ppad-aead 0.3.5 → 0.3.6

raw patch · 4 files changed

+15/−10 lines, 4 filesdep ~ppad-chachaPVP ok

version bump matches the API change (PVP)

Dependency ranges changed: ppad-chacha

API changes (from Hackage documentation)

Files

• CHANGELOG +3/−0
• lib/Crypto/AEAD/ChaCha20Poly1305.hs +10/−6
• lib/Data/Barrier.hs +0/−2
• ppad-aead.cabal +2/−2

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ # Changelog +- 0.3.6 (2026-09-06)+  * Merely bumps the ppad-chacha dependency.+ - 0.3.5 (2026-08-01)   * Merely bumps the ppad-poly1305 dependency. 

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ _poly1305_key_gen key nonce = case ChaCha20.block key 0 nonce of   Left ChaCha20.InvalidKey -> Left InvalidKey   Left ChaCha20.InvalidNonce -> Left InvalidNonce+  Left ChaCha20.CounterOverflow -> Left CounterOverflow   Right k -> pure (BS.take 32 k) {-# INLINEABLE _poly1305_key_gen #-} @@ -98,9 +99,10 @@  -- | Error values. data Error =-    InvalidKey    -- ^ the provided key was not 256 bits long-  | InvalidNonce  -- ^ the provided nonce was not 96 bits long-  | InvalidMAC    -- ^ the provided MAC does not authenticate the ciphertext+    InvalidKey      -- ^ the provided key was not 256 bits long+  | InvalidNonce    -- ^ the provided nonce was not 96 bits long+  | InvalidMAC      -- ^ the provided MAC does not authenticate the ciphertext+  | CounterOverflow -- ^ cipher exhausted   deriving (Eq, Show)  -- RFC8439 2.8@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@   :: BS.ByteString -- ^ arbitrary-length additional authenticated data   -> BS.ByteString -- ^ 256-bit key   -> BS.ByteString -- ^ 96-bit nonce-  -> BS.ByteString -- ^ arbitrary-length plaintext+  -> BS.ByteString -- ^ arbitrary-length (technically, ~256 GiB) plaintext   -> Either Error (BS.ByteString, BS.ByteString) -- ^ (ciphertext, 128-bit MAC) encrypt aad key nonce plaintext   | BS.length key  /= 32  = Left InvalidKey@@ -130,8 +132,9 @@   | otherwise = do       otk <- _poly1305_key_gen key nonce       case ChaCha20.cipher key 1 nonce plaintext of-        Left ChaCha20.InvalidKey -> Left InvalidKey     -- impossible, but..-        Left ChaCha20.InvalidNonce -> Left InvalidNonce -- ditto+        Left ChaCha20.InvalidKey      -> Left InvalidKey -- impossible, but..+        Left ChaCha20.InvalidNonce    -> Left InvalidNonce -- ditto+        Left ChaCha20.CounterOverflow -> Left CounterOverflow         Right cip -> do           let md0 = aad <> pad16 aad               md1 = md0 <> cip <> pad16 cip@@ -171,6 +174,7 @@           | ct_eq mac tag -> case ChaCha20.cipher key 1 nonce cip of               Left ChaCha20.InvalidKey -> Left InvalidKey               Left ChaCha20.InvalidNonce -> Left InvalidNonce+              Left ChaCha20.CounterOverflow -> Left CounterOverflow               Right v -> pure v           | otherwise ->               Left InvalidMAC

@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ --       external call it cannot see through. Inline it into the caller --       and the barrier is gone. -----   Guarded by the substratum + censor constant-time checks; weakening---   either property re-introduces the timing leak. barrier :: Word8 -> Word8 barrier x = x {-# NOINLINE barrier #-}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ cabal-version:      3.0 name:               ppad-aead-version:            0.3.5+version:            0.3.6 synopsis:           A pure AEAD-ChaCha20-Poly1305 construction license:            MIT license-file:       LICENSE@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@   build-depends:       base >= 4.9 && < 5     , bytestring >= 0.9 && < 0.13-    , ppad-chacha >= 0.2.2 && < 0.3+    , ppad-chacha >= 0.3 && < 0.4     , ppad-poly1305 >= 0.4.6 && < 0.5  test-suite aead-tests