord32 life + putWord32 ageadd + putOpaque8 nonce + putOpaque16 label + putExtensions exts +encodeHandshake13' EndOfEarlyData13 = "" +encodeHandshake13' (EncryptedExtensions13 exts) = runPut $ putExtensions exts +encodeHandshake13' (Certificate13 reqctx (CertificateChain_ cc) ess) = encodeCertificate13 reqctx cc ess +encodeHandshake13' (CertRequest13 reqctx exts) = runPut $ do + putOpaque8 reqctx + putExtensions exts +encodeHandshake13' (CertVerify13 (DigitallySigned hs sig)) = runPut $ do + putSignatureHashAlgorithm hs + putOpaque16 sig +encodeHandshake13' (Finished13 (VerifyData dat)) = runPut $ putBytes dat +encodeHandshake13' (KeyUpdate13 UpdateNotRequested) = runPut $ putWord8 0 +encodeHandshake13' (KeyUpdate13 UpdateRequested) = runPut $ putWord8 1 +encodeHandshake13' (CompressedCertificate13 reqctx (CertificateChain_ cc) ess) = runPut $ do + putWord16 1 -- zlib: fixme + let bs = encodeCertificate13 reqctx cc ess + putWord24 $ fromIntegral $ B.length bs + putOpaque24 $ BL.toStrict $ compress $ BL.fromStrict bs + +encodeHandshakeHeader13 :: HandshakeType -> Int -> ByteString +encodeHandshakeHeader13 ty len = runPut $ do + putWord8 (fromHandshakeType ty) + putWord24 len + +encodeCertificate13 + :: CertReqContext -> CertificateChain -> [[ExtensionRaw]] -> ByteString +encodeCertificate13 reqctx cc ess = runPut $ do + putOpaque8 reqctx + putOpaque24 (runPut $ mapM_ putCert $ zip certs ess) + where + CertificateChainRaw certs = encodeCertificateChain cc + putCert (certRaw, exts) = do + putOpaque24 certRaw + putExtensions exts + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +decodeHandshakes13 :: MonadError TLSError m => ByteString -> m [Handshake13] +decodeHandshakes13 bs = case decodeHandshakeRecord13 bs of + GotError err -> throwError err + GotPartial _cont -> error "decodeHandshakes13" + GotSuccess (ty, content) -> case decodeHandshake13 ty content of + Left e -> throwError e + Right h -> return [h] + GotSuccessRemaining (ty, content) left -> case decodeHandshake13 ty content of + Left e -> throwError e + Right h -> (h :) <$> decodeHandshakes13 left + +decodeHandshakeRecord13 :: ByteString -> GetResult (HandshakeType, ByteString) +decodeHandshakeRecord13 = runGet "handshake-record" $ do + ty <- getHandshakeType + content <- getOpaque24 + return (ty, content) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +decodeHandshake13 + :: HandshakeType -> ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake13 +decodeHandshake13 ty = runGetErr ("handshake[" ++ show ty ++ "]") $ case ty of + HandshakeType_ServerHello -> decodeServerHello13 + HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket -> decodeNewSessionTicket13 + HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData -> return EndOfEarlyData13 + HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions -> decodeEncryptedExtensions13 + HandshakeType_Certificate -> decodeCertificate13 + HandshakeType_CertRequest -> decodeCertRequest13 + HandshakeType_CertVerify -> decodeCertVerify13 + HandshakeType_Finished -> decodeFinished13 + HandshakeType_KeyUpdate -> decodeKeyUpdate13 + HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate -> decodeCompressedCertificate13 + (HandshakeType x) -> fail $ "Unsupported HandshakeType " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +decodeServerHello13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeServerHello13 = do + ver <- getBinaryVersion + random <- getServerRandom32 + session <- getSession + cipherid <- CipherId <$> getWord16 + comp <- getWord8 + exts <- getWord16 >>= getExtensions . fromIntegral + return $ + ServerHello13 $ + SH + { shVersion = ver + , shRandom = random + , shSession = session + , shCipher = cipherid + , shComp = comp + , shExtensions = exts + } + +decodeNewSessionTicket13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeNewSessionTicket13 = do + life <- getWord32 + ageadd <- getWord32 + nonce <- TicketNonce <$> getOpaque8 + label <- SessionIDorTicket_ <$> getOpaque16 + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + exts <- getExtensions len + return $ NewSessionTicket13 life ageadd nonce label exts + +decodeEncryptedExtensions13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeEncryptedExtensions13 = + EncryptedExtensions13 <$> do + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + getExtensions len + +decodeCertificate13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeCertificate13 = do + reqctx <- getOpaque8 + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord24 + (certRaws, ess) <- unzip <$> getList len getCert + case decodeCertificateChain $ CertificateChainRaw certRaws of + Left (i, s) -> fail ("error certificate parsing " ++ show i ++ ":" ++ s) + Right cc -> return $ Certificate13 reqctx (CertificateChain_ cc) ess + where + getCert = do + l <- fromIntegral <$> getWord24 + cert <- getBytes l + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + exts <- getExtensions len + return (3 + l + 2 + len, (cert, exts)) + +decodeCertRequest13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeCertRequest13 = do + reqctx <- getOpaque8 + len <- fromIntegral <$> getWord16 + exts <- getExtensions len + return $ CertRequest13 reqctx exts + +decodeCertVerify13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeCertVerify13 = + CertVerify13 <$> (DigitallySigned <$> getSignatureHashAlgorithm <*> getOpaque16) + +decodeFinished13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeFinished13 = Finished13 . VerifyData <$> (remaining >>= getBytes) + +decodeKeyUpdate13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeKeyUpdate13 = do + ru <- getWord8 + case ru of + 0 -> return $ KeyUpdate13 UpdateNotRequested + 1 -> return $ KeyUpdate13 UpdateRequested + x -> fail $ "Unknown request_update: " ++ show x + +decodeCompressedCertificate13 :: Get Handshake13 +decodeCompressedCertificate13 = do + algo <- getWord16 + when (algo /= 1) $ fail "comp algo is not supported" -- fixme + len <- getWord24 + bs <- getOpaque24 + if bs == "" + then fail "empty compressed certificate" + else case decompressIt bs of + Left e -> fail (show e) + Right bs' -> do + when (B.length bs' /= len) $ fail "plain length is wrong" + case runGetMaybe decodeCertificate13 bs' of + Just (Certificate13 reqctx certs ess) -> return $ CompressedCertificate13 reqctx certs ess + -- _ -> fail "compressed certificate cannot be parsed" + _ -> fail $ "invalid compressed certificate: len = " ++ show len + +decompressIt :: ByteString -> Either DecompressError ByteString +decompressIt inp = unsafePerformIO $ E.handle handler $ do + Right . BL.toStrict <$> E.evaluate (decompress (BL.fromStrict inp)) + where + handler e = return $ Left (e :: DecompressError) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs b/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs @@ -0,0 +1,899 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE Strict #-} + +module Network.TLS.Parameters ( + ClientParams (..), + defaultParamsClient, + ServerParams (..), + defaultParamsServer, + CommonParams, + DebugParams (..), + defaultDebugParams, + defaultKeyLogger, + ClientHooks (..), + defaultClientHooks, + OnCertificateRequest, + OnServerCertificate, + ServerHooks (..), + defaultServerHooks, + Supported (..), + defaultSupported, + Shared (..), + defaultShared, + Limit (..), + defaultLimit, + + -- * Parameters + MaxFragmentEnum (..), + EMSMode (..), + GroupUsage (..), + CertificateUsage (..), + CertificateRejectReason (..), + Information (..), +) where + +import Control.Concurrent (MVar, newMVar, withMVar) +import Crypto.HPKE +import Data.Default (Default (def)) +import System.Environment (lookupEnv) +import System.IO.Unsafe (unsafePerformIO) + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.Credentials +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Measurement +import Network.TLS.RNG (Seed) +import Network.TLS.Session +import Network.TLS.Struct +import qualified Network.TLS.Struct as Struct +import Network.TLS.Types (HostName) +import Network.TLS.X509 + +type CommonParams = (Supported, Shared, DebugParams) + +-- | All settings should not be used in production +data DebugParams = DebugParams + { debugSeed :: Maybe Seed + -- ^ Disable the true randomness in favor of deterministic seed that will produce + -- a deterministic random from. This is useful for tests and debugging purpose. + -- Do not use in production + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , debugPrintSeed :: Seed -> IO () + -- ^ Add a way to print the seed that was randomly generated. reusing the same seed + -- will reproduce the same randomness with 'debugSeed' + -- + -- Default: no printing + , debugVersionForced :: Maybe Version + -- ^ Force to choose this version in the server side. + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , debugKeyLogger :: String -> IO () + -- ^ Printing main keys. + -- + -- Default: no printing + , debugError :: String -> IO () + , debugTraceKey :: String -> IO () + } + +{-# NOINLINE keyLogLock #-} +keyLogLock :: MVar () +keyLogLock = unsafePerformIO $ newMVar () + +{-# NOINLINE keyLogFile #-} +keyLogFile :: Maybe FilePath +keyLogFile = unsafePerformIO $ lookupEnv "SSLKEYLOGFILE" + +-- | Key logger with the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable. +defaultKeyLogger :: String -> IO () +defaultKeyLogger ~msg = case keyLogFile of + Nothing -> return () + Just file -> withMVar keyLogLock $ \_ -> appendFile file (msg ++ "\n") + +-- | Default value for 'DebugParams' +defaultDebugParams :: DebugParams +defaultDebugParams = + DebugParams + { debugSeed = Nothing + , debugPrintSeed = const (return ()) + , debugVersionForced = Nothing + , debugKeyLogger = defaultKeyLogger + , debugError = \ ~_ -> return () + , debugTraceKey = \ ~_ -> return () + } + +instance Show DebugParams where + show _ = "DebugParams" +instance Default DebugParams where + def = defaultDebugParams + +{-# DEPRECATED clientUseMaxFragmentLength "UseMaxFragmentLength is deprecated" #-} + +data ClientParams = ClientParams + { clientUseMaxFragmentLength :: Maybe MaxFragmentEnum + -- ^ + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , clientServerIdentification :: (HostName, ByteString) + -- ^ Define the name of the server, along with an extra service + -- identification blob. this is important that the hostname part + -- is properly filled for security reason, as it allow to properly + -- associate the remote side with the given certificate during a + -- handshake. + -- + -- The extra blob is useful to differentiate services running on + -- the same host, but that might have different certificates + -- given. It's only used as part of the X509 validation + -- infrastructure. + -- + -- This value is typically set by 'defaultParamsClient'. + , clientUseServerNameIndication :: Bool + -- ^ Allow the use of the Server Name Indication TLS extension + -- during handshake, which allow the client to specify which host + -- name, it's trying to access. This is useful to distinguish + -- CNAME aliasing (e.g. web virtual host). + -- + -- Default: 'True' + , clientWantSessionResume :: Maybe (SessionID, SessionData) + -- ^ try to establish a connection using this session for TLS + -- 1.2/TLS 1.3. This can be used for TLS 1.3 but for backward + -- compatibility purpose only. Use 'clientWantSessionResume13' + -- instead for TLS 1.3. + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , clientWantSessionResumeList :: [(SessionID, SessionData)] + -- ^ try to establish a connection using one of this sessions + -- especially for TLS 1.3. This take precedence over + -- 'clientWantSessionResume'. For convenience, this can be + -- specified for TLS 1.2 but only the first entry is used. + -- + -- Default: '[]' + , clientWantTicket :: Bool + -- ^ Whether to solicit TLS 1.2 session tickets (or TLS 1.3 + -- resumption PSKs) from servers. With a 'False' setting, + -- stateless clients that never do resumption can avoid + -- wasting server and client resources used to generate, + -- transmit and process tickets that will never be used. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + -- + -- @since 2.4.1 + , clientShared :: Shared + -- ^ See the default value of 'Shared'. + , clientHooks :: ClientHooks + -- ^ See the default value of 'ClientHooks'. + , clientSupported :: Supported + -- ^ In this element, you'll need to override the default empty + -- value of of 'supportedCiphers' with a suitable cipherlist. + -- + -- See the default value of 'Supported'. + , clientDebug :: DebugParams + -- ^ See the default value of 'DebugParams'. + , clientUseEarlyData :: Bool + -- ^ Client tries to send early data in TLS 1.3 via 'sendData' if + -- possible. If not accepted by the server, the early data is + -- automatically re-sent. + -- + -- Default: 'False' + , clientUseECH :: Bool + -- ^ Enabling Encrypted Client Hello. + -- If 'sharedECHConfigList' is null, a greasing ECH extension is sent. + -- Otherwise, a valid ECH is sent. + -- If the server rejects ECH in Server Hello, + -- the client sends an alert after negotiation. + -- + -- Default: 'False' + -- + -- @since 2.1.9 + } + deriving (Show) + +-- | Default value for 'ClientParams' +defaultParamsClient :: HostName -> ByteString -> ClientParams +defaultParamsClient serverName serverId = + ClientParams + { clientUseMaxFragmentLength = Nothing + , clientServerIdentification = (serverName, serverId) + , clientUseServerNameIndication = True + , clientWantSessionResume = Nothing + , clientWantSessionResumeList = [] + , clientWantTicket = True + , clientShared = def + , clientHooks = def + , clientSupported = def + , clientDebug = defaultDebugParams + , clientUseEarlyData = False + , clientUseECH = False + } + +data ServerParams = ServerParams + { serverWantClientCert :: Bool + -- ^ Request a certificate from client. + -- + -- Default: 'False' + , serverCACertificates :: [SignedCertificate] + -- ^ This is a list of certificates from which the disinguished + -- names are sent in certificate request messages. For TLS1.0, it + -- should not be empty. + -- + -- Default: '[]' + , serverDHEParams :: Maybe DHParams + -- ^ Server Optional Diffie Hellman parameters. Setting + -- parameters is necessary for FFDHE key exchange when clients are + -- not compatible with RFC 7919. + -- + -- Value can be one of the standardized groups from module + -- "Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE" or custom parameters generated with + -- 'Crypto.PubKey.DH.generateParams'. + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , serverHooks :: ServerHooks + -- ^ See the default value of 'ServerHooks'. + , serverShared :: Shared + -- ^ See the default value of 'Shared'. + , serverSupported :: Supported + -- ^ See the default value of 'Supported'. + , serverDebug :: DebugParams + -- ^ See the default value of 'DebugParams'. + , serverEarlyDataSize :: Int + -- ^ Server accepts this size of early data in TLS 1.3. 0 (or + -- lower) means that the server does not accept early data. + -- + -- Default: 0 + , serverTicketLifetime :: Int + -- ^ Lifetime in seconds for session tickets generated by the + -- server. Acceptable value range is 0 to 604800 (7 days). + -- + -- Default: 7200 (2 hours) + , serverECHKey :: [(ConfigId, ByteString)] + -- ^ ECH secret keys. + -- + -- Default: '[]' + -- + -- @since 2.1.9 + } + deriving (Show) + +defaultParamsServer :: ServerParams +defaultParamsServer = + ServerParams + { serverWantClientCert = False + , serverCACertificates = [] + , serverDHEParams = Nothing + , serverHooks = def + , serverShared = def + , serverSupported = def + , serverDebug = defaultDebugParams + , serverEarlyDataSize = 0 + , serverTicketLifetime = 7200 + , serverECHKey = [] + } + +instance Default ServerParams where + def = defaultParamsServer + +-- | List all the supported algorithms, versions, ciphers, etc supported. +data Supported = Supported + { supportedVersions :: [Version] + -- ^ Supported versions by this context. On the client side, the + -- highest version will be used to establish the connection. On + -- the server side, the highest version that is less or equal than + -- the client version will be chosen. + -- + -- Versions should be listed in preferred order, i.e. higher + -- versions first. + -- + -- Default: @[TLS13,TLS12]@ + , supportedCiphers :: [Cipher] + -- ^ Supported cipher methods. The default is empty, specify a + -- suitable cipher list. + -- 'Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher.ciphersuite_default' is often a good + -- choice. + -- + -- Default: @[]@ + , supportedCompressions :: [Compression] + -- ^ Supported compressions methods. By default only the "null" + -- compression is supported, which means no compression will be + -- performed. Allowing other compression method is not advised as + -- it causes a connection failure when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. + -- + -- Default: @[nullCompression]@ + , supportedHashSignatures :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + -- ^ All supported hash/signature algorithms pair for client + -- certificate verification and server signature in (EC)DHE, + -- ordered by decreasing priority. + -- + -- This list is sent to the peer as part of the + -- "signature_algorithms" extension. It is used to restrict + -- accepted signatures received from the peer at TLS level (not in + -- X.509 certificates), but only when the TLS version is 1.2 or + -- above. In order to disable SHA-1 one must then also disable + -- earlier protocol versions in 'supportedVersions'. + -- + -- The list also impacts the selection of possible algorithms when + -- generating signatures. + -- + -- Note: with TLS 1.3 some algorithms have been deprecated and + -- will not be used even when listed in the parameter: MD5, SHA-1, + -- SHA-224, RSA PKCS#1, DSA. + -- + -- Default: + -- + -- @ + -- [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) + -- , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA384, SignatureECDSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) + -- , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) + -- , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) + -- , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) + -- , (Struct.HashSHA1, SignatureDSA) + -- ] + -- @ + , supportedSecureRenegotiation :: Bool + -- ^ Secure renegotiation defined in RFC5746. If 'True', clients + -- send the renegotiation_info extension. If 'True', servers + -- handle the extension or the renegotiation SCSV then send the + -- renegotiation_info extension. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation :: Bool + -- ^ If 'True', renegotiation is allowed from the client side. + -- This is vulnerable to DOS attacks. If 'False', renegotiation + -- is allowed only from the server side via HelloRequest. + -- + -- Default: 'False' + , supportedExtendedMainSecret :: EMSMode + -- ^ The mode regarding extended main secret. Enabling this + -- extension provides better security for TLS versions 1.2. TLS + -- 1.3 provides the security properties natively and does not need + -- the extension. + -- + -- By default the extension is 'RequireEMS'. So, the handshake + -- will fail when the peer does not support the extension. + -- + -- Default: 'RequireEMS' + , supportedSession :: Bool + -- ^ Set if we support session. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + , supportedFallbackScsv :: Bool + -- ^ Support for fallback SCSV defined in RFC7507. If 'True', + -- servers reject handshakes which suggest a lower protocol than + -- the highest protocol supported. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + , supportedEmptyPacket :: Bool + -- ^ In ver <= TLS1.0, block ciphers using CBC are using CBC + -- residue as IV, which can be guessed by an attacker. Hence, an + -- empty packet is normally sent before a normal data packet, to + -- prevent guessability. Some Microsoft TLS-based protocol + -- implementations, however, consider these empty packets as a + -- protocol violation and disconnect. If this parameter is + -- 'False', empty packets will never be added, which is less + -- secure, but might help in rare cases. + -- + -- Default: 'True' + , supportedHPKE :: [(KEM_ID, KDF_ID, AEAD_ID)] + -- ^ Client only. + -- + -- @since 2.1.9 + , supportedGroups :: [Group] + -- ^ A list of supported elliptic curves and finite-field groups + -- in preferred order. + -- + -- * TLS 1.3 client: this list is used as the 1st argument to + -- 'onSelectKeyShareGroups' to select groups in "key_share". + -- This list is also used as values of "supported_groups". + -- * TLS 1.3 server: this list is not used. + -- * TLS 1.2 client: this list is also used as values of + -- "supported_groups". + -- * TLS 1.2 server: this list is used to select a key exchange + -- mechanism. + -- + -- The list is sent to the server as part of the + -- "supported_groups" extension. It is used in both clients and + -- servers to restrict accepted groups in DH key exchange. Up + -- until TLS v1.2, it is also used by a client to restrict + -- accepted elliptic curves in ECDSA signatures. + -- + -- The default value includes all groups with security strength + -- of 128 bits or more. + -- + -- Default: @[X25519,P256,P384,X448,P521,FFDHE3072,FFDHE4096,FFDHE6144,FFDHE8192,X25519MLKEM768,P256MLKEM768,P384MLKEM1024,MLKEM768,MLKEM1024]@ + , supportedGroupsTLS13 :: [[Group]] + -- ^ The inside @[Group]@ is the list of @Group@ at the same level + -- in preferred order. The inside @[Group]@s are also listed in + -- preferred order. + -- + -- TLS 1.3 server: this is used as the 1st argument to + -- 'onSelectKeyShare'. + -- + -- Default: @[[X25519MLKEM768,P256MLKEM768,P384MLKEM1024],[X25519,P256],[P384,X448,P521],[FFDHE2048,FFDHE3072,FFDHE4096,FFDHE6144,FFDHE8192],[MLKEM768,MLKEM1024]]@ + -- + -- @since 2.2.3 + } + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Client or server policy regarding Extended Main Secret +data EMSMode + = -- | Extended Main Secret is not used + NoEMS + | -- | Extended Main Secret is allowed + AllowEMS + | -- | Extended Main Secret is required + RequireEMS + deriving (Show, Eq) + +defaultHPKE :: [(KEM_ID, KDF_ID, AEAD_ID)] +defaultHPKE = + [ (DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, AES_128_GCM) + , (DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, ChaCha20Poly1305) + , (DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, AES_128_GCM) + , (DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA512, AES_128_GCM) + , (DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256, HKDF_SHA256, ChaCha20Poly1305) + , (DHKEM_P521_HKDF_SHA512, HKDF_SHA512, AES_256_GCM) + ] + +defaultSupported :: Supported +defaultSupported = + Supported + { supportedVersions = [TLS13, TLS12] + , supportedCiphers = ciphersuite_default + , supportedCompressions = [nullCompression] + , supportedHashSignatures = Struct.supportedSignatureSchemes + , supportedSecureRenegotiation = True + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = False + , supportedExtendedMainSecret = RequireEMS + , supportedSession = True + , supportedFallbackScsv = True + , supportedEmptyPacket = True + , supportedHPKE = defaultHPKE + , supportedGroups = supportedNamedGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = supportedNamedGroupsTLS13 + } + +instance Default Supported where + def = defaultSupported + +-- | Parameters that are common to clients and servers. +data Shared = Shared + { sharedCredentials :: Credentials + -- ^ The list of certificates and private keys that a server will + -- use as part of authentication to clients. Actual credentials + -- that are used are selected dynamically from this list based on + -- client capabilities. Additional credentials returned by + -- 'onServerNameIndication' are also considered. + -- + -- When credential list is left empty (the default value), no key + -- exchange can take place. + -- + -- Default: 'mempty' + , sharedSessionManager :: SessionManager + -- ^ Callbacks used by clients and servers in order to resume TLS + -- sessions. The default implementation never resumes sessions. + -- Package + -- provides an in-memory implementation. + -- + -- Default: 'noSessionManager' + , sharedCAStore :: CertificateStore + -- ^ A collection of trust anchors to be used by a client as part + -- of validation of server certificates. This is set as first + -- argument to function 'onServerCertificate'. Package + -- gives access to a default certificate + -- store configured in the system. + -- + -- Default: 'mempty' + , sharedValidationCache :: ValidationCache + -- ^ Callbacks that may be used by a client to cache certificate + -- validation results (positive or negative) and avoid expensive + -- signature check. The default implementation does not have any + -- caching. + -- + -- See the default value of 'ValidationCache'. + , sharedHelloExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] + -- ^ Additional extensions to be sent during the Hello sequence. + -- + -- For a client this is always included in message ClientHello. + -- For a server, this is sent in messages ServerHello or + -- EncryptedExtensions based on the TLS version. + -- + -- Default: @[]@ + , sharedECHConfigList :: ECHConfigList + -- ^ ECH configuration. + -- + -- @since 2.1.9 + , sharedLimit :: Limit + -- ^ Limitation parameters. + -- + -- @since 2.1.8 + } + +instance Show Shared where + show _ = "Shared" +instance Default Shared where + def = defaultShared + +defaultShared :: Shared +defaultShared = + Shared + { sharedCredentials = mempty + , sharedSessionManager = noSessionManager + , sharedCAStore = mempty + , sharedValidationCache = def + , sharedHelloExtensions = [] + , sharedECHConfigList = [] + , sharedLimit = defaultLimit + } + +-- | Group usage callback possible return values. +data GroupUsage + = -- | usage of group accepted + GroupUsageValid + | -- | usage of group provides insufficient security + GroupUsageInsecure + | -- | usage of group rejected for other reason (specified as string) + GroupUsageUnsupported String + | -- | usage of group with an invalid public value + GroupUsageInvalidPublic + deriving (Show, Eq) + +defaultGroupUsage :: Int -> DHParams -> DHPublic -> IO GroupUsage +defaultGroupUsage minBits params public + | even $ dhParamsGetP params = + return $ GroupUsageUnsupported "invalid odd prime" + | not $ dhValid params (dhParamsGetG params) = + return $ GroupUsageUnsupported "invalid generator" + | not $ dhValid params (dhUnwrapPublic public) = + return GroupUsageInvalidPublic + -- To prevent Logjam attack + | dhParamsGetBits params < minBits = return GroupUsageInsecure + | otherwise = return GroupUsageValid + +-- | Type for 'onCertificateRequest'. This type synonym is to make +-- document readable. +type OnCertificateRequest = + ( [CertificateType] + , Maybe [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + , [DistinguishedName] + ) + -> IO (Maybe (CertificateChain, PrivKey)) + +-- | Type for 'onServerCertificate'. This type synonym is to make +-- document readable. +type OnServerCertificate = + CertificateStore + -> ValidationCache + -> ServiceID + -> CertificateChain + -> IO [FailedReason] + +-- | A set of callbacks run by the clients for various corners of TLS establishment +data ClientHooks = ClientHooks + { onCertificateRequest :: OnCertificateRequest + -- ^ This action is called when the a certificate request is + -- received from the server. The callback argument is the + -- information from the request. The server, at its discretion, + -- may be willing to continue the handshake without a client + -- certificate. Therefore, the callback is free to return + -- 'Nothing' to indicate that no client certificate should be + -- sent, despite the server's request. In some cases it may be + -- appropriate to get user consent before sending the certificate; + -- the content of the user's certificate may be sensitive and + -- intended only for specific servers. + -- + -- The action should select a certificate chain of one of the + -- given certificate types and one of the certificates in the + -- chain should (if possible) be signed by one of the given + -- distinguished names. Some servers, that don't have a narrow + -- set of preferred issuer CAs, will send an empty + -- 'DistinguishedName' list, rather than send all the names from + -- their trusted CA bundle. If the client does not have a + -- certificate chaining to a matching CA, it may choose a default + -- certificate instead. + -- + -- Each certificate except the last should be signed by the + -- following one. The returned private key must be for the first + -- certificates in the chain. This key will be used to signing + -- the certificate verify message. + -- + -- The public key in the first certificate, and the matching + -- returned private key must be compatible with one of the list of + -- 'HashAndSignatureAlgorithm' value when provided. TLS 1.3 + -- changes the meaning of the list elements, adding explicit code + -- points for each supported pair of hash and signature (public + -- key) algorithms, rather than combining separate codes for the + -- hash and key. For details see + -- + -- section 4.2.3. When no compatible certificate chain is + -- available, return 'Nothing' if it is OK to continue without a + -- client certificate. Returning a non-matching certificate + -- should result in a handshake failure. + -- + -- While the TLS version is not provided to the callback, the + -- content of the @signature_algorithms@ list provides a strong + -- hint, since TLS 1.3 servers will generally list RSA pairs with + -- a hash component of 'Intrinsic' (@0x08@). + -- + -- Note that is is the responsibility of this action to select a + -- certificate matching one of the requested certificate types + -- (public key algorithms). Returning a non-matching one will + -- lead to handshake failure later. + -- + -- Default: returns 'Nothing' anyway. + , onServerCertificate :: OnServerCertificate + -- ^ Used by the client to validate the server certificate. The + -- default implementation calls 'validateDefault' which validates + -- according to the default hooks and checks provided by + -- "Data.X509.Validation". This can be replaced with a custom + -- validation function using different settings. + -- + -- The function is not expected to verify the key-usage extension + -- of the end-entity certificate, as this depends on the + -- dynamically-selected cipher and this part should not be cached. + -- Key-usage verification is performed by the library internally. + -- + -- Default: 'validateDefault' + , onSuggestALPN :: IO (Maybe [ByteString]) + -- ^ This action is called when the client sends ClientHello + -- to determine ALPN values such as '["h2", "http/1.1"]'. + -- + -- Default: returns 'Nothing' + , onCustomFFDHEGroup :: DHParams -> DHPublic -> IO GroupUsage + -- ^ This action is called to validate DHE parameters when the + -- server selected a finite-field group not part of the + -- "Supported Groups Registry" or not part of 'supportedGroups' + -- list. + -- + -- With TLS 1.3 custom groups have been removed from the + -- protocol, so this callback is only used when the version + -- negotiated is 1.2 or below. + -- + -- The default behavior with (dh_p, dh_g, dh_size) and pub as + -- follows: + -- + -- (1) rejecting if dh_p is even + -- (2) rejecting unless 1 < dh_g && dh_g < dh_p - 1 + -- (3) rejecting unless 1 < dh_p && pub < dh_p - 1 + -- (4) rejecting if dh_size < 1024 (to prevent Logjam attack) + -- + -- See RFC 7919 section 3.1 for recommendations. + , onServerFinished :: Information -> IO () + -- ^ When a handshake is done, this hook can check `Information`. + , onSelectKeyShareGroups :: [Group] -> [Group] + -- ^ A function to select groups in "key_share" by TLS 1.3 client. + -- + -- Client's 'supportedGroups' is passed as the 1st argument. + -- + -- The default function specifies a pair of hybrid (classical + + -- post quantum) group and classical group to transit from + -- classical key exchange to hybrid key exchange. With the + -- default value of 'supportedGroups', X25519MLKEM and X25519 + -- are chosen. + -- + -- Middleboxes may drop a ClientHello that contains large + -- X2219MLKEM. In such environment, @take 1@, which selects + -- X22519 only with the default value, is maybe a good + -- candidate. + -- + -- In the case where X22519 is only contained in "key_share", a + -- wise-server without nasty middleboxes may ask the client to + -- send X2219MLKEM via HelloRetryRequest as X2219MLKEM is + -- specified in "supported_groups". + -- + -- @since 2.2.3 + } + +defaultOnSelectKeyShareGroups :: [Group] -> [Group] +defaultOnSelectKeyShareGroups groups = take 1 hs ++ take 1 es + where + (hs, es) = partition isHybrid groups + +isHybrid :: Group -> Bool +isHybrid X25519MLKEM768 = True +isHybrid P256MLKEM768 = True +isHybrid P384MLKEM1024 = True +isHybrid _ = False + +defaultClientHooks :: ClientHooks +defaultClientHooks = + ClientHooks + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return Nothing + , onServerCertificate = validateDefault + , onSuggestALPN = return Nothing + , onCustomFFDHEGroup = defaultGroupUsage 1024 + , onServerFinished = \_ -> return () + , onSelectKeyShareGroups = defaultOnSelectKeyShareGroups + } + +instance Show ClientHooks where + show _ = "ClientHooks" +instance Default ClientHooks where + def = defaultClientHooks + +-- | A set of callbacks run by the server for various corners of the TLS establishment +data ServerHooks = ServerHooks + { onClientCertificate :: CertificateChain -> IO CertificateUsage + -- ^ This action is called when a client certificate chain is + -- received from the client. When it returns a + -- CertificateUsageReject value, the handshake is aborted. + -- + -- The function is not expected to verify the key-usage extension + -- of the certificate. This verification is performed by the + -- library internally. + -- + -- Default: returns the following: + -- + -- @ + -- CertificateUsageReject (CertificateRejectOther "no client certificates expected") + -- @ + , onUnverifiedClientCert :: IO Bool + -- ^ This action is called when the client certificate cannot be + -- verified. Return 'True' to accept the certificate anyway, or + -- 'False' to fail verification. + -- + -- Default: returns 'False' + , onCipherChoosing :: Version -> [Cipher] -> Cipher + -- ^ Allow the server to choose the cipher relative to the the + -- client version and the client list of ciphers. + -- + -- This could be useful with old clients and as a workaround to + -- the BEAST (where RC4 is sometimes preferred with TLS < 1.1) + -- + -- The client cipher list cannot be empty. + -- + -- Default: taking the head of ciphers. + , onServerNameIndication :: Maybe HostName -> IO Credentials + -- ^ Allow the server to indicate additional credentials to be + -- used depending on the host name indicated by the client. + -- + -- This is most useful for transparent proxies where credentials + -- must be generated on the fly according to the host the client + -- is trying to connect to. + -- + -- Returned credentials may be ignored if a client does not + -- support the signature algorithms used in the certificate chain. + -- + -- Default: returns 'mempty' + , onNewHandshake :: Measurement -> IO Bool + -- ^ At each new handshake, we call this hook to see if we allow + -- handshake to happens. + -- + -- Default: returns 'True' + , onALPNClientSuggest :: Maybe ([ByteString] -> IO ByteString) + -- ^ Allow the server to choose an application layer protocol + -- suggested from the client through the ALPN (Application Layer + -- Protocol Negotiation) extensions. If the server supports no + -- protocols that the client advertises an empty 'ByteString' + -- should be returned. + -- + -- Default: 'Nothing' + , onEncryptedExtensionsCreating :: [ExtensionRaw] -> IO [ExtensionRaw] + -- ^ Allow to modify extensions to be sent in EncryptedExtensions + -- of TLS 1.3. + -- + -- Default: 'return' + , onSelectKeyShare + :: [[Group]] + -> [Group] + -> [Group] + -> IO (Maybe Group, Bool) + -- ^ A function to select one key share by TLS 1.3 server. + -- + -- The 1st argument is server's 'supportedGroupsTLS13'. + -- The 2nd arguments is client's groups in "supported_groups" + -- The 3rd arguments is client's groups in "key_share". + -- + -- 'True' in the result indicates sending a hello retry request + -- with this group. + -- + -- The default function targets @[Group]@ in the first argument in + -- order. If there is a common group among the "key_share" + -- groups, it will use that group for key exchange. + -- Alternatively, if there is a common group among the + -- "supported_groups" groups, it will instruct to send the + -- HelloRetryRequest using that group. Otherwise, it will check + -- the next @[Group]@. + -- + -- @since 2.2.3 + } + +-- | Default value for 'ServerHooks' +defaultServerHooks :: ServerHooks +defaultServerHooks = + ServerHooks + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> + return $ + CertificateUsageReject $ + CertificateRejectOther "no client certificates expected" + , onUnverifiedClientCert = return False + , onCipherChoosing = \_ ccs -> case ccs of + [] -> error "onCipherChoosing" + c : _ -> c + , onServerNameIndication = \_ -> return mempty + , onNewHandshake = \_ -> return True + , onALPNClientSuggest = Nothing + , onEncryptedExtensionsCreating = return + , onSelectKeyShare = defaultOnSelectKeyShare + } + +instance Show ServerHooks where + show _ = "ServerHooks" +instance Default ServerHooks where + def = defaultServerHooks + +defaultOnSelectKeyShare + :: [[Group]] -- Server groups + -> [Group] -- Client's groups in "supported_groups" + -> [Group] -- Client's groups in "key_share" + -> IO (Maybe Group, Bool) +defaultOnSelectKeyShare serverSupportedLoL clientSupportedGroups clientKeyShareGroups = go serverSupportedLoL + where + go [] = return (Nothing, False) + go (gs : gss) = case gs `intersect` clientKeyShareGroups of + [] -> case gs `intersect` clientSupportedGroups of + [] -> go gss + h : _ -> return (Just h, True) + g : _ -> return (Just g, False) + +-- | Information related to a running context, e.g. current cipher +data Information = Information + { infoVersion :: Version + , infoCipher :: Cipher + , infoCompression :: Compression + , infoMainSecret :: Maybe ByteString + , infoExtendedMainSecret :: Bool + , infoClientRandom :: Maybe ClientRandom + , infoServerRandom :: Maybe ServerRandom + , infoSupportedGroup :: Maybe Group + , infoTLS12Resumption :: Bool + , infoTLS13HandshakeMode :: Maybe HandshakeMode13 + , infoIsEarlyDataAccepted :: Bool + , infoIsECHAccepted :: Bool + } + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Limitations for security. +-- +-- @since 2.1.7 +data Limit = Limit + { limitRecordSize :: Maybe Int + -- ^ Record size limit defined in RFC 8449. + -- + -- If 'Nothing', the "record_size_limit" extension is not used. + -- + -- In the case of 'Just': A client sends the "record_size_limit" + -- extension with this value to the server. A server sends back + -- this extension with its own value if a client sends the + -- extension. When negotiated, both my limit and peer's limit are + -- enabled for protected communication. + -- + -- Default: Nothing + , limitHandshakeFragment :: Int + -- ^ The limit to accept the number of each handshake message. + -- For instance, a nasty client may send many fragments of client + -- certificate. + -- + -- Default: 32 + } + deriving (Eq, Show) + +-- | Default value for 'Limit'. +defaultLimit :: Limit +defaultLimit = + Limit + { limitRecordSize = Nothing + , limitHandshakeFragment = 32 + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs b/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/PostHandshake.hs @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +module Network.TLS.PostHandshake ( + requestCertificate, + requestCertificateServer, + postHandshakeAuthWith, + postHandshakeAuthClientWith, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Client +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Server +import Network.TLS.IO +import Network.TLS.Struct13 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Post-handshake certificate request with TLS 1.3. Returns 'False' +-- if the request was impossible, i.e. the remote client supports +-- post-handshake authentication or the connection is established in +-- TLS 1.2. Returns 'True' if the client authentication succeeds. An +-- exception is thrown if the authentication fails. Server only. +requestCertificate :: Context -> IO Bool +requestCertificate ctx = + checkValid ctx >> doRequestCertificate_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx + +-- | Handle a post-handshake authentication flight with TLS 1.3. This +-- is called automatically by 'recvData', in a context where the read +-- lock is already taken. Client only. +postHandshakeAuthWith :: Context -> Handshake13 -> IO () +postHandshakeAuthWith ctx hs = + withWriteLock ctx $ + handleException ctx $ + doPostHandshakeAuthWith_ (ctxRoleParams ctx) ctx hs diff --git a/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs b/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/QUIC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +-- | +-- API to run the TLS handshake establishing a QUIC connection. +-- +-- On the northbound API: +-- +-- * QUIC starts a TLS client or server thread with 'tlsQUICClient' or +-- 'tlsQUICServer'. +-- +-- TLS invokes QUIC callbacks to use the QUIC transport +-- +-- * TLS uses 'quicSend' and 'quicRecv' to send and receive handshake message +-- fragments. +-- +-- * TLS calls 'quicInstallKeys' to provide to QUIC the traffic secrets it +-- should use for encryption/decryption. +-- +-- * TLS calls 'quicNotifyExtensions' to notify to QUIC the transport parameters +-- exchanged through the handshake protocol. +-- +-- * TLS calls 'quicDone' when the handshake is done. +module Network.TLS.QUIC ( + -- * Handshakers + tlsQUICClient, + tlsQUICServer, + + -- * Callback + QUICCallbacks (..), + CryptLevel (..), + KeyScheduleEvent (..), + + -- * Secrets + EarlySecretInfo (..), + HandshakeSecretInfo (..), + ApplicationSecretInfo (..), + EarlySecret, + HandshakeSecret, + ApplicationSecret, + TrafficSecrets, + ServerTrafficSecret (..), + ClientTrafficSecret (..), + + -- * Negotiated parameters + NegotiatedProtocol, + HandshakeMode13 (..), + + -- * Extensions + ExtensionRaw (..), + ExtensionID (ExtensionID, EID_QuicTransportParameters), + + -- * Errors + errorTLS, + errorToAlertDescription, + errorToAlertMessage, + fromAlertDescription, + toAlertDescription, + + -- * Hash + hkdfExpandLabel, + hkdfExtract, + hashDigestSize, + + -- * Constants + quicMaxEarlyDataSize, + + -- * Supported + defaultSupported, +) where + +import Data.Default (def) + +import Network.TLS.Backend +import Network.TLS.Context +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Core +import Network.TLS.Crypto (hashDigestSize) +import Network.TLS.Crypto.Types +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Common +import Network.TLS.Handshake.Control +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State +import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.KeySchedule (hkdfExpandLabel, hkdfExtract) +import Network.TLS.Parameters hiding (defaultSupported) +import Network.TLS.Record.Layer +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +nullBackend :: Backend +nullBackend = + Backend + { backendFlush = return () + , backendClose = return () + , backendSend = \_ -> return () + , backendRecv = \_ -> return "" + } + +-- | Argument given to 'quicInstallKeys' when encryption material is available. +data KeyScheduleEvent + = -- | Key material and parameters for traffic at 0-RTT level + InstallEarlyKeys (Maybe EarlySecretInfo) + | -- | Key material and parameters for traffic at handshake level + InstallHandshakeKeys HandshakeSecretInfo + | -- | Key material and parameters for traffic at application level + InstallApplicationKeys ApplicationSecretInfo + +-- | Callbacks implemented by QUIC and to be called by TLS at specific points +-- during the handshake. TLS may invoke them from external threads but calls +-- are not concurrent. Only a single callback function is called at a given +-- point in time. +data QUICCallbacks = QUICCallbacks + { quicSend :: [(CryptLevel, ByteString)] -> IO () + -- ^ Called by TLS so that QUIC sends one or more handshake fragments. The + -- content transiting on this API is the plaintext of the fragments and + -- QUIC responsibility is to encrypt this payload with the key material + -- given for the specified level and an appropriate encryption scheme. + -- + -- The size of the fragments may exceed QUIC datagram limits so QUIC may + -- break them into smaller fragments. + -- + -- The handshake protocol sometimes combines content at two levels in a + -- single flight. The TLS library does its best to provide this in the + -- same @quicSend@ call and with a multi-valued argument. QUIC can then + -- decide how to transmit this optimally. + , quicRecv :: CryptLevel -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString) + -- ^ Called by TLS to receive from QUIC the next plaintext handshake + -- fragment. The argument specifies with which encryption level the + -- fragment should be decrypted. + -- + -- QUIC may return partial fragments to TLS. TLS will then call + -- @quicRecv@ again as long as necessary. Note however that fragments + -- must be returned in the correct sequence, i.e. the order the TLS peer + -- emitted them. + -- + -- The function may return an error to TLS if end of stream is reached or + -- if a protocol error has been received, believing the handshake cannot + -- proceed any longer. If the TLS handshake protocol cannot recover from + -- this error, the failure condition will be reported back to QUIC through + -- the control interface. + , quicInstallKeys :: Context -> KeyScheduleEvent -> IO () + -- ^ Called by TLS when new encryption material is ready to be used in the + -- handshake. The next 'quicSend' or 'quicRecv' may now use the + -- associated encryption level (although the previous level is also + -- possible: directions Send/Recv do not change at the same time). + , quicNotifyExtensions :: Context -> [ExtensionRaw] -> IO () + -- ^ Called by TLS when QUIC-specific extensions have been received from + -- the peer. + , quicDone :: Context -> IO () + -- ^ Called when 'handshake' is done. 'tlsQUICServer' is + -- finished after calling this hook. 'tlsQUICClient' calls + -- 'recvData' after calling this hook to wait for new session + -- tickets. + } + +newRecordLayer + :: QUICCallbacks + -> RecordLayer [(CryptLevel, ByteString)] +newRecordLayer callbacks = newTransparentRecordLayer get send recv + where + get = getTxLevel + send = quicSend callbacks + recv ctx = getRxLevel ctx >>= quicRecv callbacks + +-- | Start a TLS handshake thread for a QUIC client. The client will use the +-- specified TLS parameters and call the provided callback functions to send and +-- receive handshake data. +tlsQUICClient :: ClientParams -> QUICCallbacks -> IO () +tlsQUICClient cparams callbacks = do + ctx0 <- contextNew nullBackend cparams + mylimref <- newRecordLimitRef Nothing + peerlimref <- newRecordLimitRef Nothing + let ctx1 = + ctx0 + { ctxHandshakeSync = HandshakeSync sync (\_ _ -> return ()) + , ctxMyRecordLimit = mylimref + , ctxPeerRecordLimit = peerlimref + , ctxQUICMode = True + } + rl = newRecordLayer callbacks + ctx2 = updateRecordLayer rl ctx1 + handshake ctx2 + quicDone callbacks ctx2 + void $ recvData ctx2 -- waiting for new session tickets + where + sync ctx (SendClientHello mEarlySecInfo) = + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallEarlyKeys mEarlySecInfo) + sync ctx (RecvServerHello handSecInfo) = + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallHandshakeKeys handSecInfo) + sync ctx (SendClientFinished exts appSecInfo) = do + let qexts = filterQTP exts + when (null qexts) $ do + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are missing" MissingExtension + quicNotifyExtensions callbacks ctx qexts + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallApplicationKeys appSecInfo) + +-- | Start a TLS handshake thread for a QUIC server. The server will use the +-- specified TLS parameters and call the provided callback functions to send and +-- receive handshake data. +tlsQUICServer :: ServerParams -> QUICCallbacks -> IO () +tlsQUICServer sparams callbacks = do + ctx0 <- contextNew nullBackend sparams + mylimref <- newRecordLimitRef Nothing + peerlimref <- newRecordLimitRef Nothing + let ctx1 = + ctx0 + { ctxHandshakeSync = HandshakeSync (\_ _ -> return ()) sync + , ctxMyRecordLimit = mylimref + , ctxPeerRecordLimit = peerlimref + , ctxQUICMode = True + } + rl = newRecordLayer callbacks + ctx2 = updateRecordLayer rl ctx1 + handshake ctx2 + quicDone callbacks ctx2 + where + sync ctx (SendServerHello exts mEarlySecInfo handSecInfo) = do + let qexts = filterQTP exts + when (null qexts) $ do + throwCore $ + Error_Protocol "QUIC transport parameters are missing" MissingExtension + quicNotifyExtensions callbacks ctx qexts + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallEarlyKeys mEarlySecInfo) + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallHandshakeKeys handSecInfo) + sync ctx (SendServerFinished appSecInfo) = + quicInstallKeys callbacks ctx (InstallApplicationKeys appSecInfo) + +filterQTP :: [ExtensionRaw] -> [ExtensionRaw] +filterQTP = + filter + (\(ExtensionRaw eid _) -> eid == EID_QuicTransportParameters) + +-- | Can be used by callbacks to signal an unexpected condition. This will then +-- generate an "internal_error" alert in the TLS stack. +errorTLS :: String -> IO a +errorTLS msg = throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg InternalError + +-- | Return the alert that a TLS endpoint would send to the peer for the +-- specified library error. +errorToAlertDescription :: TLSError -> AlertDescription +errorToAlertDescription = snd . errorToAlert + +-- | Decode an alert from the assigned value. +toAlertDescription :: Word8 -> AlertDescription +toAlertDescription = AlertDescription + +defaultSupported :: Supported +defaultSupported = + def + { supportedVersions = [TLS13] + , supportedCiphers = + [ cipher13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + ] + , supportedGroups = [X25519, X448, P256, P384, P521] + } + +-- | Max early data size for QUIC. +quicMaxEarlyDataSize :: Int +quicMaxEarlyDataSize = 0xffffffff diff --git a/Network/TLS/RNG.hs b/Network/TLS/RNG.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/RNG.hs @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} + +module Network.TLS.RNG ( + StateRNG (..), + Seed, + seedNew, + seedToInteger, + seedFromInteger, + withTLSRNG, + newStateRNG, + MonadRandom, + getRandomBytes, +) where + +import Crypto.Random + +newtype StateRNG = StateRNG ChaChaDRG + deriving (DRG) + +instance Show StateRNG where + show _ = "rng[..]" + +withTLSRNG + :: StateRNG + -> MonadPseudoRandom StateRNG a + -> (a, StateRNG) +withTLSRNG rng f = withDRG rng f + +newStateRNG :: Seed -> StateRNG +newStateRNG seed = StateRNG $ drgNewSeed seed diff --git a/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs b/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Receiving --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the Receiving module contains calls related to unmarshalling packets according --- to the TLS state --- -module Network.TLS.Receiving (processHandshake, processPacket, processServerHello) where - -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad.State -import Control.Monad.Error - -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B - -import Network.TLS.Util -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Record -import Network.TLS.Packet -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Crypto -import Data.Certificate.X509 - -returnEither :: Either TLSError a -> TLSSt a -returnEither (Left err) = throwError err -returnEither (Right a) = return a - -processPacket :: Record Plaintext -> TLSSt Packet - -processPacket (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ AppData $ fragmentGetBytes fragment - -processPacket (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return . Alert =<< returnEither (decodeAlerts $ fragmentGetBytes fragment) - -processPacket (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = do - returnEither $ decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment - switchRxEncryption - return ChangeCipherSpec - -processPacket (Record ProtocolType_Handshake ver fragment) = do - keyxchg <- getCipherKeyExchangeType - let currentparams = CurrentParams - { cParamsVersion = ver - , cParamsKeyXchgType = maybe CipherKeyExchange_RSA id $ keyxchg - } - handshakes <- returnEither (decodeHandshakes $ fragmentGetBytes fragment) - hss <- forM handshakes $ \(ty, content) -> do - case decodeHandshake currentparams ty content of - Left err -> throwError err - Right hs -> return hs - return $ Handshake hss - -processHandshake :: Handshake -> TLSSt () -processHandshake hs = do - clientmode <- isClientContext - case hs of - ClientHello cver ran _ _ _ ex -> unless clientmode $ do - mapM_ processClientExtension ex - startHandshakeClient cver ran - Certificates certs -> when clientmode $ do processCertificates certs - ClientKeyXchg content -> unless clientmode $ do - processClientKeyXchg content - Finished fdata -> processClientFinished fdata - _ -> return () - when (finishHandshakeTypeMaterial $ typeOfHandshake hs) (updateHandshakeDigest $ encodeHandshake hs) - where - -- secure renegotiation - processClientExtension (0xff01, content) = do - v <- getVerifiedData True - let bs = encodeExtSecureRenegotiation v Nothing - when (bs /= content) $ throwError $ - Error_Protocol ("client verified data not matching: " ++ show v ++ ":" ++ show content, True, HandshakeFailure) - setSecureRenegotiation True - -- unknown extensions - processClientExtension _ = return () - -decryptRSA :: ByteString -> TLSSt (Either KxError ByteString) -decryptRSA econtent = do - ver <- stVersion <$> get - rsapriv <- fromJust "rsa private key" . hstRSAPrivateKey . fromJust "handshake" . stHandshake <$> get - return $ kxDecrypt rsapriv (if ver < TLS10 then econtent else B.drop 2 econtent) - -processServerHello :: Handshake -> TLSSt () -processServerHello (ServerHello sver ran _ _ _ ex) = do - -- FIXME notify the user to take action if the extension requested is missing - -- secreneg <- getSecureRenegotiation - -- when (secreneg && (isNothing $ lookup 0xff01 ex)) $ ... - mapM_ processServerExtension ex - setServerRandom ran - setVersion sver - where - processServerExtension (0xff01, content) = do - cv <- getVerifiedData True - sv <- getVerifiedData False - let bs = encodeExtSecureRenegotiation cv (Just sv) - when (bs /= content) $ throwError $ Error_Protocol ("server secure renegotiation data not matching", True, HandshakeFailure) - return () - - processServerExtension _ = return () -processServerHello _ = error "processServerHello called on wrong type" - --- process the client key exchange message. the protocol expects the initial --- client version received in ClientHello, not the negotiated version. --- in case the version mismatch, generate a random master secret -processClientKeyXchg :: ByteString -> TLSSt () -processClientKeyXchg encryptedPremaster = do - expectedVer <- hstClientVersion . fromJust "handshake" . stHandshake <$> get - random <- genTLSRandom 48 - ePremaster <- decryptRSA encryptedPremaster - case ePremaster of - Left _ -> setMasterSecretFromPre random - Right premaster -> case decodePreMasterSecret premaster of - Left _ -> setMasterSecretFromPre random - Right (ver, _) - | ver /= expectedVer -> setMasterSecretFromPre random - | otherwise -> setMasterSecretFromPre premaster - -processClientFinished :: FinishedData -> TLSSt () -processClientFinished fdata = do - cc <- stClientContext <$> get - expected <- getHandshakeDigest (not cc) - when (expected /= fdata) $ do - throwError $ Error_Protocol("bad record mac", True, BadRecordMac) - updateVerifiedData False fdata - return () - -processCertificates :: [X509] -> TLSSt () -processCertificates certs = do - let (X509 mainCert _ _ _ _) = head certs - case certPubKey mainCert of - PubKeyRSA pubkey -> setPublicKey (PubRSA pubkey) - _ -> return () diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record.hs b/Network/TLS/Record.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Record.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Record.hs @@ -1,32 +1,36 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Record --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- The Record Protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments the --- data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the data, applies --- a MAC, encrypts, and transmits the result. Received data is --- decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then delivered to --- higher-level clients. --- -module Network.TLS.Record - ( Record(..) - , Fragment - , fragmentGetBytes - , fragmentPlaintext - , fragmentCiphertext - , recordToRaw - , rawToRecord - , recordToHeader - , Plaintext - , Compressed - , Ciphertext - , engageRecord - , disengageRecord - ) where +-- | The Record Protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments +-- the data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the data, +-- applies a MAC, encrypts, and transmits the result. Received data +-- is decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then +-- delivered to higher-level clients. +module Network.TLS.Record ( + Record (..), + -- * Fragment manipulation types + Fragment, + fragmentGetBytes, + fragmentPlaintext, + fragmentCiphertext, + recordToRaw, + rawToRecord, + recordToHeader, + Plaintext, + Ciphertext, + + -- * Encrypt and decrypt from the record layer + encryptRecord, + decryptRecord, + + -- * State tracking + RecordM, + runRecordM, + RecordState (..), + newRecordState, + getRecordVersion, + setRecordIV, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Record.Decrypt +import Network.TLS.Record.Encrypt +import Network.TLS.Record.State import Network.TLS.Record.Types -import Network.TLS.Record.Engage -import Network.TLS.Record.Disengage diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Decrypt.hs @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} + +module Network.TLS.Record.Decrypt ( + decryptRecord, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Crypto.Cipher.Types (AuthTag (..)) +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Record.Types +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Util +import Network.TLS.Wire + +decryptRecord :: Record Ciphertext -> Int -> RecordM (Record Plaintext) +decryptRecord record@(Record ct ver fragment) lim = do + st <- get + case stCipher st of + Nothing -> noDecryption + _ -> do + recOpts <- getRecordOptions + let mver = recordVersion recOpts + if recordTLS13 recOpts + then decryptData13 mver (fragmentGetBytes fragment) st + else onRecordFragment record $ fragmentUncipher $ \e -> + decryptData mver record e st lim + where + noDecryption = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentUncipher $ checkPlainLimit lim + decryptData13 mver e st = case ct of + ProtocolType_AppData -> do + inner <- decryptData mver record e st (lim + 1) + case unInnerPlaintext inner of + Left message -> throwError $ Error_Protocol message UnexpectedMessage + Right (ct', d) -> return $ Record ct' ver $ fragmentPlaintext d + ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec -> noDecryption + ProtocolType_Alert -> noDecryption + _ -> + throwError $ Error_Protocol "illegal plain text" UnexpectedMessage + +unInnerPlaintext :: ByteString -> Either String (ProtocolType, ByteString) +unInnerPlaintext inner = + case B.unsnoc dc of + Nothing -> Left $ unknownContentType13 (0 :: Word8) + Just (bytes, c) + | B.null bytes && ProtocolType c `elem` nonEmptyContentTypes -> + Left ("empty " ++ show (ProtocolType c) ++ " record disallowed") + | otherwise -> Right (ProtocolType c, bytes) + where + (dc, _pad) = B.spanEnd (== 0) inner + nonEmptyContentTypes = [ProtocolType_Handshake, ProtocolType_Alert] + unknownContentType13 c = "unknown TLS 1.3 content type: " ++ show c + +getCipherData :: Record a -> CipherData -> RecordM ByteString +getCipherData (Record pt ver _) cdata = do + -- check if the MAC is valid. + macValid <- case cipherDataMAC cdata of + Nothing -> return True + Just digest -> do + let new_hdr = Header pt ver (fromIntegral $ B.length $ cipherDataContent cdata) + expected_digest <- makeDigest new_hdr $ cipherDataContent cdata + return (expected_digest == digest) + + -- check if the padding is filled with the correct pattern if it exists + -- (before TLS10 this checks instead that the padding length is minimal) + paddingValid <- case cipherDataPadding cdata of + Nothing -> return True + Just (pad, _blksz) -> do + let b = B.length pad - 1 + return $ B.replicate (B.length pad) (fromIntegral b) == pad + + unless (macValid &&! paddingValid) $ + throwError $ + Error_Protocol "bad record mac Stream/Block" BadRecordMac + + return $ cipherDataContent cdata + +checkPlainLimit :: Int -> ByteString -> RecordM ByteString +checkPlainLimit lim plain + | len > lim = + throwError $ + Error_Protocol + ( "plaintext exceeding record size limit: " + ++ show len + ++ " > " + ++ show lim + ) + RecordOverflow + | otherwise = return plain + where + len = B.length plain + +decryptData + :: Version + -> Record Ciphertext + -> ByteString + -> RecordState + -> Int + -> RecordM ByteString +decryptData ver record econtent tst lim = + decryptOf (cstKey cst) >>= checkPlainLimit lim + where + cipher = fromJust $ stCipher tst + bulk = cipherBulk cipher + cst = stCryptState tst + macSize = hashDigestSize $ cipherHash cipher + blockSize = bulkBlockSize bulk + econtentLen = B.length econtent + + sanityCheckError = + throwError + (Error_Packet "encrypted content too small for encryption parameters") + + decryptOf :: BulkState -> RecordM ByteString + decryptOf (BulkStateBlock decryptF) = do + let minContent = bulkIVSize bulk + max (macSize + 1) blockSize + + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher + when + ((econtentLen `mod` blockSize) /= 0 || econtentLen < minContent) + sanityCheckError + + {- update IV -} + (iv, econtent') <- + get2o econtent (bulkIVSize bulk, econtentLen - bulkIVSize bulk) + let (content', iv') = decryptF iv econtent' + modify' $ \txs -> txs{stCryptState = cst{cstIV = iv'}} + + let paddinglength = fromIntegral (B.last content') + 1 + let contentlen = B.length content' - paddinglength - macSize + (content, mac, padding) <- get3i content' (contentlen, macSize, paddinglength) + getCipherData + record + CipherData + { cipherDataContent = content + , cipherDataMAC = Just mac + , cipherDataPadding = Just (padding, blockSize) + } + decryptOf (BulkStateStream (BulkStream decryptF)) = do + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher + when (econtentLen < macSize) sanityCheckError + + let (content', bulkStream') = decryptF econtent + {- update Ctx -} + let contentlen = B.length content' - macSize + (content, mac) <- get2i content' (contentlen, macSize) + modify' $ \txs -> txs{stCryptState = cst{cstKey = BulkStateStream bulkStream'}} + getCipherData + record + CipherData + { cipherDataContent = content + , cipherDataMAC = Just mac + , cipherDataPadding = Nothing + } + decryptOf (BulkStateAEAD decryptF) = do + let authTagLen = bulkAuthTagLen bulk + nonceExpLen = bulkExplicitIV bulk + cipherLen = econtentLen - authTagLen - nonceExpLen + + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher + when (econtentLen < (authTagLen + nonceExpLen)) sanityCheckError + + (enonce, econtent', authTag) <- + get3o econtent (nonceExpLen, cipherLen, authTagLen) + let encodedSeq = encodeWord64 $ msSequence $ stMacState tst + iv = cstIV (stCryptState tst) + ivlen = B.length iv + Header typ v _ = recordToHeader record + hdrLen = if ver >= TLS13 then econtentLen else cipherLen + hdr = Header typ v $ fromIntegral hdrLen + ad + | ver >= TLS13 = encodeHeader hdr + | otherwise = B.concat [encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr] + sqnc = B.replicate (ivlen - 8) 0 `B.append` encodedSeq + nonce + | nonceExpLen == 0 = BA.xor iv sqnc + | otherwise = iv `B.append` enonce + (content, authTag2) = decryptF nonce econtent' ad + + when (AuthTag (convert authTag) /= authTag2) $ + throwError $ + Error_Protocol "bad record mac on AEAD" BadRecordMac + + modify' incrRecordState + return content + decryptOf BulkStateUninitialized = + throwError $ Error_Protocol "decrypt state uninitialized" InternalError + + -- handling of outer format can report errors with Error_Packet + get3o s ls = + maybe (throwError $ Error_Packet "record bad format") return $ partition3 s ls + get2o s (d1, d2) = get3o s (d1, d2, 0) >>= \(r1, r2, _) -> return (r1, r2) + + -- all format errors related to decrypted content are reported + -- externally as integrity failures, i.e. BadRecordMac + get3i s ls = + maybe (throwError $ Error_Protocol "record bad format" BadRecordMac) return $ + partition3 s ls + get2i s (d1, d2) = get3i s (d1, d2, 0) >>= \(r1, r2, _) -> return (r1, r2) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,117 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Record.Disengage --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- Disengage a record from the Record layer. --- The record is decrypted, checked for integrity and then decompressed. --- -module Network.TLS.Record.Disengage - ( disengageRecord - ) where - -import Control.Monad.State -import Control.Monad.Error - -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Cap -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Record.Types -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Compression -import Network.TLS.Util -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B - -disengageRecord :: Record Ciphertext -> TLSSt (Record Plaintext) -disengageRecord = decryptRecord >=> uncompressRecord - -uncompressRecord :: Record Compressed -> TLSSt (Record Plaintext) -uncompressRecord record = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentUncompress $ \bytes -> - withCompression $ compressionInflate bytes - -decryptRecord :: Record Ciphertext -> TLSSt (Record Compressed) -decryptRecord record = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentUncipher $ \e -> do - st <- get - if stRxEncrypted st - then decryptData e >>= getCipherData record - else return e - -getCipherData :: Record a -> CipherData -> TLSSt ByteString -getCipherData (Record pt ver _) cdata = do - -- check if the MAC is valid. - macValid <- case cipherDataMAC cdata of - Nothing -> return True - Just digest -> do - let new_hdr = Header pt ver (fromIntegral $ B.length $ cipherDataContent cdata) - expected_digest <- makeDigest False new_hdr $ cipherDataContent cdata - return (expected_digest `bytesEq` digest) - - -- check if the padding is filled with the correct pattern if it exists - paddingValid <- case cipherDataPadding cdata of - Nothing -> return True - Just pad -> do - cver <- gets stVersion - let b = B.length pad - 1 - return (if cver < TLS10 then True else B.replicate (B.length pad) (fromIntegral b) `bytesEq` pad) - - unless (macValid &&! paddingValid) $ do - throwError $ Error_Protocol ("bad record mac", True, BadRecordMac) - - return $ cipherDataContent cdata - -decryptData :: Bytes -> TLSSt CipherData -decryptData econtent = do - st <- get - - let cipher = fromJust "cipher" $ stCipher st - let bulk = cipherBulk cipher - let cst = fromJust "rx crypt state" $ stRxCryptState st - let digestSize = hashSize $ cipherHash cipher - let writekey = cstKey cst - - case bulkF bulk of - BulkNoneF -> do - let contentlen = B.length econtent - digestSize - case partition3 econtent (contentlen, digestSize, 0) of - Nothing -> - throwError $ Error_Misc "partition3 failed" - Just (content, mac, _) -> - return $ CipherData - { cipherDataContent = content - , cipherDataMAC = Just mac - , cipherDataPadding = Nothing - } - BulkBlockF _ decryptF -> do - {- update IV -} - let (iv, econtent') = - if hasExplicitBlockIV $ stVersion st - then B.splitAt (bulkIVSize bulk) econtent - else (cstIV cst, econtent) - let newiv = fromJust "new iv" $ takelast (bulkBlockSize bulk) econtent' - put $ st { stRxCryptState = Just $ cst { cstIV = newiv } } - - let content' = decryptF writekey iv econtent' - let paddinglength = fromIntegral (B.last content') + 1 - let contentlen = B.length content' - paddinglength - digestSize - let (content, mac, padding) = fromJust "p3" $ partition3 content' (contentlen, digestSize, paddinglength) - return $ CipherData - { cipherDataContent = content - , cipherDataMAC = Just mac - , cipherDataPadding = Just padding - } - BulkStreamF initF _ decryptF -> do - let iv = cstIV cst - let (content', newiv) = decryptF (if iv /= B.empty then iv else initF writekey) econtent - {- update Ctx -} - let contentlen = B.length content' - digestSize - let (content, mac, _) = fromJust "p3" $ partition3 content' (contentlen, digestSize, 0) - put $ st { stRxCryptState = Just $ cst { cstIV = newiv } } - return $ CipherData - { cipherDataContent = content - , cipherDataMAC = Just mac - , cipherDataPadding = Nothing - } - diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Encrypt.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Encrypt.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Encrypt.hs @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} + +-- | +-- Engage a record into the Record layer. +-- The record is compressed, added some integrity field, then encrypted. +-- +-- Starting with TLS v1.3, only the "null" compression method is negotiated in +-- the handshake, so the compression step will be a no-op. Integrity and +-- encryption are performed using an AEAD cipher only. +module Network.TLS.Record.Encrypt ( + encryptRecord, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import Crypto.Cipher.Types (AuthTag (..)) +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Record.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire + +-- when Tx Encrypted is set, we pass the data through encryptContent, otherwise +-- we just return the compress payload directly as the ciphered one +-- +encryptRecord :: Record Plaintext -> RecordM (Record Ciphertext) +encryptRecord record@(Record ct ver fragment) = do + st <- get + case stCipher st of + Nothing -> noEncryption + _ -> do + recOpts <- getRecordOptions + if recordTLS13 recOpts + then encryptContent13 + else onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCipher (encryptContent False record) + where + noEncryption = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCipher return + encryptContent13 + | ct == ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec = noEncryption + | otherwise = do + let bytes = fragmentGetBytes fragment + fragment' = fragmentPlaintext $ innerPlaintext ct bytes + record' = Record ProtocolType_AppData ver fragment' + onRecordFragment record' $ fragmentCipher (encryptContent True record') + +innerPlaintext :: ProtocolType -> ByteString -> ByteString +innerPlaintext (ProtocolType c) bytes = runPut $ do + putBytes bytes + putWord8 c -- non zero! + -- fixme: zeros padding + +encryptContent :: Bool -> Record Plaintext -> ByteString -> RecordM ByteString +encryptContent tls13 record content = do + cst <- getCryptState + bulk <- getBulk + case cstKey cst of + BulkStateBlock encryptF -> do + digest <- makeDigest (recordToHeader record) content + let content' = B.concat [content, digest] + encryptBlock encryptF content' bulk + BulkStateStream encryptF -> do + digest <- makeDigest (recordToHeader record) content + let content' = B.concat [content, digest] + encryptStream encryptF content' + BulkStateAEAD encryptF -> + encryptAead tls13 bulk encryptF content record + BulkStateUninitialized -> + return content + +encryptBlock :: BulkBlock -> ByteString -> Bulk -> RecordM ByteString +encryptBlock encryptF content bulk = do + cst <- getCryptState + let blockSize = fromIntegral $ bulkBlockSize bulk + let msg_len = B.length content + let padding = + if blockSize > 0 + then + let padbyte = blockSize - (msg_len `mod` blockSize) + in let padbyte' = if padbyte == 0 then blockSize else padbyte + in B.replicate padbyte' (fromIntegral (padbyte' - 1)) + else B.empty + + let (e, _iv') = encryptF (cstIV cst) $ B.concat [content, padding] + + return $ B.concat [cstIV cst, e] + +encryptStream :: BulkStream -> ByteString -> RecordM ByteString +encryptStream (BulkStream encryptF) content = do + cst <- getCryptState + let (!e, !newBulkStream) = encryptF content + modify' $ \tstate -> tstate{stCryptState = cst{cstKey = BulkStateStream newBulkStream}} + return e + +encryptAead + :: Bool + -> Bulk + -> BulkAEAD + -> ByteString + -> Record Plaintext + -> RecordM ByteString +encryptAead tls13 bulk encryptF content record = do + let authTagLen = bulkAuthTagLen bulk + nonceExpLen = bulkExplicitIV bulk + cst <- getCryptState + encodedSeq <- encodeWord64 <$> getMacSequence + + let iv = cstIV cst + ivlen = B.length iv + Header typ v plainLen = recordToHeader record + hdrLen = if tls13 then plainLen + fromIntegral authTagLen else plainLen + hdr = Header typ v hdrLen + ad + | tls13 = encodeHeader hdr + | otherwise = B.concat [encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr] + sqnc = B.replicate (ivlen - 8) 0 `B.append` encodedSeq + nonce + | nonceExpLen == 0 = BA.xor iv sqnc + | otherwise = B.concat [iv, encodedSeq] + (e, AuthTag authtag) = encryptF nonce content ad + econtent + | nonceExpLen == 0 = e `B.append` convert authtag + | otherwise = B.concat [encodedSeq, e, convert authtag] + modify' incrRecordState + return econtent + +getCryptState :: RecordM CryptState +getCryptState = stCryptState <$> get diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Record.Engage --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- Engage a record into the Record layer. --- The record is compressed, added some integrity field, then encrypted. --- -module Network.TLS.Record.Engage - ( engageRecord - ) where - -import Control.Monad.State - -import Network.TLS.Cap -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Record.Types -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Compression -import Network.TLS.Util -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B - -engageRecord :: Record Plaintext -> TLSSt (Record Ciphertext) -engageRecord = compressRecord >=> encryptRecord - -compressRecord :: Record Plaintext -> TLSSt (Record Compressed) -compressRecord record = - onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCompress $ \bytes -> do - withCompression $ compressionDeflate bytes - -{- - - when Tx Encrypted is set, we pass the data through encryptContent, otherwise - - we just return the packet - -} -encryptRecord :: Record Compressed -> TLSSt (Record Ciphertext) -encryptRecord record = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCipher $ \bytes -> do - st <- get - if stTxEncrypted st - then encryptContent record bytes - else return bytes - -encryptContent :: Record Compressed -> ByteString -> TLSSt ByteString -encryptContent record content = do - digest <- makeDigest True (recordToHeader record) content - encryptData $ B.concat [content, digest] - -encryptData :: ByteString -> TLSSt ByteString -encryptData content = do - st <- get - - let cipher = fromJust "cipher" $ stCipher st - let bulk = cipherBulk cipher - let cst = fromJust "tx crypt state" $ stTxCryptState st - - let writekey = cstKey cst - - case bulkF bulk of - BulkNoneF -> return content - BulkBlockF encrypt _ -> do - let blockSize = fromIntegral $ bulkBlockSize bulk - let msg_len = B.length content - let padding = if blockSize > 0 - then - let padbyte = blockSize - (msg_len `mod` blockSize) in - let padbyte' = if padbyte == 0 then blockSize else padbyte in - B.replicate padbyte' (fromIntegral (padbyte' - 1)) - else - B.empty - - -- before TLS 1.1, the block cipher IV is made of the residual of the previous block. - iv <- if hasExplicitBlockIV $ stVersion st - then genTLSRandom (bulkIVSize bulk) - else return $ cstIV cst - let e = encrypt writekey iv (B.concat [ content, padding ]) - if hasExplicitBlockIV $ stVersion st - then return $ B.concat [iv,e] - else do - let newiv = fromJust "new iv" $ takelast (bulkIVSize bulk) e - put $ st { stTxCryptState = Just $ cst { cstIV = newiv } } - return e - BulkStreamF initF encryptF _ -> do - let iv = cstIV cst - let (e, newiv) = encryptF (if iv /= B.empty then iv else initF writekey) content - put $ st { stTxCryptState = Just $ cst { cstIV = newiv } } - return e - diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Layer.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Layer.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Layer.hs @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +module Network.TLS.Record.Layer ( + RecordLayer (..), + newTransparentRecordLayer, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Context +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.Struct + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +newTransparentRecordLayer + :: Eq ann + => (Context -> IO ann) + -> ([(ann, ByteString)] -> IO ()) + -> (Context -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString)) + -> RecordLayer [(ann, ByteString)] +newTransparentRecordLayer get send recv = + RecordLayer + { recordEncode12 = transparentEncodeRecord get + , recordEncode13 = transparentEncodeRecord get + , recordSendBytes = transparentSendBytes send + , recordRecv12 = transparentRecvRecord recv + , recordRecv13 = transparentRecvRecord recv + } + +transparentEncodeRecord + :: (Context -> IO ann) + -> Context + -> Record Plaintext + -> IO (Either TLSError [(ann, ByteString)]) +transparentEncodeRecord _ _ (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ _) = + return $ Right [] +transparentEncodeRecord _ _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ _) = + -- all alerts are silent and must be transported externally based on + -- TLS exceptions raised by the library + return $ Right [] +transparentEncodeRecord get ctx (Record _ _ frag) = + get ctx >>= \a -> return $ Right [(a, fragmentGetBytes frag)] + +transparentSendBytes + :: Eq ann + => ([(ann, ByteString)] -> IO ()) + -> Context + -> [(ann, ByteString)] + -> IO () +transparentSendBytes send _ input = + send + [ (a, bs) | (a, frgs) <- compress input, let bs = B.concat frgs, not (B.null bs) + ] + +transparentRecvRecord + :: (Context -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString)) + -> Context + -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) +transparentRecvRecord recv ctx = + fmap (Record ProtocolType_Handshake TLS12 . fragmentPlaintext) <$> recv ctx + +compress :: Eq ann => [(ann, val)] -> [(ann, [val])] +compress [] = [] +compress ((a, v) : xs) = + let (ys, zs) = span ((== a) . fst) xs + in (a, v : map snd ys) : compress zs diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Recv.hs @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +-- | TLS record layer in Rx direction +module Network.TLS.Record.Recv ( + recvRecord12, + recvRecord13, +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +getMyPlainLimit :: Context -> IO Int +getMyPlainLimit ctx = do + msiz <- getMyRecordLimit ctx + return $ case msiz of + Nothing -> defaultRecordSizeLimit + Just siz -> siz + +getRecord + :: Context + -> Header + -> ByteString + -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) +getRecord ctx header content = do + withLog ctx $ \logging -> loggingIORecv logging header content + lim <- getMyPlainLimit ctx + runRxRecordState ctx $ do + let erecord = rawToRecord header $ fragmentCiphertext content + decryptRecord erecord lim + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +exceedsTLSCiphertext :: Int -> Word16 -> Bool +exceedsTLSCiphertext overhead actual = + -- In TLS 1.3, overhead is included one more byte for content type. + fromIntegral actual > defaultRecordSizeLimit + overhead + +-- | recvRecord receive a full TLS record (header + data), from the other side. +-- +-- The record is disengaged from the record layer +recvRecord12 + :: Context + -- ^ TLS context + -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) +recvRecord12 ctx = + readExactBytes ctx 5 >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . decodeHeader) + where + recvLengthE = either (return . Left) recvLength + + recvLength header@(Header _ _ readlen) = do + -- RFC 5246 Section 7.2.2 + -- A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more + -- than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a + -- TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This + -- message is always fatal and should never be observed in + -- communication between proper implementations (except when + -- messages were corrupted in the network). + if exceedsTLSCiphertext 2048 readlen + then return $ Left maximumSizeExceeded + else + readExactBytes ctx (fromIntegral readlen) + >>= either (return . Left) (getRecord ctx header) + +recvRecord13 :: Context -> IO (Either TLSError (Record Plaintext)) +recvRecord13 ctx = readExactBytes ctx 5 >>= either (return . Left) (recvLengthE . decodeHeader) + where + recvLengthE = either (return . Left) recvLength + recvLength header@(Header _ _ readlen) = do + -- RFC 8446 Section 5.2: + -- An AEAD algorithm used in TLS 1.3 MUST NOT produce an + -- expansion greater than 255 octets. An endpoint that + -- receives a record from its peer with TLSCiphertext.length + -- larger than 2^14 + 256 octets MUST terminate the connection + -- with a "record_overflow" alert. This limit is derived from + -- the maximum TLSInnerPlaintext length of 2^14 octets + 1 + -- octet for ContentType + the maximum AEAD expansion of 255 + -- octets. + if exceedsTLSCiphertext 256 readlen + then return $ Left maximumSizeExceeded + else + readExactBytes ctx (fromIntegral readlen) + >>= either (return . Left) (getRecord ctx header) + +maximumSizeExceeded :: TLSError +maximumSizeExceeded = Error_Protocol "record exceeding maximum size" RecordOverflow + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +readExactBytes :: Context -> Int -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString) +readExactBytes ctx sz = do + hdrbs <- contextRecv ctx sz + if B.length hdrbs == sz + then return $ Right hdrbs + else do + setEOF ctx + return . Left $ + if B.null hdrbs + then Error_EOF + else + Error_Packet + ( "partial packet: expecting " + ++ show sz + ++ " bytes, got: " + ++ show (B.length hdrbs) + ) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Send.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Send.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Send.hs @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +-- | TLS record layer in Tx direction +module Network.TLS.Record.Send ( + encodeRecord12, + encodeRecord13, + sendBytes, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Context.Internal +import Network.TLS.Hooks +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Record +import Network.TLS.Struct + +encodeRecordM :: Record Plaintext -> RecordM ByteString +encodeRecordM record = do + erecord <- encryptRecord record + let (hdr, content) = recordToRaw erecord + return $ B.concat [encodeHeader hdr, content] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +encodeRecord12 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString) +encodeRecord12 ctx = prepareRecord12 ctx . encodeRecordM + +-- before TLS 1.1, the block cipher IV is made of the residual of the previous block, +-- so we use cstIV as is, however in other case we generate an explicit IV +prepareRecord12 :: Context -> RecordM a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +prepareRecord12 ctx f = do + txState <- readMVar $ ctxTxRecordState ctx + let sz = case stCipher txState of + Nothing -> 0 + Just cipher -> + if hasRecordIV $ bulkF $ cipherBulk cipher + then bulkIVSize $ cipherBulk cipher + else 0 -- to not generate IV + if sz > 0 + then do + newIV <- getStateRNG ctx sz + runTxRecordState ctx (modify' (setRecordIV newIV) >> f) + else runTxRecordState ctx f + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +encodeRecord13 :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError ByteString) +encodeRecord13 ctx = prepareRecord13 ctx . encodeRecordM + +prepareRecord13 :: Context -> RecordM a -> IO (Either TLSError a) +prepareRecord13 = runTxRecordState + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +sendBytes :: Context -> ByteString -> IO () +sendBytes ctx dataToSend = do + withLog ctx $ \logging -> loggingIOSent logging dataToSend + contextSend ctx dataToSend diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/State.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/State.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/State.hs @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-} + +module Network.TLS.Record.State ( + CryptState (..), + CryptLevel (..), + HasCryptLevel (..), + MacState (..), + RecordOptions (..), + RecordState (..), + newRecordState, + incrRecordState, + RecordM, + runRecordM, + getRecordOptions, + getRecordVersion, + setRecordIV, + withCompression, + computeDigest, + makeDigest, + getBulk, + getMacSequence, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Compression +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.MAC +import Network.TLS.Packet +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Wire + +data CryptState = CryptState + { cstKey :: BulkState + , cstIV :: IV + , -- In TLS 1.2 or earlier, this holds mac secret. + -- In TLS 1.3, this holds application traffic secret N. + cstMacSecret :: Secret + } + deriving (Show) + +newtype MacState = MacState + { msSequence :: Word64 + } + deriving (Show) + +data RecordOptions = RecordOptions + { recordVersion :: Version -- version to use when sending/receiving + , recordTLS13 :: Bool -- TLS13 record processing + } + +-- | TLS encryption level. +data CryptLevel + = -- | Unprotected traffic + CryptInitial + | -- | Protected with main secret (TLS < 1.3) + CryptMainSecret + | -- | Protected with early traffic secret (TLS 1.3) + CryptEarlySecret + | -- | Protected with handshake traffic secret (TLS 1.3) + CryptHandshakeSecret + | -- | Protected with application traffic secret (TLS 1.3) + CryptApplicationSecret + deriving (Eq, Show) + +class HasCryptLevel a where getCryptLevel :: proxy a -> CryptLevel +instance HasCryptLevel EarlySecret where getCryptLevel _ = CryptEarlySecret +instance HasCryptLevel HandshakeSecret where + getCryptLevel _ = CryptHandshakeSecret +instance HasCryptLevel ApplicationSecret where + getCryptLevel _ = CryptApplicationSecret + +data RecordState = RecordState + { stCipher :: Maybe Cipher + , stCompression :: Compression + , stCryptLevel :: CryptLevel + , stCryptState :: CryptState + , stMacState :: MacState + } + deriving (Show) + +newtype RecordM a = RecordM + { runRecordM + :: RecordOptions + -> RecordState + -> Either TLSError (a, RecordState) + } + +instance Applicative RecordM where + pure a = RecordM $ \_ st -> Right (a, st) + (<*>) = ap + +instance Monad RecordM where + m1 >>= m2 = RecordM $ \opt st -> + case runRecordM m1 opt st of + Left err -> Left err + Right (a, st2) -> runRecordM (m2 a) opt st2 + +instance Functor RecordM where + fmap f m = RecordM $ \opt st -> + case runRecordM m opt st of + Left err -> Left err + Right (a, st2) -> Right (f a, st2) + +getRecordOptions :: RecordM RecordOptions +getRecordOptions = RecordM $ \opt st -> Right (opt, st) + +getRecordVersion :: RecordM Version +getRecordVersion = recordVersion <$> getRecordOptions + +instance MonadState RecordState RecordM where + put x = RecordM $ \_ _ -> Right ((), x) + get = RecordM $ \_ st -> Right (st, st) + state f = RecordM $ \_ st -> Right (f st) + +instance MonadError TLSError RecordM where + throwError e = RecordM $ \_ _ -> Left e + catchError m f = RecordM $ \opt st -> + case runRecordM m opt st of + Left err -> runRecordM (f err) opt st + r -> r + +newRecordState :: RecordState +newRecordState = + RecordState + { stCipher = Nothing + , stCompression = nullCompression + , stCryptLevel = CryptInitial + , stCryptState = CryptState BulkStateUninitialized B.empty BA.empty + , stMacState = MacState 0 + } + +incrRecordState :: RecordState -> RecordState +incrRecordState ts = ts{stMacState = MacState (ms + 1)} + where + (MacState ms) = stMacState ts + +setRecordIV :: ByteString -> RecordState -> RecordState +setRecordIV iv st = st{stCryptState = (stCryptState st){cstIV = iv}} + +withCompression :: (Compression -> (Compression, a)) -> RecordM a +withCompression f = do + st <- get + let (nc, a) = f $ stCompression st + put $ st{stCompression = nc} + return a + +computeDigest + :: Version -> RecordState -> Header -> ByteString -> (ByteString, RecordState) +computeDigest _ver tstate hdr content = (digest, incrRecordState tstate) + where + digest = BA.convert $ macF (cstMacSecret cst) msg + cst = stCryptState tstate + cipher = fromJust $ stCipher tstate + hashA = cipherHash cipher + encodedSeq = encodeWord64 $ msSequence $ stMacState tstate + + (macF, msg) = (hmac hashA, B.concat [encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr, content]) + +makeDigest :: Header -> ByteString -> RecordM ByteString +makeDigest hdr content = do + ver <- getRecordVersion + st <- get + let (digest, nstate) = computeDigest ver st hdr content + put nstate + return digest + +getBulk :: RecordM Bulk +getBulk = cipherBulk . fromJust . stCipher <$> get + +getMacSequence :: RecordM Word64 +getMacSequence = msSequence . stMacState <$> get diff --git a/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs b/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs @@ -1,90 +1,81 @@ {-# LANGUAGE EmptyDataDecls #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Record.Types --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- The Record Protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments the --- data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the data, applies --- a MAC, encrypts, and transmits the result. Received data is --- decrypted, verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then delivered to --- higher-level clients. --- -module Network.TLS.Record.Types - ( Header(..) - , ProtocolType(..) - , packetType - -- * TLS Records - , Record(..) - -- * TLS Record fragment and constructors - , Fragment - , fragmentPlaintext - , fragmentCiphertext - , fragmentGetBytes - , Plaintext - , Compressed - , Ciphertext - -- * manipulate record - , onRecordFragment - , fragmentCompress - , fragmentCipher - , fragmentUncipher - , fragmentUncompress - -- * serialize record - , rawToRecord - , recordToRaw - , recordToHeader - ) where -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.State +-- | The Record Protocol takes messages to be transmitted, fragments +-- the data into manageable blocks. applies a MAC, encrypts, and +-- transmits the result. Received data is decrypted, verified, +-- reassembled, and then delivered to higher-level clients. +module Network.TLS.Record.Types ( + Header (..), + ProtocolType (..), + packetType, + + -- * TLS Records + Record (..), + + -- * TLS Record fragment and constructors + Fragment, + fragmentGetBytes, + fragmentPlaintext, + fragmentCiphertext, + Plaintext, + Ciphertext, + + -- * manipulate record + onRecordFragment, + fragmentCipher, + fragmentUncipher, + + -- * serialize record + rawToRecord, + recordToRaw, + recordToHeader, +) where + import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Record.State +import Network.TLS.Struct + -- | Represent a TLS record. -data Record a = Record !ProtocolType !Version !(Fragment a) deriving (Show,Eq) +data Record a = Record ProtocolType Version (Fragment a) deriving (Show, Eq) -newtype Fragment a = Fragment Bytes deriving (Show,Eq) +newtype Fragment a = Fragment {fragmentGetBytes :: ByteString} + deriving (Show, Eq) data Plaintext -data Compressed data Ciphertext -fragmentPlaintext :: Bytes -> Fragment Plaintext +fragmentPlaintext :: ByteString -> Fragment Plaintext fragmentPlaintext bytes = Fragment bytes -fragmentCiphertext :: Bytes -> Fragment Ciphertext +fragmentCiphertext :: ByteString -> Fragment Ciphertext fragmentCiphertext bytes = Fragment bytes -fragmentGetBytes :: Fragment a -> Bytes -fragmentGetBytes (Fragment bytes) = bytes - -onRecordFragment :: Record a -> (Fragment a -> TLSSt (Fragment b)) -> TLSSt (Record b) +onRecordFragment + :: Record a -> (Fragment a -> RecordM (Fragment b)) -> RecordM (Record b) onRecordFragment (Record pt ver frag) f = Record pt ver <$> f frag -fragmentMap :: (Bytes -> TLSSt Bytes) -> Fragment a -> TLSSt (Fragment b) +fragmentMap + :: (ByteString -> RecordM ByteString) -> Fragment a -> RecordM (Fragment b) fragmentMap f (Fragment b) = Fragment <$> f b --- | turn a plaintext record into a compressed record using the compression function supplied -fragmentCompress :: (Bytes -> TLSSt Bytes) -> Fragment Plaintext -> TLSSt (Fragment Compressed) -fragmentCompress f = fragmentMap f - -- | turn a compressed record into a ciphertext record using the cipher function supplied -fragmentCipher :: (Bytes -> TLSSt Bytes) -> Fragment Compressed -> TLSSt (Fragment Ciphertext) +fragmentCipher + :: (ByteString -> RecordM ByteString) + -> Fragment Plaintext + -> RecordM (Fragment Ciphertext) fragmentCipher f = fragmentMap f --- | turn a ciphertext fragment into a compressed fragment using the cipher function supplied -fragmentUncipher :: (Bytes -> TLSSt Bytes) -> Fragment Ciphertext -> TLSSt (Fragment Compressed) +-- | turn a ciphertext fragment into a plaintext fragment using the cipher function supplied +fragmentUncipher + :: (ByteString -> RecordM ByteString) + -> Fragment Ciphertext + -> RecordM (Fragment Plaintext) fragmentUncipher f = fragmentMap f --- | turn a compressed fragment into a plaintext fragment using the decompression function supplied -fragmentUncompress :: (Bytes -> TLSSt Bytes) -> Fragment Compressed -> TLSSt (Fragment Plaintext) -fragmentUncompress f = fragmentMap f - -- | turn a record into an header and bytes -recordToRaw :: Record a -> (Header, Bytes) +recordToRaw :: Record a -> (Header, ByteString) recordToRaw (Record pt ver (Fragment bytes)) = (Header pt ver (fromIntegral $ B.length bytes), bytes) -- | turn a header and a fragment into a record diff --git a/Network/TLS/Sending.hs b/Network/TLS/Sending.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Network/TLS/Sending.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Sending --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the Sending module contains calls related to marshalling packets according --- to the TLS state --- -module Network.TLS.Sending (writePacket, encryptRSA) where - -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad.State - -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B - -import Network.TLS.Util -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Record -import Network.TLS.Packet -import Network.TLS.State -import Network.TLS.Crypto - -{- - - 'makePacketData' create a Header and a content bytestring related to a packet - - this doesn't change any state - -} -makeRecord :: Packet -> TLSSt (Record Plaintext) -makeRecord pkt = do - ver <- stVersion <$> get - content <- writePacketContent pkt - return $ Record (packetType pkt) ver (fragmentPlaintext content) - -{- - - Handshake data need to update a digest - -} -processRecord :: Record Plaintext -> TLSSt (Record Plaintext) -processRecord record@(Record ty _ fragment) = do - when (ty == ProtocolType_Handshake) (updateHandshakeDigest $ fragmentGetBytes fragment) - return record - -{- - - ChangeCipherSpec state change need to be handled after encryption otherwise - - its own packet would be encrypted with the new context, instead of beeing sent - - under the current context - -} -postprocessRecord :: Record Ciphertext -> TLSSt (Record Ciphertext) -postprocessRecord record@(Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ _) = - switchTxEncryption >> return record -postprocessRecord record = return record - -{- - - marshall packet data - -} -encodeRecord :: Record Ciphertext -> TLSSt ByteString -encodeRecord record = return $ B.concat [ encodeHeader hdr, content ] - where (hdr, content) = recordToRaw record - -{- - - just update TLS state machine - -} -preProcessPacket :: Packet -> TLSSt () -preProcessPacket (Alert _) = return () -preProcessPacket (AppData _) = return () -preProcessPacket (ChangeCipherSpec) = return () -preProcessPacket (Handshake hss) = forM_ hss $ \hs -> do - case hs of - Finished fdata -> updateVerifiedData True fdata - _ -> return () - -{- - - writePacket transform a packet into marshalled data related to current state - - and updating state on the go - -} -writePacket :: Packet -> TLSSt ByteString -writePacket pkt = do - preProcessPacket pkt - makeRecord pkt >>= processRecord >>= engageRecord >>= postprocessRecord >>= encodeRecord - -{------------------------------------------------------------------------------} -{- SENDING Helpers -} -{------------------------------------------------------------------------------} - -{- if the RSA encryption fails we just return an empty bytestring, and let the protocol - - fail by itself; however it would be probably better to just report it since it's an internal problem. - -} -encryptRSA :: ByteString -> TLSSt ByteString -encryptRSA content = do - st <- get - let rsakey = fromJust "rsa public key" $ hstRSAPublicKey $ fromJust "handshake" $ stHandshake st - case withTLSRNG (stRandomGen st) (\g -> kxEncrypt g rsakey content) of - Left err -> fail ("rsa encrypt failed: " ++ show err) - Right (econtent, rng') -> put (st { stRandomGen = rng' }) >> return econtent - -writePacketContent :: Packet -> TLSSt ByteString -writePacketContent (Handshake hss) = return $ encodeHandshakes hss -writePacketContent (Alert a) = return $ encodeAlerts a -writePacketContent (ChangeCipherSpec) = return $ encodeChangeCipherSpec -writePacketContent (AppData x) = return x diff --git a/Network/TLS/Session.hs b/Network/TLS/Session.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Session.hs @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +module Network.TLS.Session ( + SessionManager (..), + noSessionManager, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Types + +-- | A session manager. +-- In the server side, all fields are used. +-- In the client side, only 'sessionEstablish' is used. +data SessionManager = SessionManager + { sessionResume :: SessionIDorTicket -> IO (Maybe SessionData) + -- ^ Used on TLS 1.2\/1.3 servers to lookup 'SessionData' with 'SessionID' or to decrypt 'Ticket' to get 'SessionData'. + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce :: SessionIDorTicket -> IO (Maybe SessionData) + -- ^ Used for 0RTT on TLS 1.3 servers to lookup 'SessionData' with 'SessionID' or to decrypt 'Ticket' to get 'SessionData'. + , sessionEstablish :: SessionIDorTicket -> SessionData -> IO (Maybe Ticket) + -- ^ Used on TLS 1.2\/1.3 servers to store 'SessionData' with 'SessionID' or to encrypt 'SessionData' to get 'Ticket' ignoring 'SessionID'. Used on TLS 1.2\/1.3 clients to store 'SessionData' with 'SessionIDorTicket' and then return 'Nothing'. For clients, only this field should be set with 'noSessionManager'. + , sessionInvalidate :: SessionIDorTicket -> IO () + -- ^ Used TLS 1.2 servers to delete 'SessionData' with 'SessionID' on errors. + , sessionUseTicket :: Bool + -- ^ Used on TLS 1.2 servers to decide to use 'SessionID' or 'Ticket'. Note that 'SessionID' and 'Ticket' are integrated as identity in TLS 1.3. + } + +-- | The session manager to do nothing. +noSessionManager :: SessionManager +noSessionManager = + SessionManager + { sessionResume = \_ -> return Nothing + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = \_ -> return Nothing + , sessionEstablish = \_ _ -> return Nothing + , sessionInvalidate = \_ -> return () + , -- Don't send NewSessionTicket in TLS 1.2 by default. + -- Send NewSessionTicket with SessionID in TLS 1.3 by default. + sessionUseTicket = False + } diff --git a/Network/TLS/State.hs b/Network/TLS/State.hs --- a/Network/TLS/State.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/State.hs @@ -1,377 +1,374 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving, FlexibleContexts, MultiParamTypeClasses, ExistentialQuantification, RankNTypes, CPP #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.State --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the State module contains calls related to state initialization/manipulation --- which is use by the Receiving module and the Sending module. --- -module Network.TLS.State - ( TLSState(..) - , TLSSt - , runTLSState - , TLSHandshakeState(..) - , TLSCryptState(..) - , TLSMacState(..) - , newTLSState - , genTLSRandom - , withTLSRNG - , withCompression - , assert -- FIXME move somewhere else (Internal.hs ?) - , updateVerifiedData - , finishHandshakeTypeMaterial - , finishHandshakeMaterial - , makeDigest - , setMasterSecret - , setMasterSecretFromPre - , setPublicKey - , setPrivateKey - , setKeyBlock - , setVersion - , setCipher - , setServerRandom - , setSecureRenegotiation - , getSecureRenegotiation - , getVerifiedData - , setSession - , getSession - , getSessionData - , needEmptyPacket - , isSessionResuming - , switchTxEncryption - , switchRxEncryption - , getCipherKeyExchangeType - , isClientContext - , startHandshakeClient - , updateHandshakeDigest - , getHandshakeDigest - , endHandshake - ) where +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE Rank2Types #-} -import Data.Word -import Data.Maybe (isNothing) -import Network.TLS.Util -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Wire -import Network.TLS.Packet -import Network.TLS.Crypto -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Compression -import Network.TLS.MAC -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad -import Control.Monad.State -import Control.Monad.Error +-- | the State module contains calls related to state +-- initialization/manipulation which is use by the Receiving module +-- and the Sending module. +module Network.TLS.State ( + TLSState (..), + TLSSt, + runTLSState, + newTLSState, + withTLSRNG, + setVerifyDataForSend, + setVerifyDataForRecv, + getVerifyData, + getMyVerifyData, + getPeerVerifyData, + getFirstVerifyData, + finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial, + finishedHandshakeMaterial, + certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial, + certVerifyHandshakeMaterial, + setVersion, + setVersionIfUnset, + getVersion, + getVersionWithDefault, + setSecureRenegotiation, + getSecureRenegotiation, + setExtensionALPN, + getExtensionALPN, + setNegotiatedProtocol, + getNegotiatedProtocol, + setClientALPNSuggest, + getClientALPNSuggest, + setClientEcPointFormatSuggest, + getClientEcPointFormatSuggest, + setClientSNI, + clearClientSNI, + getClientSNI, + getClientCertificateChain, + setClientCertificateChain, + getServerCertificateChain, + setServerCertificateChain, + setSession, + getSession, + getRole, + -- + setTLS12SessionResuming, + getTLS12SessionResuming, + -- + setTLS13ExporterSecret, + getTLS13ExporterSecret, + setTLS13KeyShare, + getTLS13KeyShare, + setTLS13PreSharedKey, + getTLS13PreSharedKey, + setTLS13HRR, + getTLS13HRR, + setTLS13Cookie, + getTLS13Cookie, + setTLS13ClientSupportsPHA, + getTLS13ClientSupportsPHA, + setTLS12SessionTicket, + getTLS12SessionTicket, + + -- * random + genRandom, + withRNG, +) where + +import Control.Monad.State.Strict import Crypto.Random +import Data.X509 (CertificateChain) -assert :: Monad m => String -> [(String,Bool)] -> m () -assert fctname list = forM_ list $ \ (name, assumption) -> do - when assumption $ fail (fctname ++ ": assumption about " ++ name ++ " failed") +import Network.TLS.ErrT +import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.RNG +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types (HostName, Role (..), Secret, Ticket, WireBytes) +import Network.TLS.Wire (GetContinuation) -data TLSCryptState = TLSCryptState - { cstKey :: !Bytes - , cstIV :: !Bytes - , cstMacSecret :: !Bytes - } deriving (Show) +data TLSState = TLSState + { stSession :: Session + , -- RFC 5746, Renegotiation Indication Extension + -- RFC 5929, Channel Bindings for TLS, "tls-unique" + stSecureRenegotiation :: Bool + , stClientVerifyData :: Maybe VerifyData + , stServerVerifyData :: Maybe VerifyData + , -- RFC 5929, Channel Bindings for TLS, "tls-server-end-point" + stServerCertificateChain :: Maybe CertificateChain + , stExtensionALPN :: Bool -- RFC 7301 + , stNegotiatedProtocol :: Maybe ByteString -- ALPN protocol + , stHandshakeRecordCont12 + :: (Maybe (GetContinuation (HandshakeType, ByteString)), WireBytes) + , stHandshakeRecordCont13 + :: (Maybe (GetContinuation (HandshakeType, ByteString)), WireBytes) + , stClientALPNSuggest :: Maybe [ByteString] + , stClientGroupSuggest :: Maybe [Group] + , stClientEcPointFormatSuggest :: Maybe [EcPointFormat] + , stClientCertificateChain :: Maybe CertificateChain + , stClientSNI :: Maybe HostName + , stRandomGen :: StateRNG + , stClientContext :: Role + , stVersion :: Maybe Version + , -- + stTLS12SessionResuming :: Bool + , stTLS12SessionTicket :: Maybe Ticket + , -- + stTLS13KeyShare :: Maybe KeyShare + , stTLS13PreSharedKey :: Maybe PreSharedKey + , stTLS13HRR :: Bool + , stTLS13Cookie :: Maybe Cookie + , stTLS13ExporterSecret :: Maybe Secret + , stTLS13ClientSupportsPHA :: Bool -- Post-Handshake Authentication + } -data TLSMacState = TLSMacState - { msSequence :: Word64 - } deriving (Show) +newtype TLSSt a = TLSSt {runTLSSt :: ErrT TLSError (State TLSState) a} + deriving (Monad, MonadError TLSError, Functor, Applicative) -data TLSHandshakeState = TLSHandshakeState - { hstClientVersion :: !(Version) - , hstClientRandom :: !ClientRandom - , hstServerRandom :: !(Maybe ServerRandom) - , hstMasterSecret :: !(Maybe Bytes) - , hstRSAPublicKey :: !(Maybe PublicKey) - , hstRSAPrivateKey :: !(Maybe PrivateKey) - , hstHandshakeDigest :: !HashCtx - } deriving (Show) +instance MonadState TLSState TLSSt where + put x = TLSSt (lift $ put x) + get = TLSSt (lift get) + state f = TLSSt (lift $ state f) -data StateRNG = forall g . CryptoRandomGen g => StateRNG g +runTLSState :: TLSSt a -> TLSState -> (Either TLSError a, TLSState) +runTLSState f st = runState (runErrT (runTLSSt f)) st -instance Show StateRNG where - show _ = "rng[..]" +newTLSState :: StateRNG -> Role -> TLSState +newTLSState rng clientContext = + TLSState + { stSession = Session Nothing + , stSecureRenegotiation = False + , stClientVerifyData = Nothing + , stServerVerifyData = Nothing + , stServerCertificateChain = Nothing + , stExtensionALPN = False + , stNegotiatedProtocol = Nothing + , stHandshakeRecordCont12 = (Nothing, []) + , stHandshakeRecordCont13 = (Nothing, []) + , stClientALPNSuggest = Nothing + , stClientGroupSuggest = Nothing + , stClientEcPointFormatSuggest = Nothing + , stClientCertificateChain = Nothing + , stClientSNI = Nothing + , stRandomGen = rng + , stClientContext = clientContext + , stVersion = Nothing + , stTLS12SessionResuming = False + , stTLS12SessionTicket = Nothing + , stTLS13KeyShare = Nothing + , stTLS13PreSharedKey = Nothing + , stTLS13HRR = False + , stTLS13Cookie = Nothing + , stTLS13ExporterSecret = Nothing + , stTLS13ClientSupportsPHA = False + } -data TLSState = TLSState - { stClientContext :: Bool - , stVersion :: !Version - , stHandshake :: !(Maybe TLSHandshakeState) - , stSession :: Session - , stSessionResuming :: Bool - , stTxEncrypted :: Bool - , stRxEncrypted :: Bool - , stTxCryptState :: !(Maybe TLSCryptState) - , stRxCryptState :: !(Maybe TLSCryptState) - , stTxMacState :: !(Maybe TLSMacState) - , stRxMacState :: !(Maybe TLSMacState) - , stCipher :: Maybe Cipher - , stCompression :: Compression - , stRandomGen :: StateRNG - , stSecureRenegotiation :: Bool -- RFC 5746 - , stClientVerifiedData :: Bytes -- RFC 5746 - , stServerVerifiedData :: Bytes -- RFC 5746 - } deriving (Show) +setVerifyDataForSend :: VerifyData -> TLSSt () +setVerifyDataForSend bs = do + role <- getRole + case role of + ClientRole -> modify' (\st -> st{stClientVerifyData = Just bs}) + ServerRole -> modify' (\st -> st{stServerVerifyData = Just bs}) -newtype TLSSt a = TLSSt { runTLSSt :: ErrorT TLSError (State TLSState) a } - deriving (Monad, MonadError TLSError) +setVerifyDataForRecv :: VerifyData -> TLSSt () +setVerifyDataForRecv bs = do + role <- getRole + case role of + ClientRole -> modify' (\st -> st{stServerVerifyData = Just bs}) + ServerRole -> modify' (\st -> st{stClientVerifyData = Just bs}) -instance Functor TLSSt where - fmap f = TLSSt . fmap f . runTLSSt +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial :: HandshakeType -> Bool +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientHello = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHello = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Certificate = True +-- finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_HelloRequest = False +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertRequest = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertVerify = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Finished = True +finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial _ = False -instance MonadState TLSState TLSSt where - put x = TLSSt (lift $ put x) - get = TLSSt (lift get) -#if MIN_VERSION_mtl(2,1,0) - state f = TLSSt (lift $ state f) -#endif +finishedHandshakeMaterial :: Handshake -> Bool +finishedHandshakeMaterial = finishedHandshakeTypeMaterial . typeOfHandshake -runTLSState :: TLSSt a -> TLSState -> (Either TLSError a, TLSState) -runTLSState f st = runState (runErrorT (runTLSSt f)) st +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial :: HandshakeType -> Bool +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientHello = True +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHello = True +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Certificate = True +-- certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_HelloRequest = False +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = True +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = True +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = True +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertRequest = True +-- certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertVerify = False +-- certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Finished = False +certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial _ = False -newTLSState :: CryptoRandomGen g => g -> TLSState -newTLSState rng = TLSState - { stClientContext = False - , stVersion = TLS10 - , stHandshake = Nothing - , stSession = Session Nothing - , stSessionResuming = False - , stTxEncrypted = False - , stRxEncrypted = False - , stTxCryptState = Nothing - , stRxCryptState = Nothing - , stTxMacState = Nothing - , stRxMacState = Nothing - , stCipher = Nothing - , stCompression = nullCompression - , stRandomGen = StateRNG rng - , stSecureRenegotiation = False - , stClientVerifiedData = B.empty - , stServerVerifiedData = B.empty - } +certVerifyHandshakeMaterial :: Handshake -> Bool +certVerifyHandshakeMaterial = certVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterial . typeOfHandshake -withTLSRNG :: StateRNG -> (forall g . CryptoRandomGen g => g -> Either e (a,g)) -> Either e (a, StateRNG) -withTLSRNG (StateRNG rng) f = case f rng of - Left err -> Left err - Right (a, rng') -> Right (a, StateRNG rng') +setSession :: Session -> TLSSt () +setSession session = modify' (\st -> st{stSession = session}) -withCompression :: (Compression -> (Compression, a)) -> TLSSt a -withCompression f = do - compression <- stCompression <$> get - let (nc, a) = f compression - modify (\st -> st { stCompression = nc }) - return a +getSession :: TLSSt Session +getSession = gets stSession -genTLSRandom :: (MonadState TLSState m, MonadError TLSError m) => Int -> m Bytes -genTLSRandom n = do - st <- get - case withTLSRNG (stRandomGen st) (genBytes n) of - Left err -> throwError $ Error_Random $ show err - Right (bytes, rng') -> put (st { stRandomGen = rng' }) >> return bytes +setTLS12SessionResuming :: Bool -> TLSSt () +setTLS12SessionResuming b = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS12SessionResuming = b}) -makeDigest :: MonadState TLSState m => Bool -> Header -> Bytes -> m Bytes -makeDigest w hdr content = do - st <- get - let ver = stVersion st - let cst = fromJust "crypt state" $ if w then stTxCryptState st else stRxCryptState st - let ms = fromJust "mac state" $ if w then stTxMacState st else stRxMacState st - let cipher = fromJust "cipher" $ stCipher st - let hashf = hashF $ cipherHash cipher +getTLS12SessionResuming :: TLSSt Bool +getTLS12SessionResuming = gets stTLS12SessionResuming - let (macF, msg) = - if ver < TLS10 - then (macSSL hashf, B.concat [ encodeWord64 $ msSequence ms, encodeHeaderNoVer hdr, content ]) - else (hmac hashf 64, B.concat [ encodeWord64 $ msSequence ms, encodeHeader hdr, content ]) - let digest = macF (cstMacSecret cst) msg +setVersion :: Version -> TLSSt () +setVersion ver = modify' (\st -> st{stVersion = Just ver}) - let newms = ms { msSequence = (msSequence ms) + 1 } +setVersionIfUnset :: Version -> TLSSt () +setVersionIfUnset ver = modify' maybeSet + where + maybeSet st = case stVersion st of + Nothing -> st{stVersion = Just ver} + Just _ -> st - modify (\_ -> if w then st { stTxMacState = Just newms } else st { stRxMacState = Just newms }) - return digest +getVersion :: TLSSt Version +getVersion = + fromMaybe (error "internal error: version hasn't been set yet") + <$> gets stVersion -updateVerifiedData :: MonadState TLSState m => Bool -> Bytes -> m () -updateVerifiedData sending bs = do - cc <- isClientContext - if cc /= sending - then modify (\st -> st { stServerVerifiedData = bs }) - else modify (\st -> st { stClientVerifiedData = bs }) +getVersionWithDefault :: Version -> TLSSt Version +getVersionWithDefault defaultVer = fromMaybe defaultVer <$> gets stVersion -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial :: HandshakeType -> Bool -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientHello = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHello = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Certificate = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_HelloRequest = False -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertRequest = True -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_CertVerify = False -finishHandshakeTypeMaterial HandshakeType_Finished = True +setSecureRenegotiation :: Bool -> TLSSt () +setSecureRenegotiation b = modify' (\st -> st{stSecureRenegotiation = b}) -finishHandshakeMaterial :: Handshake -> Bool -finishHandshakeMaterial = finishHandshakeTypeMaterial . typeOfHandshake +getSecureRenegotiation :: TLSSt Bool +getSecureRenegotiation = gets stSecureRenegotiation -switchTxEncryption, switchRxEncryption :: MonadState TLSState m => m () -switchTxEncryption = modify (\st -> st { stTxEncrypted = True }) -switchRxEncryption = modify (\st -> st { stRxEncrypted = True }) +setExtensionALPN :: Bool -> TLSSt () +setExtensionALPN b = modify' (\st -> st{stExtensionALPN = b}) -setServerRandom :: MonadState TLSState m => ServerRandom -> m () -setServerRandom ran = updateHandshake "srand" (\hst -> hst { hstServerRandom = Just ran }) +getExtensionALPN :: TLSSt Bool +getExtensionALPN = gets stExtensionALPN -setMasterSecret :: MonadState TLSState m => Bytes -> m () -setMasterSecret masterSecret = do - hasValidHandshake "master secret" +setNegotiatedProtocol :: ByteString -> TLSSt () +setNegotiatedProtocol s = modify' (\st -> st{stNegotiatedProtocol = Just s}) - updateHandshake "master secret" (\hst -> hst { hstMasterSecret = Just masterSecret } ) - setKeyBlock - return () +getNegotiatedProtocol :: TLSSt (Maybe ByteString) +getNegotiatedProtocol = gets stNegotiatedProtocol -setMasterSecretFromPre :: MonadState TLSState m => Bytes -> m () -setMasterSecretFromPre premasterSecret = do - hasValidHandshake "generate master secret" - st <- get - setMasterSecret $ genSecret st - where - genSecret st = - let hst = fromJust "handshake" $ stHandshake st in - generateMasterSecret (stVersion st) - premasterSecret - (hstClientRandom hst) - (fromJust "server random" $ hstServerRandom hst) +setClientALPNSuggest :: [ByteString] -> TLSSt () +setClientALPNSuggest ps = modify' (\st -> st{stClientALPNSuggest = Just ps}) -setPublicKey :: MonadState TLSState m => PublicKey -> m () -setPublicKey pk = updateHandshake "publickey" (\hst -> hst { hstRSAPublicKey = Just pk }) +getClientALPNSuggest :: TLSSt (Maybe [ByteString]) +getClientALPNSuggest = gets stClientALPNSuggest -setPrivateKey :: MonadState TLSState m => PrivateKey -> m () -setPrivateKey pk = updateHandshake "privatekey" (\hst -> hst { hstRSAPrivateKey = Just pk }) +setClientEcPointFormatSuggest :: [EcPointFormat] -> TLSSt () +setClientEcPointFormatSuggest epf = modify' (\st -> st{stClientEcPointFormatSuggest = Just epf}) -getSessionData :: MonadState TLSState m => m (Maybe SessionData) -getSessionData = do - st <- get - return (stHandshake st >>= hstMasterSecret >>= wrapSessionData st) - where wrapSessionData st masterSecret = do - return $ SessionData - { sessionVersion = stVersion st - , sessionCipher = cipherID $ fromJust "cipher" $ stCipher st - , sessionSecret = masterSecret - } +getClientEcPointFormatSuggest :: TLSSt (Maybe [EcPointFormat]) +getClientEcPointFormatSuggest = gets stClientEcPointFormatSuggest -setSession :: MonadState TLSState m => Session -> Bool -> m () -setSession session resuming = modify (\st -> st { stSession = session, stSessionResuming = resuming }) +setClientCertificateChain :: CertificateChain -> TLSSt () +setClientCertificateChain s = modify' (\st -> st{stClientCertificateChain = Just s}) -getSession :: MonadState TLSState m => m Session -getSession = gets stSession +getClientCertificateChain :: TLSSt (Maybe CertificateChain) +getClientCertificateChain = gets stClientCertificateChain -isSessionResuming :: MonadState TLSState m => m Bool -isSessionResuming = gets stSessionResuming +setServerCertificateChain :: CertificateChain -> TLSSt () +setServerCertificateChain s = modify' (\st -> st{stServerCertificateChain = Just s}) -needEmptyPacket :: MonadState TLSState m => m Bool -needEmptyPacket = gets f - where f st = (stVersion st <= TLS10) - && (maybe False (\c -> bulkBlockSize (cipherBulk c) > 0) (stCipher st)) +getServerCertificateChain :: TLSSt (Maybe CertificateChain) +getServerCertificateChain = gets stServerCertificateChain -setKeyBlock :: MonadState TLSState m => m () -setKeyBlock = do - st <- get +setClientSNI :: HostName -> TLSSt () +setClientSNI hn = modify' (\st -> st{stClientSNI = Just hn}) - let hst = fromJust "handshake" $ stHandshake st +clearClientSNI :: TLSSt () +clearClientSNI = modify' (\st -> st{stClientSNI = Nothing}) - let cc = stClientContext st - let cipher = fromJust "cipher" $ stCipher st - let keyblockSize = cipherKeyBlockSize cipher +getClientSNI :: TLSSt (Maybe HostName) +getClientSNI = gets stClientSNI - let bulk = cipherBulk cipher - let digestSize = hashSize $ cipherHash cipher - let keySize = bulkKeySize bulk - let ivSize = bulkIVSize bulk - let kb = generateKeyBlock (stVersion st) (hstClientRandom hst) - (fromJust "server random" $ hstServerRandom hst) - (fromJust "master secret" $ hstMasterSecret hst) keyblockSize +getVerifyData :: Role -> TLSSt VerifyData +getVerifyData client = do + mVerifyData <- + gets (if client == ClientRole then stClientVerifyData else stServerVerifyData) + return $ fromMaybe (VerifyData "") mVerifyData - let (cMACSecret, sMACSecret, cWriteKey, sWriteKey, cWriteIV, sWriteIV) = - fromJust "p6" $ partition6 kb (digestSize, digestSize, keySize, keySize, ivSize, ivSize) +getMyVerifyData :: TLSSt (Maybe VerifyData) +getMyVerifyData = do + role <- getRole + if role == ClientRole + then gets stClientVerifyData + else gets stServerVerifyData - let cstClient = TLSCryptState - { cstKey = cWriteKey - , cstIV = cWriteIV - , cstMacSecret = cMACSecret } - let cstServer = TLSCryptState - { cstKey = sWriteKey - , cstIV = sWriteIV - , cstMacSecret = sMACSecret } - let msClient = TLSMacState { msSequence = 0 } - let msServer = TLSMacState { msSequence = 0 } - put $ st - { stTxCryptState = Just $ if cc then cstClient else cstServer - , stRxCryptState = Just $ if cc then cstServer else cstClient - , stTxMacState = Just $ if cc then msClient else msServer - , stRxMacState = Just $ if cc then msServer else msClient - } +getPeerVerifyData :: TLSSt (Maybe VerifyData) +getPeerVerifyData = do + role <- getRole + if role == ClientRole + then gets stServerVerifyData + else gets stClientVerifyData -setCipher :: MonadState TLSState m => Cipher -> m () -setCipher cipher = modify (\st -> st { stCipher = Just cipher }) +getFirstVerifyData :: TLSSt (Maybe VerifyData) +getFirstVerifyData = do + ver <- getVersion + case ver of + TLS13 -> gets stServerVerifyData + _ -> do + resuming <- getTLS12SessionResuming + if resuming + then gets stServerVerifyData + else gets stClientVerifyData -setVersion :: MonadState TLSState m => Version -> m () -setVersion ver = modify (\st -> st { stVersion = ver }) +getRole :: TLSSt Role +getRole = gets stClientContext -setSecureRenegotiation :: MonadState TLSState m => Bool -> m () -setSecureRenegotiation b = modify (\st -> st { stSecureRenegotiation = b }) +genRandom :: Int -> TLSSt ByteString +genRandom n = do + withRNG (getRandomBytes n) -getSecureRenegotiation :: MonadState TLSState m => m Bool -getSecureRenegotiation = get >>= return . stSecureRenegotiation +withRNG :: MonadPseudoRandom StateRNG a -> TLSSt a +withRNG f = do + st <- get + let (a, rng') = withTLSRNG (stRandomGen st) f + put (st{stRandomGen = rng'}) + return a -getCipherKeyExchangeType :: MonadState TLSState m => m (Maybe CipherKeyExchangeType) -getCipherKeyExchangeType = get >>= return . (maybe Nothing (Just . cipherKeyExchange) . stCipher) +setTLS12SessionTicket :: Ticket -> TLSSt () +setTLS12SessionTicket t = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS12SessionTicket = Just t}) -getVerifiedData :: MonadState TLSState m => Bool -> m Bytes -getVerifiedData client = get >>= return . (if client then stClientVerifiedData else stServerVerifiedData) +getTLS12SessionTicket :: TLSSt (Maybe Ticket) +getTLS12SessionTicket = gets stTLS12SessionTicket -isClientContext :: MonadState TLSState m => m Bool -isClientContext = get >>= return . stClientContext +setTLS13ExporterSecret :: Secret -> TLSSt () +setTLS13ExporterSecret key = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13ExporterSecret = Just key}) --- create a new empty handshake state -newEmptyHandshake :: Version -> ClientRandom -> HashCtx -> TLSHandshakeState -newEmptyHandshake ver crand digestInit = TLSHandshakeState - { hstClientVersion = ver - , hstClientRandom = crand - , hstServerRandom = Nothing - , hstMasterSecret = Nothing - , hstRSAPublicKey = Nothing - , hstRSAPrivateKey = Nothing - , hstHandshakeDigest = digestInit - } +getTLS13ExporterSecret :: TLSSt (Maybe Secret) +getTLS13ExporterSecret = gets stTLS13ExporterSecret -startHandshakeClient :: MonadState TLSState m => Version -> ClientRandom -> m () -startHandshakeClient ver crand = do - -- FIXME check if handshake is already not null - let initCtx = if ver < TLS12 then hashMD5SHA1 else hashSHA256 - chs <- get >>= return . stHandshake - when (isNothing chs) $ - modify (\st -> st { stHandshake = Just $ newEmptyHandshake ver crand initCtx }) +setTLS13KeyShare :: Maybe KeyShare -> TLSSt () +setTLS13KeyShare mks = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13KeyShare = mks}) -hasValidHandshake :: MonadState TLSState m => String -> m () -hasValidHandshake name = get >>= \st -> assert name [ ("valid handshake", isNothing $ stHandshake st) ] +getTLS13KeyShare :: TLSSt (Maybe KeyShare) +getTLS13KeyShare = gets stTLS13KeyShare -updateHandshake :: MonadState TLSState m => String -> (TLSHandshakeState -> TLSHandshakeState) -> m () -updateHandshake n f = do - hasValidHandshake n - modify (\st -> st { stHandshake = f <$> stHandshake st }) +setTLS13PreSharedKey :: Maybe PreSharedKey -> TLSSt () +setTLS13PreSharedKey mpsk = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13PreSharedKey = mpsk}) -updateHandshakeDigest :: MonadState TLSState m => Bytes -> m () -updateHandshakeDigest content = updateHandshake "update digest" $ \hs -> - hs { hstHandshakeDigest = hashUpdate (hstHandshakeDigest hs) content } +getTLS13PreSharedKey :: TLSSt (Maybe PreSharedKey) +getTLS13PreSharedKey = gets stTLS13PreSharedKey -getHandshakeDigest :: MonadState TLSState m => Bool -> m Bytes -getHandshakeDigest client = do - st <- get - let hst = fromJust "handshake" $ stHandshake st - let hashctx = hstHandshakeDigest hst - let msecret = fromJust "master secret" $ hstMasterSecret hst - return $ (if client then generateClientFinished else generateServerFinished) (stVersion st) msecret hashctx +setTLS13HRR :: Bool -> TLSSt () +setTLS13HRR b = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13HRR = b}) -endHandshake :: MonadState TLSState m => m () -endHandshake = modify (\st -> st { stHandshake = Nothing }) +getTLS13HRR :: TLSSt Bool +getTLS13HRR = gets stTLS13HRR + +setTLS13Cookie :: Maybe Cookie -> TLSSt () +setTLS13Cookie mcookie = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13Cookie = mcookie}) + +getTLS13Cookie :: TLSSt (Maybe Cookie) +getTLS13Cookie = gets stTLS13Cookie + +setTLS13ClientSupportsPHA :: Bool -> TLSSt () +setTLS13ClientSupportsPHA b = modify' (\st -> st{stTLS13ClientSupportsPHA = b}) + +getTLS13ClientSupportsPHA :: TLSSt Bool +getTLS13ClientSupportsPHA = gets stTLS13ClientSupportsPHA diff --git a/Network/TLS/Struct.hs b/Network/TLS/Struct.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Struct.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Struct.hs @@ -1,442 +1,501 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} {-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} -{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Struct --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the Struct module contains all definitions and values of the TLS protocol --- -module Network.TLS.Struct - ( Bytes - , Version(..) - , ConnectionEnd(..) - , CipherType(..) - , CipherData(..) - , Extension - , CertificateType(..) - , HashAlgorithm(..) - , SignatureAlgorithm(..) - , ProtocolType(..) - , TLSError(..) - , ServerDHParams(..) - , ServerRSAParams(..) - , ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData(..) - , Packet(..) - , Header(..) - , ServerRandom(..) - , ClientRandom(..) - , serverRandom - , clientRandom - , FinishedData - , SessionID - , Session(..) - , SessionData(..) - , AlertLevel(..) - , AlertDescription(..) - , HandshakeType(..) - , Handshake(..) - , numericalVer - , verOfNum - , TypeValuable, valOfType, valToType - , packetType - , typeOfHandshake - ) where -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B (length) -import Data.Word -import Data.Certificate.X509 (X509) -import Data.Typeable -import Control.Monad.Error (Error(..)) -import Control.Exception (Exception(..)) +-- | The Struct module contains all definitions and values of the TLS +-- protocol. +module Network.TLS.Struct ( + Version (..), + CipherData (..), + CertificateType ( + CertificateType, + CertificateType_RSA_Sign, + CertificateType_DSA_Sign, + CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign, + CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign, + CertificateType_Ed448_Sign + ), + fromCertificateType, + lastSupportedCertificateType, + DigitallySigned (..), + Signature, + ProtocolType ( + .., + ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec, + ProtocolType_Alert, + ProtocolType_Handshake, + ProtocolType_AppData + ), + TLSError (..), + TLSException (..), + DistinguishedName, + ServerDHParams (..), + serverDHParamsToParams, + serverDHParamsToPublic, + serverDHParamsFrom, + ServerECDHParams (..), + ServerRSAParams (..), + ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData (..), + ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData (..), + Packet (..), + Header (..), + ServerRandom (..), + ClientRandom (..), + FinishedData, + VerifyData (..), + SessionID, + Session (..), + SessionData (..), + AlertLevel ( + .., + AlertLevel_Warning, + AlertLevel_Fatal + ), + AlertDescription ( + .., + CloseNotify, + UnexpectedMessage, + BadRecordMac, + DecryptionFailed, + RecordOverflow, + DecompressionFailure, + HandshakeFailure, + BadCertificate, + UnsupportedCertificate, + CertificateRevoked, + CertificateExpired, + CertificateUnknown, + IllegalParameter, + UnknownCa, + AccessDenied, + DecodeError, + DecryptError, + ExportRestriction, + ProtocolVersion, + InsufficientSecurity, + InternalError, + InappropriateFallback, + UserCanceled, + NoRenegotiation, + MissingExtension, + UnsupportedExtension, + CertificateUnobtainable, + UnrecognizedName, + BadCertificateStatusResponse, + BadCertificateHashValue, + UnknownPskIdentity, + CertificateRequired, + NoApplicationProtocol + ), + HandshakeType ( + .., + HandshakeType_HelloRequest, + HandshakeType_ClientHello, + HandshakeType_ServerHello, + HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket, + HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData, + HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions, + HandshakeType_Certificate, + HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg, + HandshakeType_CertRequest, + HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone, + HandshakeType_CertVerify, + HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg, + HandshakeType_Finished, + HandshakeType_KeyUpdate, + HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate + ), + CertificateChain_ (..), + emptyCertificateChain_, + Handshake (..), + packetType, + typeOfHandshake, + module Network.TLS.HashAndSignature, + ExtensionRaw (..), + ExtensionID (..), + showCertificateChain, + isHelloRetryRequest, + hrrRandom, + ClientHello (..), + ServerHello (..), + HandshakeR, +) where -type Bytes = ByteString +import Data.X509 ( + CertificateChain (..), + DistinguishedName, + certSubjectDN, + getCharacterStringRawData, + getDistinguishedElements, + getSigned, + signedObject, + ) --- | Versions known to TLS --- --- SSL2 is just defined, but this version is and will not be supported. -data Version = SSL2 | SSL3 | TLS10 | TLS11 | TLS12 deriving (Show, Eq, Ord) +import Network.TLS.Crypto +import Network.TLS.Error +import {-# SOURCE #-} Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.HashAndSignature +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types -data ConnectionEnd = ConnectionServer | ConnectionClient -data CipherType = CipherStream | CipherBlock | CipherAEAD +---------------------------------------------------------------- data CipherData = CipherData - { cipherDataContent :: Bytes - , cipherDataMAC :: Maybe Bytes - , cipherDataPadding :: Maybe Bytes - } deriving (Show,Eq) + { cipherDataContent :: ByteString + , cipherDataMAC :: Maybe ByteString + , cipherDataPadding :: Maybe (ByteString, Int) + } + deriving (Show, Eq) -data CertificateType = - CertificateType_RSA_Sign -- TLS10 - | CertificateType_DSS_Sign -- TLS10 - | CertificateType_RSA_Fixed_DH -- TLS10 - | CertificateType_DSS_Fixed_DH -- TLS10 - | CertificateType_RSA_Ephemeral_DH -- TLS12 - | CertificateType_DSS_Ephemeral_DH -- TLS12 - | CertificateType_fortezza_dms -- TLS12 - | CertificateType_Unknown Word8 - deriving (Show,Eq) +---------------------------------------------------------------- -data HashAlgorithm = - HashNone - | HashMD5 - | HashSHA1 - | HashSHA224 - | HashSHA256 - | HashSHA384 - | HashSHA512 - | HashOther Word8 - deriving (Show,Eq) +-- | Some of the IANA registered code points for 'CertificateType' are not +-- currently supported by the library. Nor should they be, they're are either +-- unwise, obsolete or both. There's no point in conveying these to the user +-- in the client certificate request callback. The request callback will be +-- filtered to exclude unsupported values. If the user cannot find a certificate +-- for a supported code point, we'll go ahead without a client certificate and +-- hope for the best, unless the user's callback decides to throw an exception. +newtype CertificateType = CertificateType {fromCertificateType :: Word8} + deriving (Eq, Ord) -data SignatureAlgorithm = - SignatureAnonymous - | SignatureRSA - | SignatureDSS - | SignatureECDSA - | SignatureOther Word8 - deriving (Show,Eq) +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +-- | TLS10 and up, RFC5246 +pattern CertificateType_RSA_Sign :: CertificateType +pattern CertificateType_RSA_Sign = CertificateType 1 +-- | TLS10 and up, RFC5246 +pattern CertificateType_DSA_Sign :: CertificateType +pattern CertificateType_DSA_Sign = CertificateType 2 +-- | TLS10 and up, RFC8422 +pattern CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign :: CertificateType +pattern CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign = CertificateType 64 +-- \| There are no code points that map to the below synthetic types, these +-- are inferred indirectly from the @signature_algorithms@ extension of the +-- TLS 1.3 @CertificateRequest@ message. the value assignments are there +-- only to avoid partial function warnings. +pattern CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign :: CertificateType +pattern CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign = CertificateType 254 -- fixme: dummy value +pattern CertificateType_Ed448_Sign :: CertificateType +pattern CertificateType_Ed448_Sign = CertificateType 255 -- fixme: dummy value -data ProtocolType = - ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec - | ProtocolType_Alert - | ProtocolType_Handshake - | ProtocolType_AppData - deriving (Eq, Show) +instance Show CertificateType where + show CertificateType_RSA_Sign = "rsa_sign" + show CertificateType_DSA_Sign = "dss_sign" + show CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign = "ecdsa_sign" + show CertificateType_Ed25519_Sign = "ed25519_sign" + show CertificateType_Ed448_Sign = "ed448_sign" + show (CertificateType x) = "CertificateType " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} --- | TLSError that might be returned through the TLS stack -data TLSError = - Error_Misc String -- ^ mainly for instance of Error - | Error_Protocol (String, Bool, AlertDescription) - | Error_Certificate String - | Error_HandshakePolicy String -- ^ handshake policy failed. - | Error_Random String - | Error_EOF - | Error_Packet String - | Error_Packet_Size_Mismatch (Int, Int) - | Error_Packet_unexpected String String - | Error_Packet_Parsing String - | Error_Internal_Packet_ByteProcessed Int Int Int - | Error_Unknown_Version Word8 Word8 - | Error_Unknown_Type String - deriving (Eq, Show, Typeable) +-- | Last supported certificate type, no 'CertificateType that +-- compares greater than this one (based on the 'Ord' instance, +-- not on the wire code point) will be reported to the application +-- via the client certificate request callback. +lastSupportedCertificateType :: CertificateType +lastSupportedCertificateType = CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign -instance Error TLSError where - noMsg = Error_Misc "" - strMsg = Error_Misc +------------------------------------------------------------ -instance Exception TLSError +type Signature = ByteString -data Packet = - Handshake [Handshake] - | Alert [(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] - | ChangeCipherSpec - | AppData ByteString - deriving (Show,Eq) +data DigitallySigned = DigitallySigned HashAndSignatureAlgorithm Signature + deriving (Eq) -data Header = Header ProtocolType Version Word16 deriving (Show,Eq) +instance Show DigitallySigned where + show (DigitallySigned hs _sig) = "DigitallySigned " ++ show hs ++ " \"...\"" -newtype ServerRandom = ServerRandom Bytes deriving (Show, Eq) -newtype ClientRandom = ClientRandom Bytes deriving (Show, Eq) -type SessionID = Bytes -newtype Session = Session (Maybe SessionID) deriving (Show, Eq) +---------------------------------------------------------------- -data SessionData = SessionData - { sessionVersion :: Version - , sessionCipher :: CipherID - , sessionSecret :: Bytes - } +newtype ProtocolType = ProtocolType {fromProtocolType :: Word8} deriving (Eq) -type CipherID = Word16 -type CompressionID = Word8 -type FinishedData = Bytes -type Extension = (Word16, Bytes) +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec :: ProtocolType +pattern ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec = ProtocolType 20 -constrRandom32 :: (Bytes -> a) -> Bytes -> Maybe a -constrRandom32 constr l = if B.length l == 32 then Just (constr l) else Nothing +pattern ProtocolType_Alert :: ProtocolType +pattern ProtocolType_Alert = ProtocolType 21 -serverRandom :: Bytes -> Maybe ServerRandom -serverRandom l = constrRandom32 ServerRandom l +pattern ProtocolType_Handshake :: ProtocolType +pattern ProtocolType_Handshake = ProtocolType 22 -clientRandom :: Bytes -> Maybe ClientRandom -clientRandom l = constrRandom32 ClientRandom l +pattern ProtocolType_AppData :: ProtocolType +pattern ProtocolType_AppData = ProtocolType 23 -data AlertLevel = - AlertLevel_Warning - | AlertLevel_Fatal - deriving (Show,Eq) +instance Show ProtocolType where + show ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec = "ChangeCipherSpec" + show ProtocolType_Alert = "Alert" + show ProtocolType_Handshake = "Handshake" + show ProtocolType_AppData = "AppData" + show (ProtocolType x) = "ProtocolType " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} -data AlertDescription = - CloseNotify - | UnexpectedMessage - | BadRecordMac - | DecryptionFailed -- ^ deprecated alert, should never be sent by compliant implementation - | RecordOverflow - | DecompressionFailure - | HandshakeFailure - | BadCertificate - | UnsupportedCertificate - | CertificateRevoked - | CertificateExpired - | CertificateUnknown - | IllegalParameter - | UnknownCa - | AccessDenied - | DecodeError - | DecryptError - | ExportRestriction - | ProtocolVersion - | InsufficientSecurity - | InternalError - | UserCanceled - | NoRenegotiation - deriving (Show,Eq) +---------------------------------------------------------------- -data HandshakeType = - HandshakeType_HelloRequest - | HandshakeType_ClientHello - | HandshakeType_ServerHello - | HandshakeType_Certificate - | HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg - | HandshakeType_CertRequest - | HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone - | HandshakeType_CertVerify - | HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg - | HandshakeType_Finished - deriving (Show,Eq) +data Packet + = Handshake [Handshake] [WireBytes] + | Alert [(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] + | ChangeCipherSpec + | AppData ByteString + deriving (Eq) -data ServerDHParams = ServerDHParams - { dh_p :: Integer -- ^ prime modulus - , dh_g :: Integer -- ^ generator - , dh_Ys :: Integer -- ^ public value (g^X mod p) - } deriving (Show,Eq) +instance Show Packet where + show (Handshake hs _) = "Handshake " ++ show hs + show (Alert as) = "Alert " ++ show as + show ChangeCipherSpec = "ChangeCipherSpec" + show (AppData bs) = "AppData " ++ showBytesHex bs -data ServerRSAParams = ServerRSAParams - { rsa_modulus :: Integer - , rsa_exponent :: Integer - } deriving (Show,Eq) +data Header = Header ProtocolType Version Word16 deriving (Show, Eq) -data ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData = - SKX_DH_Anon ServerDHParams - | SKX_DHE_DSS ServerDHParams [Word8] - | SKX_DHE_RSA ServerDHParams [Word8] - | SKX_RSA (Maybe ServerRSAParams) - | SKX_DH_DSS (Maybe ServerRSAParams) - | SKX_DH_RSA (Maybe ServerRSAParams) - | SKX_Unknown Bytes - deriving (Show,Eq) +newtype ServerRandom = ServerRandom {unServerRandom :: ByteString} + deriving (Eq) +instance Show ServerRandom where + show sr@(ServerRandom bs) + | isHelloRetryRequest sr = "HelloRetryReqest" + | otherwise = "ServerRandom " ++ showBytesHex bs -data Handshake = - ClientHello !Version !ClientRandom !Session ![CipherID] ![CompressionID] [Extension] - | ServerHello !Version !ServerRandom !Session !CipherID !CompressionID [Extension] - | Certificates [X509] - | HelloRequest - | ServerHelloDone - | ClientKeyXchg Bytes - | ServerKeyXchg ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData - | CertRequest [CertificateType] (Maybe [ (HashAlgorithm, SignatureAlgorithm) ]) [Word8] - | CertVerify [Word8] - | Finished FinishedData - deriving (Show,Eq) +hrrRandom :: ServerRandom +hrrRandom = + ServerRandom + "\xCF\x21\xAD\x74\xE5\x9A\x61\x11\xBE\x1D\x8C\x02\x1E\x65\xB8\x91\xC2\xA2\x11\x16\x7A\xBB\x8C\x5E\x07\x9E\x09\xE2\xC8\xA8\x33\x9C" -packetType :: Packet -> ProtocolType -packetType (Handshake _) = ProtocolType_Handshake -packetType (Alert _) = ProtocolType_Alert -packetType ChangeCipherSpec = ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec -packetType (AppData _) = ProtocolType_AppData +isHelloRetryRequest :: ServerRandom -> Bool +isHelloRetryRequest = (== hrrRandom) -typeOfHandshake :: Handshake -> HandshakeType -typeOfHandshake (ClientHello _ _ _ _ _ _) = HandshakeType_ClientHello -typeOfHandshake (ServerHello _ _ _ _ _ _) = HandshakeType_ServerHello -typeOfHandshake (Certificates _) = HandshakeType_Certificate -typeOfHandshake (HelloRequest) = HandshakeType_HelloRequest -typeOfHandshake (ServerHelloDone) = HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone -typeOfHandshake (ClientKeyXchg _) = HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg -typeOfHandshake (ServerKeyXchg _) = HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg -typeOfHandshake (CertRequest _ _ _) = HandshakeType_CertRequest -typeOfHandshake (CertVerify _) = HandshakeType_CertVerify -typeOfHandshake (Finished _) = HandshakeType_Finished +newtype ClientRandom = ClientRandom {unClientRandom :: ByteString} + deriving (Eq) -numericalVer :: Version -> (Word8, Word8) -numericalVer SSL2 = (2, 0) -numericalVer SSL3 = (3, 0) -numericalVer TLS10 = (3, 1) -numericalVer TLS11 = (3, 2) -numericalVer TLS12 = (3, 3) +instance Show ClientRandom where + show (ClientRandom bs) = "ClientRandom " ++ showBytesHex bs -verOfNum :: (Word8, Word8) -> Maybe Version -verOfNum (2, 0) = Just SSL2 -verOfNum (3, 0) = Just SSL3 -verOfNum (3, 1) = Just TLS10 -verOfNum (3, 2) = Just TLS11 -verOfNum (3, 3) = Just TLS12 -verOfNum _ = Nothing +newtype Session = Session (Maybe SessionID) deriving (Eq) +instance Show Session where + show (Session Nothing) = "Session \"\"" + show (Session (Just bs)) = "Session " ++ showBytesHex bs -class TypeValuable a where - valOfType :: a -> Word8 - valToType :: Word8 -> Maybe a +{-# DEPRECATED FinishedData "use VerifyData" #-} +type FinishedData = ByteString -instance TypeValuable ConnectionEnd where - valOfType ConnectionServer = 0 - valOfType ConnectionClient = 1 +newtype VerifyData = VerifyData ByteString deriving (Eq) +instance Show VerifyData where + show (VerifyData bs) = showBytesHex bs - valToType 0 = Just ConnectionServer - valToType 1 = Just ConnectionClient - valToType _ = Nothing +---------------------------------------------------------------- -instance TypeValuable CipherType where - valOfType CipherStream = 0 - valOfType CipherBlock = 1 - valOfType CipherAEAD = 2 +newtype HandshakeType = HandshakeType {fromHandshakeType :: Word8} + deriving (Eq) - valToType 0 = Just CipherStream - valToType 1 = Just CipherBlock - valToType 2 = Just CipherAEAD - valToType _ = Nothing +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern HandshakeType_HelloRequest :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_HelloRequest = HandshakeType 0 +pattern HandshakeType_ClientHello :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_ClientHello = HandshakeType 1 +pattern HandshakeType_ServerHello :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_ServerHello = HandshakeType 2 +pattern HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket = HandshakeType 4 +pattern HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData = HandshakeType 5 +pattern HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions = HandshakeType 8 +pattern HandshakeType_Certificate :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_Certificate = HandshakeType 11 +pattern HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = HandshakeType 12 +pattern HandshakeType_CertRequest :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_CertRequest = HandshakeType 13 +pattern HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = HandshakeType 14 +pattern HandshakeType_CertVerify :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_CertVerify = HandshakeType 15 +pattern HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = HandshakeType 16 +pattern HandshakeType_Finished :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_Finished = HandshakeType 20 +pattern HandshakeType_KeyUpdate :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_KeyUpdate = HandshakeType 24 +pattern HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate :: HandshakeType +pattern HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate = HandshakeType 25 -instance TypeValuable ProtocolType where - valOfType ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec = 20 - valOfType ProtocolType_Alert = 21 - valOfType ProtocolType_Handshake = 22 - valOfType ProtocolType_AppData = 23 +instance Show HandshakeType where + show HandshakeType_HelloRequest = "HelloRequest" + show HandshakeType_ClientHello = "ClientHello" + show HandshakeType_ServerHello = "ServerHello" + show HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket = "NewSessionTicket" + show HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData = "EndOfEarlyData" + show HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions = "EncryptedExtensions" + show HandshakeType_Certificate = "Certificate" + show HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = "ServerKeyXchg" + show HandshakeType_CertRequest = "CertRequest" + show HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = "ServerHelloDone" + show HandshakeType_CertVerify = "CertVerify" + show HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = "ClientKeyXchg" + show HandshakeType_Finished = "Finished" + show HandshakeType_KeyUpdate = "KeyUpdate" + show HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate = "CompressedCertificate" + show (HandshakeType x) = "HandshakeType " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} - valToType 20 = Just ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec - valToType 21 = Just ProtocolType_Alert - valToType 22 = Just ProtocolType_Handshake - valToType 23 = Just ProtocolType_AppData - valToType _ = Nothing +---------------------------------------------------------------- -instance TypeValuable HandshakeType where - valOfType HandshakeType_HelloRequest = 0 - valOfType HandshakeType_ClientHello = 1 - valOfType HandshakeType_ServerHello = 2 - valOfType HandshakeType_Certificate = 11 - valOfType HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg = 12 - valOfType HandshakeType_CertRequest = 13 - valOfType HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone = 14 - valOfType HandshakeType_CertVerify = 15 - valOfType HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg = 16 - valOfType HandshakeType_Finished = 20 +data ServerDHParams = ServerDHParams + { serverDHParams_p :: BigNum + , serverDHParams_g :: BigNum + , serverDHParams_y :: BigNum + } + deriving (Show, Eq) - valToType 0 = Just HandshakeType_HelloRequest - valToType 1 = Just HandshakeType_ClientHello - valToType 2 = Just HandshakeType_ServerHello - valToType 11 = Just HandshakeType_Certificate - valToType 12 = Just HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg - valToType 13 = Just HandshakeType_CertRequest - valToType 14 = Just HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone - valToType 15 = Just HandshakeType_CertVerify - valToType 16 = Just HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg - valToType 20 = Just HandshakeType_Finished - valToType _ = Nothing +serverDHParamsFrom :: DHParams -> DHPublic -> ServerDHParams +serverDHParamsFrom params dhPub = + ServerDHParams + (bigNumFromInteger $ dhParamsGetP params) + (bigNumFromInteger $ dhParamsGetG params) + (bigNumFromInteger $ dhUnwrapPublic dhPub) -instance TypeValuable AlertLevel where - valOfType AlertLevel_Warning = 1 - valOfType AlertLevel_Fatal = 2 +serverDHParamsToParams :: ServerDHParams -> DHParams +serverDHParamsToParams serverParams = + dhParams + (bigNumToInteger $ serverDHParams_p serverParams) + (bigNumToInteger $ serverDHParams_g serverParams) - valToType 1 = Just AlertLevel_Warning - valToType 2 = Just AlertLevel_Fatal - valToType _ = Nothing +serverDHParamsToPublic :: ServerDHParams -> DHPublic +serverDHParamsToPublic serverParams = + dhPublic (bigNumToInteger $ serverDHParams_y serverParams) -instance TypeValuable AlertDescription where - valOfType CloseNotify = 0 - valOfType UnexpectedMessage = 10 - valOfType BadRecordMac = 20 - valOfType DecryptionFailed = 21 - valOfType RecordOverflow = 22 - valOfType DecompressionFailure = 30 - valOfType HandshakeFailure = 40 - valOfType BadCertificate = 42 - valOfType UnsupportedCertificate = 43 - valOfType CertificateRevoked = 44 - valOfType CertificateExpired = 45 - valOfType CertificateUnknown = 46 - valOfType IllegalParameter = 47 - valOfType UnknownCa = 48 - valOfType AccessDenied = 49 - valOfType DecodeError = 50 - valOfType DecryptError = 51 - valOfType ExportRestriction = 60 - valOfType ProtocolVersion = 70 - valOfType InsufficientSecurity = 71 - valOfType InternalError = 80 - valOfType UserCanceled = 90 - valOfType NoRenegotiation = 100 +---------------------------------------------------------------- - valToType 0 = Just CloseNotify - valToType 10 = Just UnexpectedMessage - valToType 20 = Just BadRecordMac - valToType 21 = Just DecryptionFailed - valToType 22 = Just RecordOverflow - valToType 30 = Just DecompressionFailure - valToType 40 = Just HandshakeFailure - valToType 42 = Just BadCertificate - valToType 43 = Just UnsupportedCertificate - valToType 44 = Just CertificateRevoked - valToType 45 = Just CertificateExpired - valToType 46 = Just CertificateUnknown - valToType 47 = Just IllegalParameter - valToType 48 = Just UnknownCa - valToType 49 = Just AccessDenied - valToType 50 = Just DecodeError - valToType 51 = Just DecryptError - valToType 60 = Just ExportRestriction - valToType 70 = Just ProtocolVersion - valToType 71 = Just InsufficientSecurity - valToType 80 = Just InternalError - valToType 90 = Just UserCanceled - valToType 100 = Just NoRenegotiation - valToType _ = Nothing +data ServerECDHParams = ServerECDHParams Group GroupPublicA + deriving (Show, Eq) -instance TypeValuable CertificateType where - valOfType CertificateType_RSA_Sign = 1 - valOfType CertificateType_DSS_Sign = 2 - valOfType CertificateType_RSA_Fixed_DH = 3 - valOfType CertificateType_DSS_Fixed_DH = 4 - valOfType CertificateType_RSA_Ephemeral_DH = 5 - valOfType CertificateType_DSS_Ephemeral_DH = 6 - valOfType CertificateType_fortezza_dms = 20 - valOfType (CertificateType_Unknown i) = i +---------------------------------------------------------------- - valToType 1 = Just CertificateType_RSA_Sign - valToType 2 = Just CertificateType_DSS_Sign - valToType 3 = Just CertificateType_RSA_Fixed_DH - valToType 4 = Just CertificateType_DSS_Fixed_DH - valToType 5 = Just CertificateType_RSA_Ephemeral_DH - valToType 6 = Just CertificateType_DSS_Ephemeral_DH - valToType 20 = Just CertificateType_fortezza_dms - valToType i = Just (CertificateType_Unknown i) +data ServerRSAParams = ServerRSAParams + { rsa_modulus :: Integer + , rsa_exponent :: Integer + } + deriving (Show, Eq) -instance TypeValuable HashAlgorithm where - valOfType HashNone = 0 - valOfType HashMD5 = 1 - valOfType HashSHA1 = 2 - valOfType HashSHA224 = 3 - valOfType HashSHA256 = 4 - valOfType HashSHA384 = 5 - valOfType HashSHA512 = 6 - valOfType (HashOther i) = i +---------------------------------------------------------------- - valToType 0 = Just HashNone - valToType 1 = Just HashMD5 - valToType 2 = Just HashSHA1 - valToType 3 = Just HashSHA224 - valToType 4 = Just HashSHA256 - valToType 5 = Just HashSHA384 - valToType 6 = Just HashSHA512 - valToType i = Just (HashOther i) +data ServerDSAParams = ServerDSAParams deriving (Show, Eq) -instance TypeValuable SignatureAlgorithm where - valOfType SignatureAnonymous = 0 - valOfType SignatureRSA = 1 - valOfType SignatureDSS = 2 - valOfType SignatureECDSA = 3 - valOfType (SignatureOther i) = i +---------------------------------------------------------------- - valToType 0 = Just SignatureAnonymous - valToType 1 = Just SignatureRSA - valToType 2 = Just SignatureDSS - valToType 3 = Just SignatureECDSA - valToType i = Just (SignatureOther i) +data ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData + = SKX_DH_Anon ServerDHParams + | SKX_DHE_DSA ServerDHParams DigitallySigned + | SKX_DHE_RSA ServerDHParams DigitallySigned + | SKX_ECDHE_RSA ServerECDHParams DigitallySigned + | SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA ServerECDHParams DigitallySigned + | SKX_RSA (Maybe ServerRSAParams) + | SKX_DH_DSA (Maybe ServerDSAParams) + | SKX_DH_RSA (Maybe ServerRSAParams) + | SKX_Unparsed ByteString -- if we parse the server key xchg before knowing the actual cipher, we end up with this structure. + | SKX_Unknown ByteString + deriving (Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +instance Show ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData where + show (SKX_DH_Anon _) = "SKX_DH_Anon" + show (SKX_DHE_DSA _ _) = "SKX_DHE_DSA" + show (SKX_DHE_RSA _ _) = "SKX_DHE_RSA" + show (SKX_ECDHE_RSA _ _) = "SKX_ECDHE_RSA" + show (SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA _ _) = "SKX_ECDHE_ECDSA" + show (SKX_RSA _) = "SKX_RSA" + show (SKX_DH_DSA _) = "SKX_DH_DSA" + show (SKX_DH_RSA _) = "SKX_DH_RSA" + show (SKX_Unparsed _) = "SKX_Unparsed" + show (SKX_Unknown _) = "SKX_Unknown" +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData + = CKX_RSA ByteString + | CKX_DH DHPublic + | CKX_ECDH ByteString + deriving (Eq) + +instance Show ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData where + show (CKX_RSA _bs) = "CKX_RSA \"...\"" + show (CKX_DH pub) = "CKX_DH " ++ show pub + show (CKX_ECDH _bs) = "CKX_ECDH \"...\"" + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CertificateChain_ = CertificateChain_ CertificateChain deriving (Eq) +instance Show CertificateChain_ where + show (CertificateChain_ cc) = showCertificateChain cc + +emptyCertificateChain_ :: CertificateChain_ +emptyCertificateChain_ = CertificateChain_ (CertificateChain []) + +showCertificateChain :: CertificateChain -> String +showCertificateChain (CertificateChain xs) = show $ map getName xs + where + getName = + maybe "" getCharacterStringRawData + . lookup [2, 5, 4, 3] + . getDistinguishedElements + . certSubjectDN + . signedObject + . getSigned + +data ClientHello = CH + { chVersion :: Version + , chRandom :: ClientRandom + , chSession :: Session + , chCiphers :: [CipherId] + , chComps :: [CompressionID] + , chExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] + } + deriving (Eq, Show) + +data ServerHello = SH + { shVersion :: Version + , shRandom :: ServerRandom + , shSession :: Session + , shCipher :: CipherId + , shComp :: CompressionID + , shExtensions :: [ExtensionRaw] + } + deriving (Eq, Show) + +data Handshake + = ClientHello ClientHello + | ServerHello ServerHello + | Certificate CertificateChain_ + | HelloRequest + | ServerHelloDone + | ClientKeyXchg ClientKeyXchgAlgorithmData + | ServerKeyXchg ServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData + | CertRequest + [CertificateType] + [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + [DistinguishedName] + | CertVerify DigitallySigned + | Finished VerifyData + | NewSessionTicket Second Ticket + deriving (Show, Eq) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +packetType :: Packet -> ProtocolType +packetType (Handshake _ _) = ProtocolType_Handshake +packetType (Alert _) = ProtocolType_Alert +packetType ChangeCipherSpec = ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec +packetType (AppData _) = ProtocolType_AppData + +typeOfHandshake :: Handshake -> HandshakeType +typeOfHandshake ClientHello{} = HandshakeType_ClientHello +typeOfHandshake ServerHello{} = HandshakeType_ServerHello +typeOfHandshake Certificate{} = HandshakeType_Certificate +typeOfHandshake HelloRequest = HandshakeType_HelloRequest +typeOfHandshake ServerHelloDone = HandshakeType_ServerHelloDone +typeOfHandshake ClientKeyXchg{} = HandshakeType_ClientKeyXchg +typeOfHandshake ServerKeyXchg{} = HandshakeType_ServerKeyXchg +typeOfHandshake CertRequest{} = HandshakeType_CertRequest +typeOfHandshake CertVerify{} = HandshakeType_CertVerify +typeOfHandshake Finished{} = HandshakeType_Finished +typeOfHandshake NewSessionTicket{} = HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +type HandshakeR = (Handshake, WireBytes) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Struct13.hs b/Network/TLS/Struct13.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Struct13.hs @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +module Network.TLS.Struct13 ( + Packet13 (..), + Handshake13 (..), + typeOfHandshake13, + contentType, + KeyUpdate (..), + CertReqContext, + isKeyUpdate13, + TicketNonce (..), + SessionIDorTicket_ (..), + Handshake13R, +) where + +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Struct +import Network.TLS.Types + +data Packet13 + = Handshake13 [Handshake13] [WireBytes] + | Alert13 [(AlertLevel, AlertDescription)] + | ChangeCipherSpec13 + | AppData13 ByteString + deriving (Show, Eq) + +data KeyUpdate + = UpdateNotRequested + | UpdateRequested + deriving (Show, Eq) + +newtype TicketNonce = TicketNonce ByteString deriving (Eq) + +instance Show TicketNonce where + show (TicketNonce bs) = showBytesHex bs + +newtype SessionIDorTicket_ = SessionIDorTicket_ ByteString deriving (Eq) + +instance Show SessionIDorTicket_ where + show (SessionIDorTicket_ bs) = showBytesHex bs + +-- fixme: convert Word32 to proper data type +data Handshake13 + = ServerHello13 ServerHello + | NewSessionTicket13 Second Word32 TicketNonce SessionIDorTicket_ [ExtensionRaw] + | EndOfEarlyData13 + | EncryptedExtensions13 [ExtensionRaw] + | Certificate13 CertReqContext CertificateChain_ [[ExtensionRaw]] + | CertRequest13 CertReqContext [ExtensionRaw] + | CertVerify13 DigitallySigned + | Finished13 VerifyData + | KeyUpdate13 KeyUpdate + | CompressedCertificate13 CertReqContext CertificateChain_ [[ExtensionRaw]] + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Certificate request context for TLS 1.3. +type CertReqContext = ByteString + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +typeOfHandshake13 :: Handshake13 -> HandshakeType +typeOfHandshake13 ServerHello13{} = HandshakeType_ServerHello +typeOfHandshake13 NewSessionTicket13{} = HandshakeType_NewSessionTicket +typeOfHandshake13 EndOfEarlyData13{} = HandshakeType_EndOfEarlyData +typeOfHandshake13 EncryptedExtensions13{} = HandshakeType_EncryptedExtensions +typeOfHandshake13 Certificate13{} = HandshakeType_Certificate +typeOfHandshake13 CertRequest13{} = HandshakeType_CertRequest +typeOfHandshake13 CertVerify13{} = HandshakeType_CertVerify +typeOfHandshake13 Finished13{} = HandshakeType_Finished +typeOfHandshake13 KeyUpdate13{} = HandshakeType_KeyUpdate +typeOfHandshake13 CompressedCertificate13{} = HandshakeType_CompressedCertificate + +contentType :: Packet13 -> ProtocolType +contentType ChangeCipherSpec13 = ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec +contentType Handshake13{} = ProtocolType_Handshake +contentType Alert13{} = ProtocolType_Alert +contentType AppData13{} = ProtocolType_AppData +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +isKeyUpdate13 :: Handshake13 -> Bool +isKeyUpdate13 (KeyUpdate13 _) = True +isKeyUpdate13 _ = False + +type Handshake13R = (Handshake13, WireBytes) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types.hs b/Network/TLS/Types.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Types.hs @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +module Network.TLS.Types ( + module Network.TLS.Types.Cipher, + module Network.TLS.Types.Secret, + module Network.TLS.Types.Session, + module Network.TLS.Types.Version, + HostName, + Role (..), + invertRole, + Direction (..), + BigNum (..), + bigNumToInteger, + bigNumFromInteger, + defaultRecordSizeLimit, + TranscriptHash (..), + WireBytes, +) where + +import Network.Socket (HostName) + +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Types.Secret +import Network.TLS.Types.Session +import Network.TLS.Types.Version +import Network.TLS.Util.Serialization + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Role +data Role = ClientRole | ServerRole + deriving (Show, Eq) + +invertRole :: Role -> Role +invertRole ClientRole = ServerRole +invertRole ServerRole = ClientRole + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Direction +data Direction = Tx | Rx + deriving (Show, Eq) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype BigNum = BigNum ByteString + deriving (Show, Eq) + +bigNumToInteger :: BigNum -> Integer +bigNumToInteger (BigNum b) = os2ip b + +bigNumFromInteger :: Integer -> BigNum +bigNumFromInteger i = BigNum $ i2osp i + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- For plaintext +-- 2^14 for TLS 1.2 +-- 2^14 + 1 for TLS 1.3 +defaultRecordSizeLimit :: Int +defaultRecordSizeLimit = 16384 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype TranscriptHash = TranscriptHash ByteString + +instance Show TranscriptHash where + show (TranscriptHash bs) = showBytesHex bs + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +type WireBytes = [ByteString] diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Cipher.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Cipher.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Cipher.hs @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} + +module Network.TLS.Types.Cipher where + +import Crypto.Cipher.Types (AuthTag) +import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes) +import Data.IORef +import GHC.Generics +import System.IO.Unsafe (unsafePerformIO) +import Text.Printf + +import Network.TLS.Crypto (Hash (..)) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types.Version + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +type PlainText = ByteString +type CipherText = ByteString +type Secret = ScrubbedBytes +type Key = ScrubbedBytes +type IV = ByteString +type Nonce = ByteString -- aka IV +type AddDat = ByteString + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Cipher identification +type CipherID = Word16 + +newtype CipherId = CipherId {fromCipherId :: Word16} + deriving (Eq, Ord, Enum, Num, Integral, Real, Read, Generic) + +instance Show CipherId where + show (CipherId 0x00FF) = "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" + show (CipherId n) = case find eqID dict of + Just c -> cipherName c + Nothing -> printf "0x%04X" n + where + eqID c = cipherID c == n + dict = unsafePerformIO $ readIORef globalCipherDict + +-- "ciphersuite" is designed extensible. +-- So, it's not available from internal modules. +-- This is a compromise to gule "ciphersuite" to Show CipherID. + +{-# NOINLINE globalCipherDict #-} +globalCipherDict :: IORef [Cipher] +globalCipherDict = unsafePerformIO $ newIORef [] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Cipher algorithm +data Cipher = Cipher + { cipherID :: CipherID + , cipherName :: String + , cipherHash :: Hash + , cipherBulk :: Bulk + , cipherKeyExchange :: CipherKeyExchangeType + , cipherMinVer :: Maybe Version + , cipherPRFHash :: Maybe Hash + } + +instance Show Cipher where + show c = cipherName c + +instance Eq Cipher where + (==) c1 c2 = cipherID c1 == cipherID c2 + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data CipherKeyExchangeType + = CipherKeyExchange_RSA + | CipherKeyExchange_DH_Anon + | CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA + | CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + | CipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSA + | CipherKeyExchange_DH_DSA + | CipherKeyExchange_DH_RSA + | CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSA + | CipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSA + | CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA + | CipherKeyExchange_TLS13 -- not expressed in cipher suite + deriving (Show, Eq) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data Bulk = Bulk + { bulkName :: String + , bulkKeySize :: Int + , bulkIVSize :: Int + , bulkExplicitIV :: Int -- Explicit size for IV for AEAD Cipher, 0 otherwise + , bulkAuthTagLen :: Int -- Authentication tag length in bytes for AEAD Cipher, 0 otherwise + , bulkBlockSize :: Int + , bulkF :: BulkFunctions + } + +instance Show Bulk where + show bulk = bulkName bulk +instance Eq Bulk where + b1 == b2 = + and + [ bulkName b1 == bulkName b2 + , bulkKeySize b1 == bulkKeySize b2 + , bulkIVSize b1 == bulkIVSize b2 + , bulkBlockSize b1 == bulkBlockSize b2 + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data BulkFunctions + = BulkBlockF (BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkBlock) + | BulkStreamF (BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkStream) + | BulkAeadF (BulkDirection -> BulkKey -> BulkAEAD) + +data BulkDirection = BulkEncrypt | BulkDecrypt + deriving (Show, Eq) + +type BulkKey = Secret +type BulkIV = Nonce +type BulkNonce = Nonce +type BulkAdditionalData = ByteString + +type BulkBlock = BulkIV -> ByteString -> (ByteString, BulkIV) + +newtype BulkStream = BulkStream (ByteString -> (ByteString, BulkStream)) + +type BulkAEAD = + BulkNonce -> ByteString -> BulkAdditionalData -> (ByteString, AuthTag) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Secret.hs @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +module Network.TLS.Types.Secret where + +import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types.Cipher + +-- | Phantom type indicating early traffic secret. +data EarlySecret + +-- | Phantom type indicating handshake traffic secrets. +data HandshakeSecret + +-- | Phantom type indicating application traffic secrets. +data ApplicationSecret + +data ResumptionSecret + +newtype BaseSecret a = BaseSecret Secret + +instance Show (BaseSecret a) where + show (BaseSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + +newtype AnyTrafficSecret a = AnyTrafficSecret Secret + +instance Show (AnyTrafficSecret a) where + show (AnyTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + +-- | A client traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the +-- TLS key schedule. +newtype ClientTrafficSecret a = ClientTrafficSecret Secret + +instance Show (ClientTrafficSecret a) where + show (ClientTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + +-- | A server traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the +-- TLS key schedule. +newtype ServerTrafficSecret a = ServerTrafficSecret Secret + +instance Show (ServerTrafficSecret a) where + show (ServerTrafficSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs + +data SecretTriple a = SecretTriple + { triBase :: BaseSecret a + , triClient :: ClientTrafficSecret a + , triServer :: ServerTrafficSecret a + } + deriving (Show) + +data SecretPair a = SecretPair + { pairBase :: BaseSecret a + , pairClient :: ClientTrafficSecret a + } + deriving (Show) + +-- | Hold both client and server traffic secrets at the same step. +type TrafficSecrets a = (ClientTrafficSecret a, ServerTrafficSecret a) + +-- Main secret for TLS 1.2 or earlier. +newtype MainSecret = MainSecret Secret + +instance Show MainSecret where + show (MainSecret bs) = showBytesHex $ convert bs diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Session.hs @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-} + +module Network.TLS.Types.Session where + +import Codec.Serialise +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import GHC.Generics +import Network.Socket (HostName) + +import Network.TLS.Crypto (Group, Hash (..), hash) +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Types.Version + +-- | A session ID +type SessionID = ByteString + +-- | Identity +type SessionIDorTicket = ByteString + +-- | Encrypted session ticket (encrypt(encode 'SessionData')). +type Ticket = ByteString + +isTicket :: SessionIDorTicket -> Bool +isTicket x + | B.length x > 32 = True + | otherwise = False + +toSessionID :: Ticket -> SessionID +toSessionID = hash SHA256 + +-- | Compression identification +type CompressionID = Word8 + +-- | Session data to resume +data SessionData = SessionData + { sessionVersion :: Version + , sessionCipher :: CipherID + , sessionCompression :: CompressionID + , sessionClientSNI :: Maybe HostName + , -- ScrubbedBytes is not an instance of Generic, sigh. + sessionSecret :: ByteString + , sessionGroup :: Maybe Group + , sessionTicketInfo :: Maybe TLS13TicketInfo + , sessionALPN :: Maybe ByteString + , sessionMaxEarlyDataSize :: Int + , sessionFlags :: [SessionFlag] + } -- sessionFromTicket :: Bool + deriving (Show, Eq, Generic) + +is0RTTPossible :: SessionData -> Bool +is0RTTPossible sd = sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sd > 0 + +-- | Some session flags +data SessionFlag + = -- | Session created with Extended Main Secret + SessionEMS + deriving (Show, Eq, Enum, Generic) + +type Second = Word32 +type Millisecond = Word64 + +data TLS13TicketInfo = TLS13TicketInfo + { lifetime :: Second -- NewSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime in seconds + , ageAdd :: Second -- NewSessionTicket.ticket_age_add + , txrxTime :: Millisecond -- serverSendTime or clientReceiveTime + , estimatedRTT :: Maybe Millisecond + } + deriving (Show, Eq, Generic) + +instance Serialise TLS13TicketInfo +instance Serialise SessionFlag +instance Serialise SessionData diff --git a/Network/TLS/Types/Version.hs b/Network/TLS/Types/Version.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Types/Version.hs @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveGeneric #-} +{-# LANGUAGE PatternSynonyms #-} + +module Network.TLS.Types.Version ( + Version (Version, SSL2, SSL3, TLS10, TLS11, TLS12, TLS13), +) where + +import Codec.Serialise +import GHC.Generics + +import Network.TLS.Imports + +-- | Versions known to TLS +newtype Version = Version Word16 deriving (Eq, Ord, Generic) + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +pattern SSL2 :: Version +pattern SSL2 = Version 0x0002 +pattern SSL3 :: Version +pattern SSL3 = Version 0x0300 +pattern TLS10 :: Version +pattern TLS10 = Version 0x0301 +pattern TLS11 :: Version +pattern TLS11 = Version 0x0302 +pattern TLS12 :: Version +pattern TLS12 = Version 0x0303 +pattern TLS13 :: Version +pattern TLS13 = Version 0x0304 + +instance Show Version where + show SSL2 = "SSL2" + show SSL3 = "SSL3" + show TLS10 = "TLS1.0" + show TLS11 = "TLS1.1" + show TLS12 = "TLS1.2" + show TLS13 = "TLS1.3" + show (Version x) = "Version " ++ show x +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +instance Serialise Version diff --git a/Network/TLS/Util.hs b/Network/TLS/Util.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Util.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Util.hs @@ -1,64 +1,125 @@ -module Network.TLS.Util - ( sub - , takelast - , partition3 - , partition6 - , fromJust - , and' - , (&&!) - , bytesEq - ) where +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-incomplete-uni-patterns #-} -import Data.List (foldl') -import Network.TLS.Struct (Bytes) +module Network.TLS.Util ( + sub, + takelast, + partition3, + partition6, + (&&!), + fmapEither, + catchException, + forEitherM, + mapChunks_, + getChunks, + Saved, + saveMVar, + restoreMVar, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Control.Exception (SomeAsyncException (..)) +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA import qualified Data.ByteString as B -sub :: Bytes -> Int -> Int -> Maybe Bytes +import Network.TLS.Imports + +sub :: ByteString -> Int -> Int -> Maybe ByteString sub b offset len - | B.length b < offset + len = Nothing - | otherwise = Just $ B.take len $ snd $ B.splitAt offset b + | B.length b < offset + len = Nothing + | otherwise = Just $ B.take len $ snd $ B.splitAt offset b -takelast :: Int -> Bytes -> Maybe Bytes +takelast :: Int -> ByteString -> Maybe ByteString takelast i b - | B.length b >= i = sub b (B.length b - i) i - | otherwise = Nothing - -partition3 :: Bytes -> (Int,Int,Int) -> Maybe (Bytes, Bytes, Bytes) -partition3 bytes (d1,d2,d3) = if B.length bytes /= s then Nothing else Just (p1,p2,p3) - where - s = sum [d1,d2,d3] - (p1, r1) = B.splitAt d1 bytes - (p2, r2) = B.splitAt d2 r1 - (p3, _) = B.splitAt d3 r2 - -partition6 :: Bytes -> (Int,Int,Int,Int,Int,Int) -> Maybe (Bytes, Bytes, Bytes, Bytes, Bytes, Bytes) -partition6 bytes (d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6) = if B.length bytes < s then Nothing else Just (p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6) - where - s = sum [d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6] - (p1, r1) = B.splitAt d1 bytes - (p2, r2) = B.splitAt d2 r1 - (p3, r3) = B.splitAt d3 r2 - (p4, r4) = B.splitAt d4 r3 - (p5, r5) = B.splitAt d5 r4 - (p6, _) = B.splitAt d6 r5 + | B.length b >= i = sub b (B.length b - i) i + | otherwise = Nothing -fromJust :: String -> Maybe a -> a -fromJust what Nothing = error ("fromJust " ++ what ++ ": Nothing") -- yuck -fromJust _ (Just x) = x +partition3 + :: ByteString -> (Int, Int, Int) -> Maybe (ByteString, ByteString, ByteString) +partition3 bytes (d1, d2, d3) + | any (< 0) l = Nothing + | sum l /= B.length bytes = Nothing + | otherwise = Just (p1, p2, p3) + where + l = [d1, d2, d3] + (p1, r1) = B.splitAt d1 bytes + (p2, r2) = B.splitAt d2 r1 + (p3, _) = B.splitAt d3 r2 --- | This is a strict version of and -and' :: [Bool] -> Bool -and' l = foldl' (&&!) True l +partition6 + :: ScrubbedBytes + -> (Int, Int, Int, Int, Int, Int) + -> Maybe + ( ScrubbedBytes + , ScrubbedBytes + , ScrubbedBytes + , ScrubbedBytes + , ScrubbedBytes + , ScrubbedBytes + ) +partition6 bytes (d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6) = if BA.length bytes < s then Nothing else Just (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6) + where + slice' (beg, len) = BA.unsafeSlice bytes beg len + lens = [d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6] + s = sum lens + begs = scanl (+) 0 lens + ys = zip begs lens + [p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6] = map slice' ys -- | This is a strict version of &&. (&&!) :: Bool -> Bool -> Bool -True &&! True = True -True &&! False = False -False &&! True = False +True &&! True = True +True &&! False = False +False &&! True = False False &&! False = False --- | verify that 2 bytestrings are equals. --- it's a non lazy version, that will compare every bytes. --- arguments need to be of same length -bytesEq :: Bytes -> Bytes -> Bool -bytesEq b1 = and' . B.zipWith (==) b1 +fmapEither :: (a -> b) -> Either l a -> Either l b +fmapEither f = fmap f + +catchException :: IO a -> (E.SomeException -> IO a) -> IO a +catchException f handler = E.catchJust filterExn f handler + where + filterExn :: E.SomeException -> Maybe E.SomeException + filterExn e = case E.fromException (E.toException e) of + Just (SomeAsyncException _) -> Nothing + Nothing -> Just e + +forEitherM :: Monad m => [a] -> (a -> m (Either l b)) -> m (Either l [b]) +forEitherM [] _ = return (pure []) +forEitherM (x : xs) f = f x >>= doTail + where + doTail (Right b) = fmap (b :) <$> forEitherM xs f + doTail (Left e) = return (Left e) + +mapChunks_ + :: Monad m + => Maybe Int + -> (ByteString -> m a) + -> ByteString + -> m () +mapChunks_ len f = mapM_ f . getChunks len + +getChunks :: Maybe Int -> ByteString -> [ByteString] +getChunks Nothing = (: []) +getChunks (Just len) = go + where + go bs + | B.length bs > len = + let (chunk, remain) = B.splitAt len bs + in chunk : go remain + | otherwise = [bs] + +-- | An opaque newtype wrapper to prevent from poking inside content that has +-- been saved. +newtype Saved a = Saved a + +-- | Save the content of an 'MVar' to restore it later. +saveMVar :: MVar a -> IO (Saved a) +saveMVar ref = Saved <$> readMVar ref + +-- | Restore the content of an 'MVar' to a previous saved value and return the +-- content that has just been replaced. +restoreMVar :: MVar a -> Saved a -> IO (Saved a) +restoreMVar ref (Saved val) = Saved <$> swapMVar ref val diff --git a/Network/TLS/Util/ASN1.hs b/Network/TLS/Util/ASN1.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Util/ASN1.hs @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +-- | ASN1 utils for TLS +module Network.TLS.Util.ASN1 ( + decodeASN1Object, + encodeASN1Object, +) where + +import Data.ASN1.BinaryEncoding (DER (..)) +import Data.ASN1.Encoding (decodeASN1', encodeASN1') +import Data.ASN1.Types (ASN1Object, fromASN1, toASN1) + +import Network.TLS.Imports + +-- | Attempt to decode a bytestring representing +-- an DER ASN.1 serialized object into the object. +decodeASN1Object + :: ASN1Object a + => String + -> ByteString + -> Either String a +decodeASN1Object name bs = + case decodeASN1' DER bs of + Left e -> Left (name ++ ": cannot decode ASN1: " ++ show e) + Right asn1 -> case fromASN1 asn1 of + Left e -> Left (name ++ ": cannot parse ASN1: " ++ show e) + Right (d, _) -> Right d + +-- | Encode an ASN.1 Object to the DER serialized bytestring +encodeASN1Object + :: ASN1Object a + => a + -> ByteString +encodeASN1Object obj = encodeASN1' DER $ toASN1 obj [] diff --git a/Network/TLS/Util/Serialization.hs b/Network/TLS/Util/Serialization.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/Util/Serialization.hs @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +module Network.TLS.Util.Serialization ( + os2ip, + i2osp, + i2ospOf_, +) where + +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2osp, i2ospOf_, os2ip) diff --git a/Network/TLS/Wire.hs b/Network/TLS/Wire.hs --- a/Network/TLS/Wire.hs +++ b/Network/TLS/Wire.hs @@ -1,56 +1,91 @@ --- | --- Module : Network.TLS.Wire --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : unknown --- --- the Wire module is a specialized marshalling/unmarshalling package related to the TLS protocol. --- all multibytes values are written as big endian. --- -module Network.TLS.Wire - ( Get - , runGet - , remaining - , getWord8 - , getWords8 - , getWord16 - , getWords16 - , getWord24 - , getBytes - , getOpaque8 - , getOpaque16 - , getOpaque24 - , processBytes - , isEmpty - , Put - , runPut - , putWord8 - , putWords8 - , putWord16 - , putWords16 - , putWord24 - , putBytes - , putOpaque8 - , putOpaque16 - , putOpaque24 - , encodeWord16 - , encodeWord64 - ) where +-- | The Wire module is a specialized marshalling/unmarshalling +-- package related to the TLS protocol. All multibytes values are +-- written as big endian. +module Network.TLS.Wire ( + Get, + GetResult (..), + GetContinuation, + runGet, + runGetErr, + runGetMaybe, + tryGet, + remaining, + getWord8, + getWords8, + getWord16, + getWords16, + getWord24, + getWord32, + getWord64, + getBytes, + getOpaque8, + getOpaque16, + getOpaque24, + getInteger16, + getBigNum16, + getList, + processBytes, + isEmpty, + Put, + runPut, + putWord8, + putWords8, + putWord16, + putWords16, + putWord24, + putWord32, + putWord64, + putBytes, + putOpaque8, + putOpaque16, + putOpaque24, + putInteger16, + putBigNum16, + encodeWord16, + encodeWord32, + encodeWord64, +) where +import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Data.Serialize.Get hiding (runGet) import qualified Data.Serialize.Get as G import Data.Serialize.Put -import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -import Control.Monad.Error -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Data.Word -import Data.Bits -import Network.TLS.Struct -runGet :: String -> Get a -> Bytes -> Either String a -runGet lbl f = G.runGet (label lbl f) +import Network.TLS.Error +import Network.TLS.Imports +import Network.TLS.Types +import Network.TLS.Util.Serialization +type GetContinuation a = ByteString -> GetResult a +data GetResult a + = GotError TLSError + | GotPartial (GetContinuation a) + | GotSuccess a + | GotSuccessRemaining a ByteString + +runGet :: String -> Get a -> ByteString -> GetResult a +runGet lbl f = toGetResult <$> G.runGetPartial (label lbl f) + where + toGetResult (G.Fail err _) = GotError (Error_Packet_Parsing err) + toGetResult (G.Partial cont) = GotPartial (toGetResult <$> cont) + toGetResult (G.Done r bsLeft) + | B.null bsLeft = GotSuccess r + | otherwise = GotSuccessRemaining r bsLeft + +runGetErr :: String -> Get a -> ByteString -> Either TLSError a +runGetErr lbl getter b = toSimple $ runGet lbl getter b + where + toSimple (GotError err) = Left err + toSimple (GotPartial _) = Left (Error_Packet_Parsing (lbl ++ ": parsing error: partial packet")) + toSimple (GotSuccessRemaining _ _) = Left (Error_Packet_Parsing (lbl ++ ": parsing error: remaining bytes")) + toSimple (GotSuccess r) = Right r + +runGetMaybe :: Get a -> ByteString -> Maybe a +runGetMaybe f = either (const Nothing) Just . G.runGet f + +tryGet :: Get a -> ByteString -> Maybe a +tryGet f = either (const Nothing) Just . G.runGet f + getWords8 :: Get [Word8] getWords8 = getWord8 >>= \lenb -> replicateM (fromIntegral lenb) getWord8 @@ -58,61 +93,101 @@ getWord16 = getWord16be getWords16 :: Get [Word16] -getWords16 = getWord16 >>= \lenb -> replicateM (fromIntegral lenb `div` 2) getWord16 +getWords16 = do + lenb <- getWord16 + when (odd lenb) $ fail "length for ciphers must be even" + replicateM (fromIntegral lenb `shiftR` 1) getWord16 getWord24 :: Get Int getWord24 = do - a <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 - b <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 - c <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 - return $ (a `shiftL` 16) .|. (b `shiftL` 8) .|. c + a <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + b <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + c <- fromIntegral <$> getWord8 + return $ (a `shiftL` 16) .|. (b `shiftL` 8) .|. c -getOpaque8 :: Get Bytes +getWord32 :: Get Word32 +getWord32 = getWord32be + +getWord64 :: Get Word64 +getWord64 = getWord64be + +getOpaque8 :: Get ByteString getOpaque8 = getWord8 >>= getBytes . fromIntegral -getOpaque16 :: Get Bytes +getOpaque16 :: Get ByteString getOpaque16 = getWord16 >>= getBytes . fromIntegral -getOpaque24 :: Get Bytes +getOpaque24 :: Get ByteString getOpaque24 = getWord24 >>= getBytes +getInteger16 :: Get Integer +getInteger16 = os2ip <$> getOpaque16 + +getBigNum16 :: Get BigNum +getBigNum16 = BigNum <$> getOpaque16 + +getList :: Int -> Get (Int, a) -> Get [a] +getList totalLen getElement = isolate totalLen (getElements totalLen) + where + getElements len + | len < 0 = + error "list consumed too much data. should never happen with isolate." + | len == 0 = return [] + | otherwise = + getElement >>= \(elementLen, a) -> (:) a <$> getElements (len - elementLen) + processBytes :: Int -> Get a -> Get a processBytes i f = isolate i f putWords8 :: [Word8] -> Put putWords8 l = do - putWord8 $ fromIntegral (length l) - mapM_ putWord8 l + putWord8 $ fromIntegral (length l) + mapM_ putWord8 l putWord16 :: Word16 -> Put putWord16 = putWord16be +putWord32 :: Word32 -> Put +putWord32 = putWord32be + +putWord64 :: Word64 -> Put +putWord64 = putWord64be + putWords16 :: [Word16] -> Put putWords16 l = do - putWord16 $ 2 * (fromIntegral $ length l) - mapM_ putWord16 l + putWord16 $ 2 * fromIntegral (length l) + mapM_ putWord16 l putWord24 :: Int -> Put putWord24 i = do - let a = fromIntegral ((i `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff) - let b = fromIntegral ((i `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff) - let c = fromIntegral (i .&. 0xff) - mapM_ putWord8 [a,b,c] + let a = fromIntegral ((i `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff) + let b = fromIntegral ((i `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff) + let c = fromIntegral (i .&. 0xff) + mapM_ putWord8 [a, b, c] -putBytes :: Bytes -> Put +putBytes :: ByteString -> Put putBytes = putByteString -putOpaque8 :: Bytes -> Put +putOpaque8 :: ByteString -> Put putOpaque8 b = putWord8 (fromIntegral $ B.length b) >> putBytes b -putOpaque16 :: Bytes -> Put +putOpaque16 :: ByteString -> Put putOpaque16 b = putWord16 (fromIntegral $ B.length b) >> putBytes b -putOpaque24 :: Bytes -> Put +putOpaque24 :: ByteString -> Put putOpaque24 b = putWord24 (B.length b) >> putBytes b -encodeWord16 :: Word16 -> Bytes +putInteger16 :: Integer -> Put +putInteger16 = putOpaque16 . i2osp + +putBigNum16 :: BigNum -> Put +putBigNum16 (BigNum b) = putOpaque16 b + +encodeWord16 :: Word16 -> ByteString encodeWord16 = runPut . putWord16 -encodeWord64 :: Word64 -> Bytes +encodeWord32 :: Word32 -> ByteString +encodeWord32 = runPut . putWord32 + +encodeWord64 :: Word64 -> ByteString encodeWord64 = runPut . putWord64be diff --git a/Network/TLS/X509.hs b/Network/TLS/X509.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Network/TLS/X509.hs @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +-- | X509 helpers +module Network.TLS.X509 ( + CertificateChain (..), + Certificate (..), + SignedCertificate, + getCertificate, + isNullCertificateChain, + getCertificateChainLeaf, + CertificateRejectReason (..), + CertificateUsage (..), + CertificateStore, + ValidationCache, + defaultValidationCache, + exceptionValidationCache, + validateDefault, + FailedReason, + ServiceID, + wrapCertificateChecks, + pubkeyType, + validateClientCertificate, +) where + +import Data.X509 +import Data.X509.CertificateStore +import Data.X509.Validation + +isNullCertificateChain :: CertificateChain -> Bool +isNullCertificateChain (CertificateChain l) = null l + +getCertificateChainLeaf :: CertificateChain -> SignedExact Certificate +getCertificateChainLeaf (CertificateChain []) = error "empty certificate chain" +getCertificateChainLeaf (CertificateChain (x : _)) = x + +-- | Certificate and Chain rejection reason +data CertificateRejectReason + = CertificateRejectExpired + | CertificateRejectRevoked + | CertificateRejectUnknownCA + | CertificateRejectAbsent + | CertificateRejectOther String + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Certificate Usage callback possible returns values. +data CertificateUsage + = -- | usage of certificate accepted + CertificateUsageAccept + | -- | usage of certificate rejected + CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectReason + deriving (Show, Eq) + +wrapCertificateChecks :: [FailedReason] -> CertificateUsage +wrapCertificateChecks [] = CertificateUsageAccept +wrapCertificateChecks l + | Expired `elem` l = CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectExpired + | InFuture `elem` l = CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectExpired + | UnknownCA `elem` l = CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA + | SelfSigned `elem` l = CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA + | EmptyChain `elem` l = CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectAbsent + | otherwise = CertificateUsageReject $ CertificateRejectOther (show l) + +pubkeyType :: PubKey -> String +pubkeyType = show . pubkeyToAlg + +-- | A utility function for client authentication which can be used +-- `onClientCertificate`. +-- +-- Since: 2.1.7 +validateClientCertificate + :: CertificateStore + -> ValidationCache + -> CertificateChain + -> IO CertificateUsage +validateClientCertificate store cache cc = + wrapCertificateChecks + <$> validate + HashSHA256 + defaultHooks + defaultChecks{checkFQHN = False} + store + cache + ("", mempty) + cc diff --git a/README.md b/README.md deleted file mode 100644 --- a/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,45 +0,0 @@ -haskell TLS -=========== - -This library provide native Haskell TLS and SSL protocol implementation for server and client. - -Description ------------ - -This provides a high-level implementation of a sensitive security protocol, -eliminating a common set of security issues through the use of the advanced -type system, high level constructions and common Haskell features. - -Only core protocol available here, have a look at the tls-extra package for -default ciphers, compressions and certificates functions. - -Features --------- - -* tiny code base (more than 20 times smaller than openSSL, and 10 times smaller than gnuTLS) -* permissive license: BSD3. -* supported versions: SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1, TLS1.2. -* key exchange supported: only RSA. -* bulk algorithm supported: any stream or block ciphers. -* supported extensions: secure renegociation - -Common Issues -------------- - -The tools mentioned below are all available from the tls-debug package. - -* Certificate issues - -It's useful to run the following command, which will connect to the destination and -retrieve the certificate chained used. - - tls-retrievecertificate -d -p -v -c - -As an output it will print every certificates in the chain and will gives the issuer and subjects of each. -It creates a chain where issuer of certificate is the subject of the next certificate part of the chain: - - (subject #1, issuer #2) -> (subject #2, issuer #3) -> (subject #3, issuer #3) - -A "CA is unknown" error indicates that your system doesn't have a certificate in -the trusted store belonging to any of the node of the chain. - diff --git a/Setup.hs b/Setup.hs --- a/Setup.hs +++ b/Setup.hs @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ import Distribution.Simple + main = defaultMain diff --git a/TODO b/TODO deleted file mode 100644 --- a/TODO +++ /dev/null @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@ -protocol: - -- implement Certificate Verify / Certificate Request -- add Client Certificates -- process session as they should -- put 4 bytes of time in client/server random -- proper separation for key exchange algorithm (hardcoded to RSA at the moment in differents place) -- implements different key exchange algorithm -- implement AEAD bulk algorithm (TLS1.2) - -code cleanup: - -- remove show derivation on internal crypto state -- opaquify differents data type through newtype - -security audit: - -- add more unit tests for pure parts -- match security recommendation from the RFC - -misc: - -- investigate an iteratee/enumerator interface -- portability -- implement more ciphers -- check & optimize memory footprint -- compare & optimize performance diff --git a/Tests.hs b/Tests.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Tests.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,280 +0,0 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} - -import Test.QuickCheck -import Test.QuickCheck.Monadic -import Test.Framework (defaultMain, testGroup) -import Test.Framework.Providers.QuickCheck2 (testProperty) - -import Tests.Certificate -import Tests.PipeChan -import Tests.Connection - -import Data.Maybe -import Data.Word - -import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L -import Network.TLS.Core -import Network.TLS.Cipher -import Network.TLS.Struct -import Network.TLS.Packet -import Control.Applicative -import Control.Concurrent -import Control.Exception (throw, catch, SomeException) -import Control.Monad - -import Data.IORef - -import Prelude hiding (catch) - -genByteString :: Int -> Gen B.ByteString -genByteString i = B.pack <$> vector i - -instance Arbitrary Version where - arbitrary = elements [ SSL2, SSL3, TLS10, TLS11, TLS12 ] - -instance Arbitrary ProtocolType where - arbitrary = elements - [ ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec - , ProtocolType_Alert - , ProtocolType_Handshake - , ProtocolType_AppData ] - -#if MIN_VERSION_QuickCheck(2,3,0) -#else -instance Arbitrary Word8 where - arbitrary = fromIntegral <$> (choose (0,255) :: Gen Int) - -instance Arbitrary Word16 where - arbitrary = fromIntegral <$> (choose (0,65535) :: Gen Int) -#endif - -instance Arbitrary Header where - arbitrary = Header <$> arbitrary <*> arbitrary <*> arbitrary - -instance Arbitrary ClientRandom where - arbitrary = ClientRandom <$> (genByteString 32) - -instance Arbitrary ServerRandom where - arbitrary = ServerRandom <$> (genByteString 32) - -instance Arbitrary Session where - arbitrary = do - i <- choose (1,2) :: Gen Int - case i of - 2 -> liftM (Session . Just) (genByteString 32) - _ -> return $ Session Nothing - -arbitraryCiphersIDs :: Gen [Word16] -arbitraryCiphersIDs = choose (0,200) >>= vector - -arbitraryCompressionIDs :: Gen [Word8] -arbitraryCompressionIDs = choose (0,200) >>= vector - -someWords8 :: Int -> Gen [Word8] -someWords8 i = replicateM i (fromIntegral <$> (choose (0,255) :: Gen Int)) - -instance Arbitrary CertificateType where - arbitrary = elements - [ CertificateType_RSA_Sign, CertificateType_DSS_Sign - , CertificateType_RSA_Fixed_DH, CertificateType_DSS_Fixed_DH - , CertificateType_RSA_Ephemeral_DH, CertificateType_DSS_Ephemeral_DH - , CertificateType_fortezza_dms ] - -instance Arbitrary Handshake where - arbitrary = oneof - [ ClientHello - <$> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> arbitraryCiphersIDs - <*> arbitraryCompressionIDs - <*> (return []) - , ServerHello - <$> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> arbitrary - <*> (return []) - , liftM Certificates (resize 2 $ listOf $ arbitraryX509) - , pure HelloRequest - , pure ServerHelloDone - , ClientKeyXchg <$> genByteString 48 - --, liftM ServerKeyXchg - --, liftM3 CertRequest arbitrary (return Nothing) (return []) - --, liftM CertVerify (return []) - , Finished <$> (genByteString 12) - ] - -{- quickcheck property -} - -prop_header_marshalling_id :: Header -> Bool -prop_header_marshalling_id x = (decodeHeader $ encodeHeader x) == Right x - -prop_handshake_marshalling_id :: Handshake -> Bool -prop_handshake_marshalling_id x = (decodeHs $ encodeHandshake x) == Right x - where - decodeHs b = either (Left . id) (uncurry (decodeHandshake cp) . head) $ decodeHandshakes b - cp = CurrentParams { cParamsVersion = TLS10, cParamsKeyXchgType = CipherKeyExchange_RSA } - -prop_pipe_work :: PropertyM IO () -prop_pipe_work = do - pipe <- run newPipe - _ <- run (runPipe pipe) - - let bSize = 16 - n <- pick (choose (1, 32)) - - let d1 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 40 - let d2 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 45 - - d1' <- run (writePipeA pipe d1 >> readPipeB pipe (B.length d1)) - d1 `assertEq` d1' - - d2' <- run (writePipeB pipe d2 >> readPipeA pipe (B.length d2)) - d2 `assertEq` d2' - - return () - -establish_data_pipe params tlsServer tlsClient = do - -- initial setup - pipe <- newPipe - _ <- (runPipe pipe) - startQueue <- newChan - resultQueue <- newChan - - (cCtx, sCtx) <- newPairContext pipe params - - _ <- forkIO $ catch (tlsServer sCtx resultQueue) (printAndRaise "server") - _ <- forkIO $ catch (tlsClient startQueue cCtx) (printAndRaise "client") - - return (startQueue, resultQueue) - where - printAndRaise :: String -> SomeException -> IO () - printAndRaise s e = putStrLn (s ++ " exception: " ++ show e) >> throw e - -recvDataNonNull ctx = recvData' ctx >>= \l -> if L.null l then recvDataNonNull ctx else return l - -prop_handshake_initiate :: PropertyM IO () -prop_handshake_initiate = do - params <- pick arbitraryPairParams - (startQueue, resultQueue) <- run (establish_data_pipe params tlsServer tlsClient) - - {- the test involves writing data on one side of the data "pipe" and - - then checking we received them on the other side of the data "pipe" -} - d <- L.pack <$> pick (someWords8 256) - run $ writeChan startQueue d - - dres <- run $ readChan resultQueue - d `assertEq` dres - - return () - where - tlsServer ctx queue = do - handshake ctx - d <- recvDataNonNull ctx - writeChan queue d - return () - tlsClient queue ctx = do - handshake ctx - d <- readChan queue - sendData ctx d - bye ctx - return () - -prop_handshake_renegociation :: PropertyM IO () -prop_handshake_renegociation = do - params <- pick arbitraryPairParams - (startQueue, resultQueue) <- run (establish_data_pipe params tlsServer tlsClient) - - {- the test involves writing data on one side of the data "pipe" and - - then checking we received them on the other side of the data "pipe" -} - d <- L.pack <$> pick (someWords8 256) - run $ writeChan startQueue d - - dres <- run $ readChan resultQueue - d `assertEq` dres - - return () - where - tlsServer ctx queue = do - handshake ctx - d <- recvDataNonNull ctx - writeChan queue d - return () - tlsClient queue ctx = do - handshake ctx - handshake ctx - d <- readChan queue - sendData ctx d - bye ctx - return () - -prop_handshake_session_resumption :: PropertyM IO () -prop_handshake_session_resumption = do - sessionRef <- run $ newIORef Nothing - - plainParams <- pick arbitraryPairParams - let params = setPairParamsSessionSaving (\sid d -> writeIORef sessionRef $ Just (sid,d)) plainParams - - -- establish a session. - (s1, r1) <- run (establish_data_pipe params tlsServer tlsClient) - - d <- L.pack <$> pick (someWords8 256) - run $ writeChan s1 d - dres <- run $ readChan r1 - d `assertEq` dres - - -- and resume - sessionParams <- run $ readIORef sessionRef - assert (isJust sessionParams) - let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) plainParams - - -- resume - (startQueue, resultQueue) <- run (establish_data_pipe params2 tlsServer tlsClient) - - {- the test involves writing data on one side of the data "pipe" and - - then checking we received them on the other side of the data "pipe" -} - d2 <- L.pack <$> pick (someWords8 256) - run $ writeChan startQueue d2 - - dres2 <- run $ readChan resultQueue - d2 `assertEq` dres2 - - return () - where - tlsServer ctx queue = do - handshake ctx - d <- recvDataNonNull ctx - writeChan queue d - return () - tlsClient queue ctx = do - handshake ctx - d <- readChan queue - sendData ctx d - bye ctx - return () - -assertEq :: (Show a, Monad m, Eq a) => a -> a -> m () -assertEq expected got = unless (expected == got) $ error ("got " ++ show got ++ " but was expecting " ++ show expected) - -main :: IO () -main = defaultMain - [ tests_marshalling - , tests_handshake - ] - where - -- lowlevel tests to check the packet marshalling. - tests_marshalling = testGroup "Marshalling" - [ testProperty "Header" prop_header_marshalling_id - , testProperty "Handshake" prop_handshake_marshalling_id - ] - - -- high level tests between a client and server with fake ciphers. - tests_handshake = testGroup "Handshakes" - [ testProperty "setup" (monadicIO prop_pipe_work) - , testProperty "initiate" (monadicIO prop_handshake_initiate) - , testProperty "renegociation" (monadicIO prop_handshake_renegociation) - , testProperty "resumption" (monadicIO prop_handshake_session_resumption) - ] diff --git a/test/API.hs b/test/API.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/API.hs @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module API where + +import Control.Applicative +import Control.Monad +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import Data.Maybe +import Network.TLS +import Test.Hspec + +checkCtxFinished :: Context -> IO () +checkCtxFinished ctx = do + mUnique <- getTLSUnique ctx + mExporter <- getTLSExporter ctx + when (isNothing (mUnique <|> mExporter)) $ + fail "unexpected channel binding" + +recvDataAssert :: Context -> ByteString -> IO () +recvDataAssert ctx expected = do + got <- recvData ctx + got `shouldBe` expected diff --git a/test/Arbitrary.hs b/test/Arbitrary.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/Arbitrary.hs @@ -0,0 +1,452 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-} +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-orphans #-} + +module Arbitrary where + +import Control.Monad +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.List +import Data.Word +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag) +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Internal +import Test.QuickCheck + +import Certificate +import PubKey + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +instance Arbitrary Version where + arbitrary = elements [TLS12, TLS13] + +instance Arbitrary ProtocolType where + arbitrary = + elements + [ ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec + , ProtocolType_Alert + , ProtocolType_Handshake + , ProtocolType_AppData + ] + +instance Arbitrary Header where + arbitrary = Header <$> arbitrary <*> arbitrary <*> arbitrary + +instance Arbitrary ClientRandom where + arbitrary = ClientRandom <$> genByteString 32 + +instance Arbitrary ServerRandom where + arbitrary = ServerRandom <$> genByteString 32 + +instance Arbitrary Session where + arbitrary = do + i <- choose (1, 2) :: Gen Int + case i of + 2 -> Session . Just <$> genByteString 32 + _ -> return $ Session Nothing + +instance {-# OVERLAPS #-} Arbitrary [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] where + arbitrary = shuffle supportedSignatureSchemes + +instance Arbitrary DigitallySigned where + arbitrary = DigitallySigned . unsafeHead <$> arbitrary <*> genByteString 32 + +instance Arbitrary ExtensionRaw where + arbitrary = + let arbitraryContent = choose (0, 40) >>= genByteString + in ExtensionRaw . ExtensionID <$> arbitrary <*> arbitraryContent + +instance Arbitrary CertificateType where + arbitrary = + elements + [ CertificateType_RSA_Sign + , CertificateType_DSA_Sign + , CertificateType_ECDSA_Sign + ] + +instance Arbitrary CipherId where + arbitrary = CipherId <$> arbitrary + +instance Arbitrary Handshake where + arbitrary = + oneof + [ arbitrary >>= \ver -> do + ClientHello + <$> ( CH ver + <$> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> arbitraryCiphersIds + <*> arbitraryCompressionIDs + <*> arbitraryHelloExtensions ver + ) + , arbitrary >>= \ver -> + ServerHello + <$> ( SH ver + <$> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> arbitraryHelloExtensions ver + ) + , Certificate . CertificateChain_ . CertificateChain + <$> resize 2 (listOf arbitraryX509) + , pure HelloRequest + , pure ServerHelloDone + , ClientKeyXchg . CKX_RSA <$> genByteString 48 + , CertRequest <$> arbitrary <*> arbitrary <*> listOf arbitraryDN + , CertVerify <$> arbitrary + , Finished . VerifyData <$> genByteString 12 + ] + +instance Arbitrary Handshake13 where + arbitrary = + oneof + [ arbitrary >>= \ver -> + ServerHello13 + <$> ( SH TLS12 + <$> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> pure 0 + <*> arbitraryHelloExtensions ver + ) + , NewSessionTicket13 + <$> arbitrary + <*> arbitrary + <*> (TicketNonce <$> genByteString 32) -- nonce + <*> (SessionIDorTicket_ <$> genByteString 32) -- session ID + <*> arbitrary + , pure EndOfEarlyData13 + , EncryptedExtensions13 <$> arbitrary + , CertRequest13 + <$> arbitraryCertReqContext + <*> arbitrary + , resize 2 (listOf arbitraryX509) >>= \certs -> + Certificate13 + <$> arbitraryCertReqContext + <*> return (CertificateChain_ (CertificateChain certs)) + <*> replicateM (length certs) arbitrary + , CertVerify13 + <$> ( DigitallySigned . unsafeHead + <$> arbitrary + <*> genByteString 32 + ) + , Finished13 . VerifyData <$> genByteString 12 + , KeyUpdate13 <$> elements [UpdateNotRequested, UpdateRequested] + ] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +arbitraryCiphersIds :: Gen [CipherId] +arbitraryCiphersIds = map CipherId <$> (choose (0, 200) >>= vector) + +arbitraryCompressionIDs :: Gen [Word8] +arbitraryCompressionIDs = choose (0, 200) >>= vector + +someWords8 :: Int -> Gen [Word8] +someWords8 = vector + +arbitraryHelloExtensions :: Version -> Gen [ExtensionRaw] +arbitraryHelloExtensions _ver = arbitrary + +arbitraryCertReqContext :: Gen B.ByteString +arbitraryCertReqContext = oneof [return B.empty, genByteString 32] + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +knownCiphers :: [Cipher] +knownCiphers = ciphersuite_all + +instance Arbitrary Cipher where + arbitrary = elements knownCiphers + +knownVersions :: [Version] +knownVersions = [TLS13, TLS12] + +arbitraryVersions :: Gen [Version] +arbitraryVersions = sublistOf knownVersions + +-- for performance reason P521, FFDHE6144, FFDHE8192 are not tested +knownGroups, knownECGroups, knownFFGroups :: [Group] +knownECGroups = [P256, P384, X25519, X448] +knownFFGroups = [FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096] +knownGroups = knownECGroups ++ knownFFGroups + +defaultECGroup :: Group +defaultECGroup = P256 -- same as defaultECCurve + +otherKnownECGroups :: [Group] +otherKnownECGroups = filter (/= defaultECGroup) knownECGroups + +instance Arbitrary Group where + arbitrary = elements knownGroups + +instance {-# OVERLAPS #-} Arbitrary [Group] where + arbitrary = sublistOf knownGroups + +newtype EC = EC [Group] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary EC where + arbitrary = EC <$> shuffle knownECGroups + +newtype FFDHE = FFDHE [Group] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary FFDHE where + arbitrary = FFDHE <$> shuffle knownFFGroups + +isCredentialDSA :: (CertificateChain, PrivKey) -> Bool +isCredentialDSA (_, PrivKeyDSA _) = True +isCredentialDSA _ = False + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType = arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType' >>= shuffle + +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType' :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType' = do + let (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair + curveName = defaultECCurve + (ecdsaPub, ecdsaPriv) <- arbitraryECDSAPair curveName + (ed25519Pub, ed25519Priv) <- arbitraryEd25519Pair + (ed448Pub, ed448Priv) <- arbitraryEd448Pair + mapM + ( \(pub, priv) -> do + cert <- arbitraryX509WithKey (pub, priv) + return (CertificateChain [cert], priv) + ) + [ (PubKeyRSA pubKey, PrivKeyRSA privKey) + , (toPubKeyEC curveName ecdsaPub, toPrivKeyEC curveName ecdsaPriv) + , (PubKeyEd25519 ed25519Pub, PrivKeyEd25519 ed25519Priv) + , (PubKeyEd448 ed448Pub, PrivKeyEd448 ed448Priv) + ] + +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve = arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve' >>= shuffle + +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve' :: Gen [(CertificateChain, PrivKey)] +arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve' = do + ecdsaPairs <- + mapM + ( \curveName -> do + (ecdsaPub, ecdsaPriv) <- arbitraryECDSAPair curveName + return (toPubKeyEC curveName ecdsaPub, toPrivKeyEC curveName ecdsaPriv) + ) + knownECCurves + (ed25519Pub, ed25519Priv) <- arbitraryEd25519Pair + (ed448Pub, ed448Priv) <- arbitraryEd448Pair + mapM + ( \(pub, priv) -> do + cert <- arbitraryX509WithKey (pub, priv) + return (CertificateChain [cert], priv) + ) + $ [ (PubKeyEd25519 ed25519Pub, PrivKeyEd25519 ed25519Priv) + , (PubKeyEd448 ed448Pub, PrivKeyEd448 ed448Priv) + ] + ++ ecdsaPairs + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +leafPublicKey :: CertificateChain -> Maybe PubKey +leafPublicKey (CertificateChain []) = Nothing +leafPublicKey (CertificateChain (leaf : _)) = Just (certPubKey $ getCertificate leaf) + +isLeafRSA :: Maybe CertificateChain -> Bool +isLeafRSA chain = case chain >>= leafPublicKey of + Just (PubKeyRSA _) -> True + _ -> False + +arbitraryCipherPair :: Version -> Gen ([Cipher], [Cipher]) +arbitraryCipherPair connectVersion = do + serverCiphers <- + arbitrary + `suchThat` (\cs -> or [cipherAllowedForVersion connectVersion x | x <- cs]) + clientCiphers <- + arbitrary + `suchThat` ( \cs -> + or + [ x `elem` serverCiphers + && cipherAllowedForVersion connectVersion x + | x <- cs + ] + ) + return (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +instance {-# OVERLAPS #-} Arbitrary (ClientParams, ServerParams) where + arbitrary = elements knownVersions >>= arbitraryPairParamsAt + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +data GGP = GGP [Group] [Group] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary GGP where + arbitrary = arbitraryGroupPair + +-- Pair of groups so that at least the default EC group P256 and one FF group +-- are in common. This makes DHE and ECDHE ciphers always compatible with +-- extension "Supported Elliptic Curves" / "Supported Groups". +arbitraryGroupPair :: Gen GGP +arbitraryGroupPair = do + (serverECGroups, clientECGroups) <- + arbitraryGroupPairWith defaultECGroup otherKnownECGroups + serverGroups <- shuffle serverECGroups + clientGroups <- shuffle clientECGroups + return $ GGP clientGroups serverGroups + where + arbitraryGroupPairWith e es = do + s <- sublistOf es + c <- sublistOf es + return (e : s, e : c) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +arbitraryPairParams12 :: Gen (ClientParams, ServerParams) +arbitraryPairParams12 = arbitraryPairParamsAt TLS12 + +arbitraryPairParams13 :: Gen (ClientParams, ServerParams) +arbitraryPairParams13 = arbitraryPairParamsAt TLS13 + +arbitraryPairParamsAt :: Version -> Gen (ClientParams, ServerParams) +arbitraryPairParamsAt connectVersion = do + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) <- arbitraryCipherPair connectVersion + -- Select version lists containing connectVersion, as well as some other + -- versions for which we have compatible ciphers. Criteria about cipher + -- ensure we can test version downgrade. + let allowedVersions = + [ v + | v <- knownVersions + , or + [ x `elem` serverCiphers + && cipherAllowedForVersion v x + | x <- clientCiphers + ] + ] + allowedVersionsFiltered = filter (<= connectVersion) allowedVersions + -- Server or client is allowed to have versions > connectVersion, but not + -- both simultaneously. + filterSrv <- arbitrary + let (clientAllowedVersions, serverAllowedVersions) + | filterSrv = (allowedVersions, allowedVersionsFiltered) + | otherwise = (allowedVersionsFiltered, allowedVersions) + -- Generate version lists containing less than 127 elements, otherwise the + -- "supported_versions" extension cannot be correctly serialized + clientVersions <- listWithOthers connectVersion 126 clientAllowedVersions + serverVersions <- listWithOthers connectVersion 126 serverAllowedVersions + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (clientVersions, serverVersions) + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + where + listWithOthers :: a -> Int -> [a] -> Gen [a] + listWithOthers fixedElement maxOthers others + | maxOthers < 1 = return [fixedElement] + | otherwise = sized $ \n -> do + num <- choose (0, min n maxOthers) + pos <- choose (0, num) + prefix <- vectorOf pos $ elements others + suffix <- vectorOf (num - pos) $ elements others + return $ prefix ++ (fixedElement : suffix) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +getConnectVersion :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> Version +getConnectVersion (cparams, sparams) = maximum (cver `intersect` sver) + where + sver = supportedVersions (serverSupported sparams) + cver = supportedVersions (clientSupported cparams) + +isVersionEnabled :: Version -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> Bool +isVersionEnabled ver (cparams, sparams) = + (ver `elem` supportedVersions (serverSupported sparams)) + && (ver `elem` supportedVersions (clientSupported cparams)) + +arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + :: ([Version], [Version]) + -> ([Cipher], [Cipher]) + -> Gen (ClientParams, ServerParams) +arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers (clientVersions, serverVersions) (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) = do + secNeg <- arbitrary + + creds <- arbitraryCredentialsOfEachType + GGP clientGroups serverGroups <- arbitraryGroupPair + clientHashSignatures <- arbitrary + serverHashSignatures <- arbitrary + let serverState = + defaultParamsServer + { serverSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = serverCiphers + , supportedVersions = serverVersions + , supportedSecureRenegotiation = secNeg + , supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSignatures + , supportedGroups = serverGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [serverGroups] + } + , serverShared = defaultShared{sharedCredentials = Credentials creds} + } + let clientState = + (defaultParamsClient "" B.empty) + { clientSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = clientCiphers + , supportedVersions = clientVersions + , supportedSecureRenegotiation = secNeg + , supportedGroups = clientGroups + , supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSignatures + } + , clientShared = + defaultShared + { sharedValidationCache = + ValidationCache + { cacheAdd = \_ _ _ -> return () + , cacheQuery = \_ _ _ -> return ValidationCachePass + } + } + } + return (clientState, serverState) + +arbitraryClientCredential :: Version -> Gen Credential +arbitraryClientCredential _ = arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve' >>= elements + +arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage + :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> Gen (CertificateChain, PrivKey) +arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags = do + let (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair + cert <- arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage usageFlags (PubKeyRSA pubKey, ()) + return (CertificateChain [cert], PrivKeyRSA privKey) + +instance {-# OVERLAPS #-} Arbitrary (EMSMode, EMSMode) where + arbitrary = (,) <$> gen <*> gen + where + gen = elements [NoEMS, AllowEMS, RequireEMS] + +setEMSMode + :: (EMSMode, EMSMode) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +setEMSMode (cems, sems) (clientParam, serverParam) = (clientParam', serverParam') + where + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedExtendedMainSecret = cems + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedExtendedMainSecret = sems + } + } + +genByteString :: Int -> Gen B.ByteString +genByteString i = B.pack <$> vector i + +-- Just for preventing warnings of GHC 9.10 +unsafeHead :: [a] -> a +unsafeHead [] = error "unsafeHead" +unsafeHead (x : _) = x diff --git a/test/Certificate.hs b/test/Certificate.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/Certificate.hs @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-orphans #-} + +module Certificate ( + arbitraryX509, + arbitraryX509WithKey, + arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage, + arbitraryDN, + simpleCertificate, + simpleX509, + getSignatureALG, + toPubKeyEC, + toPrivKeyEC, +) where + +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2ospOf_) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECDSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC +import Data.ASN1.OID +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.Hourglass +import Data.X509 +import Test.QuickCheck + +import PubKey + +arbitraryDN :: Gen DistinguishedName +arbitraryDN = return $ DistinguishedName [] + +instance Arbitrary Date where + arbitrary = do + y <- choose (1971, 2035) + m <- elements [January .. December] + d <- choose (1, 30) + return $ normalizeDate $ Date y m d + +normalizeDate :: Date -> Date +normalizeDate d = timeConvert (timeConvert d :: Elapsed) + +instance Arbitrary TimeOfDay where + arbitrary = do + h <- choose (0, 23) + mi <- choose (0, 59) + se <- choose (0, 59) + let nsec = 0 + return $ TimeOfDay (Hours h) (Minutes mi) (Seconds se) nsec + +instance Arbitrary DateTime where + arbitrary = DateTime <$> arbitrary <*> arbitrary + +maxSerial :: Integer +maxSerial = 16777216 + +arbitraryCertificate :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> PubKey -> Gen Certificate +arbitraryCertificate usageFlags pubKey = do + serial <- choose (0, maxSerial) + subjectdn <- arbitraryDN + validity <- (,) <$> arbitrary <*> arbitrary + let sigalg = getSignatureALG pubKey + return $ + Certificate + { certVersion = 3 + , certSerial = serial + , certSignatureAlg = sigalg + , certIssuerDN = issuerdn + , certSubjectDN = subjectdn + , certValidity = validity + , certPubKey = pubKey + , certExtensions = + Extensions $ + Just + [ extensionEncode True $ ExtKeyUsage usageFlags + ] + } + where + issuerdn = DistinguishedName [(getObjectID DnCommonName, "Root CA")] + +simpleCertificate :: PubKey -> Certificate +simpleCertificate pubKey = + Certificate + { certVersion = 3 + , certSerial = 0 + , certSignatureAlg = getSignatureALG pubKey + , certIssuerDN = simpleDN + , certSubjectDN = simpleDN + , certValidity = (time1, time2) + , certPubKey = pubKey + , certExtensions = + Extensions $ + Just + [ extensionEncode True $ + ExtKeyUsage [KeyUsage_digitalSignature, KeyUsage_keyEncipherment] + ] + } + where + time1 = DateTime (Date 1999 January 1) (TimeOfDay 0 0 0 0) + time2 = DateTime (Date 2049 January 1) (TimeOfDay 0 0 0 0) + simpleDN = DistinguishedName [] + +simpleX509 :: PubKey -> SignedCertificate +simpleX509 pubKey = + let cert = simpleCertificate pubKey + sig = replicate 40 1 + sigalg = getSignatureALG pubKey + (signedExact, ()) = objectToSignedExact (\_ -> (B.pack sig, sigalg, ())) cert + in signedExact + +arbitraryX509WithKey :: (PubKey, t) -> Gen SignedCertificate +arbitraryX509WithKey = arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage knownKeyUsage + +arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage + :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> (PubKey, t) -> Gen SignedCertificate +arbitraryX509WithKeyAndUsage usageFlags (pubKey, _) = do + cert <- arbitraryCertificate usageFlags pubKey + sig <- resize 40 $ listOf1 arbitrary + let sigalg = getSignatureALG pubKey + let (signedExact, ()) = objectToSignedExact (\_ -> (B.pack sig, sigalg, ())) cert + return signedExact + +arbitraryX509 :: Gen SignedCertificate +arbitraryX509 = do + let (pubKey, privKey) = getGlobalRSAPair + arbitraryX509WithKey (PubKeyRSA pubKey, PrivKeyRSA privKey) + +instance {-# OVERLAPS #-} Arbitrary [ExtKeyUsageFlag] where + arbitrary = sublistOf knownKeyUsage + +knownKeyUsage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] +knownKeyUsage = + [ KeyUsage_digitalSignature + , KeyUsage_keyEncipherment + , KeyUsage_keyAgreement + ] + +getSignatureALG :: PubKey -> SignatureALG +getSignatureALG (PubKeyRSA _) = SignatureALG HashSHA1 PubKeyALG_RSA +getSignatureALG (PubKeyDSA _) = SignatureALG HashSHA1 PubKeyALG_DSA +getSignatureALG (PubKeyEC _) = SignatureALG HashSHA256 PubKeyALG_EC +getSignatureALG (PubKeyEd25519 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed25519 +getSignatureALG (PubKeyEd448 _) = SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash PubKeyALG_Ed448 +getSignatureALG pubKey = + error $ "getSignatureALG: unsupported public key: " ++ show pubKey + +toPubKeyEC :: ECC.CurveName -> ECDSA.PublicKey -> PubKey +toPubKeyEC curveName key = + let (x, y) = fromPoint $ ECDSA.public_q key + pub = SerializedPoint bs + bs = B.cons 4 (i2ospOf_ bytes x `B.append` i2ospOf_ bytes y) + bits = ECC.curveSizeBits (ECC.getCurveByName curveName) + bytes = (bits + 7) `div` 8 + in PubKeyEC (PubKeyEC_Named curveName pub) + +toPrivKeyEC :: ECC.CurveName -> ECDSA.PrivateKey -> PrivKey +toPrivKeyEC curveName key = + let priv = ECDSA.private_d key + in PrivKeyEC (PrivKeyEC_Named curveName priv) + +fromPoint :: ECC.Point -> (Integer, Integer) +fromPoint (ECC.Point x y) = (x, y) +fromPoint _ = error "fromPoint" diff --git a/test/CiphersSpec.hs b/test/CiphersSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/CiphersSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +module CiphersSpec where + +import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Network.TLS.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck +import Test.QuickCheck + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "ciphers" $ do + prop "can ecnrypt/decrypt" $ \(BulkTest bulk key iv t additional) -> do + let enc = bulkInit bulk BulkEncrypt key + dec = bulkInit bulk BulkDecrypt key + case (enc, dec) of + (BulkStateBlock encF, BulkStateBlock decF) -> block encF decF iv t + (BulkStateAEAD encF, BulkStateAEAD decF) -> aead encF decF iv t additional + (BulkStateStream (BulkStream encF), BulkStateStream (BulkStream decF)) -> stream encF decF t + _ -> return () + +block + :: BulkBlock + -> BulkBlock + -> BulkIV + -> ByteString + -> IO () +block e d iv t = do + let (etxt, e_iv) = e iv t + (dtxt, d_iv) = d iv etxt + dtxt `shouldBe` t + d_iv `shouldBe` e_iv + +stream + :: (ByteString -> (ByteString, BulkStream)) + -> (ByteString -> (ByteString, BulkStream)) + -> ByteString + -> Expectation +stream e d t = (fst . d . fst . e) t `shouldBe` t + +aead + :: BulkAEAD + -> BulkAEAD + -> BulkNonce + -> ByteString + -> BulkAdditionalData + -> Expectation +aead e d iv t additional = do + let (encrypted, at) = e iv t additional + (decrypted, at2) = d iv encrypted additional + decrypted `shouldBe` t + at `shouldBe` at2 + +arbitraryKey :: Bulk -> Gen BA.ScrubbedBytes +arbitraryKey bulk = BA.pack `fmap` vector (bulkKeySize bulk) + +arbitraryIV :: Bulk -> Gen B.ByteString +arbitraryIV bulk = B.pack `fmap` vector (bulkIVSize bulk + bulkExplicitIV bulk) + +arbitraryText :: Bulk -> Gen B.ByteString +arbitraryText bulk = B.pack `fmap` vector (bulkBlockSize bulk) + +data BulkTest + = BulkTest Bulk BA.ScrubbedBytes B.ByteString B.ByteString B.ByteString + deriving (Show, Eq) + +instance Arbitrary BulkTest where + arbitrary = do + bulk <- cipherBulk `fmap` elements ciphersuite_all + BulkTest bulk + <$> arbitraryKey bulk + <*> arbitraryIV bulk + <*> arbitraryText bulk + <*> arbitraryText bulk diff --git a/test/ECHSpec.hs b/test/ECHSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/ECHSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module ECHSpec (spec) where + +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Base64 as B64 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.Maybe +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Internal +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck +import Test.QuickCheck + +import Arbitrary +import Run +import Session + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "ECH" $ do + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Full" handshake13_full + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 HRR" handshake13_hrr + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK" handshake13_psk + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK ticket" handshake13_psk_ticket + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK -> HRR" handshake13_psk_fallback + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT" handshake13_0rtt + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT -> PSK" handshake13_0rtt_fallback + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EC groups" handshake13_ec + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 FFDHE groups" handshake13_ffdhe + describe "ECH greasing" $ do + prop "sends greasing ECH" handshake13_greasing + prop "sends greasing ECH HRR" handshake13_greasing_hrr + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CSP13 = CSP13 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CSP13 where + arbitrary = CSP13 <$> arbitraryPairParams13 + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake13_full :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_full (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13ECH params FullHandshake + +handshake13_hrr :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_hrr (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13ECH params HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_psk :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13ECH params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13ECH params2 PreSharedKey + +handshake13_psk_ticket :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_ticket (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13ECH params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13ECH params2 PreSharedKey + +handshake13_psk_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = + [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + ] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13ECH params HelloRetryRequest + + -- resumption fails because GCM cipher is not supported anymore, full + -- handshake is not possible because X25519 has been removed, so we are + -- back with P256 after hello retry + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let (cli2, srv2) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + srv2' = srv2{serverSupported = svrSupported'} + svrSupported' = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[P256]] + } + + runTLSSimple13ECH (cli2, srv2') HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_0rtt :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + cliHooks = + defaultClientHooks + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2"] + } + svrHooks = + defaultServerHooks + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) + } + params0 = + setParams + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientHooks = cliHooks + } + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverHooks = svrHooks + , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13ECH params HelloRetryRequest + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + where + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs = do + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + clearClientSessionRef sessionRefs + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + params2 = (pc{clientUseEarlyData = True}, ps) + + runTLS0RTTech params2 RTT0 earlyData + +handshake13_0rtt_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + group0 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group0] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group0]] + } + params = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverEarlyDataSize = 1024 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params0 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params + + let mode = if group0 == P256 then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest + runTLSSimple13ECH params0 mode + + -- and resume + mSessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + case mSessionParams of + Nothing -> expectationFailure "session params: Just is expected" + Just sessionParams -> do + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + group1 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params0 + svrSupported1 = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group1] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group1]] + } + params1 = + ( pc{clientUseEarlyData = True} + , ps + { serverEarlyDataSize = 0 + , serverSupported = svrSupported1 + } + ) + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group0] + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group1] + if group0 == group1 + -- 0-RTT is not allowed, so fallback to PreSharedKey + then runTLS0RTTech params1 PreSharedKey earlyData + -- HRR but not allowed for 0-RTT + else runTLSFailure params1 (tlsClient earlyData) tlsServer + where + tlsClient earlyData ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + tlsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + +handshake13_ec :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ec (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + EC cgrps <- generate arbitrary + EC sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + params = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13ECH params FullHandshake + +handshake13_ffdhe :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ffdhe (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + FFDHE cgrps <- generate arbitrary + FFDHE sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + + params = + setParams + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13ECH params FullHandshake + +handshake13_greasing :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_greasing (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientUseECH = True + , clientShared = (clientShared cli){sharedECHConfigList = echConfList} + } + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + (clientMessages, _) <- runTLSCaptureFail params + let isGreasing (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == EID_EncryptedClientHello + eeMessagesHaveExt = + [ any isGreasing chExtensions + | ClientHello CH{..} <- clientMessages + ] + eeMessagesHaveExt `shouldBe` [True] + +handshake13_greasing_hrr :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_greasing_hrr (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientUseECH = True + , clientShared = (clientShared cli){sharedECHConfigList = echConfList} + } + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + (clientMessages, _) <- runTLSCaptureFail params + let isGreasing (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == EID_EncryptedClientHello + eeMessagesHaveExt = + [ any isGreasing chExtensions + | ClientHello CH{..} <- clientMessages + ] + eeMessagesHaveExt `shouldBe` [True, True] + +expectJust :: String -> Maybe a -> Expectation +expectJust tag mx = case mx of + Nothing -> expectationFailure tag + Just _ -> return () + +setParams :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +setParams (cli, srv) = (cli', srv') + where + cli' = + cli + { clientUseECH = True + , clientShared = (clientShared cli){sharedECHConfigList = echConfList} + } + srv' = + srv + { serverECHKey = echKey + , serverShared = (serverShared srv){sharedECHConfigList = echConfList} + } + +echKey :: [(ConfigId, ByteString)] +echKey = [(0, B64.decodeLenient "GAl/YqzDDnssODe5t+2xlQsbSv26kNlfJ0D+nZbK62I=")] + +echConfList :: ECHConfigList +echConfList = + fromJust $ + decodeECHConfigList $ + B64.decodeLenient + "AEP+DQA/AAAgACDGNVZWrmqQfzAuYGJNa8+OEc6zaUfzd0ltyJQ2y1U2AwAEAAEAAQAQcHVibGljLWxvY2FsaG9zdAAA" diff --git a/test/EncodeSpec.hs b/test/EncodeSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/EncodeSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +module EncodeSpec where + +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Internal +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck + +import Arbitrary () + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "encoder/decoder" $ do + prop "can encode/decode Header" $ \x -> do + decodeHeader (encodeHeader x) `shouldBe` Right x + prop "can encode/decode Handshake" $ \x -> do + decodeHs (encodeHandshake x) `shouldBe` Right x + prop "can encode/decode Handshake13" $ \x -> do + decodeHs13 (encodeHandshake13 x) `shouldBe` Right x + +decodeHs :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake +decodeHs b = verifyResult (decodeHandshake cp) $ decodeHandshakeRecord b + where + cp = + CurrentParams + { cParamsVersion = TLS12 + , cParamsKeyXchgType = Just CipherKeyExchange_RSA + } + +decodeHs13 :: ByteString -> Either TLSError Handshake13 +decodeHs13 b = verifyResult decodeHandshake13 $ decodeHandshakeRecord13 b + +verifyResult :: (f -> r -> a) -> GetResult (f, r) -> a +verifyResult fn result = + case result of + GotPartial _ -> error "got partial" + GotError e -> error ("got error: " ++ show e) + GotSuccessRemaining _ _ -> error "got remaining byte left" + GotSuccess (ty, content) -> fn ty content diff --git a/test/HandshakeSpec.hs b/test/HandshakeSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/HandshakeSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,1088 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module HandshakeSpec where + +import Control.Monad +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.IORef +import Data.List +import Data.Maybe +import Data.X509 (ExtKeyUsageFlag (..)) +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher +import Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC +import Network.TLS.Internal +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck +import Test.QuickCheck + +import API +import Arbitrary +import PipeChan +import Run +import Session + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "pipe" $ do + it "can setup a channel" pipe_work + describe "handshake" $ do + prop "can run TLS 1.2" handshake_simple + prop "can run TLS 1.3" handshake13_simple + prop "can update key for TLS 1.3" handshake_update_key + prop "can prevent downgrade attack" handshake13_downgrade + prop "can negotiate hash and signature" handshake_hashsignatures + prop "can negotiate cipher suite" handshake_ciphersuites + prop "can negotiate group" handshake_groups + prop "can negotiate elliptic curve" handshake_ec + prop "can fallback for certificate with cipher" handshake_cert_fallback_cipher + prop + "can fallback for certificate with hash and signature" + handshake_cert_fallback_hs + prop "can handle server key usage" handshake_server_key_usage + prop "can handle client key usage" handshake_client_key_usage + prop "can authenticate client" handshake_client_auth + prop "can receive client authentication failure" handshake_client_auth_fail + prop "can handle extended main secret" handshake_ems + prop "can resume with extended main secret" handshake_resumption_ems + prop "can handle ALPN" handshake_alpn + prop "can handle SNI" handshake_sni + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.2 CBC" handshake_cbc + prop "can re-negotiate with TLS 1.2" handshake12_renegotiation + prop "can resume session with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_resumption + prop "can resume session ticket with TLS 1.2" handshake12_session_ticket + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Full" handshake13_full + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 HRR" handshake13_hrr + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK" handshake13_psk + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK ticket" handshake13_psk_ticket + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 PSK -> HRR" handshake13_psk_fallback + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT" handshake13_0rtt + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 0RTT -> PSK" handshake13_0rtt_fallback + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EE" handshake13_ee_groups + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 EC groups" handshake13_ec + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 FFDHE groups" handshake13_ffdhe + prop "can handshake with TLS 1.3 Post-handshake auth" post_handshake_auth + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +pipe_work :: IO () +pipe_work = do + pipe <- newPipe + _ <- runPipe pipe + + let bSize = 16 + n <- generate (choose (1, 32)) + + let d1 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 40 + let d2 = B.replicate (bSize * n) 45 + + d1' <- writePipeC pipe d1 >> readPipeS pipe (B.length d1) + d1' `shouldBe` d1 + + d2' <- writePipeS pipe d2 >> readPipeC pipe (B.length d2) + d2' `shouldBe` d2 + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_simple :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_simple = runTLSSimple + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CSP13 = CSP13 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CSP13 where + arbitrary = CSP13 <$> arbitraryPairParams13 + +handshake13_simple :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_simple (CSP13 params) = runTLSSimple13 params hs + where + cgrps = supportedGroups $ clientSupported $ fst params + sgrps = supportedGroups $ serverSupported $ snd params + hs = if unsafeHead cgrps `elem` sgrps then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_cbc :: IO () +handshake_cbc = do + clientCiphers <- generate $ cipherGen >>= shuffle + serverCiphers <- generate $ cipherGen >>= shuffle + clientGroups <- generate $ groupGen >>= shuffle + serverGroups <- generate $ groupGen >>= shuffle + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([TLS12], [TLS12]) + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + let clientParam' = clientParam { + clientSupported = (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups } } + serverParam' = serverParam { + serverSupported = (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = serverGroups } } + let ciphers = clientCiphers `intersect` serverCiphers + groups = clientGroups `intersect` serverGroups + in if compat ciphers groups + then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + where + groupGen :: Gen [Group] + groupGen = sublistOf grps `suchThat` (not . null) + where + grps = [X25519, P256, P384, FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096] + + cipherGen :: Gen [Cipher] + cipherGen = sublistOf ciphersuite_pfs_sha2_cbc `suchThat` (not . null) + + compat :: [Cipher] -> [Group] -> Bool + compat [] _ = False + compat _ [] = False + compat ciphers groups = + let mustdh = all (== CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA) $ map cipherKeyExchange ciphers + mustec = all (/= CipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSA) $ map cipherKeyExchange ciphers + havedh = any (`elem` [FFDHE2048, FFDHE3072, FFDHE4096]) groups + haveec = any (`elem` [X25519, P256, P384]) groups + in ((not mustdh || havedh) && (not mustec || haveec)) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake13_downgrade :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake13_downgrade (cparam, sparam) = do + versionForced <- + generate $ elements (supportedVersions $ clientSupported cparam) + let debug' = (serverDebug sparam){debugVersionForced = Just versionForced} + sparam' = sparam{serverDebug = debug'} + params = (cparam, sparam') + downgraded = + (isVersionEnabled TLS13 params && versionForced < TLS13) + || (isVersionEnabled TLS12 params && versionForced < TLS12) + if downgraded + then runTLSFailure params handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple params + +handshake_update_key :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_update_key = runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_hashsignatures + :: ([HashAndSignatureAlgorithm], [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm]) -> IO () +handshake_hashsignatures (clientHashSigs, serverHashSigs) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + (ciphers, ciphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSigs + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSigs + } + } + commonHashSigs = clientHashSigs `intersect` serverHashSigs + shouldFail + | tls13 = all incompatibleWithDefaultCurve commonHashSigs + | otherwise = null commonHashSigs + if shouldFail + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + where + incompatibleWithDefaultCurve (h, SignatureECDSA) = h /= HashSHA256 + incompatibleWithDefaultCurve _ = False + +handshake_ciphersuites :: ([Cipher], [Cipher]) -> IO () +handshake_ciphersuites (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let version = if tls13 then TLS13 else TLS12 + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + ([version], [version]) + (clientCiphers, serverCiphers) + let adequate = cipherAllowedForVersion version + shouldSucceed = any adequate (clientCiphers `intersect` serverCiphers) + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam) + else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam) handshake handshake + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_groups :: GGP -> IO () +handshake_groups (GGP clientGroups serverGroups) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = ciphersuite_strong + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + denyCustom <- generate arbitrary + let groupUsage = + if denyCustom + then GroupUsageUnsupported "custom group denied" + else GroupUsageValid + clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCustomFFDHEGroup = \_ _ -> return groupUsage + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = serverGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [serverGroups] + } + } + commonGroups = clientGroups `intersect` serverGroups + shouldFail = null commonGroups + p minfo = isNothing (minfo >>= infoSupportedGroup) == null commonGroups + if shouldFail + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSPredicate (clientParam', serverParam') p + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype SG = SG [Group] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary SG where + arbitrary = SG <$> shuffle sigGroups + where + sigGroups = [P256, P521] + +handshake_ec :: SG -> IO () +handshake_ec (SG sigGroups) = do + let versions = [TLS12] + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + ] + hashSignatures = + [ (HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) + ] + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + clientGroups <- generate $ shuffle sigGroups + clientHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures + serverHashSignatures <- generate $ sublistOf hashSignatures + credentials <- generate arbitraryCredentialsOfEachCurve + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedGroups = clientGroups + , supportedHashSignatures = clientHashSignatures + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedGroups = sigGroups + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sigGroups] + , supportedHashSignatures = serverHashSignatures + } + , serverShared = + (serverShared serverParam) + { sharedCredentials = Credentials credentials + } + } + sigAlgs = map snd (clientHashSignatures `intersect` serverHashSignatures) + ecdsaDenied = SignatureECDSA `notElem` sigAlgs + if ecdsaDenied + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + else runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + +-- Tests ability to use or ignore client "signature_algorithms" extension when +-- choosing a server certificate. Here peers allow DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA1 but +-- the server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature that the client does not +-- support. Server may choose the DSA certificate only when cipher +-- DHE_DSA_AES128_SHA1 is allowed. Otherwise it must fallback to the RSA +-- certificate. + +data OC = OC [Cipher] [Cipher] deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary OC where + arbitrary = OC <$> sublistOf otherCiphers <*> sublistOf otherCiphers + where + otherCiphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + +handshake_cert_fallback_cipher :: OC -> IO () +handshake_cert_fallback_cipher (OC clientCiphers serverCiphers) = do + let clientVersions = [TLS12] + serverVersions = [TLS12] + commonCiphers = [cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + hashSignatures = [(HashSHA256, SignatureRSA), (HashSHA1, SignatureDSA)] + chainRef <- newIORef Nothing + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (clientVersions, serverVersions) + (clientCiphers ++ commonCiphers, serverCiphers ++ commonCiphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = hashSignatures + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> + writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] + } + } + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam) + serverChain <- readIORef chainRef + isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` True + +-- Same as above but testing with supportedHashSignatures directly instead of +-- ciphers, and thus allowing TLS13. Peers accept RSA with SHA-256 but the +-- server RSA certificate has a SHA-1 signature. When Ed25519 is allowed by +-- both client and server, the Ed25519 certificate is selected. Otherwise the +-- server fallbacks to RSA. +-- +-- Note: SHA-1 is supposed to be disallowed in X.509 signatures with TLS13 +-- unless client advertises explicit support. Currently this is not enforced by +-- the library, which is useful to test this scenario. SHA-1 could be replaced +-- by another algorithm. + +data OHS = OHS [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] + deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary OHS where + arbitrary = OHS <$> sublistOf otherHS <*> sublistOf otherHS + where + otherHS = [(HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519)] + +handshake_cert_fallback_hs :: OHS -> IO () +handshake_cert_fallback_hs (OHS clientHS serverHS) = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = + [ cipher_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + ] + commonHS = + [ (HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) + , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) + ] + chainRef <- newIORef Nothing + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientSupported = + (clientSupported clientParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ clientHS + } + , clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onServerCertificate = \_ _ _ chain -> + writeIORef chainRef (Just chain) >> return [] + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported serverParam) + { supportedHashSignatures = commonHS ++ serverHS + } + } + eddsaDisallowed = + (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` clientHS + || (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) `notElem` serverHS + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + serverChain <- readIORef chainRef + isLeafRSA serverChain `shouldBe` eddsaDisallowed + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_server_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () +handshake_server_key_usage usageFlags = do + tls13 <- generate arbitrary + let versions = if tls13 then [TLS13] else [TLS12] + ciphers = ciphersuite_all + (clientParam, serverParam) <- + generate $ + arbitraryPairParamsWithVersionsAndCiphers + (versions, versions) + (ciphers, ciphers) + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags + let serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverShared = + (serverShared serverParam) + { sharedCredentials = Credentials [cred] + } + } + shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam, serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam, serverParam') handshake handshake + +handshake_client_key_usage :: [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> IO () +handshake_client_key_usage usageFlags = do + (clientParam, serverParam) <- generate arbitrary + cred <- generate $ arbitraryRSACredentialWithUsage usageFlags + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = \_ -> return CertificateUsageAccept + } + } + shouldSucceed = KeyUsage_digitalSignature `elem` usageFlags + if shouldSucceed + then runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + else runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_client_auth :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_client_auth (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam + serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam + version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + runTLSSimple (clientParam', serverParam') + where + validateChain cred chain + | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + +handshake_client_auth_fail :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_client_auth_fail (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientVersions = supportedVersions $ clientSupported clientParam + serverVersions = supportedVersions $ serverSupported serverParam + version = maximum (clientVersions `intersect` serverVersions) + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential version) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverWantClientCert = True + , serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') handshake handshake + where + validateChain _ _ = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_ems :: (EMSMode, EMSMode) -> IO () +handshake_ems (cems, sems) = do + params <- generate arbitrary + let params' = setEMSMode (cems, sems) params + version = getConnectVersion params' + emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 + use = cems /= NoEMS && sems /= NoEMS + require = cems == RequireEMS || sems == RequireEMS + p info = infoExtendedMainSecret info == (emsVersion && use) + if emsVersion && require && not use + then runTLSFailure params' handshake handshake + else runTLSPredicate params' (maybe False p) + +newtype CompatEMS = CompatEMS (EMSMode, EMSMode) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CompatEMS where + arbitrary = CompatEMS <$> (arbitrary `suchThat` compatible) + where + compatible (NoEMS, RequireEMS) = False + compatible (RequireEMS, NoEMS) = False + compatible _ = True + +handshake_resumption_ems :: (CompatEMS, CompatEMS) -> IO () +handshake_resumption_ems (CompatEMS ems, CompatEMS ems2) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + plainParams <- generate arbitrary + let params = + setEMSMode ems $ + setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = + setEMSMode ems2 $ + setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + let version = getConnectVersion params2 + emsVersion = version >= TLS10 && version <= TLS12 + + if emsVersion && use ems && not (use ems2) + then runTLSFailure params2 handshake handshake + else do + runTLSSimple params2 + mSessionParams2 <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + let sameSession = sessionParams == mSessionParams2 + sameUse = use ems == use ems2 + when emsVersion (sameSession `shouldBe` sameUse) + where + use (NoEMS, _) = False + use (_, NoEMS) = False + use _ = True + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake_alpn :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_alpn (clientParam, serverParam) = do + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2", "http/1.1"] + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just alpn + } + } + params' = (clientParam', serverParam') + runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx + proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + proto <- getNegotiatedProtocol ctx + proto `shouldBe` Just "h2" + alpn xs + | "h2" `elem` xs = return "h2" + | otherwise = return "http/1.1" + +handshake_sni :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +handshake_sni (clientParam, serverParam) = do + ref <- newIORef Nothing + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientServerIdentification = (serverName, "") + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onServerNameIndication = onSNI ref + } + } + params' = (clientParam', serverParam') + runTLSSuccess params' hsClient hsServer + receivedName <- readIORef ref + receivedName `shouldBe` Just (Just serverName) + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + msni <- getClientSNI ctx + expectMaybe "C: SNI should be Just" serverName msni + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + msni <- getClientSNI ctx + expectMaybe "S: SNI should be Just" serverName msni + onSNI ref name = do + mx <- readIORef ref + mx `shouldBe` Nothing + writeIORef ref (Just name) + return (Credentials []) + serverName = "haskell.org" + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +newtype CSP12 = CSP12 (ClientParams, ServerParams) deriving (Show) + +instance Arbitrary CSP12 where + arbitrary = CSP12 <$> arbitraryPairParams12 + +handshake12_renegotiation :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_renegotiation (CSP12 (cparams, sparams)) = do + renegDisabled <- generate arbitrary + let sparams' = + sparams + { serverSupported = + (serverSupported sparams) + { supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = not renegDisabled + } + } + if renegDisabled + then runTLSFailure (cparams, sparams') hsClient hsServer + else runTLSSimple (cparams, sparams') + where + hsClient ctx = handshake ctx >> handshake ctx + -- recvData receives the alert from the second handshake + hsServer ctx = handshake ctx >> void (recvData ctx) + +handshake12_session_resumption :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_session_resumption (CSP12 plainParams) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) + +handshake12_session_ticket :: CSP12 -> IO () +handshake12_session_ticket (CSP12 plainParams) = do + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers plainParams + + runTLSSimple params + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSPredicate params2 (maybe False infoTLS12Resumption) + +-------------------------------------------------------------- + +handshake13_full :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_full (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +handshake13_hrr :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_hrr (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_psk :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey + +handshake13_psk_ticket :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_ticket (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers0 = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + sessionManagers = (fst sessionManagers0, oneSessionTicket) + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let params2 = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + + runTLSSimple13 params2 PreSharedKey + +handshake13_psk_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_psk_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = + [ cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + , cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 + ] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + params0 = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + + -- resumption fails because GCM cipher is not supported anymore, full + -- handshake is not possible because X25519 has been removed, so we are + -- back with P256 after hello retry + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + let (cli2, srv2) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + srv2' = + srv2{serverSupported = svrSupported'} + svrSupported' = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_CCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[P256]] + } + + runTLSSimple13 (cli2, srv2') HelloRetryRequest + +handshake13_0rtt :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [X25519] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519]] + } + cliHooks = + defaultClientHooks + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just ["h2"] + } + svrHooks = + defaultServerHooks + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just (return . unsafeHead) + } + params0 = + ( cli + { clientSupported = cliSupported + , clientHooks = cliHooks + } + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverHooks = svrHooks + , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params0 + + runTLSSimple13 params HelloRetryRequest + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs + where + runTLS0rtt params sessionRefs = do + -- and resume + sessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + expectJust "session param should be Just" sessionParams + clearClientSessionRef sessionRefs + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming (fromJust sessionParams) params + params2 = (pc{clientUseEarlyData = True}, ps) + + runTLS0RTT params2 RTT0 earlyData + +handshake13_0rtt_fallback :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_0rtt_fallback (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + group0 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let cliSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [P256, X25519] + } + svrSupported = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group0] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group0]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv + { serverSupported = svrSupported + , serverEarlyDataSize = 1024 + } + ) + + sessionRefs <- twoSessionRefs + let sessionManagers = twoSessionManagers sessionRefs + + let params0 = setPairParamsSessionManagers sessionManagers params + + let mode = if group0 == P256 then FullHandshake else HelloRetryRequest + runTLSSimple13 params0 mode + + -- and resume + mSessionParams <- readClientSessionRef sessionRefs + case mSessionParams of + Nothing -> expectationFailure "session params: Just is expected" + Just sessionParams -> do + earlyData <- B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + group1 <- generate $ elements [P256, X25519] + let (pc, ps) = setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionParams params0 + svrSupported1 = + defaultSupported + { supportedCiphers = [cipher13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256] + , supportedGroups = [group1] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[group1]] + } + params1 = + ( pc{clientUseEarlyData = True} + , ps + { serverEarlyDataSize = 0 + , serverSupported = svrSupported1 + } + ) + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group0] + -- C: [P256, X25519] + -- S: [group1] + if group0 == group1 + -- 0-RTT is not allowed, so fallback to PreSharedKey + then runTLS0RTT params1 PreSharedKey earlyData + -- HRR but not allowed for 0-RTT + else runTLSFailure params1 (tlsClient earlyData) tlsServer + where + tlsClient earlyData ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + tlsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + +handshake13_ee_groups :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ee_groups (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + let -- The client prefers P256 + cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = [P256, X25519]} + -- The server prefers X25519 + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = [X25519, P256] + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [[X25519, P256]] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + (_, serverMessages) <- runTLSCapture13 params + -- The server should tell X25519 in supported_groups in EE to client + let isSupportedGroups (ExtensionRaw eid _) = eid == EID_SupportedGroups + eeMessagesHaveExt = + [ any isSupportedGroups exts + | EncryptedExtensions13 exts <- serverMessages + ] + eeMessagesHaveExt `shouldBe` [True] + +handshake13_ec :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ec (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + EC cgrps <- generate arbitrary + EC sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +handshake13_ffdhe :: CSP13 -> IO () +handshake13_ffdhe (CSP13 (cli, srv)) = do + FFDHE cgrps <- generate arbitrary + FFDHE sgrps <- generate arbitrary + let cliSupported = (clientSupported cli){supportedGroups = cgrps} + svrSupported = + (serverSupported srv) + { supportedGroups = sgrps + , supportedGroupsTLS13 = [sgrps] + } + params = + ( cli{clientSupported = cliSupported} + , srv{serverSupported = svrSupported} + ) + runTLSSimple13 params FullHandshake + +post_handshake_auth :: CSP13 -> IO () +post_handshake_auth (CSP13 (clientParam, serverParam)) = do + cred <- generate (arbitraryClientCredential TLS13) + let clientParam' = + clientParam + { clientHooks = + (clientHooks clientParam) + { onCertificateRequest = \_ -> return $ Just cred + } + } + serverParam' = + serverParam + { serverHooks = + (serverHooks serverParam) + { onClientCertificate = validateChain cred + } + } + if isCredentialDSA cred + then runTLSFailure (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer + else runTLSSuccess (clientParam', serverParam') hsClient hsServer + where + validateChain cred chain + | chain == fst cred = return CertificateUsageAccept + | otherwise = return (CertificateUsageReject CertificateRejectUnknownCA) + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx "request 1" + recvDataAssert ctx "response 1" + sendData ctx "request 2" + recvDataAssert ctx "response 2" + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + recvDataAssert ctx "request 1" + _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- single request + sendData ctx "response 1" + recvDataAssert ctx "request 2" + _ <- requestCertificate ctx + _ <- requestCertificate ctx -- two simultaneously + sendData ctx "response 2" + +expectJust :: String -> Maybe a -> Expectation +expectJust tag mx = case mx of + Nothing -> expectationFailure tag + Just _ -> return () diff --git a/test/PipeChan.hs b/test/PipeChan.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/PipeChan.hs @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +-- create a similar concept than a unix pipe. +module PipeChan ( + PipeChan (..), + newPipe, + runPipe, + readPipeC, + readPipeS, + writePipeC, + writePipeS, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent +import Control.Monad (forever) +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.IORef + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | represent a unidirectional pipe with a buffered read channel and +-- a write channel +data UniPipeChan = UniPipeChan + { getReadUniPipe :: Chan ByteString + , getWriteUniPipe :: Chan ByteString + } + +newUniPipeChan :: IO UniPipeChan +newUniPipeChan = UniPipeChan <$> newChan <*> newChan + +runUniPipe :: UniPipeChan -> IO ThreadId +runUniPipe UniPipeChan{..} = + forkIO $ + forever $ + readChan getReadUniPipe >>= writeChan getWriteUniPipe + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +-- | Represent a bidirectional pipe with 2 nodes A and B +data PipeChan = PipeChan + { fromC :: IORef ByteString + , fromS :: IORef ByteString + , c2s :: UniPipeChan + , s2c :: UniPipeChan + } + +newPipe :: IO PipeChan +newPipe = + PipeChan + <$> newIORef B.empty + <*> newIORef B.empty + <*> newUniPipeChan + <*> newUniPipeChan + +runPipe :: PipeChan -> IO (ThreadId, ThreadId) +runPipe PipeChan{..} = (,) <$> runUniPipe c2s <*> runUniPipe s2c + +readPipeC :: PipeChan -> Int -> IO ByteString +readPipeC PipeChan{..} sz = readBuffered fromS (getWriteUniPipe s2c) sz + +writePipeC :: PipeChan -> ByteString -> IO () +writePipeC PipeChan{..} = writeChan $ getWriteUniPipe c2s + +readPipeS :: PipeChan -> Int -> IO ByteString +readPipeS PipeChan{..} sz = readBuffered fromC (getWriteUniPipe c2s) sz + +writePipeS :: PipeChan -> ByteString -> IO () +writePipeS PipeChan{..} = writeChan $ getReadUniPipe s2c + +-- helper to read buffered data. +readBuffered :: IORef ByteString -> Chan ByteString -> Int -> IO ByteString +readBuffered ref chan sz = do + left <- readIORef ref + if B.length left >= sz + then do + let (ret, nleft) = B.splitAt sz left + writeIORef ref nleft + return ret + else do + let newSize = sz - B.length left + newData <- readChan chan + writeIORef ref newData + remain <- readBuffered ref chan newSize + return (left `B.append` remain) diff --git a/test/PubKey.hs b/test/PubKey.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/PubKey.hs @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +module PubKey ( + arbitraryRSAPair, + arbitraryDSAPair, + arbitraryECDSAPair, + arbitraryEd25519Pair, + arbitraryEd448Pair, + globalRSAPair, + getGlobalRSAPair, + knownECCurves, + defaultECCurve, + dsaParams, + rsaParams, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent.MVar +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DSA as DSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECDSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA +import Crypto.Random +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import System.IO.Unsafe +import Test.QuickCheck + +arbitraryRSAPair :: Gen (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) +arbitraryRSAPair = (rngToRSA . drgNewTest) `fmap` arbitrary + where + rngToRSA :: ChaChaDRG -> (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) + rngToRSA rng = fst $ withDRG rng arbitraryRSAPairWithRNG + +arbitraryRSAPairWithRNG :: MonadRandom m => m (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) +arbitraryRSAPairWithRNG = RSA.generate 256 0x10001 + +{-# NOINLINE globalRSAPair #-} +globalRSAPair :: MVar (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) +globalRSAPair = unsafePerformIO $ do + drg <- drgNew + newMVar (fst $ withDRG drg arbitraryRSAPairWithRNG) + +{-# NOINLINE getGlobalRSAPair #-} +getGlobalRSAPair :: (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) +getGlobalRSAPair = unsafePerformIO (readMVar globalRSAPair) + +rsaParams :: (RSA.PublicKey, RSA.PrivateKey) +rsaParams = (pub, priv) + where + priv = + RSA.PrivateKey + { RSA.private_pub = pub + , RSA.private_d = d + , RSA.private_p = 0 + , RSA.private_q = 0 + , RSA.private_dP = 0 + , RSA.private_dQ = 0 + , RSA.private_qinv = 0 + } + pub = + RSA.PublicKey + { RSA.public_size = 1024 `div` 8 + , RSA.public_n = n + , RSA.public_e = e + } + n = + 0x00c086b4c6db28ae578d73766d6fdd04b913808a85bf9ad7bcfc9a6ff04d13d2ff75f761ce7db9ee8996e29dc433d19a2d3f748e8d368ba099781d58276e1863a324ae3fb1a061874cd9f3510e54e49727c68de0616964335371cfb63f15ebff8ce8df09c74fb8625f8f58548b90f079a3405f522e738e664d0c645b015664f7c7 + e = 0x10001 + d = + 0x3edc3cae28e4717818b1385ba7088d0038c3e176a606d2a5dbfc38cc46fe500824e62ec312fde04a803f61afac13a5b95c5c9c26b346879b54429083df488b4f29bb7b9722d366d6f5d2b512150a2e950eacfe0fd9dd56b87b0322f74ae3c8d8674ace62bc723f7c05e9295561efd70d7a924c6abac2e482880fc0149d5ad481 + +dsaParams :: DSA.Params +dsaParams = + DSA.Params + { DSA.params_p = + 0x009f356bbc4750645555b02aa3918e85d5e35bdccd56154bfaa3e1801d5fe0faf65355215148ea866d5732fd27eb2f4d222c975767d2eb573513e460eceae327c8ac5da1f4ce765c49a39cae4c904b4e5cc64554d97148f20a2655027a0cf8f70b2550cc1f0c9861ce3a316520ab0588407ea3189d20c78bd52df97e56cbe0bbeb + , DSA.params_q = 0x00f33a57b47de86ff836f9fe0bb060c54ab293133b + , DSA.params_g = + 0x3bb973c4f6eee92d1530f250487735595d778c2e5c8147d67a46ebcba4e6444350d49da8e7da667f9b1dbb22d2108870b9fcfabc353cdfac5218d829f22f69130317cc3b0d724881e34c34b8a2571d411da6458ef4c718df9e826f73e16a035b1dcbc1c62cac7a6604adb3e7930be8257944c6dfdddd655004b98253185775ff + } + +arbitraryDSAPair :: Gen (DSA.PublicKey, DSA.PrivateKey) +arbitraryDSAPair = do + priv <- choose (1, DSA.params_q dsaParams) + let pub = DSA.calculatePublic dsaParams priv + return (DSA.PublicKey dsaParams pub, DSA.PrivateKey dsaParams priv) + +-- for performance reason P521 is not tested +knownECCurves :: [ECC.CurveName] +knownECCurves = + [ ECC.SEC_p256r1 + , ECC.SEC_p384r1 + , ECC.SEC_p521r1 + ] + +defaultECCurve :: ECC.CurveName +defaultECCurve = ECC.SEC_p256r1 + +arbitraryECDSAPair :: ECC.CurveName -> Gen (ECDSA.PublicKey, ECDSA.PrivateKey) +arbitraryECDSAPair curveName = do + d <- choose (1, n - 1) + let p = ECC.pointBaseMul curve d + return (ECDSA.PublicKey curve p, ECDSA.PrivateKey curve d) + where + curve = ECC.getCurveByName curveName + n = ECC.ecc_n . ECC.common_curve $ curve + +arbitraryEd25519Pair :: Gen (Ed25519.PublicKey, Ed25519.SecretKey) +arbitraryEd25519Pair = do + bytes <- vectorOf 32 arbitrary + let priv = fromCryptoPassed $ Ed25519.secretKey (B.pack bytes) + return (Ed25519.toPublic priv, priv) + +arbitraryEd448Pair :: Gen (Ed448.PublicKey, Ed448.SecretKey) +arbitraryEd448Pair = do + bytes <- vectorOf 57 arbitrary + let priv = fromCryptoPassed $ Ed448.secretKey (B.pack bytes) + return (Ed448.toPublic priv, priv) + +fromCryptoPassed :: CryptoFailable a -> a +fromCryptoPassed (CryptoPassed x) = x +fromCryptoPassed _ = error "fromCryptoPassed" diff --git a/test/Run.hs b/test/Run.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/Run.hs @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-} + +module Run ( + runTLS, + runTLSSimple, + runTLSPredicate, + runTLSSimple13, + runTLSSimple13ECH, + runTLS0RTT, + runTLS0RTTech, + runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate, + runTLSCaptureFail, + runTLSCapture13, + runTLSSuccess, + runTLSFailure, + expectMaybe, + newPairContext, + withDataPipe, + byeBye, +) where + +import Control.Concurrent +import Control.Concurrent.Async +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import Control.Monad +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.IORef +import Network.TLS +import System.Timeout +import Test.Hspec +import Test.QuickCheck + +import API +import Arbitrary +import PipeChan + +type ClinetWithInput = Chan ByteString -> Context -> IO () +type ServerWithOutput = Context -> Chan [ByteString] -> IO () + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +runTLS + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> ClinetWithInput + -> ServerWithOutput + -> IO () +runTLS = runTLSN 1 + +runTLSN + :: Int + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> ClinetWithInput + -> ServerWithOutput + -> IO () +runTLSN n params tlsClient tlsServer = do + inputChan <- newChan + outputChan <- newChan + -- generate some data to send + ds <- replicateM n $ B.pack <$> generate (someWords8 256) + forM_ ds $ writeChan inputChan + -- run client and server + withPairContext params $ \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + concurrently_ (server sCtx outputChan) (client inputChan cCtx) + -- read result + mDs <- timeout 1000000 $ readChan outputChan -- 60 sec + expectMaybe "timeout" ds mDs + where + server sCtx outputChan = + E.catch + (tlsServer sCtx outputChan) + (printAndRaise "S: " (serverSupported $ snd params)) + client inputChan cCtx = + E.catch + (tlsClient inputChan cCtx) + (printAndRaise "C: " (clientSupported $ fst params)) + printAndRaise :: String -> Supported -> E.SomeException -> IO () + printAndRaise s supported e = do + putStrLn $ + s + ++ " exception: " + ++ show e + ++ ", supported: " + ++ show supported + E.throwIO e + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +runTLSSimple :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +runTLSSimple params = runTLSPredicate params (const True) + +runTLSPredicate + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> (Maybe Information -> Bool) -> IO () +runTLSPredicate params p = runTLSSuccess params hsClient hsServer + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + checkInfoPredicate ctx + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + checkInfoPredicate ctx + checkInfoPredicate ctx = do + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + unless (p minfo) $ + fail ("unexpected information: " ++ show minfo) + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +runTLSSimple13 + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> HandshakeMode13 + -> IO () +runTLSSimple13 params mode = + runTLSSuccess params hsClient hsServer + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "C: mode should be Just" mode mmode + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode + +runTLSSimple13ECH + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> HandshakeMode13 + -> IO () +runTLSSimple13ECH params mode = + runTLSSuccess params hsClient hsServer + where + hsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + let mmode = minfo >>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode + maccepted = infoIsECHAccepted <$> minfo + expectMaybe "C: mode should be Just" mode mmode + expectMaybe "C: TLS accepted should be Just" True maccepted + hsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode + +runTLS0RTT + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> HandshakeMode13 + -> ByteString + -> IO () +runTLS0RTT params mode earlyData = + withPairContext params $ \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + concurrently_ (tlsServer sCtx) (tlsClient cCtx) + where + tlsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "C: mode should be Just" mode mmode + tlsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + let ls = chunkLengths $ B.length earlyData + chunks <- replicateM (length ls) $ recvData ctx + (map B.length chunks, B.concat chunks) `shouldBe` (ls, earlyData) + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + bye ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode + chunkLengths :: Int -> [Int] + chunkLengths len + | len > 16384 = 16384 : chunkLengths (len - 16384) + | len > 0 = [len] + | otherwise = [] + +runTLS0RTTech + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> HandshakeMode13 + -> ByteString + -> IO () +runTLS0RTTech params mode earlyData = + withPairContext params $ \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + concurrently_ (tlsServer sCtx) (tlsClient cCtx) + where + tlsClient ctx = do + handshake ctx + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + _ <- recvData ctx + bye ctx + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + let mmode = minfo >>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode + maccepted = infoIsECHAccepted <$> minfo + expectMaybe "C: mode should be Just" mode mmode + expectMaybe "C: TLS accepted should be Just" True maccepted + tlsServer ctx = do + handshake ctx + let ls = chunkLengths $ B.length earlyData + chunks <- replicateM (length ls) $ recvData ctx + (map B.length chunks, B.concat chunks) `shouldBe` (ls, earlyData) + sendData ctx $ L.fromStrict earlyData + bye ctx + mmode <- (>>= infoTLS13HandshakeMode) <$> contextGetInformation ctx + expectMaybe "S: mode should be Just" mode mmode + chunkLengths :: Int -> [Int] + chunkLengths len + | len > 16384 = 16384 : chunkLengths (len - 16384) + | len > 0 = [len] + | otherwise = [] + +expectMaybe :: (Show a, Eq a) => String -> a -> Maybe a -> Expectation +expectMaybe tag e mx = case mx of + Nothing -> expectationFailure tag + Just x -> x `shouldBe` e + +runTLSCaptureFail + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO ([Handshake], [Handshake]) +runTLSCaptureFail params = do + sRef <- newIORef [] + cRef <- newIORef [] + runTLSFailure params (hsClient cRef) (hsServer sRef) + sReceived <- readIORef sRef + cReceived <- readIORef cRef + return (reverse sReceived, reverse cReceived) + where + hsClient ref ctx = do + installHook ctx ref + handshake ctx + sendData ctx "Foo" + hsServer ref ctx = do + installHook ctx ref + handshake ctx + _ <- recvData ctx + return () + installHook ctx ref = + let recv hss = modifyIORef ref (hss :) >> return hss + in contextHookSetHandshakeRecv ctx recv + +runTLSCapture13 + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO ([Handshake13], [Handshake13]) +runTLSCapture13 params = do + sRef <- newIORef [] + cRef <- newIORef [] + runTLSSuccess params (hsClient cRef) (hsServer sRef) + sReceived <- readIORef sRef + cReceived <- readIORef cRef + return (reverse sReceived, reverse cReceived) + where + hsClient ref ctx = do + installHook ctx ref + handshake ctx + hsServer ref ctx = do + installHook ctx ref + handshake ctx + installHook ctx ref = + let recv hss = modifyIORef ref (hss :) >> return hss + in contextHookSetHandshake13Recv ctx recv + +runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> IO () +runTLSSimpleKeyUpdate params = runTLSN 3 params tlsClient tlsServer + where + tlsClient queue ctx = do + handshake ctx + d0 <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d0]) + d1 <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d1]) + req <- generate $ elements [OneWay, TwoWay] + _ <- updateKey ctx req + d2 <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d2]) + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + tlsServer ctx queue = do + handshake ctx + d0 <- recvData ctx + req <- generate $ elements [OneWay, TwoWay] + _ <- updateKey ctx req + d1 <- recvData ctx + d2 <- recvData ctx + writeChan queue [d0, d1, d2] + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +runTLSSuccess + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (Context -> IO ()) + -> (Context -> IO ()) + -> IO () +runTLSSuccess params hsClient hsServer = runTLS params tlsClient tlsServer + where + tlsClient queue ctx = do + hsClient ctx + d <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d]) + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + tlsServer ctx queue = do + hsServer ctx + d <- recvData ctx + writeChan queue [d] + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + +runTLSFailure + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (Context -> IO c) + -> (Context -> IO s) + -> IO () +runTLSFailure params hsClient hsServer = + withPairContext params $ \(cCtx, sCtx) -> + concurrently_ (tlsServer sCtx) (tlsClient cCtx) + where + tlsClient ctx = hsClient ctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException + tlsServer ctx = hsServer ctx `shouldThrow` anyTLSException + +anyTLSException :: Selector TLSException +anyTLSException = const True + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +debug :: Bool +debug = False + +withPairContext + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> ((Context, Context) -> IO ()) -> IO () +withPairContext params body = + E.bracket + (newPairContext params) + (\((t1, t2), _) -> killThread t1 >> killThread t2) + (\(_, ctxs) -> body ctxs) + +newPairContext + :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> IO ((ThreadId, ThreadId), (Context, Context)) +newPairContext (cParams, sParams) = do + pipe <- newPipe + tids <- runPipe pipe + let noFlush = return () + let noClose = return () + + let cBackend = Backend noFlush noClose (writePipeC pipe) (readPipeC pipe) + let sBackend = Backend noFlush noClose (writePipeS pipe) (readPipeS pipe) + cCtx' <- contextNew cBackend cParams + sCtx' <- contextNew sBackend sParams + + contextHookSetLogging cCtx' (logging "client: ") + contextHookSetLogging sCtx' (logging "server: ") + + return (tids, (cCtx', sCtx')) + where + logging pre = + if debug + then + defaultLogging + { loggingPacketSent = putStrLn . ((pre ++ ">> ") ++) + , loggingPacketRecv = putStrLn . ((pre ++ "<< ") ++) + } + else defaultLogging + + +withDataPipe :: (ClientParams, ServerParams) -> (Context -> Chan result -> IO ()) -> (Chan start -> Context -> IO ()) -> ((start -> IO (), IO result) -> IO a) -> IO a +withDataPipe params tlsServer tlsClient cont = do + -- initial setup + startQueue <- newChan + resultQueue <- newChan + + (cCtx, sCtx) <- snd <$> newPairContext params + + withAsync (E.catch (tlsServer sCtx resultQueue) + (printAndRaise "server" (serverSupported $ snd params))) $ \sAsync -> withAsync (E.catch (tlsClient startQueue cCtx) + (printAndRaise "client" (clientSupported $ fst params))) $ \cAsync -> do + let readResult = waitBoth cAsync sAsync >> readChan resultQueue + cont (writeChan startQueue, readResult) + + where + printAndRaise :: String -> Supported -> E.SomeException -> IO () + printAndRaise s supported e = do + putStrLn $ s ++ " exception: " ++ show e ++ + ", supported: " ++ show supported + E.throwIO e + +-- Terminate the write direction and wait to receive the peer EOF. This is +-- necessary in situations where we want to confirm the peer status, or to make +-- sure to receive late messages like session tickets. In the test suite this +-- is used each time application code ends the connection without prior call to +-- 'recvData'. +byeBye :: Context -> IO () +byeBye ctx = do + bye ctx + bs <- recvData ctx + unless (B.null bs) $ fail "byeBye: unexpected application data" diff --git a/test/Session.hs b/test/Session.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/Session.hs @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -Wno-orphans #-} + +module Session ( + readClientSessionRef, + clearClientSessionRef, + twoSessionRefs, + twoSessionManagers, + setPairParamsSessionManagers, + setPairParamsSessionResuming, + oneSessionTicket, +) where + +import Codec.Serialise +import Control.Monad +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.IORef +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.Internal + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +readClientSessionRef :: (IORef (Maybe c), IORef (Maybe s)) -> IO (Maybe c) +readClientSessionRef refs = readIORef (fst refs) + +clearClientSessionRef :: (IORef (Maybe c), IORef (Maybe s)) -> IO () +clearClientSessionRef refs = writeIORef (fst refs) Nothing + +twoSessionRefs :: IO (IORef (Maybe client), IORef (Maybe server)) +twoSessionRefs = (,) <$> newIORef Nothing <*> newIORef Nothing + +-- | simple session manager to store one session id and session data for a single thread. +-- a Real concurrent session manager would use an MVar and have multiples items. +oneSessionManager :: IORef (Maybe (SessionID, SessionData)) -> SessionManager +oneSessionManager ref = + noSessionManager + { sessionResume = \myId -> readIORef ref >>= maybeResume False myId + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = \myId -> readIORef ref >>= maybeResume True myId + , sessionEstablish = \myId dat -> writeIORef ref (Just (myId, dat)) >> return Nothing + , sessionInvalidate = \_ -> return () + , sessionUseTicket = False + } + where + maybeResume onlyOnce myId (Just (sid, sdata)) + | sid == myId = when onlyOnce (writeIORef ref Nothing) >> return (Just sdata) + maybeResume _ _ _ = return Nothing + +twoSessionManagers + :: (IORef (Maybe (SessionID, SessionData)), IORef (Maybe (SessionID, SessionData))) + -> (SessionManager, SessionManager) +twoSessionManagers (cRef, sRef) = (oneSessionManager cRef, oneSessionManager sRef) + +setPairParamsSessionManagers + :: (SessionManager, SessionManager) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +setPairParamsSessionManagers (clientManager, serverManager) (clientParams, serverParams) = (nc, ns) + where + nc = + clientParams + { clientShared = updateSessionManager clientManager $ clientShared clientParams + } + ns = + serverParams + { serverShared = updateSessionManager serverManager $ serverShared serverParams + } + updateSessionManager manager shared = shared{sharedSessionManager = manager} + +---------------------------------------------------------------- + +setPairParamsSessionResuming + :: (SessionID, SessionData) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) + -> (ClientParams, ServerParams) +setPairParamsSessionResuming sessionStuff (clientParams, serverParams) = + ( clientParams{clientWantSessionResume = Just sessionStuff} + , serverParams + ) + +oneSessionTicket :: SessionManager +oneSessionTicket = + noSessionManager + { sessionResume = resume + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = resume + , sessionEstablish = \_ dat -> return $ Just $ L.toStrict $ serialise dat + , sessionInvalidate = \_ -> return () + , sessionUseTicket = True + } + +resume :: Ticket -> IO (Maybe SessionData) +resume ticket + | isTicket ticket = return $ Just $ deserialise $ L.fromStrict ticket + | otherwise = return Nothing diff --git a/test/Spec.hs b/test/Spec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/Spec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -F -pgmF hspec-discover #-} diff --git a/test/ThreadSpec.hs b/test/ThreadSpec.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/ThreadSpec.hs @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module ThreadSpec where + +import Control.Concurrent +import Control.Concurrent.Async +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.Foldable (traverse_) +import Network.TLS +import Test.Hspec +import Test.Hspec.QuickCheck + +import API +import Arbitrary () +import Run + +spec :: Spec +spec = do + describe "thread safety" $ do + prop "can read/write concurrently" $ \params -> + runTLS params tlsClient tlsServer + +tlsClient :: Chan ByteString -> Context -> IO () +tlsClient queue ctx = do + handshake ctx + runReaderWriters ctx "server-value" "client-value" + d <- readChan queue + sendData ctx (L.fromChunks [d]) + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + +tlsServer :: Context -> Chan [ByteString] -> IO () +tlsServer ctx queue = do + handshake ctx + runReaderWriters ctx "client-value" "server-value" + d <- recvData ctx + writeChan queue [d] + checkCtxFinished ctx + bye ctx + +runReaderWriters :: Context -> ByteString -> L.ByteString -> IO () +runReaderWriters ctx r w = + -- run concurrently 10 readers and 10 writers on the same context + let workers = concat $ replicate 10 [recvDataAssert ctx r, sendData ctx w] + in runConcurrently $ traverse_ Concurrently workers diff --git a/tls.cabal b/tls.cabal --- a/tls.cabal +++ b/tls.cabal @@ -1,89 +1,280 @@ -Name: tls -Version: 0.9.11 -Description: - Native Haskell TLS and SSL protocol implementation for server and client. - . - This provides a high-level implementation of a sensitive security protocol, - eliminating a common set of security issues through the use of the advanced - type system, high level constructions and common Haskell features. - . - Currently implement the SSL3.0, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and TLS1.2 protocol, - with only RSA supported for Key Exchange. - . - Only core protocol available here, have a look at the - package for default - ciphers, compressions and certificates functions. -License: BSD3 -License-file: LICENSE -Copyright: Vincent Hanquez -Author: Vincent Hanquez -Maintainer: Vincent Hanquez -Synopsis: TLS/SSL protocol native implementation (Server and Client) -Build-Type: Simple -Category: Network -stability: experimental -Cabal-Version: >=1.6 -Homepage: http://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls -data-files: README.md, TODO +cabal-version: >=1.10 +name: tls +version: 2.4.3 +license: BSD3 +license-file: LICENSE +copyright: Vincent Hanquez +maintainer: Kazu Yamamoto +author: Vincent Hanquez +homepage: https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls +synopsis: TLS protocol native implementation +description: + Native Haskell TLS 1.2/1.3 protocol implementation for servers and clients. -Flag test - Description: Build unit test - Default: False +category: Network +build-type: Simple +extra-source-files: + test/*.hs + CHANGELOG.md -Flag executable - Description: Build the executable - Default: False +source-repository head + type: git + location: https://github.com/haskell-tls/hs-tls + subdir: tls -Library - Build-Depends: base >= 3 && < 5 - , mtl - , cryptohash >= 0.6 - , cereal >= 0.3 - , bytestring - , crypto-api >= 0.5 - , cryptocipher >= 0.3.0 && < 0.4.0 - , certificate >= 1.2.0 && < 1.3.0 - Exposed-modules: Network.TLS - Network.TLS.Cipher - Network.TLS.Compression - Network.TLS.Internal - other-modules: Network.TLS.Cap - Network.TLS.Struct - Network.TLS.Core - Network.TLS.Context - Network.TLS.Crypto - Network.TLS.MAC - Network.TLS.Measurement - Network.TLS.Packet - Network.TLS.Record - Network.TLS.Record.Types - Network.TLS.Record.Engage - Network.TLS.Record.Disengage - Network.TLS.State - Network.TLS.Sending - Network.TLS.Receiving - Network.TLS.Util - Network.TLS.Wire - ghc-options: -Wall - if impl(ghc == 7.6.1) - ghc-options: -O0 +flag devel + description: Development commands + default: False -executable Tests - Main-is: Tests.hs - if flag(test) - Buildable: True - Build-Depends: base >= 3 && < 5 - , QuickCheck >= 2 - , test-framework - , test-framework-quickcheck2 - , bytestring - , time - , cprng-aes - , cryptocipher >= 0.3.0 - else - Buildable: False - ghc-options: -Wall -fno-warn-orphans -fno-warn-missing-signatures -fhpc +library + exposed-modules: + Network.TLS + Network.TLS.Cipher + Network.TLS.Compression + Network.TLS.Internal + Network.TLS.Extra + Network.TLS.Extra.Cipher + Network.TLS.Extra.CipherCBC + Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE + Network.TLS.QUIC -source-repository head - type: git - location: git://github.com/vincenthz/hs-tls + other-modules: + Network.TLS.Struct + Network.TLS.Struct13 + Network.TLS.Core + Network.TLS.Context + Network.TLS.Context.Internal + Network.TLS.Credentials + Network.TLS.Backend + Network.TLS.Crypto + Network.TLS.Crypto.DH + Network.TLS.Crypto.IES + Network.TLS.Crypto.Types + Network.TLS.ErrT + Network.TLS.Error + Network.TLS.Extension + Network.TLS.Handshake + Network.TLS.Handshake.Certificate + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ClientHello + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.Common + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.ServerHello + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS12 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Client.TLS13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Common + Network.TLS.Handshake.Common13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Control + Network.TLS.Handshake.Key + Network.TLS.Handshake.Random + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello12 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ClientHello13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.Common + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello12 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.ServerHello13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS12 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Server.TLS13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature + Network.TLS.Handshake.State + Network.TLS.Handshake.State13 + Network.TLS.Handshake.TranscriptHash + Network.TLS.HashAndSignature + Network.TLS.Hooks + Network.TLS.IO + Network.TLS.IO.Decode + Network.TLS.IO.Encode + Network.TLS.Imports + Network.TLS.KeySchedule + Network.TLS.MAC + Network.TLS.Measurement + Network.TLS.Packet + Network.TLS.Packet13 + Network.TLS.Parameters + Network.TLS.PostHandshake + Network.TLS.RNG + Network.TLS.Record + Network.TLS.Record.Decrypt + Network.TLS.Record.Encrypt + Network.TLS.Record.Layer + Network.TLS.Record.Recv + Network.TLS.Record.Send + Network.TLS.Record.State + Network.TLS.Record.Types + Network.TLS.Session + Network.TLS.State + Network.TLS.Types + Network.TLS.Types.Cipher + Network.TLS.Types.Secret + Network.TLS.Types.Session + Network.TLS.Types.Version + Network.TLS.Util + Network.TLS.Util.ASN1 + Network.TLS.Util.Serialization + Network.TLS.Wire + Network.TLS.X509 + + default-language: Haskell2010 + default-extensions: Strict StrictData + ghc-options: -Wall + build-depends: + base >=4.9 && <5, + base16-bytestring, + bytestring >=0.10 && <0.13, + cereal >=0.5.3 && <0.6, + crypton >=1.1.2 && <1.2, + crypton-asn1-encoding >= 0.10.0 && < 0.11, + crypton-asn1-types >= 0.4.1 && < 0.5, + crypton-x509 >=1.9 && <1.10, + crypton-x509-store >=1.9 && <1.10, + crypton-x509-validation >=1.9 && <1.10, + data-default, + ech-config, + hpke >=0.1.0 && <0.2, + mlkem >= 0.2.0 && <0.3, + mtl >=2.2 && <2.4, + network >=3.1, + ram >=0.22.0 && <0.23, + random >=1.2 && <1.4, + serialise >=0.2 && <0.3, + transformers >=0.5 && <0.7, + unix-time >=0.4.11 && <0.6, + zlib >=0.7 && <0.8 + +executable tls-server + main-is: tls-server.hs + hs-source-dirs: util + other-modules: + Common + Server + Imports + + default-language: Haskell2010 + default-extensions: Strict StrictData + ghc-options: -Wall -threaded -rtsopts + build-depends: + base >=4.9 && <5, + base16-bytestring, + bytestring, + containers, + crypton, + crypton-x509-store, + crypton-x509-system, + ech-config, + network, + network-run, + tls + + if flag(devel) + + else + buildable: False + +executable tls-client + main-is: tls-client.hs + hs-source-dirs: util + other-modules: + Client + Common + Imports + + default-language: Haskell2010 + default-extensions: Strict StrictData + ghc-options: -Wall -threaded -rtsopts + build-depends: + base >=4.9 && <5, + base16-bytestring, + bytestring, + crypton, + crypton-x509-store, + crypton-x509-system, + ech-config, + network, + network-run >=0.5, + tls + + if flag(devel) + + else + buildable: False + +test-suite spec + type: exitcode-stdio-1.0 + main-is: Spec.hs + build-tool-depends: hspec-discover:hspec-discover + hs-source-dirs: test + other-modules: + API + Arbitrary + Certificate + CiphersSpec + ECHSpec + EncodeSpec + HandshakeSpec + PipeChan + PubKey + Run + Session + ThreadSpec + + default-language: Haskell2010 + default-extensions: Strict StrictData + ghc-options: -Wall -threaded -rtsopts + build-depends: + base >=4.9 && <5, + QuickCheck, + async, + base64-bytestring, + bytestring, + crypton, + crypton-asn1-types, + crypton-x509, + crypton-x509-validation, + ech-config, + hspec, + ram, + serialise, + time-hourglass, + tls + +benchmark tls-bench + type: exitcode-stdio-1.0 + main-is: Benchmarks.hs + hs-source-dirs: Benchmarks test + other-modules: + API + Arbitrary + Certificate + CiphersSpec + ECHSpec + EncodeSpec + HandshakeSpec + PipeChan + PubKey + Run + Session + ThreadSpec + + default-language: Haskell2010 + ghc-options: -Wall + build-depends: + base >=4.9 && <5, + QuickCheck, + async, + base64-bytestring, + bytestring, + containers, + crypton, + crypton-asn1-types, + crypton-x509, + crypton-x509-store, + crypton-x509-validation, + data-default, + ech-config, + hspec, + network, + network-run, + serialise, + tasty-bench, + time-hourglass, + tls diff --git a/util/Client.hs b/util/Client.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/Client.hs @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Client ( + Aux (..), + Cli, + clientHTTP11, + clientDNS, +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString.Base16 as BS16 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as C8 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as CL8 +import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty) +import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as NE +import Network.Socket +import Network.TLS + +import Imports + +data Aux = Aux + { auxAuthority :: HostName + , auxPort :: ServiceName + , auxDebugPrint :: String -> IO () + , auxShow :: ByteString -> IO () + , auxReadResumptionData :: IO [(SessionID, SessionData)] + } + +type Cli = Aux -> NonEmpty ByteString -> Context -> IO () + +clientHTTP11 :: Cli +clientHTTP11 aux@Aux{..} paths ctx = do + sendData ctx $ + CL8.fromStrict $ + "GET " + <> NE.head paths + <> " HTTP/1.1\r\n" + <> "Host: " + <> C8.pack auxAuthority + <> "\r\n" + <> "Connection: close\r\n" + <> "\r\n" + consume ctx aux + +clientDNS :: Cli +clientDNS Aux{..} _paths ctx = do + sendData + ctx + "\x00\x2c\xdc\xe3\x01\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x03\x77\x77\x77\x07\x65\x78\x61\x6d\x70\x6c\x65\x03\x63\x6f\x6d\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x29\x04\xd0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + bs <- recvData ctx + auxShow $ "Reply: " <> BS16.encode bs + auxShow "\n" + +consume :: Context -> Aux -> IO () +consume ctx Aux{..} = loop + where + loop = do + bs <- recvData ctx + if bs == "" + then auxShow "\n" + else auxShow bs >> loop diff --git a/util/Common.hs b/util/Common.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/Common.hs @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} +-- Disable this warning so we can still test deprecated functionality. +{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-warnings-deprecations #-} + +module Common ( + printDHParams, + printGroups, + readNumber, + readDHParams, + readGroups, + getCertificateStore, + getLogger, + namedGroups, + getInfo, + printHandshakeInfo, + showBytesHex, +) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString.Base16 as B16 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as C8 +import Data.Char (isDigit) +import Data.X509.CertificateStore +import Network.TLS hiding (HostName) +import Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE +import System.Exit +import System.X509 + +import Imports + +namedDHParams :: [(String, DHParams)] +namedDHParams = + [ ("ffdhe2048", ffdhe2048) + , ("ffdhe3072", ffdhe3072) + , ("ffdhe4096", ffdhe4096) + , ("ffdhe6144", ffdhe6144) + , ("ffdhe8192", ffdhe8192) + ] + +{- FOURMOLU_DISABLE -} +namedGroups :: [(String, Group)] +namedGroups = + [ ("ffdhe2048", FFDHE2048) + , ("ffdhe3072", FFDHE3072) + , ("ffdhe4096", FFDHE4096) + , ("ffdhe6144", FFDHE6144) + , ("ffdhe8192", FFDHE8192) + , ("p256", P256) + , ("p384", P384) + , ("p521", P521) + , ("x25519", X25519) + , ("x448", X448) + , ("mlkem512", MLKEM512) + , ("mlkem768", MLKEM768) + , ("mlkem1024", MLKEM1024) + , ("x25519mlkem768", X25519MLKEM768) + , ("p256mlkem768", P256MLKEM768) + , ("p384mlkem1024", P384MLKEM1024) + ] +{- FOURMOLU_ENABLE -} + +readNumber :: (Num a, Read a) => String -> Maybe a +readNumber s + | all isDigit s = Just $ read s + | otherwise = Nothing + +readDHParams :: String -> IO (Maybe DHParams) +readDHParams s = + case lookup s namedDHParams of + Nothing -> (Just . read) `fmap` readFile s + mparams -> return mparams + +readGroups :: String -> [Group] +readGroups s = fromMaybe [] $ traverse (`lookup` namedGroups) (split ',' s) + +printDHParams :: IO () +printDHParams = do + putStrLn "DH Parameters" + putStrLn "=====================================" + forM_ namedDHParams $ \(name, _) -> putStrLn name + putStrLn "(or /path/to/dhparams)" + +printGroups :: IO () +printGroups = do + putStrLn "Groups" + putStrLn "=====================================" + forM_ namedGroups $ \(name, _) -> putStrLn name + +split :: Char -> String -> [String] +split _ "" = [] +split c s = case break (c ==) s of + ("", _ : rs) -> split c rs + (s', "") -> [s'] + (s', _ : rs) -> s' : split c rs + +getCertificateStore :: [FilePath] -> IO CertificateStore +getCertificateStore [] = getSystemCertificateStore +getCertificateStore paths = foldM readPathAppend mempty paths + where + readPathAppend acc path = do + mstore <- readCertificateStore path + case mstore of + Nothing -> error ("invalid certificate store: " ++ path) + Just st -> return $! mappend st acc + +getLogger :: Maybe FilePath -> (String -> IO ()) +getLogger Nothing = \_ -> return () +getLogger (Just file) = \msg -> appendFile file (msg ++ "\n") + +getInfo :: Context -> IO Information +getInfo ctx = do + minfo <- contextGetInformation ctx + case minfo of + Nothing -> do + putStrLn "Error: information cannot be obtained" + exitFailure + Just info -> return info + +printHandshakeInfo :: Information -> IO () +printHandshakeInfo i = do + putStrLn $ "Version: " ++ show (infoVersion i) + putStrLn $ "Cipher: " ++ show (infoCipher i) + putStrLn $ "Compression: " ++ show (infoCompression i) + putStrLn $ "Groups: " ++ maybe "(none)" show (infoSupportedGroup i) + when (infoVersion i < TLS13) $ do + putStrLn $ "Extended master secret: " ++ show (infoExtendedMainSecret i) + putStrLn $ "Resumption: " ++ show (infoTLS12Resumption i) + when (infoVersion i == TLS13) $ do + putStrLn $ "Handshake mode: " ++ show (fromJust (infoTLS13HandshakeMode i)) + putStrLn $ "Early data accepted: " ++ show (infoIsEarlyDataAccepted i) + putStrLn $ "Encrypted client hello accepted: " ++ show (infoIsECHAccepted i) + +showBytesHex :: ByteString -> String +showBytesHex bs = C8.unpack $ B16.encode bs diff --git a/util/Imports.hs b/util/Imports.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/Imports.hs @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +module Imports ( + ByteString, + module Control.Applicative, + module Control.Monad, + module Data.List, + module Data.Maybe, + module Data.Monoid, + module Data.Word, +) where + +import Control.Applicative +import Control.Monad +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import Data.List +import Data.Maybe +import Data.Monoid +import Data.Word diff --git a/util/Server.hs b/util/Server.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/Server.hs @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module Server where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as BS +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as C8 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 as CL8 +import Data.IORef +import Network.TLS +import Prelude hiding (getLine) + +import Imports + +-- "<>" creates *chunks* of lazy ByteString, resulting +-- many TLS fragments. +-- To prevent this, strict ByteString is created first and +-- converted into lazy one. +html :: CL8.ByteString +html = + CL8.fromStrict $ + "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" + <> "Context-Type: text/html\r\n" + <> "Content-Length: " + <> C8.pack (show (BS.length body)) + <> "\r\n" + <> "\r\n" + <> body + where + body = "<Hello world!" + +server :: Context -> Bool -> IO () +server ctx showRequest = do + bs <- recvData ctx + case C8.uncons bs of + Nothing -> return () + Just ('A', _) -> do + sendData ctx $ CL8.fromStrict bs + echo ctx + Just _ -> handleHTML ctx showRequest bs + +echo :: Context -> IO () +echo ctx = loop + where + loop = do + bs <- recvData ctx + when (bs /= "") $ do + sendData ctx $ CL8.fromStrict bs + loop + +handleHTML :: Context -> Bool -> ByteString -> IO () +handleHTML ctx showRequest ini = do + getLine <- newSource ctx ini + process getLine + where + process getLine = do + bs <- getLine + when ("GET /keyupdate" `BS.isPrefixOf` bs) $ do + r <- updateKey ctx TwoWay + putStrLn $ "Updating key..." ++ if r then "OK" else "NG" + when ("GET /secret" `BS.isPrefixOf` bs) $ do + r <- requestCertificate ctx + putStrLn $ "Post handshake authentication..." ++ if r then "OK" else "NG" + when (bs /= "") $ do + when showRequest $ do + BS.putStr bs + BS.putStr "\n" + consume getLine + sendData ctx html + consume getLine = do + bs <- getLine + when (bs /= "") $ do + when showRequest $ do + BS.putStr bs + BS.putStr "\n" + consume getLine + +newSource :: Context -> ByteString -> IO (IO ByteString) +newSource ctx ini = do + ref <- newIORef ini + return $ getline ref + where + getline :: IORef ByteString -> IO ByteString + getline ref = do + bs0 <- readIORef ref + case BS.breakSubstring "\n" bs0 of + (_, "") -> do + bs1 <- recvData ctx + writeIORef ref (bs0 <> bs1) + getline ref + (bs1, bs2) -> do + writeIORef ref $ BS.drop 1 bs2 + return $ BS.dropWhileEnd (== 0x0d) bs1 diff --git a/util/tls-client.hs b/util/tls-client.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/tls-client.hs @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +{-# LANGUAGE MultiWayIf #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedLists #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Main where + +import Control.Concurrent +import qualified Control.Exception as E +import qualified Data.ByteString.Base16 as BS16 +import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as C8 +import Data.IORef +import Data.List.NonEmpty (NonEmpty) +import qualified Data.List.NonEmpty as NE +import Data.X509.CertificateStore +import Network.Run.TCP +import Network.Socket +import Network.TLS hiding (is0RTTPossible) +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import Network.TLS.Internal (makeCipherShowPretty) +import System.Console.GetOpt +import System.Environment +import System.Exit +import System.X509 + +import Client +import Common +import Imports + +data Options = Options + { optDebugLog :: Bool + , optShow :: Bool + , optKeyLogFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optGroups :: [Group] + , optValidate :: Bool + , optVerNego :: Bool + , optResumption :: Bool + , opt0RTT :: Bool + , optRetry :: Bool + , optVersions :: [Version] + , optALPN :: String + , optCertFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optKeyFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optECHConfigFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optTraceKey :: Bool + , optIPv4Only :: Bool + , optIPv6Only :: Bool + , optTrustedAnchor :: Maybe FilePath + } + deriving (Show) + +defaultOptions :: Options +defaultOptions = + Options + { optDebugLog = False + , optShow = False + , optKeyLogFile = Nothing + , optGroups = supportedGroups defaultSupported + , optValidate = False + , optVerNego = False + , optResumption = False + , opt0RTT = False + , optRetry = False + , optVersions = supportedVersions defaultSupported + , optALPN = "http/1.1" + , optCertFile = Nothing + , optKeyFile = Nothing + , optECHConfigFile = Nothing + , optTraceKey = False + , optIPv4Only = False + , optIPv6Only = False + , optTrustedAnchor = Nothing + } + +usage :: String +usage = "Usage: tls-client [OPTION] addr port [path]" + +options :: [OptDescr (Options -> Options)] +options = + [ Option + ['d'] + ["debug"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optDebugLog = True})) + "print debug info" + , Option + ['v'] + ["show-content"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optShow = True})) + "print downloaded content" + , Option + ['l'] + ["key-log-file"] + (ReqArg (\file o -> o{optKeyLogFile = Just file}) "") + "a file to store negotiated secrets" + , Option + ['g'] + ["groups"] + (ReqArg (\gs o -> o{optGroups = readGroups gs}) "") + "specify groups" + , Option + ['e'] + ["validate"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optValidate = True})) + "validate server's certificate" + , Option + ['R'] + ["resumption"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optResumption = True})) + "try session resumption" + , Option + ['Z'] + ["0rtt"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{opt0RTT = True})) + "try sending early data" + , Option + ['S'] + ["hello-retry"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optRetry = True})) + "try client hello retry" + , Option + ['2'] + ["tls12"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optVersions = [TLS12]})) + "use TLS 1.2" + , Option + ['3'] + ["tls13"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optVersions = [TLS13]})) + "use TLS 1.3" + , Option + ['a'] + ["alpn"] + (ReqArg (\a o -> o{optALPN = a}) "") + "set ALPN" + , Option + ['c'] + ["cert"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optCertFile = Just fl}) "") + "certificate file" + , Option + ['k'] + ["key"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optKeyFile = Just fl}) "") + "key file" + , Option + [] + ["ech-config"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optECHConfigFile = Just fl}) "") + "ECH config file" + , Option + [] + ["trace-key"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optTraceKey = True})) + "Trace transcript hash" + , Option + ['4'] + [] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optIPv4Only = True, optIPv6Only = False})) + "IPv4 only" + , Option + ['6'] + [] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optIPv6Only = True, optIPv4Only = False})) + "IPv6 only" + , Option + ['t'] + ["trusted-anchor"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optTrustedAnchor = Just fl}) "") + "trusted anchor file" + ] + +showUsageAndExit :: String -> IO a +showUsageAndExit msg = do + putStrLn msg + putStrLn $ usageInfo usage options + putStrLn $ " = " ++ intercalate "," (map fst namedGroups) + exitFailure + +clientOpts :: [String] -> IO (Options, [String]) +clientOpts argv = + case getOpt Permute options argv of + (o, n, []) -> return (foldl (flip id) defaultOptions o, n) + (_, _, errs) -> showUsageAndExit $ concat errs + +main :: IO () +main = do + args <- getArgs + (opts@Options{..}, ips) <- clientOpts args + (host, port, paths) <- case ips of + [] -> showUsageAndExit usage + _ : [] -> showUsageAndExit usage + h : p : [] -> return (h, p, ["/"]) + h : p : ps -> return (h, p, C8.pack <$> NE.fromList ps) + when (null optGroups) $ do + putStrLn "Error: unsupported groups" + exitFailure + let onCertReq = \_ -> case optCertFile of + Just certFile -> case optKeyFile of + Just keyFile -> do + Right (!cc, !priv) <- credentialLoadX509 certFile keyFile + return $ Just (cc, priv) + _ -> return Nothing + _ -> return Nothing + ref <- newIORef [] + let debug + | optDebugLog = putStrLn + | otherwise = \_ -> return () + traceKey + | optTraceKey = putStrLn + | otherwise = \_ -> return () + showContent + | optShow = C8.putStr + | otherwise = \_ -> return () + aux = + Aux + { auxAuthority = host + , auxPort = port + , auxDebugPrint = debug + , auxShow = showContent + , auxReadResumptionData = readIORef ref + } + mstore <- case optTrustedAnchor of + Nothing -> + if optValidate then Just <$> getSystemCertificateStore else return Nothing + Just file -> do + mstore' <- readCertificateStore file + when (isNothing mstore') $ showUsageAndExit "cannot set trusted anchor" + return mstore' + echConfList <- case optECHConfigFile of + Nothing -> return [] + Just ecnff -> + loadECHConfigList ecnff `E.catch` \(E.SomeException _) -> do + putStrLn $ ecnff ++ " is broken" + exitFailure + let cparams = + getClientParams + opts + host + port + (smIORef ref) + mstore + onCertReq + echConfList + debug + traceKey + client + | optALPN == "dot" = clientDNS + | otherwise = clientHTTP11 + makeCipherShowPretty + runClient opts client cparams aux paths + +runClient + :: Options -> Cli -> ClientParams -> Aux -> NonEmpty ByteString -> IO () +runClient opts@Options{..} client cparams aux@Aux{..} paths = do + auxDebugPrint "------------------------" + (info1, msd) <- runTLS opts cparams aux $ \ctx -> do + i1 <- getInfo ctx + when optDebugLog $ printHandshakeInfo i1 + client aux paths ctx + msd' <- auxReadResumptionData + return (i1, msd') + if + | optResumption -> + if isResumptionPossible msd + then do + let cparams2 = modifyClientParams cparams msd False + info2 <- runClient2 opts client cparams2 aux paths + if infoVersion info1 == TLS12 + then do + if infoTLS12Resumption info2 + then do + putStrLn "Result: (R) TLS resumption ... OK" + exitSuccess + else do + putStrLn "Result: (R) TLS resumption ... NG" + exitFailure + else do + if infoTLS13HandshakeMode info2 == Just PreSharedKey + then do + putStrLn "Result: (R) TLS resumption ... OK" + exitSuccess + else do + putStrLn "Result: (R) TLS resumption ... NG" + exitFailure + else do + putStrLn "Result: (R) TLS resumption ... NG" + exitFailure + | opt0RTT -> + if is0RTTPossible info1 msd + then do + let cparams2 = modifyClientParams cparams msd True + info2 <- runClient2 opts client cparams2 aux paths + if infoTLS13HandshakeMode info2 == Just RTT0 + then do + putStrLn "Result: (Z) 0-RTT ... OK" + exitSuccess + else do + putStrLn "Result: (Z) 0-RTT ... NG" + exitFailure + else do + putStrLn "Result: (Z) 0-RTT ... NG" + exitFailure + | optRetry -> + if infoTLS13HandshakeMode info1 == Just HelloRetryRequest + then do + putStrLn "Result: (S) retry ... OK" + exitSuccess + else do + putStrLn "Result: (S) retry ... NG" + exitFailure + | otherwise -> do + putStrLn "Result: (H) handshake ... OK" + when (optALPN == "http/1.1") $ + putStrLn "Result: (1) HTTP/1.1 transaction ... OK" + exitSuccess + +runClient2 + :: Options + -> Cli + -> ClientParams + -> Aux + -> NonEmpty ByteString + -> IO Information +runClient2 opts@Options{..} client cparams aux@Aux{..} paths = do + threadDelay 100000 + auxDebugPrint "<<<< next connection >>>>" + auxDebugPrint "------------------------" + runTLS opts cparams aux $ \ctx -> do + if opt0RTT + then do + void $ client aux paths ctx + i <- getInfo ctx + when optDebugLog $ printHandshakeInfo i + return i + else do + i <- getInfo ctx + when optDebugLog $ printHandshakeInfo i + void $ client aux paths ctx + return i + +runTLS + :: Options + -> ClientParams + -> Aux + -> (Context -> IO a) + -> IO a +runTLS Options{..} cparams Aux{..} action = + runTCPClientWithSettings settings auxAuthority auxPort $ \sock -> do + ctx <- contextNew sock cparams + when optDebugLog $ + contextHookSetLogging + ctx + defaultLogging + { loggingPacketSent = putStrLn . (">> " ++) + , loggingPacketRecv = putStrLn . ("<< " ++) + -- , loggingIOSent = \bs -> putStrLn $ "}} " ++ showBytesHex bs + -- , loggingIORecv = \hd bs -> putStrLn $ "{{ " ++ show hd ++ " " ++ showBytesHex bs + } + handshake ctx + r <- action ctx + bye ctx + return r + where + select addrs + | optIPv4Only = case NE.filter (\ai -> addrFamily ai == AF_INET) addrs of + [] -> error "IPv4 address is not available" + ai : _ -> ai + | optIPv6Only = case NE.filter (\ai -> addrFamily ai == AF_INET6) addrs of + [] -> error "IPv6 address is not available" + ai : _ -> ai + | otherwise = NE.head addrs + settings = + defaultSettings + { settingsSelectAddrInfo = select + } + +modifyClientParams + :: ClientParams -> [(SessionID, SessionData)] -> Bool -> ClientParams +modifyClientParams cparams ts early = + cparams + { clientWantSessionResumeList = ts + , clientUseEarlyData = early + } + +getClientParams + :: Options + -> HostName + -> ServiceName + -> SessionManager + -> Maybe CertificateStore + -> OnCertificateRequest + -> ECHConfigList + -> (String -> IO ()) + -> (String -> IO ()) + -> ClientParams +getClientParams Options{..} serverName port sm mstore onCertReq echConfList printError traceKey = + (defaultParamsClient serverName (C8.pack port)) + { clientSupported = supported + , clientUseServerNameIndication = True + , clientShared = shared + , clientHooks = hooks + , clientDebug = debug + , clientUseECH = not (null echConfList) + } + where + groups + | optRetry = FFDHE8192 : optGroups + | otherwise = optGroups + shared = + defaultShared + { sharedSessionManager = sm + , sharedCAStore = fromMaybe mempty mstore + , sharedValidationCache = validateCache + , sharedLimit = + defaultLimit + { limitRecordSize = Just 8192 + } + , sharedECHConfigList = echConfList + } + supported = + defaultSupported + { supportedVersions = optVersions + , supportedGroups = groups + } + hooks = + defaultClientHooks + { onSuggestALPN = return $ Just [C8.pack optALPN] + , onCertificateRequest = onCertReq + } + validateCache + | isJust mstore = sharedValidationCache defaultShared + | otherwise = + ValidationCache + (\_ _ _ -> return ValidationCachePass) + (\_ _ _ -> return ()) + debug = + defaultDebugParams + { debugKeyLogger = getLogger optKeyLogFile + , debugError = printError + , debugTraceKey = traceKey + } + +smIORef :: IORef [(SessionID, SessionData)] -> SessionManager +smIORef ref = + noSessionManager + { sessionEstablish = \sid sdata -> + modifyIORef' ref (\xs -> (sid, sdata) : xs) + >> printTicket sid sdata + >> return Nothing + } + +printTicket :: SessionID -> SessionData -> IO () +printTicket sid sdata = do + C8.putStr $ "Ticket: " <> C8.take 16 (BS16.encode sid) <> "..., " + putStrLn $ "0-RTT: " <> if sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sdata > 0 then "OK" else "NG" + +isResumptionPossible :: [(SessionID, SessionData)] -> Bool +isResumptionPossible = not . null + +is0RTTPossible :: Information -> [(SessionID, SessionData)] -> Bool +is0RTTPossible _ [] = False +is0RTTPossible info xs = + infoVersion info == TLS13 + && any (\(_, sd) -> sessionMaxEarlyDataSize sd > 0) xs diff --git a/util/tls-server.hs b/util/tls-server.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/util/tls-server.hs @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} + +module Main where + +import Data.IORef +import qualified Data.Map.Strict as M +import Data.X509.CertificateStore +import Network.Run.TCP +import Network.TLS +import Network.TLS.ECH.Config +import Network.TLS.Internal +import System.Console.GetOpt +import System.Environment (getArgs) +import System.Exit +import System.IO +import System.X509 + +import Common +import Imports +import Server + +data Options = Options + { optDebugLog :: Bool + , optClientAuth :: Bool + , optShow :: Bool + , optKeyLogFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optTrustedAnchor :: Maybe FilePath + , optGroups :: [Group] + , optCertFile :: FilePath + , optKeyFile :: FilePath + , optECHConfigFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optECHKeyFile :: Maybe FilePath + , optTraceKey :: Bool + } + deriving (Show) + +defaultOptions :: Options +defaultOptions = + Options + { optDebugLog = False + , optClientAuth = False + , optShow = False + , optKeyLogFile = Nothing + , optTrustedAnchor = Nothing + , -- excluding FFDHE8192 for retry + optGroups = FFDHE8192 `delete` supportedGroups defaultSupported + , optCertFile = "servercert.pem" + , optKeyFile = "serverkey.pem" + , optECHConfigFile = Nothing + , optECHKeyFile = Nothing + , optTraceKey = False + } + +options :: [OptDescr (Options -> Options)] +options = + [ Option + ['a'] + ["client-auth"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optClientAuth = True})) + "require client authentication" + , Option + ['d'] + ["debug"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optDebugLog = True})) + "print debug info" + , Option + ['v'] + ["show-content"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optShow = True})) + "print downloaded content" + , Option + ['l'] + ["key-log-file"] + (ReqArg (\file o -> o{optKeyLogFile = Just file}) "") + "a file to store negotiated secrets" + , Option + ['g'] + ["groups"] + (ReqArg (\gs o -> o{optGroups = readGroups gs}) "") + "groups for key exchange" + , Option + ['c'] + ["cert"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optCertFile = fl}) "") + "certificate file" + , Option + ['k'] + ["key"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optKeyFile = fl}) "") + "key file" + , Option + ['t'] + ["trusted-anchor"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optTrustedAnchor = Just fl}) "") + "trusted anchor file" + , Option + [] + ["ech-config"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optECHConfigFile = Just fl}) "") + "ECH config file" + , Option + [] + ["ech-key"] + (ReqArg (\fl o -> o{optECHKeyFile = Just fl}) "") + "ECH key file" + , Option + [] + ["trace-key"] + (NoArg (\o -> o{optTraceKey = True})) + "Trace transcript hash" + ] + +usage :: String +usage = "Usage: tls-server [OPTION] addr port" + +showUsageAndExit :: String -> IO a +showUsageAndExit msg = do + putStrLn msg + putStrLn $ usageInfo usage options + exitFailure + +serverOpts :: [String] -> IO (Options, [String]) +serverOpts argv = + case getOpt Permute options argv of + (o, n, []) -> return (foldl (flip id) defaultOptions o, n) + (_, _, errs) -> showUsageAndExit $ concat errs + +main :: IO () +main = do + hSetBuffering stdout NoBuffering + args <- getArgs + (Options{..}, ips) <- serverOpts args + (host, port) <- case ips of + [h, p] -> return (h, p) + _ -> showUsageAndExit "cannot recognize and \n" + when (null optGroups) $ do + putStrLn "Error: unsupported groups" + exitFailure + smgr <- newSessionManager + Right cred@(!_cc, !_priv) <- credentialLoadX509 optCertFile optKeyFile + mstore <- do + mstore' <- case optTrustedAnchor of + Nothing -> Just <$> getSystemCertificateStore + Just file -> readCertificateStore file + when (isNothing mstore') $ showUsageAndExit "cannot set trusted anchor" + return mstore' + ech <- case optECHKeyFile of + Nothing -> case optECHConfigFile of + Nothing -> return ([], []) + Just _ -> showUsageAndExit "must specify ECH key file, too" + Just ekeyf -> case optECHConfigFile of + Nothing -> showUsageAndExit "must specify ECH config file, too" + Just ecnff -> do + ekey <- loadECHSecretKeys [ekeyf] + ecnf <- loadECHConfigList ecnff + return (ekey, ecnf) + let keyLog = getLogger optKeyLogFile + printError + | optDebugLog = putStrLn + | otherwise = \_ -> return () + traceKey + | optTraceKey = putStrLn + | otherwise = \_ -> return () + creds = Credentials [cred] + makeCipherShowPretty + runTCPServer (Just host) port $ \sock -> do + let sparams = + getServerParams + creds + optGroups + smgr + keyLog + optClientAuth + mstore + ech + printError + traceKey + ctx <- contextNew sock sparams + when optDebugLog $ + contextHookSetLogging + ctx + defaultLogging + { loggingPacketSent = putStrLn . ("<< " ++) + , loggingPacketRecv = putStrLn . (">> " ++) + -- , loggingIOSent = \bs -> putStrLn $ "{{ " ++ showBytesHex bs + -- , loggingIORecv = \hd bs -> putStrLn $ "}} " ++ show hd ++ " " ++ showBytesHex bs + } + when (optDebugLog || optShow) $ putStrLn "------------------------" + handshake ctx + when optDebugLog $ + getInfo ctx >>= printHandshakeInfo + server ctx optShow + bye ctx + +getServerParams + :: Credentials + -> [Group] + -> SessionManager + -> (String -> IO ()) + -> Bool + -> Maybe CertificateStore + -> ([(Word8, ByteString)], ECHConfigList) + -> (String -> IO ()) + -> (String -> IO ()) + -> ServerParams +getServerParams creds groups sm keyLog clientAuth mstore (ekey, ecnf) printError traceKey = + defaultParamsServer + { serverSupported = supported + , serverShared = shared + , serverHooks = hooks + , serverDebug = debug + , serverEarlyDataSize = 2048 + , serverWantClientCert = clientAuth + , serverECHKey = ekey + } + where + shared = + defaultShared + { sharedCredentials = creds + , sharedSessionManager = sm + , sharedCAStore = case mstore of + Just store -> store + Nothing -> sharedCAStore defaultShared + , sharedECHConfigList = ecnf + , sharedLimit = + defaultLimit + { limitRecordSize = Just 16384 + } + } + supported = + defaultSupported + { supportedGroups = groups + } + hooks = + defaultServerHooks + { onALPNClientSuggest = Just chooseALPN + , onClientCertificate = case mstore of + Nothing -> onClientCertificate defaultServerHooks + Just _ -> + validateClientCertificate (sharedCAStore shared) (sharedValidationCache shared) + } + debug = + defaultDebugParams + { debugKeyLogger = keyLog + , debugError = printError + , debugTraceKey = traceKey + } + +chooseALPN :: [ByteString] -> IO ByteString +chooseALPN protos + | "http/1.1" `elem` protos = return "http/1.1" + | otherwise = return "" + +newSessionManager :: IO SessionManager +newSessionManager = do + ref <- newIORef M.empty + return $ + noSessionManager + { sessionResume = \key -> do + M.lookup key <$> readIORef ref + , sessionResumeOnlyOnce = \key -> do + M.lookup key <$> readIORef ref + , sessionEstablish = \key val -> do + atomicModifyIORef' ref $ \m -> (M.insert key val m, Nothing) + , sessionInvalidate = \key -> do + atomicModifyIORef' ref $ \m -> (M.delete key m, ()) + , sessionUseTicket = False + }