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cryptonite 0.25 → 0.30

raw patch · 194 files changed

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CHANGELOG.md view
@@ -1,3 +1,52 @@+## 0.30++* Fix some C symbol blake2b prefix to be cryptonite_ prefix (fix mixing with other C library)+* add hmac-lazy+* Fix compilation with GHC 9.2+* Drop support for GHC8.0, GHC8.2, GHC8.4, GHC8.6++## 0.29++* advance compilation with gmp breakage due to change upstream+* Add native EdDSA support++## 0.28++* Add hash constant time capability+* Prevent possible overflow during hashing by hashing in 4GB chunks++## 0.27++* Optimise AES GCM and CCM+* Optimise P256R1 implementation+* Various AES-NI building improvements+* Add better ECDSA support+* Add XSalsa derive+* Implement square roots for ECC binary curve+* Various tests and benchmarks++## 0.26++* Add Rabin cryptosystem (and variants)+* Add bcrypt_pbkdf key derivation function+* Optimize Blowfish implementation+* Add KMAC (Keccak Message Authentication Code)+* Add ECDSA sign/verify digest APIs+* Hash algorithms with runtime output length+* Update blake2 to latest upstream version+* RSA-PSS with arbitrary key size+* SHAKE with output length not divisible by 8+* Add Read and Data instances for Digest type+* Improve P256 scalar primitives+* Fix hash truncation bug in DSA+* Fix cost parsing for bcrypt+* Fix ECC failures on arm64+* Correction to PKCS#1 v1.5 padding+* Use powModSecInteger when available+* Drop GHC 7.8 and GHC 7.10 support, refer to pkg-guidelines+* Optimise GCM mode+* Add little endian serialization of integer+ ## 0.25  * Improve digest binary conversion efficiency
Crypto/Cipher/AES.hs view
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ import Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Data.ByteArray as BA- -- | AES with 128 bit key newtype AES128 = AES128 AES     deriving (NFData)
Crypto/Cipher/AES/Primitive.hs view
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@     , decryptCTR     , decryptXTS +    -- * CTR with 32-bit wrapping+    , combineC32+     -- * Incremental GCM     , gcmMode     , gcmInit@@ -128,7 +131,7 @@     deriving (NFData)  sizeGCM :: Int-sizeGCM = 80+sizeGCM = 320  sizeOCB :: Int sizeOCB = 160@@ -317,6 +320,21 @@            -> ba         -- ^ output decrypted decryptXTS = doXTS c_aes_decrypt_xts +-- | encrypt/decrypt using Counter mode (32-bit wrapping used in AES-GCM-SIV)+{-# NOINLINE combineC32 #-}+combineC32 :: ByteArray ba+           => AES        -- ^ AES Context+           -> IV AES     -- ^ initial vector of AES block size (usually representing a 128 bit integer)+           -> ba         -- ^ plaintext input+           -> ba         -- ^ ciphertext output+combineC32 ctx iv input+    | len <= 0          = B.empty+    | B.length iv /= 16 = error $ "AES error: IV length must be block size (16). Its length is: " ++ show (B.length iv)+    | otherwise = B.allocAndFreeze len doEncrypt+  where doEncrypt o = withKeyAndIV ctx iv $ \k v -> withByteArray input $ \i ->+                      c_aes_encrypt_c32 (castPtr o) k v i (fromIntegral len)+        len = B.length input+ {-# INLINE doECB #-} doECB :: ByteArray ba       => (Ptr b -> Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ())@@ -577,6 +595,9 @@  foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_encrypt_ctr"     c_aes_encrypt_ctr :: CString -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_encrypt_c32"+    c_aes_encrypt_c32 :: CString -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ()  foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_gcm_init"     c_aes_gcm_init :: Ptr AESGCM -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CUInt -> IO ()
+ Crypto/Cipher/AESGCMSIV.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Implementation of AES-GCM-SIV, an AEAD scheme with nonce misuse resistance+-- defined in <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8452 RFC 8452>.+--+-- To achieve the nonce misuse-resistance property, encryption requires two+-- passes on the plaintext, hence no streaming API is provided.  This AEAD+-- operates on complete inputs held in memory.  For simplicity, the+-- implementation of decryption uses a similar pattern, with performance+-- penalty compared to an implementation which is able to merge both passes.+--+-- The specification allows inputs up to 2^36 bytes but this implementation+-- requires AAD and plaintext/ciphertext to be both smaller than 2^32 bytes.+{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-}+{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}+module Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV+    ( Nonce+    , nonce+    , generateNonce+    , encrypt+    , decrypt+    ) where++import Data.Bits+import Data.Word++import Foreign.C.Types+import Foreign.C.String+import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr)+import Foreign.Storable (peekElemOff, poke, pokeElemOff)++import           Data.ByteArray+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+import           Data.Memory.Endian (toLE)+import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memXor)++import Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive+import Crypto.Cipher.Types+import Crypto.Error+import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO)+import Crypto.Random+++-- 12-byte nonces++-- | Nonce value for AES-GCM-SIV, always 12 bytes.+newtype Nonce = Nonce Bytes deriving (Show, Eq, ByteArrayAccess)++-- | Nonce smart constructor.  Accepts only 12-byte inputs.+nonce :: ByteArrayAccess iv => iv -> CryptoFailable Nonce+nonce iv+    | B.length iv == 12 = CryptoPassed (Nonce $ B.convert iv)+    | otherwise         = CryptoFailed CryptoError_IvSizeInvalid++-- | Generate a random nonce for use with AES-GCM-SIV.+generateNonce :: MonadRandom m => m Nonce+generateNonce = Nonce <$> getRandomBytes 12+++-- POLYVAL (mutable context)++newtype Polyval = Polyval Bytes++polyvalInit :: ScrubbedBytes -> IO Polyval+polyvalInit h = Polyval <$> doInit+  where doInit = B.alloc 272 $ \pctx -> B.withByteArray h $ \ph ->+            c_aes_polyval_init pctx ph++polyvalUpdate :: ByteArrayAccess ba => Polyval -> ba -> IO ()+polyvalUpdate (Polyval ctx) bs = B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx ->+    B.withByteArray bs $ \pbs -> c_aes_polyval_update pctx pbs sz+  where sz = fromIntegral (B.length bs)++polyvalFinalize :: Polyval -> IO ScrubbedBytes+polyvalFinalize (Polyval ctx) = B.alloc 16 $ \dst ->+    B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx -> c_aes_polyval_finalize pctx dst++foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_init"+    c_aes_polyval_init :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_update"+    c_aes_polyval_update :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ()++foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize"+    c_aes_polyval_finalize :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO ()+++-- Key Generation++le32iv :: Word32 -> Nonce -> Bytes+le32iv n (Nonce iv) = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do+    poke ptr (toLE n)+    copyByteArrayToPtr iv (ptr `plusPtr` 4)++deriveKeys :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> Nonce -> (ScrubbedBytes, AES)+deriveKeys aes iv =+    case cipherKeySize aes of+        KeySizeFixed sz | sz `mod` 8 == 0 ->+            let mak = buildKey [0 .. 1]+                key = buildKey [2 .. fromIntegral (sz `div` 8) + 1]+                mek = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key)+             in (mak, mek)+        _ -> error "AESGCMSIV: invalid cipher"+  where+    idx n = ecbEncrypt aes (le32iv n iv) `takeView` 8+    buildKey = B.concat . map idx+++-- Encryption and decryption++lengthInvalid :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Bool+lengthInvalid bs+    | finiteBitSize len > 32 = len >= 1 `unsafeShiftL` 32+    | otherwise              = False+  where len = B.length bs++-- | AEAD encryption with the specified key and nonce.  The key must be given+-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256'+-- cipher.+--+-- Lengths of additional data and plaintext must be less than 2^32 bytes,+-- otherwise an exception is thrown.+encrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba)+        => aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> (AuthTag, ba)+encrypt aes iv aad plaintext+    | lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large"+    | lengthInvalid plaintext = error "AESGCMSIV: plaintext is too large"+    | otherwise = (AuthTag tag, ciphertext)+  where+    (mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv+    ss = getSs mak aad plaintext+    tag = buildTag mek ss iv+    ciphertext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) plaintext++-- | AEAD decryption with the specified key and nonce.  The key must be given+-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256'+-- cipher.+--+-- Lengths of additional data and ciphertext must be less than 2^32 bytes,+-- otherwise an exception is thrown.+decrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba)+        => aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> AuthTag -> Maybe ba+decrypt aes iv aad ciphertext (AuthTag tag)+    | lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large"+    | lengthInvalid ciphertext = error "AESGCMSIV: ciphertext is too large"+    | tag `constEq` buildTag mek ss iv = Just plaintext+    | otherwise = Nothing+  where+    (mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv+    ss = getSs mak aad plaintext+    plaintext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) ciphertext++-- Calculate S_s = POLYVAL(mak, X_1, X_2, ...).+getSs :: (ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArrayAccess ba)+      => ScrubbedBytes -> aad -> ba -> ScrubbedBytes+getSs mak aad plaintext = unsafeDoIO $ do+    ctx <- polyvalInit mak+    polyvalUpdate ctx aad+    polyvalUpdate ctx plaintext+    polyvalUpdate ctx (lb :: Bytes)  -- the "length block"+    polyvalFinalize ctx+  where+    lb = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do+            pokeElemOff ptr 0 (toLE64 $ B.length aad)+            pokeElemOff ptr 1 (toLE64 $ B.length plaintext)+    toLE64 x = toLE (fromIntegral x * 8 :: Word64)++-- XOR the first 12 bytes of S_s with the nonce and clear the most significant+-- bit of the last byte.+tagInput :: ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes+tagInput ss (Nonce iv) =+    B.copyAndFreeze ss $ \ptr ->+    B.withByteArray iv $ \ivPtr -> do+        memXor ptr ptr ivPtr 12+        b <- peekElemOff ptr 15+        pokeElemOff ptr 15 (b .&. (0x7f :: Word8))++-- Encrypt the result with AES using the message-encryption key to produce the+-- tag.+buildTag :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes+buildTag mek ss iv = ecbEncrypt mek (tagInput ss iv)++-- The initial counter block is the tag with the most significant bit of the+-- last byte set to one.+transformTag :: Bytes -> IV AES+transformTag tag = toIV $ B.copyAndFreeze tag $ \ptr ->+    peekElemOff ptr 15 >>= pokeElemOff ptr 15 . (.|. (0x80 :: Word8))+  where toIV bs = let Just iv = makeIV (bs :: Bytes) in iv
Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Box.hs view
@@ -5,15 +5,33 @@ -- Portability : Good {-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box-    ( createKeySchedule+    (   KeySchedule(..)+    ,   createKeySchedule+    ,   copyKeySchedule     ) where -import Crypto.Internal.WordArray (mutableArray32FromAddrBE, MutableArray32)+import           Crypto.Internal.WordArray (MutableArray32,+                                            mutableArray32FromAddrBE,+                                            mutableArrayRead32,+                                            mutableArrayWrite32) +newtype KeySchedule = KeySchedule MutableArray32++-- | Copy the state of one key schedule into the other.+--   The first parameter is the destination and the second the source.+copyKeySchedule :: KeySchedule -> KeySchedule -> IO ()+copyKeySchedule (KeySchedule dst) (KeySchedule src) = loop 0+  where+    loop 1042 = return ()+    loop i    = do+        w32 <-mutableArrayRead32 src i+        mutableArrayWrite32 dst i w32+        loop (i + 1)+ -- | Create a key schedule mutable array of the pbox followed by -- all the sboxes.-createKeySchedule :: IO MutableArray32-createKeySchedule = mutableArray32FromAddrBE 1042 "\+createKeySchedule :: IO KeySchedule+createKeySchedule = KeySchedule `fmap` mutableArray32FromAddrBE 1042 "\     \\x24\x3f\x6a\x88\x85\xa3\x08\xd3\x13\x19\x8a\x2e\x03\x70\x73\x44\     \\xa4\x09\x38\x22\x29\x9f\x31\xd0\x08\x2e\xfa\x98\xec\x4e\x6c\x89\     \\x45\x28\x21\xe6\x38\xd0\x13\x77\xbe\x54\x66\xcf\x34\xe9\x0c\x6c\
Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Primitive.hs view
@@ -5,197 +5,254 @@ -- Portability : Good  -- Rewritten by Vincent Hanquez (c) 2015+--              Lars Petersen (c) 2018 -- -- Original code: --      Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive, copyright (c) 2012 Stijn van Drongelen --      based on: BlowfishAux.hs (C) 2002 HardCore SoftWare, Doug Hoyte --           (as found in Crypto-4.2.4)-+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive     ( Context     , initBlowfish     , encrypt     , decrypt-    , eksBlowfish+    , KeySchedule+    , createKeySchedule+    , freezeKeySchedule+    , expandKey+    , expandKeyWithSalt+    , cipherBlockMutable     ) where -import           Control.Monad (when)+import           Control.Monad              (when) import           Data.Bits import           Data.Memory.Endian import           Data.Word +import           Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box import           Crypto.Error+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray  (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess)+import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray  as B import           Crypto.Internal.Compat import           Crypto.Internal.Imports-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes)-import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B-import           Crypto.Internal.Words import           Crypto.Internal.WordArray-import           Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box --- | variable keyed blowfish state-data Context = BF (Int -> Word32) -- p-                  (Int -> Word32) -- sbox0-                  (Int -> Word32) -- sbox1-                  (Int -> Word32) -- sbox2-                  (Int -> Word32) -- sbox2+newtype Context = Context Array32  instance NFData Context where-    rnf (BF p a b c d) = p `seq` a `seq` b `seq` c `seq` d `seq` ()+    rnf a = a `seq` () +-- | Initialize a new Blowfish context from a key.+--+-- key needs to be between 0 and 448 bits.+initBlowfish :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CryptoFailable Context+initBlowfish key+    | B.length key > (448 `div` 8) = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid+    | otherwise                    = CryptoPassed $ unsafeDoIO $ do+        ks <- createKeySchedule+        expandKey ks key+        freezeKeySchedule ks++-- | Get an immutable Blowfish context by freezing a mutable key schedule.+freezeKeySchedule :: KeySchedule -> IO Context+freezeKeySchedule (KeySchedule ma) = Context `fmap` mutableArray32Freeze ma++expandKey :: (ByteArrayAccess key) => KeySchedule -> key -> IO ()+expandKey ks@(KeySchedule ma) key = do+    when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r+        when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1)+    loop 0 0 0+    where+        loop i l r = do+            n <- cipherBlockMutable ks (fromIntegral l `shiftL` 32 .|. fromIntegral r)+            let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32)+                nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff)+            mutableArrayWrite32 ma i nl+            mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i + 1) nr+            when (i < 18 + 1024) (loop (i + 2) nl nr)++expandKeyWithSalt :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt)+    => KeySchedule+    -> key+    -> salt+    -> IO ()+expandKeyWithSalt ks key salt+    | B.length salt == 16 = expandKeyWithSalt128 ks key (fromBE $ B.toW64BE salt 0) (fromBE $ B.toW64BE salt 8)+    | otherwise           = expandKeyWithSaltAny ks key salt++expandKeyWithSaltAny :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt)+    => KeySchedule         -- ^ The key schedule+    -> key                 -- ^ The key+    -> salt                -- ^ The salt+    -> IO ()+expandKeyWithSaltAny ks@(KeySchedule ma) key salt = do+    when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r+        when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1)+    -- Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes+    when (B.length salt > 0) $ iterKeyStream salt 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do+        let l' = xor l a0+        let r' = xor r a1+        n <- cipherBlockMutable ks (fromIntegral l' `shiftL` 32 .|. fromIntegral r')+        let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32)+            nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff)+        mutableArrayWrite32 ma i nl+        mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i + 1) nr+        when (i + 2 < 18 + 1024) (cont nl nr)++expandKeyWithSalt128 :: ByteArrayAccess ba+    => KeySchedule         -- ^ The key schedule+    -> ba                  -- ^ The key+    -> Word64              -- ^ First word of the salt+    -> Word64              -- ^ Second word of the salt+    -> IO ()+expandKeyWithSalt128 ks@(KeySchedule ma) key salt1 salt2 = do+    when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l+        mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r+        when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1)+    -- Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes+    loop 0 salt1 salt1 salt2+    where+        loop i input slt1 slt2+            | i == 1042   = return ()+            | otherwise = do+                n <- cipherBlockMutable ks input+                let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32)+                    nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff)+                mutableArrayWrite32 ma i     nl+                mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i+1) nr+                loop (i+2) (n `xor` slt2) slt2 slt1+ -- | Encrypt blocks -- -- Input need to be a multiple of 8 bytes encrypt :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba-encrypt = cipher+encrypt ctx ba+    | B.length ba == 0         = B.empty+    | B.length ba `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length"+    | otherwise                = B.mapAsWord64 (cipherBlock ctx False) ba  -- | Decrypt blocks -- -- Input need to be a multiple of 8 bytes decrypt :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba-decrypt = cipher . decryptContext--decryptContext :: Context -> Context-decryptContext (BF p s0 s1 s2 s3) = BF (\i -> p (17-i)) s0 s1 s2 s3--cipher :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba-cipher ctx b-    | B.length b == 0         = B.empty-    | B.length b `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length"-    | otherwise               = B.mapAsWord64 (coreCrypto ctx) b---- | Initialize a new Blowfish context from a key.------ key needs to be between 0 and 448 bits.-initBlowfish :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CryptoFailable Context-initBlowfish key-    | len > (448 `div` 8) = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid-    | otherwise           = CryptoPassed $ makeKeySchedule key (Nothing :: Maybe (Bytes, Int))-  where len = B.length key+decrypt ctx ba+    | B.length ba == 0         = B.empty+    | B.length ba `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length"+    | otherwise                = B.mapAsWord64 (cipherBlock ctx True) ba --- | The BCrypt "expensive key schedule" version of blowfish.+-- | Encrypt or decrypt a single block of 64 bits. ----- Salt must be 128 bits--- Cost must be between 4 and 31 inclusive--- See <https://www.usenix.org/conference/1999-usenix-annual-technical-conference/future-adaptable-password-scheme>-eksBlowfish :: (ByteArrayAccess salt, ByteArrayAccess password) => Int -> salt -> password -> Context-eksBlowfish cost salt key-    | B.length salt /= 16 = error "bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes"-    | otherwise           = makeKeySchedule key (Just (salt, cost))--coreCrypto :: Context -> Word64 -> Word64-coreCrypto (BF p s0 s1 s2 s3) input = doRound input 0-  where-    -- transform the input over 16 rounds+-- The inverse argument decides whether to encrypt or decrypt.+cipherBlock :: Context -> Bool -> Word64 -> Word64+cipherBlock (Context ar) inverse input = doRound input 0+    where+    -- | Transform the input over 16 rounds     doRound :: Word64 -> Int -> Word64-    doRound i roundIndex+    doRound !i roundIndex         | roundIndex == 16 =             let final = (fromIntegral (p 16) `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral (p 17)              in rotateL (i `xor` final) 32         | otherwise     =-            let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` (p roundIndex)-                newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` (f newr)) .|. (fromIntegral newr)+            let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` p roundIndex+                newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` f newr) .|. fromIntegral newr              in doRound newi (roundIndex+1)++    -- | The Blowfish Feistel function F     f   :: Word32 -> Word64-    f t = let a = s0 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 24) .&. 0xff)-              b = s1 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff)-              c = s2 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff)-              d = s3 (fromIntegral $ t .&. 0xff)+    f t = let a = s0 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 24))+              b = s1 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 16))+              c = s2 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 8))+              d = s3 (0xff .&.  t)            in fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32 ---- | Create a key schedule for either plain Blowfish or the BCrypt "EKS" version--- For the expensive version, the salt and cost factor are supplied. Salt must be--- a 128-bit byte array.------ The standard case is just a single key expansion with the salt set to zero.-makeKeySchedule :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) => key-> Maybe (salt, Int) -> Context-makeKeySchedule keyBytes saltCost =-    let v = unsafeDoIO $ do-              mv <- createKeySchedule-              case saltCost of-                  -- Standard blowfish-                  Nothing -> expandKey mv 0 0 keyBytes-                  -- The expensive case-                  Just (s, cost)  -> do-                      let (salt1, salt2) = splitSalt s-                      expandKey mv salt1 salt2 keyBytes-                      forM_ [1..2^cost :: Int] $ \_ -> do-                          expandKey mv 0 0 keyBytes-                          expandKey mv 0 0 s-              mutableArray32Freeze mv-     in BF (\i -> arrayRead32 v i)-           (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s0+i))-           (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s1+i))-           (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s2+i))-           (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s3+i))-  where-        splitSalt s = (fromBE (B.toW64BE s 0), fromBE (B.toW64BE s 8))--        -- Indices of the S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words-        -- The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys-        s0 = 18-        s1 = 274-        s2 = 530-        s3 = 786+    -- | S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words+    --   The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys+    s0, s1, s2, s3 :: Word32 -> Word32+    s0 i            = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 18)+    s1 i            = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 274)+    s2 i            = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 530)+    s3 i            = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 786)+    p              :: Int -> Word32+    p i | inverse   = arrayRead32 ar (17 - i)+        | otherwise = arrayRead32 ar i -expandKey :: ByteArrayAccess ba-          => MutableArray32      -- ^ The key schedule-          -> Word64              -- ^ First word of the salt-          -> Word64              -- ^ Second word of the salt-          -> ba                  -- ^ The key-          -> IO ()-expandKey mv salt1 salt2 key = do-    when (len > 0) $ forM_ [0..17] $ \i -> do-        let a = B.index key ((i * 4 + 0) `mod` len)-            b = B.index key ((i * 4 + 1) `mod` len)-            c = B.index key ((i * 4 + 2) `mod` len)-            d = B.index key ((i * 4 + 3) `mod` len)-            k = (fromIntegral a `shiftL` 24) .|.-                (fromIntegral b `shiftL` 16) .|.-                (fromIntegral c `shiftL`  8) .|.-                (fromIntegral d)-        mutableArrayWriteXor32 mv i k-    prepare mv-    return ()-  where-        len = B.length key+-- | Blowfish encrypt a Word using the current state of the key schedule+cipherBlockMutable :: KeySchedule -> Word64 -> IO Word64+cipherBlockMutable (KeySchedule ma) input = doRound input 0+    where+    -- | Transform the input over 16 rounds+    doRound !i roundIndex+        | roundIndex == 16 = do+            pVal1 <- mutableArrayRead32 ma 16+            pVal2 <- mutableArrayRead32 ma 17+            let final = (fromIntegral pVal1 `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral pVal2+            return $ rotateL (i `xor` final) 32+        | otherwise     = do+            pVal <- mutableArrayRead32 ma roundIndex+            let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` pVal+            newr' <- f newr+            let newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` newr') .|. fromIntegral newr+            doRound newi (roundIndex+1) -        -- | Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes-        prepare mctx = loop 0 salt1 salt1 salt2-          where loop i input slt1 slt2-                  | i == 1042   = return ()-                  | otherwise = do-                      ninput <- coreCryptoMutable input-                      let (nl, nr) = w64to32 ninput-                      mutableArrayWrite32 mctx i     nl-                      mutableArrayWrite32 mctx (i+1) nr-                      loop (i+2) (ninput `xor` slt2) slt2 slt1+    -- | The Blowfish Feistel function F+    f   :: Word32 -> IO Word64+    f t = do+        a <- s0 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 24))+        b <- s1 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 16))+        c <- s2 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 8))+        d <- s3 (0xff .&.  t)+        return (fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32) -                -- | Blowfish encrypt a Word using the current state of the key schedule-                coreCryptoMutable :: Word64 -> IO Word64-                coreCryptoMutable input = doRound input 0-                  where doRound i roundIndex-                          | roundIndex == 16 = do-                              pVal1 <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx 16-                              pVal2 <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx 17-                              let final = (fromIntegral pVal1 `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral pVal2-                              return $ rotateL (i `xor` final) 32-                          | otherwise     = do-                              pVal <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx roundIndex-                              let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` pVal-                              newr' <- f newr-                              let newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` newr') .|. (fromIntegral newr)-                              doRound newi (roundIndex+1)+    -- | S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words+    --   The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys+    s0, s1, s2, s3 :: Word32 -> IO Word32+    s0 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 18)+    s1 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 274)+    s2 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 530)+    s3 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 786) -                -- The Blowfish Feistel function F-                f   :: Word32 -> IO Word64-                f t = do a <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s0 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 24) .&. 0xff))-                         b <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s1 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff))-                         c <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s2 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff))-                         d <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s3 + fromIntegral (t .&. 0xff))-                         return (fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32)-                  where s0 = 18-                        s1 = 274-                        s2 = 530-                        s3 = 786+iterKeyStream :: (ByteArrayAccess x)+    => x+    -> Word32+    -> Word32+    -> (Int -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> (Word32 -> Word32 -> IO ()) -> IO ())+    -> IO ()+iterKeyStream x a0 a1 g = f 0 0 a0 a1+    where+        len          = B.length x+        -- Avoiding the modulo operation when interating over the ring+        -- buffer is assumed to be more efficient here. All other+        -- implementations do this, too. The branch prediction shall prefer+        -- the branch with the increment.+        n j          = if j + 1 >= len then 0 else j + 1+        f i j0 b0 b1 = g i l r b0 b1 (f (i + 2) j8)+            where+                j1 = n j0+                j2 = n j1+                j3 = n j2+                j4 = n j3+                j5 = n j4+                j6 = n j5+                j7 = n j6+                j8 = n j7+                x0 = fromIntegral (B.index x j0)+                x1 = fromIntegral (B.index x j1)+                x2 = fromIntegral (B.index x j2)+                x3 = fromIntegral (B.index x j3)+                x4 = fromIntegral (B.index x j4)+                x5 = fromIntegral (B.index x j5)+                x6 = fromIntegral (B.index x j6)+                x7 = fromIntegral (B.index x j7)+                l  = shiftL x0 24 .|. shiftL x1 16 .|. shiftL x2 8 .|. x3+                r  = shiftL x4 24 .|. shiftL x5 16 .|. shiftL x6 8 .|. x7+{-# INLINE iterKeyStream #-}+-- Benchmarking shows that GHC considers this function too big to inline+-- although forcing inlining causes an actual improvement.+-- It is assumed that all function calls (especially the continuation)+-- collapse into a tight loop after inlining.
Crypto/Cipher/ChaCha.hs view
@@ -41,14 +41,14 @@            -> nonce -- ^ the nonce (64 or 96 bits)            -> State -- ^ the initial ChaCha state initialize nbRounds key nonce-    | not (kLen `elem` [16,32])       = error "ChaCha: key length should be 128 or 256 bits"-    | not (nonceLen `elem` [8,12])    = error "ChaCha: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits"-    | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "ChaCha: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"+    | kLen `notElem` [16,32]          = error "ChaCha: key length should be 128 or 256 bits"+    | nonceLen `notElem` [8,12]       = error "ChaCha: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits"+    | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20]    = error "ChaCha: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"     | otherwise                       = unsafeDoIO $ do         stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr ->             B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr  ->             B.withByteArray key   $ \keyPtr ->-                ccryptonite_chacha_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr+                ccryptonite_chacha_init stPtr  nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr         return $ State stPtr   where kLen     = B.length key         nonceLen = B.length nonce
Crypto/Cipher/RC4.hs view
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ import           Crypto.Internal.Imports  -- | The encryption state for RC4+--+-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal+-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments,+-- and change in future versions.  The bytearray should not be used as input to+-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype State = State ScrubbedBytes     deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData)
Crypto/Cipher/Salsa.hs view
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@            -> nonce  -- ^ the nonce (64 or 96 bits)            -> State  -- ^ the initial Salsa state initialize nbRounds key nonce-    | not (kLen `elem` [16,32])       = error "Salsa: key length should be 128 or 256 bits"-    | not (nonceLen `elem` [8,12])    = error "Salsa: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits"-    | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "Salsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"+    | kLen `notElem` [16,32]          = error "Salsa: key length should be 128 or 256 bits"+    | nonceLen `notElem` [8,12]       = error "Salsa: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits"+    | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20]    = error "Salsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"     | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do         stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr ->             B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr  ->             B.withByteArray key   $ \keyPtr ->-                ccryptonite_salsa_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr+                ccryptonite_salsa_init stPtr nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr         return $ State stPtr   where kLen     = B.length key         nonceLen = B.length nonce
Crypto/Cipher/Twofish.hs view
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import Crypto.Cipher.Twofish.Primitive import Crypto.Cipher.Types import Crypto.Cipher.Utils-import Crypto.Internal.Imports  newtype Twofish128 = Twofish128 Twofish
Crypto/Cipher/Twofish/Primitive.hs view
@@ -8,15 +8,12 @@     ) where  import           Crypto.Error-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import           Crypto.Internal.WordArray-import           Crypto.Internal.Words import           Data.Word-import           Data.Int import           Data.Bits import           Data.List-import           Control.Monad  -- Based on the Golang referance implementation -- https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/master/twofish/twofish.go@@ -206,7 +203,7 @@  data Column = Zero | One | Two | Three deriving (Show, Eq, Enum, Bounded) -genSboxes :: ByteArray ba => KeyPackage ba -> [Word8] -> (Array32, Array32, Array32, Array32)+genSboxes :: KeyPackage ba -> [Word8] -> (Array32, Array32, Array32, Array32) genSboxes keyPackage ws = (mkArray b0', mkArray b1', mkArray b2', mkArray b3')     where range = [0..255]           mkArray = array32 256
Crypto/Cipher/Types/AEAD.hs view
@@ -27,24 +27,24 @@ -- | Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data algorithms data AEAD cipher = forall st . AEAD     { aeadModeImpl :: AEADModeImpl st-    , aeadState    :: st+    , aeadState    :: !st     }  -- | Append some header information to an AEAD context aeadAppendHeader :: ByteArrayAccess aad => AEAD cipher -> aad -> AEAD cipher-aeadAppendHeader (AEAD impl st) aad = AEAD impl $ (aeadImplAppendHeader impl) st aad+aeadAppendHeader (AEAD impl st) aad = AEAD impl $ aeadImplAppendHeader impl st aad  -- | Encrypt some data and update the AEAD context aeadEncrypt :: ByteArray ba => AEAD cipher -> ba -> (ba, AEAD cipher)-aeadEncrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ (aeadImplEncrypt impl) st ba+aeadEncrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ aeadImplEncrypt impl st ba  -- | Decrypt some data and update the AEAD context aeadDecrypt :: ByteArray ba => AEAD cipher -> ba -> (ba, AEAD cipher)-aeadDecrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ (aeadImplDecrypt impl) st ba+aeadDecrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ aeadImplDecrypt impl st ba  -- | Finalize the AEAD context and return the authentication tag aeadFinalize :: AEAD cipher -> Int -> AuthTag-aeadFinalize (AEAD impl st) n = (aeadImplFinalize impl) st n+aeadFinalize (AEAD impl st) = aeadImplFinalize impl st  -- | Simple AEAD encryption aeadSimpleEncrypt :: (ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba)
Crypto/Cipher/Types/Base.hs view
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import           Data.Word import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (Bytes, ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B+import           Crypto.Internal.DeepSeq import           Crypto.Error  -- | Different specifier for key size in bytes@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@  -- | Authentication Tag for AE cipher mode newtype AuthTag = AuthTag { unAuthTag :: Bytes }-    deriving (Show, ByteArrayAccess)+    deriving (Show, ByteArrayAccess, NFData)  instance Eq AuthTag where     (AuthTag a) == (AuthTag b) = B.constEq a b
Crypto/Cipher/Types/Block.hs view
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@     ) where  import           Data.Word-import           Data.Monoid import           Crypto.Error import           Crypto.Cipher.Types.Base import           Crypto.Cipher.Types.GF@@ -164,7 +163,7 @@ -- | Increment an IV by a number. -- -- Assume the IV is in Big Endian format.-ivAdd :: BlockCipher c => IV c -> Int -> IV c+ivAdd :: IV c -> Int -> IV c ivAdd (IV b) i = IV $ copy b   where copy :: ByteArray bs => bs -> bs         copy bs = B.copyAndFreeze bs $ loop i (B.length bs - 1)
Crypto/Cipher/Utils.hs view
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@  import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Cipher.Types-import Crypto.Internal.Imports  import Data.ByteArray as BA
Crypto/Cipher/XSalsa.hs view
@@ -12,18 +12,17 @@ {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} module Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa     ( initialize+    , derive     , combine     , generate     , State     ) where -import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, ScrubbedBytes)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import           Crypto.Internal.Compat import           Crypto.Internal.Imports import           Foreign.Ptr-import           Foreign.Storable-import           Foreign.C.Types import           Crypto.Cipher.Salsa hiding (initialize)  -- | Initialize a new XSalsa context with the number of rounds,@@ -36,15 +35,41 @@ initialize nbRounds key nonce     | kLen /= 32                      = error "XSalsa: key length should be 256 bits"     | nonceLen /= 24                  = error "XSalsa: nonce length should be 192 bits"-    | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "XSalsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"+    | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20]    = error "XSalsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20"     | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do         stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr ->             B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr  ->             B.withByteArray key   $ \keyPtr ->-                ccryptonite_xsalsa_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr+                ccryptonite_xsalsa_init stPtr nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr         return $ State stPtr   where kLen     = B.length key         nonceLen = B.length nonce +-- | Use an already initialized context and new nonce material to derive another+-- XSalsa context.+--+-- This allows a multi-level cascade where a first key @k1@ and nonce @n1@ is+-- used to get @HState(k1,n1)@, and this value is then used as key @k2@ to build+-- @XSalsa(k2,n2)@.  Function 'initialize' is to be called with the first 192+-- bits of @n1|n2@, and the call to @derive@ should add the remaining 128 bits.+--+-- The output context always uses the same number of rounds as the input+-- context.+derive :: ByteArrayAccess nonce+       => State  -- ^ base XSalsa state+       -> nonce  -- ^ the remainder nonce (128 bits)+       -> State  -- ^ the new XSalsa state+derive (State stPtr') nonce+    | nonceLen /= 16 = error "XSalsa: nonce length should be 128 bits"+    | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do+        stPtr <- B.copy stPtr' $ \stPtr ->+            B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr  ->+                ccryptonite_xsalsa_derive stPtr nonceLen noncePtr+        return $ State stPtr+  where nonceLen = B.length nonce+ foreign import ccall "cryptonite_xsalsa_init"     ccryptonite_xsalsa_init :: Ptr State -> Int -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_xsalsa_derive"+    ccryptonite_xsalsa_derive :: Ptr State -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()
Crypto/ConstructHash/MiyaguchiPreneel.hs view
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@       where         (hd, tl) = B.splitAt bsz msg --- | Compute Miyaguchi-Preneel one way compress using the infered block cipher.+-- | Compute Miyaguchi-Preneel one way compress using the inferred block cipher. --   Only safe when KEY-SIZE equals to BLOCK-SIZE. -- --   Simple usage /mp' msg :: MiyaguchiPreneel AES128/
Crypto/Data/AFIS.hs view
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@             diffuse hashAlg lastBlock blockSize         fillRandomBlock g blockPtr = do             let (rand :: Bytes, g') = randomBytesGenerate blockSize g-            B.withByteArray rand $ \randPtr -> memCopy blockPtr randPtr (fromIntegral blockSize)+            B.withByteArray rand $ \randPtr -> memCopy blockPtr randPtr blockSize             return g'  -- | Merge previously diffused data back to the original data.
Crypto/Data/Padding.hs view
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ -- Portability : unknown -- -- Various cryptographic padding commonly used for block ciphers--- or assymetric systems.+-- or asymmetric systems. -- module Crypto.Data.Padding     ( Format(..)
Crypto/ECC.hs view
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ -- Elliptic Curve Cryptography -- {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@     , EllipticCurve(..)     , EllipticCurveDH(..)     , EllipticCurveArith(..)+    , EllipticCurveBasepointArith(..)     , KeyPair(..)     , SharedSecret(..)     ) where@@ -31,17 +33,18 @@ import qualified Crypto.ECC.Simple.Prim as Simple import           Crypto.Random import           Crypto.Error-import           Crypto.Internal.Proxy import           Crypto.Internal.Imports import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B+import           Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) import           Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2ospOf_, os2ip)+import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE as LE import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519 as X25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 as X448-import           Data.Function (on) import           Data.ByteArray (convert) import           Data.Data (Data())-import           Data.Typeable (Typeable())+import           Data.Kind (Type)+import           Data.Proxy  -- | An elliptic curve key pair composed of the private part (a scalar), and -- the associated point.@@ -55,10 +58,10 @@  class EllipticCurve curve where     -- | Point on an Elliptic Curve-    type Point curve  :: *+    type Point curve  :: Type      -- | Scalar in the Elliptic Curve domain-    type Scalar curve :: *+    type Scalar curve :: Type      -- | Generate a new random scalar on the curve.     -- The scalar will represent a number between 1 and the order of the curve non included@@ -99,7 +102,7 @@     -- value or an exception.     ecdh :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret -class EllipticCurve curve => EllipticCurveArith curve where+class (EllipticCurve curve, Eq (Point curve)) => EllipticCurveArith curve where     -- | Add points on a curve     pointAdd :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> Point curve -> Point curve @@ -112,11 +115,40 @@ --   -- | Scalar Inverse --   scalarInverse :: Scalar curve -> Scalar curve +class (EllipticCurveArith curve, Eq (Scalar curve)) => EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve where+    -- | Get the curve order size in bits+    curveOrderBits :: proxy curve -> Int++    -- | Multiply a scalar with the curve base point+    pointBaseSmul :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve++    -- | Multiply the point @p@ with @s2@ and add a lifted to curve value @s1@+    pointsSmulVarTime :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> Point curve+    pointsSmulVarTime prx s1 s2 p = pointAdd prx (pointBaseSmul prx s1) (pointSmul prx s2 p)++    -- | Encode an elliptic curve scalar into big-endian form+    encodeScalar :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> bs++    -- | Try to decode the big-endian form of an elliptic curve scalar+    decodeScalar :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve)++    -- | Convert an elliptic curve scalar to an integer+    scalarToInteger :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Integer++    -- | Try to create an elliptic curve scalar from an integer+    scalarFromInteger :: proxy curve -> Integer -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve)++    -- | Add two scalars and reduce modulo the curve order+    scalarAdd :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve++    -- | Multiply two scalars and reduce modulo the curve order+    scalarMul :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve+ -- | P256 Curve -- -- also known as P256 data Curve_P256R1 = Curve_P256R1-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_P256R1 where     type Point Curve_P256R1 = P256.Point@@ -134,11 +166,11 @@             uncompressed = B.singleton 4             xy = P256.pointToBinary p     decodePoint _ mxy = case B.uncons mxy of-        Nothing -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid+        Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid         Just (m,xy)             -- uncompressed             | m == 4 -> P256.pointFromBinary xy-            | otherwise -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid+            | otherwise -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid  instance EllipticCurveArith Curve_P256R1 where     pointAdd  _ a b = P256.pointAdd a b@@ -149,8 +181,19 @@     ecdhRaw _ s p = SharedSecret $ P256.pointDh s p     ecdh  prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p) +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P256R1 where+    curveOrderBits _ = 256+    pointBaseSmul _ = P256.toPoint+    pointsSmulVarTime _ = P256.pointsMulVarTime+    encodeScalar _ = P256.scalarToBinary+    decodeScalar _ = P256.scalarFromBinary+    scalarToInteger _ = P256.scalarToInteger+    scalarFromInteger _ = P256.scalarFromInteger+    scalarAdd _ = P256.scalarAdd+    scalarMul _ = P256.scalarMul+ data Curve_P384R1 = Curve_P384R1-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_P384R1 where     type Point Curve_P384R1 = Simple.Point Simple.SEC_p384r1@@ -172,8 +215,19 @@       where         prx = Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1 +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P384R1 where+    curveOrderBits _ = 384+    pointBaseSmul _ = Simple.pointBaseMul+    pointsSmulVarTime _ = ecPointsMulVarTime+    encodeScalar _ = ecScalarToBinary+    decodeScalar _ = ecScalarFromBinary+    scalarToInteger _ = ecScalarToInteger+    scalarFromInteger _ = ecScalarFromInteger+    scalarAdd _ = ecScalarAdd+    scalarMul _ = ecScalarMul+ data Curve_P521R1 = Curve_P521R1-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_P521R1 where     type Point Curve_P521R1 = Simple.Point Simple.SEC_p521r1@@ -195,8 +249,19 @@       where         prx = Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1 +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P521R1 where+    curveOrderBits _ = 521+    pointBaseSmul _ = Simple.pointBaseMul+    pointsSmulVarTime _ = ecPointsMulVarTime+    encodeScalar _ = ecScalarToBinary+    decodeScalar _ = ecScalarFromBinary+    scalarToInteger _ = ecScalarToInteger+    scalarFromInteger _ = ecScalarFromInteger+    scalarAdd _ = ecScalarAdd+    scalarMul _ = ecScalarMul+ data Curve_X25519 = Curve_X25519-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_X25519 where     type Point Curve_X25519 = X25519.PublicKey@@ -215,7 +280,7 @@     ecdh prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p)  data Curve_X448 = Curve_X448-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_X448 where     type Point Curve_X448 = X448.PublicKey@@ -234,7 +299,7 @@     ecdh prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p)  data Curve_Edwards25519 = Curve_Edwards25519-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance EllipticCurve Curve_Edwards25519 where     type Point Curve_Edwards25519 = Edwards25519.Point@@ -251,6 +316,22 @@     pointNegate _ p = Edwards25519.pointNegate p     pointSmul _ s p = Edwards25519.pointMul s p +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_Edwards25519 where+    curveOrderBits _ = 253+    pointBaseSmul _ = Edwards25519.toPoint+    pointsSmulVarTime _ = Edwards25519.pointsMulVarTime+    encodeScalar _ = B.reverse . Edwards25519.scalarEncode+    decodeScalar _ bs+        | B.length bs == 32 = Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong (B.reverse bs)+        | otherwise         = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid+    scalarToInteger _ s = LE.os2ip (Edwards25519.scalarEncode s :: B.Bytes)+    scalarFromInteger _ i =+        case LE.i2ospOf 32 i of+            Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid+            Just bs -> Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong (bs :: B.Bytes)+    scalarAdd _ = Edwards25519.scalarAdd+    scalarMul _ = Edwards25519.scalarMul+ checkNonZeroDH :: SharedSecret -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret checkNonZeroDH s@(SharedSecret b)     | B.constAllZero b = CryptoFailed CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid@@ -272,7 +353,7 @@  decodeECPoint :: (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArray bs) => bs -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Point curve) decodeECPoint mxy = case B.uncons mxy of-    Nothing     -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid+    Nothing     -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid     Just (m,xy)         -- uncompressed         | m == 4 ->@@ -281,4 +362,47 @@                 x = os2ip xb                 y = os2ip yb              in Simple.pointFromIntegers (x,y)-        | otherwise -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid+        | otherwise -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid++ecPointsMulVarTime :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve+                   => Simple.Scalar curve+                   -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Point curve+                   -> Simple.Point curve+ecPointsMulVarTime n1 = Simple.pointAddTwoMuls n1 g+  where g = Simple.curveEccG $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve)++ecScalarFromBinary :: forall curve bs . (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArrayAccess bs)+                   => bs -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Scalar curve)+ecScalarFromBinary ba+    | B.length ba /= size = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid+    | otherwise           = CryptoPassed (Simple.Scalar $ os2ip ba)+  where size = ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve)++ecScalarToBinary :: forall curve bs . (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArray bs)+                 => Simple.Scalar curve -> bs+ecScalarToBinary (Simple.Scalar s) = i2ospOf_ size s+  where size = ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve)++ecScalarFromInteger :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve+                    => Integer -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Scalar curve)+ecScalarFromInteger s+    | numBits s > nb = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid+    | otherwise      = CryptoPassed (Simple.Scalar s)+  where nb = 8 * ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve)++ecScalarToInteger :: Simple.Scalar curve -> Integer+ecScalarToInteger (Simple.Scalar s) = s++ecCurveOrderBytes :: Simple.Curve c => proxy c -> Int+ecCurveOrderBytes prx = (numBits n + 7) `div` 8+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx++ecScalarAdd :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve+            => Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve+ecScalarAdd (Simple.Scalar a) (Simple.Scalar b) = Simple.Scalar ((a + b) `mod` n)+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve)++ecScalarMul :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve+            => Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve+ecScalarMul (Simple.Scalar a) (Simple.Scalar b) = Simple.Scalar ((a * b) `mod` n)+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve)
Crypto/ECC/Edwards25519.hs view
@@ -73,15 +73,12 @@     , pointsMulVarTime     ) where -import           Data.Bits import           Data.Word import           Foreign.C.Types import           Foreign.Ptr-import           Foreign.Storable  import           Crypto.Error-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes,-                                            ScrubbedBytes, withByteArray)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (Bytes, ScrubbedBytes, withByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import           Crypto.Internal.Compat import           Crypto.Internal.Imports@@ -286,45 +283,45 @@         withByteArray p  $ \pp  ->              ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime out ps1 pp ps2 -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_eq"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_eq"     ed25519_scalar_eq :: Ptr Scalar                       -> Ptr Scalar                       -> IO CInt -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_encode"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_encode"     ed25519_scalar_encode :: Ptr Word8                           -> Ptr Scalar                           -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_decode_long"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_decode_long"     ed25519_scalar_decode_long :: Ptr Scalar                                -> Ptr Word8                                -> CSize                                -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_add"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_add"     ed25519_scalar_add :: Ptr Scalar -- sum                        -> Ptr Scalar -- a                        -> Ptr Scalar -- b                        -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_mul"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_mul"     ed25519_scalar_mul :: Ptr Scalar -- out                        -> Ptr Scalar -- a                        -> Ptr Scalar -- b                        -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_encode"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_encode"     ed25519_point_encode :: Ptr Word8                          -> Ptr Point                          -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_decode_vartime"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_decode_vartime"     ed25519_point_decode_vartime :: Ptr Point                                  -> Ptr Word8                                  -> IO CInt -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_eq"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_eq"     ed25519_point_eq :: Ptr Point                      -> Ptr Point                      -> IO CInt@@ -333,23 +330,23 @@     ed25519_point_has_prime_order :: Ptr Point                                   -> IO CInt -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_negate"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_negate"     ed25519_point_negate :: Ptr Point -- minus_a                          -> Ptr Point -- a                          -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_add"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_add"     ed25519_point_add :: Ptr Point -- sum                       -> Ptr Point -- a                       -> Ptr Point -- b                       -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_double"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_double"     ed25519_point_double :: Ptr Point -- two_a                          -> Ptr Point -- a                          -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor"+foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor"     ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor :: Ptr Point -- eight_a                                   -> Ptr Point -- a                                   -> IO ()
Crypto/ECC/Simple/Prim.hs view
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@     ) where  import Data.Maybe-import Crypto.Internal.Imports-import Crypto.Internal.Proxy+import Data.Proxy import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic import Crypto.Number.F2m import Crypto.Number.Generate (generateBetween)
Crypto/ECC/Simple/Types.hs view
@@ -84,28 +84,28 @@     , curveEccG :: Point curve -- ^ base point     , curveEccN :: Integer     -- ^ order of G     , curveEccH :: Integer     -- ^ cofactor-    } deriving (Show,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Eq,Data)  newtype CurveBinaryParam = CurveBinaryParam Integer-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  newtype CurvePrimeParam = CurvePrimeParam Integer-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  data CurveType =       CurveBinary CurveBinaryParam     | CurvePrime CurvePrimeParam-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | ECC Private Number newtype Scalar curve = Scalar Integer-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable,NFData)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,NFData)  -- | Define a point on a curve. data Point curve =       Point Integer Integer     | PointO -- ^ Point at Infinity-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData (Point curve) where     rnf (Point x y) = x `seq` y `seq` ()
Crypto/Error/Types.hs view
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import           Data.Data  import           Basement.Monad (MonadFailure(..))-import           Crypto.Internal.Imports  -- | Enumeration of all possible errors that can be found in this library data CryptoError =@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@     | CryptoError_SaltTooSmall     | CryptoError_OutputLengthTooSmall     | CryptoError_OutputLengthTooBig-    deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data)  instance E.Exception CryptoError @@ -83,7 +82,7 @@     pure a     = CryptoPassed a     (<*>) fm m = fm >>= \p -> m >>= \r2 -> return (p r2) instance Monad CryptoFailable where-    return a = CryptoPassed a+    return = pure     (>>=) m1 m2 = do         case m1 of             CryptoPassed a -> m2 a
Crypto/Hash.hs view
@@ -28,14 +28,17 @@     -- * Hash methods parametrized by algorithm     , hashInitWith     , hashWith+    , hashPrefixWith     -- * Hash methods     , hashInit     , hashUpdates     , hashUpdate     , hashFinalize+    , hashFinalizePrefix     , hashBlockSize     , hashDigestSize     , hash+    , hashPrefix     , hashlazy     -- * Hash algorithms     , module Crypto.Hash.Algorithms@@ -44,20 +47,24 @@ import           Basement.Types.OffsetSize (CountOf (..)) import           Basement.Block (Block, unsafeFreeze) import           Basement.Block.Mutable (copyFromPtr, new)-import           Control.Monad import           Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Crypto.Hash.Algorithms-import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr)+import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr) import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L import           Data.Word (Word8)+import           Data.Int (Int32)  -- | Hash a strict bytestring into a digest. hash :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithm a) => ba -> Digest a hash bs = hashFinalize $ hashUpdate hashInit bs +-- | Hash the first N bytes of a bytestring, with code path independent from N.+hashPrefix :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithmPrefix a) => ba -> Int -> Digest a+hashPrefix = hashFinalizePrefix hashInit+ -- | Hash a lazy bytestring into a digest. hashlazy :: HashAlgorithm a => L.ByteString -> Digest a hashlazy lbs = hashFinalize $ hashUpdates hashInit (L.toChunks lbs)@@ -82,9 +89,17 @@ hashUpdates c l     | null ls   = c     | otherwise = Context $ B.copyAndFreeze c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) ->-        mapM_ (\b -> B.withByteArray b $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length b)) ls+        mapM_ (\b -> B.withByteArray b (processBlocks ctx (B.length b))) ls   where     ls = filter (not . B.null) l+    -- process the data in 2GB chunks to fit in uint32_t and Int on 32 bit systems+    processBlocks ctx bytesLeft dataPtr+        | bytesLeft == 0 = return ()+        | otherwise = do+            hashInternalUpdate ctx dataPtr (fromIntegral actuallyProcessed)+            processBlocks ctx (bytesLeft - actuallyProcessed) (dataPtr `plusPtr` actuallyProcessed)+        where+            actuallyProcessed = min bytesLeft (fromIntegral (maxBound :: Int32))  -- | Finalize a context and return a digest. hashFinalize :: forall a . HashAlgorithm a@@ -95,6 +110,24 @@         ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) -> hashInternalFinalize ctx dig         return () +-- | Update the context with the first N bytes of a bytestring and return the+-- digest.  The code path is independent from N but much slower than a normal+-- 'hashUpdate'.  The function can be called for the last bytes of a message, in+-- order to exclude a variable padding, without leaking the padding length.  The+-- begining of the message, never impacted by the padding, should preferably go+-- through 'hashUpdate' for better performance.+hashFinalizePrefix :: forall a ba . (HashAlgorithmPrefix a, ByteArrayAccess ba)+                   => Context a+                   -> ba+                   -> Int+                   -> Digest a+hashFinalizePrefix !c b len =+    Digest $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \(dig :: Ptr (Digest a)) -> do+        ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) ->+            B.withByteArray b $ \d ->+                hashInternalFinalizePrefix ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length b) (fromIntegral len) dig+        return ()+ -- | Initialize a new context for a specified hash algorithm hashInitWith :: HashAlgorithm alg => alg -> Context alg hashInitWith _ = hashInit@@ -103,6 +136,10 @@ hashWith :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithm alg) => alg -> ba -> Digest alg hashWith _ = hash +-- | Run the 'hashPrefix' function but takes an explicit hash algorithm parameter+hashPrefixWith :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithmPrefix alg) => alg -> ba -> Int -> Digest alg+hashPrefixWith _ = hashPrefix+ -- | Try to transform a bytearray into a Digest of specific algorithm. -- -- If the digest is not the right size for the algorithm specified, then@@ -110,7 +147,7 @@ digestFromByteString :: forall a ba . (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => ba -> Maybe (Digest a) digestFromByteString = from undefined   where-        from :: HashAlgorithm a => a -> ba -> Maybe (Digest a)+        from :: a -> ba -> Maybe (Digest a)         from alg bs             | B.length bs == (hashDigestSize alg) = Just $ Digest $ unsafeDoIO $ copyBytes bs             | otherwise                           = Nothing
Crypto/Hash/Algorithms.hs view
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@-{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} -- | -- Module      : Crypto.Hash.Algorithms -- License     : BSD-style@@ -10,6 +9,7 @@ -- module Crypto.Hash.Algorithms     ( HashAlgorithm+    , HashAlgorithmPrefix     -- * Hash algorithms     , Blake2s_160(..)     , Blake2s_224(..)@@ -42,12 +42,10 @@     , SHA3_256(..)     , SHA3_384(..)     , SHA3_512(..)-#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0)     , SHAKE128(..)     , SHAKE256(..)     , Blake2b(..), Blake2bp(..)     , Blake2s(..), Blake2sp(..)-#endif     , Skein256_224(..)     , Skein256_256(..)     , Skein512_224(..)@@ -57,7 +55,7 @@     , Whirlpool(..)     ) where -import           Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm)+import           Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm, HashAlgorithmPrefix) import           Crypto.Hash.Blake2s import           Crypto.Hash.Blake2sp import           Crypto.Hash.Blake2b@@ -78,7 +76,5 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Skein256 import           Crypto.Hash.Skein512 import           Crypto.Hash.Whirlpool-#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) import           Crypto.Hash.SHAKE import           Crypto.Hash.Blake2-#endif
Crypto/Hash/Blake2.hs view
@@ -42,9 +42,8 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)-import           GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat, natVal)+import           GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat) import           Crypto.Internal.Nat  -- | Fast and secure alternative to SHA1 and HMAC-SHA1@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ -- * Blake2s 256 -- data Blake2s (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2s-  deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 256)       => HashAlgorithm (Blake2s bitlen)@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ -- * Blake2b 512 -- data Blake2b (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2b-  deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 512)       => HashAlgorithm (Blake2b bitlen)@@ -116,7 +115,7 @@     c_blake2b_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()  data Blake2sp (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2sp-  deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 256)       => HashAlgorithm (Blake2sp bitlen)@@ -139,7 +138,7 @@     c_blake2sp_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()  data Blake2bp (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2bp-  deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 512)       => HashAlgorithm (Blake2bp bitlen)
Crypto/Hash/Blake2b.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Blake2b (160 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_160 = Blake2b_160-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_160 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2b_160 = 128@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Blake2b (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_224 = Blake2b_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2b_224 = 128@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@  -- | Blake2b (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_256 = Blake2b_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2b_256 = 128@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@  -- | Blake2b (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_384 = Blake2b_384-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_384 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2b_384 = 128@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@  -- | Blake2b (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_512 = Blake2b_512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_512 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2b_512 = 128
Crypto/Hash/Blake2bp.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Blake2bp (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2bp_512 = Blake2bp_512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2bp_512 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2bp_512 = 128
Crypto/Hash/Blake2s.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Blake2s (160 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_160 = Blake2s_160-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_160 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2s_160 = 64@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Blake2s (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_224 = Blake2s_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2s_224 = 64@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@  -- | Blake2s (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_256 = Blake2s_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2s_256 = 64
Crypto/Hash/Blake2sp.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Blake2sp (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2sp_224 = Blake2sp_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2sp_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2sp_224 = 64@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Blake2sp (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2sp_256 = Blake2sp_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Blake2sp_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Blake2sp_256 = 64
Crypto/Hash/IO.hs view
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ import           Foreign.Ptr  -- | A Mutable hash context+--+-- This type is an instance of 'B.ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose.+-- Internal layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data+-- fragments, and change in future versions.  The bytearray should not be used+-- as input to cryptographic algorithms. newtype MutableContext a = MutableContext B.Bytes     deriving (B.ByteArrayAccess)
Crypto/Hash/Keccak.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Keccak (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_224 = Keccak_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Keccak_224 = 144@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Keccak (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_256 = Keccak_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Keccak_256 = 136@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@  -- | Keccak (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_384 = Keccak_384-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_384 where     type HashBlockSize           Keccak_384 = 104@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@  -- | Keccak (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_512 = Keccak_512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_512 where     type HashBlockSize           Keccak_512 = 72
Crypto/Hash/MD2.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | MD2 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD2 = MD2-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm MD2 where     type HashBlockSize           MD2 = 16
Crypto/Hash/MD4.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | MD4 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD4 = MD4-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm MD4 where     type HashBlockSize           MD4 = 64
Crypto/Hash/MD5.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | MD5 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD5 = MD5-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm MD5 where     type HashBlockSize           MD5 = 64@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_md5_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_md5_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix MD5 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_md5_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_md5_init"     c_md5_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_md5_finalize"     c_md5_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_md5_finalize_prefix"+    c_md5_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/RIPEMD160.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | RIPEMD160 cryptographic hash algorithm data RIPEMD160 = RIPEMD160-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm RIPEMD160 where     type HashBlockSize           RIPEMD160 = 64
Crypto/Hash/SHA1.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA1 = SHA1-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA1 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA1 = 64@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha1_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_sha1_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA1 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha1_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha1_init"     c_sha1_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha1_finalize"     c_sha1_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha1_finalize_prefix"+    c_sha1_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/SHA224.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | SHA224 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA224 = SHA224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA224 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA224 = 64@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha224_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_sha224_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA224 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha224_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha224_init"     c_sha224_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha224_finalize"     c_sha224_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix"+    c_sha224_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/SHA256.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | SHA256 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA256 = SHA256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA256 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA256 = 64@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha256_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_sha256_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA256 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha256_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha256_init"     c_sha256_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha256_finalize"     c_sha256_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix"+    c_sha256_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/SHA3.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | SHA3 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_224 = SHA3_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_224 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA3_224 = 144@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | SHA3 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_256 = SHA3_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_256 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA3_256 = 136@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@  -- | SHA3 (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_384 = SHA3_384-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_384 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA3_384 = 104@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@  -- | SHA3 (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_512 = SHA3_512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_512 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA3_512 = 72
Crypto/Hash/SHA384.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | SHA384 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA384 = SHA384-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA384 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA384 = 128@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha384_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_sha384_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA384 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha384_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha384_init"     c_sha384_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha384_finalize"     c_sha384_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix"+    c_sha384_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/SHA512.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | SHA512 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512 = SHA512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA512 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA512 = 128@@ -35,6 +34,9 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha512_update     hashInternalFinalize      = c_sha512_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA512 where+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha512_finalize_prefix+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha512_init"     c_sha512_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -43,3 +45,6 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha512_finalize"     c_sha512_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix"+    c_sha512_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/SHA512t.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | SHA512t (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512t_224 = SHA512t_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA512t_224 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA512t_224 = 128@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | SHA512t (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512t_256 = SHA512t_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm SHA512t_256 where     type HashBlockSize           SHA512t_256 = 128
Crypto/Hash/SHAKE.hs view
@@ -12,37 +12,44 @@ {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} {-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-} {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}-{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-} {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} {-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHAKE-    (  SHAKE128 (..), SHAKE256 (..)+    (  SHAKE128 (..), SHAKE256 (..), HashSHAKE (..)     ) where +import           Control.Monad (when) import           Crypto.Hash.Types-import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr)-import           Data.Typeable+import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, castPtr)+import           Foreign.Storable (Storable(..))+import           Data.Bits+import           Data.Data import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -import           Data.Proxy (Proxy(..))-import           GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat, natVal)+import           GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat, type (+)) import           Crypto.Internal.Nat +-- | Type class of SHAKE algorithms.+class HashAlgorithm a => HashSHAKE a where+    -- | Alternate finalization needed for cSHAKE+    cshakeInternalFinalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO ()+    -- | Get the digest bit length+    cshakeOutputLength :: a -> Int+ -- | SHAKE128 (128 bits) extendable output function.  Supports an arbitrary--- digest size (multiple of 8 bits), to be specified as a type parameter--- of kind 'Nat'.+-- digest size, to be specified as a type parameter of kind 'Nat'. -- -- Note: outputs from @'SHAKE128' n@ and @'SHAKE128' m@ for the same input are -- correlated (one being a prefix of the other).  Results are unrelated to -- 'SHAKE256' results. data SHAKE128 (bitlen :: Nat) = SHAKE128-    deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show, Data) -instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen) => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE128 bitlen) where+instance KnownNat bitlen => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE128 bitlen) where     type HashBlockSize           (SHAKE128 bitlen)  = 168-    type HashDigestSize          (SHAKE128 bitlen) = Div8 bitlen+    type HashDigestSize          (SHAKE128 bitlen) = Div8 (bitlen + 7)     type HashInternalContextSize (SHAKE128 bitlen) = 376     hashBlockSize  _          = 168     hashDigestSize _          = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)@@ -51,19 +58,22 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha3_update     hashInternalFinalize      = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) +instance KnownNat bitlen => HashSHAKE (SHAKE128 bitlen) where+    cshakeInternalFinalize = cshakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)+    cshakeOutputLength _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)+ -- | SHAKE256 (256 bits) extendable output function.  Supports an arbitrary--- digest size (multiple of 8 bits), to be specified as a type parameter--- of kind 'Nat'.+-- digest size, to be specified as a type parameter of kind 'Nat'. -- -- Note: outputs from @'SHAKE256' n@ and @'SHAKE256' m@ for the same input are -- correlated (one being a prefix of the other).  Results are unrelated to -- 'SHAKE128' results. data SHAKE256 (bitlen :: Nat) = SHAKE256-    deriving (Show, Typeable)+    deriving (Show, Data) -instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen) => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE256 bitlen) where+instance KnownNat bitlen => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE256 bitlen) where     type HashBlockSize           (SHAKE256 bitlen) = 136-    type HashDigestSize          (SHAKE256 bitlen) = Div8 bitlen+    type HashDigestSize          (SHAKE256 bitlen) = Div8 (bitlen + 7)     type HashInternalContextSize (SHAKE256 bitlen) = 344     hashBlockSize  _          = 136     hashDigestSize _          = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)@@ -72,7 +82,11 @@     hashInternalUpdate        = c_sha3_update     hashInternalFinalize      = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) -shakeFinalizeOutput :: (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen)+instance KnownNat bitlen => HashSHAKE (SHAKE256 bitlen) where+    cshakeInternalFinalize = cshakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)+    cshakeOutputLength _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)++shakeFinalizeOutput :: KnownNat bitlen                     => proxy bitlen                     -> Ptr (Context a)                     -> Ptr (Digest a)@@ -80,7 +94,27 @@ shakeFinalizeOutput d ctx dig = do     c_sha3_finalize_shake ctx     c_sha3_output ctx dig (byteLen d)+    shakeTruncate d (castPtr dig) +cshakeFinalizeOutput :: KnownNat bitlen+                     => proxy bitlen+                     -> Ptr (Context a)+                     -> Ptr (Digest a)+                     -> IO ()+cshakeFinalizeOutput d ctx dig = do+    c_sha3_finalize_cshake ctx+    c_sha3_output ctx dig (byteLen d)+    shakeTruncate d (castPtr dig)++shakeTruncate :: KnownNat bitlen => proxy bitlen -> Ptr Word8 -> IO ()+shakeTruncate d ptr =+    when (bits > 0) $ do+        byte <- peekElemOff ptr index+        pokeElemOff ptr index (byte .&. mask)+  where+    mask = (1 `shiftL` bits) - 1+    (index, bits) = integralNatVal d `divMod` 8+ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_init"     c_sha3_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () @@ -89,6 +123,9 @@  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake"     c_sha3_finalize_shake :: Ptr (Context a) -> IO ()++foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake"+    c_sha3_finalize_cshake :: Ptr (Context a) -> IO ()  foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_output"     c_sha3_output :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> Word32 -> IO ()
Crypto/Hash/Skein256.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Skein256 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein256_224 = Skein256_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein256_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein256_224 = 32@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Skein256 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein256_256 = Skein256_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein256_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein256_256 = 32
Crypto/Hash/Skein512.hs view
@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)   -- | Skein512 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_224 = Skein512_224-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_224 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein512_224 = 64@@ -40,7 +39,7 @@  -- | Skein512 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_256 = Skein512_256-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_256 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein512_256 = 64@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@  -- | Skein512 (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_384 = Skein512_384-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_384 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein512_384 = 64@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@  -- | Skein512 (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_512 = Skein512_512-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_512 where     type HashBlockSize           Skein512_512 = 64
Crypto/Hash/Tiger.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | Tiger cryptographic hash algorithm data Tiger = Tiger-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Tiger where     type HashBlockSize           Tiger = 64
Crypto/Hash/Types.hs view
@@ -8,10 +8,13 @@ -- Crypto hash types definitions -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}+{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Types     ( HashAlgorithm(..)+    , HashAlgorithmPrefix(..)     , Context(..)     , Digest(..)     ) where@@ -19,10 +22,15 @@ import           Crypto.Internal.Imports import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B+import           Control.Monad.ST+import           Data.Char (digitToInt, isHexDigit) import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr)-import           Basement.Block (Block)+import           Basement.Block (Block, unsafeFreeze)+import           Basement.Block.Mutable (MutableBlock, new, unsafeWrite) import           Basement.NormalForm (deepseq)+import           Basement.Types.OffsetSize (CountOf(..), Offset(..)) import           GHC.TypeLits (Nat)+import           Data.Data (Data)  -- | Class representing hashing algorithms. --@@ -52,12 +60,28 @@     -- | Finalize the context and set the digest raw memory to the right value     hashInternalFinalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () +-- | Hashing algorithms with a constant-time implementation.+class HashAlgorithm a => HashAlgorithmPrefix a where+    -- | Update the context with the first N bytes of a buffer and finalize this+    -- context.  The code path executed is independent from N and depends only+    -- on the complete buffer length.+    hashInternalFinalizePrefix :: Ptr (Context a)+                               -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32+                               -> Word32+                               -> Ptr (Digest a)+                               -> IO ()+ {- hashContextGetAlgorithm :: HashAlgorithm a => Context a -> a hashContextGetAlgorithm = undefined -}  -- | Represent a context for a given hash algorithm.+--+-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal+-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments,+-- and change in future versions.  The bytearray should not be used as input to+-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype Context a = Context Bytes     deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData) @@ -71,7 +95,7 @@ -- Creating a digest from a bytearray is also possible with function -- 'Crypto.Hash.digestFromByteString'. newtype Digest a = Digest (Block Word8)-    deriving (Eq,Ord,ByteArrayAccess)+    deriving (Eq,Ord,ByteArrayAccess, Data)  instance NFData (Digest a) where     rnf (Digest u) = u `deepseq` ()@@ -79,3 +103,21 @@ instance Show (Digest a) where     show (Digest bs) = map (toEnum . fromIntegral)                      $ B.unpack (B.convertToBase B.Base16 bs :: Bytes)++instance HashAlgorithm a => Read (Digest a) where+    readsPrec _ str = runST $ do mut <- new (CountOf len)+                                 loop mut len str+      where+        len = hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)++        loop :: MutableBlock Word8 s -> Int -> String -> ST s [(Digest a, String)]+        loop mut 0   cs          = (\b -> [(Digest b, cs)]) <$> unsafeFreeze mut+        loop _   _   []          = return []+        loop _   _   [_]         = return []+        loop mut n   (c:(d:ds))+            | not (isHexDigit c) = return []+            | not (isHexDigit d) = return []+            | otherwise          = do+                let w8 = fromIntegral $ digitToInt c * 16 + digitToInt d+                unsafeWrite mut (Offset $ len - n) w8+                loop mut (n - 1) ds
Crypto/Hash/Whirlpool.hs view
@@ -17,12 +17,11 @@ import           Crypto.Hash.Types import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import           Data.Data-import           Data.Typeable import           Data.Word (Word8, Word32)  -- | Whirlpool cryptographic hash algorithm data Whirlpool = Whirlpool-    deriving (Show,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Data)  instance HashAlgorithm Whirlpool where     type HashBlockSize           Whirlpool = 64
+ Crypto/Internal/Builder.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.Internal.Builder+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+-- Stability   : stable+-- Portability : Good+--+-- Delaying and merging ByteArray allocations.  This is similar to module+-- "Data.ByteArray.Pack" except the total length is computed automatically based+-- on what is appended.+--+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+module Crypto.Internal.Builder+    ( Builder+    , buildAndFreeze+    , builderLength+    , byte+    , bytes+    , zero+    ) where++import           Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess)+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memSet)++import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr)+import           Foreign.Storable (poke)++import           Crypto.Internal.Imports hiding (empty)++data Builder =  Builder !Int (Ptr Word8 -> IO ())  -- size and initializer++instance Semigroup Builder where+    (Builder s1 f1) <> (Builder s2 f2) = Builder (s1 + s2) f+      where f p = f1 p >> f2 (p `plusPtr` s1)++builderLength :: Builder -> Int+builderLength (Builder s _) = s++buildAndFreeze :: ByteArray ba => Builder -> ba+buildAndFreeze (Builder s f) = B.allocAndFreeze s f++byte :: Word8 -> Builder+byte !b = Builder 1 (`poke` b)++bytes :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Builder+bytes bs = Builder (B.length bs) (B.copyByteArrayToPtr bs)++zero :: Int -> Builder+zero s = if s > 0 then Builder s (\p -> memSet p 0 s) else empty++empty :: Builder+empty = Builder 0 (const $ return ())
Crypto/Internal/CompatPrim.hs view
@@ -23,15 +23,21 @@     , convert4To32     ) where -import GHC.Prim #if !defined(ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && !defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) import Data.Memory.Endian (getSystemEndianness, Endianness(..)) #endif +#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 902+import GHC.Prim+#else+import GHC.Prim hiding (Word32#)+type Word32# = Word#+#endif+ -- | Byteswap Word# to or from Big Endian -- -- On a big endian machine, this function is a nop.-be32Prim :: Word# -> Word#+be32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32# #ifdef ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN be32Prim = byteswap32Prim #elif defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)@@ -43,7 +49,7 @@ -- | Byteswap Word# to or from Little Endian -- -- On a little endian machine, this function is a nop.-le32Prim :: Word# -> Word#+le32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32# #ifdef ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN le32Prim w = w #elif defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN)@@ -54,16 +60,11 @@  -- | Simple compatibility for byteswap the lower 32 bits of a Word# -- at the primitive level-byteswap32Prim :: Word# -> Word#-#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 708-byteswap32Prim w = byteSwap32# w+byteswap32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32#+#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 902+byteswap32Prim w = wordToWord32# (byteSwap32# (word32ToWord# w)) #else-byteswap32Prim w =-    let !a =       uncheckedShiftL# w 24#-        !b = and# (uncheckedShiftL# w 8#) 0x00ff0000##-        !c = and# (uncheckedShiftRL# w 8#) 0x0000ff00##-        !d = and# (uncheckedShiftRL# w 24#) 0x000000ff##-     in or# a (or# b (or# c d))+byteswap32Prim w = byteSwap32# w #endif  -- | Combine 4 word8 [a,b,c,d] to a word32 representing [a,b,c,d]
Crypto/Internal/Imports.hs view
@@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ -- Stability   : experimental -- Portability : unknown --+{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} module Crypto.Internal.Imports     ( module X     ) where  import Data.Word               as X+#if !(MIN_VERSION_base(4,11,0))+import Data.Semigroup          as X (Semigroup(..))+#endif import Control.Applicative     as X import Control.Monad           as X (forM, forM_, void) import Control.Arrow           as X (first, second)
Crypto/Internal/Nat.hs view
@@ -9,20 +9,21 @@     , type IsAtMost, type IsAtLeast     , byteLen     , integralNatVal+    , type IsDiv8     , type Div8     , type Mod8     ) where  import           GHC.TypeLits -byteLen :: (KnownNat bitlen, IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a-byteLen d = fromInteger (natVal d `div` 8)+byteLen :: (KnownNat bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a+byteLen d = fromInteger ((natVal d + 7) `div` 8)  integralNatVal :: (KnownNat bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a integralNatVal = fromInteger . natVal  type family IsLE (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) (c :: Bool) where-    IsLE bitlen n 'True  = 'True+    IsLE _ _ 'True  = 'True #if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0)     IsLE bitlen n 'False = TypeError       (     ('Text "bitlen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitlen ':<>: 'Text " is greater than " ':<>: 'ShowType n)@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ type IsAtMost  (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) = IsLE bitlen n (bitlen <=? n) ~ 'True  type family IsGE (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) (c :: Bool) where-    IsGE bitlen n 'True  = 'True+    IsGE _ _ 'True  = 'True #if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0)     IsGE bitlen n 'False = TypeError       (     ('Text "bitlen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitlen ':<>: 'Text " is lesser than " ':<>: 'ShowType n)@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@     Div8 n  = 8 + Div8 (n - 64)  type family IsDiv8 (bitLen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) where-    IsDiv8 bitLen 0 = 'True+    IsDiv8 _ 0 = 'True #if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0)     IsDiv8 bitLen 1 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8")     IsDiv8 bitLen 2 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8")@@ -130,15 +131,15 @@     IsDiv8 bitLen 6 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8")     IsDiv8 bitLen 7 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8") #else-    IsDiv8 bitLen 1 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 2 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 3 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 4 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 5 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 6 = 'False-    IsDiv8 bitLen 7 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 1 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 2 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 3 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 4 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 5 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 6 = 'False+    IsDiv8 _ 7 = 'False #endif-    IsDiv8 bitLen n = IsDiv8 n (Mod8 n)+    IsDiv8 _ n = IsDiv8 n (Mod8 n)  type family Mod8 (n :: Nat) where     Mod8 0 = 0@@ -207,4 +208,6 @@     Mod8 63 = 7     Mod8 n = Mod8 (n - 64) +-- | ensure the given `bitlen` is divisible by 8+-- type IsDivisibleBy8 bitLen = IsDiv8 bitLen bitLen ~ 'True
− Crypto/Internal/Proxy.hs 
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@--- |--- Module      : Crypto.Internal.Proxy--- License     : BSD-style--- Maintainer  : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>--- Stability   : experimental--- Portability : Good----module Crypto.Internal.Proxy-    ( Proxy(..)-    ) where---- | A type witness for 'a' as phantom type-data Proxy a = Proxy
Crypto/KDF/Argon2.hs view
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@     , hash     ) where -import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import           Crypto.Error import           Control.Monad (when)
Crypto/KDF/BCrypt.hs view
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ -- >>> validatePassword password bcryptHash -- >>> True -- >>> let otherPassword = B.pack "otherpassword"--- >>> otherHash <- hashPassword 12 otherPasssword :: IO B.ByteString+-- >>> otherHash <- hashPassword 12 otherPassword :: IO B.ByteString -- >>> validatePassword otherPassword otherHash -- >>> True --@@ -52,11 +52,16 @@     ) where -import           Control.Monad (unless, when)-import           Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive (eksBlowfish, encrypt)-import           Crypto.Random (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes)-import           Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes)-import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+import           Control.Monad                    (forM_, unless, when)+import           Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive (Context, createKeySchedule,+                                                   encrypt, expandKey,+                                                   expandKeyWithSalt,+                                                   freezeKeySchedule)+import           Crypto.Internal.Compat+import           Crypto.Random                    (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes)+import           Data.ByteArray                   (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess,+                                                   Bytes)+import qualified Data.ByteArray                   as B import           Data.ByteArray.Encoding import           Data.Char @@ -136,7 +141,7 @@     -- Truncate the password if necessary and append a null byte for C compatibility     key = B.snoc (B.take 72 password) 0 -    ctx = eksBlowfish cost salt key+    ctx = expensiveBlowfishContext key salt cost      -- The BCrypt plaintext: "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt"     orpheanBeholder = B.pack [79,114,112,104,101,97,110,66,101,104,111,108,100,101,114,83,99,114,121,68,111,117,98,116]@@ -159,10 +164,26 @@     costTens  = fromIntegral (B.index bc 4) - zero     costUnits = fromIntegral (B.index bc 5) - zero     version   = chr (fromIntegral (B.index bc 2))-    cost      = costUnits + (if costTens == 0 then 0 else 10^costTens) :: Int+    cost      = costUnits + 10*costTens :: Int      decodeSaltHash saltHash = do         let (s, h) = B.splitAt 22 saltHash         salt <- convertFromBase Base64OpenBSD s         hash <- convertFromBase Base64OpenBSD h         return (salt, hash)++-- | Create a key schedule for the BCrypt "EKS" version.+--+-- Salt must be a 128-bit byte array.+-- Cost must be between 4 and 31 inclusive+-- See <https://www.usenix.org/conference/1999-usenix-annual-technical-conference/future-adaptable-password-scheme>+expensiveBlowfishContext :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) => key-> salt -> Int -> Context+expensiveBlowfishContext keyBytes saltBytes cost+  | B.length saltBytes /= 16 = error "bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes"+  | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do+        ks <- createKeySchedule+        expandKeyWithSalt ks keyBytes saltBytes+        forM_ [1..2^cost :: Int] $ \_ -> do+            expandKey ks keyBytes+            expandKey ks saltBytes+        freezeKeySchedule ks
+ Crypto/KDF/BCryptPBKDF.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : Good+--+-- Port of the bcrypt_pbkdf key derivation function from OpenBSD+-- as described at <http://man.openbsd.org/bcrypt_pbkdf.3>.+module Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF+    ( Parameters (..)+    , generate+    , hashInternal+    )+where++import           Basement.Block                   (MutableBlock)+import qualified Basement.Block                   as Block+import qualified Basement.Block.Mutable           as Block+import           Basement.Monad                   (PrimState)+import           Basement.Types.OffsetSize        (CountOf (..), Offset (..))+import           Control.Exception                (finally)+import           Control.Monad                    (when)+import qualified Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box       as Blowfish+import qualified Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive as Blowfish+import           Crypto.Hash.Algorithms           (SHA512 (..))+import           Crypto.Hash.Types                (Context,+                                                   hashDigestSize,+                                                   hashInternalContextSize,+                                                   hashInternalFinalize,+                                                   hashInternalInit,+                                                   hashInternalUpdate)+import           Crypto.Internal.Compat           (unsafeDoIO)+import           Data.Bits+import qualified Data.ByteArray                   as B+import           Data.Foldable                    (forM_)+import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods           (memCopy, memSet, memXor)+import           Data.Word+import           Foreign.Ptr                      (Ptr, castPtr)+import           Foreign.Storable                 (peekByteOff, pokeByteOff)++data Parameters = Parameters+  { iterCounts   :: Int -- ^ The number of user-defined iterations for the algorithm+                        --   (must be > 0)+  , outputLength :: Int -- ^ The number of bytes to generate out of BCryptPBKDF+                        --   (must be in 1..1024)+  } deriving (Eq, Ord, Show)++-- | Derive a key of specified length using the bcrypt_pbkdf algorithm.+generate :: (B.ByteArray pass, B.ByteArray salt, B.ByteArray output)+       => Parameters+       -> pass+       -> salt+       -> output+generate params pass salt+    | iterCounts params < 1       = error "BCryptPBKDF: iterCounts must be > 0"+    | keyLen < 1 || keyLen > 1024 = error "BCryptPBKDF: outputLength must be in 1..1024"+    | otherwise                   = B.unsafeCreate keyLen deriveKey+  where+    outLen, tmpLen, blkLen, keyLen, passLen, saltLen, ctxLen, hashLen, blocks :: Int+    outLen  = 32+    tmpLen  = 32+    blkLen  = 4+    passLen = B.length pass+    saltLen = B.length salt+    keyLen  = outputLength params+    ctxLen  = hashInternalContextSize SHA512+    hashLen = hashDigestSize SHA512 -- 64+    blocks  = (keyLen + outLen - 1) `div` outLen++    deriveKey :: Ptr Word8 -> IO ()+    deriveKey keyPtr = do+        -- Allocate all necessary memory. The algorihm shall not allocate+        -- any more dynamic memory after this point. Blocks need to be pinned+        -- as pointers to them are passed to the SHA512 implementation.+        ksClean        <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule+        ksDirty        <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule+        ctxMBlock      <- Block.newPinned (CountOf ctxLen  :: CountOf Word8)+        outMBlock      <- Block.newPinned (CountOf outLen  :: CountOf Word8)+        tmpMBlock      <- Block.newPinned (CountOf tmpLen  :: CountOf Word8)+        blkMBlock      <- Block.newPinned (CountOf blkLen  :: CountOf Word8)+        passHashMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf hashLen :: CountOf Word8)+        saltHashMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf hashLen :: CountOf Word8)+        -- Finally erase all memory areas that contain information from+        -- which the derived key could be reconstructed.+        -- As all MutableBlocks are pinned it shall be guaranteed that+        -- no temporary trampoline buffers are allocated.+        finallyErase outMBlock $ finallyErase passHashMBlock $+            B.withByteArray pass                $ \passPtr->+            B.withByteArray salt                $ \saltPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr ctxMBlock      $ \ctxPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr outMBlock      $ \outPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr tmpMBlock      $ \tmpPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr blkMBlock      $ \blkPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr passHashMBlock $ \passHashPtr->+            Block.withMutablePtr saltHashMBlock $ \saltHashPtr-> do+                -- Hash the password.+                let shaPtr = castPtr ctxPtr :: Ptr (Context SHA512)+                hashInternalInit     shaPtr+                hashInternalUpdate   shaPtr passPtr (fromIntegral passLen)+                hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr passHashPtr)+                passHashBlock <- Block.unsafeFreeze passHashMBlock+                forM_ [1..blocks] $ \block-> do+                    -- Poke the increased block counter.+                    Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 0 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 24)+                    Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 1 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 16)+                    Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 2 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR`  8)+                    Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 3 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR`  0)+                    -- First round (slightly different).+                    hashInternalInit     shaPtr+                    hashInternalUpdate   shaPtr saltPtr (fromIntegral saltLen)+                    hashInternalUpdate   shaPtr blkPtr  (fromIntegral blkLen)+                    hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr saltHashPtr)+                    Block.unsafeFreeze saltHashMBlock >>= \x-> do+                        Blowfish.copyKeySchedule ksDirty ksClean+                        hashInternalMutable ksDirty passHashBlock x tmpMBlock+                    memCopy outPtr tmpPtr outLen+                    -- Remaining rounds.+                    forM_ [2..iterCounts params] $ const $ do+                        hashInternalInit     shaPtr+                        hashInternalUpdate   shaPtr tmpPtr (fromIntegral tmpLen)+                        hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr saltHashPtr)+                        Block.unsafeFreeze saltHashMBlock >>= \x-> do+                            Blowfish.copyKeySchedule ksDirty ksClean+                            hashInternalMutable ksDirty passHashBlock x tmpMBlock+                        memXor outPtr outPtr tmpPtr outLen+                    -- Spread the current out buffer evenly over the key buffer.+                    -- After both loops have run every byte of the key buffer+                    -- will have been written to exactly once and every byte+                    -- of the output will have been used.+                    forM_ [0..outLen - 1] $ \outIdx-> do+                        let keyIdx = outIdx * blocks + block - 1+                        when (keyIdx < keyLen) $ do+                            w8 <- peekByteOff outPtr outIdx :: IO Word8+                            pokeByteOff keyPtr keyIdx w8++-- | Internal hash function used by `generate`.+--+-- Normal users should not need this.+hashInternal :: (B.ByteArrayAccess pass, B.ByteArrayAccess salt, B.ByteArray output)+    => pass+    -> salt+    -> output+hashInternal passHash saltHash+    | B.length passHash /= 64 = error "passHash must be 512 bits"+    | B.length saltHash /= 64 = error "saltHash must be 512 bits"+    | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do+        ks0 <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule+        outMBlock <- Block.newPinned 32+        hashInternalMutable ks0 passHash saltHash outMBlock+        B.convert `fmap` Block.freeze outMBlock++hashInternalMutable :: (B.ByteArrayAccess pass, B.ByteArrayAccess salt)+    => Blowfish.KeySchedule+    -> pass+    -> salt+    -> MutableBlock Word8 (PrimState IO)+    -> IO ()+hashInternalMutable bfks passHash saltHash outMBlock = do+    Blowfish.expandKeyWithSalt bfks passHash saltHash+    forM_ [0..63 :: Int] $ const $ do+        Blowfish.expandKey bfks saltHash+        Blowfish.expandKey bfks passHash+    -- "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" represented as 4 Word64 in big-endian.+    store  0 =<< cipher 64 0x4f78796368726f6d+    store  8 =<< cipher 64 0x61746963426c6f77+    store 16 =<< cipher 64 0x6669736853776174+    store 24 =<< cipher 64 0x44796e616d697465+    where+        store :: Offset Word8 -> Word64 -> IO ()+        store o w64 = do+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 0) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 32)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 1) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 40)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 2) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 48)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 3) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 56)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 4) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR`  0)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 5) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR`  8)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 6) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 16)+            Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 7) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 24)+        cipher :: Int -> Word64 -> IO Word64+        cipher 0 block = return block+        cipher i block = Blowfish.cipherBlockMutable bfks block >>= cipher (i - 1)++finallyErase :: MutableBlock Word8 (PrimState IO) -> IO () -> IO ()+finallyErase mblock action =+    action `finally` Block.withMutablePtr mblock (\ptr-> memSet ptr 0 len)+    where+        CountOf len = Block.mutableLengthBytes mblock
Crypto/KDF/PBKDF2.hs view
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import           Data.Bits import           Foreign.Marshal.Alloc import           Foreign.Ptr (plusPtr, Ptr)-import           Foreign.C.Types (CUInt(..), CInt(..), CSize(..))+import           Foreign.C.Types (CUInt(..), CSize(..))  import           Crypto.Hash (HashAlgorithm) import qualified Crypto.MAC.HMAC as HMAC
Crypto/MAC/CMAC.hs view
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@   cipherIPT :: BlockCipher k => k -> [Word8]-cipherIPT = expandIPT . blockSize   where+cipherIPT = expandIPT . blockSize  -- Data type which represents the smallest irreducibule binary polynomial -- against specified degree.
Crypto/MAC/HMAC.hs view
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} module Crypto.MAC.HMAC     ( hmac+    , hmacLazy     , HMAC(..)     -- * Incremental     , Context(..)@@ -24,27 +25,35 @@ import           Crypto.Hash hiding (Context) import qualified Crypto.Hash as Hash (Context) import           Crypto.Hash.IO-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods import           Crypto.Internal.Compat-import           Crypto.Internal.Imports+import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L  -- | Represent an HMAC that is a phantom type with the hash used to produce the mac. ----- The Eq instance is constant time.+-- The Eq instance is constant time.  No Show instance is provided, to avoid+-- printing by mistake. newtype HMAC a = HMAC { hmacGetDigest :: Digest a }     deriving (ByteArrayAccess)  instance Eq (HMAC a) where     (HMAC b1) == (HMAC b2) = B.constEq b1 b2 --- | compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function+-- | Compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function hmac :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess message, HashAlgorithm a)      => key     -- ^ Secret key      -> message -- ^ Message to MAC      -> HMAC a hmac secret msg = finalize $ updates (initialize secret) [msg]++-- | Compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function, for a lazy input+hmacLazy :: (ByteArrayAccess key, HashAlgorithm a)+     => key     -- ^ Secret key+     -> L.ByteString -- ^ Message to MAC+     -> HMAC a+hmacLazy secret msg = finalize $ updates (initialize secret) (L.toChunks msg)  -- | Represent an ongoing HMAC state, that can be appended with 'update' -- and finalize to an HMAC with 'hmacFinalize'
+ Crypto/MAC/KMAC.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.MAC.KMAC+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Provide the KMAC (Keccak Message Authentication Code) algorithm, derived from+-- the SHA-3 base algorithm Keccak and defined in NIST SP800-185.+--+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}+module Crypto.MAC.KMAC+    ( HashSHAKE+    , kmac+    , KMAC(..)+    -- * Incremental+    , Context+    , initialize+    , update+    , updates+    , finalize+    ) where++import qualified Crypto.Hash as H+import           Crypto.Hash.SHAKE (HashSHAKE(..))+import           Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm(..), Digest(..))+import qualified Crypto.Hash.Types as H+import           Crypto.Internal.Builder+import           Crypto.Internal.Imports+import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr)+import           Data.Bits (shiftR)+import           Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+++-- cSHAKE++cshakeInit :: forall a name string prefix . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess name, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess prefix)+           => name -> string -> prefix -> H.Context a+cshakeInit n s p = H.Context $ B.allocAndFreeze c $ \(ptr :: Ptr (H.Context a)) -> do+    hashInternalInit ptr+    B.withByteArray b $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ptr d (fromIntegral $ B.length b)+    B.withByteArray p $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ptr d (fromIntegral $ B.length p)+  where+    c = hashInternalContextSize (undefined :: a)+    w = hashBlockSize (undefined :: a)+    x = encodeString n <> encodeString s+    b = buildAndFreeze (bytepad x w) :: B.Bytes++cshakeUpdate :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba)+             => H.Context a -> ba -> H.Context a+cshakeUpdate = H.hashUpdate++cshakeUpdates :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba)+              => H.Context a -> [ba] -> H.Context a+cshakeUpdates = H.hashUpdates++cshakeFinalize :: forall a suffix . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess suffix)+               => H.Context a -> suffix -> Digest a+cshakeFinalize !c s =+    Digest $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \dig -> do+        ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (H.Context a)) -> do+            B.withByteArray s $ \d ->+                hashInternalUpdate ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length s)+            cshakeInternalFinalize ctx dig+        return ()+++-- KMAC++-- | Represent a KMAC that is a phantom type with the hash used to produce the+-- mac.+--+-- The Eq instance is constant time.  No Show instance is provided, to avoid+-- printing by mistake.+newtype KMAC a = KMAC { kmacGetDigest :: Digest a }+    deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData)++instance Eq (KMAC a) where+    (KMAC b1) == (KMAC b2) = B.constEq b1 b2++-- | Compute a KMAC using the supplied customization string and key.+kmac :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess ba)+     => string -> key -> ba -> KMAC a+kmac str key msg = finalize $ updates (initialize str key) [msg]++-- | Represent an ongoing KMAC state, that can be appended with 'update' and+-- finalized to a 'KMAC' with 'finalize'.+newtype Context a = Context (H.Context a)++-- | Initialize a new incremental KMAC context with the supplied customization+-- string and key.+initialize :: forall a string key . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess key)+           => string -> key -> Context a+initialize str key = Context $ cshakeInit n str p+  where+    n = B.pack [75,77,65,67] :: B.Bytes  -- "KMAC"+    w = hashBlockSize (undefined :: a)+    p = buildAndFreeze (bytepad (encodeString key) w) :: B.ScrubbedBytes++-- | Incrementally update a KMAC context.+update :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Context a -> ba -> Context a+update (Context ctx) = Context . cshakeUpdate ctx++-- | Incrementally update a KMAC context with multiple inputs.+updates :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Context a -> [ba] -> Context a+updates (Context ctx) = Context . cshakeUpdates ctx++-- | Finalize a KMAC context and return the KMAC.+finalize :: forall a . HashSHAKE a => Context a -> KMAC a+finalize (Context ctx) = KMAC $ cshakeFinalize ctx suffix+  where+    l = cshakeOutputLength (undefined :: a)+    suffix = buildAndFreeze (rightEncode l) :: B.Bytes+++-- Utilities++bytepad :: Builder -> Int -> Builder+bytepad x w = prefix <> x <> zero padLen+  where+    prefix = leftEncode w+    padLen = (w - builderLength prefix - builderLength x) `mod` w++encodeString :: ByteArrayAccess bin => bin -> Builder+encodeString s = leftEncode (8 * B.length s) <> bytes s++leftEncode :: Int -> Builder+leftEncode x = byte len <> digits+  where+    digits = i2osp x+    len    = fromIntegral (builderLength digits)++rightEncode :: Int -> Builder+rightEncode x = digits <> byte len+  where+    digits = i2osp x+    len    = fromIntegral (builderLength digits)++i2osp :: Int -> Builder+i2osp i | i >= 256  = i2osp (shiftR i 8) <> byte (fromIntegral i)+        | otherwise = byte (fromIntegral i)
Crypto/MAC/Poly1305.hs view
@@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ import           Crypto.Error  -- | Poly1305 State+--+-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal+-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments,+-- and change in future versions.  The bytearray should not be used as input to+-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype State = State ScrubbedBytes     deriving (ByteArrayAccess)
Crypto/Number/Basic.hs view
@@ -13,8 +13,11 @@     , log2     , numBits     , numBytes+    , asPowerOf2AndOdd     ) where +import Data.Bits+ import Crypto.Number.Compat  -- | @sqrti@ returns two integers @(l,b)@ so that @l <= sqrt i <= b@.@@ -98,3 +101,16 @@ -- | Compute the number of bytes for an integer numBytes :: Integer -> Int numBytes n = gmpSizeInBytes n `onGmpUnsupported` ((numBits n + 7) `div` 8)++-- | Express an integer as an odd number and a power of 2+asPowerOf2AndOdd :: Integer -> (Int, Integer)+asPowerOf2AndOdd a+    | a == 0       = (0, 0)+    | odd a        = (0, a)+    | a < 0        = let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd $ abs a in (e, -a1)+    | isPowerOf2 a = (log2 a, 1)+    | otherwise    = loop a 0+        where      +          isPowerOf2 n = (n /= 0) && ((n .&. (n - 1)) == 0)+          loop n pw = if n `mod` 2 == 0 then loop (n `div` 2) (pw + 1)+                      else (pw, n)
Crypto/Number/Compat.hs view
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@     , gmpSizeInBytes     , gmpSizeInBits     , gmpExportInteger+    , gmpExportIntegerLE     , gmpImportInteger+    , gmpImportIntegerLE     ) where  #ifndef MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp@@ -70,8 +72,12 @@ -- | Compute the power modulus using extra security to remain constant -- time wise through GMP gmpPowModSecInteger :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> GmpSupported Integer-#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0)+#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0) gmpPowModSecInteger _ _ _ = GmpUnsupported+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,2)+gmpPowModSecInteger b e m = GmpSupported (powModSecInteger b e m)+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0)+gmpPowModSecInteger _ _ _ = GmpUnsupported #elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpPowModSecInteger b e m = GmpSupported (powModSecInteger b e m) #else@@ -99,7 +105,9 @@  -- | Get the next prime from a specific value through GMP gmpNextPrime :: Integer -> GmpSupported Integer-#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1)+#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0)+gmpNextPrime _ = GmpUnsupported+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpNextPrime n = GmpSupported (nextPrimeInteger n) #else gmpNextPrime _ = GmpUnsupported@@ -107,7 +115,9 @@  -- | Test if a number is prime using Miller Rabin gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin :: Int -> Integer -> GmpSupported Bool-#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1)+#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0)+gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin _ _ = GmpUnsupported+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin (I# tries) !n = GmpSupported $     case testPrimeInteger n tries of         0# -> False@@ -132,7 +142,7 @@ gmpSizeInBits _ = GmpUnsupported #endif --- | Export an integer to a memory+-- | Export an integer to a memory (big-endian) gmpExportInteger :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO ()) #if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) gmpExportInteger n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ do@@ -146,7 +156,21 @@ gmpExportInteger _ _ = GmpUnsupported #endif --- | Import an integer from a memory+-- | Export an integer to a memory (little-endian)+gmpExportIntegerLE :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO ())+#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0)+gmpExportIntegerLE n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ do+    _ <- exportIntegerToAddr n addr 0#+    return ()+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1)+gmpExportIntegerLE n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ IO $ \s ->+    case exportIntegerToAddr n addr 0# s of+        (# s2, _ #) -> (# s2, () #)+#else+gmpExportIntegerLE _ _ = GmpUnsupported+#endif++-- | Import an integer from a memory (big-endian) gmpImportInteger :: Int -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO Integer) #if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) gmpImportInteger (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $@@ -156,4 +180,16 @@     importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 1# s #else gmpImportInteger _ _ = GmpUnsupported+#endif++-- | Import an integer from a memory (little-endian)+gmpImportIntegerLE :: Int -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO Integer)+#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0)+gmpImportIntegerLE (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $+    importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 0#+#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1)+gmpImportIntegerLE (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ IO $ \s ->+    importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 0# s+#else+gmpImportIntegerLE _ _ = GmpUnsupported #endif
Crypto/Number/F2m.hs view
@@ -16,14 +16,15 @@     , mulF2m     , squareF2m'     , squareF2m+    , powF2m     , modF2m+    , sqrtF2m     , invF2m     , divF2m     ) where  import Data.Bits (xor, shift, testBit, setBit) import Data.List-import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Number.Basic  -- | Binary Polynomial represented by an integer@@ -67,8 +68,8 @@ mulF2m fx n1 n2     |    fx < 0       || n1 < 0-      || n2 < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary binary polynomial"-    | fx == 0   = error "modF2m: cannot multiply modulo zero polynomial"+      || n2 < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary polynomial"+    | fx == 0   = error "mulF2m: cannot multiply modulo zero polynomial"     | otherwise = modF2m fx $ go (if n2 `mod` 2 == 1 then n1 else 0) (log2 n2)       where         go n s | s == 0  = n@@ -97,9 +98,36 @@ squareF2m' :: Integer            -> Integer squareF2m' n-    | n < 0     = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary binary polynomial"+    | n < 0     = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary polynomial"     | otherwise = foldl' (\acc s -> if testBit n s then setBit acc (2 * s) else acc) 0 [0 .. log2 n] {-# INLINE squareF2m' #-}++-- | Exponentiation in F₂m by computing @a^b mod fx@.+--+-- This implements an exponentiation by squaring based solution. It inherits the+-- same restrictions as 'squareF2m'. Negative exponents are disallowed.+powF2m :: BinaryPolynomial -- ^Modulus+       -> Integer          -- ^a+       -> Integer          -- ^b+       -> Integer+powF2m fx a b+  | b < 0     = error "powF2m: negative exponents disallowed"+  | b == 0    = if fx > 1 then 1 else 0+  | even b    = squareF2m fx x+  | otherwise = mulF2m fx a (squareF2m' x)+  where x = powF2m fx a (b `div` 2)++-- | Square rooot in F₂m.+--+-- We exploit the fact that @a^(2^m) = a@, or in particular, @a^(2^m - 1) = 1@+-- from a classical result by Lagrange. Thus the square root is simply @a^(2^(m+-- - 1))@.+sqrtF2m :: BinaryPolynomial -- ^Modulus+        -> Integer          -- ^a+        -> Integer+sqrtF2m fx a = go (log2 fx - 1) a+  where go 0 x = x+        go n x = go (n - 1) (squareF2m fx x)  -- | Extended GCD algorithm for polynomials. For @a@ and @b@ returns @(g, u, v)@ such that @a * u + b * v == g@. --
Crypto/Number/ModArithmetic.hs view
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}-{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} -- | -- Module      : Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic -- License     : BSD-style@@ -15,20 +14,23 @@     -- * Inverse computing     , inverse     , inverseCoprimes+    , inverseFermat+    -- * Squares+    , jacobi+    , squareRoot     ) where  import Control.Exception (throw, Exception)-import Data.Typeable import Crypto.Number.Basic import Crypto.Number.Compat  -- | Raised when two numbers are supposed to be coprimes but are not. data CoprimesAssertionError = CoprimesAssertionError-    deriving (Show,Typeable)+    deriving (Show)  instance Exception CoprimesAssertionError --- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponant using+-- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponent using -- algorithms design to avoid side channels and timing measurement -- -- Modulo need to be odd otherwise the normal fast modular exponentiation@@ -38,11 +40,10 @@ -- from expFast, and thus provide the same unstudied and dubious -- timing and side channels claims. ----- with GHC 7.10, the powModSecInteger is missing from integer-gmp--- (which is now integer-gmp2), so is has the same security as old--- ghc version.+-- Before GHC 8.4.2, powModSecInteger is missing from integer-gmp,+-- so expSafe has the same security as expFast. expSafe :: Integer -- ^ base-        -> Integer -- ^ exponant+        -> Integer -- ^ exponent         -> Integer -- ^ modulo         -> Integer -- ^ result expSafe b e m@@ -52,14 +53,14 @@     | otherwise = gmpPowModInteger b e m    `onGmpUnsupported`                   exponentiation b e m --- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponant using+-- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponent using -- the fastest algorithm without any consideration for -- hiding parameters. -- -- Use this function when all the parameters are public,--- otherwise 'expSafe' should be prefered.+-- otherwise 'expSafe' should be preferred. expFast :: Integer -- ^ base-        -> Integer -- ^ exponant+        -> Integer -- ^ exponent         -> Integer -- ^ modulo         -> Integer -- ^ result expFast b e m = gmpPowModInteger b e m `onGmpUnsupported` exponentiation b e m@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@     | b == 1    = b     | e == 0    = 1     | e == 1    = b `mod` m-    | even e    = let p = (exponentiation b (e `div` 2) m) `mod` m+    | even e    = let p = exponentiation b (e `div` 2) m `mod` m                    in (p^(2::Integer)) `mod` m     | otherwise = (b * exponentiation b (e-1) m) `mod` m @@ -95,3 +96,122 @@     case inverse g m of         Nothing -> throw CoprimesAssertionError         Just i  -> i++-- | Computes the Jacobi symbol (a/n).+-- 0 ≤ a < n; n ≥ 3 and odd.+--+-- The Legendre and Jacobi symbols are indistinguishable exactly when the+-- lower argument is an odd prime, in which case they have the same value.+--+-- See algorithm 2.149 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+jacobi :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer+jacobi a n+    | n < 3 || even n  = Nothing+    | a == 0 || a == 1 = Just a+    | n <= a           = jacobi (a `mod` n) n+    | a < 0            =+      let b = if n `mod` 4 == 1 then 1 else -1+       in fmap (*b) (jacobi (-a) n)+    | otherwise        =+      let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd a+          nMod8   = n `mod` 8+          nMod4   = n `mod` 4+          a1Mod4  = a1 `mod` 4+          s'      = if even e || nMod8 == 1 || nMod8 == 7 then 1 else -1+          s       = if nMod4 == 3 && a1Mod4 == 3 then -s' else s'+          n1      = n `mod` a1+       in if a1 == 1 then Just s+          else fmap (*s) (jacobi n1 a1)++-- | Modular inverse using Fermat's little theorem.  This works only when+-- the modulus is prime but avoids side channels like in 'expSafe'.+inverseFermat :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer+inverseFermat g p = expSafe g (p - 2) p++-- | Raised when the assumption about the modulus is invalid.+data ModulusAssertionError = ModulusAssertionError+    deriving (Show)++instance Exception ModulusAssertionError++-- | Modular square root of @g@ modulo a prime @p@.+--+-- If the modulus is found not to be prime, the function will raise a+-- 'ModulusAssertionError'.+--+-- This implementation is variable time and should be used with public+-- parameters only.+squareRoot :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer+squareRoot p+    | p < 2     = throw ModulusAssertionError+    | otherwise =+        case p `divMod` 8 of+           (v, 3) -> method1 (2 * v + 1)+           (v, 7) -> method1 (2 * v + 2)+           (u, 5) -> method2 u+           (_, 1) -> tonelliShanks p+           (0, 2) -> \a -> Just (if even a then 0 else 1)+           _      -> throw ModulusAssertionError++  where+    x `eqMod` y = (x - y) `mod` p == 0++    validate g y | (y * y) `eqMod` g = Just y+                 | otherwise         = Nothing++    -- p == 4u + 3 and u' == u + 1+    method1 u' g =+        let y = expFast g u' p+         in validate g y++    -- p == 8u + 5+    method2 u g =+        let gamma = expFast (2 * g) u p+            g_gamma = g * gamma+            i = (2 * g_gamma * gamma) `mod` p+            y = (g_gamma * (i - 1)) `mod` p+         in validate g y++tonelliShanks :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer+tonelliShanks p a+    | aa == 0   = Just 0+    | otherwise =+        case expFast aa p2 p of+            b | b == p1   -> Nothing+              | b == 1    -> Just $ go (expFast aa ((s + 1) `div` 2) p)+                                       (expFast aa s p)+                                       (expFast n  s p)+                                       e+              | otherwise -> throw ModulusAssertionError+  where+    aa = a `mod` p+    p1 = p - 1+    p2 = p1 `div` 2+    n  = findN 2++    x `mul` y = (x * y) `mod` p++    pow2m 0 x = x+    pow2m i x = pow2m (i - 1) (x `mul` x)++    (e, s) = asPowerOf2AndOdd p1++    -- find a quadratic non-residue+    findN i+        | expFast i p2 p == p1 = i+        | otherwise            = findN (i + 1)++    -- find m such that b^(2^m) == 1 (mod p)+    findM b i+        | b == 1    = i+        | otherwise = findM (b `mul` b) (i + 1)++    go !x b g !r+        | b == 1    = x+        | otherwise =+            let r' = findM b 0+                z = pow2m (r - r' - 1) g+                x' = x `mul` z+                b' = b `mul` g'+                g' = z `mul` z+             in go x' b' g' r'
+ Crypto/Number/Nat.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.Number.Nat+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : Good+--+-- Numbers at type level.+--+-- This module provides extensions to "GHC.TypeLits" and "GHC.TypeNats" useful+-- to work with cryptographic algorithms parameterized with a variable bit+-- length.  Constraints like @'IsDivisibleBy8' n@ ensure that the type-level+-- parameter is applicable to the algorithm.+--+-- Functions are also provided to test whether constraints are satisfied from+-- values known at runtime.  The following example shows how to discharge+-- 'IsDivisibleBy8' in a computation @fn@ requiring this constraint:+--+-- > withDivisibleBy8 :: Integer+-- >                  -> (forall proxy n . (KnownNat n, IsDivisibleBy8 n) => proxy n -> a)+-- >                  -> Maybe a+-- > withDivisibleBy8 len fn = do+-- >     SomeNat p <- someNatVal len+-- >     Refl <- isDivisibleBy8 p+-- >     pure (fn p)+--+-- Function @withDivisibleBy8@ above returns 'Nothing' when the argument @len@+-- is negative or not divisible by 8.+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}+{-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-}+module Crypto.Number.Nat+    ( type IsDivisibleBy8+    , type IsAtMost, type IsAtLeast+    , isDivisibleBy8+    , isAtMost+    , isAtLeast+    ) where++import           Data.Type.Equality+import           GHC.TypeLits+import           Unsafe.Coerce (unsafeCoerce)++import           Crypto.Internal.Nat++-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsDivisibleBy8' n@ is satified+isDivisibleBy8 :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> Maybe (IsDiv8 n n :~: 'True)+isDivisibleBy8 n+    | mod (natVal n) 8 == 0 = Just (unsafeCoerce Refl)+    | otherwise             = Nothing++-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsAtMost' value bound@ is+-- satified+isAtMost :: (KnownNat value, KnownNat bound)+         => proxy value -> proxy' bound -> Maybe ((value <=? bound) :~: 'True)+isAtMost x y+    | natVal x <= natVal y  = Just (unsafeCoerce Refl)+    | otherwise             = Nothing++-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsAtLeast' value bound@ is+-- satified+isAtLeast :: (KnownNat value, KnownNat bound)+          => proxy value -> proxy' bound -> Maybe ((bound <=? value) :~: 'True)+isAtLeast = flip isAtMost
Crypto/Number/Prime.hs view
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@     , isCoprime     ) where -import Crypto.Internal.Imports- import Crypto.Number.Compat import Crypto.Number.Generate import Crypto.Number.Basic (sqrti, gcde)@@ -129,7 +127,7 @@     factorise :: Integer -> Integer -> (Integer, Integer)     factorise !si !vi         | vi `testBit` 0 = (si, vi)-        | otherwise     = factorise (si+1) (vi `shiftR` 1) -- probably faster to not shift v continously, but just once.+        | otherwise     = factorise (si+1) (vi `shiftR` 1) -- probably faster to not shift v continuously, but just once.     expmod = expSafe      -- when iteration reach zero, we have a probable prime
Crypto/Number/Serialize.hs view
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ -- | Just like 'i2osp', but takes an extra parameter for size. -- If the number is too big to fit in @len@ bytes, 'Nothing' is returned -- otherwise the number is padded with 0 to fit the @len@ required.+{-# INLINABLE i2ospOf #-} i2ospOf :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> Maybe ba i2ospOf len m     | len <= 0  = Nothing
Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal.hs view
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@  -- | Fill a pointer with the big endian binary representation of an integer ----- If the room available @ptrSz is less than the number of bytes needed,+-- If the room available @ptrSz@ is less than the number of bytes needed, -- 0 is returned. Likewise if a parameter is invalid, 0 is returned. -- -- Returns the number of bytes written@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@     | otherwise  = gmpImportInteger ptrSz ptr `onGmpUnsupported` loop 0 0 ptr   where     loop :: Integer -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO Integer-    loop !acc i p+    loop !acc i !p         | i == ptrSz = return acc         | otherwise  = do             w <- peekByteOff p i :: IO Word8
+ Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal/LE.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : Good+--+-- Fast serialization primitives for integer using raw pointers (little endian)+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+module Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE+    ( i2osp+    , i2ospOf+    , os2ip+    ) where++import           Crypto.Number.Compat+import           Crypto.Number.Basic+import           Data.Bits+import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods+import           Data.Word (Word8)+import           Foreign.Ptr+import           Foreign.Storable++-- | Fill a pointer with the little endian binary representation of an integer+--+-- If the room available @ptrSz@ is less than the number of bytes needed,+-- 0 is returned. Likewise if a parameter is invalid, 0 is returned.+--+-- Returns the number of bytes written+i2osp :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int+i2osp m ptr ptrSz+    | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0+    | m < 0      = return 0+    | m == 0     = pokeByteOff ptr 0 (0 :: Word8) >> return 1+    | ptrSz < sz = return 0+    | otherwise  = fillPtr ptr sz m >> return sz+  where+    !sz    = numBytes m++-- | Similar to 'i2osp', except it will pad any remaining space with zero.+i2ospOf :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int+i2ospOf m ptr ptrSz+    | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0+    | m < 0      = return 0+    | ptrSz < sz = return 0+    | otherwise  = do+        memSet ptr 0 ptrSz+        fillPtr ptr sz m+        return ptrSz+  where+    !sz    = numBytes m++fillPtr :: Ptr Word8 -> Int -> Integer -> IO ()+fillPtr p sz m = gmpExportIntegerLE m p `onGmpUnsupported` export 0 m+  where+    export ofs i+        | ofs >= sz = return ()+        | otherwise = do+            let (i', b) = i `divMod` 256+            pokeByteOff p ofs (fromIntegral b :: Word8)+            export (ofs+1) i'++-- | Transform a little endian binary integer representation pointed by a+-- pointer and a size into an integer+os2ip :: Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Integer+os2ip ptr ptrSz+    | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0+    | otherwise  = gmpImportIntegerLE ptrSz ptr `onGmpUnsupported` loop 0 (ptrSz-1) ptr+  where+    loop :: Integer -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO Integer+    loop !acc i !p+        | i < 0      = return acc+        | otherwise  = do+            w <- peekByteOff p i :: IO Word8+            loop ((acc `shiftL` 8) .|. fromIntegral w) (i-1) p
+ Crypto/Number/Serialize/LE.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : Good+--+-- Fast serialization primitives for integer (little endian)+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+module Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE+    ( i2osp+    , os2ip+    , i2ospOf+    , i2ospOf_+    ) where++import           Crypto.Number.Basic+import           Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO)+import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B+import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE as Internal++-- | @os2ip@ converts a byte string into a positive integer.+os2ip :: B.ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Integer+os2ip bs = unsafeDoIO $ B.withByteArray bs (\p -> Internal.os2ip p (B.length bs))++-- | @i2osp@ converts a positive integer into a byte string.+--+-- The first byte is LSB (least significant byte); the last byte is the MSB (most significant byte)+i2osp :: B.ByteArray ba => Integer -> ba+i2osp 0 = B.allocAndFreeze 1  (\p -> Internal.i2osp 0 p 1 >> return ())+i2osp m = B.allocAndFreeze sz (\p -> Internal.i2osp m p sz >> return ())+  where+        !sz = numBytes m++-- | Just like 'i2osp', but takes an extra parameter for size.+-- If the number is too big to fit in @len@ bytes, 'Nothing' is returned+-- otherwise the number is padded with 0 to fit the @len@ required.+{-# INLINABLE i2ospOf #-}+i2ospOf :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> Maybe ba+i2ospOf len m+    | len <= 0  = Nothing+    | m < 0     = Nothing+    | sz > len  = Nothing+    | otherwise = Just $ B.unsafeCreate len (\p -> Internal.i2ospOf m p len >> return ())+  where+        !sz = numBytes m++-- | Just like 'i2ospOf' except that it doesn't expect a failure: i.e.+-- an integer larger than the number of output bytes requested.+--+-- For example if you just took a modulo of the number that represent+-- the size (example the RSA modulo n).+i2ospOf_ :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> ba+i2ospOf_ len = maybe (error "i2ospOf_: integer is larger than expected") id . i2ospOf len
Crypto/OTP.hs view
@@ -42,15 +42,14 @@     ) where -import           Data.Bits (shiftL, shiftR, (.&.), (.|.))+import           Data.Bits (shiftL, (.&.), (.|.)) import           Data.ByteArray.Mapping (fromW64BE) import           Data.List (elemIndex) import           Data.Word-import           Foreign.Storable (poke) import           Control.Monad (unless) import           Crypto.Hash (HashAlgorithm, SHA1(..)) import           Crypto.MAC.HMAC-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B
Crypto/PubKey/Curve25519.hs view
@@ -33,9 +33,8 @@ import           Crypto.Error import           Crypto.Internal.Compat import           Crypto.Internal.Imports-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, ScrubbedBytes, Bytes, withByteArray)+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes, Bytes, withByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B-import           Crypto.Error (CryptoFailable(..)) import           Crypto.Random  -- | A Curve25519 Secret key
Crypto/PubKey/Curve448.hs view
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ -- data types are compatible with the encoding specified in RFC 7748. -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}-{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.PubKey.Curve448     ( SecretKey     , PublicKey@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@  import           Data.Word import           Foreign.Ptr-import           GHC.Ptr  import           Crypto.Error import           Crypto.Random
Crypto/PubKey/DH.hs view
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@     { params_p :: Integer     , params_g :: Integer     , params_bits :: Int-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData Params where     rnf (Params p g bits) = rnf p `seq` rnf g `seq` bits `seq` ()
Crypto/PubKey/DSA.hs view
@@ -28,19 +28,18 @@     , toPrivateKey     ) where -import           Crypto.Random.Types-import           Data.Bits (testBit)-import           Data.Data-import           Data.Maybe-import           Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits)-import           Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expFast, expSafe, inverse)-import           Crypto.Number.Serialize-import           Crypto.Number.Generate-import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess(length), convert, index, dropView, takeView)-import           Crypto.Internal.Imports-import           Crypto.Hash-import           Prelude hiding (length) +import Data.Data+import Data.Maybe++import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expFast, expSafe, inverse)+import Crypto.Number.Generate+import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)+import Crypto.Internal.Imports+import Crypto.Hash+import Crypto.PubKey.Internal (dsaTruncHash)+import Crypto.Random.Types+ -- | DSA Public Number, usually embedded in DSA Public Key type PublicNumber = Integer @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@     { params_p :: Integer -- ^ DSA p     , params_g :: Integer -- ^ DSA g     , params_q :: Integer -- ^ DSA q-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData Params where     rnf (Params p g q) = p `seq` g `seq` q `seq` ()@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ data Signature = Signature     { sign_r :: Integer -- ^ DSA r     , sign_s :: Integer -- ^ DSA s-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData Signature where     rnf (Signature r s) = r `seq` s `seq` ()@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ data PublicKey = PublicKey     { public_params :: Params       -- ^ DSA parameters     , public_y      :: PublicNumber -- ^ DSA public Y-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData PublicKey where     rnf (PublicKey params y) = y `seq` params `seq` ()@@ -82,14 +81,14 @@ data PrivateKey = PrivateKey     { private_params :: Params        -- ^ DSA parameters     , private_x      :: PrivateNumber -- ^ DSA private X-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData PrivateKey where     rnf (PrivateKey params x) = x `seq` params `seq` ()  -- | Represent a DSA key pair data KeyPair = KeyPair Params PublicNumber PrivateNumber-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData KeyPair where     rnf (KeyPair params y x) = x `seq` y `seq` params `seq` ()@@ -126,7 +125,7 @@           x              = private_x pk           -- compute r,s           kInv      = fromJust $ inverse k q-          hm        = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg msg+          hm        = dsaTruncHash hashAlg msg q           r         = expSafe g k p `mod` q           s         = (kInv * (hm + x * r)) `mod` q @@ -148,11 +147,8 @@     | otherwise                            = v == r     where (Params p g q) = public_params pk           y       = public_y pk-          hm      = os2ip . truncateHash $ hashWith hashAlg m-+          hm      = dsaTruncHash hashAlg m q           w       = fromJust $ inverse s q           u1      = (hm*w) `mod` q           u2      = (r*w) `mod` q           v       = ((expFast g u1 p) * (expFast y u2 p)) `mod` p `mod` q-          -- if the hash is larger than the size of q, truncate it; FIXME: deal with the case of a q not evenly divisible by 8-          truncateHash h = if numBits (os2ip h) > numBits q then takeView h (numBits q `div` 8) else dropView h 0
Crypto/PubKey/ECC/ECDSA.hs view
@@ -11,45 +11,46 @@     , toPublicKey     , toPrivateKey     , signWith+    , signDigestWith     , sign+    , signDigest     , verify+    , verifyDigest     ) where  import Control.Monad-import Crypto.Random.Types-import Data.Bits (shiftR)-import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import Data.Data-import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits)++import Crypto.Hash+import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverse)-import Crypto.Number.Serialize import Crypto.Number.Generate import Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types import Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim-import Crypto.Hash-import Crypto.Hash.Types (hashDigestSize)+import Crypto.PubKey.Internal (dsaTruncHashDigest)+import Crypto.Random.Types  -- | Represent a ECDSA signature namely R and S. data Signature = Signature     { sign_r :: Integer -- ^ ECDSA r     , sign_s :: Integer -- ^ ECDSA s-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | ECDSA Private Key. data PrivateKey = PrivateKey     { private_curve :: Curve     , private_d     :: PrivateNumber-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | ECDSA Public Key. data PublicKey = PublicKey     { public_curve :: Curve     , public_q     :: PublicPoint-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | ECDSA Key Pair. data KeyPair = KeyPair Curve PublicPoint PrivateNumber-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | Public key of a ECDSA Key pair. toPublicKey :: KeyPair -> PublicKey@@ -59,17 +60,16 @@ toPrivateKey :: KeyPair -> PrivateKey toPrivateKey (KeyPair curve _ priv) = PrivateKey curve priv --- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k number.+-- | Sign digest using the private key and an explicit k number. -- -- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks.-signWith :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash)-         => Integer    -- ^ k random number-         -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key-         -> hash       -- ^ hash function-         -> msg        -- ^ message to sign-         -> Maybe Signature-signWith k (PrivateKey curve d) hashAlg msg = do-    let z = tHash hashAlg msg n+signDigestWith :: HashAlgorithm hash+               => Integer     -- ^ k random number+               -> PrivateKey  -- ^ private key+               -> Digest hash -- ^ digest to sign+               -> Maybe Signature+signDigestWith k (PrivateKey curve d) digest = do+    let z = dsaTruncHashDigest digest n         CurveCommon _ _ g n _ = common_curve curve     let point = pointMul curve k g     r <- case point of@@ -80,26 +80,44 @@     when (r == 0 || s == 0) Nothing     return $ Signature r s --- | Sign message using the private key.+-- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k number. -- -- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks.-sign :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m)-     => PrivateKey -> hash -> msg -> m Signature-sign pk hashAlg msg = do+signWith :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash)+         => Integer    -- ^ k random number+         -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key+         -> hash       -- ^ hash function+         -> msg        -- ^ message to sign+         -> Maybe Signature+signWith k pk hashAlg msg = signDigestWith k pk (hashWith hashAlg msg)++-- | Sign digest using the private key.+--+-- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks.+signDigest :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m)+           => PrivateKey -> Digest hash -> m Signature+signDigest pk digest = do     k <- generateBetween 1 (n - 1)-    case signWith k pk hashAlg msg of-         Nothing  -> sign pk hashAlg msg+    case signDigestWith k pk digest of+         Nothing  -> signDigest pk digest          Just sig -> return sig   where n = ecc_n . common_curve $ private_curve pk --- | Verify a bytestring using the public key.-verify :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> PublicKey -> Signature -> msg -> Bool-verify _       (PublicKey _ PointO) _ _ = False-verify hashAlg pk@(PublicKey curve q) (Signature r s) msg+-- | Sign message using the private key.+--+-- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks.+sign :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m)+     => PrivateKey -> hash -> msg -> m Signature+sign pk hashAlg msg = signDigest pk (hashWith hashAlg msg)++-- | Verify a digest using the public key.+verifyDigest :: HashAlgorithm hash => PublicKey -> Signature -> Digest hash -> Bool+verifyDigest (PublicKey _ PointO) _ _ = False+verifyDigest pk@(PublicKey curve q) (Signature r s) digest     | r < 1 || r >= n || s < 1 || s >= n = False     | otherwise = maybe False (r ==) $ do         w <- inverse s n-        let z  = tHash hashAlg msg n+        let z  = dsaTruncHashDigest digest n             u1 = z * w `mod` n             u2 = r * w `mod` n             x  = pointAddTwoMuls curve u1 g u2 q@@ -110,10 +128,6 @@         g = ecc_g cc         cc = common_curve $ public_curve pk --- | Truncate and hash.-tHash :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> msg -> Integer -> Integer-tHash hashAlg m n-    | d > 0 = shiftR e d-    | otherwise = e-  where e = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m-        d = hashDigestSize hashAlg * 8 - numBits n+-- | Verify a bytestring using the public key.+verify :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> PublicKey -> Signature -> msg -> Bool+verify hashAlg pk sig msg = verifyDigest pk sig (hashWith hashAlg msg)
Crypto/PubKey/ECC/P256.hs view
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ -- P256 support -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}-{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE EmptyDataDecls #-} {-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unused-binds #-} module Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256@@ -22,7 +21,9 @@     , pointDh     , pointsMulVarTime     , pointIsValid+    , pointIsAtInfinity     , toPoint+    , pointX     , pointToIntegers     , pointFromIntegers     , pointToBinary@@ -31,10 +32,13 @@     -- * Scalar arithmetic     , scalarGenerate     , scalarZero+    , scalarN     , scalarIsZero     , scalarAdd     , scalarSub+    , scalarMul     , scalarInv+    , scalarInvSafe     , scalarCmp     , scalarFromBinary     , scalarToBinary@@ -45,7 +49,6 @@ import           Data.Word import           Foreign.Ptr import           Foreign.C.Types-import           Control.Monad  import           Crypto.Internal.Compat import           Crypto.Internal.Imports@@ -77,6 +80,9 @@ data P256Y data P256X +order :: Integer+order = 0xffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Point methods ------------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -110,7 +116,7 @@ -- | Negate a point pointNegate :: Point -> Point pointNegate a = withNewPoint $ \dx dy ->-    withPoint a $ \ax ay -> do+    withPoint a $ \ax ay ->         ccryptonite_p256e_point_negate ax ay dx dy  -- | Multiply a point by a scalar@@ -118,16 +124,16 @@ -- warning: variable time pointMul :: Scalar -> Point -> Point pointMul scalar p = withNewPoint $ \dx dy ->-    withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> withScalarZero $ \nzero ->-        ccryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime nzero n px py dx dy+    withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py ->+        ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul n px py dx dy  -- | Similar to 'pointMul', serializing the x coordinate as binary. -- When scalar is multiple of point order the result is all zero. pointDh :: ByteArray binary => Scalar -> Point -> binary pointDh scalar p =     B.unsafeCreate scalarSize $ \dst -> withTempPoint $ \dx dy -> do-        withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> withScalarZero $ \nzero ->-            ccryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime nzero n px py dx dy+        withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py ->+            ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul n px py dx dy         ccryptonite_p256_to_bin (castPtr dx) dst  -- | multiply the point @p with @n2 and add a lifted to curve value @n1@@ -146,6 +152,19 @@     r <- ccryptonite_p256_is_valid_point px py     return (r /= 0) +-- | Check if a 'Point' is the point at infinity+pointIsAtInfinity :: Point -> Bool+pointIsAtInfinity (Point b) = constAllZero b++-- | Return the x coordinate as a 'Scalar' if the point is not at infinity+pointX :: Point -> Maybe Scalar+pointX p+    | pointIsAtInfinity p = Nothing+    | otherwise           = Just $+        withNewScalarFreeze $ \d    ->+        withPoint p         $ \px _ ->+            ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n (castPtr px) (castPtr d)+ -- | Convert a point to (x,y) Integers pointToIntegers :: Point -> (Integer, Integer) pointToIntegers p = unsafeDoIO $ withPoint p $ \px py ->@@ -188,12 +207,12 @@     validatePoint :: Point -> CryptoFailable Point     validatePoint p         | pointIsValid p = CryptoPassed p-        | otherwise      = CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid+        | otherwise      = CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid  -- | Convert from binary to a point, possibly invalid unsafePointFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Point unsafePointFromBinary ba-    | B.length ba /= pointSize = CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid+    | B.length ba /= pointSize = CryptoFailed CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid     | otherwise                =         CryptoPassed $ withNewPoint $ \px py -> B.withByteArray ba $ \src -> do             ccryptonite_p256_from_bin src                        (castPtr px)@@ -216,41 +235,40 @@ scalarZero :: Scalar scalarZero = withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> ccryptonite_p256_init d +-- | The scalar representing the curve order+scalarN :: Scalar+scalarN = throwCryptoError (scalarFromInteger order)+ -- | Check if the scalar is 0 scalarIsZero :: Scalar -> Bool scalarIsZero s = unsafeDoIO $ withScalar s $ \d -> do     result <- ccryptonite_p256_is_zero d     return $ result /= 0 -scalarNeedReducing :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO Bool-scalarNeedReducing d = do-    c <- ccryptonite_p256_cmp d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n-    return (c >= 0)- -- | Perform addition between two scalars -- -- > a + b scalarAdd :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar scalarAdd a b =-    withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> do-        carry <- ccryptonite_p256_add pa pb d-        when (carry /= 0) $ void $ ccryptonite_p256_sub d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d-        needReducing <- scalarNeedReducing d-        when needReducing $ do-            ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d d+    withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb ->+        ccryptonite_p256e_modadd ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa pb d  -- | Perform subtraction between two scalars -- -- > a - b scalarSub :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar scalarSub a b =-    withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> do-        borrow <- ccryptonite_p256_sub pa pb d-        when (borrow /= 0) $ void $ ccryptonite_p256_add d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d-        --needReducing <- scalarNeedReducing d-        --when needReducing $ do-        --    ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d d+    withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb ->+        ccryptonite_p256e_modsub ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa pb d +-- | Perform multiplication between two scalars+--+-- > a * b+scalarMul :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar+scalarMul a b =+    withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb ->+         ccryptonite_p256_modmul ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa 0 pb d+ -- | Give the inverse of the scalar -- -- > 1 / a@@ -261,6 +279,14 @@     withNewScalarFreeze $ \b -> withScalar a $ \pa ->         ccryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa b +-- | Give the inverse of the scalar using safe exponentiation+--+-- > 1 / a+scalarInvSafe :: Scalar -> Scalar+scalarInvSafe a =+    withNewScalarFreeze $ \b -> withScalar a $ \pa ->+        ccryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert pa b+ -- | Compare 2 Scalar scalarCmp :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Ordering scalarCmp a b = unsafeDoIO $@@ -271,7 +297,7 @@ -- | convert a scalar from binary scalarFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Scalar scalarFromBinary ba-    | B.length ba /= scalarSize = CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid+    | B.length ba /= scalarSize = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid     | otherwise                 =         CryptoPassed $ withNewScalarFreeze $ \p -> B.withByteArray ba $ \b ->             ccryptonite_p256_from_bin b p@@ -312,18 +338,9 @@ withTempPoint :: (Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -> IO a) -> IO a withTempPoint f = allocTempScrubbed pointSize (\p -> let px = castPtr p in f px (pxToPy px)) -withTempScalar :: (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a-withTempScalar f = allocTempScrubbed scalarSize (f . castPtr)- withScalar :: Scalar -> (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a withScalar (Scalar d) f = B.withByteArray d f -withScalarZero :: (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a-withScalarZero f =-    withTempScalar $ \d -> do-        ccryptonite_p256_init d-        f d- allocTemp :: Int -> (Ptr Word8 -> IO a) -> IO a allocTemp n f = ignoreSnd <$> B.allocRet n f   where@@ -352,18 +369,20 @@     ccryptonite_p256_is_zero :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_clear"     ccryptonite_p256_clear :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO ()-foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_add"-    ccryptonite_p256_add :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt+foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_modadd"+    ccryptonite_p256e_modadd :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_add_d"     ccryptonite_p256_add_d :: Ptr P256Scalar -> P256Digit -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt-foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_sub"-    ccryptonite_p256_sub :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt+foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_modsub"+    ccryptonite_p256e_modsub :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_cmp"     ccryptonite_p256_cmp :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_mod"     ccryptonite_p256_mod :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modmul"     ccryptonite_p256_modmul :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> P256Digit -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO ()+foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert"+    ccryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () --foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modinv" --    ccryptonite_p256_modinv :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime"@@ -383,6 +402,13 @@     ccryptonite_p256e_point_negate :: Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y                                    -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y                                    -> IO ()++-- compute (out_x,out_y) = n * (in_x,in_y)+foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_point_mul"+    ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul :: Ptr P256Scalar -- n+                                -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -- in_{x,y}+                                -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -- out_{x,y}+                                -> IO ()  -- compute (out_x,out,y) = n1 * G + n2 * (in_x,in_y) foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime"
Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Types.hs view
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ -- | Define either a binary curve or a prime curve. data Curve = CurveF2m CurveBinary -- ^ 𝔽(2^m)            | CurveFP  CurvePrime  -- ^ 𝔽p-           deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+           deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | ECC Public Point type PublicPoint = Point@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ -- | Define a point on a curve. data Point = Point Integer Integer            | PointO -- ^ Point at Infinity-           deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+           deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData Point where     rnf (Point x y) = x `seq` y `seq` ()@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ -- | Define an elliptic curve in 𝔽(2^m). -- The firt parameter is the Integer representatioin of the irreducible polynomial f(x). data CurveBinary = CurveBinary Integer CurveCommon-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData CurveBinary where     rnf (CurveBinary i cc) = i `seq` cc `seq` ()@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ -- | Define an elliptic curve in 𝔽p. -- The first parameter is the Prime Number. data CurvePrime = CurvePrime Integer CurveCommon-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | Parameters in common between binary and prime curves. common_curve :: Curve -> CurveCommon@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@     , ecc_g :: Point   -- ^ base point     , ecc_n :: Integer -- ^ order of G     , ecc_h :: Integer -- ^ cofactor-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  -- | Define names for known recommended curves. data CurveName =@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@     | SEC_t409r1     | SEC_t571k1     | SEC_t571r1-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Ord,Enum,Bounded,Data,Typeable)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Ord,Enum,Bounded,Data)  {- curvesOIDs :: [ (CurveName, [Integer]) ]
+ Crypto/PubKey/ECDSA.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, with the parameterized+-- curve implementations provided by module "Crypto.ECC".+--+-- Public/private key pairs can be generated using+-- 'curveGenerateKeyPair' or decoded from binary.+--+-- /WARNING:/ Only curve P-256 has constant-time implementation.+-- Signature operations with P-384 and P-521 may leak the private key.+--+-- Signature verification should be safe for all curves.+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}+{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-}+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-}+{-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-}+module Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA+    ( EllipticCurveECDSA (..)+    -- * Public keys+    , PublicKey+    , encodePublic+    , decodePublic+    , toPublic+    -- * Private keys+    , PrivateKey+    , encodePrivate+    , decodePrivate+    -- * Signatures+    , Signature(..)+    , signatureFromIntegers+    , signatureToIntegers+    -- * Generation and verification+    , signWith+    , signDigestWith+    , sign+    , signDigest+    , verify+    , verifyDigest+    ) where++import           Control.Monad++import           Crypto.ECC+import qualified Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types as Simple+import           Crypto.Error+import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Hash.Types+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess)+import           Crypto.Internal.Imports+import           Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverseFermat)+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 as P256+import           Crypto.Random.Types++import           Data.Bits+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+import           Data.Data++import           Foreign.Ptr (Ptr)+import           Foreign.Storable (peekByteOff, pokeByteOff)++-- | Represent a ECDSA signature namely R and S.+data Signature curve = Signature+    { sign_r :: Scalar curve -- ^ ECDSA r+    , sign_s :: Scalar curve -- ^ ECDSA s+    }++deriving instance Eq (Scalar curve) => Eq (Signature curve)+deriving instance Show (Scalar curve) => Show (Signature curve)++instance NFData (Scalar curve) => NFData (Signature curve) where+    rnf (Signature r s) = rnf r `seq` rnf s `seq` ()++-- | ECDSA Public Key.+type PublicKey curve = Point curve++-- | ECDSA Private Key.+type PrivateKey curve = Scalar curve++-- | Elliptic curves with ECDSA capabilities.+class EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve => EllipticCurveECDSA curve where+    -- | Is a scalar in the accepted range for ECDSA+    scalarIsValid :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Bool++    -- | Test whether the scalar is zero+    scalarIsZero :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Bool+    scalarIsZero prx s = s == throwCryptoError (scalarFromInteger prx 0)++    -- | Scalar inversion modulo the curve order+    scalarInv :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Maybe (Scalar curve)++    -- | Return the point X coordinate as a scalar+    pointX :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> Maybe (Scalar curve)++instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P256R1 where+    scalarIsValid _ s = not (P256.scalarIsZero s)+                            && P256.scalarCmp s P256.scalarN == LT++    scalarIsZero _ = P256.scalarIsZero++    scalarInv _ s = let inv = P256.scalarInvSafe s+                     in if P256.scalarIsZero inv then Nothing else Just inv++    pointX _  = P256.pointX++instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P384R1 where+    scalarIsValid _ = ecScalarIsValid (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1)++    scalarIsZero _ = ecScalarIsZero++    scalarInv _ = ecScalarInv (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1)++    pointX _  = ecPointX (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1)++instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P521R1 where+    scalarIsValid _ = ecScalarIsValid (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1)++    scalarIsZero _ = ecScalarIsZero++    scalarInv _ = ecScalarInv (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1)++    pointX _  = ecPointX (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1)+++-- | Create a signature from integers (R, S).+signatureFromIntegers :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve+                      => proxy curve -> (Integer, Integer) -> CryptoFailable (Signature curve)+signatureFromIntegers prx (r, s) =+    liftA2 Signature (scalarFromInteger prx r) (scalarFromInteger prx s)++-- | Get integers (R, S) from a signature.+--+-- The values can then be used to encode the signature to binary with+-- ASN.1.+signatureToIntegers :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve+                    => proxy curve -> Signature curve -> (Integer, Integer)+signatureToIntegers prx sig =+    (scalarToInteger prx $ sign_r sig, scalarToInteger prx $ sign_s sig)++-- | Encode a public key into binary form, i.e. the uncompressed encoding+-- referenced from <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5480 RFC 5480> section 2.2.+encodePublic :: (EllipticCurve curve, ByteArray bs)+             => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve -> bs+encodePublic = encodePoint++-- | Try to decode the binary form of a public key.+decodePublic :: (EllipticCurve curve, ByteArray bs)+             => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (PublicKey curve)+decodePublic = decodePoint++-- | Encode a private key into binary form, i.e. the @privateKey@ field+-- described in <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5915 RFC 5915>.+encodePrivate :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArray bs)+              => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> bs+encodePrivate = encodeScalar++-- | Try to decode the binary form of a private key.+decodePrivate :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArray bs)+              => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (PrivateKey curve)+decodePrivate = decodeScalar++-- | Create a public key from a private key.+toPublic :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve+         => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> PublicKey curve+toPublic = pointBaseSmul++-- | Sign digest using the private key and an explicit k scalar.+signDigestWith :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash)+               => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> PrivateKey curve -> Digest hash -> Maybe (Signature curve)+signDigestWith prx k d digest = do+    let z = tHashDigest prx digest+        point = pointBaseSmul prx k+    r <- pointX prx point+    kInv <- scalarInv prx k+    let s = scalarMul prx kInv (scalarAdd prx z (scalarMul prx r d))+    when (scalarIsZero prx r || scalarIsZero prx s) Nothing+    return $ Signature r s++-- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k scalar.+signWith :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash)+         => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> PrivateKey curve -> hash -> msg -> Maybe (Signature curve)+signWith prx k d hashAlg msg = signDigestWith prx k d (hashWith hashAlg msg)++-- | Sign a digest using hash and private key.+signDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, MonadRandom m, HashAlgorithm hash)+           => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> Digest hash -> m (Signature curve)+signDigest prx pk digest = do+    k <- curveGenerateScalar prx+    case signDigestWith prx k pk digest of+        Nothing  -> signDigest prx pk digest+        Just sig -> return sig++-- | Sign a message using hash and private key.+sign :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, MonadRandom m, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash)+     => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> hash -> msg -> m (Signature curve)+sign prx pk hashAlg msg = signDigest prx pk (hashWith hashAlg msg)++-- | Verify a digest using hash and public key.+verifyDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash)+       => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve -> Signature curve -> Digest hash -> Bool+verifyDigest prx q (Signature r s) digest+    | not (scalarIsValid prx r) = False+    | not (scalarIsValid prx s) = False+    | otherwise = maybe False (r ==) $ do+        w <- scalarInv prx s+        let z  = tHashDigest prx digest+            u1 = scalarMul prx z w+            u2 = scalarMul prx r w+            x  = pointsSmulVarTime prx u1 u2 q+        pointX prx x+    -- Note: precondition q /= PointO is not tested because we assume+    -- point decoding never decodes point at infinity.++-- | Verify a signature using hash and public key.+verify :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash)+       => proxy curve -> hash -> PublicKey curve -> Signature curve -> msg -> Bool+verify prx hashAlg q sig msg = verifyDigest prx q sig (hashWith hashAlg msg)++-- | Truncate a digest based on curve order size.+tHashDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash)+            => proxy curve -> Digest hash -> Scalar curve+tHashDigest prx (Digest digest) = throwCryptoError $ decodeScalar prx encoded+  where m      = curveOrderBits prx+        d      = m - B.length digest * 8+        (n, r) = m `divMod` 8+        n'     = if r > 0 then succ n else n++        encoded+            | d >  0    = B.zero (n' - B.length digest) `B.append` digest+            | d == 0    = digest+            | r == 0    = B.take n digest+            | otherwise = shiftBytes digest++        shiftBytes bs = B.allocAndFreeze n' $ \dst ->+            B.withByteArray bs $ \src -> go dst src 0 0++        go :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Word8 -> Int -> IO ()+        go dst src !a i+            | i >= n'   = return ()+            | otherwise = do+                b <- peekByteOff src i+                pokeByteOff dst i (unsafeShiftR b (8 - r) .|. unsafeShiftL a r)+                go dst src b (succ i)+++ecScalarIsValid :: Simple.Curve c => proxy c -> Simple.Scalar c -> Bool+ecScalarIsValid prx (Simple.Scalar s) = s > 0 && s < n+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx++ecScalarIsZero :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve+               => Simple.Scalar curve -> Bool+ecScalarIsZero (Simple.Scalar a) = a == 0++ecScalarInv :: Simple.Curve c+            => proxy c -> Simple.Scalar c -> Maybe (Simple.Scalar c)+ecScalarInv prx (Simple.Scalar s)+    | i == 0    = Nothing+    | otherwise = Just $ Simple.Scalar i+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx+        i = inverseFermat s n++ecPointX :: Simple.Curve c+         => proxy c -> Simple.Point c -> Maybe (Simple.Scalar c)+ecPointX _   Simple.PointO      = Nothing+ecPointX prx (Simple.Point x _) = Just (Simple.Scalar $ x `mod` n)+  where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx
Crypto/PubKey/ECIES.hs view
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ import           Crypto.ECC import           Crypto.Error import           Crypto.Random-import           Crypto.Internal.Proxy  -- | Generate random a new Shared secret and the associated point -- to do a ECIES style encryption
+ Crypto/PubKey/EdDSA.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- EdDSA signature generation and verification, implemented in Haskell and+-- parameterized with elliptic curve and hash algorithm.  Only edwards25519 is+-- supported at the moment.+--+-- The module provides \"context\" and \"prehash\" variants defined in+-- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032 RFC 8032>.+--+-- This implementation is most useful when wanting to customize the hash+-- algorithm.  See module "Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519" for faster Ed25519 with+-- SHA-512.+--+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds                  #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts           #-}+{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-}+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings          #-}+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes                 #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables        #-}+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies               #-}+module Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA+    ( SecretKey+    , PublicKey+    , Signature+    -- * Curves with EdDSA implementation+    , EllipticCurveEdDSA(CurveDigestSize)+    , publicKeySize+    , secretKeySize+    , signatureSize+    -- * Smart constructors+    , signature+    , publicKey+    , secretKey+    -- * Methods+    , toPublic+    , sign+    , signCtx+    , signPh+    , verify+    , verifyCtx+    , verifyPh+    , generateSecretKey+    ) where++import           Data.Bits+import           Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, Bytes, ScrubbedBytes, View)+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B+import           Data.ByteString (ByteString)+import           Data.Proxy++import           Crypto.ECC+import qualified Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 as Edwards25519+import           Crypto.Error+import           Crypto.Hash (Digest)+import           Crypto.Hash.IO+import           Crypto.Random++import           GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat, Nat)++import           Crypto.Internal.Builder+import           Crypto.Internal.Compat+import           Crypto.Internal.Imports+import           Crypto.Internal.Nat (integralNatVal)++import           Foreign.Storable+++-- API++-- | An EdDSA Secret key+newtype SecretKey curve = SecretKey ScrubbedBytes+    deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData)++-- | An EdDSA public key+newtype PublicKey curve hash = PublicKey Bytes+    deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData)++-- | An EdDSA signature+newtype Signature curve hash = Signature Bytes+    deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData)++-- | Elliptic curves with an implementation of EdDSA+class ( EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve+      , KnownNat (CurveDigestSize curve)+      ) => EllipticCurveEdDSA curve where++    -- | Size of the digest for this curve (in bytes)+    type CurveDigestSize curve :: Nat++    -- | Size of secret keys for this curve (in bytes)+    secretKeySize :: proxy curve -> Int++    -- hash with specified parameters+    hashWithDom :: (HashAlgorithm hash, ByteArrayAccess ctx, ByteArrayAccess msg)+                => proxy curve -> hash -> Bool -> ctx -> Builder -> msg -> Bytes++    -- conversion between scalar, point and public key+    pointPublic :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> PublicKey curve hash+    publicPoint :: proxy curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> CryptoFailable (Point curve)+    encodeScalarLE :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> bs+    decodeScalarLE :: ByteArrayAccess bs => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve)++    -- how to use bits in a secret key+    scheduleSecret :: ( HashAlgorithm hash+                      , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+                      )+                   => proxy curve+                   -> hash+                   -> SecretKey curve+                   -> (Scalar curve, View Bytes)++-- | Size of public keys for this curve (in bytes)+publicKeySize :: EllipticCurveEdDSA curve => proxy curve -> Int+publicKeySize prx = signatureSize prx `div` 2++-- | Size of signatures for this curve (in bytes)+signatureSize :: forall proxy curve . EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+              => proxy curve -> Int+signatureSize _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy (CurveDigestSize curve))+++-- Constructors++-- | Try to build a public key from a bytearray+publicKey :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+             , HashAlgorithm hash+             , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+             , ByteArrayAccess ba+             )+          => proxy curve -> hash -> ba -> CryptoFailable (PublicKey curve hash)+publicKey prx _ bs+    | B.length bs == publicKeySize prx =+        CryptoPassed (PublicKey $ B.convert bs)+    | otherwise =+        CryptoFailed CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid++-- | Try to build a secret key from a bytearray+secretKey :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess ba)+          => proxy curve -> ba -> CryptoFailable (SecretKey curve)+secretKey prx bs+    | B.length bs == secretKeySize prx =+        CryptoPassed (SecretKey $ B.convert bs)+    | otherwise                        =+        CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid++-- | Try to build a signature from a bytearray+signature :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+             , HashAlgorithm hash+             , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+             , ByteArrayAccess ba+             )+          => proxy curve -> hash -> ba -> CryptoFailable (Signature curve hash)+signature prx _ bs+    | B.length bs == signatureSize prx =+        CryptoPassed (Signature $ B.convert bs)+    | otherwise =+        CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid+++-- Conversions++-- | Generate a secret key+generateSecretKey :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, MonadRandom m)+                  => proxy curve -> m (SecretKey curve)+generateSecretKey prx = SecretKey <$> getRandomBytes (secretKeySize prx)++-- | Create a public key from a secret key+toPublic :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+            , HashAlgorithm hash+            , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+            )+         => proxy curve -> hash -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash+toPublic prx alg priv =+    let p = pointBaseSmul prx (secretScalar prx alg priv)+     in pointPublic prx p++secretScalar :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+                , HashAlgorithm hash+                , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+                )+             => proxy curve -> hash -> SecretKey curve -> Scalar curve+secretScalar prx alg priv = fst (scheduleSecret prx alg priv)+++-- EdDSA signature generation & verification++-- | Sign a message using the key pair+sign :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+        , HashAlgorithm hash+        , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+        , ByteArrayAccess msg+        )+     => proxy curve -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash+sign prx = signCtx prx emptyCtx++-- | Verify a message+verify :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+          , HashAlgorithm hash+          , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+          , ByteArrayAccess msg+          )+       => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool+verify prx = verifyCtx prx emptyCtx++-- | Sign a message using the key pair under context @ctx@+signCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+           , HashAlgorithm hash+           , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+           , ByteArrayAccess ctx+           , ByteArrayAccess msg+           )+        => proxy curve -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash+signCtx prx = signPhCtx prx False++-- | Verify a message under context @ctx@+verifyCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+             , HashAlgorithm hash+             , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+             , ByteArrayAccess ctx+             , ByteArrayAccess msg+             )+          => proxy curve -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool+verifyCtx prx = verifyPhCtx prx False++-- | Sign a prehashed message using the key pair under context @ctx@+signPh :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+          , HashAlgorithm hash+          , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+          , ByteArrayAccess ctx+          )+       => proxy curve -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> Digest prehash -> Signature curve hash+signPh prx = signPhCtx prx True++-- | Verify a prehashed message under context @ctx@+verifyPh :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+            , HashAlgorithm hash+            , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+            , ByteArrayAccess ctx+            )+         => proxy curve -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> Digest prehash -> Signature curve hash -> Bool+verifyPh prx = verifyPhCtx prx True++signPhCtx :: forall proxy curve hash ctx msg .+             ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+             , HashAlgorithm hash+             , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+             , ByteArrayAccess ctx+             , ByteArrayAccess msg+             )+          => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash+signPhCtx prx ph ctx priv pub msg =+    let alg  = undefined :: hash+        (s, prefix) = scheduleSecret prx alg priv+        digR = hashWithDom prx alg ph ctx (bytes prefix) msg+        r    = decodeScalarNoErr prx digR+        pR   = pointBaseSmul prx r+        bsR  = encodePoint prx pR+        sK   = getK prx ph ctx pub bsR msg+        sS   = scalarAdd prx r (scalarMul prx sK s)+     in encodeSignature prx (bsR, pR, sS)++verifyPhCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+               , HashAlgorithm hash+               , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+               , ByteArrayAccess ctx+               , ByteArrayAccess msg+               )+            => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool+verifyPhCtx prx ph ctx pub msg sig =+    case doVerify of+        CryptoPassed verified -> verified+        CryptoFailed _        -> False+  where+    doVerify = do+        (bsR, pR, sS) <- decodeSignature prx sig+        nPub <- pointNegate prx `fmap` publicPoint prx pub+        let sK  = getK prx ph ctx pub bsR msg+            pR' = pointsSmulVarTime prx sS sK nPub+        return (pR == pR')++emptyCtx :: Bytes+emptyCtx = B.empty++getK :: forall proxy curve hash ctx msg .+        ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+        , HashAlgorithm hash+        , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+        , ByteArrayAccess ctx+        , ByteArrayAccess msg+        )+     => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> Bytes -> msg -> Scalar curve+getK prx ph ctx (PublicKey pub) bsR msg =+    let alg  = undefined :: hash+        digK = hashWithDom prx alg ph ctx (bytes bsR <> bytes pub) msg+     in decodeScalarNoErr prx digK++encodeSignature :: EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+                => proxy curve+                -> (Bytes, Point curve, Scalar curve)+                -> Signature curve hash+encodeSignature prx (bsR, _, sS) = Signature $ buildAndFreeze $+    bytes bsR <> bytes bsS <> zero len0+  where+    bsS  = encodeScalarLE prx sS :: Bytes+    len0 = signatureSize prx - B.length bsR - B.length bsS++decodeSignature :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+                   , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve+                   )+                => proxy curve+                -> Signature curve hash+                -> CryptoFailable (Bytes, Point curve, Scalar curve)+decodeSignature prx (Signature bs) = do+    let (bsR, bsS) = B.splitAt (publicKeySize prx) bs+    pR <- decodePoint prx bsR+    sS <- decodeScalarLE prx bsS+    return (bsR, pR, sS)++-- implementations are supposed to decode any scalar up to the size of the digest+decodeScalarNoErr :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess bs)+                  => proxy curve -> bs -> Scalar curve+decodeScalarNoErr prx = unwrap "decodeScalarNoErr" . decodeScalarLE prx++unwrap :: String -> CryptoFailable a -> a+unwrap name (CryptoFailed _) = error (name ++ ": assumption failed")+unwrap _    (CryptoPassed x) = x+++-- Ed25519 implementation++instance EllipticCurveEdDSA Curve_Edwards25519 where+    type CurveDigestSize Curve_Edwards25519 = 64+    secretKeySize _ = 32++    hashWithDom _ alg ph ctx bss+        | not ph && B.null ctx = digestDomMsg alg bss+        | otherwise            = digestDomMsg alg (dom <> bss)+      where dom = bytes ("SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions" :: ByteString) <>+                  byte (if ph then 1 else 0) <>+                  byte (fromIntegral $ B.length ctx) <>+                  bytes ctx++    pointPublic _ = PublicKey . Edwards25519.pointEncode+    publicPoint _ = Edwards25519.pointDecode+    encodeScalarLE _ = Edwards25519.scalarEncode+    decodeScalarLE _ = Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong++    scheduleSecret prx alg priv =+        (decodeScalarNoErr prx clamped, B.dropView hashed 32)+      where+        hashed  = digest alg $ \update -> update priv++        clamped :: Bytes+        clamped = B.copyAndFreeze (B.takeView hashed 32) $ \p -> do+                      b0  <- peekElemOff p 0  :: IO Word8+                      b31 <- peekElemOff p 31 :: IO Word8+                      pokeElemOff p 31 ((b31 .&. 0x7F) .|. 0x40)+                      pokeElemOff p 0  (b0 .&. 0xF8)+++{-+  Optimize hashing by limiting the number of roundtrips between Haskell and C.+  Hash "update" functions do not use unsafe FFI call, so better concanetate+  small fragments together and call the update function once.++  Using the IO hash interface avoids context buffer copies.++  Data type Digest is not used directly but converted to Bytes early. Any use of+  withByteArray on the unpinned Digest backend would require copy through a+  pinned trampoline.+-}++digestDomMsg :: (HashAlgorithm alg, ByteArrayAccess msg)+             => alg -> Builder -> msg -> Bytes+digestDomMsg alg bss bs = digest alg $ \update ->+    update (buildAndFreeze bss :: Bytes) >> update bs++digest :: HashAlgorithm alg+       => alg+       -> ((forall bs . ByteArrayAccess bs => bs -> IO ()) -> IO ())+       -> Bytes+digest alg fn = B.convert $ unsafeDoIO $ do+    mc <- hashMutableInitWith alg+    fn (hashMutableUpdate mc)+    hashMutableFinalize mc
Crypto/PubKey/Internal.hs view
@@ -8,10 +8,18 @@ module Crypto.PubKey.Internal     ( and'     , (&&!)+    , dsaTruncHash+    , dsaTruncHashDigest     ) where +import Data.Bits (shiftR) import Data.List (foldl') +import Crypto.Hash+import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess)+import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits)+import Crypto.Number.Serialize+ -- | This is a strict version of and and' :: [Bool] -> Bool and' l = foldl' (&&!) True l@@ -22,3 +30,18 @@ True  &&! False = False False &&! True  = False False &&! False = False++-- | Truncate and hash for DSA and ECDSA.+dsaTruncHash :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> msg -> Integer -> Integer+dsaTruncHash hashAlg = dsaTruncHashDigest . hashWith hashAlg++-- | Truncate a digest for DSA and ECDSA.+dsaTruncHashDigest :: HashAlgorithm hash => Digest hash -> Integer -> Integer+dsaTruncHashDigest digest n+    | d > 0 = shiftR e d+    | otherwise = e+  where e = os2ip digest+        d = hashDigestSize (getHashAlg digest) * 8 - numBits n++getHashAlg :: Digest hash -> hash+getHashAlg _ = undefined
Crypto/PubKey/RSA.hs view
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@     , generateBlinder     ) where -import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Random.Types import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverse, inverseCoprimes) import Crypto.Number.Generate (generateMax)@@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ -- generateWith :: (Integer, Integer) -- ^ chosen distinct primes p and q              -> Int                -- ^ size in bytes-             -> Integer            -- ^ RSA public exponant 'e'+             -> Integer            -- ^ RSA public exponent 'e'              -> Maybe (PublicKey, PrivateKey) generateWith (p,q) size e =     case inverse e phi of@@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ -- | generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes. generate :: MonadRandom m          => Int     -- ^ size in bytes-         -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponant 'e'+         -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponent 'e'          -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey) generate size e = loop   where
Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PKCS15.hs view
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ -- | Produce a standard PKCS1.5 padding for signature padSignature :: ByteArray signature => Int -> signature -> Either Error signature padSignature klen signature-    | klen < siglen+1 = Left SignatureTooLong-    | otherwise       = Right (B.pack padding `B.append` signature)+    | klen < siglen + 11 = Left SignatureTooLong+    | otherwise          = Right (B.pack padding `B.append` signature)   where         siglen    = B.length signature         padding   = 0 : 1 : (replicate (klen - siglen - 3) 0xff ++ [0])
Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PSS.hs view
@@ -26,11 +26,12 @@ import           Crypto.PubKey.RSA (generateBlinder) import           Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) import           Data.Bits (xor, shiftR, (.&.)) import           Data.Word  import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray)-import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert)+import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert, eq)  import           Data.ByteString (ByteString) import qualified Data.ByteString as B@@ -69,18 +70,19 @@                    -> Digest hash   -- ^ Message digest                    -> Either Error ByteString signDigestWithSalt salt blinder params pk digest-    | k < hashLen + saltLen + 2 = Left InvalidParameters-    | otherwise                 = Right $ dp blinder pk em+    | emLen < hashLen + saltLen + 2 = Left InvalidParameters+    | otherwise                     = Right $ dp blinder pk em     where k        = private_size pk+          emLen    = if emTruncate pubBits then k - 1 else k           mHash    = B.convert digest-          dbLen    = k - hashLen - 1+          dbLen    = emLen - hashLen - 1           saltLen  = B.length salt           hashLen  = hashDigestSize (pssHash params)-          pubBits  = private_size pk * 8 -- to change if public_size is converted in bytes+          pubBits  = numBits (private_n pk)           m'       = B.concat [B.replicate 8 0,mHash,salt]           h        = B.convert $ hashWith (pssHash params) m'           db       = B.concat [B.replicate (dbLen - saltLen - 1) 0,B.singleton 1,salt]-          dbmask   = (pssMaskGenAlg params) h dbLen+          dbmask   = pssMaskGenAlg params h dbLen           maskedDB = B.pack $ normalizeToKeySize pubBits $ B.zipWith xor db dbmask           em       = B.concat [maskedDB, h, B.singleton (pssTrailerField params)] @@ -148,7 +150,7 @@        -> ByteString -- ^ Message to verify        -> ByteString -- ^ Signature        -> Bool-verify params pk m s = verifyDigest params pk mHash s+verify params pk m = verifyDigest params pk mHash   where mHash     = hashWith (pssHash params) m  -- | Verify a signature using the PSS Parameters@@ -161,30 +163,37 @@              -> ByteString  -- ^ Signature              -> Bool verifyDigest params pk digest s-    | public_size pk /= B.length s        = False+    | B.length s /= k                     = False+    | B.any (/= 0) pre                    = False     | B.last em /= pssTrailerField params = False-    | not (B.all (== 0) ps0)              = False+    | B.any (/= 0) ps0                    = False     | b1 /= B.singleton 1                 = False-    | otherwise                           = h == B.convert h'+    | otherwise                           = B.eq h h'         where -- parameters               hashLen   = hashDigestSize (pssHash params)               mHash     = B.convert digest-              dbLen     = public_size pk - hashLen - 1-              pubBits   = public_size pk * 8 -- to change if public_size is converted in bytes+              k         = public_size pk+              emLen     = if emTruncate pubBits then k - 1 else k+              dbLen     = emLen - hashLen - 1+              pubBits   = numBits (public_n pk)               -- unmarshall fields-              em        = ep pk s-              maskedDB  = B.take (B.length em - hashLen - 1) em+              (pre, em) = B.splitAt (k - emLen) (ep pk s) -- drop 0..1 byte+              maskedDB  = B.take dbLen em               h         = B.take hashLen $ B.drop (B.length maskedDB) em-              dbmask    = (pssMaskGenAlg params) h dbLen+              dbmask    = pssMaskGenAlg params h dbLen               db        = B.pack $ normalizeToKeySize pubBits $ B.zipWith xor maskedDB dbmask               (ps0,z)   = B.break (== 1) db               (b1,salt) = B.splitAt 1 z               m'        = B.concat [B.replicate 8 0,mHash,salt]               h'        = hashWith (pssHash params) m' +-- When the modulus has bit length 1 modulo 8 we drop the first byte.+emTruncate :: Int -> Bool+emTruncate bits = ((bits-1) .&. 0x7) == 0+ normalizeToKeySize :: Int -> [Word8] -> [Word8] normalizeToKeySize _    []     = [] -- very unlikely normalizeToKeySize bits (x:xs) = x .&. mask : xs     where mask = if sh > 0 then 0xff `shiftR` (8-sh) else 0xff-          sh   = ((bits-1) .&. 0x7)+          sh   = (bits-1) .&. 0x7
Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Types.hs view
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ data PublicKey = PublicKey     { public_size :: Int      -- ^ size of key in bytes     , public_n    :: Integer  -- ^ public p*q-    , public_e    :: Integer  -- ^ public exponant e-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    , public_e    :: Integer  -- ^ public exponent e+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData PublicKey where     rnf (PublicKey sz n e) = rnf n `seq` rnf e `seq` sz `seq` ()@@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ -- data PrivateKey = PrivateKey     { private_pub  :: PublicKey -- ^ public part of a private key (size, n and e)-    , private_d    :: Integer   -- ^ private exponant d+    , private_d    :: Integer   -- ^ private exponent d     , private_p    :: Integer   -- ^ p prime number     , private_q    :: Integer   -- ^ q prime number     , private_dP   :: Integer   -- ^ d mod (p-1)     , private_dQ   :: Integer   -- ^ d mod (q-1)     , private_qinv :: Integer   -- ^ q^(-1) mod p-    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable)+    } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data)  instance NFData PrivateKey where     rnf (PrivateKey pub d p q dp dq qinv) =@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ -- -- note the RSA private key contains already an instance of public key for efficiency newtype KeyPair = KeyPair PrivateKey-    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable,NFData)+    deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,NFData)  -- | Public key of a RSA KeyPair toPublicKey :: KeyPair -> PublicKey
+ Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Basic.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega <crodveg@yahoo.es>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Rabin cryptosystem for public-key cryptography and digital signature.+--+{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-}+module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic+    ( PublicKey(..)+    , PrivateKey(..)+    , Signature(..)+    , generate+    , encrypt+    , encryptWithSeed+    , decrypt+    , sign+    , signWith+    , verify+    ) where++import           Data.ByteString (ByteString)+import qualified Data.ByteString as B+import           Data.Data+import           Data.Either (rights)++import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Number.Basic (gcde, numBytes)+import           Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi)+import           Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2osp, i2ospOf_, os2ip)+import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP +import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types+import           Crypto.Random (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes)++-- | Represent a Rabin public key.+data PublicKey = PublicKey+    { public_size :: Int      -- ^ size of key in bytes+    , public_n    :: Integer  -- ^ public p*q+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Represent a Rabin private key.+data PrivateKey = PrivateKey+    { private_pub :: PublicKey+    , private_p   :: Integer   -- ^ p prime number+    , private_q   :: Integer   -- ^ q prime number+    , private_a   :: Integer+    , private_b   :: Integer+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Rabin Signature.+data Signature = Signature (Integer, Integer) deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes.+-- Primes p and q are both congruent 3 mod 4.+--+-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+generate :: MonadRandom m+         => Int+         -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey)+generate size = do+    (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 4 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 4 == 3)+    return $ generateKeys p q+  where +    generateKeys p q =+        let n = p*q+            (a, b, _) = gcde p q +            publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size+                                    , public_n    = n }+            privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey+                                    , private_p   = p+                                    , private_q   = q+                                    , private_a   = a+                                    , private_b   = b }+            in (publicKey, privateKey)++-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key an a predefined OAEP seed.+--+-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+encryptWithSeed :: HashAlgorithm hash+                => ByteString                               -- ^ Seed+                -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding+                -> PublicKey                                -- ^ public key+                -> ByteString                               -- ^ plaintext+                -> Either Error ByteString+encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m =+    let n  = public_n pk+        k  = numBytes n+     in do+        m' <- pad seed oaep k m+        let m'' = os2ip m'+        return $ i2osp $ expSafe m'' 2 n++-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key.+encrypt :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m)+        => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding parameters+        -> PublicKey                                -- ^ public key+        -> ByteString                               -- ^ plaintext +        -> m (Either Error ByteString)+encrypt oaep pk m = do+    seed <- getRandomBytes hashLen+    return $ encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m+  where+    hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep) ++-- | Decrypt ciphertext using private key.+--+-- See algorithm 8.12 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+decrypt :: HashAlgorithm hash+        => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding parameters+        -> PrivateKey                               -- ^ private key+        -> ByteString                               -- ^ ciphertext+        -> Maybe ByteString+decrypt oaep pk c =+    let p  = private_p pk +        q  = private_q pk     +        a  = private_a pk +        b  = private_b pk+        n  = public_n $ private_pub pk+        k  = numBytes n+        c' = os2ip c+        solutions = rights $ toList $ mapTuple (unpad oaep k . i2ospOf_ k) $ sqroot' c' p q a b n+     in if length solutions /= 1 then Nothing+        else Just $ head solutions+      where toList (w, x, y, z) = w:x:y:z:[]+            mapTuple f (w, x, y, z) = (f w, f x, f y, f z)++-- | Sign message using padding, hash algorithm and private key.+--+-- See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabin_signature_algorithm>.+signWith :: HashAlgorithm hash+         => ByteString    -- ^ padding+         -> PrivateKey    -- ^ private key+         -> hash          -- ^ hash function+         -> ByteString    -- ^ message to sign+         -> Either Error Signature+signWith padding pk hashAlg m = do+    h <- calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m+    signature <- calculateSignature h+    return signature+  where+    calculateSignature h =+        let p = private_p pk+            q = private_q pk     +            a = private_a pk +            b = private_b pk+            n = public_n $ private_pub pk+         in if h >= n then Left MessageTooLong+            else let (r, _, _, _) = sqroot' h p q a b n+                  in Right $ Signature (os2ip padding, r)++-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key.+--+-- See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabin_signature_algorithm>.+sign :: (MonadRandom m, HashAlgorithm hash)+     => PrivateKey    -- ^ private key+     -> hash          -- ^ hash function+     -> ByteString    -- ^ message to sign+     -> m (Either Error Signature)+sign pk hashAlg m = do+    padding <- findPadding+    return $ signWith padding pk hashAlg m+  where +    findPadding = do+        padding <- getRandomBytes 8+        case calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m of+            Right _ -> return padding+            _       -> findPadding++-- | Calculate hash of message and padding.+-- If the padding is valid, then the result of the hash operation is returned, otherwise an error.+calculateHash :: HashAlgorithm hash+              => ByteString    -- ^ padding+              -> PrivateKey    -- ^ private key+              -> hash          -- ^ hash function+              -> ByteString    -- ^ message to sign+              -> Either Error Integer+calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m = +    let p = private_p pk+        q = private_q pk+        h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg $ B.append padding m+     in case (jacobi (h `mod` p) p, jacobi (h `mod` q) q) of+            (Just 1, Just 1) -> Right h+            _                -> Left InvalidParameters++-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key.+--+-- See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabin_signature_algorithm>.+verify :: HashAlgorithm hash+       => PublicKey     -- ^ private key+       -> hash          -- ^ hash function+       -> ByteString    -- ^ message+       -> Signature     -- ^ signature+       -> Bool+verify pk hashAlg m (Signature (padding, s)) =+    let n  = public_n pk+        p  = i2osp padding+        h  = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg $ B.append p m +        h' = expSafe s 2 n+     in h' == h++-- | Square roots modulo prime p where p is congruent 3 mod 4+-- Value a must be a quadratic residue modulo p (i.e. jacobi symbol (a/n) = 1).+--+-- See algorithm 3.36 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+sqroot :: Integer+       -> Integer   -- ^ prime p+       -> (Integer, Integer)+sqroot a p =+    let r = expSafe a ((p + 1) `div` 4) p+     in (r, -r)++-- | Square roots modulo n given its prime factors p and q (both congruent 3 mod 4)+-- Value a must be a quadratic residue of both modulo p and modulo q (i.e. jacobi symbols (a/p) = (a/q) = 1).+-- +-- See algorithm 3.44 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+sqroot' :: Integer +        -> Integer  -- ^ prime p+        -> Integer  -- ^ prime q+        -> Integer  -- ^ c such that c*p + d*q = 1+        -> Integer  -- ^ d such that c*p + d*q = 1+        -> Integer  -- ^ n = p*q+        -> (Integer, Integer, Integer, Integer)+sqroot' a p q c d n =+    let (r, _) = sqroot a p+        (s, _) = sqroot a q+        x      = (r*d*q + s*c*p) `mod` n+        y      = (r*d*q - s*c*p) `mod` n+     in (x, (-x) `mod` n, y, (-y) `mod` n)
+ Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Modified.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega <crodveg@yahoo.es>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Modified-Rabin public-key digital signature algorithm.+-- See algorithm 11.30 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+--+{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-}+module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified+    ( PublicKey(..)+    , PrivateKey(..)+    , generate+    , sign+    , verify+    ) where++import           Data.ByteString+import           Data.Data++import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi)+import           Crypto.Number.Serialize (os2ip)+import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types+import           Crypto.Random.Types++-- | Represent a Modified-Rabin public key.+data PublicKey = PublicKey+    { public_size :: Int      -- ^ size of key in bytes+    , public_n    :: Integer  -- ^ public p*q+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Represent a Modified-Rabin private key.+data PrivateKey = PrivateKey+    { private_pub :: PublicKey+    , private_p   :: Integer   -- ^ p prime number+    , private_q   :: Integer   -- ^ q prime number+    , private_d   :: Integer+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes.+-- Prime p is congruent 3 mod 8 and prime q is congruent 7 mod 8.+generate :: MonadRandom m+         => Int           +         -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey)+generate size = do+    (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 8 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 8 == 7)+    return $ generateKeys p q+  where +    generateKeys p q =+        let n = p*q   +            d = (n - p - q + 5) `div` 8+            publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size+                                    , public_n    = n }+            privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey+                                    , private_p   = p+                                    , private_q   = q+                                    , private_d   = d }+            in (publicKey, privateKey)++-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key.+sign :: HashAlgorithm hash+     => PrivateKey    -- ^ private key+     -> hash          -- ^ hash function+     -> ByteString    -- ^ message to sign+     -> Either Error Integer+sign pk hashAlg m =+    let d = private_d pk+        n = public_n $ private_pub pk+        h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m+        limit = (n - 6) `div` 16+     in if h > limit then Left MessageTooLong+        else let h' = 16*h + 6+              in case jacobi h' n of+                    Just 1    -> Right $ expSafe h' d n+                    Just (-1) -> Right $ expSafe (h' `div` 2) d n+                    _         -> Left InvalidParameters++-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key.+verify :: HashAlgorithm hash+       => PublicKey     -- ^ public key+       -> hash          -- ^ hash function+       -> ByteString    -- ^ message+       -> Integer       -- ^ signature+       -> Bool+verify pk hashAlg m s =+    let n   = public_n pk+        h   = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m+        s'  = expSafe s 2 n+        s'' = case s' `mod` 8 of+            6 -> s'+            3 -> 2*s'+            7 -> n - s'+            2 -> 2*(n - s')+            _ -> 0+     in case s'' `mod` 16 of+            6 -> let h' = (s'' - 6) `div` 16+                  in h' == h +            _ -> False
+ Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/OAEP.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega <crodveg@yahoo.es>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- OAEP padding scheme.+-- See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optimal_asymmetric_encryption_padding>.+--+module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP+    ( OAEPParams(..)+    , defaultOAEPParams+    , pad+    , unpad+    ) where+        +import           Data.ByteString (ByteString)+import qualified Data.ByteString as B+import           Data.Bits (xor)++import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray)+import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert)+import           Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction+import           Crypto.PubKey.Internal (and')+import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types++-- | Parameters for OAEP padding.+data OAEPParams hash seed output = OAEPParams+    { oaepHash       :: hash                            -- ^ hash function to use+    , oaepMaskGenAlg :: MaskGenAlgorithm seed output    -- ^ mask Gen algorithm to use+    , oaepLabel      :: Maybe ByteString                -- ^ optional label prepended to message+    }++-- | Default Params with a specified hash function.+defaultOAEPParams :: (ByteArrayAccess seed, ByteArray output, HashAlgorithm hash)+                  => hash+                  -> OAEPParams hash seed output+defaultOAEPParams hashAlg =+    OAEPParams { oaepHash       = hashAlg+               , oaepMaskGenAlg = mgf1 hashAlg+               , oaepLabel      = Nothing+               }++-- | Pad a message using OAEP.+pad :: HashAlgorithm hash+    => ByteString                               -- ^ Seed+    -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP params to use+    -> Int                                      -- ^ size of public key in bytes+    -> ByteString                               -- ^ Message pad+    -> Either Error ByteString+pad seed oaep k msg+    | k < 2*hashLen+2          = Left InvalidParameters+    | B.length seed /= hashLen = Left InvalidParameters+    | mLen > k - 2*hashLen-2   = Left MessageTooLong+    | otherwise                = Right em+    where -- parameters+        mLen       = B.length msg+        mgf        = oaepMaskGenAlg oaep+        labelHash  = hashWith (oaepHash oaep) (maybe B.empty id $ oaepLabel oaep)+        hashLen    = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep)+        -- put fields+        ps         = B.replicate (k - mLen - 2*hashLen - 2) 0+        db         = B.concat [B.convert labelHash, ps, B.singleton 0x1, msg]+        dbmask     = mgf seed (k - hashLen - 1)+        maskedDB   = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor db dbmask+        seedMask   = mgf maskedDB hashLen+        maskedSeed = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor seed seedMask+        em         = B.concat [B.singleton 0x0, maskedSeed, maskedDB]++-- | Un-pad a OAEP encoded message.+unpad :: HashAlgorithm hash+      => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString  -- ^ OAEP params to use+      -> Int                                    -- ^ size of public key in bytes+      -> ByteString                             -- ^ encoded message (not encrypted)+      -> Either Error ByteString+unpad oaep k em+    | paddingSuccess = Right msg+    | otherwise      = Left MessageNotRecognized+    where -- parameters+        mgf        = oaepMaskGenAlg oaep+        labelHash  = B.convert $ hashWith (oaepHash oaep) (maybe B.empty id $ oaepLabel oaep)+        hashLen    = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep)+        -- getting em's fields+        (pb, em0)  = B.splitAt 1 em+        (maskedSeed, maskedDB) = B.splitAt hashLen em0+        seedMask   = mgf maskedDB hashLen+        seed       = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor maskedSeed seedMask+        dbmask     = mgf seed (k - hashLen - 1)+        db         = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor maskedDB dbmask+        -- getting db's fields+        (labelHash', db1) = B.splitAt hashLen db+        (_, db2)   = B.break (/= 0) db1+        (ps1, msg) = B.splitAt 1 db2++        paddingSuccess = and' [ labelHash' == labelHash -- no need for constant eq+                              , ps1        == B.replicate 1 0x1+                              , pb         == B.replicate 1 0x0+                              ]
+ Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/RW.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega <crodveg@yahoo.es>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Rabin-Williams cryptosystem for public-key encryption and digital signature. +-- See pages 323 - 324 in "Computational Number Theory and Modern Cryptography" by Song Y. Yan.+-- Also inspired by https://github.com/vanilala/vncrypt/blob/master/vncrypt/vnrw_gmp.c.+-- +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-}+module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW+    ( PublicKey(..)+    , PrivateKey(..)+    , generate+    , encrypt+    , encryptWithSeed+    , decrypt+    , sign+    , verify+    ) where++import           Data.ByteString+import           Data.Data++import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Number.Basic (numBytes)+import           Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi)+import           Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2osp, i2ospOf_, os2ip)+import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP+import           Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types+import           Crypto.Random.Types++-- | Represent a Rabin-Williams public key.+data PublicKey = PublicKey+    { public_size :: Int      -- ^ size of key in bytes+    , public_n    :: Integer  -- ^ public p*q+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Represent a Rabin-Williams private key.+data PrivateKey = PrivateKey+    { private_pub :: PublicKey+    , private_p   :: Integer   -- ^ p prime number+    , private_q   :: Integer   -- ^ q prime number+    , private_d   :: Integer+    } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data)++-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes.+-- Prime p is congruent 3 mod 8 and prime q is congruent 7 mod 8.+generate :: MonadRandom m+         => Int           +         -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey)+generate size = do+    (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 8 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 8 == 7) +    return (generateKeys p q)+  where +    generateKeys p q =+        let n = p*q   +            d = ((p - 1)*(q - 1) `div` 4 + 1) `div` 2+            publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size+                                    , public_n    = n }+            privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey+                                    , private_p   = p+                                    , private_q   = q+                                    , private_d   = d }+            in (publicKey, privateKey)++-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key an a predefined OAEP seed.+--+-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al.+encryptWithSeed :: HashAlgorithm hash+                => ByteString                               -- ^ Seed+                -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding+                -> PublicKey                                -- ^ public key+                -> ByteString                               -- ^ plaintext+                -> Either Error ByteString+encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m =+    let n = public_n pk+        k = numBytes n+     in do+        m'  <- pad seed oaep k m+        m'' <- ep1 n $ os2ip m'+        return $ i2osp $ ep2 n m''++-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key.+encrypt :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m)+        => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding parameters+        -> PublicKey                                -- ^ public key+        -> ByteString                               -- ^ plaintext +        -> m (Either Error ByteString)+encrypt oaep pk m = do+    seed <- getRandomBytes hashLen+    return $ encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m+  where+    hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep)   ++-- | Decrypt ciphertext using private key.+decrypt :: HashAlgorithm hash+        => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString    -- ^ OAEP padding parameters+        -> PrivateKey                               -- ^ private key+        -> ByteString                               -- ^ ciphertext+        -> Maybe ByteString+decrypt oaep pk c =+    let d  = private_d pk    +        n  = public_n $ private_pub pk+        k  = numBytes n+        c' = i2ospOf_ k $ dp2 n $ dp1 d n $ os2ip c+     in case unpad oaep k c' of+            Left _  -> Nothing+            Right p -> Just p   ++-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key.+sign :: HashAlgorithm hash+     => PrivateKey  -- ^ private key+     -> hash        -- ^ hash function+     -> ByteString  -- ^ message to sign+     -> Either Error Integer+sign pk hashAlg m =+    let d = private_d pk+        n = public_n $ private_pub pk+     in do+        m' <- ep1 n $ os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m+        return $ dp1 d n m' ++-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key.+verify :: HashAlgorithm hash+       => PublicKey     -- ^ public key+       -> hash          -- ^ hash function+       -> ByteString    -- ^ message+       -> Integer       -- ^ signature+       -> Bool+verify pk hashAlg m s =+    let n  = public_n pk+        h  = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m+        h' = dp2 n $ ep2 n s+     in h' == h++-- | Encryption primitive 1+ep1 :: Integer -> Integer -> Either Error Integer+ep1 n m =+    let m'   = 2*m + 1+        m''  = 2*m'+        m''' = 2*m''+     in case jacobi m' n of+            Just (-1) | m'' < n -> Right m''+            Just 1 | m''' < n   -> Right m'''+            _                   -> Left InvalidParameters++-- | Encryption primitive 2+ep2 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer+ep2 n m = expSafe m 2 n++-- | Decryption primitive 1+dp1 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer+dp1 d n c = expSafe c d n++-- | Decryption primitive 2+dp2 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer+dp2 n c = let c'  = c `div` 2+              c'' = (n - c) `div` 2+           in case c `mod` 4 of+                0 -> ((c' `div` 2 - 1) `div` 2)+                1 -> ((c'' `div` 2 - 1) `div` 2)+                2 -> ((c' - 1) `div` 2)+                _ -> ((c'' - 1) `div` 2)
+ Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Types.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega <crodveg@yahoo.es>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types+    ( Error(..)+    , generatePrimes+    ) where++import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits)+import Crypto.Number.Prime (generatePrime, findPrimeFromWith)+import Crypto.Random.Types++type PrimeCondition = Integer -> Bool++-- | Error possible during encryption, decryption or signing.+data Error = MessageTooLong       -- ^ the message to encrypt is too long+           | MessageNotRecognized -- ^ the message decrypted doesn't have a OAEP structure+           | InvalidParameters    -- ^ some parameters lead to breaking assumptions+           deriving (Show, Eq)++-- | Generate primes p & q+generatePrimes :: MonadRandom m +               => Int                   -- ^ size in bytes          +               -> PrimeCondition        -- ^ condition prime p must satisfy+               -> PrimeCondition        -- ^ condition prime q must satisfy+               -> m (Integer, Integer)  -- ^ chosen distinct primes p and q+generatePrimes size pCond qCond =+    let pBits = (8*(size `div` 2))+        qBits = (8*(size - (size `div` 2)))+     in do+        p <- generatePrime' pBits pCond+        q <- generatePrime' qBits qCond+        return (p, q)+      where+        generatePrime' bits cond = do+            pr' <- generatePrime bits+            let pr = findPrimeFromWith cond pr'+            if numBits pr == bits then return pr+            else generatePrime' bits cond
Crypto/Random.hs view
@@ -80,6 +80,13 @@ -- -- It can also be used in other contexts provided the input -- has been properly randomly generated.+--+-- Note that the @Arbitrary@ instance provided by QuickCheck for 'Word64' does+-- not have a uniform distribution.  It is often better to use instead+-- @arbitraryBoundedRandom@.+--+-- System endianness impacts how the tuple is interpreted and therefore changes+-- the resulting DRG. drgNewTest :: (Word64, Word64, Word64, Word64, Word64) -> ChaChaDRG drgNewTest = initializeWords
Crypto/Random/ChaChaDRG.hs view
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@  -- | Initialize a new ChaCha context with the number of rounds, -- the key and the nonce associated.-initialize :: B.ByteArrayAccess seed+initialize :: ByteArrayAccess seed            => seed        -- ^ 40 bytes of seed            -> ChaChaDRG   -- ^ the initial ChaCha state initialize seed = ChaChaDRG $ C.initializeSimple seed
Crypto/Random/Entropy/Backend.hs view
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@     ) where  import Foreign.Ptr+import Data.Proxy import Data.Word (Word8)-import Crypto.Internal.Proxy import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Source #ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND import Crypto.Random.Entropy.RDRand
Crypto/Random/SystemDRG.hs view
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import           Crypto.Random.Types import           Crypto.Random.Entropy.Unsafe import           Crypto.Internal.Compat-import           Crypto.Internal.Imports import           Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray) import           Data.Memory.PtrMethods as B (memCopy) import           Data.Maybe (catMaybes)
Crypto/Random/Types.hs view
@@ -15,10 +15,9 @@  import Crypto.Random.Entropy import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray-import Crypto.Internal.Imports  -- | A monad constraint that allows to generate random bytes-class (Functor m, Monad m) => MonadRandom m where+class Monad m => MonadRandom m where     getRandomBytes :: ByteArray byteArray => Int -> m byteArray  -- | A Deterministic Random Generator (DRG) class@@ -47,7 +46,7 @@          in (f a, g3)  instance DRG gen => Monad (MonadPseudoRandom gen) where-    return a    = MonadPseudoRandom $ \g -> (a, g)+    return      = pure     (>>=) m1 m2 = MonadPseudoRandom $ \g1 ->         let (a, g2) = runPseudoRandom m1 g1          in runPseudoRandom (m2 a) g2
+ Crypto/System/CPU.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@+-- |+-- Module      : Crypto.System.CPU+-- License     : BSD-style+-- Maintainer  : Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+-- Stability   : experimental+-- Portability : unknown+--+-- Gives information about cryptonite runtime environment.+--+{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-}+{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-}+module Crypto.System.CPU+    ( ProcessorOption (..)+    , processorOptions+    ) where++import Data.Data+import Data.List (findIndices)+#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND+import Data.Maybe (isJust)+#endif+import Data.Word (Word8)+import Foreign.Ptr+import Foreign.Storable++import Crypto.Internal.Compat++#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND+import Crypto.Random.Entropy.RDRand+import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Source+#endif++-- | CPU options impacting cryptography implementation and library performance.+data ProcessorOption+    = AESNI   -- ^ Support for AES instructions, with flag @support_aesni@+    | PCLMUL  -- ^ Support for CLMUL instructions, with flag @support_pclmuldq@+    | RDRAND  -- ^ Support for RDRAND instruction, with flag @support_rdrand@+    deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data)++-- | Options which have been enabled at compile time and are supported by the+-- current CPU.+processorOptions :: [ProcessorOption]+processorOptions = unsafeDoIO $ do+    p <- cryptonite_aes_cpu_init+    options <- traverse (getOption p) aesOptions+    rdrand  <- hasRDRand+    return (decodeOptions options ++ [ RDRAND | rdrand ])+  where+    aesOptions    = [ AESNI .. PCLMUL ]+    getOption p   = peekElemOff p . fromEnum+    decodeOptions = map toEnum . findIndices (> 0)+{-# NOINLINE processorOptions #-}++hasRDRand :: IO Bool+#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND+hasRDRand = fmap isJust getRDRand+  where getRDRand = entropyOpen :: IO (Maybe RDRand)+#else+hasRDRand = return False+#endif++foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes_cpu_init"+    cryptonite_aes_cpu_init :: IO (Ptr Word8)
Crypto/Tutorial.hs view
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@        -- * Symmetric block ciphers       -- $symmetric_block_ciphers++      -- * Combining primitives+      -- $combining_primitives     ) where  -- $api_design@@ -147,3 +150,46 @@ -- >           putStrLn $ "Original Message: " ++ show msg -- >           putStrLn $ "Message after encryption: " ++ show eMsg -- >           putStrLn $ "Message after decryption: " ++ show dMsg++-- $combining_primitives+--+-- This example shows how to use Curve25519, XSalsa and Poly1305 primitives to+-- emulate NaCl's @crypto_box@ construct.+--+-- > import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA+-- > import           Data.ByteString (ByteString)+-- > import qualified Data.ByteString as B+-- >+-- > import qualified Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa as XSalsa+-- > import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305+-- > import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519 as X25519+-- >+-- > -- | Build a @crypto_box@ packet encrypting the specified content with a+-- > -- 192-bit nonce, receiver public key and sender private key.+-- > crypto_box content nonce pk sk = BA.convert tag `B.append` c+-- >   where+-- >     zero         = B.replicate 16 0+-- >     shared       = X25519.dh pk sk+-- >     (iv0, iv1)   = B.splitAt 8 nonce+-- >     state0       = XSalsa.initialize 20 shared (zero `B.append` iv0)+-- >     state1       = XSalsa.derive state0 iv1+-- >     (rs, state2) = XSalsa.generate state1 32+-- >     (c, _)       = XSalsa.combine state2 content+-- >     tag          = Poly1305.auth (rs :: ByteString) c+-- >+-- > -- | Try to open a @crypto_box@ packet and recover the content using the+-- > -- 192-bit nonce, sender public key and receiver private key.+-- > crypto_box_open packet nonce pk sk+-- >     | B.length packet < 16 = Nothing+-- >     | BA.constEq tag' tag  = Just content+-- >     | otherwise            = Nothing+-- >   where+-- >     (tag', c)    = B.splitAt 16 packet+-- >     zero         = B.replicate 16 0+-- >     shared       = X25519.dh pk sk+-- >     (iv0, iv1)   = B.splitAt 8 nonce+-- >     state0       = XSalsa.initialize 20 shared (zero `B.append` iv0)+-- >     state1       = XSalsa.derive state0 iv1+-- >     (rs, state2) = XSalsa.generate state1 32+-- >     (content, _) = XSalsa.combine state2 c+-- >     tag          = Poly1305.auth (rs :: ByteString) c
README.md view
@@ -43,28 +43,7 @@ Support ------- -cryptonite supports the following platforms:--* Windows >= 8-* OSX >= 10.8-* Linux-* BSDs--On the following architectures:--* x86-64-* i386--On the following haskell versions:--* GHC 7.8.x-* GHC 7.10.x-* GHC 8.0.x-* GHC 8.2.x--Further platforms and architectures probably work too, but since the-maintainer(s) don't have regular access to them, we can't commit to-further support.+See [Haskell packages guidelines](https://github.com/vincenthz/haskell-pkg-guidelines/blob/master/README.md#support)  Known Building Issues ---------------------@@ -73,6 +52,10 @@ with the lack of autodetection feature builtin in .cabal file, it is left on the user to disable the aesni. See the [Disabling AESNI] section +On CentOS 7 the default C compiler includes intrinsic header files incompatible+with per-function target options.  Solutions are to use GCC >= 4.9 or disable+flag *use_target_attributes* (see flag configuration examples below).+ Disabling AESNI --------------- @@ -92,6 +75,13 @@ ```  For help with cabal flags, see: [stackoverflow : is there a way to define flags for cabal](http://stackoverflow.com/questions/23523869/is-there-any-way-to-define-flags-for-cabal-dependencies)++Enabling PCLMULDQ+-----------------++When the C toolchain supports it, enabling flag *support_pclmuldq* can bring+additional security and performance for AES GCM.  A CPU with the necessary+instruction set will use an alternate implementation selected at runtime.  Links -----
benchs/Bench.hs view
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} {-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}+{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Main where  import Gauge.Main  import           Crypto.Cipher.AES+import qualified Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV as AESGCMSIV import           Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish import           Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 import qualified Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 as CP@@ -15,18 +17,24 @@ import           Crypto.ECC import           Crypto.Error import           Crypto.Hash+import qualified Crypto.KDF.BCrypt as BCrypt import qualified Crypto.KDF.PBKDF2 as PBKDF2 import           Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) import           Crypto.Number.Generate import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim as ECC+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA as EdDSA import           Crypto.Random  import           Control.DeepSeq (NFData) import           Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, Bytes) import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 as P256+ import Number.F2m  data HashAlg = forall alg . HashAlgorithm alg => HashAlg alg@@ -104,12 +112,25 @@          params n iter = PBKDF2.Parameters iter n +benchBCrypt =+    [ bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-4"  $ nf bcrypt 4+    , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-5"  $ nf bcrypt 5+    , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-7"  $ nf bcrypt 7+    , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-11" $ nf bcrypt 11+    ]+  where+        bcrypt :: Int -> B.ByteString+        bcrypt cost = BCrypt.bcrypt cost mysalt mypass +        mypass, mysalt :: B.ByteString+        mypass = "password"+        mysalt = "saltsaltsaltsalt"+ benchBlockCipher =     [ bgroup "ECB" benchECB     , bgroup "CBC" benchCBC     ]-  where +  where         benchECB =             [ bench "DES-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: DES) cipherInit key8) input1024             , bench "Blowfish128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: Blowfish128) cipherInit key16) input1024@@ -148,15 +169,34 @@         iv16 = maybe (error "iv size 16") id $ makeIV key16  benchAE =-    [ bench "ChaChaPoly1305" $ nf (run key32) (input64, input1024)+    [ bench "ChaChaPoly1305" $ nf (cp key32) (input64, input1024)+    , bench "AES-GCM" $ nf (gcm key32) (input64, input1024)+    , bench "AES-CCM" $ nf (ccm key32) (input64, input1024)+    , bench "AES-GCM-SIV" $ nf (gcmsiv key32) (input64, input1024)     ]-  where run k (ini, plain) =+  where cp k (ini, plain) =             let iniState            = throwCryptoError $ CP.initialize k (throwCryptoError $ CP.nonce12 nonce12)                 afterAAD            = CP.finalizeAAD (CP.appendAAD ini iniState)                 (out, afterEncrypt) = CP.encrypt plain afterAAD                 outtag              = CP.finalize afterEncrypt-             in (out, outtag)+             in (outtag, out) +        gcm k (ini, plain) =+            let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256+                state = throwCryptoError $ aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce12+             in aeadSimpleEncrypt state ini plain 16++        ccm k (ini, plain) =+            let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256+                mode = AEAD_CCM 1024 CCM_M16 CCM_L3+                state = throwCryptoError $ aeadInit mode ctx nonce12+             in aeadSimpleEncrypt state ini plain 16++        gcmsiv k (ini, plain) =+            let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256+                iv = throwCryptoError (AESGCMSIV.nonce nonce12)+             in AESGCMSIV.encrypt ctx iv ini plain+         input64 = B.replicate 64 0         input1024 = B.replicate 1024 0 @@ -168,20 +208,42 @@ benchECC =     [ bench "pointAddTwoMuls-baseline"  $ nf run_b (n1, p1, n2, p2)     , bench "pointAddTwoMuls-optimized" $ nf run_o (n1, p1, n2, p2)+    , bench "pointAdd-ECC" $ nf run_c (p1, p2)+    , bench "pointMul-ECC" $ nf run_d (n1, p2)     ]   where run_b (n, p, k, q) = ECC.pointAdd c (ECC.pointMul c n p)                                             (ECC.pointMul c k q)          run_o (n, p, k, q) = ECC.pointAddTwoMuls c n p k q+        run_c (p, q) = ECC.pointAdd c p q+        run_d (n, p) = ECC.pointMul c n p          c  = ECC.getCurveByName ECC.SEC_p256r1-        r1 = 7-        r2 = 11-        p1 = ECC.pointBaseMul c r1-        p2 = ECC.pointBaseMul c r2+        p1 = ECC.pointBaseMul c n1+        p2 = ECC.pointBaseMul c n2         n1 = 0x2ba9daf2363b2819e69b34a39cf496c2458a9b2a21505ea9e7b7cbca42dc7435         n2 = 0xf054a7f60d10b8c2cf847ee90e9e029f8b0e971b09ca5f55c4d49921a11fadc1 +benchP256 =+    [ bench "pointAddTwoMuls-P256"  $ nf run_p (n1, p1, n2, p2)+    , bench "pointAdd-P256"  $ nf run_q (p1, p2)+    , bench "pointMul-P256"  $ nf run_t (n1, p1)+    ]+  where run_p (n, p, k, q) = P256.pointAdd (P256.pointMul n p) (P256.pointMul k q)+        run_q (p, q) = P256.pointAdd p q+        run_t (n, p) = P256.pointMul n p++        xS = 0xde2444bebc8d36e682edd27e0f271508617519b3221a8fa0b77cab3989da97c9+        yS = 0xc093ae7ff36e5380fc01a5aad1e66659702de80f53cec576b6350b243042a256+        xT = 0x55a8b00f8da1d44e62f6b3b25316212e39540dc861c89575bb8cf92e35e0986b+        yT = 0x5421c3209c2d6c704835d82ac4c3dd90f61a8a52598b9e7ab656e9d8c8b24316+        p1 = P256.pointFromIntegers (xS, yS)+        p2 = P256.pointFromIntegers (xT, yT)+        n1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger 0x2ba9daf2363b2819e69b34a39cf496c2458a9b2a21505ea9e7b7cbca42dc7435+        n2 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger 0xf054a7f60d10b8c2cf847ee90e9e029f8b0e971b09ca5f55c4d49921a11fadc1+++ benchFFDH = map doFFDHBench primes   where     doFFDHBench (e, p) =@@ -228,15 +290,95 @@              , ("X448",   CurveDH Curve_X448)              ] +data CurveHashECDSA =+    forall curve hashAlg . (ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve,+                            NFData (Scalar curve),+                            NFData (Point curve),+                            HashAlgorithm hashAlg) => CurveHashECDSA curve hashAlg++benchECDSA = map doECDSABench curveHashes+  where+    doECDSABench (name, CurveHashECDSA c hashAlg) =+        let proxy = Just c -- using Maybe as Proxy+         in bgroup name+                [ env (signGenerate proxy) $ bench "sign" . nfIO . signRun proxy hashAlg+                , env (verifyGenerate proxy hashAlg) $ bench "verify" . nf (verifyRun proxy hashAlg)+                ]++    signGenerate proxy = do+        m <- tenKB+        s <- curveGenerateScalar proxy+        return (s, m)++    signRun proxy hashAlg (priv, msg) = ECDSA.sign proxy priv hashAlg msg++    verifyGenerate proxy hashAlg = do+        m <- tenKB+        KeyPair p s <- curveGenerateKeyPair proxy+        sig <- ECDSA.sign proxy s hashAlg m+        return (p, sig, m)++    verifyRun proxy hashAlg (pub, sig, msg) = ECDSA.verify proxy hashAlg pub sig msg++    tenKB :: IO Bytes+    tenKB = getRandomBytes 10240++    curveHashes = [ ("secp256r1_sha256", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P256R1 SHA256)+                  , ("secp384r1_sha384", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P384R1 SHA384)+                  , ("secp521r1_sha512", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P521R1 SHA512)+                  ]++benchEdDSA =+    [ bgroup "EdDSA-Ed25519" benchGenEd25519+    , bgroup "Ed25519"       benchEd25519+    ]+  where+    benchGen prx alg =+        [ bench "sign"   $ perBatchEnv (genEnv prx alg) (run_gen_sign   prx)+        , bench "verify" $ perBatchEnv (genEnv prx alg) (run_gen_verify prx)+        ]++    benchGenEd25519 = benchGen (Just Curve_Edwards25519) SHA512+    benchEd25519    =+        [ bench "sign"   $ perBatchEnv ed25519Env run_ed25519_sign+        , bench "verify" $ perBatchEnv ed25519Env run_ed25519_verify+        ]++    msg = B.empty -- empty message = worst-case scenario showing API overhead++    genEnv prx alg _ = do+        sec <- EdDSA.generateSecretKey prx+        let pub = EdDSA.toPublic prx alg sec+            sig = EdDSA.sign prx sec pub msg+        return (sec, pub, sig)++    run_gen_sign prx (sec, pub, _) = return (EdDSA.sign prx sec pub msg)++    run_gen_verify prx (_, pub, sig) = return (EdDSA.verify prx pub msg sig)++    ed25519Env _ = do+        sec <- Ed25519.generateSecretKey+        let pub = Ed25519.toPublic sec+            sig = Ed25519.sign sec pub msg+        return (sec, pub, sig)++    run_ed25519_sign (sec, pub, _) = return (Ed25519.sign sec pub msg)++    run_ed25519_verify (_, pub, sig) = return (Ed25519.verify pub msg sig)+ main = defaultMain     [ bgroup "hash" benchHash     , bgroup "block-cipher" benchBlockCipher     , bgroup "AE" benchAE     , bgroup "pbkdf2" benchPBKDF2+    , bgroup "bcrypt" benchBCrypt     , bgroup "ECC" benchECC+    , bgroup "P256" benchP256     , bgroup "DH"           [ bgroup "FFDH" benchFFDH           , bgroup "ECDH" benchECDH           ]+    , bgroup "ECDSA" benchECDSA+    , bgroup "EdDSA" benchEdDSA     , bgroup "F2m" benchF2m     ]
cbits/aes/block128.h view
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ 	} } +static inline void block128_byte_reverse(block128 *a)+{+	uint64_t s0 = a->q[0], s1 = a->q[1];+	a->q[0] = bitfn_swap64(s1);+	a->q[1] = bitfn_swap64(s0);+}+ static inline void block128_inc_be(block128 *b) { 	uint64_t v = be64_to_cpu(b->q[1]);@@ -116,6 +123,16 @@ 		b->q[1] = 0; 	} else 		b->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(v);+}++static inline void block128_inc32_be(block128 *b)+{+	b->d[3] = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(b->d[3]) + 1);+}++static inline void block128_inc32_le(block128 *b)+{+	b->d[0] = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(b->d[0]) + 1); }  #ifdef IMPL_DEBUG
cbits/aes/gf.c view
@@ -34,39 +34,113 @@ #include <aes/gf.h> #include <aes/x86ni.h> -/* this is a really inefficient way to GF multiply.- * the alternative without hw accel is building small tables- * to speed up the multiplication.- * TODO: optimise with tables+/* inplace GFMUL for xts mode */+void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(block128 *a)+{+	const uint64_t gf_mask = cpu_to_le64(0x8000000000000000ULL);+	uint64_t r = ((a->q[1] & gf_mask) ? cpu_to_le64(0x87) : 0);+	a->q[1] = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(a->q[1]) << 1) | (a->q[0] & gf_mask ? 1 : 0));+	a->q[0] = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->q[0]) << 1) ^ r;+}+++/*+ * GF multiplication with Shoup's method and 4-bit table.+ *+ * We precompute the products of H with all 4-bit polynomials and store them in+ * a 'table_4bit' array.  To avoid unnecessary byte swapping, the 16 blocks are+ * written to the table with qwords already converted to CPU order.  Table+ * indices use the reflected bit ordering, i.e. polynomials X^0, X^1, X^2, X^3+ * map to bit positions 3, 2, 1, 0 respectively.+ *+ * To multiply an arbitrary block with H, the input block is decomposed in 4-bit+ * segments.  We get the final result after 32 table lookups and additions, one+ * for each segment, interleaving multiplication by P(X)=X^4.  */-void cryptonite_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b)++/* convert block128 qwords between BE and CPU order */+static inline void block128_cpu_swap_be(block128 *a, const block128 *b) {-	uint64_t a0, a1, v0, v1;+	a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(b->q[1]);+	a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(b->q[0]);+}++/* multiplication by P(X)=X, assuming qwords already in CPU order */+static inline void cpu_gf_mulx(block128 *a, const block128 *b)+{+	uint64_t v0 = b->q[0];+	uint64_t v1 = b->q[1];+	a->q[1] = v1 >> 1 | v0 << 63;+	a->q[0] = v0 >> 1 ^ ((0-(v1 & 1)) & 0xe100000000000000ULL);+}++static const uint64_t r4_0[] =+	{ 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x1c20000000000000ULL+	, 0x3840000000000000ULL, 0x2460000000000000ULL+	, 0x7080000000000000ULL, 0x6ca0000000000000ULL+	, 0x48c0000000000000ULL, 0x54e0000000000000ULL+	, 0xe100000000000000ULL, 0xfd20000000000000ULL+	, 0xd940000000000000ULL, 0xc560000000000000ULL+	, 0x9180000000000000ULL, 0x8da0000000000000ULL+	, 0xa9c0000000000000ULL, 0xb5e0000000000000ULL+	};++/* multiplication by P(X)=X^4, assuming qwords already in CPU order */+static inline void cpu_gf_mulx4(block128 *a, const block128 *b)+{+	uint64_t v0 = b->q[0];+	uint64_t v1 = b->q[1];+	a->q[1] = v1 >> 4 | v0 << 60;+	a->q[0] = v0 >> 4 ^ r4_0[v1 & 0xf];+}++/* initialize the 4-bit table given H */+void cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h)+{+	block128 v, *p; 	int i, j; -	a0 = a1 = 0;-	v0 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[0]);-	v1 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[1]);+	/* multiplication by 0 is 0 */+	block128_zero(&htable[0]); -	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)-		for (j = 0x80; j != 0; j >>= 1) {-			uint8_t x = b->b[i] & j;-			a0 ^= x ? v0 : 0;-			a1 ^= x ? v1 : 0;-			x = (uint8_t) v1 & 1;-			v1 = (v1 >> 1) | (v0 << 63);-			v0 = (v0 >> 1) ^ (x ? (0xe1ULL << 56) : 0);+	/* at index 8=2^3 we have H.X^0 = H */+	i = 8;+	block128_cpu_swap_be(&htable[i], h); /* in CPU order */+	p = &htable[i];++	/* for other powers of 2, repeat multiplication by P(X)=X */+	for (i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1)+	{+		cpu_gf_mulx(&htable[i], p);+		p = &htable[i];+	}++	/* remaining elements are linear combinations */+	for (i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1) {+		p = &htable[i];+		v = *p;+		for (j = 1; j < i; j++) {+			p[j] = v;+			block128_xor_aligned(&p[j], &htable[j]); 		}-	a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(a0);-	a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(a1);+	} } -/* inplace GFMUL for xts mode */-void cryptonite_gf_mulx(block128 *a)+/* multiply a block with H */+void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable) {-	const uint64_t gf_mask = cpu_to_le64(0x8000000000000000ULL);-	uint64_t r = ((a->q[1] & gf_mask) ? cpu_to_le64(0x87) : 0);-	a->q[1] = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(a->q[1]) << 1) | (a->q[0] & gf_mask ? 1 : 0));-	a->q[0] = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->q[0]) << 1) ^ r;+	block128 b;+	int i;+	block128_zero(&b);+	for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--)+	{+		uint8_t v = a->b[i];+		block128_xor_aligned(&b, &htable[v & 0xf]); /* high bits (reflected) */+		cpu_gf_mulx4(&b, &b);+		block128_xor_aligned(&b, &htable[v >> 4]);  /* low bits (reflected) */+		if (i > 0)+			cpu_gf_mulx4(&b, &b);+		else+			block128_cpu_swap_be(a, &b); /* restore BE order when done */+	} }-
cbits/aes/gf.h view
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@  #include "aes/block128.h" -void cryptonite_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b);-void cryptonite_gf_mulx(block128 *a);+typedef block128 table_4bit[16];++void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(block128 *a);++void cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h);+void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable);  #endif
cbits/aes/x86ni.c view
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <string.h> #include <cryptonite_aes.h> #include <cryptonite_cpu.h>+#include <aes/gf.h> #include <aes/x86ni.h> #include <aes/block128.h> @@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ /* old GCC version doesn't cope with the shuffle parameters, that can take 2 values (0xff and 0xaa)  * in our case, passed as argument despite being a immediate 8 bits constant anyway.  * un-factorise aes_128_key_expansion into 2 version that have the shuffle parameter explicitly set */+TARGET_AESNI static __m128i aes_128_key_expansion_ff(__m128i key, __m128i keygened) { 	keygened = _mm_shuffle_epi32(keygened, 0xff);@@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ 	return _mm_xor_si128(key, keygened); } +TARGET_AESNI static __m128i aes_128_key_expansion_aa(__m128i key, __m128i keygened) { 	keygened = _mm_shuffle_epi32(keygened, 0xaa);@@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ 	return _mm_xor_si128(key, keygened); } +TARGET_AESNI void cryptonite_aesni_init(aes_key *key, uint8_t *ikey, uint8_t size) { 	__m128i k[28];@@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ /* TO OPTIMISE: use pcmulqdq... or some faster code.  * this is the lamest way of doing it, but i'm out of time.  * this is basically a copy of gf_mulx in gf.c */+TARGET_AESNI static __m128i gfmulx(__m128i v) { 	uint64_t v_[2] ALIGNMENT(16);@@ -157,38 +162,113 @@ 	return v; } -static void unopt_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b)+TARGET_AESNI+static __m128i gfmul_generic(__m128i tag, const table_4bit htable) {-	uint64_t a0, a1, v0, v1;-	int i, j;+	aes_block _t;+	_mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_t, tag);+	cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(&_t, htable);+	tag = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *) &_t);+	return tag;+} -	a0 = a1 = 0;-	v0 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[0]);-	v1 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[1]);+#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL -	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)-		for (j = 0x80; j != 0; j >>= 1) {-			uint8_t x = b->b[i] & j;-			a0 ^= x ? v0 : 0;-			a1 ^= x ? v1 : 0;-			x = (uint8_t) v1 & 1;-			v1 = (v1 >> 1) | (v0 << 63);-			v0 = (v0 >> 1) ^ (x ? (0xe1ULL << 56) : 0);-		}-	a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(a0);-	a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(a1);+__m128i (*gfmul_branch_ptr)(__m128i a, const table_4bit t) = gfmul_generic;+#define gfmul(a,t) ((*gfmul_branch_ptr)(a,t))++/* See Intel carry-less-multiplication-instruction-in-gcm-mode-paper.pdf+ *+ * Adapted from figure 5, with additional byte swapping so that interface+ * is simimar to cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul.+ */+TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL+static __m128i gfmul_pclmuldq(__m128i a, const table_4bit htable)+{+	__m128i b, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4, tmp5, tmp6, tmp7, tmp8, tmp9;+	__m128i bswap_mask = _mm_set_epi8(0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15);++	a = _mm_shuffle_epi8(a, bswap_mask);+	b = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) htable);++	tmp3 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x00);+	tmp4 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x10);+	tmp5 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x01);+	tmp6 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x11);++	tmp4 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp4, tmp5);+	tmp5 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp4, 8);+	tmp4 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp4, 8);+	tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp5);+	tmp6 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp6, tmp4);++	tmp7 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 31);+	tmp8 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp6, 31);+	tmp3 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 1);+	tmp6 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp6, 1);++	tmp9 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp7, 12);+	tmp8 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp8, 4);+	tmp7 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp7, 4);+	tmp3 = _mm_or_si128(tmp3, tmp7);+	tmp6 = _mm_or_si128(tmp6, tmp8);+	tmp6 = _mm_or_si128(tmp6, tmp9);++	tmp7 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 31);+	tmp8 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 30);+	tmp9 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 25);++	tmp7 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp7, tmp8);+	tmp7 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp7, tmp9);+	tmp8 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp7, 4);+	tmp7 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp7, 12);+	tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp7);++	tmp2 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 1);+	tmp4 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 2);+	tmp5 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 7);+	tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp4);+	tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp5);+	tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp8);+	tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp2);+	tmp6 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp6, tmp3);++	return _mm_shuffle_epi8(tmp6, bswap_mask); } -static __m128i ghash_add(__m128i tag, __m128i h, __m128i m)+void cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h) {-	aes_block _t, _h;-	tag = _mm_xor_si128(tag, m);+	/* When pclmul is active we don't need to fill the table.  Instead we just+	 * store H at index 0.  It is written in reverse order, so function+	 * gfmul_pclmuldq will not byte-swap this value.+	 */+	htable->q[0] = bitfn_swap64(h->q[1]);+	htable->q[1] = bitfn_swap64(h->q[0]);+} -	_mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_t, tag);-	_mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_h, h);-	unopt_gf_mul(&_t, &_h);-	tag = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *) &_t);-	return tag;+TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL+void cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable)+{+	__m128i _a, _b;+	_a = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) a);+	_b = gfmul_pclmuldq(_a, htable);+	_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) a, _b);+}++void cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul(void)+{+	gfmul_branch_ptr = gfmul_pclmuldq;+}++#else+#define gfmul(a,t) (gfmul_generic(a,t))+#endif++TARGET_AESNI+static inline __m128i ghash_add(__m128i tag, const table_4bit htable, __m128i m)+{+	tag = _mm_xor_si128(tag, m);+	return gfmul(tag, htable); }  #define PRELOAD_ENC_KEYS128(k) \
cbits/aes/x86ni.h view
@@ -40,7 +40,16 @@ #include <cryptonite_aes.h> #include <aes/block128.h> +#ifdef WITH_TARGET_ATTRIBUTES+#define TARGET_AESNI __attribute__((target("ssse3,aes")))+#define TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL __attribute__((target("sse4.1,aes,pclmul")))+#else+#define TARGET_AESNI+#define TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL+#endif+ #ifdef IMPL_DEBUG+TARGET_AESNI static void block128_sse_print(__m128i m) { 	block128 b;@@ -64,6 +73,8 @@ void cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_cbc256(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr128(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr256(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length);+void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_128(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length);+void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_256(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts128(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2,                            aes_block *_tweak, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts256(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2,@@ -72,7 +83,11 @@ void cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt128(uint8_t *out, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt256(uint8_t *out, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); -void gf_mul_x86ni(block128 *res, block128 *a_, block128 *b_);+#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL+void cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul(void);+void cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h);+void cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable);+#endif  #endif
cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c view
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@  * SUCH DAMAGE.  */ +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_block)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ 	_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) out, m); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_block)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ 	_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) out, m); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ecb)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ 	} } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_ecb)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -71,6 +75,7 @@ 	} } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_cbc)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ 	} } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_cbc)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ 	} } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr)(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -151,6 +158,49 @@ 	return ; } +TARGET_AESNI+void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_)(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len)+{+	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;+	__m128i one        = _mm_set_epi32(0,0,0,1);+	uint32_t nb_blocks = len / 16;+	uint32_t part_block_len = len % 16;++	/* get the IV */+	__m128i iv = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) _iv);++	PRELOAD_ENC(k);++	for (; nb_blocks-- > 0; output += 16, input += 16) {+		/* encrypt the iv and and xor it the input block */+		__m128i tmp = iv;+		DO_ENC_BLOCK(tmp);+		__m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) input);+		m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp);++		_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) output, m);+		/* iv += 1 */+		iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one);+	}++	if (part_block_len != 0) {+		aes_block block;+		memset(&block.b, 0, 16);+		memcpy(&block.b, input, part_block_len);++		__m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &block);+		__m128i tmp = iv;++		DO_ENC_BLOCK(tmp);+		m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp);+		_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) &block.b, m);+		memcpy(output, &block.b, part_block_len);+	}++	return ;+}++TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2,                                aes_block *_tweak, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) {@@ -181,6 +231,7 @@ 	} while (0); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt)(uint8_t *output, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { 	__m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data;@@ -191,7 +242,6 @@  	gcm->length_input += length; -	__m128i h  = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->h); 	__m128i tag = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->tag); 	__m128i iv = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->civ); 	iv = _mm_shuffle_epi8(iv, bswap_mask);@@ -200,7 +250,7 @@  	for (; nb_blocks-- > 0; output += 16, input += 16) { 		/* iv += 1 */-		iv = _mm_add_epi64(iv, one);+		iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one);  		/* put back iv in big endian, encrypt it, 		 * and xor it to input */@@ -209,7 +259,7 @@ 		__m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) input); 		m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); -		tag = ghash_add(tag, h, m);+		tag = ghash_add(tag, gcm->htable, m);  		/* store it out */ 		_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) output, m);@@ -240,7 +290,7 @@ 		block128_copy_bytes(&block, input, part_block_len);  		/* iv += 1 */-		iv = _mm_add_epi64(iv, one);+		iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one);  		/* put back iv in big endian mode, encrypt it and xor it with input */ 		__m128i tmp = _mm_shuffle_epi8(iv, bswap_mask);@@ -250,7 +300,7 @@ 		m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); 		m = _mm_shuffle_epi8(m, mask); -		tag = ghash_add(tag, h, m);+		tag = ghash_add(tag, gcm->htable, m);  		/* make output */ 		_mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) &block.b, m);
cbits/argon2/core.c view
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@  * Copyright 2015  * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves  *- * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 + * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0  * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of  * these licenses can be found at:  *@@ -83,25 +83,25 @@     } while ((void)0, 0)      if (outlen <= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {-        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen));-        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));-        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));-        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen));     } else {         uint32_t toproduce;         uint8_t out_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];         uint8_t in_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];-        TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));-        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));-        TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));-        TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes)));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen));+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES));         memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);         out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;         toproduce = (uint32_t)outlen - BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;          while (toproduce > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) {             memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);-            TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer,+            TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer,                         BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0));             memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2);             out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2;@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@         }          memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES);-        TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL,+        TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL,                     0));         memcpy(out, out_buffer, toproduce);     }@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ }  /***************Memory functions*****************/-static +static int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory,                     size_t num, size_t size) {     size_t memory_size = num*size;@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@      return ARGON2_OK; }-static +static void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,                  size_t num, size_t size) {     size_t memory_size = num*size;@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ }  #endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */-static +static int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance) { 	if (instance == NULL || instance->lanes == 0) { 	    return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ 			fill_memory_blocks_st(instance) : fill_memory_blocks_mt(instance); #endif }-static +static int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context) {     if (NULL == context) {         return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER;@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@      return ARGON2_OK; }-static +static void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance) {     uint32_t l;     /* Make the first and second block in each lane as G(H0||i||0) or@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@     }     clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE); }-static +static void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context,                   argon2_type type) {     blake2b_state BlakeHash;@@ -597,31 +597,31 @@         return;     } -    blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);+    _cryptonite_blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);      store32(&value, context->lanes);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, context->outlen);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, context->m_cost);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, context->t_cost);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, context->version);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, (uint32_t)type);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      store32(&value, context->pwdlen);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      if (context->pwd != NULL) {-        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd,+        _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd,                        context->pwdlen);          if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD) {@@ -631,18 +631,18 @@     }      store32(&value, context->saltlen);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      if (context->salt != NULL) {-        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt,+        _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt,                        context->saltlen);     }      store32(&value, context->secretlen);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      if (context->secret != NULL) {-        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret,+        _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret,                        context->secretlen);          if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET) {@@ -652,16 +652,16 @@     }      store32(&value, context->adlen);-    blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value));      if (context->ad != NULL) {-        blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad,+        _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad,                        context->adlen);     } -    blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH);+    _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH); }-static +static int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context) {     uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH];     int result = ARGON2_OK;
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2-impl.h view
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@   return w; #else   const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )src;-  return (( uint16_t )( p[0] ) <<  0) |-         (( uint16_t )( p[1] ) <<  8) ;+  return ( uint16_t )((( uint32_t )( p[0] ) <<  0) |+                      (( uint32_t )( p[1] ) <<  8)); #endif }
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2.h view
@@ -142,51 +142,51 @@   };    /* Streaming API */-  int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P );-  int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P );-  int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );    /* Variable output length API */-  int blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen );-  int blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); -  int blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen );-  int blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);    /* Simple API */-  int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); -  int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); -  int blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );    /* This is simply an alias for blake2b */-  int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );  #if defined(__cplusplus) }
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2b-ref.c view
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ }  /* init xors IV with input parameter block */-int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) {   const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )( P );   size_t i;@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@   -int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -113,11 +113,11 @@   memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) );   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2b_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  if( blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1;+  if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1;    {     uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];     memset( block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );     memcpy( block, key, keylen );-    blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );     secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }   return 0;@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #undef G #undef ROUND -int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   if( inlen > 0 )@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0};   size_t i;@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ }  /* inlen, at least, should be uint64_t. Others can be size_t. */-int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2b_state S[1]; @@ -287,26 +287,26 @@    if( keylen > 0 )   {-    if( blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;   }   else   {-    if( blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;   } -  blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );-  blake2b_final( S, out, outlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S, out, outlen );   return 0; } -int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {-  return blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen);+int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {+  return _cryptonite_blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); }  #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) {-  return blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -329,9 +329,9 @@   for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i )   {     uint8_t hash[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];-    blake2b( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES ); -    if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) )+    if( 0 != memcmp( hash, _cryptonite_blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) )     {       goto fail;     }@@ -346,25 +346,25 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       } -      if (0 != memcmp(hash, blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {+      if (0 != memcmp(hash, _cryptonite_blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) {         goto fail;       }     }
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2bp-ref.c view
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ */ static int blake2bp_init_leaf_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) {-  int err = blake2b_init_param(S, P);+  int err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param(S, P);   S->outlen = P->inner_length;   return err; }@@ -74,11 +74,11 @@   memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) );   memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2b_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   size_t i; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   size_t i; @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ }  -int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   size_t left = S->buflen;@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@     memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      in += fill;     inlen -= fill;@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];   size_t i;@@ -201,19 +201,19 @@        if( left > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; -      blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left );     } -    blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );   }    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];   blake2b_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1];@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -273,10 +273,10 @@     {       const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;-      blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len );     } -    blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );   }    if( blake2bp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 )@@ -285,9 +285,9 @@   FS->last_node = 1; /* Mark as last node */    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen );;+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen );; }  #if defined(BLAKE2BP_SELFTEST)@@ -326,21 +326,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2s-ref.c view
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ }  /* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */-int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) {   const unsigned char *p = ( const unsigned char * )( P );   size_t i;@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@   /* Sequential blake2s initialization */-int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -109,10 +109,10 @@   /* memset(P->reserved, 0, sizeof(P->reserved) ); */   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2s_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -133,13 +133,13 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  if( blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1;+  if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1;    {     uint8_t block[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES];     memset( block, 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );     memcpy( block, key, keylen );-    blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );     secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }   return 0;@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ #undef G #undef ROUND -int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   if( inlen > 0 )@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = {0};   size_t i;@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2s_state S[1]; @@ -279,22 +279,22 @@    if( keylen > 0 )   {-    if( blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;   }   else   {-    if( blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;   } -  blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );-  blake2s_final( S, out, outlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S, out, outlen );   return 0; }  #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) {-  return blake2s( out, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES in, inlen, NULL, 0 );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s( out, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@   for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i )   {     uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];-    blake2s( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );      if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2s_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) )     {@@ -334,21 +334,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/ref/blake2sp-ref.c view
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ static int blake2sp_init_leaf_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) {-  int err = blake2s_init_param(S, P);+  int err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param(S, P);   S->outlen = P->inner_length;   return err; }@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@   P->inner_length = BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;   memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2s_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   size_t i; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   size_t i; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ }  -int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   size_t left = S->buflen;@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@     memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      in += fill;     inlen -= fill;@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ }  -int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];   size_t i;@@ -198,20 +198,20 @@        if( left > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; -      blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left );     } -    blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );   }    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); }  -int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];   blake2s_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1];@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -271,10 +271,10 @@     {       const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;-      blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len );     } -    blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );   }    if( blake2sp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 )@@ -283,9 +283,9 @@   FS->last_node = 1;    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); }  @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@   for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i )   {     uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];-    blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );      if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2sp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) )     {@@ -326,21 +326,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2-impl.h view
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@   return w; #else   const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )src;-  return (( uint16_t )( p[0] ) <<  0) |-         (( uint16_t )( p[1] ) <<  8) ;+  return ( uint16_t )((( uint32_t )( p[0] ) <<  0) |+                      (( uint32_t )( p[1] ) <<  8)); #endif }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2.h view
@@ -142,51 +142,51 @@   };    /* Streaming API */-  int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P );-  int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P );-  int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); -  int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen );-  int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen );    /* Variable output length API */-  int blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen );-  int blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); -  int blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen );-  int blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );-  int blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen);    /* Simple API */-  int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); -  int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); -  int blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );-  int blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );    /* This is simply an alias for blake2b */-  int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );+  int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen );  #if defined(__cplusplus) }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c view
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ }  /* init xors IV with input parameter block */-int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) {   size_t i;   /*blake2b_init0( S ); */@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@   /* Some sort of default parameter block initialization, for sequential blake2b */-int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -111,10 +111,10 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  return blake2b_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -135,14 +135,14 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  if( blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 )+  if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 )     return 0;    {     uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES];     memset( block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );     memcpy( block, key, keylen );-    blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );     secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }   return 0;@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ }  -int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   if( inlen > 0 )@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ }  -int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   if( out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen )     return -1;@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ }  -int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2b_state S[1]; @@ -281,26 +281,26 @@    if( keylen )   {-    if( blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;   }   else   {-    if( blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;   } -  blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );-  blake2b_final( S, out, outlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S, out, outlen );   return 0; } -int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {-  return blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen);+int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {+  return _cryptonite_blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); }  #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) {-  return blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -340,21 +340,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2bp.c view
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ */ static int blake2bp_init_leaf_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) {-  int err = blake2b_init_param(S, P);+  int err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param(S, P);   S->outlen = P->inner_length;   return err; }@@ -74,11 +74,11 @@   memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) );   memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2b_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   size_t i;   if( !outlen || outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) return -1;@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   size_t i; @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ }  -int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   size_t left = S->buflen;@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@     memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      in += fill;     inlen -= fill;@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@   -int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];   size_t i;@@ -202,19 +202,19 @@        if( left > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; -      blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left );     } -    blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );   }    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];   blake2b_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1];@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -274,10 +274,10 @@     {       const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;       const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES;-      blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len );+      _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len );     } -    blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );   }    if( blake2bp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 )@@ -286,9 +286,9 @@   FS->last_node = 1; /* Mark as last node */    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen ); }  @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@   for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i )   {     uint8_t hash[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES];-    blake2bp( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2bp( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES );      if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2bp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) )     {@@ -328,21 +328,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c view
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ }  /* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */-int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) {   size_t i;   /*blake2s_init0( S ); */@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@   /* Some sort of default parameter block initialization, for sequential blake2s */-int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -110,11 +110,11 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  return blake2s_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -136,14 +136,14 @@   memset( P->salt,     0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); -  if( blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 )+  if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 )     return -1;    {     uint8_t block[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES];     memset( block, 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );     memcpy( block, key, keylen );-    blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );     secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }   return 0;@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@   STOREU( &S->h[4], _mm_xor_si128( ff1, _mm_xor_si128( row2, row4 ) ) ); } -int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   if( inlen > 0 )@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = {0};   size_t i;@@ -275,15 +275,15 @@    if( keylen > 0 )   {-    if( blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1;   }   else   {-    if( blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;+    if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1;   } -  blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );-  blake2s_final( S, out, outlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen );+  _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S, out, outlen );   return 0; } @@ -330,21 +330,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c view
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ static int blake2sp_init_leaf_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) {-  int err = blake2s_init_param(S, P);+  int err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param(S, P);   S->outlen = P->inner_length;   return err; }@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@   P->inner_length = BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;   memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) );   memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) );-  return blake2s_init_param( S, P );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); }  -int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) {   size_t i; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@   return 0; } -int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   size_t i; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ }  -int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) {   const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin;   size_t left = S->buflen;@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@     memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      in += fill;     inlen -= fill;@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ }  -int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];   size_t i;@@ -199,20 +199,20 @@        if( left > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; -      blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left );     } -    blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );   }    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); }  -int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen )+int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) {   uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];   blake2s_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1];@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@     memcpy( block, key, keylen );      for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-      blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );      secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */   }@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@      while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES )     {-      blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES );       in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;     }@@ -272,10 +272,10 @@     {       const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;       const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES;-      blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len );+      _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len );     } -    blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );   }    if( blake2sp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 )@@ -284,9 +284,9 @@   FS->last_node = 1;    for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i )-    blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); -  return blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen );+  return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); }  #if defined(BLAKE2SP_SELFTEST)@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@   for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i )   {     uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];-    blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );+    _cryptonite_blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES );      if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2sp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) )     {@@ -325,21 +325,21 @@       size_t mlen = i;       int err = 0; -      if( (err = blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {+      if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) {         goto fail;       }        while (mlen >= step) {-        if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {+        if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) {           goto fail;         }         mlen -= step;         p += step;       }-      if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }-      if ( (err = blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {+      if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) {         goto fail;       }
cbits/cryptonite_aes.c view
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_cbc(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_cbc(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length);+void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit,                              uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit,@@ -69,6 +70,8 @@ 	DECRYPT_CBC_128, DECRYPT_CBC_192, DECRYPT_CBC_256, 	/* ctr */ 	ENCRYPT_CTR_128, ENCRYPT_CTR_192, ENCRYPT_CTR_256,+	/* ctr with 32-bit wrapping */+	ENCRYPT_C32_128, ENCRYPT_C32_192, ENCRYPT_C32_256, 	/* xts */ 	ENCRYPT_XTS_128, ENCRYPT_XTS_192, ENCRYPT_XTS_256, 	DECRYPT_XTS_128, DECRYPT_XTS_192, DECRYPT_XTS_256,@@ -81,6 +84,8 @@ 	/* ccm */ 	ENCRYPT_CCM_128, ENCRYPT_CCM_192, ENCRYPT_CCM_256, 	DECRYPT_CCM_128, DECRYPT_CCM_192, DECRYPT_CCM_256,+	/* ghash */+	GHASH_HINIT, GHASH_GF_MUL, };  void *cryptonite_aes_branch_table[] = {@@ -113,6 +118,10 @@ 	[ENCRYPT_CTR_128]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr, 	[ENCRYPT_CTR_192]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr, 	[ENCRYPT_CTR_256]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr,+	/* CTR with 32-bit wrapping */+	[ENCRYPT_C32_128]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32,+	[ENCRYPT_C32_192]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32,+	[ENCRYPT_C32_256]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32, 	/* XTS */ 	[ENCRYPT_XTS_128]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts, 	[ENCRYPT_XTS_192]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts,@@ -141,6 +150,9 @@ 	[DECRYPT_CCM_128]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt, 	[DECRYPT_CCM_192]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt, 	[DECRYPT_CCM_256]   = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt,+	/* GHASH */+	[GHASH_HINIT]       = cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit,+	[GHASH_GF_MUL]      = cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul, };  typedef void (*init_f)(aes_key *, uint8_t *, uint8_t);@@ -152,6 +164,8 @@ typedef void (*ocb_crypt_f)(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); typedef void (*ccm_crypt_f)(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); typedef void (*block_f)(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *input);+typedef void (*hinit_f)(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h);+typedef void (*gf_mul_f)(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable);  #ifdef WITH_AESNI #define GET_INIT(strength) \@@ -166,6 +180,8 @@ 	((cbc_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_CBC_128 + strength])) #define GET_CTR_ENCRYPT(strength) \ 	((ctr_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_128 + strength]))+#define GET_C32_ENCRYPT(strength) \+	((ctr_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_128 + strength])) #define GET_XTS_ENCRYPT(strength) \ 	((xts_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_128 + strength])) #define GET_XTS_DECRYPT(strength) \@@ -186,6 +202,10 @@ 	(((block_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_BLOCK_128 + k->strength]))(o,k,i)) #define cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(o,k,i) \ 	(((block_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_BLOCK_128 + k->strength]))(o,k,i))+#define cryptonite_hinit(t,h) \+	(((hinit_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_HINIT]))(t,h))+#define cryptonite_gf_mul(a,t) \+	(((gf_mul_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_GF_MUL]))(a,t)) #else #define GET_INIT(strenght) cryptonite_aes_generic_init #define GET_ECB_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ecb@@ -193,6 +213,7 @@ #define GET_CBC_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_cbc #define GET_CBC_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_cbc #define GET_CTR_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr+#define GET_C32_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32 #define GET_XTS_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts #define GET_XTS_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_xts #define GET_GCM_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_gcm_encrypt@@ -203,13 +224,23 @@ #define GET_CCM_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt #define cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(o,k,i) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_block(o,k,i) #define cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(o,k,i) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_block(o,k,i)+#define cryptonite_hinit(t,h) cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(t,h)+#define cryptonite_gf_mul(a,t) cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(a,t) #endif +#define CPU_AESNI        0+#define CPU_PCLMUL       1+#define CPU_OPTION_COUNT 2++static uint8_t cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_OPTION_COUNT] = {};+ #if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI) static void initialize_table_ni(int aesni, int pclmul) { 	if (!aesni) 		return;+	cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_AESNI] = 1;+ 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[INIT_128] = cryptonite_aesni_init; 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[INIT_256] = cryptonite_aesni_init; @@ -230,6 +261,9 @@ 	/* CTR */ 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr128; 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr256;+	/* CTR with 32-bit wrapping */+	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_128;+	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_256; 	/* XTS */ 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts128; 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts256;@@ -241,9 +275,27 @@ 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_OCB_128] = cryptonite_aesni_ocb_encrypt128; 	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_OCB_256] = cryptonite_aesni_ocb_encrypt256; 	*/+#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL+	if (!pclmul)+		return;+	cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_PCLMUL] = 1;++	/* GHASH */+	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_HINIT]     = cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul,+	cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_GF_MUL]    = cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul,+	cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul();+#endif } #endif +uint8_t *cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(void)+{+#if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI)+	cryptonite_aesni_initialize_hw(initialize_table_ni);+#endif+	return cryptonite_aes_cpu_options;+}+ void cryptonite_aes_initkey(aes_key *key, uint8_t *origkey, uint8_t size) { 	switch (size) {@@ -251,9 +303,7 @@ 	case 24: key->nbr = 12; key->strength = 1; break; 	case 32: key->nbr = 14; key->strength = 2; break; 	}-#if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI)-	cryptonite_aesni_initialize_hw(initialize_table_ni);-#endif+	cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(); 	init_f _init = GET_INIT(key->strength); 	_init(key, origkey, size); }@@ -315,6 +365,12 @@ 	e(output, key, iv, input, len); } +void cryptonite_aes_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len)+{+	ctr_f e = GET_C32_ENCRYPT(key->strength);+	e(output, key, iv, input, len);+}+ void cryptonite_aes_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit,                      uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks) {@@ -367,20 +423,22 @@ static void gcm_ghash_add(aes_gcm *gcm, block128 *b) { 	block128_xor(&gcm->tag, b);-	cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->tag, &gcm->h);+	cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->tag, gcm->htable); }  void cryptonite_aes_gcm_init(aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *iv, uint32_t len) {+	block128 h; 	gcm->length_aad = 0; 	gcm->length_input = 0; -	block128_zero(&gcm->h);+	block128_zero(&h); 	block128_zero(&gcm->tag); 	block128_zero(&gcm->iv);  	/* prepare H : encrypt_K(0^128) */-	cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&gcm->h, key, &gcm->h);+	cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&h, key, &h);+	cryptonite_hinit(gcm->htable, &h);  	if (len == 12) { 		block128_copy_bytes(&gcm->iv, iv, 12);@@ -390,15 +448,15 @@ 		int i; 		for (; len >= 16; len -= 16, iv += 16) { 			block128_xor(&gcm->iv, (block128 *) iv);-			cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h);+			cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); 		} 		if (len > 0) { 			block128_xor_bytes(&gcm->iv, iv, len);-			cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h);+			cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); 		} 		for (i = 15; origlen; --i, origlen >>= 8) 			gcm->iv.b[i] ^= (uint8_t) origlen;-		cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h);+		cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); 	}  	block128_copy_aligned(&gcm->civ, &gcm->iv);@@ -492,7 +550,7 @@ static void ccm_cbcmac_add(aes_ccm* ccm, aes_key* key, block128* bi) { 	block128_xor_aligned(&ccm->xi, bi);-	cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->xi);+	cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->xi); }  /* even though it is possible to support message size as large as 2^64, we support up to 2^32 only */@@ -750,6 +808,30 @@ 	} } +void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len)+{+	aes_block block, o;+	uint32_t nb_blocks = len / 16;+	int i;++	/* preload IV in block */+	block128_copy(&block, iv);++	for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; block128_inc32_le(&block), output += 16, input += 16) {+		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&o, key, &block);+		block128_vxor((block128 *) output, &o, (block128 *) input);+	}++	if ((len % 16) != 0) {+		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&o, key, &block);+		for (i = 0; i < (len % 16); i++) {+			*output = ((uint8_t *) &o)[i] ^ *input;+			output++;+			input++;+		}+	}+}+ void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit,                              uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks) {@@ -761,9 +843,9 @@  	/* TO OPTIMISE: this is really inefficient way to do that */ 	while (spoint-- > 0)-		cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak);+		cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak); -	for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak)) {+	for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { 		block128_vxor(&block, input, &tweak); 		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&block, k1, &block); 		block128_vxor(output, &block, &tweak);@@ -781,9 +863,9 @@  	/* TO OPTIMISE: this is really inefficient way to do that */ 	while (spoint-- > 0)-		cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak);+		cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak); -	for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak)) {+	for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { 		block128_vxor(&block, input, &tweak); 		cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(&block, k1, &block); 		block128_vxor(output, &block, &tweak);@@ -796,7 +878,7 @@  	gcm->length_input += length; 	for (; length >= 16; input += 16, output += 16, length -= 16) {-		block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ);+		block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ);  		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); 		block128_xor(&out, (block128 *) input);@@ -807,7 +889,7 @@ 		aes_block tmp; 		int i; -		block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ);+		block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ); 		/* create e(civ) in out */ 		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); 		/* initialize a tmp as input and xor it to e(civ) */@@ -829,7 +911,7 @@  	gcm->length_input += length; 	for (; length >= 16; input += 16, output += 16, length -= 16) {-		block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ);+		block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ);  		cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); 		gcm_ghash_add(gcm, (block128 *) input);@@ -840,7 +922,7 @@ 		aes_block tmp; 		int i; -		block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ);+		block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ);  		block128_zero(&tmp); 		block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length);@@ -972,4 +1054,56 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { 	ocb_generic_crypt(output, ocb, key, input, length, 0);+}++static inline void gf_mulx_rev(block128 *a, const block128 *h)+{+	uint64_t v1 = cpu_to_le64(h->q[0]);+	uint64_t v0 = cpu_to_le64(h->q[1]);+	a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(v1 >> 1 | v0 << 63);+	a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(v0 >> 1 ^ ((0-(v1 & 1)) & 0xe100000000000000ULL));+}++void cryptonite_aes_polyval_init(aes_polyval *ctx, const aes_block *h)+{+	aes_block r;++	/* ByteReverse(S_0) = 0 */+	block128_zero(&ctx->s);++	/* ByteReverse(H) * x */+	gf_mulx_rev(&r, h);+	cryptonite_hinit(ctx->htable, &r);+}++void cryptonite_aes_polyval_update(aes_polyval *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t length)+{+	aes_block r;+	const uint8_t *p;+	uint32_t sz;++	/* This automatically pads with zeros if input is not a multiple of the+	   block size. */+	for (p = input; length > 0; p += 16, length -= sz)+	{+		sz = length < 16 ? length : 16;++		/* ByteReverse(X_j) */+		block128_zero(&r);+		memcpy(&r, p, sz);+		block128_byte_reverse(&r);++		/* ByteReverse(S_{j-1}) + ByteReverse(X_j) */+		block128_xor_aligned(&ctx->s, &r);++		/* ByteReverse(S_j) */+		cryptonite_gf_mul(&ctx->s, ctx->htable);+	}+}++void cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize(aes_polyval *ctx, aes_block *dst)+{+	/* S_s */+	block128_copy_aligned(dst, &ctx->s);+	block128_byte_reverse(dst); }
cbits/cryptonite_aes.h view
@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ 	uint8_t data[16*14*2]; } aes_key; -/* size = 4*16+2*8= 80 */+/* size = 19*16+2*8= 320 */ typedef struct { 	aes_block tag;-	aes_block h;+	aes_block htable[16]; 	aes_block iv; 	aes_block civ; 	uint64_t length_aad;@@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ 	block128 li[4]; } aes_ocb; +/* size = 17*16= 272 */+typedef struct {+	aes_block htable[16];+	aes_block s;+} aes_polyval;+ /* in bytes: either 16,24,32 */ void cryptonite_aes_initkey(aes_key *ctx, uint8_t *key, uint8_t size); @@ -114,5 +120,11 @@ void cryptonite_aes_ccm_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_ccm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_ccm_finish(uint8_t *tag, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key);++uint8_t *cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(void);++void cryptonite_aes_polyval_init(aes_polyval *ctx, const aes_block *h);+void cryptonite_aes_polyval_update(aes_polyval *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t length);+void cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize(aes_polyval *ctx, aes_block *dst);  #endif
cbits/cryptonite_align.h view
@@ -44,11 +44,21 @@ 	*((uint32_t *) dst) = cpu_to_le32(v); } +static inline void xor_le32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v)+{+	*((uint32_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_le32(v);+}+ static inline void store_be32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { 	*((uint32_t *) dst) = cpu_to_be32(v); } +static inline void xor_be32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v)+{+	*((uint32_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_be32(v);+}+ static inline void store_le64_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) { 	*((uint64_t *) dst) = cpu_to_le64(v);@@ -59,6 +69,11 @@ 	*((uint64_t *) dst) = cpu_to_be64(v); } +static inline void xor_be64_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v)+{+	*((uint64_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_be64(v);+}+ #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define load_le32(a) load_le32_aligned(a) #else@@ -70,20 +85,30 @@  #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_le32(a, b) store_le32_aligned(a, b)+#define xor_le32(a, b) xor_le32_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_le32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { 	dst[0] = v; dst[1] = v >> 8; dst[2] = v >> 16; dst[3] = v >> 24; }+static inline void xor_le32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v)+{+	dst[0] ^= v; dst[1] ^= v >> 8; dst[2] ^= v >> 16; dst[3] ^= v >> 24;+} #endif  #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_be32(a, b) store_be32_aligned(a, b)+#define xor_be32(a, b) xor_be32_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_be32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { 	dst[3] = v; dst[2] = v >> 8; dst[1] = v >> 16; dst[0] = v >> 24; }+static inline void xor_be32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v)+{+	dst[3] ^= v; dst[2] ^= v >> 8; dst[1] ^= v >> 16; dst[0] ^= v >> 24;+} #endif  #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK@@ -98,11 +123,17 @@  #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_be64(a, b) store_be64_aligned(a, b)+#define xor_be64(a, b) xor_be64_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_be64(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) { 	dst[7] = v      ; dst[6] = v >> 8 ; dst[5] = v >> 16; dst[4] = v >> 24; 	dst[3] = v >> 32; dst[2] = v >> 40; dst[1] = v >> 48; dst[0] = v >> 56;+}+static inline void xor_be64(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v)+{+	dst[7] ^= v      ; dst[6] ^= v >> 8 ; dst[5] ^= v >> 16; dst[4] ^= v >> 24;+	dst[3] ^= v >> 32; dst[2] ^= v >> 40; dst[1] ^= v >> 48; dst[0] ^= v >> 56; } #endif
cbits/cryptonite_blake2b.c view
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@  void cryptonite_blake2b_init(blake2b_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) {-	blake2b_init(ctx, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2b_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); }  void cryptonite_blake2b_update(blake2b_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) {-	blake2b_update(ctx, data, len);+	_cryptonite_blake2b_update(ctx, data, len); }  void cryptonite_blake2b_finalize(blake2b_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) {-	blake2b_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2b_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); }
cbits/cryptonite_blake2bp.c view
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@  void cryptonite_blake2bp_init(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) {-	blake2bp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2bp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); }  void cryptonite_blake2bp_update(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) {-	blake2bp_update(ctx, data, len);+	_cryptonite_blake2bp_update(ctx, data, len); }  void cryptonite_blake2bp_finalize(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) {-	blake2bp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2bp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); }
cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c view
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@  void cryptonite_blake2s_init(blake2s_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) {-	blake2s_init(ctx, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2s_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); }  void cryptonite_blake2s_update(blake2s_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) {-	blake2s_update(ctx, data, len);+	_cryptonite_blake2s_update(ctx, data, len); }  void cryptonite_blake2s_finalize(blake2s_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) {-	blake2s_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2s_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); }
cbits/cryptonite_blake2sp.c view
@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@  void cryptonite_blake2sp_init(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) {-	blake2sp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2sp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); }  void cryptonite_blake2sp_update(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) {-	blake2sp_update(ctx, data, len);+	_cryptonite_blake2sp_update(ctx, data, len); }  void cryptonite_blake2sp_finalize(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) {-	blake2sp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8);+	_cryptonite_blake2sp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); }
cbits/cryptonite_chacha.c view
@@ -98,7 +98,6 @@                                  uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv) { 	const uint8_t *constants = (keylen == 32) ? sigma : tau;-	int i;  	ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(constants, 4);
+ cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c view
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@+/*+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions+ * are met:+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.h>++void CRYPTONITE_HASHED(finalize_prefix)(struct HASHED_LOWER(ctx) *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out)+{+	uint64_t bits[HASHED(BITS_ELEMS)];+	uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) &bits;+	uint32_t index, padidx, padlen, pos, out_mask;+	static const uint32_t cut_off = HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) - sizeof(bits);++	/* Make sure n <= len */+	n += (len - n) & constant_time_lt(len, n);++	/* Initial index, based on current context state */+	index = CRYPTONITE_HASHED(get_index)(ctx);++	/* Final size after n bytes */+	CRYPTONITE_HASHED(incr_sz)(ctx, bits, n);++	/* Padding index and length */+	padidx = CRYPTONITE_HASHED(get_index)(ctx);+	padlen = HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) + cut_off - padidx;+	padlen -= HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) & constant_time_lt(padidx, cut_off);++	/* Initialize buffers because we will XOR into them */+	memset(ctx->buf + index, 0, HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) - index);+	memset(out, 0, HASHED(DIGEST_SIZE));+	pos = 0;++	/* Iterate based on the full buffer length, regardless of n, and include+	 * the maximum overhead with padding and size bytes+	 */+	while (pos < len + HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) + sizeof(bits)) {+		uint8_t b;++		/* Take as many bytes from the input buffer as possible */+		if (pos < len)+			b = *(data++) & (uint8_t) constant_time_lt(pos, n);+		else+			b = 0;++		/* First padding byte */+		b |= 0x80 & (uint8_t) constant_time_eq(pos, n);++		/* Size bytes are always at the end of a block */+		if (index >= cut_off)+			b |= p[index - cut_off] & (uint8_t) constant_time_ge(pos, n + padlen);++		/* Store this byte into the buffer */+		ctx->buf[index++] ^= b;+		pos++;++		/* Process a full block, at a boundary which is independent from n */+		if (index >= HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE)) {+			index = 0;+			HASHED_LOWER(do_chunk)(ctx, (void *) ctx->buf);+			memset(ctx->buf, 0, HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE));++			/* Try to store the result: this is a no-op except when we reach the+			 * actual size based on n, more iterations may continue after that+			 * when len is really larger+			 */+			out_mask = constant_time_eq(pos, n + padlen + sizeof(bits));+			CRYPTONITE_HASHED(select_digest)(ctx, out, out_mask);+		}+	}+}
+ cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.h view
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@+/*+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Olivier Chéron <olivier.cheron@gmail.com>+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions+ * are met:+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *	notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *	notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *	documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++#ifndef CRYPTONITE_HASH_PREFIX_H+#define CRYPTONITE_HASH_PREFIX_H++#include <stdint.h>++static inline uint32_t constant_time_msb(uint32_t a)+{+	return 0 - (a >> 31);+}++static inline uint32_t constant_time_lt(uint32_t a, uint32_t b)+{+	return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));+}++static inline uint32_t constant_time_ge(uint32_t a, uint32_t b)+{+	return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);+}++static inline uint32_t constant_time_is_zero(uint32_t a)+{+	return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));+}++static inline uint32_t constant_time_eq(uint32_t a, uint32_t b)+{+	return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);+}++static inline uint64_t constant_time_msb_64(uint64_t a)+{+	return 0 - (a >> 63);+}++static inline uint64_t constant_time_lt_64(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)+{+	return constant_time_msb_64(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));+}++#endif
cbits/cryptonite_md5.c view
@@ -185,3 +185,30 @@ 	store_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2]); 	store_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); }++#define HASHED(m) MD5_##m+#define HASHED_LOWER(m) md5_##m+#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_md5_##m+#define MD5_BLOCK_SIZE 64+#define MD5_BITS_ELEMS 1++static inline uint32_t cryptonite_md5_get_index(const struct md5_ctx *ctx)+{+	return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f);+}++static inline void cryptonite_md5_incr_sz(struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n)+{+	ctx->sz += n;+	*bits = cpu_to_le64(ctx->sz << 3);+}++static inline void cryptonite_md5_select_digest(const struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask)+{+	xor_le32(out   , ctx->h[0] & out_mask);+	xor_le32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1] & out_mask);+	xor_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2] & out_mask);+	xor_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3] & out_mask);+}++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.c>
cbits/cryptonite_md5.h view
@@ -39,5 +39,6 @@ void cryptonite_md5_init(struct md5_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_md5_update(struct md5_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_md5_finalize(struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_md5_finalize_prefix(struct md5_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  #endif
cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c view
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ } #endif -/* Returns the number of bytes succesfully generated */+/* Returns the number of bytes successfully generated */ int cryptonite_get_rand_bytes(uint8_t *buffer, size_t len) { 	RDRAND_T tmp;
cbits/cryptonite_salsa.c view
@@ -120,7 +120,6 @@                                 uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv) { 	const uint8_t *constants = (keylen == 32) ? sigma : tau;-	int i;  	st->d[0] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 0); 	st->d[5] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 4);
cbits/cryptonite_sha1.c view
@@ -216,3 +216,31 @@ 	store_be32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); 	store_be32(out+16, ctx->h[4]); }++#define HASHED(m) SHA1_##m+#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha1_##m+#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha1_##m+#define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE 64+#define SHA1_BITS_ELEMS 1++static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha1_get_index(const struct sha1_ctx *ctx)+{+	return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f);+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha1_incr_sz(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n)+{+	ctx->sz += n;+	*bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3);+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha1_select_digest(const struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask)+{+	xor_be32(out   , ctx->h[0] & out_mask);+	xor_be32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1] & out_mask);+	xor_be32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2] & out_mask);+	xor_be32(out+12, ctx->h[3] & out_mask);+	xor_be32(out+16, ctx->h[4] & out_mask);+}++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.c>
cbits/cryptonite_sha1.h view
@@ -41,5 +41,6 @@ void cryptonite_sha1_init(struct sha1_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha1_update(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha1_finalize(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_sha1_finalize_prefix(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  #endif
cbits/cryptonite_sha256.c view
@@ -161,6 +161,14 @@ 	memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE); } +void cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out)+{+	uint8_t intermediate[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];++	cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix(ctx, data, len, n, intermediate);+	memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE);+}+ void cryptonite_sha256_finalize(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out) { 	static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x80, };@@ -182,3 +190,29 @@ 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) 		store_be32(out+4*i, ctx->h[i]); }++#define HASHED(m) SHA256_##m+#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha256_##m+#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha256_##m+#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64+#define SHA256_BITS_ELEMS 1++static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha256_get_index(const struct sha256_ctx *ctx)+{+	return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f);+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha256_incr_sz(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n)+{+	ctx->sz += n;+	*bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3);+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha256_select_digest(const struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask)+{+	uint32_t i;+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)+		xor_be32(out+4*i, ctx->h[i] & out_mask);+}++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.c>
cbits/cryptonite_sha256.h view
@@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ void cryptonite_sha224_init(struct sha224_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha224_update(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha224_finalize(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  void cryptonite_sha256_init(struct sha256_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha256_update(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha256_finalize(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  #endif
cbits/cryptonite_sha3.c view
@@ -99,8 +99,11 @@ }  /*- * Initialize a SHA-3 / SHAKE context: hashlen is the security level (and- * half the capacity) in bits+ * Initialize a SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context: hashlen is the security level+ * (and half the capacity) in bits.+ *+ * In case of cSHAKE, the message prefix with encoded N and S must be added with+ * cryptonite_sha3_update.  */ void cryptonite_sha3_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) {@@ -110,7 +113,7 @@ 	ctx->bufsz = bufsz; } -/* Update a SHA-3 / SHAKE context */+/* Update a SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context */ void cryptonite_sha3_update(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { 	uint32_t to_fill;@@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ }  /*- * Extract some bytes from a finalized SHA-3 / SHAKE context.+ * Extract some bytes from a finalized SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context.  * May be called multiple times.  */ void cryptonite_sha3_output(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t len)@@ -224,6 +227,12 @@ void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx) { 	cryptonite_sha3_finalize_with_pad_byte(ctx, 0x1F);+}++/* Finalize a cSHAKE context. Output is read using cryptonite_sha3_output. */+void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx)+{+	cryptonite_sha3_finalize_with_pad_byte(ctx, 0x04); }  void cryptonite_keccak_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen)
cbits/cryptonite_sha3.h view
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ void cryptonite_sha3_finalize(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out);  void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx);+void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha3_output(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t len);  void cryptonite_keccak_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen);
cbits/cryptonite_sha512.c view
@@ -180,6 +180,14 @@ 	memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE); } +void cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out)+{+	uint8_t intermediate[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];++	cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix(ctx, data, len, n, intermediate);+	memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE);+}+ void cryptonite_sha512_finalize(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out) { 	static uint8_t padding[128] = { 0x80, };@@ -202,6 +210,38 @@ 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) 		store_be64(out+8*i, ctx->h[i]); }++#define HASHED(m) SHA512_##m+#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha512_##m+#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha512_##m+#define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128+#define SHA512_BITS_ELEMS 2++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.h>++static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha512_get_index(const struct sha512_ctx *ctx)+{+	return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz[0] & 0x7f);+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha512_incr_sz(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n)+{+	ctx->sz[0] += n;+	ctx->sz[1] += 1 & constant_time_lt_64(ctx->sz[0], n);+	bits[0] = cpu_to_be64((ctx->sz[1] << 3 | ctx->sz[0] >> 61));+	bits[1] = cpu_to_be64((ctx->sz[0] << 3));+}++static inline void cryptonite_sha512_select_digest(const struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask)+{+	uint32_t i;+	uint64_t out_mask_64 = out_mask;+	out_mask_64 |= out_mask_64 << 32;+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)+		xor_be64(out+8*i, ctx->h[i] & out_mask_64);+}++#include <cryptonite_hash_prefix.c>  #include <stdio.h>
cbits/cryptonite_sha512.h view
@@ -46,10 +46,12 @@ void cryptonite_sha384_init(struct sha384_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha384_update(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha384_finalize(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  void cryptonite_sha512_init(struct sha512_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha512_update(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha512_finalize(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out);+void cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out);  /* only multiples of 8 are supported as valid t values */ void cryptonite_sha512t_init(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen);
cbits/cryptonite_skein256.c view
@@ -167,7 +167,6 @@ void cryptonite_skein256_finalize(struct skein256_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { 	uint32_t outsize;-	uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; 	uint64_t x[4]; 	int i, j, n;
cbits/cryptonite_skein512.c view
@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ void cryptonite_skein512_finalize(struct skein512_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { 	uint32_t outsize;-	uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; 	uint64_t x[8]; 	int i, j, n;
cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c view
@@ -777,7 +777,6 @@ 	uint64_t K[8];        /* the round key */ 	uint64_t block[8];    /* mu(buffer) */ 	uint64_t state[8];    /* the cipher state */-	uint64_t L[8]; 	uint8_t *buffer = ctx->buffer;  	/*
cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c view
@@ -47,13 +47,27 @@        (x6, x7, x8, x9) is the first 128 bits of a 192-bit nonce   */   cryptonite_salsa_init_core(&ctx->st, keylen, key, 8, iv);-  ctx->st.d[ 8] = load_le32(iv + 8);-  ctx->st.d[ 9] = load_le32(iv + 12); +  /* Continue initialization in a separate function that may also+     be called independently */+  cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(ctx, ivlen - 8, iv + 8);+}++void cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx,+                              uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv)+{+  /* Finish creating initial 512-bit input block:+       (x6, x7, x8, x9) is the first 128 bits of a 192-bit nonce++     Except iv has been shifted by 64 bits so there are now only 128 bits ahead.+  */+  ctx->st.d[ 8] += load_le32(iv + 0);+  ctx->st.d[ 9] += load_le32(iv + 4);+   /* Compute (z0, z1, . . . , z15) = doubleround ^(r/2) (x0, x1, . . . , x15) */   block hSalsa;   memset(&hSalsa, 0, sizeof(block));-  cryptonite_salsa_core_xor(nb_rounds, &hSalsa, &ctx->st);+  cryptonite_salsa_core_xor(ctx->nb_rounds, &hSalsa, &ctx->st);     /* Build a new 512-bit input block (x′0, x′1, . . . , x′15):        (x′0, x′5, x′10, x′15) is the Salsa20 constant@@ -69,8 +83,8 @@   ctx->st.d[12] = hSalsa.d[ 7] - ctx->st.d[ 7];   ctx->st.d[13] = hSalsa.d[ 8] - ctx->st.d[ 8];   ctx->st.d[14] = hSalsa.d[ 9] - ctx->st.d[ 9];-  ctx->st.d[ 6] = load_le32(iv + 16);-  ctx->st.d[ 7] = load_le32(iv + 20);+  ctx->st.d[ 6] = load_le32(iv + 8);+  ctx->st.d[ 7] = load_le32(iv + 12);   ctx->st.d[ 8] = 0;   ctx->st.d[ 9] = 0; }
cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.h view
@@ -33,5 +33,6 @@ #include "cryptonite_salsa.h"  void cryptonite_xsalsa_init(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, uint8_t nb_rounds, uint32_t keylen, const uint8_t *key, uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv);+void cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv);  #endif
+ cbits/include32/p256/p256.h view
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@+/*+ * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may+ *       be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software+ *       without specific prior written permission.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO+ * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_+#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_++// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers.+// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms.++#include <stdint.h>++#ifdef __cplusplus+extern "C" {+#endif++#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 32+#define P256_NDIGITS 8+#define P256_NBYTES 32++// n' such as n * n' = -1 mod (2^32)+#define P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR 0xEE00BC4F++#define P256_LITERAL(lo,hi) (lo), (hi)++typedef int cryptonite_p256_err;+typedef uint32_t cryptonite_p256_digit;+typedef int32_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit;+typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit;+typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit;++// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment.+typedef struct {+  cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS];+} cryptonite_p256_int;++extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n;  // Curve order+extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p;  // Curve prime+extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b;  // Curve param++// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.+void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.+void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant.+int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index);++// b := a % MOD+void cryptonite_p256_mod(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD+void cryptonite_p256_modmul(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* b,+    cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// b := 1 / a % MOD+// MOD best be SECP256r1_n+void cryptonite_p256_modinv(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := 1 / a % MOD+// MOD best be SECP256r1_n+// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv()+void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)+// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit.+cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)+void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);++int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);+int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);+int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Returns -1, 0 or 1.+int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b);++// c: = a - b+// Returns -1 on borrow.+int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// c := a + b+// Returns 1 on carry.+int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// c := a + (single digit)b+// Returns carry 1 on carry.+int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// ec routines.++// {out_x,out_y} := nG+void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,+                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,+                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y}+void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,+                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x,+                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,+                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,+                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y}+void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime(+    const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2,+    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,+    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve.+int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y);++// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips.+void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]);++// Reads from big-endian binary form,+// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short.+void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst);++#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a)+#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y])++#define P256_ZERO {{0}}+#define P256_ONE {{1}}++#ifdef __cplusplus+}+#endif++#endif  // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_
+ cbits/include32/p256/p256_gf.h view
@@ -0,0 +1,779 @@+/*+ * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may+ *       be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software+ *       without specific prior written permission.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO+ * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++// This is an implementation of the P256 finite field. It's written to be+// portable and still constant-time.+//+// WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from+//          obvious. Be careful when touching this code.+//+// See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background.++#include <stdint.h>+#include <stdio.h>++#include <string.h>+#include <stdlib.h>++#include "p256/p256.h"++typedef uint8_t u8;+typedef uint32_t u32;+typedef int32_t s32;+typedef uint64_t u64;++/* Our field elements are represented as nine 32-bit limbs.+ *+ * The value of an felem (field element) is:+ *   x[0] + (x[1] * 2**29) + (x[2] * 2**57) + ... + (x[8] * 2**228)+ *+ * That is, each limb is alternately 29 or 28-bits wide in little-endian+ * order.+ *+ * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like. A+ * 28, 29, ... pattern would cause us to hit 2**256, but that causes problems+ * when multiplying as terms end up one bit short of a limb which would require+ * much bit-shifting to correct.+ *+ * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value+ * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257.+ */+typedef u32 limb;+#define NLIMBS 9+typedef limb felem[NLIMBS];++static const limb kBottom28Bits = 0xfffffff;+static const limb kBottom29Bits = 0x1fffffff;++/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 29 and+ * 28-bit words. */+static const felem kOne = {+    2, 0, 0, 0xffff800,+    0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fbfffff, 0x1ffffff,+    0+};+static const felem kZero = {0};+static const felem kP = {+    0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x3ff,+    0, 0, 0x200000, 0xf000000,+    0xfffffff+};+static const felem k2P = {+    0x1ffffffe, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x7ff,+    0, 0, 0x400000, 0xe000000,+    0x1fffffff+};+/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar+ * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables+ * concatenated.+ *+ * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base+ * point, G.+ *+ *   Index  |  Index (binary) | Value+ *       0  |           0000  | 0G (all zeros, omitted)+ *       1  |           0001  | G+ *       2  |           0010  | 2**64G+ *       3  |           0011  | 2**64G + G+ *       4  |           0100  | 2**128G+ *       5  |           0101  | 2**128G + G+ *       6  |           0110  | 2**128G + 2**64G+ *       7  |           0111  | 2**128G + 2**64G + G+ *       8  |           1000  | 2**192G+ *       9  |           1001  | 2**192G + G+ *      10  |           1010  | 2**192G + 2**64G+ *      11  |           1011  | 2**192G + 2**64G + G+ *      12  |           1100  | 2**192G + 2**128G+ *      13  |           1101  | 2**192G + 2**128G + G+ *      14  |           1110  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G+ *      15  |           1111  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G+ *+ * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G,+ * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G.+ *+ * This is ~2KB of data. */+static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = {+    0x11522878, 0xe730d41, 0xdb60179, 0x4afe2ff, 0x12883add, 0xcaddd88, 0x119e7edc, 0xd4a6eab, 0x3120bee,+    0x1d2aac15, 0xf25357c, 0x19e45cdd, 0x5c721d0, 0x1992c5a5, 0xa237487, 0x154ba21, 0x14b10bb, 0xae3fe3,+    0xd41a576, 0x922fc51, 0x234994f, 0x60b60d3, 0x164586ae, 0xce95f18, 0x1fe49073, 0x3fa36cc, 0x5ebcd2c,+    0xb402f2f, 0x15c70bf, 0x1561925c, 0x5a26704, 0xda91e90, 0xcdc1c7f, 0x1ea12446, 0xe1ade1e, 0xec91f22,+    0x26f7778, 0x566847e, 0xa0bec9e, 0x234f453, 0x1a31f21a, 0xd85e75c, 0x56c7109, 0xa267a00, 0xb57c050,+    0x98fb57, 0xaa837cc, 0x60c0792, 0xcfa5e19, 0x61bab9e, 0x589e39b, 0xa324c5, 0x7d6dee7, 0x2976e4b,+    0x1fc4124a, 0xa8c244b, 0x1ce86762, 0xcd61c7e, 0x1831c8e0, 0x75774e1, 0x1d96a5a9, 0x843a649, 0xc3ab0fa,+    0x6e2e7d5, 0x7673a2a, 0x178b65e8, 0x4003e9b, 0x1a1f11c2, 0x7816ea, 0xf643e11, 0x58c43df, 0xf423fc2,+    0x19633ffa, 0x891f2b2, 0x123c231c, 0x46add8c, 0x54700dd, 0x59e2b17, 0x172db40f, 0x83e277d, 0xb0dd609,+    0xfd1da12, 0x35c6e52, 0x19ede20c, 0xd19e0c0, 0x97d0f40, 0xb015b19, 0x449e3f5, 0xe10c9e, 0x33ab581,+    0x56a67ab, 0x577734d, 0x1dddc062, 0xc57b10d, 0x149b39d, 0x26a9e7b, 0xc35df9f, 0x48764cd, 0x76dbcca,+    0xca4b366, 0xe9303ab, 0x1a7480e7, 0x57e9e81, 0x1e13eb50, 0xf466cf3, 0x6f16b20, 0x4ba3173, 0xc168c33,+    0x15cb5439, 0x6a38e11, 0x73658bd, 0xb29564f, 0x3f6dc5b, 0x53b97e, 0x1322c4c0, 0x65dd7ff, 0x3a1e4f6,+    0x14e614aa, 0x9246317, 0x1bc83aca, 0xad97eed, 0xd38ce4a, 0xf82b006, 0x341f077, 0xa6add89, 0x4894acd,+    0x9f162d5, 0xf8410ef, 0x1b266a56, 0xd7f223, 0x3e0cb92, 0xe39b672, 0x6a2901a, 0x69a8556, 0x7e7c0,+    0x9b7d8d3, 0x309a80, 0x1ad05f7f, 0xc2fb5dd, 0xcbfd41d, 0x9ceb638, 0x1051825c, 0xda0cf5b, 0x812e881,+    0x6f35669, 0x6a56f2c, 0x1df8d184, 0x345820, 0x1477d477, 0x1645db1, 0xbe80c51, 0xc22be3e, 0xe35e65a,+    0x1aeb7aa0, 0xc375315, 0xf67bc99, 0x7fdd7b9, 0x191fc1be, 0x61235d, 0x2c184e9, 0x1c5a839, 0x47a1e26,+    0xb7cb456, 0x93e225d, 0x14f3c6ed, 0xccc1ac9, 0x17fe37f3, 0x4988989, 0x1a90c502, 0x2f32042, 0xa17769b,+    0xafd8c7c, 0x8191c6e, 0x1dcdb237, 0x16200c0, 0x107b32a1, 0x66c08db, 0x10d06a02, 0x3fc93, 0x5620023,+    0x16722b27, 0x68b5c59, 0x270fcfc, 0xfad0ecc, 0xe5de1c2, 0xeab466b, 0x2fc513c, 0x407f75c, 0xbaab133,+    0x9705fe9, 0xb88b8e7, 0x734c993, 0x1e1ff8f, 0x19156970, 0xabd0f00, 0x10469ea7, 0x3293ac0, 0xcdc98aa,+    0x1d843fd, 0xe14bfe8, 0x15be825f, 0x8b5212, 0xeb3fb67, 0x81cbd29, 0xbc62f16, 0x2b6fcc7, 0xf5a4e29,+    0x13560b66, 0xc0b6ac2, 0x51ae690, 0xd41e271, 0xf3e9bd4, 0x1d70aab, 0x1029f72, 0x73e1c35, 0xee70fbc,+    0xad81baf, 0x9ecc49a, 0x86c741e, 0xfe6be30, 0x176752e7, 0x23d416, 0x1f83de85, 0x27de188, 0x66f70b8,+    0x181cd51f, 0x96b6e4c, 0x188f2335, 0xa5df759, 0x17a77eb6, 0xfeb0e73, 0x154ae914, 0x2f3ec51, 0x3826b59,+    0xb91f17d, 0x1c72949, 0x1362bf0a, 0xe23fddf, 0xa5614b0, 0xf7d8f, 0x79061, 0x823d9d2, 0x8213f39,+    0x1128ae0b, 0xd095d05, 0xb85c0c2, 0x1ecb2ef, 0x24ddc84, 0xe35e901, 0x18411a4a, 0xf5ddc3d, 0x3786689,+    0x52260e8, 0x5ae3564, 0x542b10d, 0x8d93a45, 0x19952aa4, 0x996cc41, 0x1051a729, 0x4be3499, 0x52b23aa,+    0x109f307e, 0x6f5b6bb, 0x1f84e1e7, 0x77a0cfa, 0x10c4df3f, 0x25a02ea, 0xb048035, 0xe31de66, 0xc6ecaa3,+    0x28ea335, 0x2886024, 0x1372f020, 0xf55d35, 0x15e4684c, 0xf2a9e17, 0x1a4a7529, 0xcb7beb1, 0xb2a78a1,+    0x1ab21f1f, 0x6361ccf, 0x6c9179d, 0xb135627, 0x1267b974, 0x4408bad, 0x1cbff658, 0xe3d6511, 0xc7d76f,+    0x1cc7a69, 0xe7ee31b, 0x54fab4f, 0x2b914f, 0x1ad27a30, 0xcd3579e, 0xc50124c, 0x50daa90, 0xb13f72,+    0xb06aa75, 0x70f5cc6, 0x1649e5aa, 0x84a5312, 0x329043c, 0x41c4011, 0x13d32411, 0xb04a838, 0xd760d2d,+    0x1713b532, 0xbaa0c03, 0x84022ab, 0x6bcf5c1, 0x2f45379, 0x18ae070, 0x18c9e11e, 0x20bca9a, 0x66f496b,+    0x3eef294, 0x67500d2, 0xd7f613c, 0x2dbbeb, 0xb741038, 0xe04133f, 0x1582968d, 0xbe985f7, 0x1acbc1a,+    0x1a6a939f, 0x33e50f6, 0xd665ed4, 0xb4b7bd6, 0x1e5a3799, 0x6b33847, 0x17fa56ff, 0x65ef930, 0x21dc4a,+    0x2b37659, 0x450fe17, 0xb357b65, 0xdf5efac, 0x15397bef, 0x9d35a7f, 0x112ac15f, 0x624e62e, 0xa90ae2f,+    0x107eecd2, 0x1f69bbe, 0x77d6bce, 0x5741394, 0x13c684fc, 0x950c910, 0x725522b, 0xdc78583, 0x40eeabb,+    0x1fde328a, 0xbd61d96, 0xd28c387, 0x9e77d89, 0x12550c40, 0x759cb7d, 0x367ef34, 0xae2a960, 0x91b8bdc,+    0x93462a9, 0xf469ef, 0xb2e9aef, 0xd2ca771, 0x54e1f42, 0x7aaa49, 0x6316abb, 0x2413c8e, 0x5425bf9,+    0x1bed3e3a, 0xf272274, 0x1f5e7326, 0x6416517, 0xea27072, 0x9cedea7, 0x6e7633, 0x7c91952, 0xd806dce,+    0x8e2a7e1, 0xe421e1a, 0x418c9e1, 0x1dbc890, 0x1b395c36, 0xa1dc175, 0x1dc4ef73, 0x8956f34, 0xe4b5cf2,+    0x1b0d3a18, 0x3194a36, 0x6c2641f, 0xe44124c, 0xa2f4eaa, 0xa8c25ba, 0xf927ed7, 0x627b614, 0x7371cca,+    0xba16694, 0x417bc03, 0x7c0a7e3, 0x9c35c19, 0x1168a205, 0x8b6b00d, 0x10e3edc9, 0x9c19bf2, 0x5882229,+    0x1b2b4162, 0xa5cef1a, 0x1543622b, 0x9bd433e, 0x364e04d, 0x7480792, 0x5c9b5b3, 0xe85ff25, 0x408ef57,+    0x1814cfa4, 0x121b41b, 0xd248a0f, 0x3b05222, 0x39bb16a, 0xc75966d, 0xa038113, 0xa4a1769, 0x11fbc6c,+    0x917e50e, 0xeec3da8, 0x169d6eac, 0x10c1699, 0xa416153, 0xf724912, 0x15cd60b7, 0x4acbad9, 0x5efc5fa,+    0xf150ed7, 0x122b51, 0x1104b40a, 0xcb7f442, 0xfbb28ff, 0x6ac53ca, 0x196142cc, 0x7bf0fa9, 0x957651,+    0x4e0f215, 0xed439f8, 0x3f46bd5, 0x5ace82f, 0x110916b6, 0x6db078, 0xffd7d57, 0xf2ecaac, 0xca86dec,+    0x15d6b2da, 0x965ecc9, 0x1c92b4c2, 0x1f3811, 0x1cb080f5, 0x2d8b804, 0x19d1c12d, 0xf20bd46, 0x1951fa7,+    0xa3656c3, 0x523a425, 0xfcd0692, 0xd44ddc8, 0x131f0f5b, 0xaf80e4a, 0xcd9fc74, 0x99bb618, 0x2db944c,+    0xa673090, 0x1c210e1, 0x178c8d23, 0x1474383, 0x10b8743d, 0x985a55b, 0x2e74779, 0x576138, 0x9587927,+    0x133130fa, 0xbe05516, 0x9f4d619, 0xbb62570, 0x99ec591, 0xd9468fe, 0x1d07782d, 0xfc72e0b, 0x701b298,+    0x1863863b, 0x85954b8, 0x121a0c36, 0x9e7fedf, 0xf64b429, 0x9b9d71e, 0x14e2f5d8, 0xf858d3a, 0x942eea8,+    0xda5b765, 0x6edafff, 0xa9d18cc, 0xc65e4ba, 0x1c747e86, 0xe4ea915, 0x1981d7a1, 0x8395659, 0x52ed4e2,+    0x87d43b7, 0x37ab11b, 0x19d292ce, 0xf8d4692, 0x18c3053f, 0x8863e13, 0x4c146c0, 0x6bdf55a, 0x4e4457d,+    0x16152289, 0xac78ec2, 0x1a59c5a2, 0x2028b97, 0x71c2d01, 0x295851f, 0x404747b, 0x878558d, 0x7d29aa4,+    0x13d8341f, 0x8daefd7, 0x139c972d, 0x6b7ea75, 0xd4a9dde, 0xff163d8, 0x81d55d7, 0xa5bef68, 0xb7b30d8,+    0xbe73d6f, 0xaa88141, 0xd976c81, 0x7e7a9cc, 0x18beb771, 0xd773cbd, 0x13f51951, 0x9d0c177, 0x1c49a78,+};+++/* Field element operations: */++/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns:+ *   0xffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**31+ *   0 for x == 0 or x > 2**31.+ *+ * x must be a u32 or an equivalent type such as limb. */+#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u32)(x) - 1) >> 31) - 1)++/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|,+ * which is a term at 2**257.+ *+ * On entry: carry < 2**3, inout[0,2,...] < 2**29, inout[1,3,...] < 2**28.+ * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**30, inout[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) {+  const u32 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry);++  inout[0] += carry << 1;+  inout[3] += 0x10000000 & carry_mask;+  /* carry < 2**3 thus (carry << 11) < 2**14 and we added 2**28 in the+   * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */+  inout[3] -= carry << 11;+  inout[4] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask;+  inout[5] += (0x10000000 - 1) & carry_mask;+  inout[6] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask;+  inout[6] -= carry << 22;+  /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the+   * next line. */+  inout[7] -= 1 & carry_mask;+  inout[7] += carry << 25;+}++/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2.+ *+ * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 32-bit word.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */+static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 29;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 28;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++#define two31m3 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 3)+#define two30m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two30p13m2 (((limb)1) << 30) + (((limb)1) << 13) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two31m2 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two31p24m2 (((limb)1) << 31) + (((limb)1) << 24) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two30m27m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 27) - (((limb)1) << 2)++/* zero31 is 0 mod p. */+static const felem zero31 = { two31m3, two30m2, two31m2, two30p13m2, two31m2, two30m2, two31p24m2, two30m27m2, two31m2 };++/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and+ *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++   for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];+    out[i] += zero31[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 29;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];+    out[i] += zero31[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 28;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words+ * with the same 29,28,... bit positions as an felem.+ *+ * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257.+ * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is+ * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be+ * in Montgomery form.+ *+ * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**64+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */+static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u64 tmp[17]) {+   /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code:+    *+    * Limb number:   0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10...+    * Width (bits):  29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29+    * Start bit:     0 | 29| 57| 86|114|143|171|200|228|257|285+    *   (odd phase): 0 | 28| 57| 85|114|142|171|199|228|256|285 */+  limb tmp2[18], carry, x, xMask;+  unsigned i;++  /* tmp contains 64-bit words with the same 29,28,29-bit positions as an+   * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another+   * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this+   * overlap. */+  tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom29Bits);++  /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>32)" to try+   * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting+   * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating+   * afterwards. */+  tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 29;+  tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits;+  tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom28Bits;+  carry = tmp2[1] >> 28;+  tmp2[1] &= kBottom28Bits;++  for (i = 2; i < 17; i++) {+    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 28;+    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 4) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i] += carry;+    carry = tmp2[i] >> 29;+    tmp2[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == 17)+      break;+    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 29;+    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom28Bits;+    tmp2[i] += carry;+    carry = tmp2[i] >> 28;+    tmp2[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  tmp2[17] = ((limb)(tmp[15] >> 32)) >> 25;+  tmp2[17] += ((limb)(tmp[16])) >> 29;+  tmp2[17] += (((limb)(tmp[16] >> 32)) << 3);+  tmp2[17] += carry;++  /* Montgomery elimination of terms.+   *+   * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can+   * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by+   * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value.+   *+   * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 29 bits of p+   * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0.+   * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the+   * extra factor of R. */+  for (i = 0;; i += 2) {+    tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 29;+    x = tmp2[i] & kBottom29Bits;+    xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x);+    tmp2[i] = 0;++    /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of+     * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their+     * right.+     *+     * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an+     * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are+     * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately+     * and are written as, for example, 28 to mean a value <2**28.+     *+     * Word:                   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10+     * Added in top half:     28  11      29  21  29  28+     *                                        28  29+     *                                            29+     * Added in bottom half:      29  10      28  21  28   28+     *                                            29+     *+     * The value that is currently offset 7 will be offset 5 for the next+     * iteration and then offset 3 for the iteration after that. Therefore+     * the total value added will be the values added at 7, 5 and 3.+     *+     * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom+     * are written as, for example, 29+28, to mean a value < 2**29+2**28.+     *+     * Word:                   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13+     *                        28  11  10  29  21  29  28  28  28  28  28+     *                            29  28  11  28  29  28  29  28  29  28+     *                                    29  28  21  21  29  21  29  21+     *                                        10  29  28  21  28  21  28+     *                                        28  29  28  29  28  29  28+     *                                            11  10  29  10  29  10+     *                                            29  28  11  28  11+     *                                                    29      29+     *                        --------------------------------------------+     *                                                30+ 31+ 30+ 31+ 30++     *                                                28+ 29+ 28+ 29+ 21++     *                                                21+ 28+ 21+ 28+ 10+     *                                                10  21+ 10  21++     *                                                    11      11+     *+     * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[10] and tmp2[12]. If+     * tmp2[10/12] has an initial value of <2**29, then the maximum value+     * will be < 2**31 + 2**30 + 2**28 + 2**21 + 2**11, which is < 2**32,+     * as required. */+    tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 10) & kBottom28Bits;+    tmp2[i + 4] += (x >> 18);++    tmp2[i + 6] += (x << 21) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i + 7] += x >> 8;++    /* At position 200, which is the starting bit position for word 7, we+     * have a factor of 0xf000000 = 2**28 - 2**24. */+    tmp2[i + 7] += 0x10000000 & xMask;+    /* Word 7 is 28 bits wide, so the 2**28 term exactly hits word 8. */+    tmp2[i + 8] += (x - 1) & xMask;+    tmp2[i + 7] -= (x << 24) & kBottom28Bits;+    tmp2[i + 8] -= x >> 4;++    tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask;+    tmp2[i + 8] -= x;+    tmp2[i + 8] += (x << 28) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i + 9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask;++    if (i+1 == NLIMBS)+      break;+    tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 28;+    x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom28Bits;+    xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x);+    tmp2[i + 1] = 0;++    tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 11) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 18);++    tmp2[i + 7] += (x << 21) & kBottom28Bits;+    tmp2[i + 8] += x >> 7;++    /* At position 199, which is the starting bit of the 8th word when+     * dealing with a context starting on an odd word, we have a factor of+     * 0x1e000000 = 2**29 - 2**25. Since we have not updated i, the 8th+     * word from i+1 is i+8. */+    tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask;+    tmp2[i + 9] += (x - 1) & xMask;+    tmp2[i + 8] -= (x << 25) & kBottom29Bits;+    tmp2[i + 9] -= x >> 4;++    tmp2[i + 9] += 0x10000000 & xMask;+    tmp2[i + 9] -= x;+    tmp2[i + 10] += (x - 1) & xMask;+  }++  /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have+   * widths of 28,29,... which we need to correct when copying them down.  */+  carry = 0;+  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {+    /* The maximum value of tmp2[i + 9] occurs on the first iteration and+     * is < 2**30+2**29+2**28. Adding 2**29 (from tmp2[i + 10]) is+     * therefore safe. */+    out[i] = tmp2[i + 9];+    out[i] += carry;+    out[i] += (tmp2[i + 10] << 28) & kBottom29Bits;+    carry = out[i] >> 29;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    out[i] = tmp2[i + 9] >> 1;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 28;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  out[8] = tmp2[17];+  out[8] += carry;+  carry = out[8] >> 29;+  out[8] &= kBottom29Bits;++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_square sets out=in*in.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) {+  u64 tmp[17];++  tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in[0];+  tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1);+  tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[1] << 1);+  tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1);+  tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[3] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * in[2];+  tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in[4] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1);+  tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[3] << 1);+  tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[5] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1);+  /* tmp[8] has the greatest value of 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**60,+   * which is < 2**64 as required. */+  tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[6] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * in[4];+  tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) *+           (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[6] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[4]) * (in[5] << 1);+  tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) *+            (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in[6] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[5]) * (in[5] << 1);+  tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *+            (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[6] << 1);+  tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in[8] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[5]) * (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[6]) * in[6];+  tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in[8] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[6]) * (in[7] << 1);+  tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in[8] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[7]) * (in[7] << 1);+  tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in[8] << 1);+  tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * in[8];++  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);+}++/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and+ *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  u64 tmp[17];++  tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in2[0];+  tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[1] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[1] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[2] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[1] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[3] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *+           (in2[1] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[4] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *+           (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[1] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[5] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *+           (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[2] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[1] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  /* tmp[8] has the greatest value but doesn't overflow. See logic in+   * felem_square. */+  tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *+           (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *+           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[3] << 1) ++           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *+           (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[0] << 0);+  tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) *+           (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) *+           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[3] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[2] << 0) ++           ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[1] << 0);+  tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) *+            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++            ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) *+            (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[3] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[2] << 0);+  tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *+            (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++            ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *+            (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[3] << 0);+  tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) *+            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++            ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[5] << 1) ++            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[4] << 0);+  tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) *+            (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[6] << 0) ++            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[5] << 0);+  tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *+            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[6] << 0);+  tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[8] << 0) ++            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[7] << 0);+  tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[8] << 0);++  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);+}++static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) {+  memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem));+}++/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] *= 3;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 29;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] *= 3;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 28;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0, next_carry;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    next_carry = out[i] >> 27;+    out[i] <<= 2;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29);+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    next_carry = out[i] >> 26;+    out[i] <<= 2;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28);+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */+static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0, next_carry;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    next_carry = out[i] >> 26;+    out[i] <<= 3;+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29);+    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    next_carry = out[i] >> 25;+    out[i] <<= 3;+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28);+    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of+ * time depending on the value of |in|. */+static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) {+  limb carry;+  int i;+  limb tmp[NLIMBS];++  felem_assign(tmp, in);++  /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */+  do {+    carry = 0;+    for (i = 0;; i++) {+      tmp[i] += carry;+      carry = tmp[i] >> 29;+      tmp[i] &= kBottom29Bits;++      i++;+      if (i == NLIMBS)+        break;++      tmp[i] += carry;+      carry = tmp[i] >> 28;+      tmp[i] &= kBottom28Bits;+    }++    felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry);+  } while (carry);++  /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */+  return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||+         memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||+         memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0;+}+++/* Montgomery operations: */++#define kRDigits {2, 0, 0, 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 1} // 2^257 mod p256.p++#define kRInvDigits {0x80000000, 1, 0xffffffff, 0, 0x80000001, 0xfffffffe, 1, 0x7fffffff}  // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p++static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits };+static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits };++/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */+static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) {+  cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted;+  int i;++  cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted);+  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted);++  for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) {+    if ((i & 1) == 0) {+      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom29Bits;+      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 29, &in_shifted);+    } else {+      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom28Bits;+      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 28, &in_shifted);+    }+  }++  cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted);+}++/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */+static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) {+  cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp;+  int i, top;++  cryptonite_p256_init(&result);+  cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp);++  cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result);+  for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) {+    if ((i & 1) == 0) {+      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 29, &tmp);+    } else {+      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 28, &tmp);+    }+    top |= cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result);+  }++  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out);++  cryptonite_p256_clear(&result);+  cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp);+}
+ cbits/include64/p256/p256.h view
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@+/*+ * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may+ *       be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software+ *       without specific prior written permission.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO+ * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_+#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_++// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers.+// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms.++#include <stdint.h>++#ifdef __cplusplus+extern "C" {+#endif++#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 64+#define P256_NDIGITS 4+#define P256_NBYTES 32++// n' such as n * n' = -1 mod (2^64)+#define P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR 0xCCD1C8AAEE00BC4F++#define P256_LITERAL(lo,hi) (((uint32_t) (lo)) + (((uint64_t) (hi)) << 32))++typedef int cryptonite_p256_err;+typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_digit;+typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit;+typedef __uint128_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit;+typedef __int128_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit;++// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment.+typedef struct {+  cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS];+} cryptonite_p256_int;++extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n;  // Curve order+extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p;  // Curve prime+extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b;  // Curve param++// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.+void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.+void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant.+int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index);++// b := a % MOD+void cryptonite_p256_mod(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD+void cryptonite_p256_modmul(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* b,+    cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// b := 1 / a % MOD+// MOD best be SECP256r1_n+void cryptonite_p256_modinv(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := 1 / a % MOD+// MOD best be SECP256r1_n+// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv()+void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime(+    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,+    cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)+// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit.+cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);++// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)+void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);++int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);+int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);+int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);++// Returns -1, 0 or 1.+int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b);++// c: = a - b+// Returns -1 on borrow.+int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// c := a + b+// Returns 1 on carry.+int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// c := a + (single digit)b+// Returns carry 1 on carry.+int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);++// ec routines.++// {out_x,out_y} := nG+void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,+                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,+                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y}+void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,+                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x,+                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,+                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,+                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y}+void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime(+    const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2,+    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,+    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);++// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve.+int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y);++// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips.+void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]);++// Reads from big-endian binary form,+// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short.+void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst);++#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a)+#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y])++#define P256_ZERO {{0}}+#define P256_ONE {{1}}++#ifdef __cplusplus+}+#endif++#endif  // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_
+ cbits/include64/p256/p256_gf.h view
@@ -0,0 +1,713 @@+/*+ * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project+ *+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.+ *     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may+ *       be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software+ *       without specific prior written permission.+ *+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO+ * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,+ * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;+ * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR+ * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.+ */++// This is an implementation of the P256 finite field. It's written to be+// portable and still constant-time.+//+// WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from+//          obvious. Be careful when touching this code.+//+// See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background.++#include <stdint.h>+#include <stdio.h>++#include <string.h>+#include <stdlib.h>++#include "p256/p256.h"++typedef uint8_t u8;+typedef uint32_t u32;+typedef uint64_t u64;+typedef int64_t s64;+typedef __uint128_t u128;++/* Our field elements are represented as five 64-bit limbs.+ *+ * The value of an felem (field element) is:+ *   x[0] + (x[1] * 2**51) + (x[2] * 2**103) + ... + (x[4] * 2**206)+ *+ * That is, each limb is alternately 51 or 52-bits wide in little-endian+ * order.+ *+ * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like.+ *+ * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value+ * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257.+ */+typedef u64 limb;+#define NLIMBS 5+typedef limb felem[NLIMBS];++static const limb kBottom51Bits = 0x7ffffffffffff;+static const limb kBottom52Bits = 0xfffffffffffff;++/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 51 and+ * 52-bit words. */+static const felem kOne = {+    2, 0xfc00000000000, 0x7ffffffffffff, 0xfff7fffffffff, 0x7ffff+};+static const felem kZero = {0};+static const felem kP = {+    0x7ffffffffffff, 0x1fffffffffff, 0, 0x4000000000, 0x3fffffffc0000+};+static const felem k2P = {+    0x7fffffffffffe, 0x3fffffffffff, 0, 0x8000000000, 0x7fffffff80000+};+/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar+ * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables+ * concatenated.+ *+ * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base+ * point, G.+ *+ *   Index  |  Index (binary) | Value+ *       0  |           0000  | 0G (all zeros, omitted)+ *       1  |           0001  | G+ *       2  |           0010  | 2**64G+ *       3  |           0011  | 2**64G + G+ *       4  |           0100  | 2**128G+ *       5  |           0101  | 2**128G + G+ *       6  |           0110  | 2**128G + 2**64G+ *       7  |           0111  | 2**128G + 2**64G + G+ *       8  |           1000  | 2**192G+ *       9  |           1001  | 2**192G + G+ *      10  |           1010  | 2**192G + 2**64G+ *      11  |           1011  | 2**192G + 2**64G + G+ *      12  |           1100  | 2**192G + 2**128G+ *      13  |           1101  | 2**192G + 2**128G + G+ *      14  |           1110  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G+ *      15  |           1111  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G+ *+ * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G,+ * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G.+ *+ * This is ~2KB of data. */+static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = {+    0x661a831522878, 0xf17fb6d805e79, 0x5889441d6ea57, 0xae33cfdb995bb, 0xc482fbb529ba,+    0x4a6af9d2aac15, 0x90e867917377c, 0x487cc962d2ae3, 0xec2a97443446e, 0x2b8ff8c52c42,+    0x45f8a2d41a576, 0xb06988d2653e4, 0x718b22c357305, 0x33fc920e79d2b, 0x17af34b0fe8db,+    0x38e17eb402f2f, 0x3382558649705, 0x47f6d48f482d1, 0x7bd42488d9b83, 0x3b247c8b86b78,+    0x4d08fc26f7778, 0x7a29a82fb2795, 0x75cd18f90d11a, 0xad8e213b0bc, 0x2d5f0142899e8,+    0x506f98098fb57, 0x2f0c98301e4aa, 0x39b30dd5cf67d, 0x9c146498ab13c, 0xa5db92df5b7b,+    0x184897fc4124a, 0xe3f73a19d8aa, 0x4e1c18e47066b, 0x27b2d4b52eaee, 0x30eac3ea10e99,+    0x4e74546e2e7d5, 0x1f4dde2d97a1d, 0x6ead0f88e1200, 0x7dec87c220f02, 0x3d08ff096310f,+    0x23e5659633ffa, 0x6ec648f08c722, 0x3172a3806ea35, 0xf6e5b681eb3c5, 0x2c3758260f89d,+    0x38dca4fd1da12, 0xf06067b78830d, 0x3194be87a068c, 0x78893c7eb602b, 0xcead60438432,+    0x6ee69a56a67ab, 0xd886f77701895, 0x67b0a4d9cee2b, 0x3586bbf3e4d53, 0x1db6f32921d93,+    0x260756ca4b366, 0x4f40e9d2039fa, 0x4f3f09f5a82bf, 0xccde2d641e8cd, 0x305a30cd2e8c5,+    0x471c235cb5439, 0xab279cd962f5a, 0x17e1fb6e2dd94, 0xfe64589800a77, 0xe8793d99775f,+    0x48c62f4e614aa, 0xbf76ef20eb2a4, 0x669c672556c, 0x24683e0eff056, 0x12252b369ab76,+    0x821de9f162d5, 0xf911ec99a95be, 0x6721f065c906b, 0x58d452035c736, 0x1f9f01a6a15,+    0x6135009b7d8d3, 0xdaeeeb417dfc0, 0x63865fea0ee17, 0x6e0a304b939d6, 0x204ba2076833d,+    0x4ade586f35669, 0x2c1077e34611a, 0x5b1a3bea3b81a, 0xf97d018a22c8b, 0x38d7996b08af8,+    0x6ea62baeb7aa0, 0xebdcbd9ef2670, 0x35dc8fe0df3fe, 0xe458309d20c24, 0x11e87898716a0,+    0x7c44bab7cb456, 0xd64d3cf1bb64, 0x189bff1bf9e66, 0xb5218a049311, 0x285dda6cbcc81,+    0x3238dcafd8c7c, 0x607736c8de0, 0xdb83d99508b1, 0x4e1a0d404cd81, 0x1588008c00ff2,+    0x16b8b36722b27, 0x876609c3f3f1a, 0x66b72ef0e17d6, 0x705f8a279d568, 0x2eaac4cd01fdd,+    0x1171ce9705fe9, 0xffc79cd3264ee, 0x700c8ab4b80f0, 0x208d3d4f57a1, 0x337262a8ca4eb,+    0x297fd01d843fd, 0xa90956fa097f8, 0x529759fdb3845, 0x1d78c5e2d0397, 0x3d6938a4adbf3,+    0x16d5853560b66, 0xf138946b9a430, 0x2ab79f4dea6a0, 0xd42053ee43ae1, 0x3b9c3ef1cf870,+    0x598934ad81baf, 0x5f1821b1d07a7, 0x416bb3a973ff3, 0x23f07bd0a047a, 0x19bdc2e09f786,+    0x56dc9981cd51f, 0xfbace23c8cd65, 0x673bd3bf5b52e, 0x46a95d229fd61, 0xe09ad64bcfb1,+    0xe5292b91f17d, 0xfeefcd8afc287, 0x58f52b0a58711, 0x4800f20c201ef, 0x2084fce608f67,+    0x12ba0b128ae0b, 0x5977ae17030b4, 0x101126ee420f6, 0xf70823495c6bd, 0xde19a27d7770,+    0x5c6ac852260e8, 0x9d22950ac4356, 0x441cca955246c, 0x660a34e5332d9, 0x14ac8ea92f8d2,+    0x6b6d7709f307e, 0x67d7e13879db, 0x2ea8626f9fbbd, 0x99609006a4b40, 0x31bb2a8f8c779,+    0x10c04828ea335, 0xae9acdcbc080a, 0x617af2342607a, 0xc7494ea53e553, 0x2ca9e2872defa,+    0x6c399fab21f1f, 0xab139b245e758, 0x3ad933dcba589, 0x4797fecb08811, 0x31f5dbf8f594,+    0x7dc6361cc7a69, 0xc8a7953ead3f9, 0x79ed693d18015, 0x418a024999a6a, 0x2c4fdc9436aa,+    0x1eb98cb06aa75, 0x2989592796a9c, 0x11194821e425, 0xe27a648228388, 0x35d834b6c12a0,+    0x541807713b532, 0x7ae0a1008aaee, 0x7017a29bcb5e, 0x6b193c23c315c, 0x19bd25ac82f2a,+    0x6a01a43eef294, 0xddf5b5fd84f19, 0x33f5ba081c016, 0xdeb052d1bc082, 0x6b2f06afa617,+    0x7ca1eda6a939f, 0xbdeb35997b50c, 0x47f2d1bccda5, 0xc2ff4adfed667, 0x87712997be4,+    0x21fc2e2b37659, 0xf7d62cd5ed951, 0x27fa9cbdf7efa, 0xba25582bf3a6b, 0x2a42b8bd89398,+    0x6d377d07eecd2, 0x9ca1df5af387, 0x1109e3427e2ba, 0xce4aa4572a19, 0x103baaef71e16,+    0x2c3b2dfde328a, 0xbec4b4a30e1ef, 0x37d92a86204f3, 0x806cfde68eb39, 0x246e2f72b8aa5,+    0x68d3de93462a9, 0x53b8acba6bbc3, 0x2492a70fa1696, 0x38c62d5760f55, 0x15096fe4904f2,+    0x4e44e9bed3e3a, 0xb28bfd79cc9bc, 0x6a77513839320, 0x480dcec6739db, 0x3601b739f2465,+    0x43c348e2a7e1, 0xe448106327879, 0x175d9cae1b0ed, 0xd3b89dee743b8, 0x392d73ca255bc,+    0x32946db0d3a18, 0x9261b09907cc, 0x5ba517a755722, 0x51f24fdaf5184, 0x1cdc732989ed8,+    0x2f7806ba16694, 0xae0c9f029f8d0, 0xd8b45102ce1, 0xca1c7db9316d6, 0x162088a67066f,+    0x39de35b2b4162, 0xa19f550d88ae9, 0x7921b27026cde, 0x94b936b66e900, 0x1023bd5fa17fc,+    0x436837814cfa4, 0x29113492283c4, 0x66d1cdd8b51d8, 0xa540702278eb2, 0x47ef1b29285d,+    0x587b50917e50e, 0xb4cda75bab3b, 0x112520b0a9886, 0x66b9ac16fee49, 0x17bf17e92b2eb,+    0x2456a2f150ed7, 0xfa214412d0280, 0x3ca7dd947fe5b, 0xa72c28598d58a, 0x255d945efc3e,+    0x2873f04e0f215, 0x74178fd1af57b, 0x788848b5b2d6, 0xb1ffafaae0db6, 0x32a1b7b3cbb2a,+    0x4bd9935d6b2da, 0x9c08f24ad30a5, 0x4e58407a80f, 0x1b3a3825a5b17, 0x6547e9fc82f5,+    0x47484aa3656c3, 0x6ee43f341a494, 0x64a98f87adea2, 0x619b3f8e95f01, 0xb6e513266ed8,+    0x421c2a673090, 0xa1c1de32348c7, 0x55b85c3a1e8a3, 0xe05ce8ef330b4, 0x2561e49c15d84,+    0x40aa2d33130fa, 0x12b827d35866f, 0xfe4cf62c8ddb, 0x2fa0ef05bb28d, 0x1c06ca63f1cb8,+    0x32a971863863b, 0xff6fc86830da1, 0x71e7b25a14cf3, 0xea9c5ebb1373a, 0x250bbaa3e1634,+    0x5b5ffeda5b765, 0xf25d2a746331b, 0x115e3a3f43632, 0x67303af43c9d5, 0x14bb538a0e559,+    0x75623687d43b7, 0xa349674a4b38d, 0x613c61829ffc6, 0x689828d8110c7, 0x139115f5af7d5,+    0xf1d856152289, 0x45cbe967168ab, 0x51f38e1680901, 0x34808e8f652b0, 0x1f4a6a921e156,+    0x35dfaf3d8341f, 0xf53ace725cb63, 0x3d86a54eef35b, 0xa103aabaffe2c, 0x2decc36296fbd,+    0x510282be73d6f, 0xd4e6365db206a, 0x4bdc5f5bb8bf3, 0xde7ea32a3aee7, 0x71269e274305,+};+++/* Field element operations: */++/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns:+ *   0xffffffffffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**63+ *   0 for x == 0 or x > 2**63.+ *+ * x must be a u64 or an equivalent type such as limb. */+#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u64)(x) - 1) >> 63) - 1)++/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|,+ * which is a term at 2**257.+ *+ * On entry: carry < 2**6, inout[0,2,...] < 2**51, inout[1,3,...] < 2**52.+ * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**52, inout[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) {+  const u64 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry);++  inout[0] += carry << 1;+  inout[1] += 0x10000000000000 & carry_mask;+  /* carry < 2**6 thus (carry << 46) < 2**52 and we added 2**52 in the+   * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */+  inout[1] -= carry << 46;+  inout[2] += (0x8000000000000 - 1) & carry_mask;+  inout[3] += (0x10000000000000 - 1) & carry_mask;+  inout[3] -= carry << 39;+  /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the+   * next line. */+  inout[4] -= 1 & carry_mask;+  inout[4] += carry << 19;+}++/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2.+ *+ * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 64-bit word.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53 */+static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 51;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 52;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++#define two53m3 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 3)+#define two54m52p48m2 (((limb)1) << 54) - (((limb)1) << 52) + (((limb)1) << 48) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two53m2p0 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 2) + (((limb)1) << 0)+#define two54m52p41m2 (((limb)1) << 54) - (((limb)1) << 52) + (((limb)1) << 41) - (((limb)1) << 2)+#define two53m21m2p0 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 21) - (((limb)1) << 2) + (((limb)1) << 0)++/* zero53 is 0 mod p. */+static const felem zero53 = { two53m3, two54m52p48m2, two53m2p0, two54m52p41m2, two53m21m2p0 };++/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53 and+ *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**52, in2[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++   for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];+    out[i] += zero53[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 51;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];+    out[i] += zero53[i];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 52;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words+ * with the same 51,52,... bit positions as an felem.+ *+ * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257.+ * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is+ * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be+ * in Montgomery form.+ *+ * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**128+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53 */+static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u128 tmp[9]) {+   /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code:+    *+    * Limb number:   0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10+    * Width (bits):  51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51+    * Start bit:     0 | 51|103|154|206|257|309|360|412|463|515+    *   (odd phase): 0 | 52|103|155|206|258|309|361|412|464|515 */+  limb tmp2[10], carry, x, xShiftedMask;+  unsigned i;++  /* tmp contains 128-bit words with the same 51,52,51-bit positions as an+   * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another+   * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this+   * overlap. */+  tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom51Bits);++  /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>64)" to try+   * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting+   * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating+   * afterwards. */+  tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 51;+  tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 64)) << 13) & kBottom52Bits;+  tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom52Bits;+  carry = tmp2[1] >> 52;+  tmp2[1] &= kBottom52Bits;++  for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) {+    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 64)) >> 39;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 52;+    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 64)) << 12) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i] += carry;+    carry = tmp2[i] >> 51;+    tmp2[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == 9)+      break;+    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 64)) >> 39;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 51;+    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 64)) << 13) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i] += carry;+    carry = tmp2[i] >> 52;+    tmp2[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  tmp2[9] = ((limb)(tmp[7] >> 64)) >> 39;+  tmp2[9] += ((limb)(tmp[8])) >> 51;+  tmp2[9] += (((limb)(tmp[8] >> 64)) << 13);+  tmp2[9] += carry;++  /* Montgomery elimination of terms.+   *+   * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can+   * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by+   * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value.+   *+   * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 51 bits of p+   * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0.+   * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the+   * extra factor of R. */+  for (i = 0;; i += 2) {+    tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 51;+    x = tmp2[i] & kBottom51Bits;+    xShiftedMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x >> 1);+    tmp2[i] = 0;++    /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of+     * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their+     * right.+     *+     * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an+     * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are+     * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately+     * and are written as, for example, 51 to mean a value <2**51.+     *+     * Word:                   1   2   3   4   5   6+     * Added in top half:     52  44  52  37  50+     *                                    51+     *                                    51+     * Added in bottom half:      51  45  51  38  50+     *                                        52+     *                                        52+     *+     * The value that is currently offset 5 will be offset 3 for the next+     * iteration and then offset 1 for the iteration after that. Therefore+     * the total value added will be the values added at 5, 3 and 1.+     *+     * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom+     * are written as, for example, 53+45, to mean a value < 2**53+2**45.+     *+     * Word:                   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9+     *                        52  44  52  37  50  50  50  50  50+     *                            51  45  51  38  37  38  37+     *                                52  51  52  51  52  51+     *                                    51  52  51  52  51+     *                                    44  52  51  52+     *                                    51  45  44+     *                                        52+     *                        ------------------------------------+     *                                53+ 53+ 54+ 52+ 53+ 52++     *                                45  44+ 50+ 51+ 52+ 50++     *                                    37  45+ 50+ 50+ 37+     *                                        38  44+ 38+     *                                            37+     *+     * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[5]. If tmp2[5] has an initial+     * value of <2**52, then the maximum value will be < 2**54 + 2**52 + 2**50 ++     * 2**45 + 2**38, which is < 2**64, as required. */+    tmp2[i + 1] += (x << 45) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i + 2] += x >> 7;++    tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 38) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i + 4] += x >> 14;++    /* On tmp2[i + 4], when x < 2**1, the subtraction with (x << 18) will not+     * underflow because it is balanced with the (x << 50) term.  On the next+     * word tmp2[i + 5], terms with (x >> 1) and (x >> 33) are both zero and+     * there is no underflow either.+     *+     * When x >= 2**1, we add 2**51 to tmp2[i + 4] to avoid an underflow.+     * Removing 1 from tmp2[i + 5] is safe because (x >> 1) - (x >> 33) is+     * strictly positive.+     */+    tmp2[i + 4] += 0x8000000000000 & xShiftedMask;+    tmp2[i + 5] -= 1 & xShiftedMask;++    tmp2[i + 4] -= (x << 18) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 50) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 1) - (x >> 33);++    if (i+1 == NLIMBS)+      break;+    tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 52;+    x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom52Bits;+    xShiftedMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x >> 2);+    tmp2[i + 1] = 0;++    tmp2[i + 2] += (x << 44) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i + 3] += x >> 7;++    tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 37) & kBottom51Bits;+    tmp2[i + 5] += x >> 14;++    /* On tmp2[i + 5], when x < 2**2, the subtraction with (x << 18) will not+     * underflow because it is balanced with the (x << 50) term.  On the next+     * word tmp2[i + 6], terms with (x >> 2) and (x >> 34) are both zero and+     * there is no underflow either.+     *+     * When x >= 2**2, we add 2**52 to tmp2[i + 5] to avoid an underflow.+     * Removing 1 from tmp2[i + 6] is safe because (x >> 2) - (x >> 34) is+     * stricly positive.+     */+    tmp2[i + 5] += 0x10000000000000 & xShiftedMask;+    tmp2[i + 6] -= 1 & xShiftedMask;++    tmp2[i + 5] -= (x << 18) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i + 5] += (x << 50) & kBottom52Bits;+    tmp2[i + 6] += (x >> 2) - (x >> 34);+  }++  /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have+   * widths of 52,51,... which we need to correct when copying them down.  */+  carry = 0;+  for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {+    out[i] = tmp2[i + 5];+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 51;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    out[i] = tmp2[i + 5] << 1;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 52;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  out[4] = tmp2[9];+  out[4] += carry;+  carry = out[4] >> 51;+  out[4] &= kBottom51Bits;++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_square sets out=in*in.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) {+  u128 tmp[9], x1x1, x3x3;++  x1x1 = ((u128) in[1]) * in[1];+  x3x3 = ((u128) in[3]) * in[3];++  tmp[0] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[0] << 0);+  tmp[1] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1) + ((x1x1 & 1) << 51);+  tmp[2] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) + (x1x1 >> 1);+  tmp[3] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) ++           ((u128) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1);+  tmp[4] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) ++           ((u128) in[1]) * (in[3] << 0) ++           ((u128) in[2]) * (in[2] << 0);+  tmp[5] = ((u128) in[1]) * (in[4] << 1) ++           ((u128) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1) + ((x3x3 & 1) << 51);+  tmp[6] = ((u128) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) + (x3x3 >> 1);+  tmp[7] = ((u128) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1);+  tmp[8] = ((u128) in[4]) * (in[4] << 0);++  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);+}++/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2.+ *+ * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53 and+ *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**52, in2[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {+  u128 tmp[9], x1y1, x1y3, x3y1, x3y3;++  x1y1 = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[1];+  x1y3 = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[3];+  x3y1 = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[1];+  x3y3 = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[3];++  tmp[0] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[0];+  tmp[1] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[1] ++           ((u128) in[1]) * in2[0] + ((x1y1 & 1) << 51);+  tmp[2] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[2] + (x1y1 >> 1) ++           ((u128) in[2]) * in2[0];+  tmp[3] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[3] ++           ((u128) in[1]) * in2[2] ++           ((u128) in[2]) * in2[1] + ((x1y3 & 1) << 51) ++           ((u128) in[3]) * in2[0] + ((x3y1 & 1) << 51);+  tmp[4] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[4] + (x1y3 >> 1) ++           ((u128) in[2]) * in2[2] + (x3y1 >> 1) ++           ((u128) in[4]) * in2[0];+  tmp[5] = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[4] ++           ((u128) in[2]) * in2[3] ++           ((u128) in[3]) * in2[2] ++           ((u128) in[4]) * in2[1] + ((x3y3 & 1) << 51);+  tmp[6] = ((u128) in[2]) * in2[4] + (x3y3 >> 1) ++           ((u128) in[4]) * in2[2];+  tmp[7] = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[4] ++           ((u128) in[4]) * in2[3];+  tmp[8] = ((u128) in[4]) * in2[4];++  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);+}++static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) {+  memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem));+}++/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    out[i] *= 3;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 51;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    out[i] *= 3;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = out[i] >> 52;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0, next_carry;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    next_carry = out[i] >> 49;+    out[i] <<= 2;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 51);+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    next_carry = out[i] >> 50;+    out[i] <<= 2;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 52);+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out.+ *+ * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53.+ * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */+static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) {+  limb carry = 0, next_carry;+  unsigned i;++  for (i = 0;; i++) {+    next_carry = out[i] >> 48;+    out[i] <<= 3;+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 51);+    out[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++    i++;+    if (i == NLIMBS)+      break;++    next_carry = out[i] >> 49;+    out[i] <<= 3;+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+    out[i] += carry;+    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 52);+    out[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+  }++  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);+}++/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of+ * time depending on the value of |in|. */+static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) {+  limb carry;+  int i;+  limb tmp[NLIMBS];++  felem_assign(tmp, in);++  /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */+  do {+    carry = 0;+    for (i = 0;; i++) {+      tmp[i] += carry;+      carry = tmp[i] >> 51;+      tmp[i] &= kBottom51Bits;++      i++;+      if (i == NLIMBS)+        break;++      tmp[i] += carry;+      carry = tmp[i] >> 52;+      tmp[i] &= kBottom52Bits;+    }++    felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry);+  } while (carry);++  /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */+  return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||+         memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||+         memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0;+}+++/* Montgomery operations: */++#define kRDigits {2, 0xfffffffe00000000, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x1fffffffd} // 2^257 mod p256.p++#define kRInvDigits {0x180000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffe80000001, 0x7fffffff00000001}  // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p++static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits };+static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits };++/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */+static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) {+  cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted;+  int i;++  cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted);+  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted);++  for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) {+    if ((i & 1) == 0) {+      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom51Bits;+      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 51, &in_shifted);+    } else {+      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom52Bits;+      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 52, &in_shifted);+    }+  }++  cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted);+}++/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */+static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) {+  cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp;+  int i, top;++  cryptonite_p256_init(&result);+  cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp);++  cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result);+  for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) {+    if ((i & 1) == 0) {+      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 51, &tmp);+    } else {+      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 52, &tmp);+    }+    top += cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result);+  }++  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out);++  cryptonite_p256_clear(&result);+  cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp);+}
cbits/p256/p256.c view
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@  */  // This is an implementation of the P256 elliptic curve group. It's written to-// be portable 32-bit, although it's still constant-time.+// be portable and still constant-time. // // WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from //          obvious. Be careful when touching this code.@@ -40,14 +40,16 @@ #include "p256/p256.h"  const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n =  // curve order-  {{0xfc632551, 0xf3b9cac2, 0xa7179e84, 0xbce6faad, -1, -1, 0, -1}};+  {{P256_LITERAL(0xfc632551, 0xf3b9cac2), P256_LITERAL(0xa7179e84, 0xbce6faad),+    P256_LITERAL(-1, -1), P256_LITERAL(0, -1)}};  const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p =  // curve field size-  {{-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1 }};+  {{P256_LITERAL(-1, -1), P256_LITERAL(-1, 0),+    P256_LITERAL(0, 0), P256_LITERAL(1, -1) }};  const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b =  // curve b-  {{0x27d2604b, 0x3bce3c3e, 0xcc53b0f6, 0x651d06b0,-    0x769886bc, 0xb3ebbd55, 0xaa3a93e7, 0x5ac635d8}};+  {{P256_LITERAL(0x27d2604b, 0x3bce3c3e), P256_LITERAL(0xcc53b0f6, 0x651d06b0),+    P256_LITERAL(0x769886bc, 0xb3ebbd55), P256_LITERAL(0xaa3a93e7, 0x5ac635d8)}};  void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a) {   memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));@@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ }  int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a) {-  int i, result = 0;+  cryptonite_p256_digit result = 0;+  int i = 0;   for (i = 0; i < P256_NDIGITS; ++i) result |= P256_DIGIT(a, i);-  return !result;+  return result == 0; }  // top, c[] += a[] * b@@ -167,6 +170,10 @@     // top can be any value at this point.     // Guestimate reducer as top * MOD, since msw of MOD is -1.     top_reducer = mulAdd(MOD, top, 0, reducer);+#if P256_BITSPERDIGIT > 32+    // Correction when msw of MOD has only high 32 bits set+    top_reducer += mulAdd(MOD, top >> 32, 0, reducer);+#endif      // Subtract reducer from top | tmp.     top = subTop(top_reducer, reducer, top, tmp + i);@@ -229,7 +236,7 @@     P256_DIGIT(b, i) = accu;   }   P256_DIGIT(b, i) = (P256_DIGIT(a, i) >> 1) |-      (highbit << (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1));+      (((cryptonite_p256_sdigit) highbit) << (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1)); }  // Return -1, 0, 1 for a < b, a == b or a > b respectively.@@ -359,30 +366,163 @@ }  void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst) {-  int i;+  int i, n;   const uint8_t* p = &src[0];    for (i = P256_NDIGITS - 1; i >= 0; --i) {-    P256_DIGIT(dst, i) =-        (p[0] << 24) |-        (p[1] << 16) |-        (p[2] << 8) |-        p[3];-    p += 4;+    cryptonite_p256_digit dig = 0;+    n = P256_BITSPERDIGIT;+    while (n > 0) {+      n -= 8;+      dig |= ((cryptonite_p256_digit) *(p++)) << n;+    }+    P256_DIGIT(dst, i) = dig;   } }  void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]) {-	int i;+	int i, n; 	uint8_t* p = &dst[0];  	for (i = P256_NDIGITS -1; i >= 0; --i) { 		const cryptonite_p256_digit dig = P256_DIGIT(src, i);-		p[0] = dig >> 24;-		p[1] = dig >> 16;-		p[2] = dig >> 8;-		p[3] = dig;-		p += 4;+		n = P256_BITSPERDIGIT;+		while (n > 0) {+			n -= 8;+			*(p++) = dig >> n;+		} 	}+}++/*+  "p256e" functions are not part of the original source+*/++#define MSB_COMPLEMENT(x) (((x) >> (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1)) - 1)++// c = a + b mod MOD+void cryptonite_p256e_modadd(const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) {+  assert(c);  /* avoid repeated checks inside inlined cryptonite_p256_add */+  cryptonite_p256_digit top = cryptonite_p256_add(a, b, c);+  top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), -1);+  top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), MSB_COMPLEMENT(top));+  addM(MOD, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), top);+}++// c = a - b mod MOD+void cryptonite_p256e_modsub(const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) {+  assert(c); /* avoid repeated checks inside inlined cryptonite_p256_sub */+  cryptonite_p256_digit top = cryptonite_p256_sub(a, b, c);+  top = addM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), ~MSB_COMPLEMENT(top));+  top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), MSB_COMPLEMENT(top));+  addM(MOD, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), top);+}++#define NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, a, nth, b, out)   \+    cryptonite_p256e_montmul(a, a, out);         \+    for (i = 1; i < nth; i++)                    \+        cryptonite_p256e_montmul(out, out, out); \+    cryptonite_p256e_montmul(out, b, out);++const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_r2 = // r^2 mod n+  {{P256_LITERAL(0xBE79EEA2, 0x83244C95), P256_LITERAL(0x49BD6FA6, 0x4699799C),+    P256_LITERAL(0x2B6BEC59, 0x2845B239), P256_LITERAL(0xF3D95620, 0x66E12D94)}};++const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_one = {{1}};++// Montgomery multiplication, i.e. c = ab/r mod n with r = 2^256.+// Implementation is adapted from 'sc_montmul' in libdecaf.+static void cryptonite_p256e_montmul(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) {+  int i, j, borrow;+  cryptonite_p256_digit accum[P256_NDIGITS+1] = {0};+  cryptonite_p256_digit hi_carry = 0;++  for (i=0; i<P256_NDIGITS; i++) {+    cryptonite_p256_digit mand = P256_DIGIT(a, i);+    const cryptonite_p256_digit *mier = P256_DIGITS(b);++    cryptonite_p256_ddigit chain = 0;+    for (j=0; j<P256_NDIGITS; j++) {+      chain += ((cryptonite_p256_ddigit)mand)*mier[j] + accum[j];+      accum[j] = chain;+      chain >>= P256_BITSPERDIGIT;+    }+    accum[j] = chain;++    mand = accum[0] * P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR;+    chain = 0;+    mier = P256_DIGITS(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_n);+    for (j=0; j<P256_NDIGITS; j++) {+      chain += (cryptonite_p256_ddigit)mand*mier[j] + accum[j];+      if (j) accum[j-1] = chain;+      chain >>= P256_BITSPERDIGIT;+    }+    chain += accum[j];+    chain += hi_carry;+    accum[j-1] = chain;+    hi_carry = chain >> P256_BITSPERDIGIT;+  }++  memcpy(P256_DIGITS(c), accum, sizeof(*c));+  borrow = cryptonite_p256_sub(c, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_n, c);+  addM(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_n, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), borrow + hi_carry);+}++// b = 1/a mod n, using Fermat's little theorem.+void cryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_int* b) {+  cryptonite_p256_int _1, _10, _11, _101, _111, _1010, _1111;+  cryptonite_p256_int _10101, _101010, _101111, x6, x8, x16, x32;+  int i;++  // Montgomerize+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(a, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_r2, &_1);++  // P-256 (secp256r1) Scalar Inversion+  // <https://briansmith.org/ecc-inversion-addition-chains-01>+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_1     , &_1     , &_10);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10    , &_1     , &_11);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10    , &_11    , &_101);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10    , &_101   , &_111);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101   , &_101   , &_1010);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101   , &_1010  , &_1111);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &_1010,  1   , &_1     , &_10101);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10101 , &_10101 , &_101010);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101   , &_101010, &_101111);+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10101 , &_101010, &x6);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x6   ,  2   , &_11    , &x8);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x8   ,  8   , &x8     , &x16);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x16  , 16   , &x16    , &x32);++  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x32  , 32+32, &x32    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,    32, &x32    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,     6, &_101111, b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 3, &_111   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 2, &_11    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 1 + 4, &_1111  , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,     5, &_10101 , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 1 + 3, &_101   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,     3, &_101   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,     3, &_101   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 3, &_111   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 3 + 6, &_101111, b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 4, &_1111  , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 1 + 1, &_1     , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 4 + 1, &_1     , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 4, &_1111  , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 3, &_111   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 1 + 3, &_111   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 3, &_111   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 3, &_101   , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 1 + 2, &_11    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 4 + 6, &_101111, b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     ,     2, &_11    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 3 + 2, &_11    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 3 + 2, &_11    , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 1, &_1     , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 5, &_10101 , b);+  NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b     , 2 + 4, &_1111  , b);++  // Demontgomerize+  cryptonite_p256e_montmul(b, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_one, b); }
− cbits/p256/p256.h 
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@-/*- * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project- *- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:- *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright- *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.- *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright- *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the- *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.- *     * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may- *       be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software- *       without specific prior written permission.- *- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO- * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,- * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;- * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,- * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR- * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF- * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.- */--#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_-#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_--// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers.-// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms.--#include <stdint.h>--#ifdef __cplusplus-extern "C" {-#endif--#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 32-#define P256_NDIGITS 8-#define P256_NBYTES 32--typedef int cryptonite_p256_err;-typedef uint32_t cryptonite_p256_digit;-typedef int32_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit;-typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit;-typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit;--// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment.-typedef struct {-  cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS];-} cryptonite_p256_int;--extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n;  // Curve order-extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p;  // Curve prime-extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b;  // Curve param--// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.-void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a);--// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero.-void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a);--// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant.-int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index);--// b := a % MOD-void cryptonite_p256_mod(-    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,-    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,-    cryptonite_p256_int* b);--// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD-void cryptonite_p256_modmul(-    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,-    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,-    const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b,-    const cryptonite_p256_int* b,-    cryptonite_p256_int* c);--// b := 1 / a % MOD-// MOD best be SECP256r1_n-void cryptonite_p256_modinv(-    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,-    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,-    cryptonite_p256_int* b);--// b := 1 / a % MOD-// MOD best be SECP256r1_n-// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv()-void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime(-    const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD,-    const cryptonite_p256_int* a,-    cryptonite_p256_int* b);--// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)-// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit.-cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);--// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT)-void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b);--int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);-int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);-int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a);--// Returns -1, 0 or 1.-int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b);--// c: = a - b-// Returns -1 on borrow.-int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);--// c := a + b-// Returns 1 on carry.-int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);--// c := a + (single digit)b-// Returns carry 1 on carry.-int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c);--// ec routines.--// {out_x,out_y} := nG-void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,-                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,-                         cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);--// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y}-void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n,-                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x,-                    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,-                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x,-                    cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);--// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y}-void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime(-    const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2,-    const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y,-    cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y);--// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve.-int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y);--// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips.-void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]);--// Reads from big-endian binary form,-// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short.-void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst);--#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a)-#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y])--#define P256_ZERO {{0}}-#define P256_ONE {{1}}--#ifdef __cplusplus-}-#endif--#endif  // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_
cbits/p256/p256_ec.c view
@@ -25,580 +25,18 @@  */  // This is an implementation of the P256 elliptic curve group. It's written to-// be portable 32-bit, although it's still constant-time.+// be portable and still constant-time. // // WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from //          obvious. Be careful when touching this code. // // See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background. -#include <stdint.h>-#include <stdio.h>--#include <string.h>-#include <stdlib.h>--#include "p256/p256.h"--typedef uint8_t u8;-typedef uint32_t u32;-typedef int32_t s32;-typedef uint64_t u64;--/* Our field elements are represented as nine 32-bit limbs.- *- * The value of an felem (field element) is:- *   x[0] + (x[1] * 2**29) + (x[2] * 2**57) + ... + (x[8] * 2**228)- *- * That is, each limb is alternately 29 or 28-bits wide in little-endian- * order.- *- * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like. A- * 28, 29, ... pattern would cause us to hit 2**256, but that causes problems- * when multiplying as terms end up one bit short of a limb which would require- * much bit-shifting to correct.- *- * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value- * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257.- */-typedef u32 limb;-#define NLIMBS 9-typedef limb felem[NLIMBS];--static const limb kBottom28Bits = 0xfffffff;-static const limb kBottom29Bits = 0x1fffffff;--/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 29 and- * 28-bit words. */-static const felem kOne = {-    2, 0, 0, 0xffff800,-    0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fbfffff, 0x1ffffff,-    0-};-static const felem kZero = {0};-static const felem kP = {-    0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x3ff,-    0, 0, 0x200000, 0xf000000,-    0xfffffff-};-static const felem k2P = {-    0x1ffffffe, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x7ff,-    0, 0, 0x400000, 0xe000000,-    0x1fffffff-};-/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar- * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables- * concatenated.- *- * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base- * point, G.- *- *   Index  |  Index (binary) | Value- *       0  |           0000  | 0G (all zeros, omitted)- *       1  |           0001  | G- *       2  |           0010  | 2**64G- *       3  |           0011  | 2**64G + G- *       4  |           0100  | 2**128G- *       5  |           0101  | 2**128G + G- *       6  |           0110  | 2**128G + 2**64G- *       7  |           0111  | 2**128G + 2**64G + G- *       8  |           1000  | 2**192G- *       9  |           1001  | 2**192G + G- *      10  |           1010  | 2**192G + 2**64G- *      11  |           1011  | 2**192G + 2**64G + G- *      12  |           1100  | 2**192G + 2**128G- *      13  |           1101  | 2**192G + 2**128G + G- *      14  |           1110  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G- *      15  |           1111  | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G- *- * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G,- * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G.- *- * This is ~2KB of data. */-static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = {-    0x11522878, 0xe730d41, 0xdb60179, 0x4afe2ff, 0x12883add, 0xcaddd88, 0x119e7edc, 0xd4a6eab, 0x3120bee,-    0x1d2aac15, 0xf25357c, 0x19e45cdd, 0x5c721d0, 0x1992c5a5, 0xa237487, 0x154ba21, 0x14b10bb, 0xae3fe3,-    0xd41a576, 0x922fc51, 0x234994f, 0x60b60d3, 0x164586ae, 0xce95f18, 0x1fe49073, 0x3fa36cc, 0x5ebcd2c,-    0xb402f2f, 0x15c70bf, 0x1561925c, 0x5a26704, 0xda91e90, 0xcdc1c7f, 0x1ea12446, 0xe1ade1e, 0xec91f22,-    0x26f7778, 0x566847e, 0xa0bec9e, 0x234f453, 0x1a31f21a, 0xd85e75c, 0x56c7109, 0xa267a00, 0xb57c050,-    0x98fb57, 0xaa837cc, 0x60c0792, 0xcfa5e19, 0x61bab9e, 0x589e39b, 0xa324c5, 0x7d6dee7, 0x2976e4b,-    0x1fc4124a, 0xa8c244b, 0x1ce86762, 0xcd61c7e, 0x1831c8e0, 0x75774e1, 0x1d96a5a9, 0x843a649, 0xc3ab0fa,-    0x6e2e7d5, 0x7673a2a, 0x178b65e8, 0x4003e9b, 0x1a1f11c2, 0x7816ea, 0xf643e11, 0x58c43df, 0xf423fc2,-    0x19633ffa, 0x891f2b2, 0x123c231c, 0x46add8c, 0x54700dd, 0x59e2b17, 0x172db40f, 0x83e277d, 0xb0dd609,-    0xfd1da12, 0x35c6e52, 0x19ede20c, 0xd19e0c0, 0x97d0f40, 0xb015b19, 0x449e3f5, 0xe10c9e, 0x33ab581,-    0x56a67ab, 0x577734d, 0x1dddc062, 0xc57b10d, 0x149b39d, 0x26a9e7b, 0xc35df9f, 0x48764cd, 0x76dbcca,-    0xca4b366, 0xe9303ab, 0x1a7480e7, 0x57e9e81, 0x1e13eb50, 0xf466cf3, 0x6f16b20, 0x4ba3173, 0xc168c33,-    0x15cb5439, 0x6a38e11, 0x73658bd, 0xb29564f, 0x3f6dc5b, 0x53b97e, 0x1322c4c0, 0x65dd7ff, 0x3a1e4f6,-    0x14e614aa, 0x9246317, 0x1bc83aca, 0xad97eed, 0xd38ce4a, 0xf82b006, 0x341f077, 0xa6add89, 0x4894acd,-    0x9f162d5, 0xf8410ef, 0x1b266a56, 0xd7f223, 0x3e0cb92, 0xe39b672, 0x6a2901a, 0x69a8556, 0x7e7c0,-    0x9b7d8d3, 0x309a80, 0x1ad05f7f, 0xc2fb5dd, 0xcbfd41d, 0x9ceb638, 0x1051825c, 0xda0cf5b, 0x812e881,-    0x6f35669, 0x6a56f2c, 0x1df8d184, 0x345820, 0x1477d477, 0x1645db1, 0xbe80c51, 0xc22be3e, 0xe35e65a,-    0x1aeb7aa0, 0xc375315, 0xf67bc99, 0x7fdd7b9, 0x191fc1be, 0x61235d, 0x2c184e9, 0x1c5a839, 0x47a1e26,-    0xb7cb456, 0x93e225d, 0x14f3c6ed, 0xccc1ac9, 0x17fe37f3, 0x4988989, 0x1a90c502, 0x2f32042, 0xa17769b,-    0xafd8c7c, 0x8191c6e, 0x1dcdb237, 0x16200c0, 0x107b32a1, 0x66c08db, 0x10d06a02, 0x3fc93, 0x5620023,-    0x16722b27, 0x68b5c59, 0x270fcfc, 0xfad0ecc, 0xe5de1c2, 0xeab466b, 0x2fc513c, 0x407f75c, 0xbaab133,-    0x9705fe9, 0xb88b8e7, 0x734c993, 0x1e1ff8f, 0x19156970, 0xabd0f00, 0x10469ea7, 0x3293ac0, 0xcdc98aa,-    0x1d843fd, 0xe14bfe8, 0x15be825f, 0x8b5212, 0xeb3fb67, 0x81cbd29, 0xbc62f16, 0x2b6fcc7, 0xf5a4e29,-    0x13560b66, 0xc0b6ac2, 0x51ae690, 0xd41e271, 0xf3e9bd4, 0x1d70aab, 0x1029f72, 0x73e1c35, 0xee70fbc,-    0xad81baf, 0x9ecc49a, 0x86c741e, 0xfe6be30, 0x176752e7, 0x23d416, 0x1f83de85, 0x27de188, 0x66f70b8,-    0x181cd51f, 0x96b6e4c, 0x188f2335, 0xa5df759, 0x17a77eb6, 0xfeb0e73, 0x154ae914, 0x2f3ec51, 0x3826b59,-    0xb91f17d, 0x1c72949, 0x1362bf0a, 0xe23fddf, 0xa5614b0, 0xf7d8f, 0x79061, 0x823d9d2, 0x8213f39,-    0x1128ae0b, 0xd095d05, 0xb85c0c2, 0x1ecb2ef, 0x24ddc84, 0xe35e901, 0x18411a4a, 0xf5ddc3d, 0x3786689,-    0x52260e8, 0x5ae3564, 0x542b10d, 0x8d93a45, 0x19952aa4, 0x996cc41, 0x1051a729, 0x4be3499, 0x52b23aa,-    0x109f307e, 0x6f5b6bb, 0x1f84e1e7, 0x77a0cfa, 0x10c4df3f, 0x25a02ea, 0xb048035, 0xe31de66, 0xc6ecaa3,-    0x28ea335, 0x2886024, 0x1372f020, 0xf55d35, 0x15e4684c, 0xf2a9e17, 0x1a4a7529, 0xcb7beb1, 0xb2a78a1,-    0x1ab21f1f, 0x6361ccf, 0x6c9179d, 0xb135627, 0x1267b974, 0x4408bad, 0x1cbff658, 0xe3d6511, 0xc7d76f,-    0x1cc7a69, 0xe7ee31b, 0x54fab4f, 0x2b914f, 0x1ad27a30, 0xcd3579e, 0xc50124c, 0x50daa90, 0xb13f72,-    0xb06aa75, 0x70f5cc6, 0x1649e5aa, 0x84a5312, 0x329043c, 0x41c4011, 0x13d32411, 0xb04a838, 0xd760d2d,-    0x1713b532, 0xbaa0c03, 0x84022ab, 0x6bcf5c1, 0x2f45379, 0x18ae070, 0x18c9e11e, 0x20bca9a, 0x66f496b,-    0x3eef294, 0x67500d2, 0xd7f613c, 0x2dbbeb, 0xb741038, 0xe04133f, 0x1582968d, 0xbe985f7, 0x1acbc1a,-    0x1a6a939f, 0x33e50f6, 0xd665ed4, 0xb4b7bd6, 0x1e5a3799, 0x6b33847, 0x17fa56ff, 0x65ef930, 0x21dc4a,-    0x2b37659, 0x450fe17, 0xb357b65, 0xdf5efac, 0x15397bef, 0x9d35a7f, 0x112ac15f, 0x624e62e, 0xa90ae2f,-    0x107eecd2, 0x1f69bbe, 0x77d6bce, 0x5741394, 0x13c684fc, 0x950c910, 0x725522b, 0xdc78583, 0x40eeabb,-    0x1fde328a, 0xbd61d96, 0xd28c387, 0x9e77d89, 0x12550c40, 0x759cb7d, 0x367ef34, 0xae2a960, 0x91b8bdc,-    0x93462a9, 0xf469ef, 0xb2e9aef, 0xd2ca771, 0x54e1f42, 0x7aaa49, 0x6316abb, 0x2413c8e, 0x5425bf9,-    0x1bed3e3a, 0xf272274, 0x1f5e7326, 0x6416517, 0xea27072, 0x9cedea7, 0x6e7633, 0x7c91952, 0xd806dce,-    0x8e2a7e1, 0xe421e1a, 0x418c9e1, 0x1dbc890, 0x1b395c36, 0xa1dc175, 0x1dc4ef73, 0x8956f34, 0xe4b5cf2,-    0x1b0d3a18, 0x3194a36, 0x6c2641f, 0xe44124c, 0xa2f4eaa, 0xa8c25ba, 0xf927ed7, 0x627b614, 0x7371cca,-    0xba16694, 0x417bc03, 0x7c0a7e3, 0x9c35c19, 0x1168a205, 0x8b6b00d, 0x10e3edc9, 0x9c19bf2, 0x5882229,-    0x1b2b4162, 0xa5cef1a, 0x1543622b, 0x9bd433e, 0x364e04d, 0x7480792, 0x5c9b5b3, 0xe85ff25, 0x408ef57,-    0x1814cfa4, 0x121b41b, 0xd248a0f, 0x3b05222, 0x39bb16a, 0xc75966d, 0xa038113, 0xa4a1769, 0x11fbc6c,-    0x917e50e, 0xeec3da8, 0x169d6eac, 0x10c1699, 0xa416153, 0xf724912, 0x15cd60b7, 0x4acbad9, 0x5efc5fa,-    0xf150ed7, 0x122b51, 0x1104b40a, 0xcb7f442, 0xfbb28ff, 0x6ac53ca, 0x196142cc, 0x7bf0fa9, 0x957651,-    0x4e0f215, 0xed439f8, 0x3f46bd5, 0x5ace82f, 0x110916b6, 0x6db078, 0xffd7d57, 0xf2ecaac, 0xca86dec,-    0x15d6b2da, 0x965ecc9, 0x1c92b4c2, 0x1f3811, 0x1cb080f5, 0x2d8b804, 0x19d1c12d, 0xf20bd46, 0x1951fa7,-    0xa3656c3, 0x523a425, 0xfcd0692, 0xd44ddc8, 0x131f0f5b, 0xaf80e4a, 0xcd9fc74, 0x99bb618, 0x2db944c,-    0xa673090, 0x1c210e1, 0x178c8d23, 0x1474383, 0x10b8743d, 0x985a55b, 0x2e74779, 0x576138, 0x9587927,-    0x133130fa, 0xbe05516, 0x9f4d619, 0xbb62570, 0x99ec591, 0xd9468fe, 0x1d07782d, 0xfc72e0b, 0x701b298,-    0x1863863b, 0x85954b8, 0x121a0c36, 0x9e7fedf, 0xf64b429, 0x9b9d71e, 0x14e2f5d8, 0xf858d3a, 0x942eea8,-    0xda5b765, 0x6edafff, 0xa9d18cc, 0xc65e4ba, 0x1c747e86, 0xe4ea915, 0x1981d7a1, 0x8395659, 0x52ed4e2,-    0x87d43b7, 0x37ab11b, 0x19d292ce, 0xf8d4692, 0x18c3053f, 0x8863e13, 0x4c146c0, 0x6bdf55a, 0x4e4457d,-    0x16152289, 0xac78ec2, 0x1a59c5a2, 0x2028b97, 0x71c2d01, 0x295851f, 0x404747b, 0x878558d, 0x7d29aa4,-    0x13d8341f, 0x8daefd7, 0x139c972d, 0x6b7ea75, 0xd4a9dde, 0xff163d8, 0x81d55d7, 0xa5bef68, 0xb7b30d8,-    0xbe73d6f, 0xaa88141, 0xd976c81, 0x7e7a9cc, 0x18beb771, 0xd773cbd, 0x13f51951, 0x9d0c177, 0x1c49a78,-};+#include "p256/p256_gf.h"   /* Field element operations: */ -/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns:- *   0xffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**31- *   0 for x == 0 or x > 2**31.- *- * x must be a u32 or an equivalent type such as limb. */-#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u32)(x) - 1) >> 31) - 1)--/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|,- * which is a term at 2**257.- *- * On entry: carry < 2**3, inout[0,2,...] < 2**29, inout[1,3,...] < 2**28.- * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**30, inout[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) {-  const u32 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry);--  inout[0] += carry << 1;-  inout[3] += 0x10000000 & carry_mask;-  /* carry < 2**3 thus (carry << 11) < 2**14 and we added 2**28 in the-   * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */-  inout[3] -= carry << 11;-  inout[4] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask;-  inout[5] += (0x10000000 - 1) & carry_mask;-  inout[6] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask;-  inout[6] -= carry << 22;-  /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the-   * next line. */-  inout[7] -= 1 & carry_mask;-  inout[7] += carry << 25;-}--/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2.- *- * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 32-bit word.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */-static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {-  limb carry = 0;-  unsigned i;--  for (i = 0;; i++) {-    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 29;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == NLIMBS)-      break;--    out[i] = in[i] + in2[i];-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 28;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--#define two31m3 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 3)-#define two30m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 2)-#define two30p13m2 (((limb)1) << 30) + (((limb)1) << 13) - (((limb)1) << 2)-#define two31m2 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 2)-#define two31p24m2 (((limb)1) << 31) + (((limb)1) << 24) - (((limb)1) << 2)-#define two30m27m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 27) - (((limb)1) << 2)--/* zero31 is 0 mod p. */-static const felem zero31 = { two31m3, two30m2, two31m2, two30p13m2, two31m2, two30m2, two31p24m2, two30m27m2, two31m2 };--/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2.- *- * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and- *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {-  limb carry = 0;-  unsigned i;--   for (i = 0;; i++) {-    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];-    out[i] += zero31[i];-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 29;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == NLIMBS)-      break;--    out[i] = in[i] - in2[i];-    out[i] += zero31[i];-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 28;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words- * with the same 29,28,... bit positions as an felem.- *- * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257.- * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is- * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be- * in Montgomery form.- *- * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**64- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */-static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u64 tmp[17]) {-   /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code:-    *-    * Limb number:   0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10...-    * Width (bits):  29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29-    * Start bit:     0 | 29| 57| 86|114|143|171|200|228|257|285-    *   (odd phase): 0 | 28| 57| 85|114|142|171|199|228|256|285 */-  limb tmp2[18], carry, x, xMask;-  unsigned i;--  /* tmp contains 64-bit words with the same 29,28,29-bit positions as an-   * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another-   * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this-   * overlap. */-  tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom29Bits);--  /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>32)" to try-   * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting-   * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating-   * afterwards. */-  tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 29;-  tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits;-  tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom28Bits;-  carry = tmp2[1] >> 28;-  tmp2[1] &= kBottom28Bits;--  for (i = 2; i < 17; i++) {-    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25;-    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 28;-    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 4) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i] += carry;-    carry = tmp2[i] >> 29;-    tmp2[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == 17)-      break;-    tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25;-    tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 29;-    tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits;-    tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom28Bits;-    tmp2[i] += carry;-    carry = tmp2[i] >> 28;-    tmp2[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  tmp2[17] = ((limb)(tmp[15] >> 32)) >> 25;-  tmp2[17] += ((limb)(tmp[16])) >> 29;-  tmp2[17] += (((limb)(tmp[16] >> 32)) << 3);-  tmp2[17] += carry;--  /* Montgomery elimination of terms.-   *-   * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can-   * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by-   * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value.-   *-   * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 29 bits of p-   * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0.-   * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the-   * extra factor of R. */-  for (i = 0;; i += 2) {-    tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 29;-    x = tmp2[i] & kBottom29Bits;-    xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x);-    tmp2[i] = 0;--    /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of-     * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their-     * right.-     *-     * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an-     * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are-     * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately-     * and are written as, for example, 28 to mean a value <2**28.-     *-     * Word:                   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10-     * Added in top half:     28  11      29  21  29  28-     *                                        28  29-     *                                            29-     * Added in bottom half:      29  10      28  21  28   28-     *                                            29-     *-     * The value that is currently offset 7 will be offset 5 for the next-     * iteration and then offset 3 for the iteration after that. Therefore-     * the total value added will be the values added at 7, 5 and 3.-     *-     * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom-     * are written as, for example, 29+28, to mean a value < 2**29+2**28.-     *-     * Word:                   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  11  12  13-     *                        28  11  10  29  21  29  28  28  28  28  28-     *                            29  28  11  28  29  28  29  28  29  28-     *                                    29  28  21  21  29  21  29  21-     *                                        10  29  28  21  28  21  28-     *                                        28  29  28  29  28  29  28-     *                                            11  10  29  10  29  10-     *                                            29  28  11  28  11-     *                                                    29      29-     *                        ---------------------------------------------     *                                                30+ 31+ 30+ 31+ 30+-     *                                                28+ 29+ 28+ 29+ 21+-     *                                                21+ 28+ 21+ 28+ 10-     *                                                10  21+ 10  21+-     *                                                    11      11-     *-     * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[10] and tmp2[12]. If-     * tmp2[10/12] has an initial value of <2**29, then the maximum value-     * will be < 2**31 + 2**30 + 2**28 + 2**21 + 2**11, which is < 2**32,-     * as required. */-    tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 10) & kBottom28Bits;-    tmp2[i + 4] += (x >> 18);--    tmp2[i + 6] += (x << 21) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i + 7] += x >> 8;--    /* At position 200, which is the starting bit position for word 7, we-     * have a factor of 0xf000000 = 2**28 - 2**24. */-    tmp2[i + 7] += 0x10000000 & xMask;-    /* Word 7 is 28 bits wide, so the 2**28 term exactly hits word 8. */-    tmp2[i + 8] += (x - 1) & xMask;-    tmp2[i + 7] -= (x << 24) & kBottom28Bits;-    tmp2[i + 8] -= x >> 4;--    tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask;-    tmp2[i + 8] -= x;-    tmp2[i + 8] += (x << 28) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i + 9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask;--    if (i+1 == NLIMBS)-      break;-    tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 28;-    x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom28Bits;-    xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x);-    tmp2[i + 1] = 0;--    tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 11) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 18);--    tmp2[i + 7] += (x << 21) & kBottom28Bits;-    tmp2[i + 8] += x >> 7;--    /* At position 199, which is the starting bit of the 8th word when-     * dealing with a context starting on an odd word, we have a factor of-     * 0x1e000000 = 2**29 - 2**25. Since we have not updated i, the 8th-     * word from i+1 is i+8. */-    tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask;-    tmp2[i + 9] += (x - 1) & xMask;-    tmp2[i + 8] -= (x << 25) & kBottom29Bits;-    tmp2[i + 9] -= x >> 4;--    tmp2[i + 9] += 0x10000000 & xMask;-    tmp2[i + 9] -= x;-    tmp2[i + 10] += (x - 1) & xMask;-  }--  /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have-   * widths of 28,29,... which we need to correct when copying them down.  */-  carry = 0;-  for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {-    /* The maximum value of tmp2[i + 9] occurs on the first iteration and-     * is < 2**30+2**29+2**28. Adding 2**29 (from tmp2[i + 10]) is-     * therefore safe. */-    out[i] = tmp2[i + 9];-    out[i] += carry;-    out[i] += (tmp2[i + 10] << 28) & kBottom29Bits;-    carry = out[i] >> 29;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    out[i] = tmp2[i + 9] >> 1;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 28;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  out[8] = tmp2[17];-  out[8] += carry;-  carry = out[8] >> 29;-  out[8] &= kBottom29Bits;--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--/* felem_square sets out=in*in.- *- * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) {-  u64 tmp[17];--  tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in[0];-  tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1);-  tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[1] << 1);-  tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1);-  tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[1]) * (in[3] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * in[2];-  tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in[4] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1);-  tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[3] << 1);-  tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[5] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1);-  /* tmp[8] has the greatest value of 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**60,-   * which is < 2**64 as required. */-  tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[6] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * in[4];-  tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) *-           (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[6] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[4]) * (in[5] << 1);-  tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) *-            (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in[6] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[5]) * (in[5] << 1);-  tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *-            (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[6] << 1);-  tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in[8] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[5]) * (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[6]) * in[6];-  tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in[8] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[6]) * (in[7] << 1);-  tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in[8] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[7]) * (in[7] << 1);-  tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in[8] << 1);-  tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * in[8];--  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);-}--/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2.- *- * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and- *           in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) {-  u64 tmp[17];--  tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in2[0];-  tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[1] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[1] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[2] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[1] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[3] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *-           (in2[1] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[4] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *-           (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[1] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[5] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *-           (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[2] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[1] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  /* tmp[8] has the greatest value but doesn't overflow. See logic in-   * felem_square. */-  tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) *-           (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) *-           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[3] << 1) +-           ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *-           (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[0] << 0);-  tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) *-           (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) *-           (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[3] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[2] << 0) +-           ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[1] << 0);-  tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) *-            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-            ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) *-            (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[3] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[2] << 0);-  tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) *-            (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-            ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *-            (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[3] << 0);-  tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) *-            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-            ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[5] << 1) +-            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[4] << 0);-  tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) *-            (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[6] << 0) +-            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[5] << 0);-  tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) *-            (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[6] << 0);-  tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[8] << 0) +-            ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[7] << 0);-  tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[8] << 0);--  felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp);-}--static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) {-  memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem));-}- /* felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1}  *  * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem:@@ -667,131 +105,7 @@   felem_mul(out, ftmp2, ftmp); /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 3 */ } -/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out.- *- * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) {-  limb carry = 0;-  unsigned i; -  for (i = 0;; i++) {-    out[i] *= 3;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 29;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == NLIMBS)-      break;--    out[i] *= 3;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = out[i] >> 28;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out.- *- * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) {-  limb carry = 0, next_carry;-  unsigned i;--  for (i = 0;; i++) {-    next_carry = out[i] >> 27;-    out[i] <<= 2;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29);-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == NLIMBS)-      break;--    next_carry = out[i] >> 26;-    out[i] <<= 2;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28);-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out.- *- * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29.- * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */-static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) {-  limb carry = 0, next_carry;-  unsigned i;--  for (i = 0;; i++) {-    next_carry = out[i] >> 26;-    out[i] <<= 3;-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29);-    out[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--    i++;-    if (i == NLIMBS)-      break;--    next_carry = out[i] >> 25;-    out[i] <<= 3;-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-    out[i] += carry;-    carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28);-    out[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-  }--  felem_reduce_carry(out, carry);-}--/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of- * time depending on the value of |in|. */-static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) {-  limb carry;-  int i;-  limb tmp[NLIMBS];--  felem_assign(tmp, in);--  /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */-  do {-    carry = 0;-    for (i = 0;; i++) {-      tmp[i] += carry;-      carry = tmp[i] >> 29;-      tmp[i] &= kBottom29Bits;--      i++;-      if (i == NLIMBS)-        break;--      tmp[i] += carry;-      carry = tmp[i] >> 28;-      tmp[i] &= kBottom28Bits;-    }--    felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry);-  } while (carry);--  /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */-  return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||-         memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 ||-         memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0;-}-- /* Group operations:  *  * Elements of the elliptic curve group are represented in Jacobian@@ -971,9 +285,9 @@   felem_diff(y_out, y_out, tmp); } -/* copy_conditional sets out=in if mask = 0xffffffff in constant time.+/* copy_conditional sets out=in if mask = -1 in constant time.  *- * On entry: mask is either 0 or 0xffffffff. */+ * On entry: mask is either 0 or -1. */ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) {   int i; @@ -1168,58 +482,6 @@   } } -#define kRDigits {2, 0, 0, 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 1} // 2^257 mod p256.p--#define kRInvDigits {0x80000000, 1, 0xffffffff, 0, 0x80000001, 0xfffffffe, 1, 0x7fffffff}  // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p--static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits };-static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits };--/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */-static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) {-  cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted;-  int i;--  cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted);-  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted);--  for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) {-    if ((i & 1) == 0) {-      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom29Bits;-      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 29, &in_shifted);-    } else {-      out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom28Bits;-      cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 28, &in_shifted);-    }-  }--  cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted);-}--/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */-static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) {-  cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp;-  int i, top;--  cryptonite_p256_init(&result);-  cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp);--  cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result);-  for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) {-    if ((i & 1) == 0) {-      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 29, &tmp);-    } else {-      top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 28, &tmp);-    }-    top |= cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result);-  }--  cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out);--  cryptonite_p256_clear(&result);-  cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp);-}- /* cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul sets {out_x,out_y} = nG, where n is < the  * order of the group. */ void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int* n, cryptonite_p256_int* out_x, cryptonite_p256_int* out_y) {@@ -1287,19 +549,16 @@     const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x2, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y2,     cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y) {-    felem x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, px1, py1, px2, py2;-    const cryptonite_p256_int one = P256_ONE;+    felem x, y, z, px1, py1, px2, py2;      to_montgomery(px1, in_x1);     to_montgomery(py1, in_y1);     to_montgomery(px2, in_x2);     to_montgomery(py2, in_y2); -    scalar_mult(x1, y1, z1, px1, py1, &one);-    scalar_mult(x2, y2, z2, px2, py2, &one);-    point_add_or_double_vartime(x1, y1, z1, x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2);+    point_add_or_double_vartime(x, y, z, px1, py1, kOne, px2, py2, kOne); -    point_to_affine(px1, py1, x1, y1, z1);+    point_to_affine(px1, py1, x, y, z);     from_montgomery(out_x, px1);     from_montgomery(out_y, py1); }@@ -1313,4 +572,21 @@ {     memcpy(out_x, in_x, P256_NBYTES);     cryptonite_p256_sub(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in_y, out_y);+}++/* this function is not part of the original source+   cryptonite_p256e_point_mul sets {out_x,out_y} = n*{in_x,in_y}, where+   n is < the order of the group.+ */+void cryptonite_p256e_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int* n,+    const cryptonite_p256_int* in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int* in_y,+    cryptonite_p256_int* out_x, cryptonite_p256_int* out_y) {+  felem x, y, z, px, py;++  to_montgomery(px, in_x);+  to_montgomery(py, in_y);+  scalar_mult(x, y, z, px, py, n);+  point_to_affine(px, py, x, y, z);+  from_montgomery(out_x, px);+  from_montgomery(out_y, py); }
cryptonite.cabal view
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ Name:                cryptonite-version:             0.25+version:             0.30 Synopsis:            Cryptography Primitives sink Description:     A repository of cryptographic primitives.@@ -8,18 +8,18 @@     .     * Hash: SHA1, SHA2, SHA3, SHAKE, MD2, MD4, MD5, Keccak, Skein, Ripemd, Tiger, Whirlpool, Blake2     .-    * MAC: HMAC, Poly1305+    * MAC: HMAC, KMAC, Poly1305     .     * Asymmetric crypto: DSA, RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, ECC, Curve25519, Curve448, Ed25519, Ed448     .-    * Key Derivation Function: PBKDF2, Scrypt, HKDF, Argon2+    * Key Derivation Function: PBKDF2, Scrypt, HKDF, Argon2, BCrypt, BCryptPBKDF     .     * Cryptographic Random generation: System Entropy, Deterministic Random Generator     .     * Data related: Anti-Forensic Information Splitter (AFIS)     .     If anything cryptographic related is missing from here, submit-    a pull request to have it added. This package strive to be a+    a pull request to have it added. This package strives to be a     cryptographic kitchen sink that provides cryptography for everyone.     .     Evaluate the security related to your requirements before using.@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ Build-Type:          Simple Homepage:            https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite Bug-reports:         https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/issues-Cabal-Version:       >=1.18-tested-with:         GHC==8.0.2, GHC==7.10.3, GHC==7.8.4+Cabal-Version:       1.18+tested-with:         GHC==9.2.2, GHC==9.0.2, GHC==8.10.7, GHC==8.8.4 extra-doc-files:     README.md CHANGELOG.md extra-source-files:  cbits/*.h                      cbits/aes/*.h@@ -50,12 +50,14 @@                      cbits/decaf/p448/*.h                      cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_tables.c                      cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf.c-                     cbits/p256/*.h+                     cbits/include32/p256/*.h+                     cbits/include64/p256/*.h                      cbits/blake2/ref/*.h                      cbits/blake2/sse/*.h                      cbits/argon2/*.h                      cbits/argon2/*.c                      cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c+                     cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c                      tests/*.hs  source-repository head@@ -102,8 +104,14 @@   Default:           False   Manual:            True +Flag use_target_attributes+  Description:       use GCC / clang function attributes instead of global target options.+  Default:           True+  Manual:            True+ Library   Exposed-modules:   Crypto.Cipher.AES+                     Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV                      Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish                      Crypto.Cipher.CAST5                      Crypto.Cipher.Camellia@@ -126,17 +134,22 @@                      Crypto.MAC.CMAC                      Crypto.MAC.Poly1305                      Crypto.MAC.HMAC+                     Crypto.MAC.KMAC                      Crypto.Number.Basic                      Crypto.Number.F2m                      Crypto.Number.Generate                      Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic+                     Crypto.Number.Nat                      Crypto.Number.Prime                      Crypto.Number.Serialize+                     Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE                      Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal+                     Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE                      Crypto.KDF.Argon2                      Crypto.KDF.PBKDF2                      Crypto.KDF.Scrypt                      Crypto.KDF.BCrypt+                     Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF                      Crypto.KDF.HKDF                      Crypto.Hash                      Crypto.Hash.IO@@ -153,20 +166,28 @@                      Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA                      Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256                      Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types+                     Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA                      Crypto.PubKey.ECIES                      Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519                      Crypto.PubKey.Ed448+                     Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA.Prim                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA.OAEP                      Crypto.PubKey.RSA.Types+                     Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP+                     Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic+                     Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified+                     Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW+                     Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types                      Crypto.Random                      Crypto.Random.Types                      Crypto.Random.Entropy                      Crypto.Random.EntropyPool                      Crypto.Random.Entropy.Unsafe+                     Crypto.System.CPU                      Crypto.Tutorial   Other-modules:     Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive                      Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box@@ -184,6 +205,7 @@                      Crypto.Error.Types                      Crypto.Number.Compat                      Crypto.Hash.Types+                     Crypto.Hash.Blake2                      Crypto.Hash.Blake2s                      Crypto.Hash.Blake2sp                      Crypto.Hash.Blake2b@@ -195,6 +217,7 @@                      Crypto.Hash.SHA512                      Crypto.Hash.SHA512t                      Crypto.Hash.SHA3+                     Crypto.Hash.SHAKE                      Crypto.Hash.Keccak                      Crypto.Hash.MD2                      Crypto.Hash.MD4@@ -213,24 +236,25 @@                      Crypto.PubKey.ElGamal                      Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types                      Crypto.ECC.Simple.Prim-                     Crypto.Internal.Proxy+                     Crypto.Internal.Builder                      Crypto.Internal.ByteArray                      Crypto.Internal.Compat                      Crypto.Internal.CompatPrim                      Crypto.Internal.DeepSeq                      Crypto.Internal.Imports+                     Crypto.Internal.Nat                      Crypto.Internal.Words                      Crypto.Internal.WordArray-  if impl(ghc >= 7.8)-    Other-modules:   Crypto.Hash.SHAKE-                     Crypto.Hash.Blake2-                     Crypto.Internal.Nat-  Build-depends:     base >= 4.6 && < 5-                   , bytestring-                   , memory >= 0.14.14+  if impl(ghc < 8.8)+    Buildable: False+  else+    Build-depends:   base++  Build-depends:     bytestring+                   , memory >= 0.14.18                    , basement >= 0.0.6                    , ghc-prim-  ghc-options:       -Wall -fwarn-tabs -optc-O3 -fno-warn-unused-imports+  ghc-options:       -Wall -fwarn-tabs -optc-O3   if os(linux)     extra-libraries: pthread   default-language:  Haskell2010@@ -269,7 +293,12 @@                    , cbits/decaf/include                    , cbits/decaf/p448 -  if arch(x86_64)+  if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64)+    include-dirs:      cbits/include64+  else+    include-dirs:      cbits/include32++  if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64)     C-sources:         cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.c                      , cbits/decaf/p448/f_generic.c                      , cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c@@ -292,7 +321,7 @@     include-dirs:      cbits/decaf/include/arch_32                      , cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32 -  if arch(x86_64)+  if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64)     C-sources: cbits/curve25519/curve25519-donna-c64.c   else     C-sources: cbits/curve25519/curve25519-donna.c@@ -315,9 +344,13 @@     c-sources:      cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c    if flag(support_aesni) && (os(linux) || os(freebsd) || os(osx)) && (arch(i386) || arch(x86_64))-    CC-options:     -mssse3 -maes -DWITH_AESNI+    CC-options:     -DWITH_AESNI+    if !flag(use_target_attributes)+      CC-options:     -mssse3 -maes     if flag(support_pclmuldq)-       CC-options:  -msse4.1 -mpclmul -DWITH_PCLMUL+      CC-options:   -DWITH_PCLMUL+      if !flag(use_target_attributes)+        CC-options:     -msse4.1 -mpclmul     C-sources:       cbits/aes/x86ni.c                    , cbits/aes/generic.c                    , cbits/aes/gf.c@@ -342,6 +375,8 @@    if arch(x86_64) || flag(support_sse)     CPP-options:    -DSUPPORT_SSE+    if arch(i386)+      CC-options:   -msse2    C-sources:      cbits/argon2/argon2.c   include-dirs:   cbits/argon2@@ -362,6 +397,8 @@     Build-depends:   deepseq   if flag(check_alignment)     cc-options:     -DWITH_ASSERT_ALIGNMENT+  if flag(use_target_attributes)+    cc-options:     -DWITH_TARGET_ATTRIBUTES  Test-Suite test-cryptonite   type:              exitcode-stdio-1.0@@ -370,8 +407,10 @@   Other-modules:     BlockCipher                      ChaCha                      BCrypt+                     BCryptPBKDF                      ECC                      ECC.Edwards25519+                     ECDSA                      Hash                      Imports                      KAT_AES.KATCBC@@ -381,6 +420,7 @@                      KAT_AES.KATOCB3                      KAT_AES.KATXTS                      KAT_AES+                     KAT_AESGCMSIV                      KAT_AFIS                      KAT_Argon2                      KAT_Blowfish@@ -391,9 +431,11 @@                      KAT_DES                      KAT_Ed25519                      KAT_Ed448+                     KAT_EdDSA                      KAT_CMAC                      KAT_HKDF                      KAT_HMAC+                     KAT_KMAC                      KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel                      KAT_PBKDF2                      KAT_OTP@@ -403,6 +445,8 @@                      KAT_PubKey.OAEP                      KAT_PubKey.PSS                      KAT_PubKey.P256+                     KAT_PubKey.RSA+                     KAT_PubKey.Rabin                      KAT_PubKey                      KAT_RC4                      KAT_Scrypt@@ -416,7 +460,7 @@                      Salsa                      Utils                      XSalsa-  Build-Depends:     base >= 3 && < 5+  Build-Depends:     base >= 0 && < 10                    , bytestring                    , memory                    , tasty@@ -424,7 +468,7 @@                    , tasty-hunit                    , tasty-kat                    , cryptonite-  ghc-options:       -Wall -fno-warn-orphans -fno-warn-missing-signatures -fno-warn-unused-imports -rtsopts+  ghc-options:       -Wall -fno-warn-orphans -fno-warn-missing-signatures -rtsopts   default-language:  Haskell2010  Benchmark bench-cryptonite@@ -432,7 +476,7 @@   hs-source-dirs:    benchs   Main-is:           Bench.hs   Other-modules:     Number.F2m-  Build-Depends:     base >= 3 && < 5+  Build-Depends:     base                    , bytestring                    , deepseq                    , memory
tests/BCrypt.hs view
@@ -75,4 +75,8 @@ tests = testGroup "bcrypt"     [ testGroup "KATs" makeKATs     , testCase "Invalid hash length" (assertEqual "" (Left "Invalid hash format") (validatePasswordEither B.empty ("$2a$06$DCq7YPn5Rq63x1Lad4cll.TV4S6ytwfsfvkgY8jIucDrjc8deX1s" :: B.ByteString)))+    , testCase "Hash and validate" (assertBool "Hashed password should validate" (validatePassword somePassword (bcrypt 5 aSalt somePassword :: B.ByteString)))     ]+  where+    somePassword = "some password" :: B.ByteString+    aSalt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" :: B.ByteString
+ tests/BCryptPBKDF.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}++module BCryptPBKDF (tests) where++import qualified Data.ByteString        as B++import           Test.Tasty+import           Test.Tasty.HUnit++import           Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF (Parameters (..), generate,+                                         hashInternal)++tests :: TestTree+tests = testGroup "BCryptPBKDF"+    [ testGroup "generate"+        [ testCase "1" generate1+        , testCase "2" generate2+        , testCase "3" generate3+        ]+    , testGroup "hashInternal"+        [ testCase "1" hashInternal1+        ]+    ]+  where+    -- test vector taken from the go implementation by @dchest+    generate1 = expected @=? generate params pass salt+        where+            params   = Parameters 12 32+            pass     = "password" :: B.ByteString+            salt     = "salt"     :: B.ByteString+            expected = B.pack+                [ 0x1a, 0xe4, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd4, 0x87, 0xbc, 0x02+                , 0xf6, 0x49, 0x21, 0xa4, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xea, 0x93+                , 0xbc, 0xac, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x5f, 0xda, 0x99, 0x97+                , 0x4c, 0x06, 0xb7, 0xb0, 0x1f, 0xae, 0x14, 0x9a+                ] :: B.ByteString++    -- test vector generated with the go implemenation by @dchest+    generate2 = expected @=? generate params pass salt+        where+            params   = Parameters 7 71+            pass     = "DieWuerdeDesMenschenIstUnantastbar" :: B.ByteString+            salt     = "Tafelsalz"                          :: B.ByteString+            expected = B.pack+                [ 0x17, 0xb4, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd7, 0x42, 0x33, 0x49+                , 0x5c, 0xe8, 0x79, 0x49, 0x15, 0x74, 0x4c, 0x71+                , 0xf9, 0x99, 0x66, 0x89, 0x7a, 0x60, 0xc3, 0x70+                , 0xb4, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x83, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x56, 0xde+                , 0x38, 0xbc, 0x51, 0x8c, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0xd1, 0xcf+                , 0x46, 0x0a, 0x68, 0x3d, 0xc8, 0x12, 0xcf, 0xf8+                , 0x43, 0xce, 0x21, 0x9d, 0x98, 0x81, 0x20, 0x26+                , 0x6e, 0x42, 0x0f, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x5d, 0x09, 0x8d+                , 0x45, 0xda, 0xd5, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x1d+                ] :: B.ByteString++    -- test vector generated with the go implemenation by @dchest+    generate3 = expected @=? generate params pass salt+        where+            params    = Parameters 5 5+            pass      = "ABC" :: B.ByteString+            salt      = "DEF" :: B.ByteString+            expected  = B.pack+                [ 0xdd, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x29+                ] :: B.ByteString++    hashInternal1 = expected @=? hashInternal passHash saltHash+        where+            passHash = B.pack [ 0  ..  63 ] :: B.ByteString+            saltHash = B.pack [ 64 .. 127 ] :: B.ByteString+            expected = B.pack+                [ 0x87, 0x90, 0x48, 0x70, 0xee, 0xf9, 0xde, 0xdd+                , 0xf8, 0xe7, 0x61, 0x1a, 0x14, 0x01, 0x06, 0xe6+                , 0xaa, 0xf1, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xd9, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0x04+                , 0xdb, 0x35, 0x64, 0x43, 0x72, 0x1e, 0xb5, 0x55+                ] :: B.ByteString
tests/ECC.hs view
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import qualified Crypto.ECC as ECC  import           Data.ByteArray.Encoding-import           Data.ByteString (ByteString)  import Imports @@ -25,6 +24,19 @@         , Curve ECC.Curve_X448         ] +data CurveArith = forall curve. (ECC.EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve, Show curve) => CurveArith curve++instance Show CurveArith where+    showsPrec d (CurveArith curve) = showsPrec d curve++instance Arbitrary CurveArith where+    arbitrary = elements+        [ CurveArith ECC.Curve_P256R1+        , CurveArith ECC.Curve_P384R1+        , CurveArith ECC.Curve_P521R1+        , CurveArith ECC.Curve_Edwards25519+        ]+ data VectorPoint = VectorPoint     { vpCurve :: Curve     , vpHex   :: ByteString@@ -263,13 +275,13 @@ cryptoError :: CryptoFailable a -> Maybe CryptoError cryptoError = onCryptoFailure Just (const Nothing) -doPointDecodeTest (i, vector) =+doPointDecodeTest i vector =     case vpCurve vector of         Curve curve ->             let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy              in testCase (show i) (vpError vector @=? cryptoError (ECC.decodePoint prx $ vpEncodedPoint vector)) -doWeakPointECDHTest (i, vector) =+doWeakPointECDHTest i vector =     case vpCurve vector of         Curve curve -> testCase (show i) $ do             let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy@@ -278,10 +290,10 @@             vpError vector @=? cryptoError (ECC.ecdh prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate keyPair) public)  tests = testGroup "ECC"-    [ testGroup "decodePoint" $ map doPointDecodeTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsPoint)-    , testGroup "ECDH weak points" $ map doWeakPointECDHTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsWeakPoint)+    [ testGroup "decodePoint" $ zipWith doPointDecodeTest [katZero..] vectorsPoint+    , testGroup "ECDH weak points" $ zipWith doWeakPointECDHTest [katZero..] vectorsWeakPoint     , testGroup "property"-        [ testProperty "decodePoint.encodePoint==id" $ \testDRG (Curve curve) -> do+        [ testProperty "decodePoint.encodePoint==id" $ \testDRG (Curve curve) ->             let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy                 keyPair = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateKeyPair prx                 p1 = ECC.keypairGetPublic keyPair@@ -299,5 +311,33 @@                 bobShared'   = ECC.ecdhRaw prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate bob) (ECC.keypairGetPublic alice)              in aliceShared == bobShared && aliceShared == CryptoPassed aliceShared'                                          && bobShared   == CryptoPassed bobShared'+        , testProperty "decodeScalar.encodeScalar==id" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) ->+            let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy+                s1 = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                bs = ECC.encodeScalar prx s1 :: ByteString+                s2 = ECC.decodeScalar prx bs+             in CryptoPassed s1 == s2+        , testProperty "scalarFromInteger.scalarToInteger==id" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) ->+            let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy+                s1 = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                bs = ECC.scalarToInteger prx s1+                s2 = ECC.scalarFromInteger prx bs+             in CryptoPassed s1 == s2+        , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testProperty "(a + b).P = a.P + b.P" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) ->+            let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy+                (s, a, b) = withTestDRG testDRG $+                                (,,) <$> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                                     <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                                     <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                p = ECC.pointBaseSmul prx s+             in ECC.pointSmul prx (ECC.scalarAdd prx a b) p == ECC.pointAdd prx (ECC.pointSmul prx a p) (ECC.pointSmul prx b p)+        , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testProperty "(a * b).P = a.(b.P)" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) ->+            let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy+                (s, a, b) = withTestDRG testDRG $+                                (,,) <$> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                                     <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                                     <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx+                p = ECC.pointBaseSmul prx s+             in ECC.pointSmul prx (ECC.scalarMul prx a b) p == ECC.pointSmul prx a (ECC.pointSmul prx b p)         ]     ]
+ tests/ECDSA.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@+{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}+module ECDSA (tests) where++import qualified Crypto.ECC as ECDSA+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECC+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA+import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms+import Crypto.Error+import qualified Data.ByteString as B++import Imports++data Curve = forall curve. (ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve, Show (ECDSA.Scalar curve)) => Curve curve ECC.Curve ECC.CurveName++instance Show Curve where+    showsPrec d (Curve _ _ name) = showsPrec d name++instance Arbitrary Curve where+    arbitrary = elements+        [ makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P256R1 ECC.SEC_p256r1+        , makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P384R1 ECC.SEC_p384r1+        , makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P521R1 ECC.SEC_p521r1+        ]+      where+        makeCurve c name = Curve c (ECC.getCurveByName name) name++arbitraryScalar curve = choose (1, n - 1)+  where n = ECC.ecc_n (ECC.common_curve curve)++sigECCToECDSA :: ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve+              => proxy curve -> ECC.Signature -> ECDSA.Signature curve+sigECCToECDSA prx (ECC.Signature r s) =+    ECDSA.Signature (throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx r)+                    (throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx s)++tests = localOption (QuickCheckTests 5) $ testGroup "ECDSA"+    [ testProperty "SHA1"   $ propertyECDSA SHA1+    , testProperty "SHA224" $ propertyECDSA SHA224+    , testProperty "SHA256" $ propertyECDSA SHA256+    , testProperty "SHA384" $ propertyECDSA SHA384+    , testProperty "SHA512" $ propertyECDSA SHA512+    ]+  where+    propertyECDSA hashAlg (Curve c curve _) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 msg) = do+        d    <- arbitraryScalar curve+        kECC <- arbitraryScalar curve+        let privECC   = ECC.PrivateKey curve d+            prx       = Just c -- using Maybe as Proxy+            kECDSA    = throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx kECC+            privECDSA = throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx d+            pubECDSA  = ECDSA.toPublic prx privECDSA+            Just sigECC   = ECC.signWith kECC privECC hashAlg msg+            Just sigECDSA = ECDSA.signWith prx kECDSA privECDSA hashAlg msg+            sigECDSA' = sigECCToECDSA prx sigECC+            msg' = msg `B.append` B.singleton 42+        return $ propertyHold [ eqTest "signature" sigECDSA sigECDSA'+                              , eqTest "verification" True (ECDSA.verify prx hashAlg pubECDSA sigECDSA' msg)+                              , eqTest "alteration"  False (ECDSA.verify prx hashAlg pubECDSA sigECDSA msg')+                              ]
tests/Hash.hs view
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@-{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}-{-# LANGUAGE ViewPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-}-#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}-#endif module Hash     ( tests     ) where@@ -12,7 +8,9 @@ import Crypto.Hash  import qualified Data.ByteString as B+import           Data.ByteArray (convert) import qualified Data.ByteArray.Encoding as B (convertToBase, Base(..))+import           GHC.TypeLits import Imports  v0,v1,v2 :: ByteString@@ -174,7 +172,6 @@         "69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9",         "606beeec743ccbeff6cbcdf5d5302aa855c256c29b88c8ed331ea1a6bf3c8812",         "94662583a600a12dff357c0a6f1b514a710ef0f587a38e8d2e4d7f67e9c81667" ])-#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0)     , ("SHAKE128_4096", HashAlg (SHAKE128 :: SHAKE128 4096), [         "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",         "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",@@ -215,7 +212,6 @@         "69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9",         "606beeec743ccbeff6cbcdf5d5302aa855c256c29b88c8ed331ea1a6bf3c8812",         "94662583a600a12dff357c0a6f1b514a710ef0f587a38e8d2e4d7f67e9c81667" ])-#endif     ]  runhash :: HashAlg -> ByteString -> ByteString@@ -225,6 +221,24 @@ runhashinc (HashAlg hashAlg) v = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashinc $ v   where hashinc = hashFinalize . foldl hashUpdate (hashInitWith hashAlg) +data HashPrefixAlg = forall alg . HashAlgorithmPrefix alg => HashPrefixAlg alg++expectedPrefix :: [ (String, HashPrefixAlg) ]+expectedPrefix =+    [ ("MD5", HashPrefixAlg MD5)+    , ("SHA1", HashPrefixAlg SHA1)+    , ("SHA224", HashPrefixAlg SHA224)+    , ("SHA256", HashPrefixAlg SHA256)+    , ("SHA384", HashPrefixAlg SHA384)+    , ("SHA512", HashPrefixAlg SHA512)+    ]++runhashpfx :: HashPrefixAlg -> ByteString -> ByteString+runhashpfx (HashPrefixAlg hashAlg) v = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashWith hashAlg v++runhashpfxpfx :: HashPrefixAlg -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString+runhashpfxpfx (HashPrefixAlg hashAlg) v len = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashPrefixWith hashAlg v len+ makeTestAlg (name, hashAlg, results) =     testGroup name $ concatMap maketest (zip3 is vectors results)   where@@ -240,7 +254,40 @@         runhash hashAlg inp `propertyEq` runhashinc hashAlg (chunkS ckLen inp)     ] +makeTestPrefix (hashName, hashAlg) =+    [ testProperty hashName $ \(ArbitraryBS0_2901 inp) (Int0_2901 len) ->+        runhashpfx hashAlg (B.take len inp) `propertyEq` runhashpfxpfx hashAlg inp len+    ]++makeTestHybrid (hashName, HashPrefixAlg alg) =+    [ testProperty hashName $ \(ArbitraryBS0_2901 start) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 end) -> do+        len <- choose (0, B.length end)+        let ref = hashWith alg (start `B.append` B.take len end)+            hyb = hashFinalizePrefix (hashUpdate (hashInitWith alg) start) end len+        return (ref `propertyEq` hyb)+    ]++-- SHAKE128 truncation example with expected byte at final position+-- <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Standards-and-Guidelines/documents/examples/ShakeTruncation.pdf>+shake128TruncationBytes = [0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x2f, 0x6f, 0x6f]++makeTestSHAKE128Truncation i byte =+    testCase (show i) $ xof 4088 `B.snoc` byte @=? xof (4088 + i)+  where+    hashEmpty :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> Digest (SHAKE128 n)+    hashEmpty _ = hash B.empty++    xof n = case someNatVal n of+                Nothing          -> error ("invalid Nat: " ++ show n)+                Just (SomeNat p) -> convert (hashEmpty p)+ tests = testGroup "hash"     [ testGroup "KATs" (map makeTestAlg expected)     , testGroup "Chunking" (concatMap makeTestChunk expected)+    , testGroup "Prefix" (concatMap makeTestPrefix expectedPrefix)+    , testGroup "Hybrid" (concatMap makeTestHybrid expectedPrefix)+    , testGroup "Truncating"+        [ testGroup "SHAKE128"+            (zipWith makeTestSHAKE128Truncation [1..] shake128TruncationBytes)+        ]     ]
tests/KAT_AES/KATGCM.hs view
@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@         , {-out = -}"\xe4\x42\xf8\xc4\xc6\x67\x84\x86\x4a\x5a\x6e\xc7\xe0\xca\x68\xac\x16\xbc\x5b\xbf\xf7\xd5\xf3\xfa\xf3\xb2\xcb\xb0\xa2\x14\xa1"         , {-taglen = -}16         , {-tag = -}"\x94\xd1\x47\xc3\xa2\xca\x93\xe9\x66\x93\x1e\x3b\xb3\xbb\x67\x01")+    -- vector 6 tests 32-bit counter wrapping+    ,   ( {-key = -}"\x01\x02\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , {-iv = -}"\xe8\x38\x84\x1d\x75\xae\x33\xb5\x4b\x51\x57\x89\xc9\x5f\xbe\x65"+        , {-aad = -}"\x54\x68\x65\x20\x66\x69\x76\x65\x20\x62\x6f\x78\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x77\x69\x7a\x61\x72\x64\x73\x20\x6a\x75\x6d\x70\x20\x71\x75\x69\x63\x6b\x6c\x79\x2e"+        , {-input = -}"\x54\x68\x65\x20\x71\x75\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x62\x72\x6f\x77\x6e\x20\x66\x6f\x78\x20\x6a\x75\x6d\x70\x73\x20\x6f\x76\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x6c\x61\x7a\x79\x20\x64\x6f\x67"+        , {-out = -}"\x82\x31\x9e\x5a\x6a\x7f\x43\xd0\x42\x8c\xf1\x01\xcf\x0c\x75\xf1\x5d\xda\x4f\xa1\x28\x95\xcd\xd7\x7b\xd5\x42\x68\x2f\xcd\x10\x1b\x0c\x75\x05\x54\xf4\x2f\x2b\xf6\x69\x96\x29"+        , {-taglen = -}16+        , {-tag = -}"\x9a\xfa\xf4\xea\xae\x2e\x6f\x40\x00\xf4\x89\x77\xd0\x1e\xd5\x14")     ]  vectors_aes256_enc :: [KATGCM]
+ tests/KAT_AESGCMSIV.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,494 @@+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}+{-# LANGUAGE Rank2Types #-}+{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}+module KAT_AESGCMSIV (tests) where++import Imports++import Data.Proxy+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B++import Crypto.Cipher.AES+import Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV+import Crypto.Cipher.Types+import Crypto.Error++data Vector c = Vector+    { vecPlaintext  :: ByteString+    , vecAAD        :: ByteString+    , vecKey        :: ByteString+    , vecNonce      :: ByteString+    , vecTag        :: ByteString+    , vecCiphertext :: ByteString+    }++vecCipher :: Cipher c => Vector c -> c+vecCipher = throwCryptoError . cipherInit . vecKey++vectors128 :: [Vector AES128]+vectors128 =+    [ Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = ""+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xdc\x20\xe2\xd8\x3f\x25\x70\x5b\xb4\x9e\x43\x9e\xca\x56\xde\x25"+        , vecCiphertext = ""+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x57\x87\x82\xff\xf6\x01\x3b\x81\x5b\x28\x7c\x22\x49\x3a\x36\x4c"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xb5\xd8\x39\x33\x0a\xc7\xb7\x86"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xa4\x97\x8d\xb3\x57\x39\x1a\x0b\xc4\xfd\xec\x8b\x0d\x10\x66\x39"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x73\x23\xea\x61\xd0\x59\x32\x26\x00\x47\xd9\x42"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x30\x3a\xaf\x90\xf6\xfe\x21\x19\x9c\x60\x68\x57\x74\x37\xa0\xc4"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x74\x3f\x7c\x80\x77\xab\x25\xf8\x62\x4e\x2e\x94\x85\x79\xcf\x77"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x1a\x8e\x45\xdc\xd4\x57\x8c\x66\x7c\xd8\x68\x47\xbf\x61\x55\xff"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x84\xe0\x7e\x62\xba\x83\xa6\x58\x54\x17\x24\x5d\x7e\xc4\x13\xa9\xfe\x42\x7d\x63\x15\xc0\x9b\x57\xce\x45\xf2\xe3\x93\x6a\x94\x45"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x5e\x6e\x31\x1d\xbf\x39\x5d\x35\xb0\xfe\x39\xc2\x71\x43\x88\xf8"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x3f\xd2\x4c\xe1\xf5\xa6\x7b\x75\xbf\x23\x51\xf1\x81\xa4\x75\xc7\xb8\x00\xa5\xb4\xd3\xdc\xf7\x01\x06\xb1\xee\xa8\x2f\xa1\xd6\x4d\xf4\x2b\xf7\x22\x61\x22\xfa\x92\xe1\x7a\x40\xee\xaa\xc1\x20\x1b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x8a\x26\x3d\xd3\x17\xaa\x88\xd5\x6b\xdf\x39\x36\xdb\xa7\x5b\xb8"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x24\x33\x66\x8f\x10\x58\x19\x0f\x6d\x43\xe3\x60\xf4\xf3\x5c\xd8\xe4\x75\x12\x7c\xfc\xa7\x02\x8e\xa8\xab\x5c\x20\xf7\xab\x2a\xf0\x25\x16\xa2\xbd\xcb\xc0\x8d\x52\x1b\xe3\x7f\xf2\x8c\x15\x2b\xba\x36\x69\x7f\x25\xb4\xcd\x16\x9c\x65\x90\xd1\xdd\x39\x56\x6d\x3f"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x3b\x0a\x1a\x25\x60\x96\x9c\xdf\x79\x0d\x99\x75\x9a\xbd\x15\x08"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x1e\x6d\xab\xa3\x56\x69\xf4\x27"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x08\x29\x9c\x51\x02\x74\x5a\xaa\x3a\x0c\x46\x9f\xad\x9e\x07\x5a"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x29\x6c\x78\x89\xfd\x99\xf4\x19\x17\xf4\x46\x20"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x8f\x89\x36\xec\x03\x9e\x4e\x4b\xb9\x7e\xbd\x8c\x44\x57\x44\x1f"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xe2\xb0\xc5\xda\x79\xa9\x01\xc1\x74\x5f\x70\x05\x25\xcb\x33\x5b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xe6\xaf\x6a\x7f\x87\x28\x7d\xa0\x59\xa7\x16\x84\xed\x34\x98\xe1"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x00\x48\xef\x3c\x1e\x73\xe5\x7e\x02\xbb\x85\x62\xc4\x16\xa3\x19\xe7\x3e\x4c\xaa\xc8\xe9\x6a\x1e\xcb\x29\x33\x14\x5a\x1d\x71"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x6a\x8c\xc3\x86\x5f\x76\x89\x7c\x2e\x4b\x24\x5c\xf3\x1c\x51\xf2"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x50\xc8\x30\x3e\xa9\x39\x25\xd6\x40\x90\xd0\x7b\xd1\x09\xdf\xd9\x51\x5a\x5a\x33\x43\x10\x19\xc1\x7d\x93\x46\x59\x99\xa8\xb0\x05\x32\x01\xd7\x23\x12\x0a\x85\x62\xb8\x38\xcd\xff\x25\xbf\x9d\x1e"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xcd\xc4\x6a\xe4\x75\x56\x3d\xe0\x37\x00\x1e\xf8\x4a\xe2\x17\x44"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x2f\x5c\x64\x05\x9d\xb5\x5e\xe0\xfb\x84\x7e\xd5\x13\x00\x37\x46\xac\xa4\xe6\x1c\x71\x1b\x5d\xe2\xe7\xa7\x7f\xfd\x02\xda\x42\xfe\xec\x60\x19\x10\xd3\x46\x7b\xb8\xb3\x6e\xbb\xae\xbc\xe5\xfb\xa3\x0d\x36\xc9\x5f\x48\xa3\xe7\x98\x0f\x0e\x7a\xc2\x99\x33\x2a\x80"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x07\xeb\x1f\x84\xfb\x28\xf8\xcb\x73\xde\x8e\x99\xe2\xf4\x8a\x14"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xa8\xfe\x3e\x87"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x24\xaf\xc9\x80\x5e\x97\x6f\x45\x1e\x6d\x87\xf6\xfe\x10\x65\x14"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x6b\xb0\xfe\xcf\x5d\xed\x9b\x77\xf9\x02\xc7\xd5\xda\x23\x6a\x43\x91\xdd\x02\x97"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xbf\xf9\xb2\xef\x00\xfb\x47\x92\x0c\xc7\x2a\x0c\x0f\x13\xb9\xfd"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x44\xd0\xaa\xf6\xfb\x2f\x1f\x34\xad\xd5\xe8\x06\x4e\x83\xe1\x2a\x2a\xda"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = ""+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\xe6\x60\x21\xd5\xeb\x8e\x4f\x40\x66\xd4\xad\xb9\xc3\x35\x60\xe4"+        , vecNonce      = "\xf4\x6e\x44\xbb\x3d\xa0\x01\x5c\x94\xf7\x08\x87"+        , vecTag        = "\xa4\x19\x4b\x79\x07\x1b\x01\xa8\x7d\x65\xf7\x06\xe3\x94\x95\x78"+        , vecCiphertext = ""+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x7a\x80\x6c"+        , vecAAD        = "\x46\xbb\x91\xc3\xc5"+        , vecKey        = "\x36\x86\x42\x00\xe0\xea\xf5\x28\x4d\x88\x4a\x0e\x77\xd3\x16\x46"+        , vecNonce      = "\xba\xe8\xe3\x7f\xc8\x34\x41\xb1\x60\x34\x56\x6b"+        , vecTag        = "\x71\x1b\xd8\x5b\xc1\xe4\xd3\xe0\xa4\x62\xe0\x74\xee\xa4\x28\xa8"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xaf\x60\xeb"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xbd\xc6\x6f\x14\x65\x45"+        , vecAAD        = "\xfc\x88\x0c\x94\xa9\x51\x98\x87\x42\x96"+        , vecKey        = "\xae\xdb\x64\xa6\xc5\x90\xbc\x84\xd1\xa5\xe2\x69\xe4\xb4\x78\x01"+        , vecNonce      = "\xaf\xc0\x57\x7e\x34\x69\x9b\x9e\x67\x1f\xdd\x4f"+        , vecTag        = "\xd6\xa9\xc4\x55\x45\xcf\xc1\x1f\x03\xad\x74\x3d\xba\x20\xf9\x66"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xbb\x93\xa3\xe3\x4d\x3c"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x11\x77\x44\x1f\x19\x54\x95\x86\x0f"+        , vecAAD        = "\x04\x67\x87\xf3\xea\x22\xc1\x27\xaa\xf1\x95\xd1\x89\x47\x28"+        , vecKey        = "\xd5\xcc\x1f\xd1\x61\x32\x0b\x69\x20\xce\x07\x78\x7f\x86\x74\x3b"+        , vecNonce      = "\x27\x5d\x1a\xb3\x2f\x6d\x1f\x04\x34\xd8\x84\x8c"+        , vecTag        = "\x1d\x02\xfd\x0c\xd1\x74\xc8\x4f\xc5\xda\xe2\xf6\x0f\x52\xfd\x2b"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x4f\x37\x28\x1f\x7a\xd1\x29\x49\xd0"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x9f\x57\x2c\x61\x4b\x47\x45\x91\x44\x74\xe7\xc7"+        , vecAAD        = "\xc9\x88\x2e\x53\x86\xfd\x9f\x92\xec\x48\x9c\x8f\xde\x2b\xe2\xcf\x97\xe7\x4e\x93"+        , vecKey        = "\xb3\xfe\xd1\x47\x3c\x52\x8b\x84\x26\xa5\x82\x99\x59\x29\xa1\x49"+        , vecNonce      = "\x9e\x9a\xd8\x78\x0c\x8d\x63\xd0\xab\x41\x49\xc0"+        , vecTag        = "\xc1\xdc\x2f\x87\x1f\xb7\x56\x1d\xa1\x28\x6e\x65\x5e\x24\xb7\xb0"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xf5\x46\x73\xc5\xdd\xf7\x10\xc7\x45\x64\x1c\x8b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x0d\x8c\x84\x51\x17\x80\x82\x35\x5c\x9e\x94\x0f\xea\x2f\x58"+        , vecAAD        = "\x29\x50\xa7\x0d\x5a\x1d\xb2\x31\x6f\xd5\x68\x37\x8d\xa1\x07\xb5\x2b\x0d\xa5\x52\x10\xcc\x1c\x1b\x0a"+        , vecKey        = "\x2d\x4e\xd8\x7d\xa4\x41\x02\x95\x2e\xf9\x4b\x02\xb8\x05\x24\x9b"+        , vecNonce      = "\xac\x80\xe6\xf6\x14\x55\xbf\xac\x83\x08\xa2\xd4"+        , vecTag        = "\x83\xb3\x44\x9b\x9f\x39\x55\x2d\xe9\x9d\xc2\x14\xa1\x19\x0b\x0b"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc9\xff\x54\x5e\x07\xb8\x8a\x01\x5f\x05\xb2\x74\x54\x0a\xa1"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x6b\x3d\xb4\xda\x3d\x57\xaa\x94\x84\x2b\x98\x03\xa9\x6e\x07\xfb\x6d\xe7"+        , vecAAD        = "\x18\x60\xf7\x62\xeb\xfb\xd0\x82\x84\xe4\x21\x70\x2d\xe0\xde\x18\xba\xa9\xc9\x59\x62\x91\xb0\x84\x66\xf3\x7d\xe2\x1c\x7f"+        , vecKey        = "\xbd\xe3\xb2\xf2\x04\xd1\xe9\xf8\xb0\x6b\xc4\x7f\x97\x45\xb3\xd1"+        , vecNonce      = "\xae\x06\x55\x6f\xb6\xaa\x78\x90\xbe\xbc\x18\xfe"+        , vecTag        = "\x3e\x37\x70\x94\xf0\x47\x09\xf6\x4d\x7b\x98\x53\x10\xa4\xdb\x84"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x98\xb2\x96\xe2\x4e\x8c\xc3\x5d\xce\x0b\xed\x48\x4b\x7f\x30\xd5\x80"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xe4\x2a\x3c\x02\xc2\x5b\x64\x86\x9e\x14\x6d\x7b\x23\x39\x87\xbd\xdf\xc2\x40\x87\x1d"+        , vecAAD        = "\x75\x76\xf7\x02\x8e\xc6\xeb\x5e\xa7\xe2\x98\x34\x2a\x94\xd4\xb2\x02\xb3\x70\xef\x97\x68\xec\x65\x61\xc4\xfe\x6b\x7e\x72\x96\xfa\x85\x9c\x21"+        , vecKey        = "\xf9\x01\xcf\xe8\xa6\x96\x15\xa9\x3f\xdf\x7a\x98\xca\xd4\x81\x79"+        , vecNonce      = "\x62\x45\x70\x9f\xb1\x88\x53\xf6\x8d\x83\x36\x40"+        , vecTag        = "\x2d\x15\x50\x6c\x84\xa9\xed\xd6\x5e\x13\xe9\xd2\x4a\x2a\x6e\x70"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x39\x1c\xc3\x28\xd4\x84\xa4\xf4\x64\x06\x18\x1b\xcd\x62\xef\xd9\xb3\xee\x19\x7d\x05"+        }+    ]++vectors256 :: [Vector AES256]+vectors256 =+    [ Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = ""+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x07\xf5\xf4\x16\x9b\xbf\x55\xa8\x40\x0c\xd4\x7e\xa6\xfd\x40\x0f"+        , vecCiphertext = ""+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x84\x31\x22\x13\x0f\x73\x64\xb7\x61\xe0\xb9\x74\x27\xe3\xdf\x28"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc2\xef\x32\x8e\x5c\x71\xc8\x3b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x8c\xa5\x0d\xa9\xae\x65\x59\xe4\x8f\xd1\x0f\x6e\x5c\x9c\xa1\x7e"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x9a\xab\x2a\xeb\x3f\xaa\x0a\x34\xae\xa8\xe2\xb1"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xc9\xea\xc6\xfa\x70\x09\x42\x70\x2e\x90\x86\x23\x83\xc6\xc3\x66"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x85\xa0\x1b\x63\x02\x5b\xa1\x9b\x7f\xd3\xdd\xfc\x03\x3b\x3e\x76"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xe8\x19\xe6\x3a\xbc\xd0\x20\xb0\x06\xa9\x76\x39\x76\x32\xeb\x5d"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x4a\x6a\x9d\xb4\xc8\xc6\x54\x92\x01\xb9\xed\xb5\x30\x06\xcb\xa8\x21\xec\x9c\xf8\x50\x94\x8a\x7c\x86\xc6\x8a\xc7\x53\x9d\x02\x7f"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x79\x0b\xc9\x68\x80\xa9\x9b\xa8\x04\xbd\x12\xc0\xe6\xa2\x2c\xc4"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc0\x0d\x12\x18\x93\xa9\xfa\x60\x3f\x48\xcc\xc1\xca\x3c\x57\xce\x74\x99\x24\x5e\xa0\x04\x6d\xb1\x6c\x53\xc7\xc6\x6f\xe7\x17\xe3\x9c\xf6\xc7\x48\x83\x7b\x61\xf6\xee\x3a\xdc\xee\x17\x53\x4e\xd5"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x11\x28\x64\xc2\x69\xfc\x0d\x9d\x88\xc6\x1f\xa4\x7e\x39\xaa\x08"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc2\xd5\x16\x0a\x1f\x86\x83\x83\x49\x10\xac\xda\xfc\x41\xfb\xb1\x63\x2d\x4a\x35\x3e\x8b\x90\x5e\xc9\xa5\x49\x9a\xc3\x4f\x96\xc7\xe1\x04\x9e\xb0\x80\x88\x38\x91\xa4\xdb\x8c\xaa\xa1\xf9\x9d\xd0\x04\xd8\x04\x87\x54\x07\x35\x23\x4e\x37\x44\x51\x2c\x6f\x90\xce"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x91\x21\x3f\x26\x7e\x3b\x45\x2f\x02\xd0\x1a\xe3\x3e\x4e\xc8\x54"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x1d\xe2\x29\x67\x23\x7a\x81\x32"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xc1\xa4\xa1\x9a\xe8\x00\x94\x1c\xcd\xc5\x7c\xc8\x41\x3c\x27\x7f"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x16\x3d\x6f\x9c\xc1\xb3\x46\xcd\x45\x3a\x2e\x4c"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xb2\x92\xd2\x8f\xf6\x11\x89\xe8\xe4\x9f\x38\x75\xef\x91\xaf\xf7"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc9\x15\x45\x82\x3c\xc2\x4f\x17\xdb\xb0\xe9\xe8\x07\xd5\xec\x17"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xae\xa1\xba\xd1\x27\x02\xe1\x96\x56\x04\x37\x4a\xab\x96\xdb\xbc"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x07\xda\xd3\x64\xbf\xc2\xb9\xda\x89\x11\x6d\x7b\xef\x6d\xaa\xaf\x6f\x25\x55\x10\xaa\x65\x4f\x92\x0a\xc8\x1b\x94\xe8\xba\xd3\x65"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x03\x33\x27\x42\xb2\x28\xc6\x47\x17\x36\x16\xcf\xd4\x4c\x54\xeb"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xc6\x7a\x1f\x0f\x56\x7a\x51\x98\xaa\x1f\xcc\x8e\x3f\x21\x31\x43\x36\xf7\xf5\x1c\xa8\xb1\xaf\x61\xfe\xac\x35\xa8\x64\x16\xfa\x47\xfb\xca\x3b\x5f\x74\x9c\xdf\x56\x45\x27\xf2\x31\x4f\x42\xfe\x25"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x5b\xde\x02\x85\x03\x7c\x5d\xe8\x1e\x5b\x57\x0a\x04\x9b\x62\xa0"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x67\xfd\x45\xe1\x26\xbf\xb9\xa7\x99\x30\xc4\x3a\xad\x2d\x36\x96\x7d\x3f\x0e\x4d\x21\x7c\x1e\x55\x1f\x59\x72\x78\x70\xbe\xef\xc9\x8c\xb9\x33\xa8\xfc\xe9\xde\x88\x7b\x1e\x40\x79\x99\x88\xdb\x1f\xc3\xf9\x18\x80\xed\x40\x5b\x2d\xd2\x98\x31\x88\x58\x46\x7c\x89"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x02\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\x18\x35\xe5\x17\x74\x1d\xfd\xdc\xcf\xa0\x7f\xa4\x66\x1b\x74\xcf"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x22\xb3\xf4\xcd"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xb8\x79\xad\x97\x6d\x82\x42\xac\xc1\x88\xab\x59\xca\xbf\xe3\x07"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x43\xdd\x01\x63\xcd\xb4\x8f\x9f\xe3\x21\x2b\xf6\x1b\x20\x19\x76\x06\x7f\x34\x2b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00"+        , vecAAD        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecKey        = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xcf\xcd\xf5\x04\x21\x12\xaa\x29\x68\x5c\x91\x2f\xc2\x05\x65\x43"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x46\x24\x01\x72\x4b\x5c\xe6\x58\x8d\x5a\x54\xaa\xe5\x37\x55\x13\xa0\x75"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = ""+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\xe6\x60\x21\xd5\xeb\x8e\x4f\x40\x66\xd4\xad\xb9\xc3\x35\x60\xe4\xf4\x6e\x44\xbb\x3d\xa0\x01\x5c\x94\xf7\x08\x87\x36\x86\x42\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\xe0\xea\xf5\x28\x4d\x88\x4a\x0e\x77\xd3\x16\x46"+        , vecTag        = "\x16\x9f\xbb\x2f\xbf\x38\x9a\x99\x5f\x63\x90\xaf\x22\x22\x8a\x62"+        , vecCiphertext = ""+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x67\x1f\xdd"+        , vecAAD        = "\x4f\xbd\xc6\x6f\x14"+        , vecKey        = "\xba\xe8\xe3\x7f\xc8\x34\x41\xb1\x60\x34\x56\x6b\x7a\x80\x6c\x46\xbb\x91\xc3\xc5\xae\xdb\x64\xa6\xc5\x90\xbc\x84\xd1\xa5\xe2\x69"+        , vecNonce      = "\xe4\xb4\x78\x01\xaf\xc0\x57\x7e\x34\x69\x9b\x9e"+        , vecTag        = "\x93\xda\x9b\xb8\x13\x33\xae\xe0\xc7\x85\xb2\x40\xd3\x19\x71\x9d"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x0e\xac\xcb"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x19\x54\x95\x86\x0f\x04"+        , vecAAD        = "\x67\x87\xf3\xea\x22\xc1\x27\xaa\xf1\x95"+        , vecKey        = "\x65\x45\xfc\x88\x0c\x94\xa9\x51\x98\x87\x42\x96\xd5\xcc\x1f\xd1\x61\x32\x0b\x69\x20\xce\x07\x78\x7f\x86\x74\x3b\x27\x5d\x1a\xb3"+        , vecNonce      = "\x2f\x6d\x1f\x04\x34\xd8\x84\x8c\x11\x77\x44\x1f"+        , vecTag        = "\x6b\x62\xb8\x4d\xc4\x0c\x84\x63\x6a\x5e\xc1\x20\x20\xec\x8c\x2c"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xa2\x54\xda\xd4\xf3\xf9"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xc9\x88\x2e\x53\x86\xfd\x9f\x92\xec"+        , vecAAD        = "\x48\x9c\x8f\xde\x2b\xe2\xcf\x97\xe7\x4e\x93\x2d\x4e\xd8\x7d"+        , vecKey        = "\xd1\x89\x47\x28\xb3\xfe\xd1\x47\x3c\x52\x8b\x84\x26\xa5\x82\x99\x59\x29\xa1\x49\x9e\x9a\xd8\x78\x0c\x8d\x63\xd0\xab\x41\x49\xc0"+        , vecNonce      = "\x9f\x57\x2c\x61\x4b\x47\x45\x91\x44\x74\xe7\xc7"+        , vecTag        = "\xc0\xfd\x3d\xc6\x62\x8d\xfe\x55\xeb\xb0\xb9\xfb\x22\x95\xc8\xc2"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x0d\xf9\xe3\x08\x67\x82\x44\xc4\x4b"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x1d\xb2\x31\x6f\xd5\x68\x37\x8d\xa1\x07\xb5\x2b"+        , vecAAD        = "\x0d\xa5\x52\x10\xcc\x1c\x1b\x0a\xbd\xe3\xb2\xf2\x04\xd1\xe9\xf8\xb0\x6b\xc4\x7f"+        , vecKey        = "\xa4\x41\x02\x95\x2e\xf9\x4b\x02\xb8\x05\x24\x9b\xac\x80\xe6\xf6\x14\x55\xbf\xac\x83\x08\xa2\xd4\x0d\x8c\x84\x51\x17\x80\x82\x35"+        , vecNonce      = "\x5c\x9e\x94\x0f\xea\x2f\x58\x29\x50\xa7\x0d\x5a"+        , vecTag        = "\x40\x40\x99\xc2\x58\x7f\x64\x97\x9f\x21\x82\x67\x06\xd4\x97\xd5"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x8d\xbe\xb9\xf7\x25\x5b\xf5\x76\x9d\xd5\x66\x92"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x21\x70\x2d\xe0\xde\x18\xba\xa9\xc9\x59\x62\x91\xb0\x84\x66"+        , vecAAD        = "\xf3\x7d\xe2\x1c\x7f\xf9\x01\xcf\xe8\xa6\x96\x15\xa9\x3f\xdf\x7a\x98\xca\xd4\x81\x79\x62\x45\x70\x9f"+        , vecKey        = "\x97\x45\xb3\xd1\xae\x06\x55\x6f\xb6\xaa\x78\x90\xbe\xbc\x18\xfe\x6b\x3d\xb4\xda\x3d\x57\xaa\x94\x84\x2b\x98\x03\xa9\x6e\x07\xfb"+        , vecNonce      = "\x6d\xe7\x18\x60\xf7\x62\xeb\xfb\xd0\x82\x84\xe4"+        , vecTag        = "\xb3\x08\x0d\x28\xf6\xeb\xb5\xd3\x64\x8c\xe9\x7b\xd5\xba\x67\xfd"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x79\x35\x76\xdf\xa5\xc0\xf8\x87\x29\xa7\xed\x3c\x2f\x1b\xff"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xb2\x02\xb3\x70\xef\x97\x68\xec\x65\x61\xc4\xfe\x6b\x7e\x72\x96\xfa\x85"+        , vecAAD        = "\x9c\x21\x59\x05\x8b\x1f\x0f\xe9\x14\x33\xa5\xbd\xc2\x0e\x21\x4e\xab\x7f\xec\xef\x44\x54\xa1\x0e\xf0\x65\x7d\xf2\x1a\xc7"+        , vecKey        = "\xb1\x88\x53\xf6\x8d\x83\x36\x40\xe4\x2a\x3c\x02\xc2\x5b\x64\x86\x9e\x14\x6d\x7b\x23\x39\x87\xbd\xdf\xc2\x40\x87\x1d\x75\x76\xf7"+        , vecNonce      = "\x02\x8e\xc6\xeb\x5e\xa7\xe2\x98\x34\x2a\x94\xd4"+        , vecTag        = "\x45\x4f\xc2\xa1\x54\xfe\xa9\x1f\x83\x63\xa3\x9f\xec\x7d\x0a\x49"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x85\x7e\x16\xa6\x49\x15\xa7\x87\x63\x76\x87\xdb\x4a\x95\x19\x63\x5c\xdd"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xce\xd5\x32\xce\x41\x59\xb0\x35\x27\x7d\x4d\xfb\xb7\xdb\x62\x96\x8b\x13\xcd\x4e\xec"+        , vecAAD        = "\x73\x43\x20\xcc\xc9\xd9\xbb\xbb\x19\xcb\x81\xb2\xaf\x4e\xcb\xc3\xe7\x28\x34\x32\x1f\x7a\xa0\xf7\x0b\x72\x82\xb4\xf3\x3d\xf2\x3f\x16\x75\x41"+        , vecKey        = "\x3c\x53\x5d\xe1\x92\xea\xed\x38\x22\xa2\xfb\xbe\x2c\xa9\xdf\xc8\x82\x55\xe1\x4a\x66\x1b\x8a\xa8\x2c\xc5\x42\x36\x09\x3b\xbc\x23"+        , vecNonce      = "\x68\x80\x89\xe5\x55\x40\xdb\x18\x72\x50\x4e\x1c"+        , vecTag        = "\x9d\x6c\x70\x29\x67\x5b\x89\xea\xf4\xba\x1d\xed\x1a\x28\x65\x94"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x66\x60\xc2\x6e\xa6\x61\x2f\xb1\x7a\xd9\x1e\x8e\x76\x76\x39\xed\xd6\xc9\xfa\xee"+        }+    ]++vectorsWrap256 :: [Vector AES256]+vectorsWrap256 =+    [ Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x4d\xb9\x23\xdc\x79\x3e\xe6\x49\x7c\x76\xdc\xc0\x3a\x98\xe1\x08"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecCiphertext = "\xf3\xf8\x0f\x2c\xf0\xcb\x2d\xd9\xc5\x98\x4f\xcd\xa9\x08\x45\x6c\xc5\x37\x70\x3b\x5b\xa7\x03\x24\xa6\x79\x3a\x7b\xf2\x18\xd3\xea"+        }+    , Vector+        { vecPlaintext  = "\xeb\x36\x40\x27\x7c\x7f\xfd\x13\x03\xc7\xa5\x42\xd0\x2d\x3e\x4c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecAAD        = ""+        , vecKey        = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecNonce      = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecTag        = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"+        , vecCiphertext = "\x18\xce\x4f\x0b\x8c\xb4\xd0\xca\xc6\x5f\xea\x8f\x79\x25\x7b\x20\x88\x8e\x53\xe7\x22\x99\xe5\x6d"+        }+    ]++makeEncryptionTest :: BlockCipher128 aes => Int -> Vector aes -> TestTree+makeEncryptionTest i vec@Vector{..} =+    testCase (show i) $+        (t, vecCiphertext) @=? encrypt (vecCipher vec) n vecAAD vecPlaintext+  where t = AuthTag (B.convert vecTag)+        n = throwCryptoError (nonce vecNonce)++makeDecryptionTest :: BlockCipher128 aes => Int -> Vector aes -> TestTree+makeDecryptionTest i vec@Vector{..} =+    testCase (show i) $+        Just vecPlaintext @=? decrypt (vecCipher vec) n vecAAD vecCiphertext t+  where t = AuthTag (B.convert vecTag)+        n = throwCryptoError (nonce vecNonce)++katTests :: TestName+         -> (forall c . BlockCipher128 c => Int -> Vector c -> TestTree)+         -> TestTree+katTests name makeTest = testGroup name+    [ testGroup "AES128" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectors128+    , testGroup "AES256" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectors256+    , testGroup "CounterWrap" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectorsWrap256+    ]++newtype Key c = Key ByteString+    deriving (Show,Eq)++instance Arbitrary (Key AES128) where+    arbitrary = Key <$> arbitraryBS 16++instance Arbitrary (Key AES256) where+    arbitrary = Key <$> arbitraryBS 32++instance Arbitrary Nonce where+    arbitrary = throwCryptoError . nonce <$> arbitraryBS 12++encDecTest :: BlockCipher128 c+           => Proxy c -> Key c -> Nonce+           -> ArbitraryBS0_2901 -> ArbitraryBS0_2901 -> Property+encDecTest prx (Key key) iv (ArbitraryBS0_2901 aad) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 input) =+    let c = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key) `asProxyTypeOf` prx+        (tag, ciphertext) = encrypt c iv aad input+     in decrypt c iv aad ciphertext tag === Just input++tests :: TestTree+tests = testGroup "AES-GCM-SIV"+    [ testGroup "KATs"+        [ katTests "encrypt" makeEncryptionTest+        , katTests "decrypt" makeDecryptionTest+        ]+    , testGroup "properties"+        [ testProperty "AES128" $ encDecTest (Proxy :: Proxy AES128)+        , testProperty "AES256" $ encDecTest (Proxy :: Proxy AES256)+        ]+    ]
tests/KAT_AFIS.hs view
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@       )     ] -mergeKATs = map toProp $ zip mergeVec [(0 :: Int)..]-  where toProp ((nbExpands, hashAlg, expected, dat), i) =+mergeKATs = zipWith toProp mergeVec [(0 :: Int)..]+  where toProp (nbExpands, hashAlg, expected, dat) i =             testCase ("merge " ++ show i) (expected @=? AFIS.merge hashAlg nbExpands dat)  data AFISParams = AFISParams B.ByteString Int SHA1 ChaChaDRG
tests/KAT_Argon2.hs view
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@     ]  kdfTests :: [TestTree]-kdfTests = map toKDFTest $ zip is vectors+kdfTests = zipWith toKDFTest is vectors   where-    toKDFTest (i, v) =+    toKDFTest i v =         testCase (show i)             (CryptoPassed (kdfResult v) @=? Argon2.hash (kdfOptions v) (kdfPass v) (kdfSalt v) (B.length $ kdfResult v))
tests/KAT_CAST5.hs view
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} module KAT_CAST5 (tests) where -import Imports import BlockCipher import qualified Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 as CAST5
tests/KAT_Ed25519.hs view
@@ -47,18 +47,18 @@     ]  -doPublicKeyTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed25519.toPublic sec)+doPublicKeyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed25519.toPublic sec)   where         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec)         !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.secretKey (vecSec vec) -doSignatureTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed25519.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec))+doSignatureTest i vec = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed25519.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec))   where         !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.signature (vecSig vec)         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec)         !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.secretKey (vecSec vec) -doVerifyTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed25519.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig)+doVerifyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed25519.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig)   where         !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.signature (vecSig vec)         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec)@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@  tests = testGroup "Ed25519"     [ testCase  "gen secretkey" (Ed25519.generateSecretKey *> pure ())-    , testGroup "gen publickey" $ map doPublicKeyTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)-    , testGroup "gen signature" $ map doSignatureTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)-    , testGroup "verify sig" $ map doVerifyTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)+    , testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors     ]
tests/KAT_Ed448.hs view
@@ -65,18 +65,18 @@     ]  -doPublicKeyTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed448.toPublic sec)+doPublicKeyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed448.toPublic sec)   where         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec)         !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.secretKey (vecSec vec) -doSignatureTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed448.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec))+doSignatureTest i vec = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed448.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec))   where         !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.signature (vecSig vec)         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec)         !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.secretKey (vecSec vec) -doVerifyTest (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed448.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig)+doVerifyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed448.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig)   where         !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.signature (vecSig vec)         !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec)@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@  tests = testGroup "Ed448"     [ testCase  "gen secretkey" (Ed448.generateSecretKey *> pure ())-    , testGroup "gen publickey" $ map doPublicKeyTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)-    , testGroup "gen signature" $ map doSignatureTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)-    , testGroup "verify sig" $ map doVerifyTest (zip [katZero..] vectors)+    , testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors     ]
+ tests/KAT_EdDSA.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@+{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}+{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-}+{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-}+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}+{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}+module KAT_EdDSA ( tests ) where++import           Crypto.Error+import           Crypto.ECC+import           Crypto.Hash.Algorithms+import           Crypto.Hash.IO+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA as EdDSA+import           Imports++data Vec = forall curve hash .+           ( EdDSA.EllipticCurveEdDSA curve+           , HashAlgorithm hash+           , HashDigestSize hash ~ EdDSA.CurveDigestSize curve+           ) => Vec+    { vecPrx :: Maybe curve+    , vecAlg :: hash+    , vecSec :: ByteString+    , vecPub :: ByteString+    , vecMsg :: ByteString+    , vecSig :: ByteString+    }++vectors =+    [ Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = SHA512+        , vecSec = "\x9d\x61\xb1\x9d\xef\xfd\x5a\x60\xba\x84\x4a\xf4\x92\xec\x2c\xc4\x44\x49\xc5\x69\x7b\x32\x69\x19\x70\x3b\xac\x03\x1c\xae\x7f\x60"+        , vecPub = "\xd7\x5a\x98\x01\x82\xb1\x0a\xb7\xd5\x4b\xfe\xd3\xc9\x64\x07\x3a\x0e\xe1\x72\xf3\xda\xa6\x23\x25\xaf\x02\x1a\x68\xf7\x07\x51\x1a"+        , vecMsg = ""+        , vecSig = "\xe5\x56\x43\x00\xc3\x60\xac\x72\x90\x86\xe2\xcc\x80\x6e\x82\x8a\x84\x87\x7f\x1e\xb8\xe5\xd9\x74\xd8\x73\xe0\x65\x22\x49\x01\x55\x5f\xb8\x82\x15\x90\xa3\x3b\xac\xc6\x1e\x39\x70\x1c\xf9\xb4\x6b\xd2\x5b\xf5\xf0\x59\x5b\xbe\x24\x65\x51\x41\x43\x8e\x7a\x10\x0b"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = SHA512+        , vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb"+        , vecPub = "\x3d\x40\x17\xc3\xe8\x43\x89\x5a\x92\xb7\x0a\xa7\x4d\x1b\x7e\xbc\x9c\x98\x2c\xcf\x2e\xc4\x96\x8c\xc0\xcd\x55\xf1\x2a\xf4\x66\x0c"+        , vecMsg = "\x72"+        , vecSig = "\x92\xa0\x09\xa9\xf0\xd4\xca\xb8\x72\x0e\x82\x0b\x5f\x64\x25\x40\xa2\xb2\x7b\x54\x16\x50\x3f\x8f\xb3\x76\x22\x23\xeb\xdb\x69\xda\x08\x5a\xc1\xe4\x3e\x15\x99\x6e\x45\x8f\x36\x13\xd0\xf1\x1d\x8c\x38\x7b\x2e\xae\xb4\x30\x2a\xee\xb0\x0d\x29\x16\x12\xbb\x0c\x00"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = SHA512+        , vecSec = "\xc5\xaa\x8d\xf4\x3f\x9f\x83\x7b\xed\xb7\x44\x2f\x31\xdc\xb7\xb1\x66\xd3\x85\x35\x07\x6f\x09\x4b\x85\xce\x3a\x2e\x0b\x44\x58\xf7"+        , vecPub = "\xfc\x51\xcd\x8e\x62\x18\xa1\xa3\x8d\xa4\x7e\xd0\x02\x30\xf0\x58\x08\x16\xed\x13\xba\x33\x03\xac\x5d\xeb\x91\x15\x48\x90\x80\x25"+        , vecMsg = "\xaf\x82"+        , vecSig = "\x62\x91\xd6\x57\xde\xec\x24\x02\x48\x27\xe6\x9c\x3a\xbe\x01\xa3\x0c\xe5\x48\xa2\x84\x74\x3a\x44\x5e\x36\x80\xd7\xdb\x5a\xc3\xac\x18\xff\x9b\x53\x8d\x16\xf2\x90\xae\x67\xf7\x60\x98\x4d\xc6\x59\x4a\x7c\x15\xe9\x71\x6e\xd2\x8d\xc0\x27\xbe\xce\xea\x1e\xc4\x0a"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = SHA512+        , vecSec = "\xf5\xe5\x76\x7c\xf1\x53\x31\x95\x17\x63\x0f\x22\x68\x76\xb8\x6c\x81\x60\xcc\x58\x3b\xc0\x13\x74\x4c\x6b\xf2\x55\xf5\xcc\x0e\xe5"+        , vecPub = "\x27\x81\x17\xfc\x14\x4c\x72\x34\x0f\x67\xd0\xf2\x31\x6e\x83\x86\xce\xff\xbf\x2b\x24\x28\xc9\xc5\x1f\xef\x7c\x59\x7f\x1d\x42\x6e"+        , vecMsg = "\x08\xb8\xb2\xb7\x33\x42\x42\x43\x76\x0f\xe4\x26\xa4\xb5\x49\x08\x63\x21\x10\xa6\x6c\x2f\x65\x91\xea\xbd\x33\x45\xe3\xe4\xeb\x98\xfa\x6e\x26\x4b\xf0\x9e\xfe\x12\xee\x50\xf8\xf5\x4e\x9f\x77\xb1\xe3\x55\xf6\xc5\x05\x44\xe2\x3f\xb1\x43\x3d\xdf\x73\xbe\x84\xd8\x79\xde\x7c\x00\x46\xdc\x49\x96\xd9\xe7\x73\xf4\xbc\x9e\xfe\x57\x38\x82\x9a\xdb\x26\xc8\x1b\x37\xc9\x3a\x1b\x27\x0b\x20\x32\x9d\x65\x86\x75\xfc\x6e\xa5\x34\xe0\x81\x0a\x44\x32\x82\x6b\xf5\x8c\x94\x1e\xfb\x65\xd5\x7a\x33\x8b\xbd\x2e\x26\x64\x0f\x89\xff\xbc\x1a\x85\x8e\xfc\xb8\x55\x0e\xe3\xa5\xe1\x99\x8b\xd1\x77\xe9\x3a\x73\x63\xc3\x44\xfe\x6b\x19\x9e\xe5\xd0\x2e\x82\xd5\x22\xc4\xfe\xba\x15\x45\x2f\x80\x28\x8a\x82\x1a\x57\x91\x16\xec\x6d\xad\x2b\x3b\x31\x0d\xa9\x03\x40\x1a\xa6\x21\x00\xab\x5d\x1a\x36\x55\x3e\x06\x20\x3b\x33\x89\x0c\xc9\xb8\x32\xf7\x9e\xf8\x05\x60\xcc\xb9\xa3\x9c\xe7\x67\x96\x7e\xd6\x28\xc6\xad\x57\x3c\xb1\x16\xdb\xef\xef\xd7\x54\x99\xda\x96\xbd\x68\xa8\xa9\x7b\x92\x8a\x8b\xbc\x10\x3b\x66\x21\xfc\xde\x2b\xec\xa1\x23\x1d\x20\x6b\xe6\xcd\x9e\xc7\xaf\xf6\xf6\xc9\x4f\xcd\x72\x04\xed\x34\x55\xc6\x8c\x83\xf4\xa4\x1d\xa4\xaf\x2b\x74\xef\x5c\x53\xf1\xd8\xac\x70\xbd\xcb\x7e\xd1\x85\xce\x81\xbd\x84\x35\x9d\x44\x25\x4d\x95\x62\x9e\x98\x55\xa9\x4a\x7c\x19\x58\xd1\xf8\xad\xa5\xd0\x53\x2e\xd8\xa5\xaa\x3f\xb2\xd1\x7b\xa7\x0e\xb6\x24\x8e\x59\x4e\x1a\x22\x97\xac\xbb\xb3\x9d\x50\x2f\x1a\x8c\x6e\xb6\xf1\xce\x22\xb3\xde\x1a\x1f\x40\xcc\x24\x55\x41\x19\xa8\x31\xa9\xaa\xd6\x07\x9c\xad\x88\x42\x5d\xe6\xbd\xe1\xa9\x18\x7e\xbb\x60\x92\xcf\x67\xbf\x2b\x13\xfd\x65\xf2\x70\x88\xd7\x8b\x7e\x88\x3c\x87\x59\xd2\xc4\xf5\xc6\x5a\xdb\x75\x53\x87\x8a\xd5\x75\xf9\xfa\xd8\x78\xe8\x0a\x0c\x9b\xa6\x3b\xcb\xcc\x27\x32\xe6\x94\x85\xbb\xc9\xc9\x0b\xfb\xd6\x24\x81\xd9\x08\x9b\xec\xcf\x80\xcf\xe2\xdf\x16\xa2\xcf\x65\xbd\x92\xdd\x59\x7b\x07\x07\xe0\x91\x7a\xf4\x8b\xbb\x75\xfe\xd4\x13\xd2\x38\xf5\x55\x5a\x7a\x56\x9d\x80\xc3\x41\x4a\x8d\x08\x59\xdc\x65\xa4\x61\x28\xba\xb2\x7a\xf8\x7a\x71\x31\x4f\x31\x8c\x78\x2b\x23\xeb\xfe\x80\x8b\x82\xb0\xce\x26\x40\x1d\x2e\x22\xf0\x4d\x83\xd1\x25\x5d\xc5\x1a\xdd\xd3\xb7\x5a\x2b\x1a\xe0\x78\x45\x04\xdf\x54\x3a\xf8\x96\x9b\xe3\xea\x70\x82\xff\x7f\xc9\x88\x8c\x14\x4d\xa2\xaf\x58\x42\x9e\xc9\x60\x31\xdb\xca\xd3\xda\xd9\xaf\x0d\xcb\xaa\xaf\x26\x8c\xb8\xfc\xff\xea\xd9\x4f\x3c\x7c\xa4\x95\xe0\x56\xa9\xb4\x7a\xcd\xb7\x51\xfb\x73\xe6\x66\xc6\xc6\x55\xad\xe8\x29\x72\x97\xd0\x7a\xd1\xba\x5e\x43\xf1\xbc\xa3\x23\x01\x65\x13\x39\xe2\x29\x04\xcc\x8c\x42\xf5\x8c\x30\xc0\x4a\xaf\xdb\x03\x8d\xda\x08\x47\xdd\x98\x8d\xcd\xa6\xf3\xbf\xd1\x5c\x4b\x4c\x45\x25\x00\x4a\xa0\x6e\xef\xf8\xca\x61\x78\x3a\xac\xec\x57\xfb\x3d\x1f\x92\xb0\xfe\x2f\xd1\xa8\x5f\x67\x24\x51\x7b\x65\xe6\x14\xad\x68\x08\xd6\xf6\xee\x34\xdf\xf7\x31\x0f\xdc\x82\xae\xbf\xd9\x04\xb0\x1e\x1d\xc5\x4b\x29\x27\x09\x4b\x2d\xb6\x8d\x6f\x90\x3b\x68\x40\x1a\xde\xbf\x5a\x7e\x08\xd7\x8f\xf4\xef\x5d\x63\x65\x3a\x65\x04\x0c\xf9\xbf\xd4\xac\xa7\x98\x4a\x74\xd3\x71\x45\x98\x67\x80\xfc\x0b\x16\xac\x45\x16\x49\xde\x61\x88\xa7\xdb\xdf\x19\x1f\x64\xb5\xfc\x5e\x2a\xb4\x7b\x57\xf7\xf7\x27\x6c\xd4\x19\xc1\x7a\x3c\xa8\xe1\xb9\x39\xae\x49\xe4\x88\xac\xba\x6b\x96\x56\x10\xb5\x48\x01\x09\xc8\xb1\x7b\x80\xe1\xb7\xb7\x50\xdf\xc7\x59\x8d\x5d\x50\x11\xfd\x2d\xcc\x56\x00\xa3\x2e\xf5\xb5\x2a\x1e\xcc\x82\x0e\x30\x8a\xa3\x42\x72\x1a\xac\x09\x43\xbf\x66\x86\xb6\x4b\x25\x79\x37\x65\x04\xcc\xc4\x93\xd9\x7e\x6a\xed\x3f\xb0\xf9\xcd\x71\xa4\x3d\xd4\x97\xf0\x1f\x17\xc0\xe2\xcb\x37\x97\xaa\x2a\x2f\x25\x66\x56\x16\x8e\x6c\x49\x6a\xfc\x5f\xb9\x32\x46\xf6\xb1\x11\x63\x98\xa3\x46\xf1\xa6\x41\xf3\xb0\x41\xe9\x89\xf7\x91\x4f\x90\xcc\x2c\x7f\xff\x35\x78\x76\xe5\x06\xb5\x0d\x33\x4b\xa7\x7c\x22\x5b\xc3\x07\xba\x53\x71\x52\xf3\xf1\x61\x0e\x4e\xaf\xe5\x95\xf6\xd9\xd9\x0d\x11\xfa\xa9\x33\xa1\x5e\xf1\x36\x95\x46\x86\x8a\x7f\x3a\x45\xa9\x67\x68\xd4\x0f\xd9\xd0\x34\x12\xc0\x91\xc6\x31\x5c\xf4\xfd\xe7\xcb\x68\x60\x69\x37\x38\x0d\xb2\xea\xaa\x70\x7b\x4c\x41\x85\xc3\x2e\xdd\xcd\xd3\x06\x70\x5e\x4d\xc1\xff\xc8\x72\xee\xee\x47\x5a\x64\xdf\xac\x86\xab\xa4\x1c\x06\x18\x98\x3f\x87\x41\xc5\xef\x68\xd3\xa1\x01\xe8\xa3\xb8\xca\xc6\x0c\x90\x5c\x15\xfc\x91\x08\x40\xb9\x4c\x00\xa0\xb9\xd0"+        , vecSig = "\x0a\xab\x4c\x90\x05\x01\xb3\xe2\x4d\x7c\xdf\x46\x63\x32\x6a\x3a\x87\xdf\x5e\x48\x43\xb2\xcb\xdb\x67\xcb\xf6\xe4\x60\xfe\xc3\x50\xaa\x53\x71\xb1\x50\x8f\x9f\x45\x28\xec\xea\x23\xc4\x36\xd9\x4b\x5e\x8f\xcd\x4f\x68\x1e\x30\xa6\xac\x00\xa9\x70\x4a\x18\x8a\x03"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = SHA512+        , vecSec = "\x83\x3f\xe6\x24\x09\x23\x7b\x9d\x62\xec\x77\x58\x75\x20\x91\x1e\x9a\x75\x9c\xec\x1d\x19\x75\x5b\x7d\xa9\x01\xb9\x6d\xca\x3d\x42"+        , vecPub = "\xec\x17\x2b\x93\xad\x5e\x56\x3b\xf4\x93\x2c\x70\xe1\x24\x50\x34\xc3\x54\x67\xef\x2e\xfd\x4d\x64\xeb\xf8\x19\x68\x34\x67\xe2\xbf"+        , vecMsg = "\xdd\xaf\x35\xa1\x93\x61\x7a\xba\xcc\x41\x73\x49\xae\x20\x41\x31\x12\xe6\xfa\x4e\x89\xa9\x7e\xa2\x0a\x9e\xee\xe6\x4b\x55\xd3\x9a\x21\x92\x99\x2a\x27\x4f\xc1\xa8\x36\xba\x3c\x23\xa3\xfe\xeb\xbd\x45\x4d\x44\x23\x64\x3c\xe8\x0e\x2a\x9a\xc9\x4f\xa5\x4c\xa4\x9f"+        , vecSig = "\xdc\x2a\x44\x59\xe7\x36\x96\x33\xa5\x2b\x1b\xf2\x77\x83\x9a\x00\x20\x10\x09\xa3\xef\xbf\x3e\xcb\x69\xbe\xa2\x18\x6c\x26\xb5\x89\x09\x35\x1f\xc9\xac\x90\xb3\xec\xfd\xfb\xc7\xc6\x64\x31\xe0\x30\x3d\xca\x17\x9c\x13\x8a\xc1\x7a\xd9\xbe\xf1\x17\x73\x31\xa7\x04"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = Blake2b_512+        , vecSec = "\x9d\x61\xb1\x9d\xef\xfd\x5a\x60\xba\x84\x4a\xf4\x92\xec\x2c\xc4\x44\x49\xc5\x69\x7b\x32\x69\x19\x70\x3b\xac\x03\x1c\xae\x7f\x60"+        , vecPub = "\x78\xe6\x5b\xf3\x0f\x89\x3d\x32\xfc\x57\xef\x05\x1c\x34\x1b\xde\xde\x24\x25\x44\xfc\x2a\x21\x12\xf0\xfa\x2c\x7a\xfd\xeb\xc0\x2f"+        , vecMsg = ""+        , vecSig = "\x99\xa5\x23\xbd\x46\x16\xc8\x16\x11\x44\xd6\xa9\x9d\x3c\x32\x40\x0c\xb4\xa3\x26\xf4\xd7\x9e\x30\x73\x40\xf6\xaf\xa1\x17\x50\xa0\x08\x5d\x7d\x84\x62\x6b\xc9\xe4\xb1\x53\xfc\x0e\x39\x6d\x15\xce\x44\xc3\x9b\xae\x45\x33\x80\x4d\xb1\xfe\x5b\x52\xf2\xb1\xb8\x05"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = Blake2b_512+        , vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb"+        , vecPub = "\x5e\x71\x39\x2d\x91\xe6\xa5\x8f\xed\xeb\x08\x50\x36\x4f\x56\xcd\x15\x8a\x60\x44\x75\x57\xd7\x89\x03\x89\xc9\xb3\xd4\x57\x6d\x4d"+        , vecMsg = "\x72"+        , vecSig = "\x6d\xa7\x5e\x15\xb5\x70\x7f\x4d\xe5\xa1\x53\xc4\x8a\x5d\x83\x9f\xb8\x50\x74\xc3\x8a\xeb\x62\x85\x97\x7f\x03\xa1\x39\x77\x59\x7f\x97\x60\x69\xfd\xb9\x03\xf1\x83\x47\x4a\xaa\x5e\xd0\xcf\xe8\x78\xba\x8e\xf8\x68\xc5\xe4\x7c\xa3\xf9\x6c\xcf\xb3\xa8\x9b\x2a\x06"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = Blake2b_512+        , vecSec = "\xc5\xaa\x8d\xf4\x3f\x9f\x83\x7b\xed\xb7\x44\x2f\x31\xdc\xb7\xb1\x66\xd3\x85\x35\x07\x6f\x09\x4b\x85\xce\x3a\x2e\x0b\x44\x58\xf7"+        , vecPub = "\x8d\x53\xca\x70\xf0\xea\xb2\x3b\x91\x78\x34\x57\x85\xfc\xdb\x69\xed\x67\x23\xf8\x14\x8f\x7e\x33\x9e\x88\x65\x37\x00\xb7\x18\xda"+        , vecMsg = "\xaf\x82"+        , vecSig = "\x7c\xc3\xc1\x38\x52\xbd\x12\xab\xf3\xce\x4c\xa8\xca\x28\x36\xcb\xf8\x6d\xa9\x6c\x46\x34\xc5\x0d\xf3\xfb\x80\xdc\x80\x9e\x29\xdb\x0e\x10\x9c\x36\x13\x53\x40\x7c\x12\x36\xa9\x04\xf6\x36\x86\x8a\xa3\x39\x77\xa9\x9d\x3f\x84\x45\x98\xdb\x15\x38\xb4\x29\x52\x03"+        }+    , Vec+        { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519+        , vecAlg = Blake2b_512+        , vecSec = "\xf5\xe5\x76\x7c\xf1\x53\x31\x95\x17\x63\x0f\x22\x68\x76\xb8\x6c\x81\x60\xcc\x58\x3b\xc0\x13\x74\x4c\x6b\xf2\x55\xf5\xcc\x0e\xe5"+        , vecPub = "\x9e\x3c\xa4\x9b\xb2\xd9\xe3\x6b\x8f\x0c\x94\x4a\x7b\x1c\x29\x26\x45\xda\x87\xce\x6f\xa6\xb4\x28\x86\xe5\xd7\xc8\x68\x33\xa7\x14"+        , vecMsg = "\x08\xb8\xb2\xb7\x33\x42\x42\x43\x76\x0f\xe4\x26\xa4\xb5\x49\x08\x63\x21\x10\xa6\x6c\x2f\x65\x91\xea\xbd\x33\x45\xe3\xe4\xeb\x98\xfa\x6e\x26\x4b\xf0\x9e\xfe\x12\xee\x50\xf8\xf5\x4e\x9f\x77\xb1\xe3\x55\xf6\xc5\x05\x44\xe2\x3f\xb1\x43\x3d\xdf\x73\xbe\x84\xd8\x79\xde\x7c\x00\x46\xdc\x49\x96\xd9\xe7\x73\xf4\xbc\x9e\xfe\x57\x38\x82\x9a\xdb\x26\xc8\x1b\x37\xc9\x3a\x1b\x27\x0b\x20\x32\x9d\x65\x86\x75\xfc\x6e\xa5\x34\xe0\x81\x0a\x44\x32\x82\x6b\xf5\x8c\x94\x1e\xfb\x65\xd5\x7a\x33\x8b\xbd\x2e\x26\x64\x0f\x89\xff\xbc\x1a\x85\x8e\xfc\xb8\x55\x0e\xe3\xa5\xe1\x99\x8b\xd1\x77\xe9\x3a\x73\x63\xc3\x44\xfe\x6b\x19\x9e\xe5\xd0\x2e\x82\xd5\x22\xc4\xfe\xba\x15\x45\x2f\x80\x28\x8a\x82\x1a\x57\x91\x16\xec\x6d\xad\x2b\x3b\x31\x0d\xa9\x03\x40\x1a\xa6\x21\x00\xab\x5d\x1a\x36\x55\x3e\x06\x20\x3b\x33\x89\x0c\xc9\xb8\x32\xf7\x9e\xf8\x05\x60\xcc\xb9\xa3\x9c\xe7\x67\x96\x7e\xd6\x28\xc6\xad\x57\x3c\xb1\x16\xdb\xef\xef\xd7\x54\x99\xda\x96\xbd\x68\xa8\xa9\x7b\x92\x8a\x8b\xbc\x10\x3b\x66\x21\xfc\xde\x2b\xec\xa1\x23\x1d\x20\x6b\xe6\xcd\x9e\xc7\xaf\xf6\xf6\xc9\x4f\xcd\x72\x04\xed\x34\x55\xc6\x8c\x83\xf4\xa4\x1d\xa4\xaf\x2b\x74\xef\x5c\x53\xf1\xd8\xac\x70\xbd\xcb\x7e\xd1\x85\xce\x81\xbd\x84\x35\x9d\x44\x25\x4d\x95\x62\x9e\x98\x55\xa9\x4a\x7c\x19\x58\xd1\xf8\xad\xa5\xd0\x53\x2e\xd8\xa5\xaa\x3f\xb2\xd1\x7b\xa7\x0e\xb6\x24\x8e\x59\x4e\x1a\x22\x97\xac\xbb\xb3\x9d\x50\x2f\x1a\x8c\x6e\xb6\xf1\xce\x22\xb3\xde\x1a\x1f\x40\xcc\x24\x55\x41\x19\xa8\x31\xa9\xaa\xd6\x07\x9c\xad\x88\x42\x5d\xe6\xbd\xe1\xa9\x18\x7e\xbb\x60\x92\xcf\x67\xbf\x2b\x13\xfd\x65\xf2\x70\x88\xd7\x8b\x7e\x88\x3c\x87\x59\xd2\xc4\xf5\xc6\x5a\xdb\x75\x53\x87\x8a\xd5\x75\xf9\xfa\xd8\x78\xe8\x0a\x0c\x9b\xa6\x3b\xcb\xcc\x27\x32\xe6\x94\x85\xbb\xc9\xc9\x0b\xfb\xd6\x24\x81\xd9\x08\x9b\xec\xcf\x80\xcf\xe2\xdf\x16\xa2\xcf\x65\xbd\x92\xdd\x59\x7b\x07\x07\xe0\x91\x7a\xf4\x8b\xbb\x75\xfe\xd4\x13\xd2\x38\xf5\x55\x5a\x7a\x56\x9d\x80\xc3\x41\x4a\x8d\x08\x59\xdc\x65\xa4\x61\x28\xba\xb2\x7a\xf8\x7a\x71\x31\x4f\x31\x8c\x78\x2b\x23\xeb\xfe\x80\x8b\x82\xb0\xce\x26\x40\x1d\x2e\x22\xf0\x4d\x83\xd1\x25\x5d\xc5\x1a\xdd\xd3\xb7\x5a\x2b\x1a\xe0\x78\x45\x04\xdf\x54\x3a\xf8\x96\x9b\xe3\xea\x70\x82\xff\x7f\xc9\x88\x8c\x14\x4d\xa2\xaf\x58\x42\x9e\xc9\x60\x31\xdb\xca\xd3\xda\xd9\xaf\x0d\xcb\xaa\xaf\x26\x8c\xb8\xfc\xff\xea\xd9\x4f\x3c\x7c\xa4\x95\xe0\x56\xa9\xb4\x7a\xcd\xb7\x51\xfb\x73\xe6\x66\xc6\xc6\x55\xad\xe8\x29\x72\x97\xd0\x7a\xd1\xba\x5e\x43\xf1\xbc\xa3\x23\x01\x65\x13\x39\xe2\x29\x04\xcc\x8c\x42\xf5\x8c\x30\xc0\x4a\xaf\xdb\x03\x8d\xda\x08\x47\xdd\x98\x8d\xcd\xa6\xf3\xbf\xd1\x5c\x4b\x4c\x45\x25\x00\x4a\xa0\x6e\xef\xf8\xca\x61\x78\x3a\xac\xec\x57\xfb\x3d\x1f\x92\xb0\xfe\x2f\xd1\xa8\x5f\x67\x24\x51\x7b\x65\xe6\x14\xad\x68\x08\xd6\xf6\xee\x34\xdf\xf7\x31\x0f\xdc\x82\xae\xbf\xd9\x04\xb0\x1e\x1d\xc5\x4b\x29\x27\x09\x4b\x2d\xb6\x8d\x6f\x90\x3b\x68\x40\x1a\xde\xbf\x5a\x7e\x08\xd7\x8f\xf4\xef\x5d\x63\x65\x3a\x65\x04\x0c\xf9\xbf\xd4\xac\xa7\x98\x4a\x74\xd3\x71\x45\x98\x67\x80\xfc\x0b\x16\xac\x45\x16\x49\xde\x61\x88\xa7\xdb\xdf\x19\x1f\x64\xb5\xfc\x5e\x2a\xb4\x7b\x57\xf7\xf7\x27\x6c\xd4\x19\xc1\x7a\x3c\xa8\xe1\xb9\x39\xae\x49\xe4\x88\xac\xba\x6b\x96\x56\x10\xb5\x48\x01\x09\xc8\xb1\x7b\x80\xe1\xb7\xb7\x50\xdf\xc7\x59\x8d\x5d\x50\x11\xfd\x2d\xcc\x56\x00\xa3\x2e\xf5\xb5\x2a\x1e\xcc\x82\x0e\x30\x8a\xa3\x42\x72\x1a\xac\x09\x43\xbf\x66\x86\xb6\x4b\x25\x79\x37\x65\x04\xcc\xc4\x93\xd9\x7e\x6a\xed\x3f\xb0\xf9\xcd\x71\xa4\x3d\xd4\x97\xf0\x1f\x17\xc0\xe2\xcb\x37\x97\xaa\x2a\x2f\x25\x66\x56\x16\x8e\x6c\x49\x6a\xfc\x5f\xb9\x32\x46\xf6\xb1\x11\x63\x98\xa3\x46\xf1\xa6\x41\xf3\xb0\x41\xe9\x89\xf7\x91\x4f\x90\xcc\x2c\x7f\xff\x35\x78\x76\xe5\x06\xb5\x0d\x33\x4b\xa7\x7c\x22\x5b\xc3\x07\xba\x53\x71\x52\xf3\xf1\x61\x0e\x4e\xaf\xe5\x95\xf6\xd9\xd9\x0d\x11\xfa\xa9\x33\xa1\x5e\xf1\x36\x95\x46\x86\x8a\x7f\x3a\x45\xa9\x67\x68\xd4\x0f\xd9\xd0\x34\x12\xc0\x91\xc6\x31\x5c\xf4\xfd\xe7\xcb\x68\x60\x69\x37\x38\x0d\xb2\xea\xaa\x70\x7b\x4c\x41\x85\xc3\x2e\xdd\xcd\xd3\x06\x70\x5e\x4d\xc1\xff\xc8\x72\xee\xee\x47\x5a\x64\xdf\xac\x86\xab\xa4\x1c\x06\x18\x98\x3f\x87\x41\xc5\xef\x68\xd3\xa1\x01\xe8\xa3\xb8\xca\xc6\x0c\x90\x5c\x15\xfc\x91\x08\x40\xb9\x4c\x00\xa0\xb9\xd0"+        , vecSig = "\xd0\x39\x65\xac\x31\x6a\x20\xf5\xa4\x7a\xb2\xd6\x18\x5e\xb3\xf0\xae\xea\x9c\x2e\xb8\xab\xe9\x22\xe9\x6d\x31\x7b\x3b\xd0\xef\x02\xe8\xd4\x7f\xd9\x23\x84\xe2\x86\x15\xeb\x33\x14\xad\xbc\x71\xc4\x67\x59\x96\x09\x9e\x48\x4c\xeb\x16\x28\x47\xc4\x0c\x32\x44\x0e"+        }+    ]+++doPublicKeyTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree+doPublicKeyTest i Vec{..} =+    testCase (show i) (pub @=? EdDSA.toPublic vecPrx vecAlg sec)+  where+    !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub+    !sec = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.secretKey vecPrx vecSec++doSignatureTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree+doSignatureTest i Vec{..} =+    testCase (show i) (sig @=? EdDSA.sign vecPrx sec pub vecMsg)+  where+    !sig = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.signature vecPrx vecAlg vecSig+    !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub+    !sec = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.secretKey vecPrx vecSec++doVerifyTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree+doVerifyTest i Vec{..} =+    testCase (show i) (True @=? EdDSA.verify vecPrx pub vecMsg sig)+  where+    !sig = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.signature vecPrx vecAlg vecSig+    !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub+++tests = testGroup "EdDSA"+    [ testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors+    , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors+    ]
tests/KAT_HKDF.hs view
@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ module KAT_HKDF (tests) where  import qualified Crypto.KDF.HKDF as HKDF-import Crypto.Hash (MD5(..), SHA1(..), SHA256(..)-                   , Keccak_224(..), Keccak_256(..), Keccak_384(..), Keccak_512(..)-                   , SHA3_224(..), SHA3_256(..), SHA3_384(..), SHA3_512(..)-                   , HashAlgorithm, digestFromByteString)+import Crypto.Hash (SHA256(..), HashAlgorithm) import qualified Data.ByteString as B  import Imports
+ tests/KAT_KMAC.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@+{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-}+{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-}+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}+{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-}+module KAT_KMAC (tests) where++import           Crypto.Hash (SHAKE128(..), SHAKE256(..),+                              HashAlgorithm, digestFromByteString)+import qualified Crypto.MAC.KMAC as KMAC++import qualified Data.ByteString as B++import Imports++data MACVector hash = MACVector+    { macString :: ByteString+    , macKey    :: ByteString+    , macSecret :: ByteString+    , macResult :: KMAC.KMAC hash+    }++instance Show (KMAC.KMAC a) where+    show (KMAC.KMAC d) = show d++digest :: HashAlgorithm hash => ByteString -> KMAC.KMAC hash+digest = maybe (error "cannot get digest") KMAC.KMAC . digestFromByteString++vectors128 :: [MACVector (SHAKE128 256)]+vectors128 =+    [ MACVector+        { macString = ""+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ]+        , macResult = digest "\xe5\x78\x0b\x0d\x3e\xa6\xf7\xd3\xa4\x29\xc5\x70\x6a\xa4\x3a\x00\xfa\xdb\xd7\xd4\x96\x28\x83\x9e\x31\x87\x24\x3f\x45\x6e\xe1\x4e"+        }+    , MACVector+        { macString = "My Tagged Application"+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ]+        , macResult = digest "\x3b\x1f\xba\x96\x3c\xd8\xb0\xb5\x9e\x8c\x1a\x6d\x71\x88\x8b\x71\x43\x65\x1a\xf8\xba\x0a\x70\x70\xc0\x97\x9e\x28\x11\x32\x4a\xa5"+        }+    , MACVector+        { macString = "My Tagged Application"+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ]+        , macResult = digest "\x1f\x5b\x4e\x6c\xca\x02\x20\x9e\x0d\xcb\x5c\xa6\x35\xb8\x9a\x15\xe2\x71\xec\xc7\x60\x07\x1d\xfd\x80\x5f\xaa\x38\xf9\x72\x92\x30"+        }+    ]++vectors256 :: [MACVector (SHAKE256 512)]+vectors256 =+    [ MACVector+        { macString = "My Tagged Application"+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ]+        , macResult = digest "\x20\xc5\x70\xc3\x13\x46\xf7\x03\xc9\xac\x36\xc6\x1c\x03\xcb\x64\xc3\x97\x0d\x0c\xfc\x78\x7e\x9b\x79\x59\x9d\x27\x3a\x68\xd2\xf7\xf6\x9d\x4c\xc3\xde\x9d\x10\x4a\x35\x16\x89\xf2\x7c\xf6\xf5\x95\x1f\x01\x03\xf3\x3f\x4f\x24\x87\x10\x24\xd9\xc2\x77\x73\xa8\xdd"+        }+    , MACVector+        { macString = ""+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ]+        , macResult = digest "\x75\x35\x8c\xf3\x9e\x41\x49\x4e\x94\x97\x07\x92\x7c\xee\x0a\xf2\x0a\x3f\xf5\x53\x90\x4c\x86\xb0\x8f\x21\xcc\x41\x4b\xcf\xd6\x91\x58\x9d\x27\xcf\x5e\x15\x36\x9c\xbb\xff\x8b\x9a\x4c\x2e\xb1\x78\x00\x85\x5d\x02\x35\xff\x63\x5d\xa8\x25\x33\xec\x6b\x75\x9b\x69"+        }+    , MACVector+        { macString = "My Tagged Application"+        , macKey    = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ]+        , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ]+        , macResult = digest "\xb5\x86\x18\xf7\x1f\x92\xe1\xd5\x6c\x1b\x8c\x55\xdd\xd7\xcd\x18\x8b\x97\xb4\xca\x4d\x99\x83\x1e\xb2\x69\x9a\x83\x7d\xa2\xe4\xd9\x70\xfb\xac\xfd\xe5\x00\x33\xae\xa5\x85\xf1\xa2\x70\x85\x10\xc3\x2d\x07\x88\x08\x01\xbd\x18\x28\x98\xfe\x47\x68\x76\xfc\x89\x65"+        }+    ]++macTests :: [TestTree]+macTests =+    [ testGroup "SHAKE128" (concatMap toMACTest $ zip is vectors128)+    , testGroup "SHAKE256" (concatMap toMACTest $ zip is vectors256)+    ]+    where toMACTest (i, MACVector{..}) =+            [ testCase (show i) (macResult @=? KMAC.kmac macString macKey macSecret)+            , testCase ("incr-" ++ show i) (macResult @=?+                        KMAC.finalize (KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize macString macKey) macSecret))+            ]+          is :: [Int]+          is = [1..]++data MacIncremental a = MacIncremental ByteString ByteString ByteString (KMAC.KMAC a)+    deriving (Show,Eq)++instance KMAC.HashSHAKE a => Arbitrary (MacIncremental a) where+    arbitrary = do+        str <- arbitraryBSof 0 49+        key <- arbitraryBSof 1 89+        msg <- arbitraryBSof 1 99+        return $ MacIncremental str key msg (KMAC.kmac str key msg)++data MacIncrementalList a = MacIncrementalList ByteString ByteString [ByteString] (KMAC.KMAC a)+    deriving (Show,Eq)++instance KMAC.HashSHAKE a => Arbitrary (MacIncrementalList a) where+    arbitrary = do+        str  <- arbitraryBSof 0 49+        key  <- arbitraryBSof 1 89+        msgs <- choose (1,20) >>= \n -> replicateM n (arbitraryBSof 1 99)+        return $ MacIncrementalList str key msgs (KMAC.kmac str key (B.concat msgs))++macIncrementalTests :: [TestTree]+macIncrementalTests =+    [ testIncrProperties "SHAKE128_256" (SHAKE128 :: SHAKE128 256)+    , testIncrProperties "SHAKE256_512" (SHAKE256 :: SHAKE256 512)+    ]+  where+        testIncrProperties :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => TestName -> a -> TestTree+        testIncrProperties name a = testGroup name+            [ testProperty "list-one" (prop_inc0 a)+            , testProperty "list-multi" (prop_inc1 a)+            ]++        prop_inc0 :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => a -> MacIncremental a -> Bool+        prop_inc0 _ (MacIncremental str secret msg result) =+            result `assertEq` KMAC.finalize (KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize str secret) msg)++        prop_inc1 :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => a -> MacIncrementalList a -> Bool+        prop_inc1 _ (MacIncrementalList str secret msgs result) =+            result `assertEq` KMAC.finalize (foldl' KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize str secret) msgs)++tests = testGroup "KMAC"+    [ testGroup "KATs" macTests+    , testGroup "properties" macIncrementalTests+    ]
tests/KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel.hs view
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@  import           Imports -import           Data.Char (digitToInt) import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B8 import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Data.ByteArray.Encoding (Base (Base16), convertFromBase)
tests/KAT_OTP.hs view
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@  import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms (SHA1(..), SHA256(..), SHA512(..)) import Crypto.OTP-import Data.ByteString (ByteString) import Imports  -- | Test values from Appendix D of http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4226@@ -94,9 +93,9 @@         ]     , testGroup "TOTP"         [ testGroup "KATs"-            [ testGroup "SHA1" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA1Params otpKey . fromIntegral) totpSHA1Expected)-            , testGroup "SHA256" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA256Params totpSHA256Key . fromIntegral) totpSHA256Expected)-            , testGroup "SHA512" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA512Params totpSHA512Key . fromIntegral) totpSHA512Expected)+            [ testGroup "SHA1" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA1Params otpKey) totpSHA1Expected)+            , testGroup "SHA256" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA256Params totpSHA256Key) totpSHA256Expected)+            , testGroup "SHA512" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA512Params totpSHA512Key) totpSHA512Expected)             ]         ]     ]
tests/KAT_PBKDF2.hs view
@@ -67,21 +67,21 @@     , testGroup "KATs-HMAC-SHA512" (katTests (PBKDF2.prfHMAC SHA512) vectors_hmac_sha512)     , testGroup "KATs-HMAC-SHA512 (fast)" (katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 vectors_hmac_sha512)     ]-  where katTests prf vects = map (toKatTest prf) $ zip is vects+  where katTests prf = zipWith (toKatTest prf) is -        toKatTest prf (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) =+        toKatTest prf i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) =             testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.generate prf (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) -        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 . zip is-        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) =+        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 is+        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) =             testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA1 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) -        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 . zip is-        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) =+        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 is+        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) =             testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA256 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) -        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 . zip is-        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) =+        katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 is+        toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) =             testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA512 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt)
tests/KAT_PubKey.hs view
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import KAT_PubKey.DSA import KAT_PubKey.ECC import KAT_PubKey.ECDSA+import KAT_PubKey.RSA+import KAT_PubKey.Rabin import Utils import qualified KAT_PubKey.P256 as P256 @@ -23,7 +25,7 @@                            , dbMask :: ByteString                            } -doMGFTest (i, vmgf) = testCase (show i) (dbMask vmgf @=? actual)+doMGFTest i vmgf = testCase (show i) (dbMask vmgf @=? actual)     where actual = mgf1 SHA1 (seed vmgf) (B.length $ dbMask vmgf)  vectorsMGF =@@ -34,13 +36,15 @@     ]  tests = testGroup "PubKey"-    [ testGroup "MGF1" $ map doMGFTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsMGF)+    [ testGroup "MGF1" $ zipWith doMGFTest [katZero..] vectorsMGF+    , rsaTests     , pssTests     , oaepTests     , dsaTests     , eccTests     , ecdsaTests     , P256.tests+    , rabinTests     ]  --newKats = [ eccKatTests ]
tests/KAT_PubKey/DSA.hs view
@@ -106,7 +106,43 @@         , r = 0x8c2fab489c34672140415d41a65cef1e70192e23         , s = 0x3df86a9e2efe944a1c7ea9c30cac331d00599a0e         , pgq = dsaParams-        } +        }+    , VectorDSA -- 1024-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x7BDB6B0FF756E1BB5D53583EF979082F9AD5BD5B+        , r = 0x2E1A0C2562B2912CAAF89186FB0F42001585DA55+        , s = 0x29EFB6B0AFF2D7A68EB70CA313022253B9A88DF5+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA -- 1024-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x5C842DF4F9E344EE09F056838B42C7A17F4A6433+        , r = 0x42AB2052FD43E123F0607F115052A67DCD9C5C77+        , s = 0x183916B0230D45B9931491D4C6B0BD2FB4AAF088+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA -- 2048-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x888FA6F7738A41BDC9846466ABDB8174C0338250AE50CE955CA16230F9CBD53E+        , r = 0x3A1B2DBD7489D6ED7E608FD036C83AF396E290DBD602408E8677DAABD6E7445A+        , s = 0xD26FCBA19FA3E3058FFC02CA1596CDBB6E0D20CB37B06054F7E36DED0CDBBCCF+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    , VectorDSA -- 2048-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x6EEA486F9D41A037B2C640BC5645694FF8FF4B98D066A25F76BE641CCB24BA4F+        , r = 0xC18270A93CFC6063F57A4DFA86024F700D980E4CF4E2CB65A504397273D98EA0+        , s = 0x414F22E5F31A8B6D33295C7539C1C1BA3A6160D7D68D50AC0D3A5BEAC2884FAA+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }     ]     where -- (p,g,q)           dsaParams = DSA.Params@@ -115,6 +151,174 @@             , DSA.params_q = 0xf85f0f83ac4df7ea0cdf8f469bfeeaea14156495             } +vectorsSHA224 =+    [ VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x562097C06782D60C3037BA7BE104774344687649+        , r = 0x4BC3B686AEA70145856814A6F1BB53346F02101E+        , s = 0x410697B92295D994D21EDD2F4ADA85566F6F94C1+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x4598B8EFC1A53BC8AECD58D1ABBB0C0C71E67297+        , r = 0x6868E9964E36C1689F6037F91F28D5F2C30610F2+        , s = 0x49CEC3ACDC83018C5BD2674ECAAD35B8CD22940F+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 0x667098C654426C78D7F8201EAC6C203EF030D43605032C2F1FA937E5237DBD949F34A0A2564FE126DC8B715C5141802CE0979C8246463C40E6B6BDAA2513FA611728716C2E4FD53BC95B89E69949D96512E873B9C8F8DFD499CC312882561ADECB31F658E934C0C197F2C4D96B05CBAD67381E7B768891E4DA3843D24D94CDFB5126E9B8BF21E8358EE0E0A30EF13FD6A664C0DCE3731F7FB49A4845A4FD8254687972A2D382599C9BAC4E0ED7998193078913032558134976410B89D2C171D123AC35FD977219597AA7D15C1A9A428E59194F75C721EBCBCFAE44696A499AFA74E04299F132026601638CB87AB79190D4A0986315DA8EEC6561C938996BEADF+        , k = 0xBC372967702082E1AA4FCE892209F71AE4AD25A6DFD869334E6F153BD0C4D806+        , r = 0xDC9F4DEADA8D8FF588E98FED0AB690FFCE858DC8C79376450EB6B76C24537E2C+        , s = 0xA65A9C3BC7BABE286B195D5DA68616DA8D47FA0097F36DD19F517327DC848CEC+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x06BD4C05ED74719106223BE33F2D95DA6B3B541DAD7BFBD7AC508213B6DA6670+        , r = 0x272ABA31572F6CC55E30BF616B7A265312018DD325BE031BE0CC82AA17870EA3+        , s = 0xE9CC286A52CCE201586722D36D1E917EB96A4EBDB47932F9576AC645B3A60806+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    ]++vectorsSHA256 =+    [ VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x519BA0546D0C39202A7D34D7DFA5E760B318BCFB+        , r = 0x81F2F5850BE5BC123C43F71A3033E9384611C545+        , s = 0x4CDD914B65EB6C66A8AAAD27299BEE6B035F5E89+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x5A67592E8128E03A417B0484410FB72C0B630E1A+        , r = 0x22518C127299B0F6FDC9872B282B9E70D0790812+        , s = 0x6837EC18F150D55DE95B5E29BE7AF5D01E4FE160+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x8926A27C40484216F052F4427CFD5647338B7B3939BC6573AF4333569D597C52+        , r = 0xEACE8BDBBE353C432A795D9EC556C6D021F7A03F42C36E9BC87E4AC7932CC809+        , s = 0x7081E175455F9247B812B74583E9E94F9EA79BD640DC962533B0680793A38D53+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x1D6CE6DDA1C5D37307839CD03AB0A5CBB18E60D800937D67DFB4479AAC8DEAD7+        , r = 0x8190012A1969F9957D56FCCAAD223186F423398D58EF5B3CEFD5A4146A4476F0+        , s = 0x7452A53F7075D417B4B013B278D1BB8BBD21863F5E7B1CEE679CF2188E1AB19E+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    ]++vectorsSHA384 =+    [ VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x95897CD7BBB944AA932DBC579C1C09EB6FCFC595+        , r = 0x07F2108557EE0E3921BC1774F1CA9B410B4CE65A+        , s = 0x54DF70456C86FAC10FAB47C1949AB83F2C6F7595+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x220156B761F6CA5E6C9F1B9CF9C24BE25F98CD89+        , r = 0x854CF929B58D73C3CBFDC421E8D5430CD6DB5E66+        , s = 0x91D0E0F53E22F898D158380676A871A157CDA622+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0xC345D5AB3DA0A5BCB7EC8F8FB7A7E96069E03B206371EF7D83E39068EC564920+        , r = 0xB2DA945E91858834FD9BF616EBAC151EDBC4B45D27D0DD4A7F6A22739F45C00B+        , s = 0x19048B63D9FD6BCA1D9BAE3664E1BCB97F7276C306130969F63F38FA8319021B+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 0x667098C654426C78D7F8201EAC6C203EF030D43605032C2F1FA937E5237DBD949F34A0A2564FE126DC8B715C5141802CE0979C8246463C40E6B6BDAA2513FA611728716C2E4FD53BC95B89E69949D96512E873B9C8F8DFD499CC312882561ADECB31F658E934C0C197F2C4D96B05CBAD67381E7B768891E4DA3843D24D94CDFB5126E9B8BF21E8358EE0E0A30EF13FD6A664C0DCE3731F7FB49A4845A4FD8254687972A2D382599C9BAC4E0ED7998193078913032558134976410B89D2C171D123AC35FD977219597AA7D15C1A9A428E59194F75C721EBCBCFAE44696A499AFA74E04299F132026601638CB87AB79190D4A0986315DA8EEC6561C938996BEADF+        , k = 0x206E61F73DBE1B2DC8BE736B22B079E9DACD974DB00EEBBC5B64CAD39CF9F91C+        , r = 0x239E66DDBE8F8C230A3D071D601B6FFBDFB5901F94D444C6AF56F732BEB954BE+        , s = 0x6BD737513D5E72FE85D1C750E0F73921FE299B945AAD1C802F15C26A43D34961+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    ]++vectorsSHA512 =+    [ VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x09ECE7CA27D0F5A4DD4E556C9DF1D21D28104F8B+        , r = 0x16C3491F9B8C3FBBDD5E7A7B667057F0D8EE8E1B+        , s = 0x02C36A127A7B89EDBB72E4FFBC71DABC7D4FC69C+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7+        , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B+        , k = 0x65D2C2EEB175E370F28C75BFCDC028D22C7DBE9C+        , r = 0x8EA47E475BA8AC6F2D821DA3BD212D11A3DEB9A0+        , s = 0x7C670C7AD72B6C050C109E1790008097125433E8+        , pgq = rfc6979Params1024+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "sample"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0x5A12994431785485B3F5F067221517791B85A597B7A9436995C89ED0374668FC+        , r = 0x2016ED092DC5FB669B8EFB3D1F31A91EECB199879BE0CF78F02BA062CB4C942E+        , s = 0xD0C76F84B5F091E141572A639A4FB8C230807EEA7D55C8A154A224400AFF2351+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    , VectorDSA+        { msg = "test"+        , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC+        , y = 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k = 0xAFF1651E4CD6036D57AA8B2A05CCF1A9D5A40166340ECBBDC55BE10B568AA0AA+        , r = 0x89EC4BB1400ECCFF8E7D9AA515CD1DE7803F2DAFF09693EE7FD1353E90A68307+        , s = 0xC9F0BDABCC0D880BB137A994CC7F3980CE91CC10FAF529FC46565B15CEA854E1+        , pgq = rfc6979Params2048+        }+    ]++rfc6979Params1024 = DSA.Params+    { DSA.params_p = 0x86F5CA03DCFEB225063FF830A0C769B9DD9D6153AD91D7CE27F787C43278B447E6533B86B18BED6E8A48B784A14C252C5BE0DBF60B86D6385BD2F12FB763ED8873ABFD3F5BA2E0A8C0A59082EAC056935E529DAF7C610467899C77ADEDFC846C881870B7B19B2B58F9BE0521A17002E3BDD6B86685EE90B3D9A1B02B782B1779+    , DSA.params_g = 0x07B0F92546150B62514BB771E2A0C0CE387F03BDA6C56B505209FF25FD3C133D89BBCD97E904E09114D9A7DEFDEADFC9078EA544D2E401AEECC40BB9FBBF78FD87995A10A1C27CB7789B594BA7EFB5C4326A9FE59A070E136DB77175464ADCA417BE5DCE2F40D10A46A3A3943F26AB7FD9C0398FF8C76EE0A56826A8A88F1DBD+    , DSA.params_q = 0x996F967F6C8E388D9E28D01E205FBA957A5698B1+    }++rfc6979Params2048 = DSA.Params+    { DSA.params_p = 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params_g = 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params_q = 0xF2C3119374CE76C9356990B465374A17F23F9ED35089BD969F61C6DDE9998C1F+    }+ vectorToPrivate :: VectorDSA -> DSA.PrivateKey vectorToPrivate vector = DSA.PrivateKey     { DSA.private_x      = x vector@@ -127,16 +331,32 @@     , DSA.public_params = pgq vector     } -doSignatureTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual)+doSignatureTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual)     where expected = Just $ DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)-          actual   = DSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) SHA1 (msg vector)+          actual   = DSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) hashAlg (msg vector) -doVerifyTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)-    where actual = DSA.verify SHA1 (vectorToPublic vector) (DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector)+doVerifyTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+    where actual = DSA.verify hashAlg (vectorToPublic vector) (DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector)  dsaTests = testGroup "DSA"     [ testGroup "SHA1"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map doSignatureTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map doVerifyTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1+        ]+    , testGroup "SHA224"+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA224) [katZero..] vectorsSHA224+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA224) [katZero..] vectorsSHA224+        ]+    , testGroup "SHA256"+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA256) [katZero..] vectorsSHA256+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA256) [katZero..] vectorsSHA256+        ]+    , testGroup "SHA384"+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA384) [katZero..] vectorsSHA384+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA384) [katZero..] vectorsSHA384+        ]+    , testGroup "SHA512"+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA512) [katZero..] vectorsSHA512+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA512) [katZero..] vectorsSHA512         ]     ]
tests/KAT_PubKey/ECC.hs view
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@         }     ] -doPointValidTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (valid vector @=? ECC.isPointValid (curve vector) (ECC.Point (x vector) (y vector)))+doPointValidTest i vector = testCase (show i) (valid vector @=? ECC.isPointValid (curve vector) (ECC.Point (x vector) (y vector)))  arbitraryPoint :: ECC.Curve -> Gen ECC.Point arbitraryPoint aCurve =@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@     pointGen = ECC.pointBaseMul aCurve <$> choose (1, n - 1)  eccTests = testGroup "ECC"-    [ testGroup "valid-point" $ map doPointValidTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsPoint)+    [ testGroup "valid-point" $ zipWith doPointValidTest [katZero..] vectorsPoint     , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testGroup "property"         [ testProperty "point-add" $ \aCurve (QAInteger r1) (QAInteger r2) ->             let curveN   = ECC.ecc_n . ECC.common_curve $ aCurve
tests/KAT_PubKey/ECDSA.hs view
@@ -490,32 +490,32 @@ vectorToPublic :: VectorECDSA -> ECDSA.PublicKey vectorToPublic vector = ECDSA.PublicKey (curve vector) (q vector) -doSignatureTest hashAlg (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual)+doSignatureTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual)   where expected = Just $ ECDSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)         actual   = ECDSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) hashAlg (msg vector) -doVerifyTest hashAlg (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+doVerifyTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)   where actual = ECDSA.verify hashAlg (vectorToPublic vector) (ECDSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector)  ecdsaTests = testGroup "ECDSA"     [ testGroup "SHA1"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1         ]     , testGroup "SHA224"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA224) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA224) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA224) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA224) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224         ]     , testGroup "SHA256"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA256) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA256) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA256) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA256) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256         ]     , testGroup "SHA384"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA384) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA384) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA384) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA384) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384         ]     , testGroup "SHA512"-        [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA512) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512)-        , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA512) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512)+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA512) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA512) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512         ]     ]
tests/KAT_PubKey/OAEP.hs view
@@ -81,17 +81,17 @@         }     ] -doEncryptionTest key (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vec) @=? actual)-    where actual = OAEP.encryptWithSeed (seed vec) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (message vec) +doEncryptionTest key i vec = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vec) @=? actual)+    where actual = OAEP.encryptWithSeed (seed vec) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (message vec) -doDecryptionTest key (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (Right (message vec) @=? actual)+doDecryptionTest key i vec = testCase (show i) (Right (message vec) @=? actual)     where actual = OAEP.decrypt Nothing (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vec)  oaepTests = testGroup "RSA-OAEP"     [ testGroup "internal"-        [ doEncryptionTest (private_pub rsaKeyInt) (0 :: Int, vectorInt)-        , doDecryptionTest rsaKeyInt (0 :: Int, vectorInt)+        [ doEncryptionTest (private_pub rsaKeyInt) (0 :: Int) vectorInt+        , doDecryptionTest rsaKeyInt (0 :: Int) vectorInt         ]-    , testGroup "encryption key 1024 bits" $ map (doEncryptionTest $ private_pub rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1)-    , testGroup "decryption key 1024 bits" $ map (doDecryptionTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1)+    , testGroup "encryption key 1024 bits" $ zipWith (doEncryptionTest $ private_pub rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1+    , testGroup "decryption key 1024 bits" $ zipWith (doDecryptionTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1     ]
tests/KAT_PubKey/P256.hs view
@@ -17,7 +17,19 @@     deriving (Show,Eq,Ord)  instance Arbitrary P256Scalar where-    arbitrary = P256Scalar . getQAInteger <$> arbitrary+    -- Cover the full range up to 2^256-1 except 0 and curveN.  To test edge+    -- cases with arithmetic functions, some values close to 0, curveN and+    -- 2^256 are given higher frequency.+    arbitrary = P256Scalar <$> oneof+        [ choose (1, w)+        , choose (w + 1, curveN - w - 1)+        , choose (curveN - w, curveN - 1)+        , choose (curveN + 1, curveN + w)+        , choose (curveN + w + 1, high - w - 1)+        , choose (high - w, high - 1)+        ]+      where high = 2^(256 :: Int)+            w    = 100  curve  = ECC.getCurveByName ECC.SEC_p256r1 curveN = ECC.ecc_n . ECC.common_curve $ curve@@ -26,23 +38,25 @@ pointP256ToECC :: P256.Point -> ECC.Point pointP256ToECC = uncurry ECC.Point . P256.pointToIntegers +i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes+i2ospScalar i =+    case i2ospOf 32 i of+        Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar"+        Just b  -> b+ unP256Scalar :: P256Scalar -> P256.Scalar-unP256Scalar (P256Scalar r') =-    let r = if r' == 0 then 0x2901 else (r' `mod` curveN)-        rBytes = i2ospScalar r+unP256Scalar (P256Scalar r) =+    let rBytes = i2ospScalar r      in case P256.scalarFromBinary rBytes of                     CryptoFailed err    -> error ("cannot convert scalar: " ++ show err)                     CryptoPassed scalar -> scalar-  where-    i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes-    i2ospScalar i =-        case i2ospOf 32 i of-            Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar"-            Just b  -> b  unP256 :: P256Scalar -> Integer-unP256 (P256Scalar r') = if r' == 0 then 0x2901 else (r' `mod` curveN)+unP256 (P256Scalar r) = r +modP256Scalar :: P256Scalar -> P256Scalar+modP256Scalar (P256Scalar r) = P256Scalar (r `mod` curveN)+ p256ScalarToInteger :: P256.Scalar -> Integer p256ScalarToInteger s = os2ip (P256.scalarToBinary s :: Bytes) @@ -55,9 +69,8 @@  tests = testGroup "P256"     [ testGroup "scalar"-        [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \(QAInteger r') ->-            let r = r' `mod` curveN-                rBytes = i2ospScalar r+        [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \(QAInteger r) ->+            let rBytes = i2ospScalar r              in case P256.scalarFromBinary rBytes of                     CryptoFailed err    -> error (show err)                     CryptoPassed scalar -> rBytes `propertyEq` P256.scalarToBinary scalar@@ -66,14 +79,9 @@                 r' = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2)              in r `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger r'         , testProperty "add0" $ \r ->-            let v = unP256 r+            let v = unP256 r `mod` curveN                 v' = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r) P256.scalarZero              in v `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v'-        , testProperty "add-n-1" $ \r ->-            let nm1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger (curveN - 1)-                v   = unP256 r-                v'  = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r) nm1-             in (((curveN - 1) + v) `mod` curveN) `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v'         , testProperty "sub" $ \r1 r2 ->             let r = (unP256 r1 - unP256 r2) `mod` curveN                 r' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2)@@ -83,15 +91,32 @@                     [ eqTest "r1-r2" r (p256ScalarToInteger r')                     , eqTest "r2-r1" v (p256ScalarToInteger v')                     ]-        , testProperty "sub-n-1" $ \r ->-            let nm1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger (curveN - 1)-                v = unP256 r-                v' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r) nm1-             in ((v - (curveN - 1)) `mod` curveN) `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v'+        , testProperty "sub0" $ \r ->+            let v = unP256 r `mod` curveN+                v' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r) P256.scalarZero+             in v `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v'+        , testProperty "mul" $ \r1 r2 ->+            let r = (unP256 r1 * unP256 r2) `mod` curveN+                r' = P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2)+             in r `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger r'         , testProperty "inv" $ \r' ->             let inv  = inverseCoprimes (unP256 r') curveN                 inv' = P256.scalarInv (unP256Scalar r')-             in if unP256 r' == 0 then True else inv `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger inv'+             in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> inv `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger inv'+        , testProperty "inv-safe" $ \r' ->+            let inv  = P256.scalarInv (unP256Scalar r')+                inv' = P256.scalarInvSafe (unP256Scalar r')+             in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> inv `propertyEq` inv'+        , testProperty "inv-safe-mul" $ \r' ->+            let inv = P256.scalarInvSafe (unP256Scalar r')+                res = P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar r') inv+             in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> 1 `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger res+        , testProperty "inv-safe-zero" $+            let inv0 = P256.scalarInvSafe P256.scalarZero+                invN = P256.scalarInvSafe P256.scalarN+             in propertyHold [ eqTest "scalarZero" P256.scalarZero inv0+                             , eqTest "scalarN"    P256.scalarZero invN+                             ]         ]     , testGroup "point"         [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \rx ry ->@@ -111,9 +136,16 @@                 t = P256.pointFromIntegers (xT, yT)                 r = P256.pointFromIntegers (xR, yR)              in r @=? P256.pointAdd s t-        , testProperty "lift-to-curve" $ propertyLiftToCurve-        , testProperty "point-add" $ propertyPointAdd-        , testProperty "point-negate" $ propertyPointNegate+        , testProperty "lift-to-curve" propertyLiftToCurve+        , testProperty "point-add" propertyPointAdd+        , testProperty "point-negate" propertyPointNegate+        , testProperty "point-mul" propertyPointMul+        , testProperty "infinity" $+            let gN = P256.toPoint P256.scalarN+                g1 = P256.pointBase+             in propertyHold [ eqTest "zero" True  (P256.pointIsAtInfinity gN)+                             , eqTest "base" False (P256.pointIsAtInfinity g1)+                             ]         ]     ]   where@@ -133,7 +165,8 @@             pe2   = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r2) curveGen             pR    = P256.toPoint (P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2))             peR   = ECC.pointAdd curve pe1 pe2-         in propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointAdd p1 p2)+         in (unP256 r1 + unP256 r2) `mod` curveN /= 0 ==>+            propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointAdd p1 p2)                          , eqTest "ecc" peR (pointP256ToECC pR)                          ] @@ -141,10 +174,15 @@         let p  = P256.toPoint (unP256Scalar r)             pe = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r) curveGen             pR = P256.pointNegate p-         in ECC.pointNegate curve pe `propertyEq` (pointP256ToECC pR)+         in ECC.pointNegate curve pe `propertyEq` pointP256ToECC pR -    i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes-    i2ospScalar i =-        case i2ospOf 32 i of-            Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar"-            Just b  -> b+    propertyPointMul s' r' =+        let s     = modP256Scalar s'+            r     = modP256Scalar r'+            p     = P256.toPoint (unP256Scalar r)+            pe    = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r) curveGen+            pR    = P256.toPoint (P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar s) (unP256Scalar r))+            peR   = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 s) pe+         in propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointMul (unP256Scalar s) p)+                         , eqTest "ecc" peR (pointP256ToECC pR)+                         ]
tests/KAT_PubKey/PSS.hs view
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@  import Imports +-- Module contains one vector generated by the implementation itself and other+-- vectors from <ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1-vec.zip>+ data VectorPSS = VectorPSS { message :: ByteString                            , salt :: ByteString                            , signature :: ByteString@@ -149,325 +152,197 @@         }     ] -{--# ===================================-# Example 10: A 2048-bit RSA Key Pair-# ===================================--# -------------------------------# Components of the RSA Key Pair-# --------------------------------# RSA modulus n: -a5 dd 86 7a c4 cb 02 f9 0b 94 57 d4 8c 14 a7 70 -ef 99 1c 56 c3 9c 0e c6 5f d1 1a fa 89 37 ce a5 -7b 9b e7 ac 73 b4 5c 00 17 61 5b 82 d6 22 e3 18 -75 3b 60 27 c0 fd 15 7b e1 2f 80 90 fe e2 a7 ad -cd 0e ef 75 9f 88 ba 49 97 c7 a4 2d 58 c9 aa 12 -cb 99 ae 00 1f e5 21 c1 3b b5 43 14 45 a8 d5 ae -4f 5e 4c 7e 94 8a c2 27 d3 60 40 71 f2 0e 57 7e -90 5f be b1 5d fa f0 6d 1d e5 ae 62 53 d6 3a 6a -21 20 b3 1a 5d a5 da bc 95 50 60 0e 20 f2 7d 37 -39 e2 62 79 25 fe a3 cc 50 9f 21 df f0 4e 6e ea -45 49 c5 40 d6 80 9f f9 30 7e ed e9 1f ff 58 73 -3d 83 85 a2 37 d6 d3 70 5a 33 e3 91 90 09 92 07 -0d f7 ad f1 35 7c f7 e3 70 0c e3 66 7d e8 3f 17 -b8 df 17 78 db 38 1d ce 09 cb 4a d0 58 a5 11 00 -1a 73 81 98 ee 27 cf 55 a1 3b 75 45 39 90 65 82 -ec 8b 17 4b d5 8d 5d 1f 3d 76 7c 61 37 21 ae 05 --# RSA public exponent e: -01 00 01 --# RSA private exponent d: -2d 2f f5 67 b3 fe 74 e0 61 91 b7 fd ed 6d e1 12 -29 0c 67 06 92 43 0d 59 69 18 40 47 da 23 4c 96 -93 de ed 16 73 ed 42 95 39 c9 69 d3 72 c0 4d 6b -47 e0 f5 b8 ce e0 84 3e 5c 22 83 5d bd 3b 05 a0 -99 79 84 ae 60 58 b1 1b c4 90 7c bf 67 ed 84 fa -9a e2 52 df b0 d0 cd 49 e6 18 e3 5d fd fe 59 bc -a3 dd d6 6c 33 ce bb c7 7a d4 41 aa 69 5e 13 e3 -24 b5 18 f0 1c 60 f5 a8 5c 99 4a d1 79 f2 a6 b5 -fb e9 34 02 b1 17 67 be 01 bf 07 34 44 d6 ba 1d -d2 bc a5 bd 07 4d 4a 5f ae 35 31 ad 13 03 d8 4b -30 d8 97 31 8c bb ba 04 e0 3c 2e 66 de 6d 91 f8 -2f 96 ea 1d 4b b5 4a 5a ae 10 2d 59 46 57 f5 c9 -78 95 53 51 2b 29 6d ea 29 d8 02 31 96 35 7e 3e -3a 6e 95 8f 39 e3 c2 34 40 38 ea 60 4b 31 ed c6 -f0 f7 ff 6e 71 81 a5 7c 92 82 6a 26 8f 86 76 8e -96 f8 78 56 2f c7 1d 85 d6 9e 44 86 12 f7 04 8f --# Prime p: -cf d5 02 83 fe ee b9 7f 6f 08 d7 3c bc 7b 38 36 -f8 2b bc d4 99 47 9f 5e 6f 76 fd fc b8 b3 8c 4f -71 dc 9e 88 bd 6a 6f 76 37 1a fd 65 d2 af 18 62 -b3 2a fb 34 a9 5f 71 b8 b1 32 04 3f fe be 3a 95 -2b af 75 92 44 81 48 c0 3f 9c 69 b1 d6 8e 4c e5 -cf 32 c8 6b af 46 fe d3 01 ca 1a b4 03 06 9b 32 -f4 56 b9 1f 71 89 8a b0 81 cd 8c 42 52 ef 52 71 -91 5c 97 94 b8 f2 95 85 1d a7 51 0f 99 cb 73 eb --# Prime q: -cc 4e 90 d2 a1 b3 a0 65 d3 b2 d1 f5 a8 fc e3 1b -54 44 75 66 4e ab 56 1d 29 71 b9 9f b7 be f8 44 -e8 ec 1f 36 0b 8c 2a c8 35 96 92 97 1e a6 a3 8f -72 3f cc 21 1f 5d bc b1 77 a0 fd ac 51 64 a1 d4 -ff 7f bb 4e 82 99 86 35 3c b9 83 65 9a 14 8c dd -42 0c 7d 31 ba 38 22 ea 90 a3 2b e4 6c 03 0e 8c -17 e1 fa 0a d3 78 59 e0 6b 0a a6 fa 3b 21 6d 9c -be 6c 0e 22 33 97 69 c0 a6 15 91 3e 5d a7 19 cf --# p's CRT exponent dP: -1c 2d 1f c3 2f 6b c4 00 4f d8 5d fd e0 fb bf 9a -4c 38 f9 c7 c4 e4 1d ea 1a a8 82 34 a2 01 cd 92 -f3 b7 da 52 65 83 a9 8a d8 5b b3 60 fb 98 3b 71 -1e 23 44 9d 56 1d 17 78 d7 a5 15 48 6b cb f4 7b -46 c9 e9 e1 a3 a1 f7 70 00 ef be b0 9a 8a fe 47 -e5 b8 57 cd a9 9c b1 6d 7f ff 9b 71 2e 3b d6 0c -a9 6d 9c 79 73 d6 16 d4 69 34 a9 c0 50 28 1c 00 -43 99 ce ff 1d b7 dd a7 87 66 a8 a9 b9 cb 08 73 --# q's CRT exponent dQ: -cb 3b 3c 04 ca a5 8c 60 be 7d 9b 2d eb b3 e3 96 -43 f4 f5 73 97 be 08 23 6a 1e 9e af aa 70 65 36 -e7 1c 3a cf e0 1c c6 51 f2 3c 9e 05 85 8f ee 13 -bb 6a 8a fc 47 df 4e dc 9a 4b a3 0b ce cb 73 d0 -15 78 52 32 7e e7 89 01 5c 2e 8d ee 7b 9f 05 a0 -f3 1a c9 4e b6 17 31 64 74 0c 5c 95 14 7c d5 f3 -b5 ae 2c b4 a8 37 87 f0 1d 8a b3 1f 27 c2 d0 ee -a2 dd 8a 11 ab 90 6a ba 20 7c 43 c6 ee 12 53 31 --# CRT coefficient qInv: -12 f6 b2 cf 13 74 a7 36 fa d0 56 16 05 0f 96 ab -4b 61 d1 17 7c 7f 9d 52 5a 29 f3 d1 80 e7 76 67 -e9 9d 99 ab f0 52 5d 07 58 66 0f 37 52 65 5b 0f -25 b8 df 84 31 d9 a8 ff 77 c1 6c 12 a0 a5 12 2a -9f 0b f7 cf d5 a2 66 a3 5c 15 9f 99 12 08 b9 03 -16 ff 44 4f 3e 0b 6b d0 e9 3b 8a 7a 24 48 e9 57 -e3 dd a6 cf cf 22 66 b1 06 01 3a c4 68 08 d3 b3 -88 7b 3b 00 34 4b aa c9 53 0b 4c e7 08 fc 32 b6 --# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.1-# -----------------------------------# Message to be signed:-88 31 77 e5 12 6b 9b e2 d9 a9 68 03 27 d5 37 0c -6f 26 86 1f 58 20 c4 3d a6 7a 3a d6 09 --# Salt:-04 e2 15 ee 6f f9 34 b9 da 70 d7 73 0c 87 34 ab -fc ec de 89 --# Signature:-82 c2 b1 60 09 3b 8a a3 c0 f7 52 2b 19 f8 73 54 -06 6c 77 84 7a bf 2a 9f ce 54 2d 0e 84 e9 20 c5 -af b4 9f fd fd ac e1 65 60 ee 94 a1 36 96 01 14 -8e ba d7 a0 e1 51 cf 16 33 17 91 a5 72 7d 05 f2 -1e 74 e7 eb 81 14 40 20 69 35 d7 44 76 5a 15 e7 -9f 01 5c b6 6c 53 2c 87 a6 a0 59 61 c8 bf ad 74 -1a 9a 66 57 02 28 94 39 3e 72 23 73 97 96 c0 2a -77 45 5d 0f 55 5b 0e c0 1d df 25 9b 62 07 fd 0f -d5 76 14 ce f1 a5 57 3b aa ff 4e c0 00 69 95 16 -59 b8 5f 24 30 0a 25 16 0c a8 52 2d c6 e6 72 7e -57 d0 19 d7 e6 36 29 b8 fe 5e 89 e2 5c c1 5b eb -3a 64 75 77 55 92 99 28 0b 9b 28 f7 9b 04 09 00 -0b e2 5b bd 96 40 8b a3 b4 3c c4 86 18 4d d1 c8 -e6 25 53 fa 1a f4 04 0f 60 66 3d e7 f5 e4 9c 04 -38 8e 25 7f 1c e8 9c 95 da b4 8a 31 5d 9b 66 b1 -b7 62 82 33 87 6f f2 38 52 30 d0 70 d0 7e 16 66 --# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.2-# -----------------------------------# Message to be signed:-dd 67 0a 01 46 58 68 ad c9 3f 26 13 19 57 a5 0c -52 fb 77 7c db aa 30 89 2c 9e 12 36 11 64 ec 13 -97 9d 43 04 81 18 e4 44 5d b8 7b ee 58 dd 98 7b -34 25 d0 20 71 d8 db ae 80 70 8b 03 9d bb 64 db -d1 de 56 57 d9 fe d0 c1 18 a5 41 43 74 2e 0f f3 -c8 7f 74 e4 58 57 64 7a f3 f7 9e b0 a1 4c 9d 75 -ea 9a 1a 04 b7 cf 47 8a 89 7a 70 8f d9 88 f4 8e -80 1e db 0b 70 39 df 8c 23 bb 3c 56 f4 e8 21 ac --# Salt:-8b 2b dd 4b 40 fa f5 45 c7 78 dd f9 bc 1a 49 cb -57 f9 b7 1b --# Signature:-14 ae 35 d9 dd 06 ba 92 f7 f3 b8 97 97 8a ed 7c -d4 bf 5f f0 b5 85 a4 0b d4 6c e1 b4 2c d2 70 30 -53 bb 90 44 d6 4e 81 3d 8f 96 db 2d d7 00 7d 10 -11 8f 6f 8f 84 96 09 7a d7 5e 1f f6 92 34 1b 28 -92 ad 55 a6 33 a1 c5 5e 7f 0a 0a d5 9a 0e 20 3a -5b 82 78 ae c5 4d d8 62 2e 28 31 d8 71 74 f8 ca -ff 43 ee 6c 46 44 53 45 d8 4a 59 65 9b fb 92 ec -d4 c8 18 66 86 95 f3 47 06 f6 68 28 a8 99 59 63 -7f 2b f3 e3 25 1c 24 bd ba 4d 4b 76 49 da 00 22 -21 8b 11 9c 84 e7 9a 65 27 ec 5b 8a 5f 86 1c 15 -99 52 e2 3e c0 5e 1e 71 73 46 fa ef e8 b1 68 68 -25 bd 2b 26 2f b2 53 10 66 c0 de 09 ac de 2e 42 -31 69 07 28 b5 d8 5e 11 5a 2f 6b 92 b7 9c 25 ab -c9 bd 93 99 ff 8b cf 82 5a 52 ea 1f 56 ea 76 dd -26 f4 3b aa fa 18 bf a9 2a 50 4c bd 35 69 9e 26 -d1 dc c5 a2 88 73 85 f3 c6 32 32 f0 6f 32 44 c3 --# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.3-# -----------------------------------# Message to be signed:-48 b2 b6 a5 7a 63 c8 4c ea 85 9d 65 c6 68 28 4b -08 d9 6b dc aa be 25 2d b0 e4 a9 6c b1 ba c6 01 -93 41 db 6f be fb 8d 10 6b 0e 90 ed a6 bc c6 c6 -26 2f 37 e7 ea 9c 7e 5d 22 6b d7 df 85 ec 5e 71 -ef ff 2f 54 c5 db 57 7f f7 29 ff 91 b8 42 49 1d -e2 74 1d 0c 63 16 07 df 58 6b 90 5b 23 b9 1a f1 -3d a1 23 04 bf 83 ec a8 a7 3e 87 1f f9 db --# Salt:-4e 96 fc 1b 39 8f 92 b4 46 71 01 0c 0d c3 ef d6 -e2 0c 2d 73 --# Signature:-6e 3e 4d 7b 6b 15 d2 fb 46 01 3b 89 00 aa 5b bb -39 39 cf 2c 09 57 17 98 70 42 02 6e e6 2c 74 c5 -4c ff d5 d7 d5 7e fb bf 95 0a 0f 5c 57 4f a0 9d -3f c1 c9 f5 13 b0 5b 4f f5 0d d8 df 7e df a2 01 -02 85 4c 35 e5 92 18 01 19 a7 0c e5 b0 85 18 2a -a0 2d 9e a2 aa 90 d1 df 03 f2 da ae 88 5b a2 f5 -d0 5a fd ac 97 47 6f 06 b9 3b 5b c9 4a 1a 80 aa -91 16 c4 d6 15 f3 33 b0 98 89 2b 25 ff ac e2 66 -f5 db 5a 5a 3b cc 10 a8 24 ed 55 aa d3 5b 72 78 -34 fb 8c 07 da 28 fc f4 16 a5 d9 b2 22 4f 1f 8b -44 2b 36 f9 1e 45 6f de a2 d7 cf e3 36 72 68 de -03 07 a4 c7 4e 92 41 59 ed 33 39 3d 5e 06 55 53 -1c 77 32 7b 89 82 1b de df 88 01 61 c7 8c d4 19 -6b 54 19 f7 ac c3 f1 3e 5e bf 16 1b 6e 7c 67 24 -71 6c a3 3b 85 c2 e2 56 40 19 2a c2 85 96 51 d5 -0b de 7e b9 76 e5 1c ec 82 8b 98 b6 56 3b 86 bb --# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.4-# -----------------------------------# Message to be signed:-0b 87 77 c7 f8 39 ba f0 a6 4b bb db c5 ce 79 75 -5c 57 a2 05 b8 45 c1 74 e2 d2 e9 05 46 a0 89 c4 -e6 ec 8a df fa 23 a7 ea 97 ba e6 b6 5d 78 2b 82 -db 5d 2b 5a 56 d2 2a 29 a0 5e 7c 44 33 e2 b8 2a -62 1a bb a9 0a dd 05 ce 39 3f c4 8a 84 05 42 45 -1a --# Salt:-c7 cd 69 8d 84 b6 51 28 d8 83 5e 3a 8b 1e b0 e0 -1c b5 41 ec --# Signature:-34 04 7f f9 6c 4d c0 dc 90 b2 d4 ff 59 a1 a3 61 -a4 75 4b 25 5d 2e e0 af 7d 8b f8 7c 9b c9 e7 dd -ee de 33 93 4c 63 ca 1c 0e 3d 26 2c b1 45 ef 93 -2a 1f 2c 0a 99 7a a6 a3 4f 8e ae e7 47 7d 82 cc -f0 90 95 a6 b8 ac ad 38 d4 ee c9 fb 7e ab 7a d0 -2d a1 d1 1d 8e 54 c1 82 5e 55 bf 58 c2 a2 32 34 -b9 02 be 12 4f 9e 90 38 a8 f6 8f a4 5d ab 72 f6 -6e 09 45 bf 1d 8b ac c9 04 4c 6f 07 09 8c 9f ce -c5 8a 3a ab 10 0c 80 51 78 15 5f 03 0a 12 4c 45 -0e 5a cb da 47 d0 e4 f1 0b 80 a2 3f 80 3e 77 4d -02 3b 00 15 c2 0b 9f 9b be 7c 91 29 63 38 d5 ec -b4 71 ca fb 03 20 07 b6 7a 60 be 5f 69 50 4a 9f -01 ab b3 cb 46 7b 26 0e 2b ce 86 0b e8 d9 5b f9 -2c 0c 8e 14 96 ed 1e 52 85 93 a4 ab b6 df 46 2d -de 8a 09 68 df fe 46 83 11 68 57 a2 32 f5 eb f6 -c8 5b e2 38 74 5a d0 f3 8f 76 7a 5f db f4 86 fb --# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.5-# ---------------------------------+-- ==================================+-- Example 2: A 1025-bit RSA Key Pair+-- ================================== -# Message to be signed:-f1 03 6e 00 8e 71 e9 64 da dc 92 19 ed 30 e1 7f -06 b4 b6 8a 95 5c 16 b3 12 b1 ed df 02 8b 74 97 -6b ed 6b 3f 6a 63 d4 e7 78 59 24 3c 9c cc dc 98 -01 65 23 ab b0 24 83 b3 55 91 c3 3a ad 81 21 3b -b7 c7 bb 1a 47 0a ab c1 0d 44 25 6c 4d 45 59 d9 -16 +rsaKey2 = PrivateKey+    { private_pub = PublicKey+        { public_n = 0x01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9+        , public_e = 0x010001+        , public_size = 129+        }+    , private_d = 0x027d147e4673057377fd1ea201565772176a7dc38358d376045685a2e787c23c15576bc16b9f444402d6bfc5d98a3e88ea13ef67c353eca0c0ddba9255bd7b8bb50a644afdfd1dd51695b252d22e7318d1b6687a1c10ff75545f3db0fe602d5f2b7f294e3601eab7b9d1cecd767f64692e3e536ca2846cb0c2dd486a39fa75b1+    , private_p = 0x016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1+    , private_q = 0x014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079+    , private_dP = 0xe247cce504939b8f0a36090de200938755e2444b29539a7da7a902f6056835c0db7b52559497cfe2c61a8086d0213c472c78851800b171f6401de2e9c2756f31+    , private_dQ = 0xb12fba757855e586e46f64c38a70c68b3f548d93d787b399999d4c8f0bbd2581c21e19ed0018a6d5d3df86424b3abcad40199d31495b61309f27c1bf55d487c1+    , private_qinv = 0x564b1e1fa003bda91e89090425aac05b91da9ee25061e7628d5f51304a84992fdc33762bd378a59f030a334d532bd0dae8f298ea9ed844636ad5fb8cbdc03cad+    } -# Salt:-ef a8 bf f9 62 12 b2 f4 a3 f3 71 a1 0d 57 41 52 -65 5f 5d fb +vectorsKey2 =+    [+    -- Example 2.1+      VectorPSS+        { message = "\xda\xba\x03\x20\x66\x26\x3f\xae\xdb\x65\x98\x48\x11\x52\x78\xa5\x2c\x44\xfa\xa3\xa7\x6f\x37\x51\x5e\xd3\x36\x32\x10\x72\xc4\x0a\x9d\x9b\x53\xbc\x05\x01\x40\x78\xad\xf5\x20\x87\x51\x46\xaa\xe7\x0f\xf0\x60\x22\x6d\xcb\x7b\x1f\x1f\xc2\x7e\x93\x60"+        , salt = "\x57\xbf\x16\x0b\xcb\x02\xbb\x1d\xc7\x28\x0c\xf0\x45\x85\x30\xb7\xd2\x83\x2f\xf7"+        , signature = "\x01\x4c\x5b\xa5\x33\x83\x28\xcc\xc6\xe7\xa9\x0b\xf1\xc0\xab\x3f\xd6\x06\xff\x47\x96\xd3\xc1\x2e\x4b\x63\x9e\xd9\x13\x6a\x5f\xec\x6c\x16\xd8\x88\x4b\xdd\x99\xcf\xdc\x52\x14\x56\xb0\x74\x2b\x73\x68\x68\xcf\x90\xde\x09\x9a\xdb\x8d\x5f\xfd\x1d\xef\xf3\x9b\xa4\x00\x7a\xb7\x46\xce\xfd\xb2\x2d\x7d\xf0\xe2\x25\xf5\x46\x27\xdc\x65\x46\x61\x31\x72\x1b\x90\xaf\x44\x53\x63\xa8\x35\x8b\x9f\x60\x76\x42\xf7\x8f\xab\x0a\xb0\xf4\x3b\x71\x68\xd6\x4b\xae\x70\xd8\x82\x78\x48\xd8\xef\x1e\x42\x1c\x57\x54\xdd\xf4\x2c\x25\x89\xb5\xb3"+        }+    -- Example 2.2+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xe4\xf8\x60\x1a\x8a\x6d\xa1\xbe\x34\x44\x7c\x09\x59\xc0\x58\x57\x0c\x36\x68\xcf\xd5\x1d\xd5\xf9\xcc\xd6\xad\x44\x11\xfe\x82\x13\x48\x6d\x78\xa6\xc4\x9f\x93\xef\xc2\xca\x22\x88\xce\xbc\x2b\x9b\x60\xbd\x04\xb1\xe2\x20\xd8\x6e\x3d\x48\x48\xd7\x09\xd0\x32\xd1\xe8\xc6\xa0\x70\xc6\xaf\x9a\x49\x9f\xcf\x95\x35\x4b\x14\xba\x61\x27\xc7\x39\xde\x1b\xb0\xfd\x16\x43\x1e\x46\x93\x8a\xec\x0c\xf8\xad\x9e\xb7\x2e\x83\x2a\x70\x35\xde\x9b\x78\x07\xbd\xc0\xed\x8b\x68\xeb\x0f\x5a\xc2\x21\x6b\xe4\x0c\xe9\x20\xc0\xdb\x0e\xdd\xd3\x86\x0e\xd7\x88\xef\xac\xca\xca\x50\x2d\x8f\x2b\xd6\xd1\xa7\xc1\xf4\x1f\xf4\x6f\x16\x81\xc8\xf1\xf8\x18\xe9\xc4\xf6\xd9\x1a\x0c\x78\x03\xcc\xc6\x3d\x76\xa6\x54\x4d\x84\x3e\x08\x4e\x36\x3b\x8a\xcc\x55\xaa\x53\x17\x33\xed\xb5\xde\xe5\xb5\x19\x6e\x9f\x03\xe8\xb7\x31\xb3\x77\x64\x28\xd9\xe4\x57\xfe\x3f\xbc\xb3\xdb\x72\x74\x44\x2d\x78\x58\x90\xe9\xcb\x08\x54\xb6\x44\x4d\xac\xe7\x91\xd7\x27\x3d\xe1\x88\x97\x19\x33\x8a\x77\xfe"+        , salt = "\x7f\x6d\xd3\x59\xe6\x04\xe6\x08\x70\xe8\x98\xe4\x7b\x19\xbf\x2e\x5a\x7b\x2a\x90"+        , signature = "\x01\x09\x91\x65\x6c\xca\x18\x2b\x7f\x29\xd2\xdb\xc0\x07\xe7\xae\x0f\xec\x15\x8e\xb6\x75\x9c\xb9\xc4\x5c\x5f\xf8\x7c\x76\x35\xdd\x46\xd1\x50\x88\x2f\x4d\xe1\xe9\xae\x65\xe7\xf7\xd9\x01\x8f\x68\x36\x95\x4a\x47\xc0\xa8\x1a\x8a\x6b\x6f\x83\xf2\x94\x4d\x60\x81\xb1\xaa\x7c\x75\x9b\x25\x4b\x2c\x34\xb6\x91\xda\x67\xcc\x02\x26\xe2\x0b\x2f\x18\xb4\x22\x12\x76\x1d\xcd\x4b\x90\x8a\x62\xb3\x71\xb5\x91\x8c\x57\x42\xaf\x4b\x53\x7e\x29\x69\x17\x67\x4f\xb9\x14\x19\x47\x61\x62\x1c\xc1\x9a\x41\xf6\xfb\x95\x3f\xbc\xbb\x64\x9d\xea"+        }+    -- Example 2.3+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x52\xa1\xd9\x6c\x8a\xc3\x9e\x41\xe4\x55\x80\x98\x01\xb9\x27\xa5\xb4\x45\xc1\x0d\x90\x2a\x0d\xcd\x38\x50\xd2\x2a\x66\xd2\xbb\x07\x03\xe6\x7d\x58\x67\x11\x45\x95\xaa\xbf\x5a\x7a\xeb\x5a\x8f\x87\x03\x4b\xbb\x30\xe1\x3c\xfd\x48\x17\xa9\xbe\x76\x23\x00\x23\x60\x6d\x02\x86\xa3\xfa\xf8\xa4\xd2\x2b\x72\x8e\xc5\x18\x07\x9f\x9e\x64\x52\x6e\x3a\x0c\xc7\x94\x1a\xa3\x38\xc4\x37\x99\x7c\x68\x0c\xca\xc6\x7c\x66\xbf\xa1"+        , salt = "\xfc\xa8\x62\x06\x8b\xce\x22\x46\x72\x4b\x70\x8a\x05\x19\xda\x17\xe6\x48\x68\x8c"+        , signature = "\x00\x7f\x00\x30\x01\x8f\x53\xcd\xc7\x1f\x23\xd0\x36\x59\xfd\xe5\x4d\x42\x41\xf7\x58\xa7\x50\xb4\x2f\x18\x5f\x87\x57\x85\x20\xc3\x07\x42\xaf\xd8\x43\x59\xb6\xe6\xe8\xd3\xed\x95\x9d\xc6\xfe\x48\x6b\xed\xc8\xe2\xcf\x00\x1f\x63\xa7\xab\xe1\x62\x56\xa1\xb8\x4d\xf0\xd2\x49\xfc\x05\xd3\x19\x4c\xe5\xf0\x91\x27\x42\xdb\xbf\x80\xdd\x17\x4f\x6c\x51\xf6\xba\xd7\xf1\x6c\xf3\x36\x4e\xba\x09\x5a\x06\x26\x7d\xc3\x79\x38\x03\xac\x75\x26\xae\xbe\x0a\x47\x5d\x38\xb8\xc2\x24\x7a\xb5\x1c\x48\x98\xdf\x70\x47\xdc\x6a\xdf\x52\xc6\xc4"+        }+    -- Example 2.4+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xa7\x18\x2c\x83\xac\x18\xbe\x65\x70\xa1\x06\xaa\x9d\x5c\x4e\x3d\xbb\xd4\xaf\xae\xb0\xc6\x0c\x4a\x23\xe1\x96\x9d\x79\xff"+        , salt = "\x80\x70\xef\x2d\xe9\x45\xc0\x23\x87\x68\x4b\xa0\xd3\x30\x96\x73\x22\x35\xd4\x40"+        , signature = "\x00\x9c\xd2\xf4\xed\xbe\x23\xe1\x23\x46\xae\x8c\x76\xdd\x9a\xd3\x23\x0a\x62\x07\x61\x41\xf1\x6c\x15\x2b\xa1\x85\x13\xa4\x8e\xf6\xf0\x10\xe0\xe3\x7f\xd3\xdf\x10\xa1\xec\x62\x9a\x0c\xb5\xa3\xb5\xd2\x89\x30\x07\x29\x8c\x30\x93\x6a\x95\x90\x3b\x6b\xa8\x55\x55\xd9\xec\x36\x73\xa0\x61\x08\xfd\x62\xa2\xfd\xa5\x6d\x1c\xe2\xe8\x5c\x4d\xb6\xb2\x4a\x81\xca\x3b\x49\x6c\x36\xd4\xfd\x06\xeb\x7c\x91\x66\xd8\xe9\x48\x77\xc4\x2b\xea\x62\x2b\x3b\xfe\x92\x51\xfd\xc2\x1d\x8d\x53\x71\xba\xda\xd7\x8a\x48\x82\x14\x79\x63\x35\xb4\x0b"+        }+    -- Example 2.5+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x86\xa8\x3d\x4a\x72\xee\x93\x2a\x4f\x56\x30\xaf\x65\x79\xa3\x86\xb7\x8f\xe8\x89\x99\xe0\xab\xd2\xd4\x90\x34\xa4\xbf\xc8\x54\xdd\x94\xf1\x09\x4e\x2e\x8c\xd7\xa1\x79\xd1\x95\x88\xe4\xae\xfc\x1b\x1b\xd2\x5e\x95\xe3\xdd\x46\x1f"+        , salt = "\x17\x63\x9a\x4e\x88\xd7\x22\xc4\xfc\xa2\x4d\x07\x9a\x8b\x29\xc3\x24\x33\xb0\xc9"+        , signature = "\x00\xec\x43\x08\x24\x93\x1e\xbd\x3b\xaa\x43\x03\x4d\xae\x98\xba\x64\x6b\x8c\x36\x01\x3d\x16\x71\xc3\xcf\x1c\xf8\x26\x0c\x37\x4b\x19\xf8\xe1\xcc\x8d\x96\x50\x12\x40\x5e\x7e\x9b\xf7\x37\x86\x12\xdf\xcc\x85\xfc\xe1\x2c\xda\x11\xf9\x50\xbd\x0b\xa8\x87\x67\x40\x43\x6c\x1d\x25\x95\xa6\x4a\x1b\x32\xef\xcf\xb7\x4a\x21\xc8\x73\xb3\xcc\x33\xaa\xf4\xe3\xdc\x39\x53\xde\x67\xf0\x67\x4c\x04\x53\xb4\xfd\x9f\x60\x44\x06\xd4\x41\xb8\x16\x09\x8c\xb1\x06\xfe\x34\x72\xbc\x25\x1f\x81\x5f\x59\xdb\x2e\x43\x78\xa3\xad\xdc\x18\x1e\xcf"+        }+    -- Example 2.6+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x04\x9f\x91\x54\xd8\x71\xac\x4a\x7c\x7a\xb4\x53\x25\xba\x75\x45\xa1\xed\x08\xf7\x05\x25\xb2\x66\x7c\xf1"+        , salt = "\x37\x81\x0d\xef\x10\x55\xed\x92\x2b\x06\x3d\xf7\x98\xde\x5d\x0a\xab\xf8\x86\xee"+        , signature = "\x00\x47\x5b\x16\x48\xf8\x14\xa8\xdc\x0a\xbd\xc3\x7b\x55\x27\xf5\x43\xb6\x66\xbb\x6e\x39\xd3\x0e\x5b\x49\xd3\xb8\x76\xdc\xcc\x58\xea\xc1\x4e\x32\xa2\xd5\x5c\x26\x16\x01\x44\x56\xad\x2f\x24\x6f\xc8\xe3\xd5\x60\xda\x3d\xdf\x37\x9a\x1c\x0b\xd2\x00\xf1\x02\x21\xdf\x07\x8c\x21\x9a\x15\x1b\xc8\xd4\xec\x9d\x2f\xc2\x56\x44\x67\x81\x10\x14\xef\x15\xd8\xea\x01\xc2\xeb\xbf\xf8\xc2\xc8\xef\xab\x38\x09\x6e\x55\xfc\xbe\x32\x85\xc7\xaa\x55\x88\x51\x25\x4f\xaf\xfa\x92\xc1\xc7\x2b\x78\x75\x86\x63\xef\x45\x82\x84\x31\x39\xd7\xa6"+        }+    ] -# Signature:-7e 09 35 ea 18 f4 d6 c1 d1 7c e8 2e b2 b3 83 6c -55 b3 84 58 9c e1 9d fe 74 33 63 ac 99 48 d1 f3 -46 b7 bf dd fe 92 ef d7 8a db 21 fa ef c8 9a de -42 b1 0f 37 40 03 fe 12 2e 67 42 9a 1c b8 cb d1 -f8 d9 01 45 64 c4 4d 12 01 16 f4 99 0f 1a 6e 38 -77 4c 19 4b d1 b8 21 32 86 b0 77 b0 49 9d 2e 7b -3f 43 4a b1 22 89 c5 56 68 4d ee d7 81 31 93 4b -b3 dd 65 37 23 6f 7c 6f 3d cb 09 d4 76 be 07 72 -1e 37 e1 ce ed 9b 2f 7b 40 68 87 bd 53 15 73 05 -e1 c8 b4 f8 4d 73 3b c1 e1 86 fe 06 cc 59 b6 ed -b8 f4 bd 7f fe fd f4 f7 ba 9c fb 9d 57 06 89 b5 -a1 a4 10 9a 74 6a 69 08 93 db 37 99 25 5a 0c b9 -21 5d 2d 1c d4 90 59 0e 95 2e 8c 87 86 aa 00 11 -26 52 52 47 0c 04 1d fb c3 ee c7 c3 cb f7 1c 24 -86 9d 11 5c 0c b4 a9 56 f5 6d 53 0b 80 ab 58 9a -cf ef c6 90 75 1d df 36 e8 d3 83 f8 3c ed d2 cc +-- ==================================+-- Example 3: A 1026-bit RSA Key Pair+-- ================================== -# ----------------------------------# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.6-# ---------------------------------+rsaKey3 = PrivateKey+    { private_pub = PublicKey+        { public_n = 0x02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443+        , public_e = 0x010001+        , public_size = 129+        }+    , private_d = 0x651451733b56de5ac0a689a4aeb6e6894a69014e076c88dd7a667eab3232bbccd2fc44ba2fa9c31db46f21edd1fdb23c5c128a5da5bab91e7f952b67759c7cff705415ac9fa0907c7ca6178f668fb948d869da4cc3b7356f4008dfd5449d32ee02d9a477eb69fc29266e5d9070512375a50fbbcc27e238ad98425f6ebbf88991+    , private_p = 0x01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853+    , private_q = 0x01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651+    , private_dP = 0x1f2779fd2e3e5e6bae05539518fba0cd0ead1aa4513a7cba18f1cf10e3f68195693d278a0f0ee72f89f9bc760d80e2f9d0261d516501c6ae39f14a476ce2ccf5+    , private_dQ = 0x011a0d36794b04a854aab4b2462d439a5046c91d940b2bc6f75b62956fef35a2a6e63c5309817f307bbff9d59e7e331bd363f6d66849b18346adea169f0ae9aec1+    , private_qinv = 0x0b30f0ecf558752fb3a6ce4ba2b8c675f659eba6c376585a1b39712d038ae3d2b46fcb418ae15d0905da6440e1513a30b9b7d6668fbc5e88e5ab7a175e73ba35+    } -# Message to be signed:-25 f1 08 95 a8 77 16 c1 37 45 0b b9 51 9d fa a1 -f2 07 fa a9 42 ea 88 ab f7 1e 9c 17 98 00 85 b5 -55 ae ba b7 62 64 ae 2a 3a b9 3c 2d 12 98 11 91 -dd ac 6f b5 94 9e b3 6a ee 3c 5d a9 40 f0 07 52 -c9 16 d9 46 08 fa 7d 97 ba 6a 29 15 b6 88 f2 03 -23 d4 e9 d9 68 01 d8 9a 72 ab 58 92 dc 21 17 c0 -74 34 fc f9 72 e0 58 cf 8c 41 ca 4b 4f f5 54 f7 -d5 06 8a d3 15 5f ce d0 f3 12 5b c0 4f 91 93 37 -8a 8f 5c 4c 3b 8c b4 dd 6d 1c c6 9d 30 ec ca 6e -aa 51 e3 6a 05 73 0e 9e 34 2e 85 5b af 09 9d ef -b8 af d7 +vectorsKey3 =+    [+    -- Example 3.1+      VectorPSS+        { message = "\x59\x4b\x37\x33\x3b\xbb\x2c\x84\x52\x4a\x87\xc1\xa0\x1f\x75\xfc\xec\x0e\x32\x56\xf1\x08\xe3\x8d\xca\x36\xd7\x0d\x00\x57"+        , salt = "\xf3\x1a\xd6\xc8\xcf\x89\xdf\x78\xed\x77\xfe\xac\xbc\xc2\xf8\xb0\xa8\xe4\xcf\xaa"+        , signature = "\x00\x88\xb1\x35\xfb\x17\x94\xb6\xb9\x6c\x4a\x3e\x67\x81\x97\xf8\xca\xc5\x2b\x64\xb2\xfe\x90\x7d\x6f\x27\xde\x76\x11\x24\x96\x4a\x99\xa0\x1a\x88\x27\x40\xec\xfa\xed\x6c\x01\xa4\x74\x64\xbb\x05\x18\x23\x13\xc0\x13\x38\xa8\xcd\x09\x72\x14\xcd\x68\xca\x10\x3b\xd5\x7d\x3b\xc9\xe8\x16\x21\x3e\x61\xd7\x84\xf1\x82\x46\x7a\xbf\x8a\x01\xcf\x25\x3e\x99\xa1\x56\xea\xa8\xe3\xe1\xf9\x0e\x3c\x6e\x4e\x3a\xa2\xd8\x3e\xd0\x34\x5b\x89\xfa\xfc\x9c\x26\x07\x7c\x14\xb6\xac\x51\x45\x4f\xa2\x6e\x44\x6e\x3a\x2f\x15\x3b\x2b\x16\x79\x7f"+        }+    -- Example 3.2+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x8b\x76\x95\x28\x88\x4a\x0d\x1f\xfd\x09\x0c\xf1\x02\x99\x3e\x79\x6d\xad\xcf\xbd\xdd\x38\xe4\x4f\xf6\x32\x4c\xa4\x51"+        , salt = "\xfc\xf9\xf0\xe1\xf1\x99\xa3\xd1\xd0\xda\x68\x1c\x5b\x86\x06\xfc\x64\x29\x39\xf7"+        , signature = "\x02\xa5\xf0\xa8\x58\xa0\x86\x4a\x4f\x65\x01\x7a\x7d\x69\x45\x4f\x3f\x97\x3a\x29\x99\x83\x9b\x7b\xbc\x48\xbf\x78\x64\x11\x69\x17\x95\x56\xf5\x95\xfa\x41\xf6\xff\x18\xe2\x86\xc2\x78\x30\x79\xbc\x09\x10\xee\x9c\xc3\x4f\x49\xba\x68\x11\x24\xf9\x23\xdf\xa8\x8f\x42\x61\x41\xa3\x68\xa5\xf5\xa9\x30\xc6\x28\xc2\xc3\xc2\x00\xe1\x8a\x76\x44\x72\x1a\x0c\xbe\xc6\xdd\x3f\x62\x79\xbd\xe3\xe8\xf2\xbe\x5e\x2d\x4e\xe5\x6f\x97\xe7\xce\xaf\x33\x05\x4b\xe7\x04\x2b\xd9\x1a\x63\xbb\x09\xf8\x97\xbd\x41\xe8\x11\x97\xde\xe9\x9b\x11\xaf"+        }+    -- Example 3.3+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x1a\xbd\xba\x48\x9c\x5a\xda\x2f\x99\x5e\xd1\x6f\x19\xd5\xa9\x4d\x9e\x6e\xc3\x4a\x8d\x84\xf8\x45\x57\xd2\x6e\x5e\xf9\xb0\x2b\x22\x88\x7e\x3f\x9a\x4b\x69\x0a\xd1\x14\x92\x09\xc2\x0c\x61\x43\x1f\x0c\x01\x7c\x36\xc2\x65\x7b\x35\xd7\xb0\x7d\x3f\x5a\xd8\x70\x85\x07\xa9\xc1\xb8\x31\xdf\x83\x5a\x56\xf8\x31\x07\x18\x14\xea\x5d\x3d\x8d\x8f\x6a\xde\x40\xcb\xa3\x8b\x42\xdb\x7a\x2d\x3d\x7a\x29\xc8\xf0\xa7\x9a\x78\x38\xcf\x58\xa9\x75\x7f\xa2\xfe\x4c\x40\xdf\x9b\xaa\x19\x3b\xfc\x6f\x92\xb1\x23\xad\x57\xb0\x7a\xce\x3e\x6a\xc0\x68\xc9\xf1\x06\xaf\xd9\xee\xb0\x3b\x4f\x37\xc2\x5d\xbf\xbc\xfb\x30\x71\xf6\xf9\x77\x17\x66\xd0\x72\xf3\xbb\x07\x0a\xf6\x60\x55\x32\x97\x3a\xe2\x50\x51"+        , salt = "\x98\x6e\x7c\x43\xdb\xb6\x71\xbd\x41\xb9\xa7\xf4\xb6\xaf\xc8\x0e\x80\x5f\x24\x23"+        , signature = "\x02\x44\xbc\xd1\xc8\xc1\x69\x55\x73\x6c\x80\x3b\xe4\x01\x27\x2e\x18\xcb\x99\x08\x11\xb1\x4f\x72\xdb\x96\x41\x24\xd5\xfa\x76\x06\x49\xcb\xb5\x7a\xfb\x87\x55\xdb\xb6\x2b\xf5\x1f\x46\x6c\xf2\x3a\x0a\x16\x07\x57\x6e\x98\x3d\x77\x8f\xce\xff\xa9\x2d\xf7\x54\x8a\xea\x8e\xa4\xec\xad\x2c\x29\xdd\x9f\x95\xbc\x07\xfe\x91\xec\xf8\xbe\xe2\x55\xbf\xe8\x76\x2f\xd7\x69\x0a\xa9\xbf\xa4\xfa\x08\x49\xef\x72\x8c\x2c\x42\xc4\x53\x23\x64\x52\x2d\xf2\xab\x7f\x9f\x8a\x03\xb6\x3f\x7a\x49\x91\x75\x82\x86\x68\xf5\xef\x5a\x29\xe3\x80\x2c"+        }+    -- Example 3.4+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x8f\xb4\x31\xf5\xee\x79\x2b\x6c\x2a\xc7\xdb\x53\xcc\x42\x86\x55\xae\xb3\x2d\x03\xf4\xe8\x89\xc5\xc2\x5d\xe6\x83\xc4\x61\xb5\x3a\xcf\x89\xf9\xf8\xd3\xaa\xbd\xf6\xb9\xf0\xc2\xa1\xde\x12\xe1\x5b\x49\xed\xb3\x91\x9a\x65\x2f\xe9\x49\x1c\x25\xa7\xfc\xe1\xf7\x22\xc2\x54\x36\x08\xb6\x9d\xc3\x75\xec"+        , salt = "\xf8\x31\x2d\x9c\x8e\xea\x13\xec\x0a\x4c\x7b\x98\x12\x0c\x87\x50\x90\x87\xc4\x78"+        , signature = "\x01\x96\xf1\x2a\x00\x5b\x98\x12\x9c\x8d\xf1\x3c\x4c\xb1\x6f\x8a\xa8\x87\xd3\xc4\x0d\x96\xdf\x3a\x88\xe7\x53\x2e\xf3\x9c\xd9\x92\xf2\x73\xab\xc3\x70\xbc\x1b\xe6\xf0\x97\xcf\xeb\xbf\x01\x18\xfd\x9e\xf4\xb9\x27\x15\x5f\x3d\xf2\x2b\x90\x4d\x90\x70\x2d\x1f\x7b\xa7\xa5\x2b\xed\x8b\x89\x42\xf4\x12\xcd\x7b\xd6\x76\xc9\xd1\x8e\x17\x03\x91\xdc\xd3\x45\xc0\x6a\x73\x09\x64\xb3\xf3\x0b\xcc\xe0\xbb\x20\xba\x10\x6f\x9a\xb0\xee\xb3\x9c\xf8\xa6\x60\x7f\x75\xc0\x34\x7f\x0a\xf7\x9f\x16\xaf\xa0\x81\xd2\xc9\x2d\x1e\xe6\xf8\x36\xb8"+        }+    -- Example 3.5+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xfe\xf4\x16\x1d\xfa\xaf\x9c\x52\x95\x05\x1d\xfc\x1f\xf3\x81\x0c\x8c\x9e\xc2\xe8\x66\xf7\x07\x54\x22\xc8\xec\x42\x16\xa9\xc4\xff\x49\x42\x7d\x48\x3c\xae\x10\xc8\x53\x4a\x41\xb2\xfd\x15\xfe\xe0\x69\x60\xec\x6f\xb3\xf7\xa7\xe9\x4a\x2f\x8a\x2e\x3e\x43\xdc\x4a\x40\x57\x6c\x30\x97\xac\x95\x3b\x1d\xe8\x6f\x0b\x4e\xd3\x6d\x64\x4f\x23\xae\x14\x42\x55\x29\x62\x24\x64\xca\x0c\xbf\x0b\x17\x41\x34\x72\x38\x15\x7f\xab\x59\xe4\xde\x55\x24\x09\x6d\x62\xba\xec\x63\xac\x64"+        , salt = "\x50\x32\x7e\xfe\xc6\x29\x2f\x98\x01\x9f\xc6\x7a\x2a\x66\x38\x56\x3e\x9b\x6e\x2d"+        , signature = "\x02\x1e\xca\x3a\xb4\x89\x22\x64\xec\x22\x41\x1a\x75\x2d\x92\x22\x10\x76\xd4\xe0\x1c\x0e\x6f\x0d\xde\x9a\xfd\x26\xba\x5a\xcf\x6d\x73\x9e\xf9\x87\x54\x5d\x16\x68\x3e\x56\x74\xc9\xe7\x0f\x1d\xe6\x49\xd7\xe6\x1d\x48\xd0\xca\xeb\x4f\xb4\xd8\xb2\x4f\xba\x84\xa6\xe3\x10\x8f\xee\x7d\x07\x05\x97\x32\x66\xac\x52\x4b\x4a\xd2\x80\xf7\xae\x17\xdc\x59\xd9\x6d\x33\x51\x58\x6b\x5a\x3b\xdb\x89\x5d\x1e\x1f\x78\x20\xac\x61\x35\xd8\x75\x34\x80\x99\x83\x82\xba\x32\xb7\x34\x95\x59\x60\x8c\x38\x74\x52\x90\xa8\x5e\xf4\xe9\xf9\xbd\x83"+        }+    -- Example 3.6+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xef\xd2\x37\xbb\x09\x8a\x44\x3a\xee\xb2\xbf\x6c\x3f\x8c\x81\xb8\xc0\x1b\x7f\xcb\x3f\xeb"+        , salt = "\xb0\xde\x3f\xc2\x5b\x65\xf5\xaf\x96\xb1\xd5\xcc\x3b\x27\xd0\xc6\x05\x30\x87\xb3"+        , signature = "\x01\x2f\xaf\xec\x86\x2f\x56\xe9\xe9\x2f\x60\xab\x0c\x77\x82\x4f\x42\x99\xa0\xca\x73\x4e\xd2\x6e\x06\x44\xd5\xd2\x22\xc7\xf0\xbd\xe0\x39\x64\xf8\xe7\x0a\x5c\xb6\x5e\xd4\x4e\x44\xd5\x6a\xe0\xed\xf1\xff\x86\xca\x03\x2c\xc5\xdd\x44\x04\xdb\xb7\x6a\xb8\x54\x58\x6c\x44\xee\xd8\x33\x6d\x08\xd4\x57\xce\x6c\x03\x69\x3b\x45\xc0\xf1\xef\xef\x93\x62\x4b\x95\xb8\xec\x16\x9c\x61\x6d\x20\xe5\x53\x8e\xbc\x0b\x67\x37\xa6\xf8\x2b\x4b\xc0\x57\x09\x24\xfc\x6b\x35\x75\x9a\x33\x48\x42\x62\x79\xf8\xb3\xd7\x74\x4e\x2d\x22\x24\x26\xce"+        }+    ] -# Salt:-ad 8b 15 23 70 36 46 22 4b 66 0b 55 08 85 91 7c -a2 d1 df 28 +-- ==================================+-- Example 8: A 1031-bit RSA Key Pair+-- ================================== -# Signature:-6d 3b 5b 87 f6 7e a6 57 af 21 f7 54 41 97 7d 21 -80 f9 1b 2c 5f 69 2d e8 29 55 69 6a 68 67 30 d9 -b9 77 8d 97 07 58 cc b2 60 71 c2 20 9f fb d6 12 -5b e2 e9 6e a8 1b 67 cb 9b 93 08 23 9f da 17 f7 -b2 b6 4e cd a0 96 b6 b9 35 64 0a 5a 1c b4 2a 91 -55 b1 c9 ef 7a 63 3a 02 c5 9f 0d 6e e5 9b 85 2c -43 b3 50 29 e7 3c 94 0f f0 41 0e 8f 11 4e ed 46 -bb d0 fa e1 65 e4 2b e2 52 8a 40 1c 3b 28 fd 81 -8e f3 23 2d ca 9f 4d 2a 0f 51 66 ec 59 c4 23 96 -d6 c1 1d bc 12 15 a5 6f a1 71 69 db 95 75 34 3e -f3 4f 9d e3 2a 49 cd c3 17 49 22 f2 29 c2 3e 18 -e4 5d f9 35 31 19 ec 43 19 ce dc e7 a1 7c 64 08 -8c 1f 6f 52 be 29 63 41 00 b3 91 9d 38 f3 d1 ed -94 e6 89 1e 66 a7 3b 8f b8 49 f5 87 4d f5 94 59 -e2 98 c7 bb ce 2e ee 78 2a 19 5a a6 6f e2 d0 73 -2b 25 e5 95 f5 7d 3e 06 1b 1f c3 e4 06 3b f9 8f +rsaKey8 = PrivateKey+    { private_pub = PublicKey+        { public_n = 0x495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f+        , public_e = 0x010001+        , public_size = 129+        }+    , private_d = 0x6c66ffe98980c38fcdeab5159898836165f4b4b817c4f6a8d486ee4ea9130fe9b9092bd136d184f95f504a607eac565846d2fdd6597a8967c7396ef95a6eeebb4578a643966dca4d8ee3de842de63279c618159c1ab54a89437b6a6120e4930afb52a4ba6ced8a4947ac64b30a3497cbe701c2d6266d517219ad0ec6d347dbe9+    , private_p = 0x08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb+    , private_q = 0x0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d+    , private_dP = 0x05c2a83c124b3621a2aa57ea2c3efe035eff4560f33ddebb7adab81fce69a0c8c2edc16520dda83d59a23be867963ac65f2cc710bbcfb96ee103deb771d105fd85+    , private_dQ = 0x04cae8aa0d9faa165c87b682ec140b8ed3b50b24594b7a3b2c220b3669bb819f984f55310a1ae7823651d4a02e99447972595139363434e5e30a7e7d241551e1b9+    , private_qinv = 0x07d3e47bf686600b11ac283ce88dbb3f6051e8efd04680e44c171ef531b80b2b7c39fc766320e2cf15d8d99820e96ff30dc69691839c4b40d7b06e45307dc91f3f+    } --}+vectorsKey8 =+    [+    -- Example 8.1+      VectorPSS+        { message = "\x81\x33\x2f\x4b\xe6\x29\x48\x41\x5e\xa1\xd8\x99\x79\x2e\xea\xcf\x6c\x6e\x1d\xb1\xda\x8b\xe1\x3b\x5c\xea\x41\xdb\x2f\xed\x46\x70\x92\xe1\xff\x39\x89\x14\xc7\x14\x25\x97\x75\xf5\x95\xf8\x54\x7f\x73\x56\x92\xa5\x75\xe6\x92\x3a\xf7\x8f\x22\xc6\x99\x7d\xdb\x90\xfb\x6f\x72\xd7\xbb\x0d\xd5\x74\x4a\x31\xde\xcd\x3d\xc3\x68\x58\x49\x83\x6e\xd3\x4a\xec\x59\x63\x04\xad\x11\x84\x3c\x4f\x88\x48\x9f\x20\x97\x35\xf5\xfb\x7f\xda\xf7\xce\xc8\xad\xdc\x58\x18\x16\x8f\x88\x0a\xcb\xf4\x90\xd5\x10\x05\xb7\xa8\xe8\x4e\x43\xe5\x42\x87\x97\x75\x71\xdd\x99\xee\xa4\xb1\x61\xeb\x2d\xf1\xf5\x10\x8f\x12\xa4\x14\x2a\x83\x32\x2e\xdb\x05\xa7\x54\x87\xa3\x43\x5c\x9a\x78\xce\x53\xed\x93\xbc\x55\x08\x57\xd7\xa9\xfb"+        , salt = "\x1d\x65\x49\x1d\x79\xc8\x64\xb3\x73\x00\x9b\xe6\xf6\xf2\x46\x7b\xac\x4c\x78\xfa"+        , signature = "\x02\x62\xac\x25\x4b\xfa\x77\xf3\xc1\xac\xa2\x2c\x51\x79\xf8\xf0\x40\x42\x2b\x3c\x5b\xaf\xd4\x0a\x8f\x21\xcf\x0f\xa5\xa6\x67\xcc\xd5\x99\x3d\x42\xdb\xaf\xb4\x09\xc5\x20\xe2\x5f\xce\x2b\x1e\xe1\xe7\x16\x57\x7f\x1e\xfa\x17\xf3\xda\x28\x05\x2f\x40\xf0\x41\x9b\x23\x10\x6d\x78\x45\xaa\xf0\x11\x25\xb6\x98\xe7\xa4\xdf\xe9\x2d\x39\x67\xbb\x00\xc4\xd0\xd3\x5b\xa3\x55\x2a\xb9\xa8\xb3\xee\xf0\x7c\x7f\xec\xdb\xc5\x42\x4a\xc4\xdb\x1e\x20\xcb\x37\xd0\xb2\x74\x47\x69\x94\x0e\xa9\x07\xe1\x7f\xbb\xca\x67\x3b\x20\x52\x23\x80\xc5"+        }+    -- Example 8.2+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xe2\xf9\x6e\xaf\x0e\x05\xe7\xba\x32\x6e\xcc\xa0\xba\x7f\xd2\xf7\xc0\x23\x56\xf3\xce\xde\x9d\x0f\xaa\xbf\x4f\xcc\x8e\x60\xa9\x73\xe5\x59\x5f\xd9\xea\x08"+        , salt = "\x43\x5c\x09\x8a\xa9\x90\x9e\xb2\x37\x7f\x12\x48\xb0\x91\xb6\x89\x87\xff\x18\x38"+        , signature = "\x27\x07\xb9\xad\x51\x15\xc5\x8c\x94\xe9\x32\xe8\xec\x0a\x28\x0f\x56\x33\x9e\x44\xa1\xb5\x8d\x4d\xdc\xff\x2f\x31\x2e\x5f\x34\xdc\xfe\x39\xe8\x9c\x6a\x94\xdc\xee\x86\xdb\xbd\xae\x5b\x79\xba\x4e\x08\x19\xa9\xe7\xbf\xd9\xd9\x82\xe7\xee\x6c\x86\xee\x68\x39\x6e\x8b\x3a\x14\xc9\xc8\xf3\x4b\x17\x8e\xb7\x41\xf9\xd3\xf1\x21\x10\x9b\xf5\xc8\x17\x2f\xad\xa2\xe7\x68\xf9\xea\x14\x33\x03\x2c\x00\x4a\x8a\xa0\x7e\xb9\x90\x00\x0a\x48\xdc\x94\xc8\xba\xc8\xaa\xbe\x2b\x09\xb1\xaa\x46\xc0\xa2\xaa\x0e\x12\xf6\x3f\xbb\xa7\x75\xba\x7e"+        }+    -- Example 8.3+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xe3\x5c\x6e\xd9\x8f\x64\xa6\xd5\xa6\x48\xfc\xab\x8a\xdb\x16\x33\x1d\xb3\x2e\x5d\x15\xc7\x4a\x40\xed\xf9\x4c\x3d\xc4\xa4\xde\x79\x2d\x19\x08\x89\xf2\x0f\x1e\x24\xed\x12\x05\x4a\x6b\x28\x79\x8f\xcb\x42\xd1\xc5\x48\x76\x9b\x73\x4c\x96\x37\x31\x42\x09\x2a\xed\x27\x76\x03\xf4\x73\x8d\xf4\xdc\x14\x46\x58\x6d\x0e\xc6\x4d\xa4\xfb\x60\x53\x6d\xb2\xae\x17\xfc\x7e\x3c\x04\xbb\xfb\xbb\xd9\x07\xbf\x11\x7c\x08\x63\x6f\xa1\x6f\x95\xf5\x1a\x62\x16\x93\x4d\x3e\x34\xf8\x50\x30\xf1\x7b\xbb\xc5\xba\x69\x14\x40\x58\xaf\xf0\x81\xe0\xb1\x9c\xf0\x3c\x17\x19\x5c\x5e\x88\x8b\xa5\x8f\x6f\xe0\xa0\x2e\x5c\x3b\xda\x97\x19\xa7"+        , salt = "\xc6\xeb\xbe\x76\xdf\x0c\x4a\xea\x32\xc4\x74\x17\x5b\x2f\x13\x68\x62\xd0\x45\x29"+        , signature = "\x2a\xd2\x05\x09\xd7\x8c\xf2\x6d\x1b\x6c\x40\x61\x46\x08\x6e\x4b\x0c\x91\xa9\x1c\x2b\xd1\x64\xc8\x7b\x96\x6b\x8f\xaa\x42\xaa\x0c\xa4\x46\x02\x23\x23\xba\x4b\x1a\x1b\x89\x70\x6d\x7f\x4c\x3b\xe5\x7d\x7b\x69\x70\x2d\x16\x8a\xb5\x95\x5e\xe2\x90\x35\x6b\x8c\x4a\x29\xed\x46\x7d\x54\x7e\xc2\x3c\xba\xdf\x28\x6c\xcb\x58\x63\xc6\x67\x9d\xa4\x67\xfc\x93\x24\xa1\x51\xc7\xec\x55\xaa\xc6\xdb\x40\x84\xf8\x27\x26\x82\x5c\xfe\x1a\xa4\x21\xbc\x64\x04\x9f\xb4\x2f\x23\x14\x8f\x9c\x25\xb2\xdc\x30\x04\x37\xc3\x8d\x42\x8a\xa7\x5f\x96"+        }+    -- Example 8.4+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\xdb\xc5\xf7\x50\xa7\xa1\x4b\xe2\xb9\x3e\x83\x8d\x18\xd1\x4a\x86\x95\xe5\x2e\x8a\xdd\x9c\x0a\xc7\x33\xb8\xf5\x6d\x27\x47\xe5\x29\xa0\xcc\xa5\x32\xdd\x49\xb9\x02\xae\xfe\xd5\x14\x44\x7f\x9e\x81\xd1\x61\x95\xc2\x85\x38\x68\xcb\x9b\x30\xf7\xd0\xd4\x95\xc6\x9d\x01\xb5\xc5\xd5\x0b\x27\x04\x5d\xb3\x86\x6c\x23\x24\xa4\x4a\x11\x0b\x17\x17\x74\x6d\xe4\x57\xd1\xc8\xc4\x5c\x3c\xd2\xa9\x29\x70\xc3\xd5\x96\x32\x05\x5d\x4c\x98\xa4\x1d\x6e\x99\xe2\xa3\xdd\xd5\xf7\xf9\x97\x9a\xb3\xcd\x18\xf3\x75\x05\xd2\x51\x41\xde\x2a\x1b\xff\x17\xb3\xa7\xdc\xe9\x41\x9e\xcc\x38\x5c\xf1\x1d\x72\x84\x0f\x19\x95\x3f\xd0\x50\x92\x51\xf6\xca\xfd\xe2\x89\x3d\x0e\x75\xc7\x81\xba\x7a\x50\x12\xca\x40\x1a\x4f\xa9\x9e\x04\xb3\xc3\x24\x9f\x92\x6d\x5a\xfe\x82\xcc\x87\xda\xb2\x2c\x3c\x1b\x10\x5d\xe4\x8e\x34\xac\xe9\xc9\x12\x4e\x59\x59\x7a\xc7\xeb\xf8"+        , salt = "\x02\x1f\xdc\xc6\xeb\xb5\xe1\x9b\x1c\xb1\x6e\x9c\x67\xf2\x76\x81\x65\x7f\xe2\x0a"+        , signature = "\x1e\x24\xe6\xe5\x86\x28\xe5\x17\x50\x44\xa9\xeb\x6d\x83\x7d\x48\xaf\x12\x60\xb0\x52\x0e\x87\x32\x7d\xe7\x89\x7e\xe4\xd5\xb9\xf0\xdf\x0b\xe3\xe0\x9e\xd4\xde\xa8\xc1\x45\x4f\xf3\x42\x3b\xb0\x8e\x17\x93\x24\x5a\x9d\xf8\xbf\x6a\xb3\x96\x8c\x8e\xdd\xc3\xb5\x32\x85\x71\xc7\x7f\x09\x1c\xc5\x78\x57\x69\x12\xdf\xeb\xd1\x64\xb9\xde\x54\x54\xfe\x0b\xe1\xc1\xf6\x38\x5b\x32\x83\x60\xce\x67\xec\x7a\x05\xf6\xe3\x0e\xb4\x5c\x17\xc4\x8a\xc7\x00\x41\xd2\xca\xb6\x7f\x0a\x2a\xe7\xaa\xfd\xcc\x8d\x24\x5e\xa3\x44\x2a\x63\x00\xcc\xc7"+        }+    -- Example 8.5+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x04\xdc\x25\x1b\xe7\x2e\x88\xe5\x72\x34\x85\xb6\x38\x3a\x63\x7e\x2f\xef\xe0\x76\x60\xc5\x19\xa5\x60\xb8\xbc\x18\xbd\xed\xb8\x6e\xae\x23\x64\xea\x53\xba\x9d\xca\x6e\xb3\xd2\xe7\xd6\xb8\x06\xaf\x42\xb3\xe8\x7f\x29\x1b\x4a\x88\x81\xd5\xbf\x57\x2c\xc9\xa8\x5e\x19\xc8\x6a\xcb\x28\xf0\x98\xf9\xda\x03\x83\xc5\x66\xd3\xc0\xf5\x8c\xfd\x8f\x39\x5d\xcf\x60\x2e\x5c\xd4\x0e\x8c\x71\x83\xf7\x14\x99\x6e\x22\x97\xef"+        , salt = "\xc5\x58\xd7\x16\x7c\xbb\x45\x08\xad\xa0\x42\x97\x1e\x71\xb1\x37\x7e\xea\x42\x69"+        , signature = "\x33\x34\x1b\xa3\x57\x6a\x13\x0a\x50\xe2\xa5\xcf\x86\x79\x22\x43\x88\xd5\x69\x3f\x5a\xcc\xc2\x35\xac\x95\xad\xd6\x8e\x5e\xb1\xee\xc3\x16\x66\xd0\xca\x7a\x1c\xda\x6f\x70\xa1\xaa\x76\x2c\x05\x75\x2a\x51\x95\x0c\xdb\x8a\xf3\xc5\x37\x9f\x18\xcf\xe6\xb5\xbc\x55\xa4\x64\x82\x26\xa1\x5e\x91\x2e\xf1\x9a\xd7\x7a\xde\xea\x91\x1d\x67\xcf\xef\xd6\x9b\xa4\x3f\xa4\x11\x91\x35\xff\x64\x21\x17\xba\x98\x5a\x7e\x01\x00\x32\x5e\x95\x19\xf1\xca\x6a\x92\x16\xbd\xa0\x55\xb5\x78\x50\x15\x29\x11\x25\xe9\x0d\xcd\x07\xa2\xca\x96\x73\xee"+        }+    -- Example 8.6+    , VectorPSS+        { message = "\x0e\xa3\x7d\xf9\xa6\xfe\xa4\xa8\xb6\x10\x37\x3c\x24\xcf\x39\x0c\x20\xfa\x6e\x21\x35\xc4\x00\xc8\xa3\x4f\x5c\x18\x3a\x7e\x8e\xa4\xc9\xae\x09\x0e\xd3\x17\x59\xf4\x2d\xc7\x77\x19\xcc\xa4\x00\xec\xdc\xc5\x17\xac\xfc\x7a\xc6\x90\x26\x75\xb2\xef\x30\xc5\x09\x66\x5f\x33\x21\x48\x2f\xc6\x9a\x9f\xb5\x70\xd1\x5e\x01\xc8\x45\xd0\xd8\xe5\x0d\x2a\x24\xcb\xf1\xcf\x0e\x71\x49\x75\xa5\xdb\x7b\x18\xd9\xe9\xe9\xcb\x91\xb5\xcb\x16\x86\x90\x60\xed\x18\xb7\xb5\x62\x45\x50\x3f\x0c\xaf\x90\x35\x2b\x8d\xe8\x1c\xb5\xa1\xd9\xc6\x33\x60\x92\xf0\xcd"+        , salt = "\x76\xfd\x4e\x64\xfd\xc9\x8e\xb9\x27\xa0\x40\x3e\x35\xa0\x84\xe7\x6b\xa9\xf9\x2a"+        , signature = "\x1e\xd1\xd8\x48\xfb\x1e\xdb\x44\x12\x9b\xd9\xb3\x54\x79\x5a\xf9\x7a\x06\x9a\x7a\x00\xd0\x15\x10\x48\x59\x3e\x0c\x72\xc3\x51\x7f\xf9\xff\x2a\x41\xd0\xcb\x5a\x0a\xc8\x60\xd7\x36\xa1\x99\x70\x4f\x7c\xb6\xa5\x39\x86\xa8\x8b\xbd\x8a\xbc\xc0\x07\x6a\x2c\xe8\x47\x88\x00\x31\x52\x5d\x44\x9d\xa2\xac\x78\x35\x63\x74\xc5\x36\xe3\x43\xfa\xa7\xcb\xa4\x2a\x5a\xaa\x65\x06\x08\x77\x91\xc0\x6a\x8e\x98\x93\x35\xae\xd1\x9b\xfa\xb2\xd5\xe6\x7e\x27\xfb\x0c\x28\x75\xaf\x89\x6c\x21\xb6\xe8\xe7\x30\x9d\x04\xe4\xf6\x72\x7e\x69\x46\x3e"+        }+    ] -doSignTest key (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual)+doSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual)     where actual = PSS.signWithSalt (salt vector) Nothing PSS.defaultPSSParamsSHA1 key (message vector) -doVerifyTest key (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+doVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)     where actual = PSS.verify PSS.defaultPSSParamsSHA1 (private_pub key) (message vector) (signature vector)  pssTests = testGroup "RSA-PSS"     [ testGroup "signature internal"-        [ doSignTest rsaKeyInt (katZero, vectorInt) ]+        [ doSignTest rsaKeyInt katZero vectorInt ]     , testGroup "verify internal"-        [ doVerifyTest rsaKeyInt (katZero, vectorInt) ]-    , testGroup "signature key 1024" $ map (doSignTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1)-    , testGroup "verify key 1024" $ map (doVerifyTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1)+        [ doVerifyTest rsaKeyInt katZero vectorInt ]+    , testGroup "signature key 1024" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1+    , testGroup "verify key 1024" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1+    , testGroup "signature key 1025" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey2) [katZero..] vectorsKey2+    , testGroup "verify key 1025" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey2) [katZero..] vectorsKey2+    , testGroup "signature key 1026" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey3) [katZero..] vectorsKey3+    , testGroup "verify key 1026" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey3) [katZero..] vectorsKey3+    , testGroup "signature key 1031" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey8) [katZero..] vectorsKey8+    , testGroup "verify key 1031" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey8) [katZero..] vectorsKey8     ]
+ tests/KAT_PubKey/RSA.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}+module KAT_PubKey.RSA (rsaTests) where++import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA        as RSA+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA+import           Crypto.Hash++import           Imports++import           Data.Either (isRight)++data VectorRSA = VectorRSA+    { size :: Int+    , msg  :: ByteString+    , n    :: Integer+    , e    :: Integer+    , d    :: Integer+    , p    :: Integer+    , q    :: Integer+    , dP   :: Integer+    , dQ   :: Integer+    , qinv :: Integer+    , sig  :: Either RSA.Error ByteString+    }++vectorsSHA1 =+    [ VectorRSA+        { size = 2048 `div` 8+        , msg  = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog"+        , n    = 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        , e    = 0x10001+        , d    = 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        , p    = 0x00f85bfcfe55af59445f21f67ab1d8617d1f84360556eeb660d5c466f29e4d2228f9cc3fde4c594ea97069a19c666b68b6d905b65738ae63de6c11f9181ee9262313e5165591651bb3abec192abbc8c3694550bcffa451a2e2d1976bf3ecbc4480354f8d8646133298156aaa626b8807c5295850f93686400835466b6a5ccec61b+        , q    = 0x00cec28b22b1d37c6c60d25e9747cb1bebd1270f0306db56ed8533f392d6a0cfe6b3dde13789758cf89febac214ba96667e46599f89ca210dced550ca6092a854ff95dff80ea48ff1a83455f4bb93f2ececa782da03b85a789239e8be5264130628724ceab57c8f76e4c7e822bf4fbf334c7d32610bec65047433e0e3b636afe1b+        , dP   = 0x52fe0a50c339514f33ab19be6e67ac4c2f97f2a55e236ef674f8a89e329ffbe64d731f749d76ca7e7c7e0fef3f9a6ce78d260784a600408736fdda8b60e8f0419088612a3ee7d695f7c171b78200d8abf8e9bdfe7f5e785beb45fa610c9eed151abb76c383ef2e5cfbeb24fcb68a426e741e7b108c53d859e5d39e5970a1f839+        , dQ   = 0x39ef91853b47038a6ae707d2642fa9b73e782f60adbf307085eeb4c5e496532b56234a4481a40ac870275da846c74506bf9d28b3dd501c618baf5548013185018fe2a301c0a48bb726297e367dc6129ba7685d8094ad32f0dea64295074f24fbb6dabd7e8daea686a5b09d512be89d91a09cae01eb332eb389480e3cddf2d119+        , qinv = 0x09ce1fa29008ef4b9798e5b8ec213dbdfec4fab4403ebf4b8786ad401ef33bc880c40a990b0826f72415192a206a504b27d2ba45ca555706200ea8e7a9b42d4077e9e6e0d80d4144966c53a36d23d30d987322dcc0013efe8df3b6b5914a2ceefc22cc5de6d569731794e9894f18f11d36a79558dc4c3ae5db1ce9bd05e7bf2e+        , sig  = Right "\x56\x66\x99\x0f\xd4\xea\x2b\xe0\x6d\x46\x3b\x10\x99\x5b\x06\x32\x5e\xec\x29\xfe\xa4\x63\x4d\x54\xf6\x31\x74\x5d\x01\x5a\x67\x09\x2e\xa7\x02\x8a\x48\x00\x3c\x0d\xef\x04\xe7\x52\x46\xe0\xfa\xb1\x42\x26\x89\xe7\xec\x25\x44\x76\xa0\x86\x33\xb0\xbe\x22\x17\x88\x9b\x18\x4d\x3e\xc2\x9b\xd4\x61\x2b\x9e\xde\x08\x56\xf8\xd5\xee\xb8\x38\xf4\x3d\xda\x9a\xbb\x34\x58\x87\x71\x1d\x1a\x7e\xc7\x3d\x46\x39\x01\x79\x29\x8b\xa4\xcd\xce\xd7\xab\xcb\x2e\x94\x5c\xfd\x54\xcc\xef\x80\x31\xfc\x5e\x8f\xc2\x4d\x76\x1e\x4c\xbc\x50\x7a\x9b\x08\xae\x85\xeb\x6a\xe0\x80\xdc\xff\x60\x13\xb0\x31\x94\x14\x9d\x8f\x9f\x48\x38\xcf\x4c\x82\x9d\x3b\x68\xc6\xe4\xe9\x5d\x94\x74\xa2\xac\x1f\xb9\x84\x41\x86\x11\xeb\x2c\x50\x64\xd7\x00\xe0\x85\x21\x5a\xd7\xae\x9b\x4c\x8e\x6a\x92\x97\xac\xcc\xb8\x38\x4f\x41\xb9\x3d\xa9\xfe\x69\x8b\x04\x81\xad\xfb\x0f\x49\x74\xfe\x26\x9c\x86\x0c\xf3\xd1\x8e\xa1\xb5\xaf\xef\x85\x3d\xfe\xd0\x7c\xcf\x18\xe4\x0f\x14\x99\xea\x93\x61\x79\x16\xbf\x38\xac\xa2\xa2\xac\xac\x2d\xae\x21\x85\x71\x94\xda\x5d\xa1\x82\xa8\x76\x82\xe5\x2f"+        }+    , VectorRSA+        { size = 360 `div` 8+        , msg  = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog"+        , n    = 0x00bc2d7481c83c8be55da4caeaf1a30dbf9a1226ba7443c0a66213180d3eb8e29c3162401b7be067dff8f571a8eb+        , e    = 0x10001+        , d    = 0x726fb62d82c707507a2d5055a6934136270d28ce350c3a36d89066e26fb54f5b33da0bc9a05c2084f2b39be4e1+        , p    = 0x0e3ff89e1f95a461c9f5ee480fd7b13529a225f3ee07fb+        , q    = 0x0d349ebc89329b493c03451ad20155de9775df55c55fd1+        , dP   = 0x00943adef9fb93a561967bab33f198c2c7414e777df997+        , dQ   = 0x078de99ceb5392f7f327dfb97717a27ae2e4606dddaa71+        , qinv = 0x0c54d59eaa029844fb3fe33a180161590b1cb103cc668e+        , sig  = Left RSA.SignatureTooLong+        }+    , VectorRSA+        { size = 368 `div` 8+        , msg  = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog"+        , n    = 0x009cff2fd20246e390d6860b48a3926e83086d1386f7147e9f195623cf8f18546ceb20d428b77e0748864c8f611cb7+        , e    = 0x10001+        , d    = 0x0097706cbf6624dd448c3a36ce35c27d49762a4948ca33804178d2ff826f8d336aaed622801c8d76d442be371da841+        , p    = 0x00d12519f81441069ab1a86c38e0065e9578a46e655d5a17+        , q    = 0x00c02b485ac3ee241d57b6b282f830d7d5bf6f4de75c1661+        , dP   = 0x00a1af4611444f34f4d88d7504cf23fd711e70382c42ec07+        , dQ   = 0x04226a4219a90bf9dda33e9ff6bb0649c0fea20c723cc1+        , qinv = 0x5dd87bf3c1e295dcc8602859a7cd74f05a2fe91a9d5877+        , sig  = Right "\x51\xe4\xdd\x98\xee\xd5\x06\xef\x7a\xa5\x3c\xaf\x29\x33\xa4\x91\xfa\x8b\xb8\x09\xcf\x3e\xa1\x64\x92\x71\xad\x7b\x3a\x83\xb2\xa0\x77\x94\x4e\x59\xdf\x69\x58\x2e\xc8\x8d\xa0\x70\xfe\x7d"+        }+    ]++vectorToPrivate :: VectorRSA -> RSA.PrivateKey+vectorToPrivate vector = RSA.PrivateKey+    { RSA.private_pub  = vectorToPublic vector+    , RSA.private_d    = d vector+    , RSA.private_p    = p vector+    , RSA.private_q    = q vector+    , RSA.private_dP   = dP vector+    , RSA.private_dQ   = dQ vector+    , RSA.private_qinv = qinv vector+    }++vectorToPublic :: VectorRSA -> RSA.PublicKey+vectorToPublic vector = RSA.PublicKey+    { RSA.public_size = size vector+    , RSA.public_n    = n vector+    , RSA.public_e    = e vector+    }++vectorHasSignature :: VectorRSA -> Bool+vectorHasSignature = isRight . sig++doSignatureTest i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual)+    where expected = sig vector+          actual   = RSA.sign Nothing (Just SHA1) (vectorToPrivate vector) (msg vector)++doVerifyTest i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+    where actual = RSA.verify (Just SHA1) (vectorToPublic vector) (msg vector) bs+          Right bs = sig vector++rsaTests = testGroup "RSA"+    [ testGroup "SHA1"+        [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectorsSHA1+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] $ filter vectorHasSignature vectorsSHA1+        ]+    ]
+ tests/KAT_PubKey/Rabin.hs view
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@+{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}+module KAT_PubKey.Rabin (rabinTests) where++import qualified Data.ByteString as B++import           Crypto.Hash+import           Crypto.Number.Serialize (os2ip)+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic as BRabin+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified as MRabin+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP as OAEP+import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW as RW++import           Imports++basicRabinKey = BRabin.PrivateKey+    { BRabin.private_pub = BRabin.PublicKey+        { BRabin.public_n = 0xc9c4b0df9db989d93df4137fc2de2a9cee2610523f7a450ecbbf252babe98fba2f8e389c3e420c081e18f584c5746ca43f77f6af1fc79161f8bf8fbcb9564779986ecbe656dd16740cb8e399c33ff1dcc679e73c9c98a58c65a8673b7de57290a2d3191cb27e29d627f7ec6e874b1406051ffe9181e4d90d1b487b100ad30685 +        , BRabin.public_size = 128+        }+    , BRabin.private_p = 0xe071f231ab5912285a1f8db199795f5efdea4c32f646a3436eaec091ba853a3092216f26b539bbac1fe2ab2e4fbb20aad272a434a1e909bf6d3028aecae2a7b7+    , BRabin.private_q = 0xe6229470dc7da58bfcd962f1b3ddcf52304efbfb91d31c8ed84dbae2380c1ad2e338a523b4250863a689b3f262f949bd7a9f1a603c36634bb932dd71bf5daba3+    , BRabin.private_a = 0x65956653f711a63b776ce45862d4cd78f1ad7b1f8ed118bb8b5ea5fffd59762da5dc7c5298e236a8e45d5c93477cbc51f214b1cd1a4980eda859c1cb05e55666+    , BRabin.private_b = -0x63126dd9c5d6b5215f62012885570e1306b6a47ec1c46553f3b13ceae869149d14544438dbb976800cd62fbb52266f9a6405bc91f192a462c974bc8a6f832e03+    }++modifiedRabinKey = MRabin.PrivateKey+    { MRabin.private_pub = MRabin.PublicKey+        { MRabin.public_n = 0x9461a6e7c55cb610f20fd9af5d642404a63332a8d7c4fe7aa559cbcaec691e7216eed5d9322cb6a8619c220a0241b44e0d0a7cefda01fb84e59722b4e842ab5e190d214424bbdfed6d523426fc57a28045dfbb6e8159123077c542c0278ee2daf2d8993e286bf709a10a948da6b13008441581a22233f0ad3d5ebc5858ff7be5 +        , MRabin.public_size = 128+        }+    , MRabin.private_p = 0xc401e0ddbe565a8797292389bebb561c35eb019116ba25cc6c865a8d3d7bc599626ddf0bc4f575c22f89144fe99fc3300dd497ec2b7acc0221e729a61756b3f3+    , MRabin.private_q = 0xc1cc0e35f23f5086691a18c755881e3fe6937581948b109f47605b45d055e7b352e19ff729dfb33fbecb1d28b115e590449e5e4e228ab1876d889d3d41d87ec7 +    , MRabin.private_d = 0x128c34dcf8ab96c21e41fb35ebac848094c666551af89fcf54ab39795d8d23ce42dddabb264596d50c33844140483689c1a14f9dfb403f709cb2e4569d08556b9267e6460e84c69beda1defabd0285c4852c288b7ac27b78987bd19da337a6b1c7b123476732d9c0f656cc62a17f70e8fe34516cfa85ce6475bddeae9ffa0926+    }++rwKey = RW.PrivateKey+    { RW.private_pub = RW.PublicKey+        { RW.public_n = 0x992db4c84564c68d4ee2fe0903d938b41e83bcac48dfe8f2219ccee2ccbdefda4cbeea9f1c98a515c5f39a458f5ea11bca97102aaa3d9ac69e000093024e7b968359287cdf57bdacff5df1893df3539c7e358f037d49b5c6ae7110ab8117220c73b6265987039c2c97078fccacdd3f5a560aff5076fdc3958c532db28ab9a855 +        , RW.public_size = 128+        }+    , RW.private_p = 0xc144dd739c45397d61868ca944a9729a7ad34cf90466c8f5c98a88f5ab5e3288bcfd31d4af1d441d23a756a60abd4cf05c3e0b0053eb150166a327ae31e9347b+    , RW.private_q = 0xcae5a381f25a27ae2c359068753118fc384471cd6027e88b8b910306fb940781261089259a3c569546677aebd268704c767a071dbd4f50cb9f15fe448788856f+    , RW.private_d = 0x1325b69908ac98d1a9dc5fc1207b271683d07795891bfd1e443399dc5997bdfb4997dd53e39314a2b8be7348b1ebd4237952e2055547b358d3c000126049cf729ee5d4f0ea170b902e343a8ef0831900b963ba07a3176088ab2ab095db449d0052150d6be7b5402f459f17c759f6f043b06a5da64cb86bb910d340f7fa28fdce+    }++data EncryptionVector = EncryptionVector+    { seed :: ByteString+    , plainText :: ByteString+    , cipherText :: ByteString+    }++data SignatureVector = SignatureVector +    { message :: ByteString+    , padding :: ByteString+    , signature :: Integer+    }++basicRabinEncryptionVectors =+    [ EncryptionVector+        { plainText = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5"+        , seed = "\x0c\xc7\x42\xce\x4a\x9b\x7f\x32\xf9\x51\xbc\xb2\x51\xef\xd9\x25\xfe\x4f\xe3\x5f"+        , cipherText = "\xaf\xc7\x03\xe3\x9d\x2f\x81\xc6\x3a\x80\x2a\xd1\x44\x26\x3f\x17\x0c\x0a\xe6\x48\x68\x98\x23\x14\x8f\x95\xd2\xce\xbb\xe7\x3f\x49\x34\x76\x1d\x99\x30\x7b\xeb\x84\xe5\x2a\x10\xd2\x1e\x11\x7e\x65\xe8\x88\x24\xc1\x12\xeb\x19\x0d\x97\xcd\x12\x25\x6b\x1f\x9b\x0c\x40\x40\xa3\x47\x00\xb7\x11\xf8\x50\x08\x51\x79\xe8\x1b\xd1\x77\xe0\x99\xa7\xe1\x5c\x63\xda\x29\xc7\xde\x28\x5d\x60\xed\x8e\xb2\x12\xd4\xfe\xb8\x1a\x5d\x17\x65\x80\x62\x6e\x65\x5c\x37\x07\x1c\xfa\xff\xe6\x21\xa5\x9f\xcd\x6a\x6a\xce\xa6\x96\xb2\xc5\x08\xe6"+        }   +    ]++basicRabinSignatureVectors =+    [ SignatureVector+        { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5"+        , padding = "\xe9\x87\x17\x15\xa2\xe4\x30\x15"+        , signature = 0xac95807bdd03ca975690151d39d23d75e5db2731c4ba30b83c3f3ea74709e4d4e340d7dab952356a76c9b8705b214e28d59f5bdc7c7fdff4e104569e30359b5c65c2dcd5b94db58505cd8b188267121700beebd7edbee492e374514646471b5c3fa252a2580dc7343f455683815d6d7c590dd3bcaa7df41d8b08197ccb183408+        }   +    ]++modifiedRabinSignatureVectors =+    [ SignatureVector+        { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5"+        , padding = B.empty -- not used+        , signature = 0x278c7c269119218ab7f501ea53a97ab15a3a5a263c6daed8980abec78291e9729e0e3457731cdea8ec31a7566e93d10fc9b2615fe3e54f4533a5506ac24a3bd286e270324e538066f0ddf503f9b5e0c18e18379659834906ebd99c0d31588c66e70fc653bc8865b9239999cbd35704917d8647d1199286c533233e3e03582dd+        }   +    ]+    +rwEncryptionVectors =+    [ EncryptionVector+        { plainText = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5"+        , seed = "\x0c\xc7\x42\xce\x4a\x9b\x7f\x32\xf9\x51\xbc\xb2\x51\xef\xd9\x25\xfe\x4f\xe3\x5f"+        , cipherText = "\x40\xc2\xe3\x36\xac\x46\x72\x8a\xaf\x33\x75\xe1\x27\xd0\x38\x40\xe2\x24\x4e\x20\xa7\x5d\x85\xd3\x74\x81\x21\xfd\xc9\x40\x90\x80\x8c\xed\x2d\xd3\x5b\xc4\xb7\xc9\x7c\x80\xa5\x2f\x63\x86\x34\x4e\x8c\x92\x07\x86\x9e\xda\xfd\xf8\x11\x83\x8a\x5a\x23\xc1\xe6\x77\x37\x5d\xf9\x5c\x60\xd1\x6d\xfd\x0c\x54\xd1\x00\xe9\xab\x97\x6d\x8e\x83\x8b\x6e\x1a\x38\x73\x43\xe2\x24\xc2\xe2\x4e\x74\x3f\xe4\x4d\xdd\x27\xed\xc7\x72\x88\xd3\x0f\x93\xb3\xdb\xa2\xb7\xaf\x6d\xe9\xab\x76\x53\x63\xf9\x62\xd7\x52\x44\x61\x60\x5d\x2e\x9b\xf7"+        }   +    ]++rwSignatureVectors =+    [ SignatureVector+        { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5"+        , padding = B.empty -- not used+        , signature = 0x1e57b554a8e83aacd9d4067f9535991e7db47803250cded5cc8af5458a6bb11fea852139e0afe143f9339dd94a518e354e702134d1ae222460127829d92e8bf6441336f5ae7044ec7b6c3ad8b9aeeb1ea02a49798e020cb5b558120bbb51f060eb1608ba68f90cac7edb1051c177d3bdbb99d1ad92e8d75d6f72f1d06f1d25be+        }   +    ]++doBasicRabinEncryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = BRabin.encryptWithSeed (seed vector) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (plainText vector)++doBasicRabinDecryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Just (plainText vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = BRabin.decrypt (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vector)++doBasicRabinSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (BRabin.Signature ((os2ip $ padding vector), (signature vector))) @=? actual)+    where actual = BRabin.signWith (padding vector) key SHA1 (message vector)++doBasicRabinVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+    where actual = BRabin.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (BRabin.Signature ((os2ip $ padding vector), (signature vector)))++doModifiedRabinSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = MRabin.sign key SHA1 (message vector)++doModifiedRabinVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+    where actual = MRabin.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (signature vector)++doRwEncryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = RW.encryptWithSeed (seed vector) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (plainText vector)++doRwDecryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Just (plainText vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = RW.decrypt (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vector)++doRwSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual)+    where actual = RW.sign key SHA1 (message vector)++doRwVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual)+    where actual = RW.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (signature vector)++rabinTests = testGroup "Rabin"+    [ testGroup "Basic"+        [ testGroup "encrypt" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinEncryptTest $ BRabin.private_pub basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinEncryptionVectors+        , testGroup "decrypt" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinDecryptTest basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinEncryptionVectors+        , testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinSignTest basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinSignatureVectors+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinVerifyTest $ BRabin.private_pub basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinSignatureVectors+        ]+    , testGroup "Modified"+        [ testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doModifiedRabinSignTest modifiedRabinKey) [katZero..] modifiedRabinSignatureVectors+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doModifiedRabinVerifyTest $ MRabin.private_pub modifiedRabinKey) [katZero..] modifiedRabinSignatureVectors+        ]+    , testGroup "RW"+        [ testGroup "encrypt" $ zipWith (doRwEncryptTest $ RW.private_pub rwKey) [katZero..] rwEncryptionVectors+        , testGroup "decrypt" $ zipWith (doRwDecryptTest rwKey) [katZero..] rwEncryptionVectors+        , testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doRwSignTest rwKey) [katZero..] rwSignatureVectors+        , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doRwVerifyTest $ RW.private_pub rwKey) [katZero..] rwSignatureVectors+        ]+    ]
tests/KAT_RC4.hs view
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@     ]  tests = testGroup "RC4"-    $ map toKatTest $ zip is vectors-  where toKatTest (i, (key, plainText, cipherText)) =+    $ zipWith toKatTest is vectors+  where toKatTest i (key, plainText, cipherText) =             testCase (show i) (cipherText @=? snd (RC4.combine (RC4.initialize key) plainText))         is :: [Int]         is = [1..]
tests/KAT_Scrypt.hs view
@@ -28,6 +28,6 @@     ]  tests = testGroup "Scrypt"-    $ map toCase $ zip [(1::Int)..] vectors-  where toCase (i, ((pass,salt,n,r,p,dklen), output)) =+    $ zipWith toCase [(1::Int)..] vectors+  where toCase i ((pass,salt,n,r,p,dklen), output) =             testCase (show i) (output @=? Scrypt.generate (Scrypt.Parameters n r p dklen) pass salt)
tests/Number.hs view
@@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ import Imports  import Data.ByteArray (Bytes)+import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Number.Basic import Crypto.Number.Generate-import Crypto.Number.Serialize+import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize    as BE+import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE as LE import Crypto.Number.Prime+import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic import Data.Bits  serializationVectors :: [(Int, Integer, ByteString)]@@ -50,11 +53,35 @@             bits = 6 + baseBits             prime = withTestDRG testDRG $ generateSafePrime bits          in bits == numBits prime-    , testProperty "marshalling" $ \qaInt ->-        getQAInteger qaInt == os2ip (i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)-    , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-bytearray" $ map toSerializationKat $ zip [katZero..] serializationVectors-    , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-integer" $ map toSerializationKatInteger $ zip [katZero..] serializationVectors+    , testProperty "as-power-of-2-and-odd" $ \n ->+        let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd n+         in n == (2^e)*a1+    , testProperty "squareRoot" $ \testDRG (Int0_2901 baseBits') -> do+        let baseBits = baseBits' `mod` 500+            bits = 5 + baseBits -- generating lower than 5 bits causes an error ..+            p = withTestDRG testDRG $ generatePrime bits+        g <- choose (1, p - 1)+        let square x = (x * x) `mod` p+            r = square <$> squareRoot p g+        case jacobi g p of+            Just   1  -> return $ Just g `assertEq` r+            Just (-1) -> return $ Nothing `assertEq` r+            _         -> error "invalid jacobi result"+    , testProperty "marshalling-be" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (BE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)+    , testProperty "marshalling-le" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (LE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)+    , testProperty "be-rev-le" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (B.reverse (BE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes))+    , testProperty "be-rev-le-40" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (B.reverse (BE.i2ospOf_ 40 (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes))+    , testProperty "le-rev-be" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (B.reverse (LE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes))+    , testProperty "le-rev-be-40" $ \qaInt ->+        getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (B.reverse (LE.i2ospOf_ 40 (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes))+    , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-bytearray" $ zipWith toSerializationKat [katZero..] serializationVectors+    , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-integer" $ zipWith toSerializationKatInteger [katZero..] serializationVectors     ]   where-    toSerializationKat (i, (sz, n, ba)) = testCase (show i) (ba @=? i2ospOf_ sz n)-    toSerializationKatInteger (i, (_, n, ba)) = testCase (show i) (n @=? os2ip ba)+    toSerializationKat i (sz, n, ba) = testCase (show i) (ba @=? BE.i2ospOf_ sz n)+    toSerializationKatInteger i (_, n, ba) = testCase (show i) (n @=? BE.os2ip ba)
tests/Number/F2m.hs view
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@  import Imports hiding ((.&.)) import Data.Bits+import Data.Maybe import Crypto.Number.Basic (log2) import Crypto.Number.F2m @@ -52,8 +53,34 @@ squareTests = testGroup "squareF2m"     [ testProperty "sqr(a) == a * a"         $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> mulF2m m a a == squareF2m m a+    -- disabled because we require @m@ to be a suitable modulus and there is no+    -- way to guarantee this+    -- , testProperty "sqrt(a) * sqrt(a) = a"+    --     $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative aa) -> let a = sqrtF2m m aa in mulF2m m a a == modF2m m aa+    , testProperty "sqrt(a) * sqrt(a) = a in GF(2^16)"+        $ let m = 65581 :: Integer -- x^16 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1+              nums = [0 .. 65535 :: Integer]+          in  nums == [let y = sqrtF2m m x in squareF2m m y | x <- nums]     ] +powTests = testGroup "powF2m"+    [ testProperty "2 is square"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 2 == squareF2m m a+    , testProperty "1 is identity"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 1 == modF2m m a+    , testProperty "0 is annihilator"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 0 == modF2m m 1+    , testProperty "(a * b) ^ c == (a ^ c) * (b ^ c)"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c)+            -> powF2m m (mulF2m m a b) c == mulF2m m (powF2m m a c) (powF2m m b c)+    , testProperty "a ^ (b + c) == (a ^ b) * (a ^ c)"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c)+            -> powF2m m a (b + c) == mulF2m m (powF2m m a b) (powF2m m a c)+    , testProperty "a ^ (b * c) == (a ^ b) ^ c"+        $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c)+            -> powF2m m a (b * c) == powF2m m (powF2m m a b) c+    ]+ invTests = testGroup "invF2m"     [ testProperty "1 / a * a == 1"         $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a)@@ -70,7 +97,7 @@             -> divF2m m a b == (mulF2m m a <$> invF2m m b)     , testProperty "a * b / b == a"         $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b)-            -> invF2m m b == Nothing || divF2m m (mulF2m m a b) b == Just (modF2m m a)+            -> isNothing (invF2m m b) || divF2m m (mulF2m m a b) b == Just (modF2m m a)     ]  tests = testGroup "number.F2m"@@ -78,6 +105,7 @@     , modTests     , mulTests     , squareTests+    , powTests     , invTests     , divTests     ]
tests/Padding.hs view
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@  import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Imports-import Crypto.Error  import Crypto.Data.Padding @@ -34,6 +33,6 @@                                          ]  tests = testGroup "Padding"-    [ testGroup "Cases" $ map (uncurry testPad) (zip [1..] cases)-    , testGroup "ZeroCases" $ map (uncurry testZeroPad) (zip [1..] zeroCases)+    [ testGroup "Cases" $ zipWith testPad [1..] cases+    , testGroup "ZeroCases" $ zipWith testZeroPad [1..] zeroCases     ]
tests/Salsa.hs view
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@  tests = testGroup "Salsa"     [ testGroup "KAT" $-        map (\(i,f) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) f) $ zip [1..] $ map (\(r, k,i,e) -> salsaRunSimple e r k i) vectors+        zipWith (\i (r,k,n,e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ salsaRunSimple e r k n) [1..] vectors     , testProperty "generate-combine" salsaGenerateCombine     , testProperty "chunking-generate" salsaGenerateChunks     , testProperty "chunking-combine" salsaCombineChunks
− tests/StressHash.hs 
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@-{-# LANGUAGE TypeApplications #-}-{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-}-{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-}-module Main where--import Data.Proxy-import Control.Concurrent-import Control.Concurrent.Chan-import Control.Monad-import GHC.Conc-import System.Environment-import Data.Monoid--import qualified Crypto.Hash as H-import qualified Data.ByteString as B--doHashRandom :: forall h . H.HashAlgorithm h-             => Proxy h         -- hash algorithm-             -> Chan (Int, Int) -- channel to report-             -> Int             -- thread id-             -> IO ()-doHashRandom _ chan !tid = loop 0-  where-    loop !i = do-        when (tid > 5) $ threadDelay 1200-        when ((i `mod` 1000) == 0) $ writeChan chan (tid, i)--        let lengthLimit n | n < 0     = 0-                          | n > 257   = n `mod` 257-                          | otherwise = n--        let i' = i `mod` (tid * 1500)-            (nbChunks,multi) = case i `mod` 4 of-                        0 -> (1, False)-                        1 -> (2, False)-                        2 -> (1, True)-                        3 -> (3, False)--        let dat = take nbChunks $ [B.replicate (lengthLimit i') 1, B.replicate (lengthLimit (i' + 10)) 2, B.replicate (lengthLimit (i' + 20)) 3]--        let h   = H.hashInit @ h-            h2  = H.hashUpdates h dat-            !digest = H.hashFinalize h2-            !digest2 = if multi then H.hash digest else digest-        digest2 `seq` loop (i+1)--main = do-    args <- getArgs-    let caps = numCapabilities-    putStrLn (show caps <> " capabilities")--    let n = 10--    let proxy = Proxy @ H.Blake2b_256--    s <- newChan-    mapM_ (forkIO . doHashRandom proxy s) (take n [1..])--    forever $ do-        (tid, progress) <- readChan s-        putStrLn ("thread " <> show tid <> " at " <> show progress)
tests/Tests.hs view
@@ -3,11 +3,15 @@  import Imports +import Crypto.System.CPU+ import qualified Number import qualified Number.F2m import qualified BCrypt+import qualified BCryptPBKDF import qualified ECC import qualified ECC.Edwards25519+import qualified ECDSA import qualified Hash import qualified Poly1305 import qualified Salsa@@ -17,6 +21,7 @@ import qualified KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel import qualified KAT_CMAC import qualified KAT_HMAC+import qualified KAT_KMAC import qualified KAT_HKDF import qualified KAT_Argon2 import qualified KAT_PBKDF2@@ -24,11 +29,13 @@ import qualified KAT_Curve448 import qualified KAT_Ed25519 import qualified KAT_Ed448+import qualified KAT_EdDSA import qualified KAT_OTP import qualified KAT_PubKey import qualified KAT_Scrypt -- symmetric cipher -------------------- import qualified KAT_AES+import qualified KAT_AESGCMSIV import qualified KAT_Blowfish import qualified KAT_CAST5 import qualified KAT_Camellia@@ -41,7 +48,10 @@ import qualified Padding  tests = testGroup "cryptonite"-    [ Number.tests+    [ testGroup "runtime"+        [ testCaseInfo "CPU" (return $ show processorOptions)+        ]+    , Number.tests     , Number.F2m.tests     , Hash.tests     , Padding.tests@@ -52,22 +62,26 @@         [ Poly1305.tests         , KAT_CMAC.tests         , KAT_HMAC.tests+        , KAT_KMAC.tests         ]     , KAT_Curve25519.tests     , KAT_Curve448.tests     , KAT_Ed25519.tests     , KAT_Ed448.tests+    , KAT_EdDSA.tests     , KAT_PubKey.tests     , KAT_OTP.tests     , testGroup "KDF"         [ KAT_PBKDF2.tests         , KAT_Scrypt.tests         , BCrypt.tests+        , BCryptPBKDF.tests         , KAT_HKDF.tests         , KAT_Argon2.tests         ]     , testGroup "block-cipher"         [ KAT_AES.tests+        , KAT_AESGCMSIV.tests         , KAT_Blowfish.tests         , KAT_CAST5.tests         , KAT_Camellia.tests@@ -85,6 +99,7 @@     , KAT_AFIS.tests     , ECC.tests     , ECC.Edwards25519.tests+    , ECDSA.tests     ]  main = defaultMain tests
tests/Utils.hs view
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ module Utils where  import Control.Applicative-import Control.Monad (replicateM) import Data.Char import Data.Word import Data.List@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@     deriving (Show,Eq)  instance Arbitrary TestDRG where-    arbitrary = TestDRG `fmap` arbitrary+    arbitrary = TestDRG `fmap` arbitrary  -- distribution not uniform  withTestDRG (TestDRG l) f = fst $ withDRG (drgNewTest l) f @@ -28,13 +27,13 @@     deriving (Show,Eq)  instance Arbitrary ChunkingLen where-    arbitrary = ChunkingLen `fmap` replicateM 16 (choose (0,14))+    arbitrary = ChunkingLen `fmap` vectorOf 16 (choose (0,14))  newtype ChunkingLen0_127 = ChunkingLen0_127 [Int]     deriving (Show,Eq)  instance Arbitrary ChunkingLen0_127 where-    arbitrary = ChunkingLen0_127 `fmap` replicateM 16 (choose (0,127))+    arbitrary = ChunkingLen0_127 `fmap` vectorOf 16 (choose (0,127))   newtype ArbitraryBS0_2901 = ArbitraryBS0_2901 ByteString@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@     arbitrary = oneof         [ QAInteger . fromIntegral <$> (choose (0, 65536) :: Gen Int)  -- small integer         , larger <$> choose (0,4096) <*> choose (0, 65536) -- medium integer-        , QAInteger . os2ip . B.pack <$> (choose (0,32) >>= \n -> replicateM n arbitrary) -- [ 0 .. 2^32 ] sized integer+        , QAInteger . os2ip <$> arbitraryBSof 0 32 -- [ 0 .. 2^32 ] sized integer         ]       where         larger :: Int -> Int -> QAInteger@@ -73,10 +72,10 @@         somePrime = 18446744073709551557  arbitraryBS :: Int -> Gen ByteString-arbitraryBS n = B.pack `fmap` replicateM n arbitrary+arbitraryBS = fmap B.pack . vector  arbitraryBSof :: Int -> Int -> Gen ByteString-arbitraryBSof minSize maxSize = choose (minSize, maxSize) >>= \n -> (B.pack `fmap` replicateM n arbitrary)+arbitraryBSof minSize maxSize = choose (minSize, maxSize) >>= arbitraryBS  chunkS :: ChunkingLen -> ByteString -> [ByteString] chunkS (ChunkingLen originalChunks) = loop originalChunks
tests/XSalsa.hs view
@@ -98,11 +98,31 @@        , "\xB2\xB7\x95\xFE\x6C\x1D\x4C\x83\xC1\x32\x7E\x01\x5A\x67\xD4\x46\x5F\xD8\xE3\x28\x13\x57\x5C\xBA\xB2\x63\xE2\x0E\xF0\x58\x64\xD2\xDC\x17\xE0\xE4\xEB\x81\x43\x6A\xDF\xE9\xF6\x38\xDC\xC1\xC8\xD7\x8F\x6B\x03\x06\xBA\xF9\x38\xE5\xD2\xAB\x0B\x3E\x05\xE7\x35\xCC\x6F\xFF\x2D\x6E\x02\xE3\xD6\x04\x84\xBE\xA7\xC7\xA8\xE1\x3E\x23\x19\x7F\xEA\x7B\x04\xD4\x7D\x48\xF4\xA4\xE5\x94\x41\x74\x53\x94\x92\x80\x0D\x3E\xF5\x1E\x2E\xE5\xE4\xC8\xA0\xBD\xF0\x50\xC2\xDD\x3D\xD7\x4F\xCE\x5E\x7E\x5C\x37\x36\x4F\x75\x47\xA1\x14\x80\xA3\x06\x3B\x9A\x0A\x15\x7B\x15\xB1\x0A\x5A\x95\x4D\xE2\x73\x1C\xED\x05\x5A\xA2\xE2\x76\x7F\x08\x91\xD4\x32\x9C\x42\x6F\x38\x08\xEE\x86\x7B\xED\x0D\xC7\x5B\x59\x22\xB7\xCF\xB8\x95\x70\x0F\xDA\x01\x61\x05\xA4\xC7\xB7\xF0\xBB\x90\xF0\x29\xF6\xBB\xCB\x04\xAC\x36\xAC\x16")      ] +-- Test vector from paper "Cryptography in NaCl"+vectorsCB :: [Vector]+vectorsCB =+    [ ( 20+       , "\x4A\x5D\x9D\x5B\xA4\xCE\x2D\xE1\x72\x8E\x3B\xF4\x80\x35\x0F\x25\xE0\x7E\x21\xC9\x47\xD1\x9E\x33\x76\xF0\x9B\x3C\x1E\x16\x17\x42"+       , "\x69\x69\x6E\xE9\x55\xB6\x2B\x73\xCD\x62\xBD\xA8\x75\xFC\x73\xD6\x82\x19\xE0\x03\x6B\x7A\x0B\x37"+       , "\xBE\x07\x5F\xC5\x3C\x81\xF2\xD5\xCF\x14\x13\x16\xEB\xEB\x0C\x7B\x52\x28\xC5\x2A\x4C\x62\xCB\xD4\x4B\x66\x84\x9B\x64\x24\x4F\xFC\xE5\xEC\xBA\xAF\x33\xBD\x75\x1A\x1A\xC7\x28\xD4\x5E\x6C\x61\x29\x6C\xDC\x3C\x01\x23\x35\x61\xF4\x1D\xB6\x6C\xCE\x31\x4A\xDB\x31\x0E\x3B\xE8\x25\x0C\x46\xF0\x6D\xCE\xEA\x3A\x7F\xA1\x34\x80\x57\xE2\xF6\x55\x6A\xD6\xB1\x31\x8A\x02\x4A\x83\x8F\x21\xAF\x1F\xDE\x04\x89\x77\xEB\x48\xF5\x9F\xFD\x49\x24\xCA\x1C\x60\x90\x2E\x52\xF0\xA0\x89\xBC\x76\x89\x70\x40\xE0\x82\xF9\x37\x76\x38\x48\x64\x5E\x07\x05"+       , "\x8E\x99\x3B\x9F\x48\x68\x12\x73\xC2\x96\x50\xBA\x32\xFC\x76\xCE\x48\x33\x2E\xA7\x16\x4D\x96\xA4\x47\x6F\xB8\xC5\x31\xA1\x18\x6A\xC0\xDF\xC1\x7C\x98\xDC\xE8\x7B\x4D\xA7\xF0\x11\xEC\x48\xC9\x72\x71\xD2\xC2\x0F\x9B\x92\x8F\xE2\x27\x0D\x6F\xB8\x63\xD5\x17\x38\xB4\x8E\xEE\xE3\x14\xA7\xCC\x8A\xB9\x32\x16\x45\x48\xE5\x26\xAE\x90\x22\x43\x68\x51\x7A\xCF\xEA\xBD\x6B\xB3\x73\x2B\xC0\xE9\xDA\x99\x83\x2B\x61\xCA\x01\xB6\xDE\x56\x24\x4A\x9E\x88\xD5\xF9\xB3\x79\x73\xF6\x22\xA4\x3D\x14\xA6\x59\x9B\x1F\x65\x4C\xB4\x5A\x74\xE3\x55\xA5")+    ]+ tests = testGroup "XSalsa"     [ testGroup "KAT" $-        map (\(i,f) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) f) $ zip [1..] $ map (\(r, k, i, p, e) -> salsaRunSimple r k i p e) vectors+        zipWith (\i (r, k, n, p, e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ salsaRunSimple r k n p e) [1..] vectors+    , testGroup "crypto_box encryption" $+        zipWith (\i (r, k, n, p, e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ cryptoBoxEnc r k n p e) [1..] vectorsCB     ]   where       salsaRunSimple rounds key nonce plain expected =           let salsa = XSalsa.initialize rounds key nonce           in fst (XSalsa.combine salsa plain) @?= expected++      cryptoBoxEnc rounds shared nonce plain expected =+          let zero        = B.replicate 16 0+              (iv0, iv1)  = B.splitAt 8 nonce+              salsa0      = XSalsa.initialize rounds shared (zero `B.append` iv0)+              salsa1      = XSalsa.derive salsa0 iv1+              (_, salsa2) = XSalsa.generate salsa1 32 :: (B.ByteString, XSalsa.State)+          in fst (XSalsa.combine salsa2 plain) @?= expected