diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -1,3 +1,104 @@ +## 0.30 + +* Fix some C symbol blake2b prefix to be cryptonite_ prefix (fix mixing with other C library) +* add hmac-lazy +* Fix compilation with GHC 9.2 +* Drop support for GHC8.0, GHC8.2, GHC8.4, GHC8.6 + +## 0.29 + +* advance compilation with gmp breakage due to change upstream +* Add native EdDSA support + +## 0.28 + +* Add hash constant time capability +* Prevent possible overflow during hashing by hashing in 4GB chunks + +## 0.27 + +* Optimise AES GCM and CCM +* Optimise P256R1 implementation +* Various AES-NI building improvements +* Add better ECDSA support +* Add XSalsa derive +* Implement square roots for ECC binary curve +* Various tests and benchmarks + +## 0.26 + +* Add Rabin cryptosystem (and variants) +* Add bcrypt_pbkdf key derivation function +* Optimize Blowfish implementation +* Add KMAC (Keccak Message Authentication Code) +* Add ECDSA sign/verify digest APIs +* Hash algorithms with runtime output length +* Update blake2 to latest upstream version +* RSA-PSS with arbitrary key size +* SHAKE with output length not divisible by 8 +* Add Read and Data instances for Digest type +* Improve P256 scalar primitives +* Fix hash truncation bug in DSA +* Fix cost parsing for bcrypt +* Fix ECC failures on arm64 +* Correction to PKCS#1 v1.5 padding +* Use powModSecInteger when available +* Drop GHC 7.8 and GHC 7.10 support, refer to pkg-guidelines +* Optimise GCM mode +* Add little endian serialization of integer + +## 0.25 + +* Improve digest binary conversion efficiency +* AES CCM support +* Add MonadFailure instance for CryptoFailable +* Various misc improvements on documentation +* Edwards25519 lowlevel arithmetic support +* P256 add point negation +* Improvement in ECC (benchmark, better normalization) +* Blake2 improvements to context size +* Use gauge instead of criterion +* Use haskell-ci for CI scripts +* Improve Digest memory representation to be 2 less Ints and one less boxing + moving from `UArray` to `Block` + +## 0.24 + +* Ed25519: generateSecret & Documentation updates +* Repair tutorial +* RSA: Allow signing digest directly +* IV add: fix overflow behavior +* P256: validate point when decoding +* Compilation fix with deepseq disabled +* Improve Curve448 and use decaf for Ed448 +* Compilation flag blake2 sse merged in sse support +* Process unaligned data better in hashes and AES, on architecture needing alignment +* Drop support for ghc 7.6 +* Add ability to create random generator Seed from binary data and + loosen constraint on ChaChaDRG seed from ByteArray to ByteArrayAccess. +* Add 3 associated types with the HashAlgorithm class, to get + access to the constant for BlockSize, DigestSize and ContextSize at the type level. + the related function that this replaced will be deprecated in later release, and + eventually removed. + +API CHANGES: + +* Improve ECDH safety to return failure for bad inputs (e.g. public point in small order subgroup). + To go back to previous behavior you can replace `ecdh` by `ecdhRaw`. It's recommended to + use `ecdh` and handle the error appropriately. +* Users defining their own HashAlgorithm needs to define the + HashBlockSize, HashDigest, HashInternalContextSize associated types + +## 0.23 + +* Digest memory usage improvement by using unpinned memory +* Fix generateBetween to generate within the right bounds +* Add pure Twofish implementation +* Fix memory allocation in P256 when using a temp point +* Consolidate hash benchmark code +* Add Nat-length Blake2 support (GHC > 8.0) +* Update tutorial + ## 0.22 * Add Argon2 (Password Hashing Competition winner) hash function diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/AES.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/AES.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/AES.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/AES.hs @@ -14,12 +14,11 @@ import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.Cipher.Utils import Crypto.Cipher.Types.Block import Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Data.ByteArray as BA - -- | AES with 128 bit key newtype AES128 = AES128 AES deriving (NFData) @@ -47,15 +46,6 @@ cipherKeySize _ = KeySizeFixed 32 cipherInit k = AES256 <$> (initAES =<< validateKeySize (undefined :: AES256) k) -validateKeySize :: (ByteArrayAccess key, Cipher cipher) => cipher -> key -> CryptoFailable key -validateKeySize c k = if validKeyLength - then CryptoPassed k - else CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid - where keyLength = BA.length k - validKeyLength = case cipherKeySize c of - KeySizeRange low high -> keyLength >= low && keyLength <= high - KeySizeEnum lengths -> keyLength `elem` lengths - KeySizeFixed s -> keyLength == s #define INSTANCE_BLOCKCIPHER(CSTR) \ instance BlockCipher CSTR where \ @@ -67,6 +57,7 @@ ; ctrCombine (CSTR aes) (IV iv) = encryptCTR aes (IV iv) \ ; aeadInit AEAD_GCM (CSTR aes) iv = CryptoPassed $ AEAD (gcmMode aes) (gcmInit aes iv) \ ; aeadInit AEAD_OCB (CSTR aes) iv = CryptoPassed $ AEAD (ocbMode aes) (ocbInit aes iv) \ + ; aeadInit (AEAD_CCM n m l) (CSTR aes) iv = AEAD (ccmMode aes) <$> ccmInit aes iv n m l \ ; aeadInit _ _ _ = CryptoFailed CryptoError_AEADModeNotSupported \ }; \ instance BlockCipher128 CSTR where \ diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/AES/Primitive.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/AES/Primitive.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/AES/Primitive.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/AES/Primitive.hs @@ -11,39 +11,46 @@ -- module Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive ( - -- * block cipher data types + -- * Block cipher data types AES -- * Authenticated encryption block cipher types , AESGCM , AESOCB - -- * creation + -- * Creation , initAES - -- * misc + -- * Miscellanea , genCTR , genCounter - -- * encryption + -- * Encryption , encryptECB , encryptCBC , encryptCTR , encryptXTS - -- * decryption + -- * Decryption , decryptECB , decryptCBC , decryptCTR , decryptXTS - -- * incremental GCM + -- * CTR with 32-bit wrapping + , combineC32 + + -- * Incremental GCM , gcmMode , gcmInit - -- * incremental OCB + -- * Incremental OCB , ocbMode , ocbInit + + -- * CCM + , ccmMode + , ccmInit ) where import Data.Word @@ -73,6 +80,7 @@ ctrCombine = encryptCTR aeadInit AEAD_GCM aes iv = CryptoPassed $ AEAD (gcmMode aes) (gcmInit aes iv) aeadInit AEAD_OCB aes iv = CryptoPassed $ AEAD (ocbMode aes) (ocbInit aes iv) + aeadInit (AEAD_CCM n m l) aes iv = AEAD (ccmMode aes) <$> ccmInit aes iv n m l aeadInit _ _ _ = CryptoFailed CryptoError_AEADModeNotSupported instance BlockCipher128 AES where xtsEncrypt = encryptXTS @@ -96,7 +104,16 @@ , aeadImplFinalize = ocbFinish aes } +-- | Create an AES AEAD implementation for CCM +ccmMode :: AES -> AEADModeImpl AESCCM +ccmMode aes = AEADModeImpl + { aeadImplAppendHeader = ccmAppendAAD aes + , aeadImplEncrypt = ccmEncrypt aes + , aeadImplDecrypt = ccmDecrypt aes + , aeadImplFinalize = ccmFinish aes + } + -- | AES Context (pre-processed key) newtype AES = AES ScrubbedBytes deriving (NFData) @@ -109,12 +126,19 @@ newtype AESOCB = AESOCB ScrubbedBytes deriving (NFData) +-- | AESCCM State +newtype AESCCM = AESCCM ScrubbedBytes + deriving (NFData) + sizeGCM :: Int -sizeGCM = 80 +sizeGCM = 320 sizeOCB :: Int sizeOCB = 160 +sizeCCM :: Int +sizeCCM = 80 + keyToPtr :: AES -> (Ptr AES -> IO a) -> IO a keyToPtr (AES b) f = withByteArray b (f . castPtr) @@ -152,6 +176,13 @@ a <- withByteArray newSt $ \gcmStPtr -> f (castPtr gcmStPtr) aesPtr return (a, AESOCB newSt) +withCCMKeyAndCopySt :: AES -> AESCCM -> (Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> IO a) -> IO (a, AESCCM) +withCCMKeyAndCopySt aes (AESCCM ccmSt) f = + keyToPtr aes $ \aesPtr -> do + newSt <- B.copy ccmSt (\_ -> return ()) + a <- withByteArray newSt $ \ccmStPtr -> f (castPtr ccmStPtr) aesPtr + return (a, AESCCM newSt) + -- | Initialize a new context with a key -- -- Key needs to be of length 16, 24 or 32 bytes. Any other values will return failure @@ -289,6 +320,21 @@ -> ba -- ^ output decrypted decryptXTS = doXTS c_aes_decrypt_xts +-- | encrypt/decrypt using Counter mode (32-bit wrapping used in AES-GCM-SIV) +{-# NOINLINE combineC32 #-} +combineC32 :: ByteArray ba + => AES -- ^ AES Context + -> IV AES -- ^ initial vector of AES block size (usually representing a 128 bit integer) + -> ba -- ^ plaintext input + -> ba -- ^ ciphertext output +combineC32 ctx iv input + | len <= 0 = B.empty + | B.length iv /= 16 = error $ "AES error: IV length must be block size (16). Its length is: " ++ show (B.length iv) + | otherwise = B.allocAndFreeze len doEncrypt + where doEncrypt o = withKeyAndIV ctx iv $ \k v -> withByteArray input $ \i -> + c_aes_encrypt_c32 (castPtr o) k v i (fromIntegral len) + len = B.length input + {-# INLINE doECB #-} doECB :: ByteArray ba => (Ptr b -> Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO ()) @@ -447,6 +493,78 @@ where computeTag = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \t -> withOCBKeyAndCopySt ctx ocb (c_aes_ocb_finish (castPtr t)) >> return () +ccmGetM :: CCM_M -> Int +ccmGetL :: CCM_L -> Int +ccmGetM m = case m of + CCM_M4 -> 4 + CCM_M6 -> 6 + CCM_M8 -> 8 + CCM_M10 -> 10 + CCM_M12 -> 12 + CCM_M14 -> 14 + CCM_M16 -> 16 + +ccmGetL l = case l of + CCM_L2 -> 2 + CCM_L3 -> 3 + CCM_L4 -> 4 + +-- | initialize a ccm context +{-# NOINLINE ccmInit #-} +ccmInit :: ByteArrayAccess iv => AES -> iv -> Int -> CCM_M -> CCM_L -> CryptoFailable AESCCM +ccmInit ctx iv n m l + | 15 - li /= B.length iv = CryptoFailed CryptoError_IvSizeInvalid + | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do + sm <- B.alloc sizeCCM $ \ccmStPtr -> + withKeyAndIV ctx iv $ \k v -> + c_aes_ccm_init (castPtr ccmStPtr) k v (fromIntegral $ B.length iv) (fromIntegral n) (fromIntegral mi) (fromIntegral li) + return $ CryptoPassed (AESCCM sm) + where + mi = ccmGetM m + li = ccmGetL l + +-- | append data which is only going to be authenticated to the CCM context. +-- +-- needs to happen after initialization and before appending encryption/decryption data. +{-# NOINLINE ccmAppendAAD #-} +ccmAppendAAD :: ByteArrayAccess aad => AES -> AESCCM -> aad -> AESCCM +ccmAppendAAD ctx ccm input = unsafeDoIO $ snd <$> withCCMKeyAndCopySt ctx ccm doAppend + where doAppend ccmStPtr aesPtr = + withByteArray input $ \i -> c_aes_ccm_aad ccmStPtr aesPtr i (fromIntegral $ B.length input) + +-- | append data to encrypt and append to the CCM context +-- +-- the bytearray needs to be a multiple of AES block size, unless it's the last call to this function. +-- needs to happen after AAD appending, or after initialization if no AAD data. +{-# NOINLINE ccmEncrypt #-} +ccmEncrypt :: ByteArray ba => AES -> AESCCM -> ba -> (ba, AESCCM) +ccmEncrypt ctx ccm input = unsafeDoIO $ withCCMKeyAndCopySt ctx ccm cbcmacAndIv + where len = B.length input + cbcmacAndIv ccmStPtr aesPtr = + B.alloc len $ \o -> + withByteArray input $ \i -> + c_aes_ccm_encrypt (castPtr o) ccmStPtr aesPtr i (fromIntegral len) + +-- | append data to decrypt and append to the CCM context +-- +-- the bytearray needs to be a multiple of AES block size, unless it's the last call to this function. +-- needs to happen after AAD appending, or after initialization if no AAD data. +{-# NOINLINE ccmDecrypt #-} +ccmDecrypt :: ByteArray ba => AES -> AESCCM -> ba -> (ba, AESCCM) +ccmDecrypt ctx ccm input = unsafeDoIO $ withCCMKeyAndCopySt ctx ccm cbcmacAndIv + where len = B.length input + cbcmacAndIv ccmStPtr aesPtr = + B.alloc len $ \o -> + withByteArray input $ \i -> + c_aes_ccm_decrypt (castPtr o) ccmStPtr aesPtr i (fromIntegral len) + +-- | Generate the Tag from CCM context +{-# NOINLINE ccmFinish #-} +ccmFinish :: AES -> AESCCM -> Int -> AuthTag +ccmFinish ctx ccm taglen = AuthTag $ B.take taglen computeTag + where computeTag = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \t -> + withCCMKeyAndCopySt ctx ccm (c_aes_ccm_finish (castPtr t)) >> return () + ------------------------------------------------------------------------ foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_initkey" c_aes_init :: Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () @@ -478,6 +596,9 @@ foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_encrypt_ctr" c_aes_encrypt_ctr :: CString -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_encrypt_c32" + c_aes_encrypt_c32 :: CString -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () + foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_gcm_init" c_aes_gcm_init :: Ptr AESGCM -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CUInt -> IO () @@ -508,3 +629,17 @@ foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ocb_finish" c_aes_ocb_finish :: CString -> Ptr AESOCB -> Ptr AES -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ccm_init" + c_aes_ccm_init :: Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> Ptr Word8 -> CUInt -> CUInt -> CInt -> CInt -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ccm_aad" + c_aes_ccm_aad :: Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ccm_encrypt" + c_aes_ccm_encrypt :: CString -> Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ccm_decrypt" + c_aes_ccm_decrypt :: CString -> Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_ccm_finish" + c_aes_ccm_finish :: CString -> Ptr AESCCM -> Ptr AES -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/AESGCMSIV.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/AESGCMSIV.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/AESGCMSIV.hs @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Implementation of AES-GCM-SIV, an AEAD scheme with nonce misuse resistance +-- defined in . +-- +-- To achieve the nonce misuse-resistance property, encryption requires two +-- passes on the plaintext, hence no streaming API is provided. This AEAD +-- operates on complete inputs held in memory. For simplicity, the +-- implementation of decryption uses a similar pattern, with performance +-- penalty compared to an implementation which is able to merge both passes. +-- +-- The specification allows inputs up to 2^36 bytes but this implementation +-- requires AAD and plaintext/ciphertext to be both smaller than 2^32 bytes. +{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +module Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV + ( Nonce + , nonce + , generateNonce + , encrypt + , decrypt + ) where + +import Data.Bits +import Data.Word + +import Foreign.C.Types +import Foreign.C.String +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr) +import Foreign.Storable (peekElemOff, poke, pokeElemOff) + +import Data.ByteArray +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Data.Memory.Endian (toLE) +import Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memXor) + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive +import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) +import Crypto.Random + + +-- 12-byte nonces + +-- | Nonce value for AES-GCM-SIV, always 12 bytes. +newtype Nonce = Nonce Bytes deriving (Show, Eq, ByteArrayAccess) + +-- | Nonce smart constructor. Accepts only 12-byte inputs. +nonce :: ByteArrayAccess iv => iv -> CryptoFailable Nonce +nonce iv + | B.length iv == 12 = CryptoPassed (Nonce $ B.convert iv) + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_IvSizeInvalid + +-- | Generate a random nonce for use with AES-GCM-SIV. +generateNonce :: MonadRandom m => m Nonce +generateNonce = Nonce <$> getRandomBytes 12 + + +-- POLYVAL (mutable context) + +newtype Polyval = Polyval Bytes + +polyvalInit :: ScrubbedBytes -> IO Polyval +polyvalInit h = Polyval <$> doInit + where doInit = B.alloc 272 $ \pctx -> B.withByteArray h $ \ph -> + c_aes_polyval_init pctx ph + +polyvalUpdate :: ByteArrayAccess ba => Polyval -> ba -> IO () +polyvalUpdate (Polyval ctx) bs = B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx -> + B.withByteArray bs $ \pbs -> c_aes_polyval_update pctx pbs sz + where sz = fromIntegral (B.length bs) + +polyvalFinalize :: Polyval -> IO ScrubbedBytes +polyvalFinalize (Polyval ctx) = B.alloc 16 $ \dst -> + B.withByteArray ctx $ \pctx -> c_aes_polyval_finalize pctx dst + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_init" + c_aes_polyval_init :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_update" + c_aes_polyval_update :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> CUInt -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes.h cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize" + c_aes_polyval_finalize :: Ptr Polyval -> CString -> IO () + + +-- Key Generation + +le32iv :: Word32 -> Nonce -> Bytes +le32iv n (Nonce iv) = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do + poke ptr (toLE n) + copyByteArrayToPtr iv (ptr `plusPtr` 4) + +deriveKeys :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> Nonce -> (ScrubbedBytes, AES) +deriveKeys aes iv = + case cipherKeySize aes of + KeySizeFixed sz | sz `mod` 8 == 0 -> + let mak = buildKey [0 .. 1] + key = buildKey [2 .. fromIntegral (sz `div` 8) + 1] + mek = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key) + in (mak, mek) + _ -> error "AESGCMSIV: invalid cipher" + where + idx n = ecbEncrypt aes (le32iv n iv) `takeView` 8 + buildKey = B.concat . map idx + + +-- Encryption and decryption + +lengthInvalid :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Bool +lengthInvalid bs + | finiteBitSize len > 32 = len >= 1 `unsafeShiftL` 32 + | otherwise = False + where len = B.length bs + +-- | AEAD encryption with the specified key and nonce. The key must be given +-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256' +-- cipher. +-- +-- Lengths of additional data and plaintext must be less than 2^32 bytes, +-- otherwise an exception is thrown. +encrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba) + => aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> (AuthTag, ba) +encrypt aes iv aad plaintext + | lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large" + | lengthInvalid plaintext = error "AESGCMSIV: plaintext is too large" + | otherwise = (AuthTag tag, ciphertext) + where + (mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv + ss = getSs mak aad plaintext + tag = buildTag mek ss iv + ciphertext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) plaintext + +-- | AEAD decryption with the specified key and nonce. The key must be given +-- as an initialized 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES128' or 'Crypto.Cipher.AES.AES256' +-- cipher. +-- +-- Lengths of additional data and ciphertext must be less than 2^32 bytes, +-- otherwise an exception is thrown. +decrypt :: (BlockCipher128 aes, ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba) + => aes -> Nonce -> aad -> ba -> AuthTag -> Maybe ba +decrypt aes iv aad ciphertext (AuthTag tag) + | lengthInvalid aad = error "AESGCMSIV: aad is too large" + | lengthInvalid ciphertext = error "AESGCMSIV: ciphertext is too large" + | tag `constEq` buildTag mek ss iv = Just plaintext + | otherwise = Nothing + where + (mak, mek) = deriveKeys aes iv + ss = getSs mak aad plaintext + plaintext = combineC32 mek (transformTag tag) ciphertext + +-- Calculate S_s = POLYVAL(mak, X_1, X_2, ...). +getSs :: (ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => ScrubbedBytes -> aad -> ba -> ScrubbedBytes +getSs mak aad plaintext = unsafeDoIO $ do + ctx <- polyvalInit mak + polyvalUpdate ctx aad + polyvalUpdate ctx plaintext + polyvalUpdate ctx (lb :: Bytes) -- the "length block" + polyvalFinalize ctx + where + lb = B.allocAndFreeze 16 $ \ptr -> do + pokeElemOff ptr 0 (toLE64 $ B.length aad) + pokeElemOff ptr 1 (toLE64 $ B.length plaintext) + toLE64 x = toLE (fromIntegral x * 8 :: Word64) + +-- XOR the first 12 bytes of S_s with the nonce and clear the most significant +-- bit of the last byte. +tagInput :: ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes +tagInput ss (Nonce iv) = + B.copyAndFreeze ss $ \ptr -> + B.withByteArray iv $ \ivPtr -> do + memXor ptr ptr ivPtr 12 + b <- peekElemOff ptr 15 + pokeElemOff ptr 15 (b .&. (0x7f :: Word8)) + +-- Encrypt the result with AES using the message-encryption key to produce the +-- tag. +buildTag :: BlockCipher128 aes => aes -> ScrubbedBytes -> Nonce -> Bytes +buildTag mek ss iv = ecbEncrypt mek (tagInput ss iv) + +-- The initial counter block is the tag with the most significant bit of the +-- last byte set to one. +transformTag :: Bytes -> IV AES +transformTag tag = toIV $ B.copyAndFreeze tag $ \ptr -> + peekElemOff ptr 15 >>= pokeElemOff ptr 15 . (.|. (0x80 :: Word8)) + where toIV bs = let Just iv = makeIV (bs :: Bytes) in iv diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Box.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Box.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Box.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Box.hs @@ -5,15 +5,33 @@ -- Portability : Good {-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box - ( createKeySchedule + ( KeySchedule(..) + , createKeySchedule + , copyKeySchedule ) where -import Crypto.Internal.WordArray (mutableArray32FromAddrBE, MutableArray32) +import Crypto.Internal.WordArray (MutableArray32, + mutableArray32FromAddrBE, + mutableArrayRead32, + mutableArrayWrite32) +newtype KeySchedule = KeySchedule MutableArray32 + +-- | Copy the state of one key schedule into the other. +-- The first parameter is the destination and the second the source. +copyKeySchedule :: KeySchedule -> KeySchedule -> IO () +copyKeySchedule (KeySchedule dst) (KeySchedule src) = loop 0 + where + loop 1042 = return () + loop i = do + w32 <-mutableArrayRead32 src i + mutableArrayWrite32 dst i w32 + loop (i + 1) + -- | Create a key schedule mutable array of the pbox followed by -- all the sboxes. -createKeySchedule :: IO MutableArray32 -createKeySchedule = mutableArray32FromAddrBE 1042 "\ +createKeySchedule :: IO KeySchedule +createKeySchedule = KeySchedule `fmap` mutableArray32FromAddrBE 1042 "\ \\x24\x3f\x6a\x88\x85\xa3\x08\xd3\x13\x19\x8a\x2e\x03\x70\x73\x44\ \\xa4\x09\x38\x22\x29\x9f\x31\xd0\x08\x2e\xfa\x98\xec\x4e\x6c\x89\ \\x45\x28\x21\xe6\x38\xd0\x13\x77\xbe\x54\x66\xcf\x34\xe9\x0c\x6c\ diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Primitive.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Primitive.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Primitive.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Blowfish/Primitive.hs @@ -5,197 +5,254 @@ -- Portability : Good -- Rewritten by Vincent Hanquez (c) 2015 +-- Lars Petersen (c) 2018 -- -- Original code: -- Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive, copyright (c) 2012 Stijn van Drongelen -- based on: BlowfishAux.hs (C) 2002 HardCore SoftWare, Doug Hoyte -- (as found in Crypto-4.2.4) - +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive ( Context , initBlowfish , encrypt , decrypt - , eksBlowfish + , KeySchedule + , createKeySchedule + , freezeKeySchedule + , expandKey + , expandKeyWithSalt + , cipherBlockMutable ) where -import Control.Monad (when) +import Control.Monad (when) import Data.Bits import Data.Memory.Endian import Data.Word +import Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Internal.Compat import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes) -import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B -import Crypto.Internal.Words import Crypto.Internal.WordArray -import Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box --- | variable keyed blowfish state -data Context = BF (Int -> Word32) -- p - (Int -> Word32) -- sbox0 - (Int -> Word32) -- sbox1 - (Int -> Word32) -- sbox2 - (Int -> Word32) -- sbox2 +newtype Context = Context Array32 instance NFData Context where - rnf (BF p a b c d) = p `seq` a `seq` b `seq` c `seq` d `seq` () + rnf a = a `seq` () +-- | Initialize a new Blowfish context from a key. +-- +-- key needs to be between 0 and 448 bits. +initBlowfish :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CryptoFailable Context +initBlowfish key + | B.length key > (448 `div` 8) = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid + | otherwise = CryptoPassed $ unsafeDoIO $ do + ks <- createKeySchedule + expandKey ks key + freezeKeySchedule ks + +-- | Get an immutable Blowfish context by freezing a mutable key schedule. +freezeKeySchedule :: KeySchedule -> IO Context +freezeKeySchedule (KeySchedule ma) = Context `fmap` mutableArray32Freeze ma + +expandKey :: (ByteArrayAccess key) => KeySchedule -> key -> IO () +expandKey ks@(KeySchedule ma) key = do + when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r + when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1) + loop 0 0 0 + where + loop i l r = do + n <- cipherBlockMutable ks (fromIntegral l `shiftL` 32 .|. fromIntegral r) + let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32) + nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff) + mutableArrayWrite32 ma i nl + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i + 1) nr + when (i < 18 + 1024) (loop (i + 2) nl nr) + +expandKeyWithSalt :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) + => KeySchedule + -> key + -> salt + -> IO () +expandKeyWithSalt ks key salt + | B.length salt == 16 = expandKeyWithSalt128 ks key (fromBE $ B.toW64BE salt 0) (fromBE $ B.toW64BE salt 8) + | otherwise = expandKeyWithSaltAny ks key salt + +expandKeyWithSaltAny :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) + => KeySchedule -- ^ The key schedule + -> key -- ^ The key + -> salt -- ^ The salt + -> IO () +expandKeyWithSaltAny ks@(KeySchedule ma) key salt = do + when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r + when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1) + -- Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes + when (B.length salt > 0) $ iterKeyStream salt 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do + let l' = xor l a0 + let r' = xor r a1 + n <- cipherBlockMutable ks (fromIntegral l' `shiftL` 32 .|. fromIntegral r') + let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32) + nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff) + mutableArrayWrite32 ma i nl + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i + 1) nr + when (i + 2 < 18 + 1024) (cont nl nr) + +expandKeyWithSalt128 :: ByteArrayAccess ba + => KeySchedule -- ^ The key schedule + -> ba -- ^ The key + -> Word64 -- ^ First word of the salt + -> Word64 -- ^ Second word of the salt + -> IO () +expandKeyWithSalt128 ks@(KeySchedule ma) key salt1 salt2 = do + when (B.length key > 0) $ iterKeyStream key 0 0 $ \i l r a0 a1 cont-> do + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma i l + mutableArrayWriteXor32 ma (i + 1) r + when (i + 2 < 18) (cont a0 a1) + -- Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes + loop 0 salt1 salt1 salt2 + where + loop i input slt1 slt2 + | i == 1042 = return () + | otherwise = do + n <- cipherBlockMutable ks input + let nl = fromIntegral (n `shiftR` 32) + nr = fromIntegral (n .&. 0xffffffff) + mutableArrayWrite32 ma i nl + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (i+1) nr + loop (i+2) (n `xor` slt2) slt2 slt1 + -- | Encrypt blocks -- -- Input need to be a multiple of 8 bytes encrypt :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba -encrypt = cipher +encrypt ctx ba + | B.length ba == 0 = B.empty + | B.length ba `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length" + | otherwise = B.mapAsWord64 (cipherBlock ctx False) ba -- | Decrypt blocks -- -- Input need to be a multiple of 8 bytes decrypt :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba -decrypt = cipher . decryptContext - -decryptContext :: Context -> Context -decryptContext (BF p s0 s1 s2 s3) = BF (\i -> p (17-i)) s0 s1 s2 s3 - -cipher :: ByteArray ba => Context -> ba -> ba -cipher ctx b - | B.length b == 0 = B.empty - | B.length b `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length" - | otherwise = B.mapAsWord64 (coreCrypto ctx) b - --- | Initialize a new Blowfish context from a key. --- --- key needs to be between 0 and 448 bits. -initBlowfish :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CryptoFailable Context -initBlowfish key - | len > (448 `div` 8) = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid - | otherwise = CryptoPassed $ makeKeySchedule key (Nothing :: Maybe (Bytes, Int)) - where len = B.length key +decrypt ctx ba + | B.length ba == 0 = B.empty + | B.length ba `mod` 8 /= 0 = error "invalid data length" + | otherwise = B.mapAsWord64 (cipherBlock ctx True) ba --- | The BCrypt "expensive key schedule" version of blowfish. +-- | Encrypt or decrypt a single block of 64 bits. -- --- Salt must be 128 bits --- Cost must be between 4 and 31 inclusive --- See -eksBlowfish :: (ByteArrayAccess salt, ByteArrayAccess password) => Int -> salt -> password -> Context -eksBlowfish cost salt key - | B.length salt /= 16 = error "bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes" - | otherwise = makeKeySchedule key (Just (salt, cost)) - -coreCrypto :: Context -> Word64 -> Word64 -coreCrypto (BF p s0 s1 s2 s3) input = doRound input 0 - where - -- transform the input over 16 rounds +-- The inverse argument decides whether to encrypt or decrypt. +cipherBlock :: Context -> Bool -> Word64 -> Word64 +cipherBlock (Context ar) inverse input = doRound input 0 + where + -- | Transform the input over 16 rounds doRound :: Word64 -> Int -> Word64 - doRound i roundIndex + doRound !i roundIndex | roundIndex == 16 = let final = (fromIntegral (p 16) `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral (p 17) in rotateL (i `xor` final) 32 | otherwise = - let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` (p roundIndex) - newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` (f newr)) .|. (fromIntegral newr) + let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` p roundIndex + newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` f newr) .|. fromIntegral newr in doRound newi (roundIndex+1) + + -- | The Blowfish Feistel function F f :: Word32 -> Word64 - f t = let a = s0 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 24) .&. 0xff) - b = s1 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff) - c = s2 (fromIntegral $ (t `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff) - d = s3 (fromIntegral $ t .&. 0xff) + f t = let a = s0 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 24)) + b = s1 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 16)) + c = s2 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 8)) + d = s3 (0xff .&. t) in fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32 - --- | Create a key schedule for either plain Blowfish or the BCrypt "EKS" version --- For the expensive version, the salt and cost factor are supplied. Salt must be --- a 128-bit byte array. --- --- The standard case is just a single key expansion with the salt set to zero. -makeKeySchedule :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) => key-> Maybe (salt, Int) -> Context -makeKeySchedule keyBytes saltCost = - let v = unsafeDoIO $ do - mv <- createKeySchedule - case saltCost of - -- Standard blowfish - Nothing -> expandKey mv 0 0 keyBytes - -- The expensive case - Just (s, cost) -> do - let (salt1, salt2) = splitSalt s - expandKey mv salt1 salt2 keyBytes - forM_ [1..2^cost :: Int] $ \_ -> do - expandKey mv 0 0 keyBytes - expandKey mv 0 0 s - mutableArray32Freeze mv - in BF (\i -> arrayRead32 v i) - (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s0+i)) - (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s1+i)) - (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s2+i)) - (\i -> arrayRead32 v (s3+i)) - where - splitSalt s = (fromBE (B.toW64BE s 0), fromBE (B.toW64BE s 8)) - - -- Indices of the S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words - -- The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys - s0 = 18 - s1 = 274 - s2 = 530 - s3 = 786 + -- | S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words + -- The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys + s0, s1, s2, s3 :: Word32 -> Word32 + s0 i = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 18) + s1 i = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 274) + s2 i = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 530) + s3 i = arrayRead32 ar (fromIntegral i + 786) + p :: Int -> Word32 + p i | inverse = arrayRead32 ar (17 - i) + | otherwise = arrayRead32 ar i -expandKey :: ByteArrayAccess ba - => MutableArray32 -- ^ The key schedule - -> Word64 -- ^ First word of the salt - -> Word64 -- ^ Second word of the salt - -> ba -- ^ The key - -> IO () -expandKey mv salt1 salt2 key = do - when (len > 0) $ forM_ [0..17] $ \i -> do - let a = B.index key ((i * 4 + 0) `mod` len) - b = B.index key ((i * 4 + 1) `mod` len) - c = B.index key ((i * 4 + 2) `mod` len) - d = B.index key ((i * 4 + 3) `mod` len) - k = (fromIntegral a `shiftL` 24) .|. - (fromIntegral b `shiftL` 16) .|. - (fromIntegral c `shiftL` 8) .|. - (fromIntegral d) - mutableArrayWriteXor32 mv i k - prepare mv - return () - where - len = B.length key +-- | Blowfish encrypt a Word using the current state of the key schedule +cipherBlockMutable :: KeySchedule -> Word64 -> IO Word64 +cipherBlockMutable (KeySchedule ma) input = doRound input 0 + where + -- | Transform the input over 16 rounds + doRound !i roundIndex + | roundIndex == 16 = do + pVal1 <- mutableArrayRead32 ma 16 + pVal2 <- mutableArrayRead32 ma 17 + let final = (fromIntegral pVal1 `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral pVal2 + return $ rotateL (i `xor` final) 32 + | otherwise = do + pVal <- mutableArrayRead32 ma roundIndex + let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` pVal + newr' <- f newr + let newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` newr') .|. fromIntegral newr + doRound newi (roundIndex+1) - -- | Go through the entire key schedule overwriting the P-Array and S-Boxes - prepare mctx = loop 0 salt1 salt1 salt2 - where loop i input slt1 slt2 - | i == 1042 = return () - | otherwise = do - ninput <- coreCryptoMutable input - let (nl, nr) = w64to32 ninput - mutableArrayWrite32 mctx i nl - mutableArrayWrite32 mctx (i+1) nr - loop (i+2) (ninput `xor` slt2) slt2 slt1 + -- | The Blowfish Feistel function F + f :: Word32 -> IO Word64 + f t = do + a <- s0 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 24)) + b <- s1 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 16)) + c <- s2 (0xff .&. (t `shiftR` 8)) + d <- s3 (0xff .&. t) + return (fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32) - -- | Blowfish encrypt a Word using the current state of the key schedule - coreCryptoMutable :: Word64 -> IO Word64 - coreCryptoMutable input = doRound input 0 - where doRound i roundIndex - | roundIndex == 16 = do - pVal1 <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx 16 - pVal2 <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx 17 - let final = (fromIntegral pVal1 `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral pVal2 - return $ rotateL (i `xor` final) 32 - | otherwise = do - pVal <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx roundIndex - let newr = fromIntegral (i `shiftR` 32) `xor` pVal - newr' <- f newr - let newi = ((i `shiftL` 32) `xor` newr') .|. (fromIntegral newr) - doRound newi (roundIndex+1) + -- | S-Box arrays, each containing 256 32-bit words + -- The first 18 words contain the P-Array of subkeys + s0, s1, s2, s3 :: Word32 -> IO Word32 + s0 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 18) + s1 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 274) + s2 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 530) + s3 i = mutableArrayRead32 ma (fromIntegral i + 786) - -- The Blowfish Feistel function F - f :: Word32 -> IO Word64 - f t = do a <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s0 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 24) .&. 0xff)) - b <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s1 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 16) .&. 0xff)) - c <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s2 + fromIntegral ((t `shiftR` 8) .&. 0xff)) - d <- mutableArrayRead32 mctx (s3 + fromIntegral (t .&. 0xff)) - return (fromIntegral (((a + b) `xor` c) + d) `shiftL` 32) - where s0 = 18 - s1 = 274 - s2 = 530 - s3 = 786 +iterKeyStream :: (ByteArrayAccess x) + => x + -> Word32 + -> Word32 + -> (Int -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> (Word32 -> Word32 -> IO ()) -> IO ()) + -> IO () +iterKeyStream x a0 a1 g = f 0 0 a0 a1 + where + len = B.length x + -- Avoiding the modulo operation when interating over the ring + -- buffer is assumed to be more efficient here. All other + -- implementations do this, too. The branch prediction shall prefer + -- the branch with the increment. + n j = if j + 1 >= len then 0 else j + 1 + f i j0 b0 b1 = g i l r b0 b1 (f (i + 2) j8) + where + j1 = n j0 + j2 = n j1 + j3 = n j2 + j4 = n j3 + j5 = n j4 + j6 = n j5 + j7 = n j6 + j8 = n j7 + x0 = fromIntegral (B.index x j0) + x1 = fromIntegral (B.index x j1) + x2 = fromIntegral (B.index x j2) + x3 = fromIntegral (B.index x j3) + x4 = fromIntegral (B.index x j4) + x5 = fromIntegral (B.index x j5) + x6 = fromIntegral (B.index x j6) + x7 = fromIntegral (B.index x j7) + l = shiftL x0 24 .|. shiftL x1 16 .|. shiftL x2 8 .|. x3 + r = shiftL x4 24 .|. shiftL x5 16 .|. shiftL x6 8 .|. x7 +{-# INLINE iterKeyStream #-} +-- Benchmarking shows that GHC considers this function too big to inline +-- although forcing inlining causes an actual improvement. +-- It is assumed that all function calls (especially the continuation) +-- collapse into a tight loop after inlining. diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5.hs @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : stable +-- Portability : good +-- +module Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 + ( CAST5 + ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.Cipher.CAST5.Primitive +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B + +-- | CAST5 block cipher (also known as CAST-128). Key is between +-- 40 and 128 bits. +newtype CAST5 = CAST5 Key + +instance Cipher CAST5 where + cipherName _ = "CAST5" + cipherKeySize _ = KeySizeRange 5 16 + cipherInit = initCAST5 + +instance BlockCipher CAST5 where + blockSize _ = 8 + ecbEncrypt (CAST5 k) = B.mapAsWord64 (encrypt k) + ecbDecrypt (CAST5 k) = B.mapAsWord64 (decrypt k) + +initCAST5 :: ByteArrayAccess key => key -> CryptoFailable CAST5 +initCAST5 bs + | len < 5 = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid + | len < 16 = CryptoPassed (CAST5 $ buildKey short padded) + | len == 16 = CryptoPassed (CAST5 $ buildKey False bs) + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid + where + len = B.length bs + short = len <= 10 + + padded :: B.Bytes + padded = B.convert bs `B.append` B.replicate (16 - len) 0 diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5/Primitive.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5/Primitive.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/CAST5/Primitive.hs @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} + +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Cipher.CAST5.Primitive +-- License : BSD-style +-- +-- Haskell implementation of the CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm +-- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + +module Crypto.Cipher.CAST5.Primitive + ( encrypt + , decrypt + , Key() + , buildKey + ) where + +import Control.Monad (void, (>=>)) + +import Data.Bits +import Data.Memory.Endian +import Data.Word + +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Internal.WordArray + + +-- Data Types + +data P = P {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 -- left word + {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 -- right word + +data Q = Q {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 + {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 {-# UNPACK #-} !Word32 + +-- | All subkeys for 12 or 16 rounds +data Key = K12 {-# UNPACK #-} !Array32 -- [ km1, kr1, km2, kr2, ..., km12, kr12 ] + | K16 {-# UNPACK #-} !Array32 -- [ km1, kr1, km2, kr2, ..., km16, kr16 ] + + +-- Big-endian Transformations + +decomp64 :: Word64 -> P +decomp64 x = P (fromIntegral (x `shiftR` 32)) (fromIntegral x) + +comp64 :: P -> Word64 +comp64 (P l r) = (fromIntegral l `shiftL` 32) .|. fromIntegral r + +decomp32 :: Word32 -> (Word8, Word8, Word8, Word8) +decomp32 x = + let a = fromIntegral (x `shiftR` 24) + b = fromIntegral (x `shiftR` 16) + c = fromIntegral (x `shiftR` 8) + d = fromIntegral x + in (a, b, c, d) + + +-- Encryption + +-- | Encrypts a block using the specified key +encrypt :: Key -> Word64 -> Word64 +encrypt k = comp64 . cast_enc k . decomp64 + +cast_enc :: Key -> P -> P +cast_enc (K12 a) (P l0 r0) = P r12 r11 + where + r1 = type1 a 0 l0 r0 + r2 = type2 a 2 r0 r1 + r3 = type3 a 4 r1 r2 + r4 = type1 a 6 r2 r3 + r5 = type2 a 8 r3 r4 + r6 = type3 a 10 r4 r5 + r7 = type1 a 12 r5 r6 + r8 = type2 a 14 r6 r7 + r9 = type3 a 16 r7 r8 + r10 = type1 a 18 r8 r9 + r11 = type2 a 20 r9 r10 + r12 = type3 a 22 r10 r11 + +cast_enc (K16 a) p = P r16 r15 + where + P r12 r11 = cast_enc (K12 a) p + + r13 = type1 a 24 r11 r12 + r14 = type2 a 26 r12 r13 + r15 = type3 a 28 r13 r14 + r16 = type1 a 30 r14 r15 + +-- Decryption + +-- | Decrypts a block using the specified key +decrypt :: Key -> Word64 -> Word64 +decrypt k = comp64 . cast_dec k . decomp64 + +cast_dec :: Key -> P -> P +cast_dec (K12 a) (P r12 r11) = P l0 r0 + where + r10 = type3 a 22 r12 r11 + r9 = type2 a 20 r11 r10 + r8 = type1 a 18 r10 r9 + r7 = type3 a 16 r9 r8 + r6 = type2 a 14 r8 r7 + r5 = type1 a 12 r7 r6 + r4 = type3 a 10 r6 r5 + r3 = type2 a 8 r5 r4 + r2 = type1 a 6 r4 r3 + r1 = type3 a 4 r3 r2 + r0 = type2 a 2 r2 r1 + l0 = type1 a 0 r1 r0 + +cast_dec (K16 a) (P r16 r15) = cast_dec (K12 a) (P r12 r11) + where + r14 = type1 a 30 r16 r15 + r13 = type3 a 28 r15 r14 + r12 = type2 a 26 r14 r13 + r11 = type1 a 24 r13 r12 + + +-- Non-Identical Rounds + +type1 :: Array32 -> Int -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 +type1 arr idx l r = + let km = arrayRead32 arr idx + kr = arrayRead32 arr (idx + 1) + j = (km + r) `rotateL` fromIntegral kr + (ja, jb, jc, jd) = decomp32 j + in l `xor` (((sbox_s1 ja `xor` sbox_s2 jb) - sbox_s3 jc) + sbox_s4 jd) + +type2 :: Array32 -> Int -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 +type2 arr idx l r = + let km = arrayRead32 arr idx + kr = arrayRead32 arr (idx + 1) + j = (km `xor` r) `rotateL` fromIntegral kr + (ja, jb, jc, jd) = decomp32 j + in l `xor` (((sbox_s1 ja - sbox_s2 jb) + sbox_s3 jc) `xor` sbox_s4 jd) + +type3 :: Array32 -> Int -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Word32 +type3 arr idx l r = + let km = arrayRead32 arr idx + kr = arrayRead32 arr (idx + 1) + j = (km - r) `rotateL` fromIntegral kr + (ja, jb, jc, jd) = decomp32 j + in l `xor` (((sbox_s1 ja + sbox_s2 jb) `xor` sbox_s3 jc) - sbox_s4 jd) + + +-- Key Schedule + +-- | Precompute "masking" and "rotation" subkeys +buildKey :: ByteArrayAccess key + => Bool -- ^ @True@ for short keys that only need 12 rounds + -> key -- ^ Input key padded to 16 bytes + -> Key -- ^ Output data structure +buildKey isShort key = + let P x0123 x4567 = decomp64 (fromBE $ B.toW64BE key 0) + P x89AB xCDEF = decomp64 (fromBE $ B.toW64BE key 8) + in keySchedule isShort (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) + +keySchedule :: Bool -> Q -> Key +keySchedule isShort x + | isShort = K12 $ allocArray32AndFreeze 24 $ \ma -> + void (steps123 ma 0 x >>= skip4 >>= steps123 ma 1) + + | otherwise = K16 $ allocArray32AndFreeze 32 $ \ma -> + void (steps123 ma 0 x >>= step4 ma 24 >>= steps123 ma 1 >>= step4 ma 25) + + where + sbox_s56785 a b c d e = sbox_s5 a `xor` sbox_s6 b `xor` sbox_s7 c `xor` sbox_s8 d `xor` sbox_s5 e + sbox_s56786 a b c d e = sbox_s5 a `xor` sbox_s6 b `xor` sbox_s7 c `xor` sbox_s8 d `xor` sbox_s6 e + sbox_s56787 a b c d e = sbox_s5 a `xor` sbox_s6 b `xor` sbox_s7 c `xor` sbox_s8 d `xor` sbox_s7 e + sbox_s56788 a b c d e = sbox_s5 a `xor` sbox_s6 b `xor` sbox_s7 c `xor` sbox_s8 d `xor` sbox_s8 e + + steps123 ma off = step1 ma off >=> step2 ma (off + 8) >=> step3 ma (off + 16) + + step1 :: MutableArray32 -> Int -> Q -> IO Q + step1 ma off (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) = do + let (x8, x9, xA, xB) = decomp32 x89AB + (xC, xD, xE, xF) = decomp32 xCDEF + + z0123 = x0123 `xor` sbox_s56787 xD xF xC xE x8 + z4567 = x89AB `xor` sbox_s56788 z0 z2 z1 z3 xA + z89AB = xCDEF `xor` sbox_s56785 z7 z6 z5 z4 x9 + zCDEF = x4567 `xor` sbox_s56786 zA z9 zB z8 xB + + (z0, z1, z2, z3) = decomp32 z0123 + (z4, z5, z6, z7) = decomp32 z4567 + (z8, z9, zA, zB) = decomp32 z89AB + (zC, zD, zE, zF) = decomp32 zCDEF + + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 0) $ sbox_s56785 z8 z9 z7 z6 z2 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 2) $ sbox_s56786 zA zB z5 z4 z6 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 4) $ sbox_s56787 zC zD z3 z2 z9 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 6) $ sbox_s56788 zE zF z1 z0 zC + return (Q z0123 z4567 z89AB zCDEF) + + step2 :: MutableArray32 -> Int -> Q -> IO Q + step2 ma off (Q z0123 z4567 z89AB zCDEF) = do + let (z0, z1, z2, z3) = decomp32 z0123 + (z4, z5, z6, z7) = decomp32 z4567 + + x0123 = z89AB `xor` sbox_s56787 z5 z7 z4 z6 z0 + x4567 = z0123 `xor` sbox_s56788 x0 x2 x1 x3 z2 + x89AB = z4567 `xor` sbox_s56785 x7 x6 x5 x4 z1 + xCDEF = zCDEF `xor` sbox_s56786 xA x9 xB x8 z3 + + (x0, x1, x2, x3) = decomp32 x0123 + (x4, x5, x6, x7) = decomp32 x4567 + (x8, x9, xA, xB) = decomp32 x89AB + (xC, xD, xE, xF) = decomp32 xCDEF + + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 0) $ sbox_s56785 x3 x2 xC xD x8 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 2) $ sbox_s56786 x1 x0 xE xF xD + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 4) $ sbox_s56787 x7 x6 x8 x9 x3 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 6) $ sbox_s56788 x5 x4 xA xB x7 + return (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) + + step3 :: MutableArray32 -> Int -> Q -> IO Q + step3 ma off (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) = do + let (x8, x9, xA, xB) = decomp32 x89AB + (xC, xD, xE, xF) = decomp32 xCDEF + + z0123 = x0123 `xor` sbox_s56787 xD xF xC xE x8 + z4567 = x89AB `xor` sbox_s56788 z0 z2 z1 z3 xA + z89AB = xCDEF `xor` sbox_s56785 z7 z6 z5 z4 x9 + zCDEF = x4567 `xor` sbox_s56786 zA z9 zB z8 xB + + (z0, z1, z2, z3) = decomp32 z0123 + (z4, z5, z6, z7) = decomp32 z4567 + (z8, z9, zA, zB) = decomp32 z89AB + (zC, zD, zE, zF) = decomp32 zCDEF + + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 0) $ sbox_s56785 z3 z2 zC zD z9 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 2) $ sbox_s56786 z1 z0 zE zF zC + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 4) $ sbox_s56787 z7 z6 z8 z9 z2 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 6) $ sbox_s56788 z5 z4 zA zB z6 + return (Q z0123 z4567 z89AB zCDEF) + + step4 :: MutableArray32 -> Int -> Q -> IO Q + step4 ma off (Q z0123 z4567 z89AB zCDEF) = do + let (z0, z1, z2, z3) = decomp32 z0123 + (z4, z5, z6, z7) = decomp32 z4567 + + x0123 = z89AB `xor` sbox_s56787 z5 z7 z4 z6 z0 + x4567 = z0123 `xor` sbox_s56788 x0 x2 x1 x3 z2 + x89AB = z4567 `xor` sbox_s56785 x7 x6 x5 x4 z1 + xCDEF = zCDEF `xor` sbox_s56786 xA x9 xB x8 z3 + + (x0, x1, x2, x3) = decomp32 x0123 + (x4, x5, x6, x7) = decomp32 x4567 + (x8, x9, xA, xB) = decomp32 x89AB + (xC, xD, xE, xF) = decomp32 xCDEF + + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 0) $ sbox_s56785 x8 x9 x7 x6 x3 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 2) $ sbox_s56786 xA xB x5 x4 x7 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 4) $ sbox_s56787 xC xD x3 x2 x8 + mutableArrayWrite32 ma (off + 6) $ sbox_s56788 xE xF x1 x0 xD + return (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) + + skip4 :: Q -> IO Q + skip4 (Q z0123 z4567 z89AB zCDEF) = do + let (z0, z1, z2, z3) = decomp32 z0123 + (z4, z5, z6, z7) = decomp32 z4567 + + x0123 = z89AB `xor` sbox_s56787 z5 z7 z4 z6 z0 + x4567 = z0123 `xor` sbox_s56788 x0 x2 x1 x3 z2 + x89AB = z4567 `xor` sbox_s56785 x7 x6 x5 x4 z1 + xCDEF = zCDEF `xor` sbox_s56786 xA x9 xB x8 z3 + + (x0, x1, x2, x3) = decomp32 x0123 + (x4, x5, x6, x7) = decomp32 x4567 + (x8, x9, xA, xB) = decomp32 x89AB + + return (Q x0123 x4567 x89AB xCDEF) + +-- S-Boxes + +sbox_s1 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s1 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x30\xfb\x40\xd4\x9f\xa0\xff\x0b\x6b\xec\xcd\x2f\x3f\x25\x8c\x7a\x1e\x21\x3f\x2f\x9c\x00\x4d\xd3\x60\x03\xe5\x40\xcf\x9f\xc9\x49\ + \\xbf\xd4\xaf\x27\x88\xbb\xbd\xb5\xe2\x03\x40\x90\x98\xd0\x96\x75\x6e\x63\xa0\xe0\x15\xc3\x61\xd2\xc2\xe7\x66\x1d\x22\xd4\xff\x8e\ + \\x28\x68\x3b\x6f\xc0\x7f\xd0\x59\xff\x23\x79\xc8\x77\x5f\x50\xe2\x43\xc3\x40\xd3\xdf\x2f\x86\x56\x88\x7c\xa4\x1a\xa2\xd2\xbd\x2d\ + \\xa1\xc9\xe0\xd6\x34\x6c\x48\x19\x61\xb7\x6d\x87\x22\x54\x0f\x2f\x2a\xbe\x32\xe1\xaa\x54\x16\x6b\x22\x56\x8e\x3a\xa2\xd3\x41\xd0\ + \\x66\xdb\x40\xc8\xa7\x84\x39\x2f\x00\x4d\xff\x2f\x2d\xb9\xd2\xde\x97\x94\x3f\xac\x4a\x97\xc1\xd8\x52\x76\x44\xb7\xb5\xf4\x37\xa7\ + \\xb8\x2c\xba\xef\xd7\x51\xd1\x59\x6f\xf7\xf0\xed\x5a\x09\x7a\x1f\x82\x7b\x68\xd0\x90\xec\xf5\x2e\x22\xb0\xc0\x54\xbc\x8e\x59\x35\ + \\x4b\x6d\x2f\x7f\x50\xbb\x64\xa2\xd2\x66\x49\x10\xbe\xe5\x81\x2d\xb7\x33\x22\x90\xe9\x3b\x15\x9f\xb4\x8e\xe4\x11\x4b\xff\x34\x5d\ + \\xfd\x45\xc2\x40\xad\x31\x97\x3f\xc4\xf6\xd0\x2e\x55\xfc\x81\x65\xd5\xb1\xca\xad\xa1\xac\x2d\xae\xa2\xd4\xb7\x6d\xc1\x9b\x0c\x50\ + \\x88\x22\x40\xf2\x0c\x6e\x4f\x38\xa4\xe4\xbf\xd7\x4f\x5b\xa2\x72\x56\x4c\x1d\x2f\xc5\x9c\x53\x19\xb9\x49\xe3\x54\xb0\x46\x69\xfe\ + \\xb1\xb6\xab\x8a\xc7\x13\x58\xdd\x63\x85\xc5\x45\x11\x0f\x93\x5d\x57\x53\x8a\xd5\x6a\x39\x04\x93\xe6\x3d\x37\xe0\x2a\x54\xf6\xb3\ + \\x3a\x78\x7d\x5f\x62\x76\xa0\xb5\x19\xa6\xfc\xdf\x7a\x42\x20\x6a\x29\xf9\xd4\xd5\xf6\x1b\x18\x91\xbb\x72\x27\x5e\xaa\x50\x81\x67\ + \\x38\x90\x10\x91\xc6\xb5\x05\xeb\x84\xc7\xcb\x8c\x2a\xd7\x5a\x0f\x87\x4a\x14\x27\xa2\xd1\x93\x6b\x2a\xd2\x86\xaf\xaa\x56\xd2\x91\ + \\xd7\x89\x43\x60\x42\x5c\x75\x0d\x93\xb3\x9e\x26\x18\x71\x84\xc9\x6c\x00\xb3\x2d\x73\xe2\xbb\x14\xa0\xbe\xbc\x3c\x54\x62\x37\x79\ + \\x64\x45\x9e\xab\x3f\x32\x8b\x82\x77\x18\xcf\x82\x59\xa2\xce\xa6\x04\xee\x00\x2e\x89\xfe\x78\xe6\x3f\xab\x09\x50\x32\x5f\xf6\xc2\ + \\x81\x38\x3f\x05\x69\x63\xc5\xc8\x76\xcb\x5a\xd6\xd4\x99\x74\xc9\xca\x18\x0d\xcf\x38\x07\x82\xd5\xc7\xfa\x5c\xf6\x8a\xc3\x15\x11\ + \\x35\xe7\x9e\x13\x47\xda\x91\xd0\xf4\x0f\x90\x86\xa7\xe2\x41\x9e\x31\x36\x62\x41\x05\x1e\xf4\x95\xaa\x57\x3b\x04\x4a\x80\x5d\x8d\ + \\x54\x83\x00\xd0\x00\x32\x2a\x3c\xbf\x64\xcd\xdf\xba\x57\xa6\x8e\x75\xc6\x37\x2b\x50\xaf\xd3\x41\xa7\xc1\x32\x75\x91\x5a\x0b\xf5\ + \\x6b\x54\xbf\xab\x2b\x0b\x14\x26\xab\x4c\xc9\xd7\x44\x9c\xcd\x82\xf7\xfb\xf2\x65\xab\x85\xc5\xf3\x1b\x55\xdb\x94\xaa\xd4\xe3\x24\ + \\xcf\xa4\xbd\x3f\x2d\xea\xa3\xe2\x9e\x20\x4d\x02\xc8\xbd\x25\xac\xea\xdf\x55\xb3\xd5\xbd\x9e\x98\xe3\x12\x31\xb2\x2a\xd5\xad\x6c\ + \\x95\x43\x29\xde\xad\xbe\x45\x28\xd8\x71\x0f\x69\xaa\x51\xc9\x0f\xaa\x78\x6b\xf6\x22\x51\x3f\x1e\xaa\x51\xa7\x9b\x2a\xd3\x44\xcc\ + \\x7b\x5a\x41\xf0\xd3\x7c\xfb\xad\x1b\x06\x95\x05\x41\xec\xe4\x91\xb4\xc3\x32\xe6\x03\x22\x68\xd4\xc9\x60\x0a\xcc\xce\x38\x7e\x6d\ + \\xbf\x6b\xb1\x6c\x6a\x70\xfb\x78\x0d\x03\xd9\xc9\xd4\xdf\x39\xde\xe0\x10\x63\xda\x47\x36\xf4\x64\x5a\xd3\x28\xd8\xb3\x47\xcc\x96\ + \\x75\xbb\x0f\xc3\x98\x51\x1b\xfb\x4f\xfb\xcc\x35\xb5\x8b\xcf\x6a\xe1\x1f\x0a\xbc\xbf\xc5\xfe\x4a\xa7\x0a\xec\x10\xac\x39\x57\x0a\ + \\x3f\x04\x44\x2f\x61\x88\xb1\x53\xe0\x39\x7a\x2e\x57\x27\xcb\x79\x9c\xeb\x41\x8f\x1c\xac\xd6\x8d\x2a\xd3\x7c\x96\x01\x75\xcb\x9d\ + \\xc6\x9d\xff\x09\xc7\x5b\x65\xf0\xd9\xdb\x40\xd8\xec\x0e\x77\x79\x47\x44\xea\xd4\xb1\x1c\x32\x74\xdd\x24\xcb\x9e\x7e\x1c\x54\xbd\ + \\xf0\x11\x44\xf9\xd2\x24\x0e\xb1\x96\x75\xb3\xfd\xa3\xac\x37\x55\xd4\x7c\x27\xaf\x51\xc8\x5f\x4d\x56\x90\x75\x96\xa5\xbb\x15\xe6\ + \\x58\x03\x04\xf0\xca\x04\x2c\xf1\x01\x1a\x37\xea\x8d\xbf\xaa\xdb\x35\xba\x3e\x4a\x35\x26\xff\xa0\xc3\x7b\x4d\x09\xbc\x30\x6e\xd9\ + \\x98\xa5\x26\x66\x56\x48\xf7\x25\xff\x5e\x56\x9d\x0c\xed\x63\xd0\x7c\x63\xb2\xcf\x70\x0b\x45\xe1\xd5\xea\x50\xf1\x85\xa9\x28\x72\ + \\xaf\x1f\xbd\xa7\xd4\x23\x48\x70\xa7\x87\x0b\xf3\x2d\x3b\x4d\x79\x42\xe0\x41\x98\x0c\xd0\xed\xe7\x26\x47\x0d\xb8\xf8\x81\x81\x4c\ + \\x47\x4d\x6a\xd7\x7c\x0c\x5e\x5c\xd1\x23\x19\x59\x38\x1b\x72\x98\xf5\xd2\xf4\xdb\xab\x83\x86\x53\x6e\x2f\x1e\x23\x83\x71\x9c\x9e\ + \\xbd\x91\xe0\x46\x9a\x56\x45\x6e\xdc\x39\x20\x0c\x20\xc8\xc5\x71\x96\x2b\xda\x1c\xe1\xe6\x96\xff\xb1\x41\xab\x08\x7c\xca\x89\xb9\ + \\x1a\x69\xe7\x83\x02\xcc\x48\x43\xa2\xf7\xc5\x79\x42\x9e\xf4\x7d\x42\x7b\x16\x9c\x5a\xc9\xf0\x49\xdd\x8f\x0f\x00\x5c\x81\x65\xbf"# + +sbox_s2 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s2 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x1f\x20\x10\x94\xef\x0b\xa7\x5b\x69\xe3\xcf\x7e\x39\x3f\x43\x80\xfe\x61\xcf\x7a\xee\xc5\x20\x7a\x55\x88\x9c\x94\x72\xfc\x06\x51\ + \\xad\xa7\xef\x79\x4e\x1d\x72\x35\xd5\x5a\x63\xce\xde\x04\x36\xba\x99\xc4\x30\xef\x5f\x0c\x07\x94\x18\xdc\xdb\x7d\xa1\xd6\xef\xf3\ + \\xa0\xb5\x2f\x7b\x59\xe8\x36\x05\xee\x15\xb0\x94\xe9\xff\xd9\x09\xdc\x44\x00\x86\xef\x94\x44\x59\xba\x83\xcc\xb3\xe0\xc3\xcd\xfb\ + \\xd1\xda\x41\x81\x3b\x09\x2a\xb1\xf9\x97\xf1\xc1\xa5\xe6\xcf\x7b\x01\x42\x0d\xdb\xe4\xe7\xef\x5b\x25\xa1\xff\x41\xe1\x80\xf8\x06\ + \\x1f\xc4\x10\x80\x17\x9b\xee\x7a\xd3\x7a\xc6\xa9\xfe\x58\x30\xa4\x98\xde\x8b\x7f\x77\xe8\x3f\x4e\x79\x92\x92\x69\x24\xfa\x9f\x7b\ + \\xe1\x13\xc8\x5b\xac\xc4\x00\x83\xd7\x50\x35\x25\xf7\xea\x61\x5f\x62\x14\x31\x54\x0d\x55\x4b\x63\x5d\x68\x11\x21\xc8\x66\xc3\x59\ + \\x3d\x63\xcf\x73\xce\xe2\x34\xc0\xd4\xd8\x7e\x87\x5c\x67\x2b\x21\x07\x1f\x61\x81\x39\xf7\x62\x7f\x36\x1e\x30\x84\xe4\xeb\x57\x3b\ + \\x60\x2f\x64\xa4\xd6\x3a\xcd\x9c\x1b\xbc\x46\x35\x9e\x81\x03\x2d\x27\x01\xf5\x0c\x99\x84\x7a\xb4\xa0\xe3\xdf\x79\xba\x6c\xf3\x8c\ + \\x10\x84\x30\x94\x25\x37\xa9\x5e\xf4\x6f\x6f\xfe\xa1\xff\x3b\x1f\x20\x8c\xfb\x6a\x8f\x45\x8c\x74\xd9\xe0\xa2\x27\x4e\xc7\x3a\x34\ + \\xfc\x88\x4f\x69\x3e\x4d\xe8\xdf\xef\x0e\x00\x88\x35\x59\x64\x8d\x8a\x45\x38\x8c\x1d\x80\x43\x66\x72\x1d\x9b\xfd\xa5\x86\x84\xbb\ + \\xe8\x25\x63\x33\x84\x4e\x82\x12\x12\x8d\x80\x98\xfe\xd3\x3f\xb4\xce\x28\x0a\xe1\x27\xe1\x9b\xa5\xd5\xa6\xc2\x52\xe4\x97\x54\xbd\ + \\xc5\xd6\x55\xdd\xeb\x66\x70\x64\x77\x84\x0b\x4d\xa1\xb6\xa8\x01\x84\xdb\x26\xa9\xe0\xb5\x67\x14\x21\xf0\x43\xb7\xe5\xd0\x58\x60\ + \\x54\xf0\x30\x84\x06\x6f\xf4\x72\xa3\x1a\xa1\x53\xda\xdc\x47\x55\xb5\x62\x5d\xbf\x68\x56\x1b\xe6\x83\xca\x6b\x94\x2d\x6e\xd2\x3b\ + \\xec\xcf\x01\xdb\xa6\xd3\xd0\xba\xb6\x80\x3d\x5c\xaf\x77\xa7\x09\x33\xb4\xa3\x4c\x39\x7b\xc8\xd6\x5e\xe2\x2b\x95\x5f\x0e\x53\x04\ + \\x81\xed\x6f\x61\x20\xe7\x43\x64\xb4\x5e\x13\x78\xde\x18\x63\x9b\x88\x1c\xa1\x22\xb9\x67\x26\xd1\x80\x49\xa7\xe8\x22\xb7\xda\x7b\ + \\x5e\x55\x2d\x25\x52\x72\xd2\x37\x79\xd2\x95\x1c\xc6\x0d\x89\x4c\x48\x8c\xb4\x02\x1b\xa4\xfe\x5b\xa4\xb0\x9f\x6b\x1c\xa8\x15\xcf\ + \\xa2\x0c\x30\x05\x88\x71\xdf\x63\xb9\xde\x2f\xcb\x0c\xc6\xc9\xe9\x0b\xee\xff\x53\xe3\x21\x45\x17\xb4\x54\x28\x35\x9f\x63\x29\x3c\ + \\xee\x41\xe7\x29\x6e\x1d\x2d\x7c\x50\x04\x52\x86\x1e\x66\x85\xf3\xf3\x34\x01\xc6\x30\xa2\x2c\x95\x31\xa7\x08\x50\x60\x93\x0f\x13\ + \\x73\xf9\x84\x17\xa1\x26\x98\x59\xec\x64\x5c\x44\x52\xc8\x77\xa9\xcd\xff\x33\xa6\xa0\x2b\x17\x41\x7c\xba\xd9\xa2\x21\x80\x03\x6f\ + \\x50\xd9\x9c\x08\xcb\x3f\x48\x61\xc2\x6b\xd7\x65\x64\xa3\xf6\xab\x80\x34\x26\x76\x25\xa7\x5e\x7b\xe4\xe6\xd1\xfc\x20\xc7\x10\xe6\ + \\xcd\xf0\xb6\x80\x17\x84\x4d\x3b\x31\xee\xf8\x4d\x7e\x08\x24\xe4\x2c\xcb\x49\xeb\x84\x6a\x3b\xae\x8f\xf7\x78\x88\xee\x5d\x60\xf6\ + \\x7a\xf7\x56\x73\x2f\xdd\x5c\xdb\xa1\x16\x31\xc1\x30\xf6\x6f\x43\xb3\xfa\xec\x54\x15\x7f\xd7\xfa\xef\x85\x79\xcc\xd1\x52\xde\x58\ + \\xdb\x2f\xfd\x5e\x8f\x32\xce\x19\x30\x6a\xf9\x7a\x02\xf0\x3e\xf8\x99\x31\x9a\xd5\xc2\x42\xfa\x0f\xa7\xe3\xeb\xb0\xc6\x8e\x49\x06\ + \\xb8\xda\x23\x0c\x80\x82\x30\x28\xdc\xde\xf3\xc8\xd3\x5f\xb1\x71\x08\x8a\x1b\xc8\xbe\xc0\xc5\x60\x61\xa3\xc9\xe8\xbc\xa8\xf5\x4d\ + \\xc7\x2f\xef\xfa\x22\x82\x2e\x99\x82\xc5\x70\xb4\xd8\xd9\x4e\x89\x8b\x1c\x34\xbc\x30\x1e\x16\xe6\x27\x3b\xe9\x79\xb0\xff\xea\xa6\ + \\x61\xd9\xb8\xc6\x00\xb2\x48\x69\xb7\xff\xce\x3f\x08\xdc\x28\x3b\x43\xda\xf6\x5a\xf7\xe1\x97\x98\x76\x19\xb7\x2f\x8f\x1c\x9b\xa4\ + \\xdc\x86\x37\xa0\x16\xa7\xd3\xb1\x9f\xc3\x93\xb7\xa7\x13\x6e\xeb\xc6\xbc\xc6\x3e\x1a\x51\x37\x42\xef\x68\x28\xbc\x52\x03\x65\xd6\ + \\x2d\x6a\x77\xab\x35\x27\xed\x4b\x82\x1f\xd2\x16\x09\x5c\x6e\x2e\xdb\x92\xf2\xfb\x5e\xea\x29\xcb\x14\x58\x92\xf5\x91\x58\x4f\x7f\ + \\x54\x83\x69\x7b\x26\x67\xa8\xcc\x85\x19\x60\x48\x8c\x4b\xac\xea\x83\x38\x60\xd4\x0d\x23\xe0\xf9\x6c\x38\x7e\x8a\x0a\xe6\xd2\x49\ + \\xb2\x84\x60\x0c\xd8\x35\x73\x1d\xdc\xb1\xc6\x47\xac\x4c\x56\xea\x3e\xbd\x81\xb3\x23\x0e\xab\xb0\x64\x38\xbc\x87\xf0\xb5\xb1\xfa\ + \\x8f\x5e\xa2\xb3\xfc\x18\x46\x42\x0a\x03\x6b\x7a\x4f\xb0\x89\xbd\x64\x9d\xa5\x89\xa3\x45\x41\x5e\x5c\x03\x83\x23\x3e\x5d\x3b\xb9\ + \\x43\xd7\x95\x72\x7e\x6d\xd0\x7c\x06\xdf\xdf\x1e\x6c\x6c\xc4\xef\x71\x60\xa5\x39\x73\xbf\xbe\x70\x83\x87\x76\x05\x45\x23\xec\xf1"# + +sbox_s3 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s3 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x8d\xef\xc2\x40\x25\xfa\x5d\x9f\xeb\x90\x3d\xbf\xe8\x10\xc9\x07\x47\x60\x7f\xff\x36\x9f\xe4\x4b\x8c\x1f\xc6\x44\xae\xce\xca\x90\ + \\xbe\xb1\xf9\xbf\xee\xfb\xca\xea\xe8\xcf\x19\x50\x51\xdf\x07\xae\x92\x0e\x88\x06\xf0\xad\x05\x48\xe1\x3c\x8d\x83\x92\x70\x10\xd5\ + \\x11\x10\x7d\x9f\x07\x64\x7d\xb9\xb2\xe3\xe4\xd4\x3d\x4f\x28\x5e\xb9\xaf\xa8\x20\xfa\xde\x82\xe0\xa0\x67\x26\x8b\x82\x72\x79\x2e\ + \\x55\x3f\xb2\xc0\x48\x9a\xe2\x2b\xd4\xef\x97\x94\x12\x5e\x3f\xbc\x21\xff\xfc\xee\x82\x5b\x1b\xfd\x92\x55\xc5\xed\x12\x57\xa2\x40\ + \\x4e\x1a\x83\x02\xba\xe0\x7f\xff\x52\x82\x46\xe7\x8e\x57\x14\x0e\x33\x73\xf7\xbf\x8c\x9f\x81\x88\xa6\xfc\x4e\xe8\xc9\x82\xb5\xa5\ + \\xa8\xc0\x1d\xb7\x57\x9f\xc2\x64\x67\x09\x4f\x31\xf2\xbd\x3f\x5f\x40\xff\xf7\xc1\x1f\xb7\x8d\xfc\x8e\x6b\xd2\xc1\x43\x7b\xe5\x9b\ + \\x99\xb0\x3d\xbf\xb5\xdb\xc6\x4b\x63\x8d\xc0\xe6\x55\x81\x9d\x99\xa1\x97\xc8\x1c\x4a\x01\x2d\x6e\xc5\x88\x4a\x28\xcc\xc3\x6f\x71\ + \\xb8\x43\xc2\x13\x6c\x07\x43\xf1\x83\x09\x89\x3c\x0f\xed\xdd\x5f\x2f\x7f\xe8\x50\xd7\xc0\x7f\x7e\x02\x50\x7f\xbf\x5a\xfb\x9a\x04\ + \\xa7\x47\xd2\xd0\x16\x51\x19\x2e\xaf\x70\xbf\x3e\x58\xc3\x13\x80\x5f\x98\x30\x2e\x72\x7c\xc3\xc4\x0a\x0f\xb4\x02\x0f\x7f\xef\x82\ + \\x8c\x96\xfd\xad\x5d\x2c\x2a\xae\x8e\xe9\x9a\x49\x50\xda\x88\xb8\x84\x27\xf4\xa0\x1e\xac\x57\x90\x79\x6f\xb4\x49\x82\x52\xdc\x15\ + \\xef\xbd\x7d\x9b\xa6\x72\x59\x7d\xad\xa8\x40\xd8\x45\xf5\x45\x04\xfa\x5d\x74\x03\xe8\x3e\xc3\x05\x4f\x91\x75\x1a\x92\x56\x69\xc2\ + \\x23\xef\xe9\x41\xa9\x03\xf1\x2e\x60\x27\x0d\xf2\x02\x76\xe4\xb6\x94\xfd\x65\x74\x92\x79\x85\xb2\x82\x76\xdb\xcb\x02\x77\x81\x76\ + \\xf8\xaf\x91\x8d\x4e\x48\xf7\x9e\x8f\x61\x6d\xdf\xe2\x9d\x84\x0e\x84\x2f\x7d\x83\x34\x0c\xe5\xc8\x96\xbb\xb6\x82\x93\xb4\xb1\x48\ + \\xef\x30\x3c\xab\x98\x4f\xaf\x28\x77\x9f\xaf\x9b\x92\xdc\x56\x0d\x22\x4d\x1e\x20\x84\x37\xaa\x88\x7d\x29\xdc\x96\x27\x56\xd3\xdc\ + \\x8b\x90\x7c\xee\xb5\x1f\xd2\x40\xe7\xc0\x7c\xe3\xe5\x66\xb4\xa1\xc3\xe9\x61\x5e\x3c\xf8\x20\x9d\x60\x94\xd1\xe3\xcd\x9c\xa3\x41\ + \\x5c\x76\x46\x0e\x00\xea\x98\x3b\xd4\xd6\x78\x81\xfd\x47\x57\x2c\xf7\x6c\xed\xd9\xbd\xa8\x22\x9c\x12\x7d\xad\xaa\x43\x8a\x07\x4e\ + \\x1f\x97\xc0\x90\x08\x1b\xdb\x8a\x93\xa0\x7e\xbe\xb9\x38\xca\x15\x97\xb0\x3c\xff\x3d\xc2\xc0\xf8\x8d\x1a\xb2\xec\x64\x38\x0e\x51\ + \\x68\xcc\x7b\xfb\xd9\x0f\x27\x88\x12\x49\x01\x81\x5d\xe5\xff\xd4\xdd\x7e\xf8\x6a\x76\xa2\xe2\x14\xb9\xa4\x03\x68\x92\x5d\x95\x8f\ + \\x4b\x39\xff\xfa\xba\x39\xae\xe9\xa4\xff\xd3\x0b\xfa\xf7\x93\x3b\x6d\x49\x86\x23\x19\x3c\xbc\xfa\x27\x62\x75\x45\x82\x5c\xf4\x7a\ + \\x61\xbd\x8b\xa0\xd1\x1e\x42\xd1\xce\xad\x04\xf4\x12\x7e\xa3\x92\x10\x42\x8d\xb7\x82\x72\xa9\x72\x92\x70\xc4\xa8\x12\x7d\xe5\x0b\ + \\x28\x5b\xa1\xc8\x3c\x62\xf4\x4f\x35\xc0\xea\xa5\xe8\x05\xd2\x31\x42\x89\x29\xfb\xb4\xfc\xdf\x82\x4f\xb6\x6a\x53\x0e\x7d\xc1\x5b\ + \\x1f\x08\x1f\xab\x10\x86\x18\xae\xfc\xfd\x08\x6d\xf9\xff\x28\x89\x69\x4b\xcc\x11\x23\x6a\x5c\xae\x12\xde\xca\x4d\x2c\x3f\x8c\xc5\ + \\xd2\xd0\x2d\xfe\xf8\xef\x58\x96\xe4\xcf\x52\xda\x95\x15\x5b\x67\x49\x4a\x48\x8c\xb9\xb6\xa8\x0c\x5c\x8f\x82\xbc\x89\xd3\x6b\x45\ + \\x3a\x60\x94\x37\xec\x00\xc9\xa9\x44\x71\x52\x53\x0a\x87\x4b\x49\xd7\x73\xbc\x40\x7c\x34\x67\x1c\x02\x71\x7e\xf6\x4f\xeb\x55\x36\ + \\xa2\xd0\x2f\xff\xd2\xbf\x60\xc4\xd4\x3f\x03\xc0\x50\xb4\xef\x6d\x07\x47\x8c\xd1\x00\x6e\x18\x88\xa2\xe5\x3f\x55\xb9\xe6\xd4\xbc\ + \\xa2\x04\x80\x16\x97\x57\x38\x33\xd7\x20\x7d\x67\xde\x0f\x8f\x3d\x72\xf8\x7b\x33\xab\xcc\x4f\x33\x76\x88\xc5\x5d\x7b\x00\xa6\xb0\ + \\x94\x7b\x00\x01\x57\x00\x75\xd2\xf9\xbb\x88\xf8\x89\x42\x01\x9e\x42\x64\xa5\xff\x85\x63\x02\xe0\x72\xdb\xd9\x2b\xee\x97\x1b\x69\ + \\x6e\xa2\x2f\xde\x5f\x08\xae\x2b\xaf\x7a\x61\x6d\xe5\xc9\x87\x67\xcf\x1f\xeb\xd2\x61\xef\xc8\xc2\xf1\xac\x25\x71\xcc\x82\x39\xc2\ + \\x67\x21\x4c\xb8\xb1\xe5\x83\xd1\xb7\xdc\x3e\x62\x7f\x10\xbd\xce\xf9\x0a\x5c\x38\x0f\xf0\x44\x3d\x60\x6e\x6d\xc6\x60\x54\x3a\x49\ + \\x57\x27\xc1\x48\x2b\xe9\x8a\x1d\x8a\xb4\x17\x38\x20\xe1\xbe\x24\xaf\x96\xda\x0f\x68\x45\x84\x25\x99\x83\x3b\xe5\x60\x0d\x45\x7d\ + \\x28\x2f\x93\x50\x83\x34\xb3\x62\xd9\x1d\x11\x20\x2b\x6d\x8d\xa0\x64\x2b\x1e\x31\x9c\x30\x5a\x00\x52\xbc\xe6\x88\x1b\x03\x58\x8a\ + \\xf7\xba\xef\xd5\x41\x42\xed\x9c\xa4\x31\x5c\x11\x83\x32\x3e\xc5\xdf\xef\x46\x36\xa1\x33\xc5\x01\xe9\xd3\x53\x1c\xee\x35\x37\x83"# + +sbox_s4 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s4 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x9d\xb3\x04\x20\x1f\xb6\xe9\xde\xa7\xbe\x7b\xef\xd2\x73\xa2\x98\x4a\x4f\x7b\xdb\x64\xad\x8c\x57\x85\x51\x04\x43\xfa\x02\x0e\xd1\ + \\x7e\x28\x7a\xff\xe6\x0f\xb6\x63\x09\x5f\x35\xa1\x79\xeb\xf1\x20\xfd\x05\x9d\x43\x64\x97\xb7\xb1\xf3\x64\x1f\x63\x24\x1e\x4a\xdf\ + \\x28\x14\x7f\x5f\x4f\xa2\xb8\xcd\xc9\x43\x00\x40\x0c\xc3\x22\x20\xfd\xd3\x0b\x30\xc0\xa5\x37\x4f\x1d\x2d\x00\xd9\x24\x14\x7b\x15\ + \\xee\x4d\x11\x1a\x0f\xca\x51\x67\x71\xff\x90\x4c\x2d\x19\x5f\xfe\x1a\x05\x64\x5f\x0c\x13\xfe\xfe\x08\x1b\x08\xca\x05\x17\x01\x21\ + \\x80\x53\x01\x00\xe8\x3e\x5e\xfe\xac\x9a\xf4\xf8\x7f\xe7\x27\x01\xd2\xb8\xee\x5f\x06\xdf\x42\x61\xbb\x9e\x9b\x8a\x72\x93\xea\x25\ + \\xce\x84\xff\xdf\xf5\x71\x88\x01\x3d\xd6\x4b\x04\xa2\x6f\x26\x3b\x7e\xd4\x84\x00\x54\x7e\xeb\xe6\x44\x6d\x4c\xa0\x6c\xf3\xd6\xf5\ + \\x26\x49\xab\xdf\xae\xa0\xc7\xf5\x36\x33\x8c\xc1\x50\x3f\x7e\x93\xd3\x77\x20\x61\x11\xb6\x38\xe1\x72\x50\x0e\x03\xf8\x0e\xb2\xbb\ + \\xab\xe0\x50\x2e\xec\x8d\x77\xde\x57\x97\x1e\x81\xe1\x4f\x67\x46\xc9\x33\x54\x00\x69\x20\x31\x8f\x08\x1d\xbb\x99\xff\xc3\x04\xa5\ + \\x4d\x35\x18\x05\x7f\x3d\x5c\xe3\xa6\xc8\x66\xc6\x5d\x5b\xcc\xa9\xda\xec\x6f\xea\x9f\x92\x6f\x91\x9f\x46\x22\x2f\x39\x91\x46\x7d\ + \\xa5\xbf\x6d\x8e\x11\x43\xc4\x4f\x43\x95\x83\x02\xd0\x21\x4e\xeb\x02\x20\x83\xb8\x3f\xb6\x18\x0c\x18\xf8\x93\x1e\x28\x16\x58\xe6\ + \\x26\x48\x6e\x3e\x8b\xd7\x8a\x70\x74\x77\xe4\xc1\xb5\x06\xe0\x7c\xf3\x2d\x0a\x25\x79\x09\x8b\x02\xe4\xea\xbb\x81\x28\x12\x3b\x23\ + \\x69\xde\xad\x38\x15\x74\xca\x16\xdf\x87\x1b\x62\x21\x1c\x40\xb7\xa5\x1a\x9e\xf9\x00\x14\x37\x7b\x04\x1e\x8a\xc8\x09\x11\x40\x03\ + \\xbd\x59\xe4\xd2\xe3\xd1\x56\xd5\x4f\xe8\x76\xd5\x2f\x91\xa3\x40\x55\x7b\xe8\xde\x00\xea\xe4\xa7\x0c\xe5\xc2\xec\x4d\xb4\xbb\xa6\ + \\xe7\x56\xbd\xff\xdd\x33\x69\xac\xec\x17\xb0\x35\x06\x57\x23\x27\x99\xaf\xc8\xb0\x56\xc8\xc3\x91\x6b\x65\x81\x1c\x5e\x14\x61\x19\ + \\x6e\x85\xcb\x75\xbe\x07\xc0\x02\xc2\x32\x55\x77\x89\x3f\xf4\xec\x5b\xbf\xc9\x2d\xd0\xec\x3b\x25\xb7\x80\x1a\xb7\x8d\x6d\x3b\x24\ + \\x20\xc7\x63\xef\xc3\x66\xa5\xfc\x9c\x38\x28\x80\x0a\xce\x32\x05\xaa\xc9\x54\x8a\xec\xa1\xd7\xc7\x04\x1a\xfa\x32\x1d\x16\x62\x5a\ + \\x67\x01\x90\x2c\x9b\x75\x7a\x54\x31\xd4\x77\xf7\x91\x26\xb0\x31\x36\xcc\x6f\xdb\xc7\x0b\x8b\x46\xd9\xe6\x6a\x48\x56\xe5\x5a\x79\ + \\x02\x6a\x4c\xeb\x52\x43\x7e\xff\x2f\x8f\x76\xb4\x0d\xf9\x80\xa5\x86\x74\xcd\xe3\xed\xda\x04\xeb\x17\xa9\xbe\x04\x2c\x18\xf4\xdf\ + \\xb7\x74\x7f\x9d\xab\x2a\xf7\xb4\xef\xc3\x4d\x20\x2e\x09\x6b\x7c\x17\x41\xa2\x54\xe5\xb6\xa0\x35\x21\x3d\x42\xf6\x2c\x1c\x7c\x26\ + \\x61\xc2\xf5\x0f\x65\x52\xda\xf9\xd2\xc2\x31\xf8\x25\x13\x0f\x69\xd8\x16\x7f\xa2\x04\x18\xf2\xc8\x00\x1a\x96\xa6\x0d\x15\x26\xab\ + \\x63\x31\x5c\x21\x5e\x0a\x72\xec\x49\xba\xfe\xfd\x18\x79\x08\xd9\x8d\x0d\xbd\x86\x31\x11\x70\xa7\x3e\x9b\x64\x0c\xcc\x3e\x10\xd7\ + \\xd5\xca\xd3\xb6\x0c\xae\xc3\x88\xf7\x30\x01\xe1\x6c\x72\x8a\xff\x71\xea\xe2\xa1\x1f\x9a\xf3\x6e\xcf\xcb\xd1\x2f\xc1\xde\x84\x17\ + \\xac\x07\xbe\x6b\xcb\x44\xa1\xd8\x8b\x9b\x0f\x56\x01\x39\x88\xc3\xb1\xc5\x2f\xca\xb4\xbe\x31\xcd\xd8\x78\x28\x06\x12\xa3\xa4\xe2\ + \\x6f\x7d\xe5\x32\x58\xfd\x7e\xb6\xd0\x1e\xe9\x00\x24\xad\xff\xc2\xf4\x99\x0f\xc5\x97\x11\xaa\xc5\x00\x1d\x7b\x95\x82\xe5\xe7\xd2\ + \\x10\x98\x73\xf6\x00\x61\x30\x96\xc3\x2d\x95\x21\xad\xa1\x21\xff\x29\x90\x84\x15\x7f\xbb\x97\x7f\xaf\x9e\xb3\xdb\x29\xc9\xed\x2a\ + \\x5c\xe2\xa4\x65\xa7\x30\xf3\x2c\xd0\xaa\x3f\xe8\x8a\x5c\xc0\x91\xd4\x9e\x2c\xe7\x0c\xe4\x54\xa9\xd6\x0a\xcd\x86\x01\x5f\x19\x19\ + \\x77\x07\x91\x03\xde\xa0\x3a\xf6\x78\xa8\x56\x5e\xde\xe3\x56\xdf\x21\xf0\x5c\xbe\x8b\x75\xe3\x87\xb3\xc5\x06\x51\xb8\xa5\xc3\xef\ + \\xd8\xee\xb6\xd2\xe5\x23\xbe\x77\xc2\x15\x45\x29\x2f\x69\xef\xdf\xaf\xe6\x7a\xfb\xf4\x70\xc4\xb2\xf3\xe0\xeb\x5b\xd6\xcc\x98\x76\ + \\x39\xe4\x46\x0c\x1f\xda\x85\x38\x19\x87\x83\x2f\xca\x00\x73\x67\xa9\x91\x44\xf8\x29\x6b\x29\x9e\x49\x2f\xc2\x95\x92\x66\xbe\xab\ + \\xb5\x67\x6e\x69\x9b\xd3\xdd\xda\xdf\x7e\x05\x2f\xdb\x25\x70\x1c\x1b\x5e\x51\xee\xf6\x53\x24\xe6\x6a\xfc\xe3\x6c\x03\x16\xcc\x04\ + \\x86\x44\x21\x3e\xb7\xdc\x59\xd0\x79\x65\x29\x1f\xcc\xd6\xfd\x43\x41\x82\x39\x79\x93\x2b\xcd\xf6\xb6\x57\xc3\x4d\x4e\xdf\xd2\x82\ + \\x7a\xe5\x29\x0c\x3c\xb9\x53\x6b\x85\x1e\x20\xfe\x98\x33\x55\x7e\x13\xec\xf0\xb0\xd3\xff\xb3\x72\x3f\x85\xc5\xc1\x0a\xef\x7e\xd2"# + +sbox_s5 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s5 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x7e\xc9\x0c\x04\x2c\x6e\x74\xb9\x9b\x0e\x66\xdf\xa6\x33\x79\x11\xb8\x6a\x7f\xff\x1d\xd3\x58\xf5\x44\xdd\x9d\x44\x17\x31\x16\x7f\ + \\x08\xfb\xf1\xfa\xe7\xf5\x11\xcc\xd2\x05\x1b\x00\x73\x5a\xba\x00\x2a\xb7\x22\xd8\x38\x63\x81\xcb\xac\xf6\x24\x3a\x69\xbe\xfd\x7a\ + \\xe6\xa2\xe7\x7f\xf0\xc7\x20\xcd\xc4\x49\x48\x16\xcc\xf5\xc1\x80\x38\x85\x16\x40\x15\xb0\xa8\x48\xe6\x8b\x18\xcb\x4c\xaa\xde\xff\ + \\x5f\x48\x0a\x01\x04\x12\xb2\xaa\x25\x98\x14\xfc\x41\xd0\xef\xe2\x4e\x40\xb4\x8d\x24\x8e\xb6\xfb\x8d\xba\x1c\xfe\x41\xa9\x9b\x02\ + \\x1a\x55\x0a\x04\xba\x8f\x65\xcb\x72\x51\xf4\xe7\x95\xa5\x17\x25\xc1\x06\xec\xd7\x97\xa5\x98\x0a\xc5\x39\xb9\xaa\x4d\x79\xfe\x6a\ + \\xf2\xf3\xf7\x63\x68\xaf\x80\x40\xed\x0c\x9e\x56\x11\xb4\x95\x8b\xe1\xeb\x5a\x88\x87\x09\xe6\xb0\xd7\xe0\x71\x56\x4e\x29\xfe\xa7\ + \\x63\x66\xe5\x2d\x02\xd1\xc0\x00\xc4\xac\x8e\x05\x93\x77\xf5\x71\x0c\x05\x37\x2a\x57\x85\x35\xf2\x22\x61\xbe\x02\xd6\x42\xa0\xc9\ + \\xdf\x13\xa2\x80\x74\xb5\x5b\xd2\x68\x21\x99\xc0\xd4\x21\xe5\xec\x53\xfb\x3c\xe8\xc8\xad\xed\xb3\x28\xa8\x7f\xc9\x3d\x95\x99\x81\ + \\x5c\x1f\xf9\x00\xfe\x38\xd3\x99\x0c\x4e\xff\x0b\x06\x24\x07\xea\xaa\x2f\x4f\xb1\x4f\xb9\x69\x76\x90\xc7\x95\x05\xb0\xa8\xa7\x74\ + \\xef\x55\xa1\xff\xe5\x9c\xa2\xc2\xa6\xb6\x2d\x27\xe6\x6a\x42\x63\xdf\x65\x00\x1f\x0e\xc5\x09\x66\xdf\xdd\x55\xbc\x29\xde\x06\x55\ + \\x91\x1e\x73\x9a\x17\xaf\x89\x75\x32\xc7\x91\x1c\x89\xf8\x94\x68\x0d\x01\xe9\x80\x52\x47\x55\xf4\x03\xb6\x3c\xc9\x0c\xc8\x44\xb2\ + \\xbc\xf3\xf0\xaa\x87\xac\x36\xe9\xe5\x3a\x74\x26\x01\xb3\xd8\x2b\x1a\x9e\x74\x49\x64\xee\x2d\x7e\xcd\xdb\xb1\xda\x01\xc9\x49\x10\ + \\xb8\x68\xbf\x80\x0d\x26\xf3\xfd\x93\x42\xed\xe7\x04\xa5\xc2\x84\x63\x67\x37\xb6\x50\xf5\xb6\x16\xf2\x47\x66\xe3\x8e\xca\x36\xc1\ + \\x13\x6e\x05\xdb\xfe\xf1\x83\x91\xfb\x88\x7a\x37\xd6\xe7\xf7\xd4\xc7\xfb\x7d\xc9\x30\x63\xfc\xdf\xb6\xf5\x89\xde\xec\x29\x41\xda\ + \\x26\xe4\x66\x95\xb7\x56\x64\x19\xf6\x54\xef\xc5\xd0\x8d\x58\xb7\x48\x92\x54\x01\xc1\xba\xcb\x7f\xe5\xff\x55\x0f\xb6\x08\x30\x49\ + \\x5b\xb5\xd0\xe8\x87\xd7\x2e\x5a\xab\x6a\x6e\xe1\x22\x3a\x66\xce\xc6\x2b\xf3\xcd\x9e\x08\x85\xf9\x68\xcb\x3e\x47\x08\x6c\x01\x0f\ + \\xa2\x1d\xe8\x20\xd1\x8b\x69\xde\xf3\xf6\x57\x77\xfa\x02\xc3\xf6\x40\x7e\xda\xc3\xcb\xb3\xd5\x50\x17\x93\x08\x4d\xb0\xd7\x0e\xba\ + \\x0a\xb3\x78\xd5\xd9\x51\xfb\x0c\xde\xd7\xda\x56\x41\x24\xbb\xe4\x94\xca\x0b\x56\x0f\x57\x55\xd1\xe0\xe1\xe5\x6e\x61\x84\xb5\xbe\ + \\x58\x0a\x24\x9f\x94\xf7\x4b\xc0\xe3\x27\x88\x8e\x9f\x7b\x55\x61\xc3\xdc\x02\x80\x05\x68\x77\x15\x64\x6c\x6b\xd7\x44\x90\x4d\xb3\ + \\x66\xb4\xf0\xa3\xc0\xf1\x64\x8a\x69\x7e\xd5\xaf\x49\xe9\x2f\xf6\x30\x9e\x37\x4f\x2c\xb6\x35\x6a\x85\x80\x85\x73\x49\x91\xf8\x40\ + \\x76\xf0\xae\x02\x08\x3b\xe8\x4d\x28\x42\x1c\x9a\x44\x48\x94\x06\x73\x6e\x4c\xb8\xc1\x09\x29\x10\x8b\xc9\x5f\xc6\x7d\x86\x9c\xf4\ + \\x13\x4f\x61\x6f\x2e\x77\x11\x8d\xb3\x1b\x2b\xe1\xaa\x90\xb4\x72\x3c\xa5\xd7\x17\x7d\x16\x1b\xba\x9c\xad\x90\x10\xaf\x46\x2b\xa2\ + \\x9f\xe4\x59\xd2\x45\xd3\x45\x59\xd9\xf2\xda\x13\xdb\xc6\x54\x87\xf3\xe4\xf9\x4e\x17\x6d\x48\x6f\x09\x7c\x13\xea\x63\x1d\xa5\xc7\ + \\x44\x5f\x73\x82\x17\x56\x83\xf4\xcd\xc6\x6a\x97\x70\xbe\x02\x88\xb3\xcd\xcf\x72\x6e\x5d\xd2\xf3\x20\x93\x60\x79\x45\x9b\x80\xa5\ + \\xbe\x60\xe2\xdb\xa9\xc2\x31\x01\xeb\xa5\x31\x5c\x22\x4e\x42\xf2\x1c\x5c\x15\x72\xf6\x72\x1b\x2c\x1a\xd2\xff\xf3\x8c\x25\x40\x4e\ + \\x32\x4e\xd7\x2f\x40\x67\xb7\xfd\x05\x23\x13\x8e\x5c\xa3\xbc\x78\xdc\x0f\xd6\x6e\x75\x92\x22\x83\x78\x4d\x6b\x17\x58\xeb\xb1\x6e\ + \\x44\x09\x4f\x85\x3f\x48\x1d\x87\xfc\xfe\xae\x7b\x77\xb5\xff\x76\x8c\x23\x02\xbf\xaa\xf4\x75\x56\x5f\x46\xb0\x2a\x2b\x09\x28\x01\ + \\x3d\x38\xf5\xf7\x0c\xa8\x1f\x36\x52\xaf\x4a\x8a\x66\xd5\xe7\xc0\xdf\x3b\x08\x74\x95\x05\x51\x10\x1b\x5a\xd7\xa8\xf6\x1e\xd5\xad\ + \\x6c\xf6\xe4\x79\x20\x75\x81\x84\xd0\xce\xfa\x65\x88\xf7\xbe\x58\x4a\x04\x68\x26\x0f\xf6\xf8\xf3\xa0\x9c\x7f\x70\x53\x46\xab\xa0\ + \\x5c\xe9\x6c\x28\xe1\x76\xed\xa3\x6b\xac\x30\x7f\x37\x68\x29\xd2\x85\x36\x0f\xa9\x17\xe3\xfe\x2a\x24\xb7\x97\x67\xf5\xa9\x6b\x20\ + \\xd6\xcd\x25\x95\x68\xff\x1e\xbf\x75\x55\x44\x2c\xf1\x9f\x06\xbe\xf9\xe0\x65\x9a\xee\xb9\x49\x1d\x34\x01\x07\x18\xbb\x30\xca\xb8\ + \\xe8\x22\xfe\x15\x88\x57\x09\x83\x75\x0e\x62\x49\xda\x62\x7e\x55\x5e\x76\xff\xa8\xb1\x53\x45\x46\x6d\x47\xde\x08\xef\xe9\xe7\xd4"# + +sbox_s6 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s6 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\xf6\xfa\x8f\x9d\x2c\xac\x6c\xe1\x4c\xa3\x48\x67\xe2\x33\x7f\x7c\x95\xdb\x08\xe7\x01\x68\x43\xb4\xec\xed\x5c\xbc\x32\x55\x53\xac\ + \\xbf\x9f\x09\x60\xdf\xa1\xe2\xed\x83\xf0\x57\x9d\x63\xed\x86\xb9\x1a\xb6\xa6\xb8\xde\x5e\xbe\x39\xf3\x8f\xf7\x32\x89\x89\xb1\x38\ + \\x33\xf1\x49\x61\xc0\x19\x37\xbd\xf5\x06\xc6\xda\xe4\x62\x5e\x7e\xa3\x08\xea\x99\x4e\x23\xe3\x3c\x79\xcb\xd7\xcc\x48\xa1\x43\x67\ + \\xa3\x14\x96\x19\xfe\xc9\x4b\xd5\xa1\x14\x17\x4a\xea\xa0\x18\x66\xa0\x84\xdb\x2d\x09\xa8\x48\x6f\xa8\x88\x61\x4a\x29\x00\xaf\x98\ + \\x01\x66\x59\x91\xe1\x99\x28\x63\xc8\xf3\x0c\x60\x2e\x78\xef\x3c\xd0\xd5\x19\x32\xcf\x0f\xec\x14\xf7\xca\x07\xd2\xd0\xa8\x20\x72\ + \\xfd\x41\x19\x7e\x93\x05\xa6\xb0\xe8\x6b\xe3\xda\x74\xbe\xd3\xcd\x37\x2d\xa5\x3c\x4c\x7f\x44\x48\xda\xb5\xd4\x40\x6d\xba\x0e\xc3\ + \\x08\x39\x19\xa7\x9f\xba\xee\xd9\x49\xdb\xcf\xb0\x4e\x67\x0c\x53\x5c\x3d\x9c\x01\x64\xbd\xb9\x41\x2c\x0e\x63\x6a\xba\x7d\xd9\xcd\ + \\xea\x6f\x73\x88\xe7\x0b\xc7\x62\x35\xf2\x9a\xdb\x5c\x4c\xdd\x8d\xf0\xd4\x8d\x8c\xb8\x81\x53\xe2\x08\xa1\x98\x66\x1a\xe2\xea\xc8\ + \\x28\x4c\xaf\x89\xaa\x92\x82\x23\x93\x34\xbe\x53\x3b\x3a\x21\xbf\x16\x43\x4b\xe3\x9a\xea\x39\x06\xef\xe8\xc3\x6e\xf8\x90\xcd\xd9\ + \\x80\x22\x6d\xae\xc3\x40\xa4\xa3\xdf\x7e\x9c\x09\xa6\x94\xa8\x07\x5b\x7c\x5e\xcc\x22\x1d\xb3\xa6\x9a\x69\xa0\x2f\x68\x81\x8a\x54\ + \\xce\xb2\x29\x6f\x53\xc0\x84\x3a\xfe\x89\x36\x55\x25\xbf\xe6\x8a\xb4\x62\x8a\xbc\xcf\x22\x2e\xbf\x25\xac\x6f\x48\xa9\xa9\x93\x87\ + \\x53\xbd\xdb\x65\xe7\x6f\xfb\xe7\xe9\x67\xfd\x78\x0b\xa9\x35\x63\x8e\x34\x2b\xc1\xe8\xa1\x1b\xe9\x49\x80\x74\x0d\xc8\x08\x7d\xfc\ + \\x8d\xe4\xbf\x99\xa1\x11\x01\xa0\x7f\xd3\x79\x75\xda\x5a\x26\xc0\xe8\x1f\x99\x4f\x95\x28\xcd\x89\xfd\x33\x9f\xed\xb8\x78\x34\xbf\ + \\x5f\x04\x45\x6d\x22\x25\x86\x98\xc9\xc4\xc8\x3b\x2d\xc1\x56\xbe\x4f\x62\x8d\xaa\x57\xf5\x5e\xc5\xe2\x22\x0a\xbe\xd2\x91\x6e\xbf\ + \\x4e\xc7\x5b\x95\x24\xf2\xc3\xc0\x42\xd1\x5d\x99\xcd\x0d\x7f\xa0\x7b\x6e\x27\xff\xa8\xdc\x8a\xf0\x73\x45\xc1\x06\xf4\x1e\x23\x2f\ + \\x35\x16\x23\x86\xe6\xea\x89\x26\x33\x33\xb0\x94\x15\x7e\xc6\xf2\x37\x2b\x74\xaf\x69\x25\x73\xe4\xe9\xa9\xd8\x48\xf3\x16\x02\x89\ + \\x3a\x62\xef\x1d\xa7\x87\xe2\x38\xf3\xa5\xf6\x76\x74\x36\x48\x53\x20\x95\x10\x63\x45\x76\x69\x8d\xb6\xfa\xd4\x07\x59\x2a\xf9\x50\ + \\x36\xf7\x35\x23\x4c\xfb\x6e\x87\x7d\xa4\xce\xc0\x6c\x15\x2d\xaa\xcb\x03\x96\xa8\xc5\x0d\xfe\x5d\xfc\xd7\x07\xab\x09\x21\xc4\x2f\ + \\x89\xdf\xf0\xbb\x5f\xe2\xbe\x78\x44\x8f\x4f\x33\x75\x46\x13\xc9\x2b\x05\xd0\x8d\x48\xb9\xd5\x85\xdc\x04\x94\x41\xc8\x09\x8f\x9b\ + \\x7d\xed\xe7\x86\xc3\x9a\x33\x73\x42\x41\x00\x05\x6a\x09\x17\x51\x0e\xf3\xc8\xa6\x89\x00\x72\xd6\x28\x20\x76\x82\xa9\xa9\xf7\xbe\ + \\xbf\x32\x67\x9d\xd4\x5b\x5b\x75\xb3\x53\xfd\x00\xcb\xb0\xe3\x58\x83\x0f\x22\x0a\x1f\x8f\xb2\x14\xd3\x72\xcf\x08\xcc\x3c\x4a\x13\ + \\x8c\xf6\x31\x66\x06\x1c\x87\xbe\x88\xc9\x8f\x88\x60\x62\xe3\x97\x47\xcf\x8e\x7a\xb6\xc8\x52\x83\x3c\xc2\xac\xfb\x3f\xc0\x69\x76\ + \\x4e\x8f\x02\x52\x64\xd8\x31\x4d\xda\x38\x70\xe3\x1e\x66\x54\x59\xc1\x09\x08\xf0\x51\x30\x21\xa5\x6c\x5b\x68\xb7\x82\x2f\x8a\xa0\ + \\x30\x07\xcd\x3e\x74\x71\x9e\xef\xdc\x87\x26\x81\x07\x33\x40\xd4\x7e\x43\x2f\xd9\x0c\x5e\xc2\x41\x88\x09\x28\x6c\xf5\x92\xd8\x91\ + \\x08\xa9\x30\xf6\x95\x7e\xf3\x05\xb7\xfb\xff\xbd\xc2\x66\xe9\x6f\x6f\xe4\xac\x98\xb1\x73\xec\xc0\xbc\x60\xb4\x2a\x95\x34\x98\xda\ + \\xfb\xa1\xae\x12\x2d\x4b\xd7\x36\x0f\x25\xfa\xab\xa4\xf3\xfc\xeb\xe2\x96\x91\x23\x25\x7f\x0c\x3d\x93\x48\xaf\x49\x36\x14\x00\xbc\ + \\xe8\x81\x6f\x4a\x38\x14\xf2\x00\xa3\xf9\x40\x43\x9c\x7a\x54\xc2\xbc\x70\x4f\x57\xda\x41\xe7\xf9\xc2\x5a\xd3\x3a\x54\xf4\xa0\x84\ + \\xb1\x7f\x55\x05\x59\x35\x7c\xbe\xed\xbd\x15\xc8\x7f\x97\xc5\xab\xba\x5a\xc7\xb5\xb6\xf6\xde\xaf\x3a\x47\x9c\x3a\x53\x02\xda\x25\ + \\x65\x3d\x7e\x6a\x54\x26\x8d\x49\x51\xa4\x77\xea\x50\x17\xd5\x5b\xd7\xd2\x5d\x88\x44\x13\x6c\x76\x04\x04\xa8\xc8\xb8\xe5\xa1\x21\ + \\xb8\x1a\x92\x8a\x60\xed\x58\x69\x97\xc5\x5b\x96\xea\xec\x99\x1b\x29\x93\x59\x13\x01\xfd\xb7\xf1\x08\x8e\x8d\xfa\x9a\xb6\xf6\xf5\ + \\x3b\x4c\xbf\x9f\x4a\x5d\xe3\xab\xe6\x05\x1d\x35\xa0\xe1\xd8\x55\xd3\x6b\x4c\xf1\xf5\x44\xed\xeb\xb0\xe9\x35\x24\xbe\xbb\x8f\xbd\ + \\xa2\xd7\x62\xcf\x49\xc9\x2f\x54\x38\xb5\xf3\x31\x71\x28\xa4\x54\x48\x39\x29\x05\xa6\x5b\x1d\xb8\x85\x1c\x97\xbd\xd6\x75\xcf\x2f"# + +sbox_s7 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s7 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\x85\xe0\x40\x19\x33\x2b\xf5\x67\x66\x2d\xbf\xff\xcf\xc6\x56\x93\x2a\x8d\x7f\x6f\xab\x9b\xc9\x12\xde\x60\x08\xa1\x20\x28\xda\x1f\ + \\x02\x27\xbc\xe7\x4d\x64\x29\x16\x18\xfa\xc3\x00\x50\xf1\x8b\x82\x2c\xb2\xcb\x11\xb2\x32\xe7\x5c\x4b\x36\x95\xf2\xb2\x87\x07\xde\ + \\xa0\x5f\xbc\xf6\xcd\x41\x81\xe9\xe1\x50\x21\x0c\xe2\x4e\xf1\xbd\xb1\x68\xc3\x81\xfd\xe4\xe7\x89\x5c\x79\xb0\xd8\x1e\x8b\xfd\x43\ + \\x4d\x49\x50\x01\x38\xbe\x43\x41\x91\x3c\xee\x1d\x92\xa7\x9c\x3f\x08\x97\x66\xbe\xba\xee\xad\xf4\x12\x86\xbe\xcf\xb6\xea\xcb\x19\ + \\x26\x60\xc2\x00\x75\x65\xbd\xe4\x64\x24\x1f\x7a\x82\x48\xdc\xa9\xc3\xb3\xad\x66\x28\x13\x60\x86\x0b\xd8\xdf\xa8\x35\x6d\x1c\xf2\ + \\x10\x77\x89\xbe\xb3\xb2\xe9\xce\x05\x02\xaa\x8f\x0b\xc0\x35\x1e\x16\x6b\xf5\x2a\xeb\x12\xff\x82\xe3\x48\x69\x11\xd3\x4d\x75\x16\ + \\x4e\x7b\x3a\xff\x5f\x43\x67\x1b\x9c\xf6\xe0\x37\x49\x81\xac\x83\x33\x42\x66\xce\x8c\x93\x41\xb7\xd0\xd8\x54\xc0\xcb\x3a\x6c\x88\ + \\x47\xbc\x28\x29\x47\x25\xba\x37\xa6\x6a\xd2\x2b\x7a\xd6\x1f\x1e\x0c\x5c\xba\xfa\x44\x37\xf1\x07\xb6\xe7\x99\x62\x42\xd2\xd8\x16\ + \\x0a\x96\x12\x88\xe1\xa5\xc0\x6e\x13\x74\x9e\x67\x72\xfc\x08\x1a\xb1\xd1\x39\xf7\xf9\x58\x37\x45\xcf\x19\xdf\x58\xbe\xc3\xf7\x56\ + \\xc0\x6e\xba\x30\x07\x21\x1b\x24\x45\xc2\x88\x29\xc9\x5e\x31\x7f\xbc\x8e\xc5\x11\x38\xbc\x46\xe9\xc6\xe6\xfa\x14\xba\xe8\x58\x4a\ + \\xad\x4e\xbc\x46\x46\x8f\x50\x8b\x78\x29\x43\x5f\xf1\x24\x18\x3b\x82\x1d\xba\x9f\xaf\xf6\x0f\xf4\xea\x2c\x4e\x6d\x16\xe3\x92\x64\ + \\x92\x54\x4a\x8b\x00\x9b\x4f\xc3\xab\xa6\x8c\xed\x9a\xc9\x6f\x78\x06\xa5\xb7\x9a\xb2\x85\x6e\x6e\x1a\xec\x3c\xa9\xbe\x83\x86\x88\ + \\x0e\x08\x04\xe9\x55\xf1\xbe\x56\xe7\xe5\x36\x3b\xb3\xa1\xf2\x5d\xf7\xde\xbb\x85\x61\xfe\x03\x3c\x16\x74\x62\x33\x3c\x03\x4c\x28\ + \\xda\x6d\x0c\x74\x79\xaa\xc5\x6c\x3c\xe4\xe1\xad\x51\xf0\xc8\x02\x98\xf8\xf3\x5a\x16\x26\xa4\x9f\xee\xd8\x2b\x29\x1d\x38\x2f\xe3\ + \\x0c\x4f\xb9\x9a\xbb\x32\x57\x78\x3e\xc6\xd9\x7b\x6e\x77\xa6\xa9\xcb\x65\x8b\x5c\xd4\x52\x30\xc7\x2b\xd1\x40\x8b\x60\xc0\x3e\xb7\ + \\xb9\x06\x8d\x78\xa3\x37\x54\xf4\xf4\x30\xc8\x7d\xc8\xa7\x13\x02\xb9\x6d\x8c\x32\xeb\xd4\xe7\xbe\xbe\x8b\x9d\x2d\x79\x79\xfb\x06\ + \\xe7\x22\x53\x08\x8b\x75\xcf\x77\x11\xef\x8d\xa4\xe0\x83\xc8\x58\x8d\x6b\x78\x6f\x5a\x63\x17\xa6\xfa\x5c\xf7\xa0\x5d\xda\x00\x33\ + \\xf2\x8e\xbf\xb0\xf5\xb9\xc3\x10\xa0\xea\xc2\x80\x08\xb9\x76\x7a\xa3\xd9\xd2\xb0\x79\xd3\x42\x17\x02\x1a\x71\x8d\x9a\xc6\x33\x6a\ + \\x27\x11\xfd\x60\x43\x80\x50\xe3\x06\x99\x08\xa8\x3d\x7f\xed\xc4\x82\x6d\x2b\xef\x4e\xeb\x84\x76\x48\x8d\xcf\x25\x36\xc9\xd5\x66\ + \\x28\xe7\x4e\x41\xc2\x61\x0a\xca\x3d\x49\xa9\xcf\xba\xe3\xb9\xdf\xb6\x5f\x8d\xe6\x92\xae\xaf\x64\x3a\xc7\xd5\xe6\x9e\xa8\x05\x09\ + \\xf2\x2b\x01\x7d\xa4\x17\x3f\x70\xdd\x1e\x16\xc3\x15\xe0\xd7\xf9\x50\xb1\xb8\x87\x2b\x9f\x4f\xd5\x62\x5a\xba\x82\x6a\x01\x79\x62\ + \\x2e\xc0\x1b\x9c\x15\x48\x8a\xa9\xd7\x16\xe7\x40\x40\x05\x5a\x2c\x93\xd2\x9a\x22\xe3\x2d\xbf\x9a\x05\x87\x45\xb9\x34\x53\xdc\x1e\ + \\xd6\x99\x29\x6e\x49\x6c\xff\x6f\x1c\x9f\x49\x86\xdf\xe2\xed\x07\xb8\x72\x42\xd1\x19\xde\x7e\xae\x05\x3e\x56\x1a\x15\xad\x6f\x8c\ + \\x66\x62\x6c\x1c\x71\x54\xc2\x4c\xea\x08\x2b\x2a\x93\xeb\x29\x39\x17\xdc\xb0\xf0\x58\xd4\xf2\xae\x9e\xa2\x94\xfb\x52\xcf\x56\x4c\ + \\x98\x83\xfe\x66\x2e\xc4\x05\x81\x76\x39\x53\xc3\x01\xd6\x69\x2e\xd3\xa0\xc1\x08\xa1\xe7\x16\x0e\xe4\xf2\xdf\xa6\x69\x3e\xd2\x85\ + \\x74\x90\x46\x98\x4c\x2b\x0e\xdd\x4f\x75\x76\x56\x5d\x39\x33\x78\xa1\x32\x23\x4f\x3d\x32\x1c\x5d\xc3\xf5\xe1\x94\x4b\x26\x93\x01\ + \\xc7\x9f\x02\x2f\x3c\x99\x7e\x7e\x5e\x4f\x95\x04\x3f\xfa\xfb\xbd\x76\xf7\xad\x0e\x29\x66\x93\xf4\x3d\x1f\xce\x6f\xc6\x1e\x45\xbe\ + \\xd3\xb5\xab\x34\xf7\x2b\xf9\xb7\x1b\x04\x34\xc0\x4e\x72\xb5\x67\x55\x92\xa3\x3d\xb5\x22\x93\x01\xcf\xd2\xa8\x7f\x60\xae\xb7\x67\ + \\x18\x14\x38\x6b\x30\xbc\xc3\x3d\x38\xa0\xc0\x7d\xfd\x16\x06\xf2\xc3\x63\x51\x9b\x58\x9d\xd3\x90\x54\x79\xf8\xe6\x1c\xb8\xd6\x47\ + \\x97\xfd\x61\xa9\xea\x77\x59\xf4\x2d\x57\x53\x9d\x56\x9a\x58\xcf\xe8\x4e\x63\xad\x46\x2e\x1b\x78\x65\x80\xf8\x7e\xf3\x81\x79\x14\ + \\x91\xda\x55\xf4\x40\xa2\x30\xf3\xd1\x98\x8f\x35\xb6\xe3\x18\xd2\x3f\xfa\x50\xbc\x3d\x40\xf0\x21\xc3\xc0\xbd\xae\x49\x58\xc2\x4c\ + \\x51\x8f\x36\xb2\x84\xb1\xd3\x70\x0f\xed\xce\x83\x87\x8d\xda\xda\xf2\xa2\x79\xc7\x94\xe0\x1b\xe8\x90\x71\x6f\x4b\x95\x4b\x8a\xa3"# + +sbox_s8 :: Word8 -> Word32 +sbox_s8 i = arrayRead32 t (fromIntegral i) + where + t = array32FromAddrBE 256 + "\xe2\x16\x30\x0d\xbb\xdd\xff\xfc\xa7\xeb\xda\xbd\x35\x64\x80\x95\x77\x89\xf8\xb7\xe6\xc1\x12\x1b\x0e\x24\x16\x00\x05\x2c\xe8\xb5\ + \\x11\xa9\xcf\xb0\xe5\x95\x2f\x11\xec\xe7\x99\x0a\x93\x86\xd1\x74\x2a\x42\x93\x1c\x76\xe3\x81\x11\xb1\x2d\xef\x3a\x37\xdd\xdd\xfc\ + \\xde\x9a\xde\xb1\x0a\x0c\xc3\x2c\xbe\x19\x70\x29\x84\xa0\x09\x40\xbb\x24\x3a\x0f\xb4\xd1\x37\xcf\xb4\x4e\x79\xf0\x04\x9e\xed\xfd\ + \\x0b\x15\xa1\x5d\x48\x0d\x31\x68\x8b\xbb\xde\x5a\x66\x9d\xed\x42\xc7\xec\xe8\x31\x3f\x8f\x95\xe7\x72\xdf\x19\x1b\x75\x80\x33\x0d\ + \\x94\x07\x42\x51\x5c\x7d\xcd\xfa\xab\xbe\x6d\x63\xaa\x40\x21\x64\xb3\x01\xd4\x0a\x02\xe7\xd1\xca\x53\x57\x1d\xae\x7a\x31\x82\xa2\ + \\x12\xa8\xdd\xec\xfd\xaa\x33\x5d\x17\x6f\x43\xe8\x71\xfb\x46\xd4\x38\x12\x90\x22\xce\x94\x9a\xd4\xb8\x47\x69\xad\x96\x5b\xd8\x62\ + \\x82\xf3\xd0\x55\x66\xfb\x97\x67\x15\xb8\x0b\x4e\x1d\x5b\x47\xa0\x4c\xfd\xe0\x6f\xc2\x8e\xc4\xb8\x57\xe8\x72\x6e\x64\x7a\x78\xfc\ + \\x99\x86\x5d\x44\x60\x8b\xd5\x93\x6c\x20\x0e\x03\x39\xdc\x5f\xf6\x5d\x0b\x00\xa3\xae\x63\xaf\xf2\x7e\x8b\xd6\x32\x70\x10\x8c\x0c\ + \\xbb\xd3\x50\x49\x29\x98\xdf\x04\x98\x0c\xf4\x2a\x9b\x6d\xf4\x91\x9e\x7e\xdd\x53\x06\x91\x85\x48\x58\xcb\x7e\x07\x3b\x74\xef\x2e\ + \\x52\x2f\xff\xb1\xd2\x47\x08\xcc\x1c\x7e\x27\xcd\xa4\xeb\x21\x5b\x3c\xf1\xd2\xe2\x19\xb4\x7a\x38\x42\x4f\x76\x18\x35\x85\x60\x39\ + \\x9d\x17\xde\xe7\x27\xeb\x35\xe6\xc9\xaf\xf6\x7b\x36\xba\xf5\xb8\x09\xc4\x67\xcd\xc1\x89\x10\xb1\xe1\x1d\xbf\x7b\x06\xcd\x1a\xf8\ + \\x71\x70\xc6\x08\x2d\x5e\x33\x54\xd4\xde\x49\x5a\x64\xc6\xd0\x06\xbc\xc0\xc6\x2c\x3d\xd0\x0d\xb3\x70\x8f\x8f\x34\x77\xd5\x1b\x42\ + \\x26\x4f\x62\x0f\x24\xb8\xd2\xbf\x15\xc1\xb7\x9e\x46\xa5\x25\x64\xf8\xd7\xe5\x4e\x3e\x37\x81\x60\x78\x95\xcd\xa5\x85\x9c\x15\xa5\ + \\xe6\x45\x97\x88\xc3\x7b\xc7\x5f\xdb\x07\xba\x0c\x06\x76\xa3\xab\x7f\x22\x9b\x1e\x31\x84\x2e\x7b\x24\x25\x9f\xd7\xf8\xbe\xf4\x72\ + \\x83\x5f\xfc\xb8\x6d\xf4\xc1\xf2\x96\xf5\xb1\x95\xfd\x0a\xf0\xfc\xb0\xfe\x13\x4c\xe2\x50\x6d\x3d\x4f\x9b\x12\xea\xf2\x15\xf2\x25\ + \\xa2\x23\x73\x6f\x9f\xb4\xc4\x28\x25\xd0\x49\x79\x34\xc7\x13\xf8\xc4\x61\x81\x87\xea\x7a\x6e\x98\x7c\xd1\x6e\xfc\x14\x36\x87\x6c\ + \\xf1\x54\x41\x07\xbe\xde\xee\x14\x56\xe9\xaf\x27\xa0\x4a\xa4\x41\x3c\xf7\xc8\x99\x92\xec\xba\xe6\xdd\x67\x01\x6d\x15\x16\x82\xeb\ + \\xa8\x42\xee\xdf\xfd\xba\x60\xb4\xf1\x90\x7b\x75\x20\xe3\x03\x0f\x24\xd8\xc2\x9e\xe1\x39\x67\x3b\xef\xa6\x3f\xb8\x71\x87\x30\x54\ + \\xb6\xf2\xcf\x3b\x9f\x32\x64\x42\xcb\x15\xa4\xcc\xb0\x1a\x45\x04\xf1\xe4\x7d\x8d\x84\x4a\x1b\xe5\xba\xe7\xdf\xdc\x42\xcb\xda\x70\ + \\xcd\x7d\xae\x0a\x57\xe8\x5b\x7a\xd5\x3f\x5a\xf6\x20\xcf\x4d\x8c\xce\xa4\xd4\x28\x79\xd1\x30\xa4\x34\x86\xeb\xfb\x33\xd3\xcd\xdc\ + \\x77\x85\x3b\x53\x37\xef\xfc\xb5\xc5\x06\x87\x78\xe5\x80\xb3\xe6\x4e\x68\xb8\xf4\xc5\xc8\xb3\x7e\x0d\x80\x9e\xa2\x39\x8f\xeb\x7c\ + \\x13\x2a\x4f\x94\x43\xb7\x95\x0e\x2f\xee\x7d\x1c\x22\x36\x13\xbd\xdd\x06\xca\xa2\x37\xdf\x93\x2b\xc4\x24\x82\x89\xac\xf3\xeb\xc3\ + \\x57\x15\xf6\xb7\xef\x34\x78\xdd\xf2\x67\x61\x6f\xc1\x48\xcb\xe4\x90\x52\x81\x5e\x5e\x41\x0f\xab\xb4\x8a\x24\x65\x2e\xda\x7f\xa4\ + \\xe8\x7b\x40\xe4\xe9\x8e\xa0\x84\x58\x89\xe9\xe1\xef\xd3\x90\xfc\xdd\x07\xd3\x5b\xdb\x48\x56\x94\x38\xd7\xe5\xb2\x57\x72\x01\x01\ + \\x73\x0e\xde\xbc\x5b\x64\x31\x13\x94\x91\x7e\x4f\x50\x3c\x2f\xba\x64\x6f\x12\x82\x75\x23\xd2\x4a\xe0\x77\x96\x95\xf9\xc1\x7a\x8f\ + \\x7a\x5b\x21\x21\xd1\x87\xb8\x96\x29\x26\x3a\x4d\xba\x51\x0c\xdf\x81\xf4\x7c\x9f\xad\x11\x63\xed\xea\x7b\x59\x65\x1a\x00\x72\x6e\ + \\x11\x40\x30\x92\x00\xda\x6d\x77\x4a\x0c\xdd\x61\xad\x1f\x46\x03\x60\x5b\xdf\xb0\x9e\xed\xc3\x64\x22\xeb\xe6\xa8\xce\xe7\xd2\x8a\ + \\xa0\xe7\x36\xa0\x55\x64\xa6\xb9\x10\x85\x32\x09\xc7\xeb\x8f\x37\x2d\xe7\x05\xca\x89\x51\x57\x0f\xdf\x09\x82\x2b\xbd\x69\x1a\x6c\ + \\xaa\x12\xe4\xf2\x87\x45\x1c\x0f\xe0\xf6\xa2\x7a\x3a\xda\x48\x19\x4c\xf1\x76\x4f\x0d\x77\x1c\x2b\x67\xcd\xb1\x56\x35\x0d\x83\x84\ + \\x59\x38\xfa\x0f\x42\x39\x9e\xf3\x36\x99\x7b\x07\x0e\x84\x09\x3d\x4a\xa9\x3e\x61\x83\x60\xd8\x7b\x1f\xa9\x8b\x0c\x11\x49\x38\x2c\ + \\xe9\x76\x25\xa5\x06\x14\xd1\xb7\x0e\x25\x24\x4b\x0c\x76\x83\x47\x58\x9e\x8d\x82\x0d\x20\x59\xd1\xa4\x66\xbb\x1e\xf8\xda\x0a\x82\ + \\x04\xf1\x91\x30\xba\x6e\x4e\xc0\x99\x26\x51\x64\x1e\xe7\x23\x0d\x50\xb2\xad\x80\xea\xee\x68\x01\x8d\xb2\xa2\x83\xea\x8b\xf5\x9e"# diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Camellia/Primitive.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Camellia/Primitive.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Camellia/Primitive.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Camellia/Primitive.hs @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : Good -- --- this only cover Camellia 128 bits for now, API will change once --- 192 and 256 mode are implemented too +-- This only cover Camellia 128 bits for now. The API will change once +-- 192 and 256 mode are implemented too. {-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Camellia.Primitive ( Camellia diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/ChaCha.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/ChaCha.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/ChaCha.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/ChaCha.hs @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ , combine , generate , State - -- * simple interface for DRG purpose + -- * Simple interface for DRG purpose , initializeSimple , generateSimple , StateSimple @@ -41,24 +41,26 @@ -> nonce -- ^ the nonce (64 or 96 bits) -> State -- ^ the initial ChaCha state initialize nbRounds key nonce - | not (kLen `elem` [16,32]) = error "ChaCha: key length should be 128 or 256 bits" - | not (nonceLen `elem` [8,12]) = error "ChaCha: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits" - | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "ChaCha: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" + | kLen `notElem` [16,32] = error "ChaCha: key length should be 128 or 256 bits" + | nonceLen `notElem` [8,12] = error "ChaCha: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits" + | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20] = error "ChaCha: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr -> B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr -> B.withByteArray key $ \keyPtr -> - ccryptonite_chacha_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr + ccryptonite_chacha_init stPtr nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr return $ State stPtr where kLen = B.length key nonceLen = B.length nonce -- | Initialize simple ChaCha State -initializeSimple :: ByteArray seed +-- +-- The seed need to be at least 40 bytes long +initializeSimple :: ByteArrayAccess seed => seed -- ^ a 40 bytes long seed -> StateSimple initializeSimple seed - | sLen /= 40 = error "ChaCha Random: seed length should be 40 bytes" + | sLen < 40 = error "ChaCha Random: seed length should be 40 bytes" | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do stPtr <- B.alloc 64 $ \stPtr -> B.withByteArray seed $ \seedPtr -> diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/RC4.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/RC4.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/RC4.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/RC4.hs @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ import Crypto.Internal.Imports -- | The encryption state for RC4 +-- +-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal +-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments, +-- and change in future versions. The bytearray should not be used as input to +-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype State = State ScrubbedBytes deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData) diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Salsa.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Salsa.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Salsa.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Salsa.hs @@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ -> nonce -- ^ the nonce (64 or 96 bits) -> State -- ^ the initial Salsa state initialize nbRounds key nonce - | not (kLen `elem` [16,32]) = error "Salsa: key length should be 128 or 256 bits" - | not (nonceLen `elem` [8,12]) = error "Salsa: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits" - | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "Salsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" + | kLen `notElem` [16,32] = error "Salsa: key length should be 128 or 256 bits" + | nonceLen `notElem` [8,12] = error "Salsa: nonce length should be 64 or 96 bits" + | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20] = error "Salsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr -> B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr -> B.withByteArray key $ \keyPtr -> - ccryptonite_salsa_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr + ccryptonite_salsa_init stPtr nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr return $ State stPtr where kLen = B.length key nonceLen = B.length nonce diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish.hs @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +module Crypto.Cipher.Twofish + ( Twofish128 + , Twofish192 + , Twofish256 + ) where + +import Crypto.Cipher.Twofish.Primitive +import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.Cipher.Utils + +newtype Twofish128 = Twofish128 Twofish + +instance Cipher Twofish128 where + cipherName _ = "Twofish128" + cipherKeySize _ = KeySizeFixed 16 + cipherInit key = Twofish128 <$> (initTwofish =<< validateKeySize (undefined :: Twofish128) key) + +instance BlockCipher Twofish128 where + blockSize _ = 16 + ecbEncrypt (Twofish128 key) = encrypt key + ecbDecrypt (Twofish128 key) = decrypt key + +newtype Twofish192 = Twofish192 Twofish + +instance Cipher Twofish192 where + cipherName _ = "Twofish192" + cipherKeySize _ = KeySizeFixed 24 + cipherInit key = Twofish192 <$> (initTwofish =<< validateKeySize (undefined :: Twofish192) key) + +instance BlockCipher Twofish192 where + blockSize _ = 16 + ecbEncrypt (Twofish192 key) = encrypt key + ecbDecrypt (Twofish192 key) = decrypt key + +newtype Twofish256 = Twofish256 Twofish + +instance Cipher Twofish256 where + cipherName _ = "Twofish256" + cipherKeySize _ = KeySizeFixed 32 + cipherInit key = Twofish256 <$> (initTwofish =<< validateKeySize (undefined :: Twofish256) key) + +instance BlockCipher Twofish256 where + blockSize _ = 16 + ecbEncrypt (Twofish256 key) = encrypt key + ecbDecrypt (Twofish256 key) = decrypt key diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish/Primitive.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish/Primitive.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Twofish/Primitive.hs @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +module Crypto.Cipher.Twofish.Primitive + ( Twofish + , initTwofish + , encrypt + , decrypt + ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Internal.WordArray +import Data.Word +import Data.Bits +import Data.List + +-- Based on the Golang referance implementation +-- https://github.com/golang/crypto/blob/master/twofish/twofish.go + + +-- BlockSize is the constant block size of Twofish. +blockSize :: Int +blockSize = 16 + +mdsPolynomial, rsPolynomial :: Word32 +mdsPolynomial = 0x169 -- x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^3 + 1, see [TWOFISH] 4.2 +rsPolynomial = 0x14d -- x^8 + x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + 1, see [TWOFISH] 4.3 + +data Twofish = Twofish { s :: (Array32, Array32, Array32, Array32) + , k :: Array32 } + +data ByteSize = Bytes16 | Bytes24 | Bytes32 deriving (Eq) + +data KeyPackage ba = KeyPackage { rawKeyBytes :: ba + , byteSize :: ByteSize } + +buildPackage :: ByteArray ba => ba -> Maybe (KeyPackage ba) +buildPackage key + | B.length key == 16 = return $ KeyPackage key Bytes16 + | B.length key == 24 = return $ KeyPackage key Bytes24 + | B.length key == 32 = return $ KeyPackage key Bytes32 + | otherwise = Nothing + +-- | Initialize a 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key +-- +-- Return the initialized key or a error message if the given +-- keyseed was not 16-bytes in length. +initTwofish :: ByteArray key + => key -- ^ The key to create the twofish context + -> CryptoFailable Twofish +initTwofish key = + case buildPackage key of Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid + Just keyPackage -> CryptoPassed Twofish { k = generatedK, s = generatedS } + where generatedK = array32 40 $ genK keyPackage + generatedS = genSboxes keyPackage $ sWords key + +mapBlocks :: ByteArray ba => (ba -> ba) -> ba -> ba +mapBlocks operation input + | B.null rest = blockOutput + | otherwise = blockOutput `B.append` mapBlocks operation rest + where (block, rest) = B.splitAt blockSize input + blockOutput = operation block + +-- | Encrypts the given ByteString using the given Key +encrypt :: ByteArray ba + => Twofish -- ^ The key to use + -> ba -- ^ The data to encrypt + -> ba +encrypt cipher = mapBlocks (encryptBlock cipher) + +encryptBlock :: ByteArray ba => Twofish -> ba -> ba +encryptBlock Twofish { s = (s1, s2, s3, s4), k = ks } message = store32ls ts + where (a, b, c, d) = load32ls message + a' = a `xor` arrayRead32 ks 0 + b' = b `xor` arrayRead32 ks 1 + c' = c `xor` arrayRead32 ks 2 + d' = d `xor` arrayRead32 ks 3 + (!a'', !b'', !c'', !d'') = foldl' shuffle (a', b', c', d') [0..7] + ts = (c'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 4, d'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 5, a'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 6, b'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 7) + + shuffle :: (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) -> Int -> (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) + shuffle (!retA, !retB, !retC, !retD) ind = (retA', retB', retC', retD') + where [k0, k1, k2, k3] = fmap (\offset -> arrayRead32 ks $ (8 + 4 * ind) + offset) [0..3] + t2 = byteIndex s2 retB `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retB 8) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retB 16) `xor` byteIndex s1 (shiftR retB 24) + t1 = (byteIndex s1 retA `xor` byteIndex s2 (shiftR retA 8) `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retA 16) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retA 24)) + t2 + retC' = rotateR (retC `xor` (t1 + k0)) 1 + retD' = rotateL retD 1 `xor` (t1 + t2 + k1) + t2' = byteIndex s2 retD' `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retD' 8) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retD' 16) `xor` byteIndex s1 (shiftR retD' 24) + t1' = (byteIndex s1 retC' `xor` byteIndex s2 (shiftR retC' 8) `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retC' 16) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retC' 24)) + t2' + retA' = rotateR (retA `xor` (t1' + k2)) 1 + retB' = rotateL retB 1 `xor` (t1' + t2' + k3) + +-- Unsafe, no bounds checking +byteIndex :: Array32 -> Word32 -> Word32 +byteIndex xs ind = arrayRead32 xs $ fromIntegral byte + where byte = ind `mod` 256 + +-- | Decrypts the given ByteString using the given Key +decrypt :: ByteArray ba + => Twofish -- ^ The key to use + -> ba -- ^ The data to decrypt + -> ba +decrypt cipher = mapBlocks (decryptBlock cipher) + +{- decryption for 128 bits blocks -} +decryptBlock :: ByteArray ba => Twofish -> ba -> ba +decryptBlock Twofish { s = (s1, s2, s3, s4), k = ks } message = store32ls ixs + where (a, b, c, d) = load32ls message + a' = c `xor` arrayRead32 ks 6 + b' = d `xor` arrayRead32 ks 7 + c' = a `xor` arrayRead32 ks 4 + d' = b `xor` arrayRead32 ks 5 + (!a'', !b'', !c'', !d'') = foldl' unshuffle (a', b', c', d') [8, 7..1] + ixs = (a'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 0, b'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 1, c'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 2, d'' `xor` arrayRead32 ks 3) + + unshuffle :: (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) -> Int -> (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) + unshuffle (!retA, !retB, !retC, !retD) ind = (retA', retB', retC', retD') + where [k0, k1, k2, k3] = fmap (\offset -> arrayRead32 ks $ (4 + 4 * ind) + offset) [0..3] + t2 = byteIndex s2 retD `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retD 8) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retD 16) `xor` byteIndex s1 (shiftR retD 24) + t1 = (byteIndex s1 retC `xor` byteIndex s2 (shiftR retC 8) `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retC 16) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retC 24)) + t2 + retA' = rotateL retA 1 `xor` (t1 + k2) + retB' = rotateR (retB `xor` (t2 + t1 + k3)) 1 + t2' = byteIndex s2 retB' `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retB' 8) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retB' 16) `xor` byteIndex s1 (shiftR retB' 24) + t1' = (byteIndex s1 retA' `xor` byteIndex s2 (shiftR retA' 8) `xor` byteIndex s3 (shiftR retA' 16) `xor` byteIndex s4 (shiftR retA' 24)) + t2' + retC' = rotateL retC 1 `xor` (t1' + k0) + retD' = rotateR (retD `xor` (t2' + t1' + k1)) 1 + +sbox0 :: Int -> Word8 +sbox0 = arrayRead8 t + where t = array8 + "\xa9\x67\xb3\xe8\x04\xfd\xa3\x76\x9a\x92\x80\x78\xe4\xdd\xd1\x38\ + \\x0d\xc6\x35\x98\x18\xf7\xec\x6c\x43\x75\x37\x26\xfa\x13\x94\x48\ + \\xf2\xd0\x8b\x30\x84\x54\xdf\x23\x19\x5b\x3d\x59\xf3\xae\xa2\x82\ + \\x63\x01\x83\x2e\xd9\x51\x9b\x7c\xa6\xeb\xa5\xbe\x16\x0c\xe3\x61\ + \\xc0\x8c\x3a\xf5\x73\x2c\x25\x0b\xbb\x4e\x89\x6b\x53\x6a\xb4\xf1\ + \\xe1\xe6\xbd\x45\xe2\xf4\xb6\x66\xcc\x95\x03\x56\xd4\x1c\x1e\xd7\ + \\xfb\xc3\x8e\xb5\xe9\xcf\xbf\xba\xea\x77\x39\xaf\x33\xc9\x62\x71\ + \\x81\x79\x09\xad\x24\xcd\xf9\xd8\xe5\xc5\xb9\x4d\x44\x08\x86\xe7\ + \\xa1\x1d\xaa\xed\x06\x70\xb2\xd2\x41\x7b\xa0\x11\x31\xc2\x27\x90\ + \\x20\xf6\x60\xff\x96\x5c\xb1\xab\x9e\x9c\x52\x1b\x5f\x93\x0a\xef\ + \\x91\x85\x49\xee\x2d\x4f\x8f\x3b\x47\x87\x6d\x46\xd6\x3e\x69\x64\ + \\x2a\xce\xcb\x2f\xfc\x97\x05\x7a\xac\x7f\xd5\x1a\x4b\x0e\xa7\x5a\ + \\x28\x14\x3f\x29\x88\x3c\x4c\x02\xb8\xda\xb0\x17\x55\x1f\x8a\x7d\ + \\x57\xc7\x8d\x74\xb7\xc4\x9f\x72\x7e\x15\x22\x12\x58\x07\x99\x34\ + \\x6e\x50\xde\x68\x65\xbc\xdb\xf8\xc8\xa8\x2b\x40\xdc\xfe\x32\xa4\ + \\xca\x10\x21\xf0\xd3\x5d\x0f\x00\x6f\x9d\x36\x42\x4a\x5e\xc1\xe0"# + +sbox1 :: Int -> Word8 +sbox1 = arrayRead8 t + where t = array8 + "\x75\xf3\xc6\xf4\xdb\x7b\xfb\xc8\x4a\xd3\xe6\x6b\x45\x7d\xe8\x4b\ + \\xd6\x32\xd8\xfd\x37\x71\xf1\xe1\x30\x0f\xf8\x1b\x87\xfa\x06\x3f\ + \\x5e\xba\xae\x5b\x8a\x00\xbc\x9d\x6d\xc1\xb1\x0e\x80\x5d\xd2\xd5\ + \\xa0\x84\x07\x14\xb5\x90\x2c\xa3\xb2\x73\x4c\x54\x92\x74\x36\x51\ + \\x38\xb0\xbd\x5a\xfc\x60\x62\x96\x6c\x42\xf7\x10\x7c\x28\x27\x8c\ + \\x13\x95\x9c\xc7\x24\x46\x3b\x70\xca\xe3\x85\xcb\x11\xd0\x93\xb8\ + \\xa6\x83\x20\xff\x9f\x77\xc3\xcc\x03\x6f\x08\xbf\x40\xe7\x2b\xe2\ + \\x79\x0c\xaa\x82\x41\x3a\xea\xb9\xe4\x9a\xa4\x97\x7e\xda\x7a\x17\ + \\x66\x94\xa1\x1d\x3d\xf0\xde\xb3\x0b\x72\xa7\x1c\xef\xd1\x53\x3e\ + \\x8f\x33\x26\x5f\xec\x76\x2a\x49\x81\x88\xee\x21\xc4\x1a\xeb\xd9\ + \\xc5\x39\x99\xcd\xad\x31\x8b\x01\x18\x23\xdd\x1f\x4e\x2d\xf9\x48\ + \\x4f\xf2\x65\x8e\x78\x5c\x58\x19\x8d\xe5\x98\x57\x67\x7f\x05\x64\ + \\xaf\x63\xb6\xfe\xf5\xb7\x3c\xa5\xce\xe9\x68\x44\xe0\x4d\x43\x69\ + \\x29\x2e\xac\x15\x59\xa8\x0a\x9e\x6e\x47\xdf\x34\x35\x6a\xcf\xdc\ + \\x22\xc9\xc0\x9b\x89\xd4\xed\xab\x12\xa2\x0d\x52\xbb\x02\x2f\xa9\ + \\xd7\x61\x1e\xb4\x50\x04\xf6\xc2\x16\x25\x86\x56\x55\x09\xbe\x91"# + +rs :: [[Word8]] +rs = [ [0x01, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xDB, 0x9E] + , [0xA4, 0x56, 0x82, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC6, 0x68, 0xE5] + , [0x02, 0xA1, 0xFC, 0xC1, 0x47, 0xAE, 0x3D, 0x19] + , [0xA4, 0x55, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xDB, 0x9E, 0x03] ] + + + +load32ls :: ByteArray ba => ba -> (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) +load32ls message = (intify q1, intify q2, intify q3, intify q4) + where (half1, half2) = B.splitAt 8 message + (q1, q2) = B.splitAt 4 half1 + (q3, q4) = B.splitAt 4 half2 + + intify :: ByteArray ba => ba -> Word32 + intify bytes = foldl' (\int (!word, !ind) -> int .|. shiftL (fromIntegral word) (ind * 8) ) 0 (zip (B.unpack bytes) [0..]) + +store32ls :: ByteArray ba => (Word32, Word32, Word32, Word32) -> ba +store32ls (a, b, c, d) = B.pack $ concatMap splitWordl [a, b, c, d] + where splitWordl :: Word32 -> [Word8] + splitWordl w = fmap (\ind -> fromIntegral $ shiftR w (8 * ind)) [0..3] + + +-- Create S words +sWords :: ByteArray ba => ba -> [Word8] +sWords key = sWord + where word64Count = B.length key `div` 2 + sWord = concatMap (\wordIndex -> + map (\rsRow -> + foldl' (\acc (!rsVal, !colIndex) -> + acc `xor` gfMult rsPolynomial (B.index key $ 8 * wordIndex + colIndex) rsVal + ) 0 (zip rsRow [0..]) + ) rs + ) [0..word64Count - 1] + +data Column = Zero | One | Two | Three deriving (Show, Eq, Enum, Bounded) + +genSboxes :: KeyPackage ba -> [Word8] -> (Array32, Array32, Array32, Array32) +genSboxes keyPackage ws = (mkArray b0', mkArray b1', mkArray b2', mkArray b3') + where range = [0..255] + mkArray = array32 256 + [w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8, w9, w10, w11, w12, w13, w14, w15] = take 16 ws + (b0', b1', b2', b3') = sboxBySize $ byteSize keyPackage + + sboxBySize :: ByteSize -> ([Word32], [Word32], [Word32], [Word32]) + sboxBySize Bytes16 = (b0, b1, b2, b3) + where !b0 = fmap mapper range + where mapper :: Int -> Word32 + mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w0) `xor` w4)) Zero + !b1 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w1) `xor` w5)) One + !b2 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w2) `xor` w6)) Two + !b3 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w3) `xor` w7)) Three + + sboxBySize Bytes24 = (b0, b1, b2, b3) + where !b0 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w0) `xor` w4) `xor` w8)) Zero + !b1 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w1) `xor` w5) `xor` w9)) One + !b2 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w2) `xor` w6) `xor` w10)) Two + !b3 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w3) `xor` w7) `xor` w11)) Three + + sboxBySize Bytes32 = (b0, b1, b2, b3) + where !b0 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w0) `xor` w4) `xor` w8) `xor` w12)) Zero + !b1 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w1) `xor` w5) `xor` w9) `xor` w13)) One + !b2 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox0 byte `xor` w2) `xor` w6) `xor` w10) `xor` w14)) Two + !b3 = fmap mapper range + where mapper byte = mdsColumnMult ((sbox0 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox1 . fromIntegral) ((sbox0 . fromIntegral $ sbox1 byte `xor` w3) `xor` w7) `xor` w11) `xor` w15)) Three + +genK :: (ByteArray ba) => KeyPackage ba -> [Word32] +genK keyPackage = concatMap makeTuple [0..19] + where makeTuple :: Word8 -> [Word32] + makeTuple idx = [a + b', rotateL (2 * b' + a) 9] + where tmp1 = replicate 4 $ 2 * idx + tmp2 = fmap (+1) tmp1 + a = h tmp1 keyPackage 0 + b = h tmp2 keyPackage 1 + b' = rotateL b 8 + +h :: (ByteArray ba) => [Word8] -> KeyPackage ba -> Int -> Word32 +h input keyPackage offset = foldl' xorMdsColMult 0 $ zip [y0f, y1f, y2f, y3f] $ enumFrom Zero + where key = rawKeyBytes keyPackage + [y0, y1, y2, y3] = take 4 input + (!y0f, !y1f, !y2f, !y3f) = run (y0, y1, y2, y3) $ byteSize keyPackage + + run :: (Word8, Word8, Word8, Word8) -> ByteSize -> (Word8, Word8, Word8, Word8) + run (!y0'', !y1'', !y2'', !y3'') Bytes32 = run (y0', y1', y2', y3') Bytes24 + where y0' = sbox1 (fromIntegral y0'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (6 + offset) + 0) + y1' = sbox0 (fromIntegral y1'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (6 + offset) + 1) + y2' = sbox0 (fromIntegral y2'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (6 + offset) + 2) + y3' = sbox1 (fromIntegral y3'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (6 + offset) + 3) + + run (!y0'', !y1'', !y2'', !y3'') Bytes24 = run (y0', y1', y2', y3') Bytes16 + where y0' = sbox1 (fromIntegral y0'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (4 + offset) + 0) + y1' = sbox1 (fromIntegral y1'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (4 + offset) + 1) + y2' = sbox0 (fromIntegral y2'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (4 + offset) + 2) + y3' = sbox0 (fromIntegral y3'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (4 + offset) + 3) + + run (!y0'', !y1'', !y2'', !y3'') Bytes16 = (y0', y1', y2', y3') + where y0' = sbox1 . fromIntegral $ (sbox0 . fromIntegral $ (sbox0 (fromIntegral y0'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (2 + offset) + 0))) `xor` B.index key (4 * (0 + offset) + 0) + y1' = sbox0 . fromIntegral $ (sbox0 . fromIntegral $ (sbox1 (fromIntegral y1'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (2 + offset) + 1))) `xor` B.index key (4 * (0 + offset) + 1) + y2' = sbox1 . fromIntegral $ (sbox1 . fromIntegral $ (sbox0 (fromIntegral y2'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (2 + offset) + 2))) `xor` B.index key (4 * (0 + offset) + 2) + y3' = sbox0 . fromIntegral $ (sbox1 . fromIntegral $ (sbox1 (fromIntegral y3'') `xor` B.index key (4 * (2 + offset) + 3))) `xor` B.index key (4 * (0 + offset) + 3) + + xorMdsColMult :: Word32 -> (Word8, Column) -> Word32 + xorMdsColMult acc wordAndIndex = acc `xor` uncurry mdsColumnMult wordAndIndex + +mdsColumnMult :: Word8 -> Column -> Word32 +mdsColumnMult !byte !col = + case col of Zero -> input .|. rotateL mul5B 8 .|. rotateL mulEF 16 .|. rotateL mulEF 24 + One -> mulEF .|. rotateL mulEF 8 .|. rotateL mul5B 16 .|. rotateL input 24 + Two -> mul5B .|. rotateL mulEF 8 .|. rotateL input 16 .|. rotateL mulEF 24 + Three -> mul5B .|. rotateL input 8 .|. rotateL mulEF 16 .|. rotateL mul5B 24 + where input = fromIntegral byte + mul5B = fromIntegral $ gfMult mdsPolynomial byte 0x5B + mulEF = fromIntegral $ gfMult mdsPolynomial byte 0xEF + +tupInd :: (Bits b) => b -> (a, a) -> a +tupInd b + | testBit b 0 = snd + | otherwise = fst + +gfMult :: Word32 -> Word8 -> Word8 -> Word8 +gfMult p a b = fromIntegral $ run a b' p' result 0 + where b' = (0, fromIntegral b) + p' = (0, p) + result = 0 + + run :: Word8 -> (Word32, Word32) -> (Word32, Word32) -> Word32 -> Int -> Word32 + run a' b'' p'' result' count = + if count == 7 + then result'' + else run a'' b''' p'' result'' (count + 1) + where result'' = result' `xor` tupInd (a' .&. 1) b'' + a'' = shiftR a' 1 + b''' = (fst b'', tupInd (shiftR (snd b'') 7) p'' `xor` shiftL (snd b'') 1) diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : Stable -- Portability : Excellent -- --- symmetric cipher basic types +-- Symmetric cipher basic types -- {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} module Crypto.Cipher.Types @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ -- , cfb8Decrypt -- * AEAD functions , AEADMode(..) + , CCM_M(..) + , CCM_L(..) , module Crypto.Cipher.Types.AEAD -- * Initial Vector type and constructor , IV diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/AEAD.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/AEAD.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/AEAD.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/AEAD.hs @@ -27,24 +27,24 @@ -- | Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data algorithms data AEAD cipher = forall st . AEAD { aeadModeImpl :: AEADModeImpl st - , aeadState :: st + , aeadState :: !st } -- | Append some header information to an AEAD context aeadAppendHeader :: ByteArrayAccess aad => AEAD cipher -> aad -> AEAD cipher -aeadAppendHeader (AEAD impl st) aad = AEAD impl $ (aeadImplAppendHeader impl) st aad +aeadAppendHeader (AEAD impl st) aad = AEAD impl $ aeadImplAppendHeader impl st aad -- | Encrypt some data and update the AEAD context aeadEncrypt :: ByteArray ba => AEAD cipher -> ba -> (ba, AEAD cipher) -aeadEncrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ (aeadImplEncrypt impl) st ba +aeadEncrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ aeadImplEncrypt impl st ba -- | Decrypt some data and update the AEAD context aeadDecrypt :: ByteArray ba => AEAD cipher -> ba -> (ba, AEAD cipher) -aeadDecrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ (aeadImplDecrypt impl) st ba +aeadDecrypt (AEAD impl st) ba = second (AEAD impl) $ aeadImplDecrypt impl st ba -- | Finalize the AEAD context and return the authentication tag aeadFinalize :: AEAD cipher -> Int -> AuthTag -aeadFinalize (AEAD impl st) n = (aeadImplFinalize impl) st n +aeadFinalize (AEAD impl st) = aeadImplFinalize impl st -- | Simple AEAD encryption aeadSimpleEncrypt :: (ByteArrayAccess aad, ByteArray ba) diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Base.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Base.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Base.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Base.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : Stable -- Portability : Excellent -- --- symmetric cipher basic types +-- Symmetric cipher basic types -- {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} @@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ , Cipher(..) , AuthTag(..) , AEADMode(..) + , CCM_M(..) + , CCM_L(..) , DataUnitOffset ) where import Data.Word import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (Bytes, ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Internal.DeepSeq import Crypto.Error -- | Different specifier for key size in bytes @@ -34,15 +37,18 @@ -- | Authentication Tag for AE cipher mode newtype AuthTag = AuthTag { unAuthTag :: Bytes } - deriving (Show, ByteArrayAccess) + deriving (Show, ByteArrayAccess, NFData) instance Eq AuthTag where (AuthTag a) == (AuthTag b) = B.constEq a b +data CCM_M = CCM_M4 | CCM_M6 | CCM_M8 | CCM_M10 | CCM_M12 | CCM_M14 | CCM_M16 deriving (Show, Eq) +data CCM_L = CCM_L2 | CCM_L3 | CCM_L4 deriving (Show, Eq) + -- | AEAD Mode data AEADMode = AEAD_OCB -- OCB3 - | AEAD_CCM + | AEAD_CCM Int CCM_M CCM_L | AEAD_EAX | AEAD_CWC | AEAD_GCM diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Block.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Block.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Block.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Block.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : Stable -- Portability : Excellent -- --- block cipher basic types +-- Block cipher basic types -- {-# LANGUAGE MultiParamTypeClasses #-} {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ -- * BlockCipher BlockCipher(..) , BlockCipher128(..) - -- * initialization vector (IV) + -- * Initialization vector (IV) , IV(..) , makeIV , nullIV @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ ) where import Data.Word -import Data.Monoid import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Cipher.Types.Base import Crypto.Cipher.Types.GF @@ -164,27 +163,20 @@ -- | Increment an IV by a number. -- -- Assume the IV is in Big Endian format. -ivAdd :: BlockCipher c => IV c -> Int -> IV c +ivAdd :: IV c -> Int -> IV c ivAdd (IV b) i = IV $ copy b where copy :: ByteArray bs => bs -> bs - copy bs = B.copyAndFreeze bs $ \p -> do - let until0 accu = do - r <- loop accu (B.length bs - 1) p - case r of - 0 -> return () - _ -> until0 r - until0 i + copy bs = B.copyAndFreeze bs $ loop i (B.length bs - 1) - loop :: Int -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO Int - loop 0 _ _ = return 0 - loop acc ofs p = do - v <- peek (p `plusPtr` ofs) :: IO Word8 - let accv = acc + fromIntegral v - (hi,lo) = accv `divMod` 256 - poke (p `plusPtr` ofs) (fromIntegral lo :: Word8) - if ofs == 0 - then return hi - else loop hi (ofs - 1) p + loop :: Int -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO () + loop acc ofs p + | ofs < 0 = return () + | otherwise = do + v <- peek (p `plusPtr` ofs) :: IO Word8 + let accv = acc + fromIntegral v + (hi,lo) = accv `divMod` 256 + poke (p `plusPtr` ofs) (fromIntegral lo :: Word8) + loop hi (ofs - 1) p cbcEncryptGeneric :: (ByteArray ba, BlockCipher cipher) => cipher -> IV cipher -> ba -> ba cbcEncryptGeneric cipher ivini input = mconcat $ doEnc ivini $ chunk (blockSize cipher) input diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Stream.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Stream.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Stream.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Stream.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : Stable -- Portability : Excellent -- --- stream cipher basic types +-- Stream cipher basic types -- module Crypto.Cipher.Types.Stream ( StreamCipher(..) diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Utils.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Utils.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Utils.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Types/Utils.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : Stable -- Portability : Excellent -- --- basic utility for cipher related stuff +-- Basic utility for cipher related stuff -- module Crypto.Cipher.Types.Utils where diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/Utils.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/Utils.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/Utils.hs @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +module Crypto.Cipher.Utils + ( validateKeySize + ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Cipher.Types + +import Data.ByteArray as BA + +validateKeySize :: (ByteArrayAccess key, Cipher cipher) => cipher -> key -> CryptoFailable key +validateKeySize c k = if validKeyLength + then CryptoPassed k + else CryptoFailed CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid + where keyLength = BA.length k + validKeyLength = case cipherKeySize c of + KeySizeRange low high -> keyLength >= low && keyLength <= high + KeySizeEnum lengths -> keyLength `elem` lengths + KeySizeFixed s -> keyLength == s diff --git a/Crypto/Cipher/XSalsa.hs b/Crypto/Cipher/XSalsa.hs --- a/Crypto/Cipher/XSalsa.hs +++ b/Crypto/Cipher/XSalsa.hs @@ -12,18 +12,17 @@ {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} module Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa ( initialize + , derive , combine , generate , State ) where -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, ScrubbedBytes) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Internal.Compat import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Foreign.Ptr -import Foreign.Storable -import Foreign.C.Types import Crypto.Cipher.Salsa hiding (initialize) -- | Initialize a new XSalsa context with the number of rounds, @@ -36,15 +35,41 @@ initialize nbRounds key nonce | kLen /= 32 = error "XSalsa: key length should be 256 bits" | nonceLen /= 24 = error "XSalsa: nonce length should be 192 bits" - | not (nbRounds `elem` [8,12,20]) = error "XSalsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" + | nbRounds `notElem` [8,12,20] = error "XSalsa: rounds should be 8, 12 or 20" | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do stPtr <- B.alloc 132 $ \stPtr -> B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr -> B.withByteArray key $ \keyPtr -> - ccryptonite_xsalsa_init stPtr (fromIntegral nbRounds) kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr + ccryptonite_xsalsa_init stPtr nbRounds kLen keyPtr nonceLen noncePtr return $ State stPtr where kLen = B.length key nonceLen = B.length nonce +-- | Use an already initialized context and new nonce material to derive another +-- XSalsa context. +-- +-- This allows a multi-level cascade where a first key @k1@ and nonce @n1@ is +-- used to get @HState(k1,n1)@, and this value is then used as key @k2@ to build +-- @XSalsa(k2,n2)@. Function 'initialize' is to be called with the first 192 +-- bits of @n1|n2@, and the call to @derive@ should add the remaining 128 bits. +-- +-- The output context always uses the same number of rounds as the input +-- context. +derive :: ByteArrayAccess nonce + => State -- ^ base XSalsa state + -> nonce -- ^ the remainder nonce (128 bits) + -> State -- ^ the new XSalsa state +derive (State stPtr') nonce + | nonceLen /= 16 = error "XSalsa: nonce length should be 128 bits" + | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do + stPtr <- B.copy stPtr' $ \stPtr -> + B.withByteArray nonce $ \noncePtr -> + ccryptonite_xsalsa_derive stPtr nonceLen noncePtr + return $ State stPtr + where nonceLen = B.length nonce + foreign import ccall "cryptonite_xsalsa_init" ccryptonite_xsalsa_init :: Ptr State -> Int -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_xsalsa_derive" + ccryptonite_xsalsa_derive :: Ptr State -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/ConstructHash/MiyaguchiPreneel.hs b/Crypto/ConstructHash/MiyaguchiPreneel.hs --- a/Crypto/ConstructHash/MiyaguchiPreneel.hs +++ b/Crypto/ConstructHash/MiyaguchiPreneel.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- provide the hash function construction method from block cipher +-- Provide the hash function construction method from block cipher -- -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ where (hd, tl) = B.splitAt bsz msg --- | Compute Miyaguchi-Preneel one way compress using the infered block cipher. +-- | Compute Miyaguchi-Preneel one way compress using the inferred block cipher. -- Only safe when KEY-SIZE equals to BLOCK-SIZE. -- -- Simple usage /mp' msg :: MiyaguchiPreneel AES128/ diff --git a/Crypto/Data/AFIS.hs b/Crypto/Data/AFIS.hs --- a/Crypto/Data/AFIS.hs +++ b/Crypto/Data/AFIS.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- haskell implementation of the Anti-forensic information splitter +-- Haskell implementation of the Anti-forensic information splitter -- available in LUKS. -- -- The algorithm bloats an arbitrary secret with many bits that are necessary for @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ diffuse hashAlg lastBlock blockSize fillRandomBlock g blockPtr = do let (rand :: Bytes, g') = randomBytesGenerate blockSize g - B.withByteArray rand $ \randPtr -> memCopy blockPtr randPtr (fromIntegral blockSize) + B.withByteArray rand $ \randPtr -> memCopy blockPtr randPtr blockSize return g' -- | Merge previously diffused data back to the original data. diff --git a/Crypto/Data/Padding.hs b/Crypto/Data/Padding.hs --- a/Crypto/Data/Padding.hs +++ b/Crypto/Data/Padding.hs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ -- Portability : unknown -- -- Various cryptographic padding commonly used for block ciphers --- or assymetric systems. +-- or asymmetric systems. -- module Crypto.Data.Padding ( Format(..) diff --git a/Crypto/ECC.hs b/Crypto/ECC.hs --- a/Crypto/ECC.hs +++ b/Crypto/ECC.hs @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ -- -- Elliptic Curve Cryptography -- +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} @@ -16,27 +18,33 @@ , Curve_P521R1(..) , Curve_X25519(..) , Curve_X448(..) + , Curve_Edwards25519(..) , EllipticCurve(..) , EllipticCurveDH(..) , EllipticCurveArith(..) + , EllipticCurveBasepointArith(..) , KeyPair(..) , SharedSecret(..) ) where import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 as P256 +import qualified Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 as Edwards25519 import qualified Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types as Simple import qualified Crypto.ECC.Simple.Prim as Simple import Crypto.Random import Crypto.Error -import Crypto.Internal.Proxy import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) import Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2ospOf_, os2ip) +import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE as LE import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519 as X25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 as X448 -import Data.Function (on) import Data.ByteArray (convert) +import Data.Data (Data()) +import Data.Kind (Type) +import Data.Proxy -- | An elliptic curve key pair composed of the private part (a scalar), and -- the associated point. @@ -46,14 +54,14 @@ } newtype SharedSecret = SharedSecret ScrubbedBytes - deriving (Eq, ByteArrayAccess) + deriving (Eq, ByteArrayAccess, NFData) class EllipticCurve curve where -- | Point on an Elliptic Curve - type Point curve :: * + type Point curve :: Type -- | Scalar in the Elliptic Curve domain - type Scalar curve :: * + type Scalar curve :: Type -- | Generate a new random scalar on the curve. -- The scalar will represent a number between 1 and the order of the curve non included @@ -78,22 +86,69 @@ -- is not hashed. -- -- use `pointSmul` to keep the result in Point format. - ecdh :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> SharedSecret + -- + -- /WARNING:/ Curve implementations may return a special value or an + -- exception when the public point lies in a subgroup of small order. + -- This function is adequate when the scalar is in expected range and + -- contributory behaviour is not needed. Otherwise use 'ecdh'. + ecdhRaw :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> SharedSecret + ecdhRaw prx s = throwCryptoError . ecdh prx s -class EllipticCurve curve => EllipticCurveArith curve where + -- | Generate a Diffie hellman secret value and verify that the result + -- is not the point at infinity. + -- + -- This additional test avoids risks existing with function 'ecdhRaw'. + -- Implementations always return a 'CryptoError' instead of a special + -- value or an exception. + ecdh :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret + +class (EllipticCurve curve, Eq (Point curve)) => EllipticCurveArith curve where -- | Add points on a curve pointAdd :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> Point curve -> Point curve + -- | Negate a curve point + pointNegate :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> Point curve + -- | Scalar Multiplication on a curve pointSmul :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> Point curve -- -- | Scalar Inverse -- scalarInverse :: Scalar curve -> Scalar curve +class (EllipticCurveArith curve, Eq (Scalar curve)) => EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve where + -- | Get the curve order size in bits + curveOrderBits :: proxy curve -> Int + + -- | Multiply a scalar with the curve base point + pointBaseSmul :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve + + -- | Multiply the point @p@ with @s2@ and add a lifted to curve value @s1@ + pointsSmulVarTime :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Point curve -> Point curve + pointsSmulVarTime prx s1 s2 p = pointAdd prx (pointBaseSmul prx s1) (pointSmul prx s2 p) + + -- | Encode an elliptic curve scalar into big-endian form + encodeScalar :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> bs + + -- | Try to decode the big-endian form of an elliptic curve scalar + decodeScalar :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve) + + -- | Convert an elliptic curve scalar to an integer + scalarToInteger :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Integer + + -- | Try to create an elliptic curve scalar from an integer + scalarFromInteger :: proxy curve -> Integer -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve) + + -- | Add two scalars and reduce modulo the curve order + scalarAdd :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve + + -- | Multiply two scalars and reduce modulo the curve order + scalarMul :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve -> Scalar curve + -- | P256 Curve -- -- also known as P256 data Curve_P256R1 = Curve_P256R1 + deriving (Show,Data) instance EllipticCurve Curve_P256R1 where type Point Curve_P256R1 = P256.Point @@ -111,20 +166,34 @@ uncompressed = B.singleton 4 xy = P256.pointToBinary p decodePoint _ mxy = case B.uncons mxy of - Nothing -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid Just (m,xy) -- uncompressed | m == 4 -> P256.pointFromBinary xy - | otherwise -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + | otherwise -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid instance EllipticCurveArith Curve_P256R1 where pointAdd _ a b = P256.pointAdd a b + pointNegate _ p = P256.pointNegate p pointSmul _ s p = P256.pointMul s p instance EllipticCurveDH Curve_P256R1 where - ecdh _ s p = SharedSecret $ P256.pointDh s p + ecdhRaw _ s p = SharedSecret $ P256.pointDh s p + ecdh prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p) +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P256R1 where + curveOrderBits _ = 256 + pointBaseSmul _ = P256.toPoint + pointsSmulVarTime _ = P256.pointsMulVarTime + encodeScalar _ = P256.scalarToBinary + decodeScalar _ = P256.scalarFromBinary + scalarToInteger _ = P256.scalarToInteger + scalarFromInteger _ = P256.scalarFromInteger + scalarAdd _ = P256.scalarAdd + scalarMul _ = P256.scalarMul + data Curve_P384R1 = Curve_P384R1 + deriving (Show,Data) instance EllipticCurve Curve_P384R1 where type Point Curve_P384R1 = Simple.Point Simple.SEC_p384r1 @@ -138,15 +207,27 @@ instance EllipticCurveArith Curve_P384R1 where pointAdd _ a b = Simple.pointAdd a b + pointNegate _ p = Simple.pointNegate p pointSmul _ s p = Simple.pointMul s p instance EllipticCurveDH Curve_P384R1 where - ecdh _ s p = SharedSecret $ i2ospOf_ (curveSizeBytes prx) x + ecdh _ s p = encodeECShared prx (Simple.pointMul s p) where - prx = Proxy :: Proxy Curve_P384R1 - Simple.Point x _ = pointSmul prx s p + prx = Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1 +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P384R1 where + curveOrderBits _ = 384 + pointBaseSmul _ = Simple.pointBaseMul + pointsSmulVarTime _ = ecPointsMulVarTime + encodeScalar _ = ecScalarToBinary + decodeScalar _ = ecScalarFromBinary + scalarToInteger _ = ecScalarToInteger + scalarFromInteger _ = ecScalarFromInteger + scalarAdd _ = ecScalarAdd + scalarMul _ = ecScalarMul + data Curve_P521R1 = Curve_P521R1 + deriving (Show,Data) instance EllipticCurve Curve_P521R1 where type Point Curve_P521R1 = Simple.Point Simple.SEC_p521r1 @@ -160,15 +241,27 @@ instance EllipticCurveArith Curve_P521R1 where pointAdd _ a b = Simple.pointAdd a b + pointNegate _ p = Simple.pointNegate p pointSmul _ s p = Simple.pointMul s p instance EllipticCurveDH Curve_P521R1 where - ecdh _ s p = SharedSecret $ i2ospOf_ (curveSizeBytes prx) x + ecdh _ s p = encodeECShared prx (Simple.pointMul s p) where - prx = Proxy :: Proxy Curve_P521R1 - Simple.Point x _ = pointSmul prx s p + prx = Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1 +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_P521R1 where + curveOrderBits _ = 521 + pointBaseSmul _ = Simple.pointBaseMul + pointsSmulVarTime _ = ecPointsMulVarTime + encodeScalar _ = ecScalarToBinary + decodeScalar _ = ecScalarFromBinary + scalarToInteger _ = ecScalarToInteger + scalarFromInteger _ = ecScalarFromInteger + scalarAdd _ = ecScalarAdd + scalarMul _ = ecScalarMul + data Curve_X25519 = Curve_X25519 + deriving (Show,Data) instance EllipticCurve Curve_X25519 where type Point Curve_X25519 = X25519.PublicKey @@ -182,10 +275,12 @@ decodePoint _ bs = X25519.publicKey bs instance EllipticCurveDH Curve_X25519 where - ecdh _ s p = SharedSecret $ convert secret + ecdhRaw _ s p = SharedSecret $ convert secret where secret = X25519.dh p s + ecdh prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p) data Curve_X448 = Curve_X448 + deriving (Show,Data) instance EllipticCurve Curve_X448 where type Point Curve_X448 = X448.PublicKey @@ -199,9 +294,53 @@ decodePoint _ bs = X448.publicKey bs instance EllipticCurveDH Curve_X448 where - ecdh _ s p = SharedSecret $ convert secret + ecdhRaw _ s p = SharedSecret $ convert secret where secret = X448.dh p s + ecdh prx s p = checkNonZeroDH (ecdhRaw prx s p) +data Curve_Edwards25519 = Curve_Edwards25519 + deriving (Show,Data) + +instance EllipticCurve Curve_Edwards25519 where + type Point Curve_Edwards25519 = Edwards25519.Point + type Scalar Curve_Edwards25519 = Edwards25519.Scalar + curveSizeBits _ = 255 + curveGenerateScalar _ = Edwards25519.scalarGenerate + curveGenerateKeyPair _ = toKeyPair <$> Edwards25519.scalarGenerate + where toKeyPair scalar = KeyPair (Edwards25519.toPoint scalar) scalar + encodePoint _ point = Edwards25519.pointEncode point + decodePoint _ bs = Edwards25519.pointDecode bs + +instance EllipticCurveArith Curve_Edwards25519 where + pointAdd _ a b = Edwards25519.pointAdd a b + pointNegate _ p = Edwards25519.pointNegate p + pointSmul _ s p = Edwards25519.pointMul s p + +instance EllipticCurveBasepointArith Curve_Edwards25519 where + curveOrderBits _ = 253 + pointBaseSmul _ = Edwards25519.toPoint + pointsSmulVarTime _ = Edwards25519.pointsMulVarTime + encodeScalar _ = B.reverse . Edwards25519.scalarEncode + decodeScalar _ bs + | B.length bs == 32 = Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong (B.reverse bs) + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid + scalarToInteger _ s = LE.os2ip (Edwards25519.scalarEncode s :: B.Bytes) + scalarFromInteger _ i = + case LE.i2ospOf 32 i of + Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid + Just bs -> Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong (bs :: B.Bytes) + scalarAdd _ = Edwards25519.scalarAdd + scalarMul _ = Edwards25519.scalarMul + +checkNonZeroDH :: SharedSecret -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret +checkNonZeroDH s@(SharedSecret b) + | B.constAllZero b = CryptoFailed CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + | otherwise = CryptoPassed s + +encodeECShared :: Simple.Curve curve => Proxy curve -> Simple.Point curve -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret +encodeECShared _ Simple.PointO = CryptoFailed CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid +encodeECShared prx (Simple.Point x _) = CryptoPassed . SharedSecret $ i2ospOf_ (Simple.curveSizeBytes prx) x + encodeECPoint :: forall curve bs . (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArray bs) => Simple.Point curve -> bs encodeECPoint Simple.PointO = error "encodeECPoint: cannot serialize point at infinity" encodeECPoint (Simple.Point x y) = B.concat [uncompressed,xb,yb] @@ -214,7 +353,7 @@ decodeECPoint :: (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArray bs) => bs -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Point curve) decodeECPoint mxy = case B.uncons mxy of - Nothing -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + Nothing -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid Just (m,xy) -- uncompressed | m == 4 -> @@ -223,7 +362,47 @@ x = os2ip xb y = os2ip yb in Simple.pointFromIntegers (x,y) - | otherwise -> CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + | otherwise -> CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid -curveSizeBytes :: EllipticCurve c => Proxy c -> Int -curveSizeBytes proxy = (curveSizeBits proxy + 7) `div` 8 +ecPointsMulVarTime :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve + => Simple.Scalar curve + -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Point curve + -> Simple.Point curve +ecPointsMulVarTime n1 = Simple.pointAddTwoMuls n1 g + where g = Simple.curveEccG $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve) + +ecScalarFromBinary :: forall curve bs . (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArrayAccess bs) + => bs -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Scalar curve) +ecScalarFromBinary ba + | B.length ba /= size = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid + | otherwise = CryptoPassed (Simple.Scalar $ os2ip ba) + where size = ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve) + +ecScalarToBinary :: forall curve bs . (Simple.Curve curve, ByteArray bs) + => Simple.Scalar curve -> bs +ecScalarToBinary (Simple.Scalar s) = i2ospOf_ size s + where size = ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve) + +ecScalarFromInteger :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve + => Integer -> CryptoFailable (Simple.Scalar curve) +ecScalarFromInteger s + | numBits s > nb = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid + | otherwise = CryptoPassed (Simple.Scalar s) + where nb = 8 * ecCurveOrderBytes (Proxy :: Proxy curve) + +ecScalarToInteger :: Simple.Scalar curve -> Integer +ecScalarToInteger (Simple.Scalar s) = s + +ecCurveOrderBytes :: Simple.Curve c => proxy c -> Int +ecCurveOrderBytes prx = (numBits n + 7) `div` 8 + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx + +ecScalarAdd :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve + => Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve +ecScalarAdd (Simple.Scalar a) (Simple.Scalar b) = Simple.Scalar ((a + b) `mod` n) + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve) + +ecScalarMul :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve + => Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve -> Simple.Scalar curve +ecScalarMul (Simple.Scalar a) (Simple.Scalar b) = Simple.Scalar ((a * b) `mod` n) + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters (Proxy :: Proxy curve) diff --git a/Crypto/ECC/Edwards25519.hs b/Crypto/ECC/Edwards25519.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/ECC/Edwards25519.hs @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Arithmetic primitives over curve edwards25519. +-- +-- Twisted Edwards curves are a familly of elliptic curves allowing +-- complete addition formulas without any special case and no point at +-- infinity. Curve edwards25519 is based on prime 2^255 - 19 for +-- efficient implementation. Equation and parameters are given in +-- . +-- +-- This module provides types and primitive operations that are useful +-- to implement cryptographic schemes based on curve edwards25519: +-- +-- - arithmetic functions for point addition, doubling, negation, +-- scalar multiplication with an arbitrary point, with the base point, +-- etc. +-- +-- - arithmetic functions dealing with scalars modulo the prime order +-- L of the base point +-- +-- All functions run in constant time unless noted otherwise. +-- +-- Warnings: +-- +-- 1. Curve edwards25519 has a cofactor h = 8 so the base point does +-- not generate the entire curve and points with order 2, 4, 8 exist. +-- When implementing cryptographic algorithms, special care must be +-- taken using one of the following methods: +-- +-- - points must be checked for membership in the prime-order +-- subgroup +-- +-- - or cofactor must be cleared by multiplying points by 8 +-- +-- Utility functions are provided to implement this. Testing +-- subgroup membership with 'pointHasPrimeOrder' is 50-time slower +-- than call 'pointMulByCofactor'. +-- +-- 2. Scalar arithmetic is always reduced modulo L, allowing fixed +-- length and constant execution time, but this reduction is valid +-- only when points are in the prime-order subgroup. +-- +-- 3. Because of modular reduction in this implementation it is not +-- possible to multiply points directly by scalars like 8.s or L. +-- This has to be decomposed into several steps. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +module Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 + ( Scalar + , Point + -- * Scalars + , scalarGenerate + , scalarDecodeLong + , scalarEncode + -- * Points + , pointDecode + , pointEncode + , pointHasPrimeOrder + -- * Arithmetic functions + , toPoint + , scalarAdd + , scalarMul + , pointNegate + , pointAdd + , pointDouble + , pointMul + , pointMulByCofactor + , pointsMulVarTime + ) where + +import Data.Word +import Foreign.C.Types +import Foreign.Ptr + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (Bytes, ScrubbedBytes, withByteArray) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Internal.Compat +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Crypto.Random + + +scalarArraySize :: Int +scalarArraySize = 40 -- maximum [9 * 4 {- 32 bits -}, 5 * 8 {- 64 bits -}] + +-- | A scalar modulo prime order of curve edwards25519. +newtype Scalar = Scalar ScrubbedBytes + deriving (Show,NFData) + +instance Eq Scalar where + (Scalar s1) == (Scalar s2) = unsafeDoIO $ + withByteArray s1 $ \ps1 -> + withByteArray s2 $ \ps2 -> + fmap (/= 0) (ed25519_scalar_eq ps1 ps2) + {-# NOINLINE (==) #-} + +pointArraySize :: Int +pointArraySize = 160 -- maximum [4 * 10 * 4 {- 32 bits -}, 4 * 5 * 8 {- 64 bits -}] + +-- | A point on curve edwards25519. +newtype Point = Point Bytes + deriving NFData + +instance Show Point where + showsPrec d p = + let bs = pointEncode p :: Bytes + in showParen (d > 10) $ showString "Point " + . shows (B.convertToBase B.Base16 bs :: Bytes) + +instance Eq Point where + (Point p1) == (Point p2) = unsafeDoIO $ + withByteArray p1 $ \pp1 -> + withByteArray p2 $ \pp2 -> + fmap (/= 0) (ed25519_point_eq pp1 pp2) + {-# NOINLINE (==) #-} + +-- | Generate a random scalar. +scalarGenerate :: MonadRandom randomly => randomly Scalar +scalarGenerate = throwCryptoError . scalarDecodeLong <$> generate + where + -- Scalar generation is based on a fixed number of bytes so that + -- there is no timing leak. But because of modular reduction + -- distribution is not uniform. We use many more bytes than + -- necessary so the probability bias is small. With 512 bits we + -- get 22% of scalars with a higher frequency, but the relative + -- probability difference is only 2^(-260). + generate :: MonadRandom randomly => randomly ScrubbedBytes + generate = getRandomBytes 64 + +-- | Serialize a scalar to binary, i.e. a 32-byte little-endian +-- number. +scalarEncode :: B.ByteArray bs => Scalar -> bs +scalarEncode (Scalar s) = + B.allocAndFreeze 32 $ \out -> + withByteArray s $ \ps -> ed25519_scalar_encode out ps + +-- | Deserialize a little-endian number as a scalar. Input array can +-- have any length from 0 to 64 bytes. +-- +-- Note: it is not advised to put secret information in the 3 lowest +-- bits of a scalar if this scalar may be multiplied to untrusted +-- points outside the prime-order subgroup. +scalarDecodeLong :: B.ByteArrayAccess bs => bs -> CryptoFailable Scalar +scalarDecodeLong bs + | B.length bs > 64 = CryptoFailed CryptoError_EcScalarOutOfBounds + | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ withByteArray bs initialize + where + len = fromIntegral $ B.length bs + initialize inp = do + s <- B.alloc scalarArraySize $ \ps -> + ed25519_scalar_decode_long ps inp len + return $ CryptoPassed (Scalar s) +{-# NOINLINE scalarDecodeLong #-} + +-- | Add two scalars. +scalarAdd :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar +scalarAdd (Scalar a) (Scalar b) = + Scalar $ B.allocAndFreeze scalarArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + withByteArray b $ \pb -> + ed25519_scalar_add out pa pb + +-- | Multiply two scalars. +scalarMul :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar +scalarMul (Scalar a) (Scalar b) = + Scalar $ B.allocAndFreeze scalarArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + withByteArray b $ \pb -> + ed25519_scalar_mul out pa pb + +-- | Multiplies a scalar with the curve base point. +toPoint :: Scalar -> Point +toPoint (Scalar scalar) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray scalar $ \pscalar -> + ed25519_point_base_scalarmul out pscalar + +-- | Serialize a point to a 32-byte array. +-- +-- Format is binary compatible with 'Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519.PublicKey' +-- from module "Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519". +pointEncode :: B.ByteArray bs => Point -> bs +pointEncode (Point p) = + B.allocAndFreeze 32 $ \out -> + withByteArray p $ \pp -> + ed25519_point_encode out pp + +-- | Deserialize a 32-byte array as a point, ensuring the point is +-- valid on edwards25519. +-- +-- /WARNING:/ variable time +pointDecode :: B.ByteArrayAccess bs => bs -> CryptoFailable Point +pointDecode bs + | B.length bs == 32 = unsafeDoIO $ withByteArray bs initialize + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + where + initialize inp = do + (res, p) <- B.allocRet pointArraySize $ \pp -> + ed25519_point_decode_vartime pp inp + if res == 0 then return $ CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + else return $ CryptoPassed (Point p) +{-# NOINLINE pointDecode #-} + +-- | Test whether a point belongs to the prime-order subgroup +-- generated by the base point. Result is 'True' for the identity +-- point. +-- +-- @ +-- pointHasPrimeOrder p = 'pointNegate' p == 'pointMul' l_minus_one p +-- @ +pointHasPrimeOrder :: Point -> Bool +pointHasPrimeOrder (Point p) = unsafeDoIO $ + withByteArray p $ \pp -> + fmap (/= 0) (ed25519_point_has_prime_order pp) +{-# NOINLINE pointHasPrimeOrder #-} + +-- | Negate a point. +pointNegate :: Point -> Point +pointNegate (Point a) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + ed25519_point_negate out pa + +-- | Add two points. +pointAdd :: Point -> Point -> Point +pointAdd (Point a) (Point b) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + withByteArray b $ \pb -> + ed25519_point_add out pa pb + +-- | Add a point to itself. +-- +-- @ +-- pointDouble p = 'pointAdd' p p +-- @ +pointDouble :: Point -> Point +pointDouble (Point a) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + ed25519_point_double out pa + +-- | Multiply a point by h = 8. +-- +-- @ +-- pointMulByCofactor p = 'pointMul' scalar_8 p +-- @ +pointMulByCofactor :: Point -> Point +pointMulByCofactor (Point a) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray a $ \pa -> + ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor out pa + +-- | Scalar multiplication over curve edwards25519. +-- +-- Note: when the scalar had reduction modulo L and the input point +-- has a torsion component, the output point may not be in the +-- expected subgroup. +pointMul :: Scalar -> Point -> Point +pointMul (Scalar scalar) (Point base) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray scalar $ \pscalar -> + withByteArray base $ \pbase -> + ed25519_point_scalarmul out pbase pscalar + +-- | Multiply the point @p@ with @s2@ and add a lifted to curve value @s1@. +-- +-- @ +-- pointsMulVarTime s1 s2 p = 'pointAdd' ('toPoint' s1) ('pointMul' s2 p) +-- @ +-- +-- /WARNING:/ variable time +pointsMulVarTime :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Point -> Point +pointsMulVarTime (Scalar s1) (Scalar s2) (Point p) = + Point $ B.allocAndFreeze pointArraySize $ \out -> + withByteArray s1 $ \ps1 -> + withByteArray s2 $ \ps2 -> + withByteArray p $ \pp -> + ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime out ps1 pp ps2 + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_eq" + ed25519_scalar_eq :: Ptr Scalar + -> Ptr Scalar + -> IO CInt + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_encode" + ed25519_scalar_encode :: Ptr Word8 + -> Ptr Scalar + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_decode_long" + ed25519_scalar_decode_long :: Ptr Scalar + -> Ptr Word8 + -> CSize + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_add" + ed25519_scalar_add :: Ptr Scalar -- sum + -> Ptr Scalar -- a + -> Ptr Scalar -- b + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_scalar_mul" + ed25519_scalar_mul :: Ptr Scalar -- out + -> Ptr Scalar -- a + -> Ptr Scalar -- b + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_encode" + ed25519_point_encode :: Ptr Word8 + -> Ptr Point + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_decode_vartime" + ed25519_point_decode_vartime :: Ptr Point + -> Ptr Word8 + -> IO CInt + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_eq" + ed25519_point_eq :: Ptr Point + -> Ptr Point + -> IO CInt + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_has_prime_order" + ed25519_point_has_prime_order :: Ptr Point + -> IO CInt + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_negate" + ed25519_point_negate :: Ptr Point -- minus_a + -> Ptr Point -- a + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_add" + ed25519_point_add :: Ptr Point -- sum + -> Ptr Point -- a + -> Ptr Point -- b + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_double" + ed25519_point_double :: Ptr Point -- two_a + -> Ptr Point -- a + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor" + ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor :: Ptr Point -- eight_a + -> Ptr Point -- a + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_base_scalarmul" + ed25519_point_base_scalarmul :: Ptr Point -- scaled + -> Ptr Scalar -- scalar + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_point_scalarmul" + ed25519_point_scalarmul :: Ptr Point -- scaled + -> Ptr Point -- base + -> Ptr Scalar -- scalar + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime" + ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime :: Ptr Point -- combo + -> Ptr Scalar -- scalar1 + -> Ptr Point -- base2 + -> Ptr Scalar -- scalar2 + -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Prim.hs b/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Prim.hs --- a/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Prim.hs +++ b/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Prim.hs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ ( scalarGenerate , scalarFromInteger , pointAdd + , pointNegate , pointDouble , pointBaseMul , pointMul @@ -16,8 +17,7 @@ ) where import Data.Maybe -import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Internal.Proxy +import Data.Proxy import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic import Crypto.Number.F2m import Crypto.Number.Generate (generateBetween) @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ pointNegate PointO = PointO pointNegate point@(Point x y) = case curveType point of - CurvePrime {} -> Point x (-y) + CurvePrime (CurvePrimeParam p) -> Point x (p - y) CurveBinary {} -> Point x (x `addF2m` y) -- | Elliptic Curve point addition. diff --git a/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Types.hs b/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/ECC/Simple/Types.hs @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} -- | -- Module : Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types -- License : BSD-style @@ -6,7 +7,7 @@ -- Stability : Experimental -- Portability : Excellent -- --- references: +-- References: -- -- {-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-missing-signatures #-} @@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ , curveSizeBits , curveSizeBytes , CurveParameters(..) - -- * specific curves definition + -- * Specific curves definition , SEC_p112r1(..) , SEC_p112r2(..) , SEC_p128r1(..) @@ -83,28 +84,28 @@ , curveEccG :: Point curve -- ^ base point , curveEccN :: Integer -- ^ order of G , curveEccH :: Integer -- ^ cofactor - } deriving (Show,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Eq,Data) newtype CurveBinaryParam = CurveBinaryParam Integer - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) newtype CurvePrimeParam = CurvePrimeParam Integer - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) data CurveType = CurveBinary CurveBinaryParam | CurvePrime CurvePrimeParam - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | ECC Private Number newtype Scalar curve = Scalar Integer - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,NFData) -- | Define a point on a curve. data Point curve = Point Integer Integer | PointO -- ^ Point at Infinity - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData (Point curve) where rnf (Point x y) = x `seq` y `seq` () diff --git a/Crypto/Error/Types.hs b/Crypto/Error/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/Error/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/Error/Types.hs @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ -- Cryptographic Error enumeration and handling -- {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Error.Types ( CryptoError(..) , CryptoFailable(..) @@ -21,13 +22,14 @@ import qualified Control.Exception as E import Data.Data -import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Basement.Monad (MonadFailure(..)) -- | Enumeration of all possible errors that can be found in this library data CryptoError = -- symmetric cipher errors CryptoError_KeySizeInvalid | CryptoError_IvSizeInvalid + | CryptoError_SeedSizeInvalid | CryptoError_AEADModeNotSupported -- public key cryptography error | CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid @@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ | CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid | CryptoError_PointFormatUnsupported | CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + | CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid -- Message authentification error | CryptoError_MacKeyInvalid | CryptoError_AuthenticationTagSizeInvalid @@ -49,7 +52,7 @@ | CryptoError_SaltTooSmall | CryptoError_OutputLengthTooSmall | CryptoError_OutputLengthTooBig - deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data) instance E.Exception CryptoError @@ -79,11 +82,15 @@ pure a = CryptoPassed a (<*>) fm m = fm >>= \p -> m >>= \r2 -> return (p r2) instance Monad CryptoFailable where - return a = CryptoPassed a + return = pure (>>=) m1 m2 = do case m1 of CryptoPassed a -> m2 a CryptoFailed e -> CryptoFailed e + +instance MonadFailure CryptoFailable where + type Failure CryptoFailable = CryptoError + mFail = CryptoFailed -- | Throw an CryptoError as exception on CryptoFailed result, -- otherwise return the computed value diff --git a/Crypto/Hash.hs b/Crypto/Hash.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash.hs @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ -- > hexSha3_512 :: ByteString -> String -- > hexSha3_512 bs = show (hash bs :: Digest SHA3_512) -- +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.Hash ( -- * Types @@ -23,78 +25,109 @@ , Digest -- * Functions , digestFromByteString - -- * hash methods parametrized by algorithm + -- * Hash methods parametrized by algorithm , hashInitWith , hashWith - -- * hash methods + , hashPrefixWith + -- * Hash methods , hashInit , hashUpdates , hashUpdate , hashFinalize + , hashFinalizePrefix , hashBlockSize , hashDigestSize , hash + , hashPrefix , hashlazy -- * Hash algorithms , module Crypto.Hash.Algorithms ) where -import Control.Monad +import Basement.Types.OffsetSize (CountOf (..)) +import Basement.Block (Block, unsafeFreeze) +import Basement.Block.Mutable (copyFromPtr, new) +import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) import Crypto.Hash.Types import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms -import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr) import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L +import Data.Word (Word8) +import Data.Int (Int32) -- | Hash a strict bytestring into a digest. hash :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithm a) => ba -> Digest a hash bs = hashFinalize $ hashUpdate hashInit bs +-- | Hash the first N bytes of a bytestring, with code path independent from N. +hashPrefix :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithmPrefix a) => ba -> Int -> Digest a +hashPrefix = hashFinalizePrefix hashInit + -- | Hash a lazy bytestring into a digest. hashlazy :: HashAlgorithm a => L.ByteString -> Digest a hashlazy lbs = hashFinalize $ hashUpdates hashInit (L.toChunks lbs) -- | Initialize a new context for this hash algorithm -hashInit :: HashAlgorithm a - => Context a -hashInit = doInit undefined B.allocAndFreeze - where - doInit :: HashAlgorithm a => a -> (Int -> (Ptr (Context a) -> IO ()) -> B.Bytes) -> Context a - doInit alg alloc = Context $ alloc (hashInternalContextSize alg) hashInternalInit -{-# NOINLINE hashInit #-} +hashInit :: forall a . HashAlgorithm a => Context a +hashInit = Context $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashInternalContextSize (undefined :: a)) $ \(ptr :: Ptr (Context a)) -> + hashInternalInit ptr -- | run hashUpdates on one single bytestring and return the updated context. hashUpdate :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithm a) => Context a -> ba -> Context a -hashUpdate ctx b = hashUpdates ctx [b] +hashUpdate ctx b + | B.null b = ctx + | otherwise = hashUpdates ctx [b] -- | Update the context with a list of strict bytestring, -- and return a new context with the updates. -hashUpdates :: (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) +hashUpdates :: forall a ba . (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Context a -> [ba] -> Context a -hashUpdates c l = doUpdates (B.copyAndFreeze c) - where doUpdates :: HashAlgorithm a => ((Ptr (Context a) -> IO ()) -> B.Bytes) -> Context a - doUpdates copy = Context $ copy $ \ctx -> - mapM_ (\b -> B.withByteArray b $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length b)) l -{-# NOINLINE hashUpdates #-} +hashUpdates c l + | null ls = c + | otherwise = Context $ B.copyAndFreeze c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) -> + mapM_ (\b -> B.withByteArray b (processBlocks ctx (B.length b))) ls + where + ls = filter (not . B.null) l + -- process the data in 2GB chunks to fit in uint32_t and Int on 32 bit systems + processBlocks ctx bytesLeft dataPtr + | bytesLeft == 0 = return () + | otherwise = do + hashInternalUpdate ctx dataPtr (fromIntegral actuallyProcessed) + processBlocks ctx (bytesLeft - actuallyProcessed) (dataPtr `plusPtr` actuallyProcessed) + where + actuallyProcessed = min bytesLeft (fromIntegral (maxBound :: Int32)) -- | Finalize a context and return a digest. -hashFinalize :: HashAlgorithm a +hashFinalize :: forall a . HashAlgorithm a => Context a -> Digest a -hashFinalize c = doFinalize undefined (B.copy c) (B.allocAndFreeze) - where doFinalize :: HashAlgorithm alg - => alg - -> ((Ptr (Context alg) -> IO ()) -> IO B.Bytes) - -> (Int -> (Ptr (Digest alg) -> IO ()) -> B.Bytes) - -> Digest alg - doFinalize alg copy allocDigest = - Digest $ allocDigest (hashDigestSize alg) $ \dig -> - (void $ copy $ \ctx -> hashInternalFinalize ctx dig) -{-# NOINLINE hashFinalize #-} +hashFinalize !c = + Digest $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \(dig :: Ptr (Digest a)) -> do + ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) -> hashInternalFinalize ctx dig + return () +-- | Update the context with the first N bytes of a bytestring and return the +-- digest. The code path is independent from N but much slower than a normal +-- 'hashUpdate'. The function can be called for the last bytes of a message, in +-- order to exclude a variable padding, without leaking the padding length. The +-- begining of the message, never impacted by the padding, should preferably go +-- through 'hashUpdate' for better performance. +hashFinalizePrefix :: forall a ba . (HashAlgorithmPrefix a, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => Context a + -> ba + -> Int + -> Digest a +hashFinalizePrefix !c b len = + Digest $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \(dig :: Ptr (Digest a)) -> do + ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) -> + B.withByteArray b $ \d -> + hashInternalFinalizePrefix ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length b) (fromIntegral len) dig + return () + -- | Initialize a new context for a specified hash algorithm hashInitWith :: HashAlgorithm alg => alg -> Context alg hashInitWith _ = hashInit @@ -103,14 +136,26 @@ hashWith :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithm alg) => alg -> ba -> Digest alg hashWith _ = hash +-- | Run the 'hashPrefix' function but takes an explicit hash algorithm parameter +hashPrefixWith :: (ByteArrayAccess ba, HashAlgorithmPrefix alg) => alg -> ba -> Int -> Digest alg +hashPrefixWith _ = hashPrefix + -- | Try to transform a bytearray into a Digest of specific algorithm. -- -- If the digest is not the right size for the algorithm specified, then -- Nothing is returned. -digestFromByteString :: (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => ba -> Maybe (Digest a) +digestFromByteString :: forall a ba . (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => ba -> Maybe (Digest a) digestFromByteString = from undefined where - from :: (HashAlgorithm a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => a -> ba -> Maybe (Digest a) + from :: a -> ba -> Maybe (Digest a) from alg bs - | B.length bs == (hashDigestSize alg) = (Just $ Digest $ B.convert bs) + | B.length bs == (hashDigestSize alg) = Just $ Digest $ unsafeDoIO $ copyBytes bs | otherwise = Nothing + + copyBytes :: ba -> IO (Block Word8) + copyBytes ba = do + muArray <- new count + B.withByteArray ba $ \ptr -> copyFromPtr ptr muArray 0 count + unsafeFreeze muArray + where + count = CountOf (B.length ba) diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Algorithms.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Algorithms.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Algorithms.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Algorithms.hs @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} -- | -- Module : Crypto.Hash.Algorithms -- License : BSD-style @@ -10,7 +9,8 @@ -- module Crypto.Hash.Algorithms ( HashAlgorithm - -- * hash algorithms + , HashAlgorithmPrefix + -- * Hash algorithms , Blake2s_160(..) , Blake2s_224(..) , Blake2s_256(..) @@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ , SHA3_256(..) , SHA3_384(..) , SHA3_512(..) -#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) , SHAKE128(..) , SHAKE256(..) -#endif + , Blake2b(..), Blake2bp(..) + , Blake2s(..), Blake2sp(..) , Skein256_224(..) , Skein256_256(..) , Skein512_224(..) @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ , Whirlpool(..) ) where -import Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm) +import Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm, HashAlgorithmPrefix) import Crypto.Hash.Blake2s import Crypto.Hash.Blake2sp import Crypto.Hash.Blake2b @@ -76,6 +76,5 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Skein256 import Crypto.Hash.Skein512 import Crypto.Hash.Whirlpool -#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) import Crypto.Hash.SHAKE -#endif +import Crypto.Hash.Blake2 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2.hs @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Hash.Blake2 +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Nicolas Di Prima +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Blake2 +-- +-- Implementation based from [RFC7693](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7693) +-- +-- Please consider the following when chosing a hash: +-- +-- Algorithm | Target | Collision | Digest Size | +-- Identifier | Arch | Security | in bytes | +-- ---------------+--------+-----------+-------------+ +-- id-blake2b160 | 64-bit | 2**80 | 20 | +-- id-blake2b256 | 64-bit | 2**128 | 32 | +-- id-blake2b384 | 64-bit | 2**192 | 48 | +-- id-blake2b512 | 64-bit | 2**256 | 64 | +-- ---------------+--------+-----------+-------------+ +-- id-blake2s128 | 32-bit | 2**64 | 16 | +-- id-blake2s160 | 32-bit | 2**80 | 20 | +-- id-blake2s224 | 32-bit | 2**112 | 28 | +-- id-blake2s256 | 32-bit | 2**128 | 32 | +-- ---------------+--------+-----------+-------------+ +-- +{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} +module Crypto.Hash.Blake2 + ( Blake2s(..) + , Blake2sp(..) + , Blake2b(..) + , Blake2bp(..) + ) where + +import Crypto.Hash.Types +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Data.Data +import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) +import GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat) +import Crypto.Internal.Nat + +-- | Fast and secure alternative to SHA1 and HMAC-SHA1 +-- +-- It is espacially known to target 32bits architectures. +-- +-- Known supported digest sizes: +-- +-- * Blake2s 160 +-- * Blake2s 224 +-- * Blake2s 256 +-- +data Blake2s (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2s + deriving (Show,Data) + +instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 256) + => HashAlgorithm (Blake2s bitlen) + where + type HashBlockSize (Blake2s bitlen) = 64 + type HashDigestSize (Blake2s bitlen) = Div8 bitlen + type HashInternalContextSize (Blake2s bitlen) = 136 + hashBlockSize _ = 64 + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + hashInternalContextSize _ = 136 + hashInternalInit p = c_blake2s_init p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2s_update + hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2s_finalize p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2s_init" + c_blake2s_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2s_update" + c_blake2s_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2s_finalize" + c_blake2s_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +-- | Fast cryptographic hash. +-- +-- It is especially known to target 64bits architectures. +-- +-- Known supported digest sizes: +-- +-- * Blake2b 160 +-- * Blake2b 224 +-- * Blake2b 256 +-- * Blake2b 384 +-- * Blake2b 512 +-- +data Blake2b (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2b + deriving (Show,Data) + +instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 512) + => HashAlgorithm (Blake2b bitlen) + where + type HashBlockSize (Blake2b bitlen) = 128 + type HashDigestSize (Blake2b bitlen) = Div8 bitlen + type HashInternalContextSize (Blake2b bitlen) = 248 + hashBlockSize _ = 128 + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 + hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update + hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2b_init" + c_blake2b_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2b_update" + c_blake2b_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2b_finalize" + c_blake2b_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +data Blake2sp (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2sp + deriving (Show,Data) + +instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 256) + => HashAlgorithm (Blake2sp bitlen) + where + type HashBlockSize (Blake2sp bitlen) = 64 + type HashDigestSize (Blake2sp bitlen) = Div8 bitlen + type HashInternalContextSize (Blake2sp bitlen) = 2185 + hashBlockSize _ = 64 + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + hashInternalContextSize _ = 2185 + hashInternalInit p = c_blake2sp_init p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2sp_update + hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2sp_finalize p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2sp_init" + c_blake2sp_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2sp_update" + c_blake2sp_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2sp_finalize" + c_blake2sp_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +data Blake2bp (bitlen :: Nat) = Blake2bp + deriving (Show,Data) + +instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, KnownNat bitlen, IsAtLeast bitlen 8, IsAtMost bitlen 512) + => HashAlgorithm (Blake2bp bitlen) + where + type HashBlockSize (Blake2bp bitlen) = 128 + type HashDigestSize (Blake2bp bitlen) = Div8 bitlen + type HashInternalContextSize (Blake2bp bitlen) = 2325 + hashBlockSize _ = 128 + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + hashInternalContextSize _ = 2325 + hashInternalInit p = c_blake2bp_init p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2bp_update + hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2bp_finalize p (integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen)) + + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2bp_init" + c_blake2bp_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2bp_update" + c_blake2bp_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2bp_finalize" + c_blake2bp_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2b.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2b.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2b.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2b.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Blake2b cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Blake2b ( Blake2b_160 (..), Blake2b_224 (..), Blake2b_256 (..), Blake2b_384 (..), Blake2b_512 (..) ) where @@ -17,66 +19,80 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Blake2b (160 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_160 = Blake2b_160 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_160 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2b_160 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2b_160 = 20 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2b_160 = 248 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 20 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 361 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p 160 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p 160 -- | Blake2b (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_224 = Blake2b_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_224 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2b_224 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2b_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2b_224 = 248 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 28 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 361 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p 224 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p 224 -- | Blake2b (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_256 = Blake2b_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_256 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2b_256 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2b_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2b_256 = 248 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 32 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 361 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p 256 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p 256 -- | Blake2b (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_384 = Blake2b_384 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_384 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2b_384 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2b_384 = 48 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2b_384 = 248 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 48 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 361 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p 384 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p 384 -- | Blake2b (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2b_512 = Blake2b_512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2b_512 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2b_512 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2b_512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2b_512 = 248 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 64 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 361 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 248 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2b_init p 512 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2b_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2b_finalize p 512 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2bp.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2bp.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2bp.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2bp.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Blake2bp cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Blake2bp ( Blake2bp_512 (..) ) where @@ -17,28 +19,30 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Blake2bp (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2bp_512 = Blake2bp_512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2bp_512 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2bp_512 = 128 + type HashDigestSize Blake2bp_512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2bp_512 = 1768 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 64 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 2325 - hashInternalInit p = c_blake2sp_init p 512 - hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2sp_update - hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2sp_finalize p 512 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 1768 + hashInternalInit p = c_blake2bp_init p 512 + hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2bp_update + hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2bp_finalize p 512 -foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2sp_init" - c_blake2sp_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2bp_init" + c_blake2bp_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2sp_update" - c_blake2sp_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_blake2bp_update" + c_blake2bp_update :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> IO () -foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2sp_finalize" - c_blake2sp_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_blake2bp_finalize" + c_blake2bp_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2s.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2s.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2s.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2s.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Blake2s cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Blake2s ( Blake2s_160 (..), Blake2s_224 (..), Blake2s_256 (..) ) where @@ -17,42 +19,50 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Blake2s (160 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_160 = Blake2s_160 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_160 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2s_160 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Blake2s_160 = 20 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2s_160 = 136 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 20 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 185 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 136 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2s_init p 160 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2s_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2s_finalize p 160 -- | Blake2s (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_224 = Blake2s_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_224 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2s_224 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Blake2s_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2s_224 = 136 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 28 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 185 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 136 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2s_init p 224 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2s_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2s_finalize p 224 -- | Blake2s (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2s_256 = Blake2s_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2s_256 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2s_256 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Blake2s_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2s_256 = 136 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 32 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 185 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 136 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2s_init p 256 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2s_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2s_finalize p 256 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2sp.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2sp.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Blake2sp.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Blake2sp.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Blake2sp cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Blake2sp ( Blake2sp_224 (..), Blake2sp_256 (..) ) where @@ -17,30 +19,35 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Blake2sp (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2sp_224 = Blake2sp_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2sp_224 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2sp_224 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Blake2sp_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2sp_224 = 1752 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 28 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 2185 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 1752 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2sp_init p 224 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2sp_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2sp_finalize p 224 -- | Blake2sp (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Blake2sp_256 = Blake2sp_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Blake2sp_256 where + type HashBlockSize Blake2sp_256 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Blake2sp_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Blake2sp_256 = 1752 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 32 - hashInternalContextSize _ = 2185 + hashInternalContextSize _ = 1752 hashInternalInit p = c_blake2sp_init p 256 hashInternalUpdate = c_blake2sp_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_blake2sp_finalize p 256 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/IO.hs b/Crypto/Hash/IO.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/IO.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/IO.hs @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ -- Generalized impure cryptographic hash interface -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} module Crypto.Hash.IO ( HashAlgorithm(..) , MutableContext @@ -23,6 +24,11 @@ import Foreign.Ptr -- | A Mutable hash context +-- +-- This type is an instance of 'B.ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. +-- Internal layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data +-- fragments, and change in future versions. The bytearray should not be used +-- as input to cryptographic algorithms. newtype MutableContext a = MutableContext B.Bytes deriving (B.ByteArrayAccess) @@ -51,18 +57,10 @@ hashInternalUpdate ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length dat) -- | Finalize a mutable hash context and compute a digest -hashMutableFinalize :: HashAlgorithm a => MutableContext a -> IO (Digest a) -hashMutableFinalize mc = doFinalize undefined (B.withByteArray mc) B.alloc - where doFinalize :: HashAlgorithm alg - => alg - -> ((Ptr (Context alg) -> IO ()) -> IO ()) - -> (Int -> (Ptr (Digest alg) -> IO ()) -> IO B.Bytes) - -> IO (Digest alg) - doFinalize alg withCtx allocDigest = do - b <- allocDigest (hashDigestSize alg) $ \dig -> - withCtx $ \ctx -> - hashInternalFinalize ctx dig - return $ Digest b +hashMutableFinalize :: forall a . HashAlgorithm a => MutableContext a -> IO (Digest a) +hashMutableFinalize mc = do + b <- B.alloc (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \dig -> B.withByteArray mc $ \(ctx :: Ptr (Context a)) -> hashInternalFinalize ctx dig + return $ Digest b -- | Reset the mutable context to the initial state of the hash hashMutableReset :: HashAlgorithm a => MutableContext a -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Keccak.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Keccak.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Keccak.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Keccak.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Keccak cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Keccak ( Keccak_224 (..), Keccak_256 (..), Keccak_384 (..), Keccak_512 (..) ) where @@ -17,15 +19,17 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Keccak (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_224 = Keccak_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_224 where + type HashBlockSize Keccak_224 = 144 + type HashDigestSize Keccak_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Keccak_224 = 352 hashBlockSize _ = 144 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 352 @@ -35,9 +39,12 @@ -- | Keccak (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_256 = Keccak_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_256 where + type HashBlockSize Keccak_256 = 136 + type HashDigestSize Keccak_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Keccak_256 = 344 hashBlockSize _ = 136 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 344 @@ -47,9 +54,12 @@ -- | Keccak (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_384 = Keccak_384 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_384 where + type HashBlockSize Keccak_384 = 104 + type HashDigestSize Keccak_384 = 48 + type HashInternalContextSize Keccak_384 = 312 hashBlockSize _ = 104 hashDigestSize _ = 48 hashInternalContextSize _ = 312 @@ -59,9 +69,12 @@ -- | Keccak (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Keccak_512 = Keccak_512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Keccak_512 where + type HashBlockSize Keccak_512 = 72 + type HashDigestSize Keccak_512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize Keccak_512 = 280 hashBlockSize _ = 72 hashDigestSize _ = 64 hashInternalContextSize _ = 280 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/MD2.hs b/Crypto/Hash/MD2.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/MD2.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/MD2.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- MD2 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.MD2 ( MD2 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | MD2 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD2 = MD2 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm MD2 where + type HashBlockSize MD2 = 16 + type HashDigestSize MD2 = 16 + type HashInternalContextSize MD2 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 16 hashDigestSize _ = 16 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/MD4.hs b/Crypto/Hash/MD4.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/MD4.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/MD4.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- MD4 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.MD4 ( MD4 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | MD4 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD4 = MD4 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm MD4 where + type HashBlockSize MD4 = 64 + type HashDigestSize MD4 = 16 + type HashInternalContextSize MD4 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 16 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/MD5.hs b/Crypto/Hash/MD5.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/MD5.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/MD5.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- MD5 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.MD5 ( MD5 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | MD5 cryptographic hash algorithm data MD5 = MD5 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm MD5 where + type HashBlockSize MD5 = 64 + type HashDigestSize MD5 = 16 + type HashInternalContextSize MD5 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 16 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_md5_update hashInternalFinalize = c_md5_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix MD5 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_md5_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_md5_init" c_md5_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_md5_finalize" c_md5_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_md5_finalize_prefix" + c_md5_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/RIPEMD160.hs b/Crypto/Hash/RIPEMD160.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/RIPEMD160.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/RIPEMD160.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- RIPEMD160 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.RIPEMD160 ( RIPEMD160 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | RIPEMD160 cryptographic hash algorithm data RIPEMD160 = RIPEMD160 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm RIPEMD160 where + type HashBlockSize RIPEMD160 = 64 + type HashDigestSize RIPEMD160 = 20 + type HashInternalContextSize RIPEMD160 = 128 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 20 hashInternalContextSize _ = 128 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA1.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA1.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA1.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA1.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA1 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA1 ( SHA1 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA1 = SHA1 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA1 where + type HashBlockSize SHA1 = 64 + type HashDigestSize SHA1 = 20 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA1 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 20 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_sha1_update hashInternalFinalize = c_sha1_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA1 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha1_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha1_init" c_sha1_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha1_finalize" c_sha1_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha1_finalize_prefix" + c_sha1_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA224.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA224.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA224.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA224.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA224 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA224 ( SHA224 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA224 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA224 = SHA224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA224 where + type HashBlockSize SHA224 = 64 + type HashDigestSize SHA224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA224 = 192 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 192 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_sha224_update hashInternalFinalize = c_sha224_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA224 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha224_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha224_init" c_sha224_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha224_finalize" c_sha224_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix" + c_sha224_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA256.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA256.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA256.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA256.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA256 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA256 ( SHA256 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA256 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA256 = SHA256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA256 where + type HashBlockSize SHA256 = 64 + type HashDigestSize SHA256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA256 = 192 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 192 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_sha256_update hashInternalFinalize = c_sha256_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA256 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha256_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha256_init" c_sha256_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha256_finalize" c_sha256_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix" + c_sha256_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA3.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA3.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA3.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA3.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA3 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA3 ( SHA3_224 (..), SHA3_256 (..), SHA3_384 (..), SHA3_512 (..) ) where @@ -17,14 +19,17 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) + -- | SHA3 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_224 = SHA3_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_224 where + type HashBlockSize SHA3_224 = 144 + type HashDigestSize SHA3_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA3_224 = 352 hashBlockSize _ = 144 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 352 @@ -34,9 +39,12 @@ -- | SHA3 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_256 = SHA3_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_256 where + type HashBlockSize SHA3_256 = 136 + type HashDigestSize SHA3_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA3_256 = 344 hashBlockSize _ = 136 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 344 @@ -46,9 +54,12 @@ -- | SHA3 (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_384 = SHA3_384 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_384 where + type HashBlockSize SHA3_384 = 104 + type HashDigestSize SHA3_384 = 48 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA3_384 = 312 hashBlockSize _ = 104 hashDigestSize _ = 48 hashInternalContextSize _ = 312 @@ -58,15 +69,19 @@ -- | SHA3 (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA3_512 = SHA3_512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA3_512 where + type HashBlockSize SHA3_512 = 72 + type HashDigestSize SHA3_512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA3_512 = 280 hashBlockSize _ = 72 hashDigestSize _ = 64 hashInternalContextSize _ = 280 hashInternalInit p = c_sha3_init p 512 hashInternalUpdate = c_sha3_update hashInternalFinalize p = c_sha3_finalize p 512 + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_init" c_sha3_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA384.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA384.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA384.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA384.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA384 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA384 ( SHA384 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA384 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA384 = SHA384 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA384 where + type HashBlockSize SHA384 = 128 + type HashDigestSize SHA384 = 48 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA384 = 256 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 48 hashInternalContextSize _ = 256 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_sha384_update hashInternalFinalize = c_sha384_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA384 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha384_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha384_init" c_sha384_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha384_finalize" c_sha384_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix" + c_sha384_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA512.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA512.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA512.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA512.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA512 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA512 ( SHA512 (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA512 cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512 = SHA512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA512 where + type HashBlockSize SHA512 = 128 + type HashDigestSize SHA512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA512 = 256 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 64 hashInternalContextSize _ = 256 @@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ hashInternalUpdate = c_sha512_update hashInternalFinalize = c_sha512_finalize +instance HashAlgorithmPrefix SHA512 where + hashInternalFinalizePrefix = c_sha512_finalize_prefix + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha512_init" c_sha512_init :: Ptr (Context a)-> IO () @@ -38,3 +45,6 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha512_finalize" c_sha512_finalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix" + c_sha512_finalize_prefix :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 -> Word32 -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHA512t.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHA512t.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHA512t.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHA512t.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA512t cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHA512t ( SHA512t_224 (..), SHA512t_256 (..) ) where @@ -17,15 +19,17 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | SHA512t (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512t_224 = SHA512t_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA512t_224 where + type HashBlockSize SHA512t_224 = 128 + type HashDigestSize SHA512t_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA512t_224 = 256 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 256 @@ -35,9 +39,12 @@ -- | SHA512t (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data SHA512t_256 = SHA512t_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm SHA512t_256 where + type HashBlockSize SHA512t_256 = 128 + type HashDigestSize SHA512t_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize SHA512t_256 = 256 hashBlockSize _ = 128 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 256 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/SHAKE.hs b/Crypto/Hash/SHAKE.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/SHAKE.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/SHAKE.hs @@ -5,79 +5,116 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- SHA3 extendable output functions (SHAKE). -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} {-# LANGUAGE KindSignatures #-} {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} -{-# LANGUAGE ConstraintKinds #-} {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-} {-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} {-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-} module Crypto.Hash.SHAKE - ( SHAKE128 (..), SHAKE256 (..) + ( SHAKE128 (..), SHAKE256 (..), HashSHAKE (..) ) where +import Control.Monad (when) import Crypto.Hash.Types -import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) -import Data.Typeable +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, castPtr) +import Foreign.Storable (Storable(..)) +import Data.Bits +import Data.Data import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -import Data.Proxy (Proxy(..)) -import GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat, natVal) +import GHC.TypeLits (Nat, KnownNat, type (+)) import Crypto.Internal.Nat +-- | Type class of SHAKE algorithms. +class HashAlgorithm a => HashSHAKE a where + -- | Alternate finalization needed for cSHAKE + cshakeInternalFinalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () + -- | Get the digest bit length + cshakeOutputLength :: a -> Int + -- | SHAKE128 (128 bits) extendable output function. Supports an arbitrary --- digest size (multiple of 8 bits), to be specified as a type parameter --- of kind 'Nat'. +-- digest size, to be specified as a type parameter of kind 'Nat'. -- -- Note: outputs from @'SHAKE128' n@ and @'SHAKE128' m@ for the same input are -- correlated (one being a prefix of the other). Results are unrelated to -- 'SHAKE256' results. data SHAKE128 (bitlen :: Nat) = SHAKE128 - deriving (Show, Typeable) + deriving (Show, Data) -instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitLen, KnownNat bitLen) => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE128 bitLen) where +instance KnownNat bitlen => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE128 bitlen) where + type HashBlockSize (SHAKE128 bitlen) = 168 + type HashDigestSize (SHAKE128 bitlen) = Div8 (bitlen + 7) + type HashInternalContextSize (SHAKE128 bitlen) = 376 hashBlockSize _ = 168 - hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitLen) + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) hashInternalContextSize _ = 376 hashInternalInit p = c_sha3_init p 128 hashInternalUpdate = c_sha3_update - hashInternalFinalize = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitLen) + hashInternalFinalize = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) +instance KnownNat bitlen => HashSHAKE (SHAKE128 bitlen) where + cshakeInternalFinalize = cshakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + cshakeOutputLength _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + -- | SHAKE256 (256 bits) extendable output function. Supports an arbitrary --- digest size (multiple of 8 bits), to be specified as a type parameter --- of kind 'Nat'. +-- digest size, to be specified as a type parameter of kind 'Nat'. -- -- Note: outputs from @'SHAKE256' n@ and @'SHAKE256' m@ for the same input are -- correlated (one being a prefix of the other). Results are unrelated to -- 'SHAKE128' results. data SHAKE256 (bitlen :: Nat) = SHAKE256 - deriving (Show, Typeable) + deriving (Show, Data) -instance (IsDivisibleBy8 bitLen, KnownNat bitLen) => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE256 bitLen) where +instance KnownNat bitlen => HashAlgorithm (SHAKE256 bitlen) where + type HashBlockSize (SHAKE256 bitlen) = 136 + type HashDigestSize (SHAKE256 bitlen) = Div8 (bitlen + 7) + type HashInternalContextSize (SHAKE256 bitlen) = 344 hashBlockSize _ = 136 - hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitLen) + hashDigestSize _ = byteLen (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) hashInternalContextSize _ = 344 hashInternalInit p = c_sha3_init p 256 hashInternalUpdate = c_sha3_update - hashInternalFinalize = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitLen) + hashInternalFinalize = shakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) -shakeFinalizeOutput :: (IsDivisibleBy8 bitLen, KnownNat bitLen) - => proxy bitLen +instance KnownNat bitlen => HashSHAKE (SHAKE256 bitlen) where + cshakeInternalFinalize = cshakeFinalizeOutput (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + cshakeOutputLength _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy bitlen) + +shakeFinalizeOutput :: KnownNat bitlen + => proxy bitlen -> Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () shakeFinalizeOutput d ctx dig = do c_sha3_finalize_shake ctx - c_sha3_output ctx dig (fromInteger (natVal d `div` 8)) + c_sha3_output ctx dig (byteLen d) + shakeTruncate d (castPtr dig) -byteLen :: (KnownNat bitlen, IsDivisibleBy8 bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a -byteLen d = fromInteger (natVal d `div` 8) +cshakeFinalizeOutput :: KnownNat bitlen + => proxy bitlen + -> Ptr (Context a) + -> Ptr (Digest a) + -> IO () +cshakeFinalizeOutput d ctx dig = do + c_sha3_finalize_cshake ctx + c_sha3_output ctx dig (byteLen d) + shakeTruncate d (castPtr dig) +shakeTruncate :: KnownNat bitlen => proxy bitlen -> Ptr Word8 -> IO () +shakeTruncate d ptr = + when (bits > 0) $ do + byte <- peekElemOff ptr index + pokeElemOff ptr index (byte .&. mask) + where + mask = (1 `shiftL` bits) - 1 + (index, bits) = integralNatVal d `divMod` 8 + foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_init" c_sha3_init :: Ptr (Context a) -> Word32 -> IO () @@ -86,6 +123,9 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake" c_sha3_finalize_shake :: Ptr (Context a) -> IO () + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake" + c_sha3_finalize_cshake :: Ptr (Context a) -> IO () foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_sha3_output" c_sha3_output :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> Word32 -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Skein256.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Skein256.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Skein256.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Skein256.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Skein256 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Skein256 ( Skein256_224 (..), Skein256_256 (..) ) where @@ -17,15 +19,17 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Skein256 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein256_224 = Skein256_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein256_224 where + type HashBlockSize Skein256_224 = 32 + type HashDigestSize Skein256_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein256_224 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 32 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 @@ -35,9 +39,12 @@ -- | Skein256 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein256_256 = Skein256_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein256_256 where + type HashBlockSize Skein256_256 = 32 + type HashDigestSize Skein256_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein256_256 = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 32 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Skein512.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Skein512.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Skein512.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Skein512.hs @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Skein512 cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Skein512 ( Skein512_224 (..), Skein512_256 (..), Skein512_384 (..), Skein512_512 (..) ) where @@ -17,15 +19,17 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Skein512 (224 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_224 = Skein512_224 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_224 where + type HashBlockSize Skein512_224 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Skein512_224 = 28 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein512_224 = 160 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 28 hashInternalContextSize _ = 160 @@ -35,9 +39,12 @@ -- | Skein512 (256 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_256 = Skein512_256 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_256 where + type HashBlockSize Skein512_256 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Skein512_256 = 32 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein512_256 = 160 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 32 hashInternalContextSize _ = 160 @@ -47,9 +54,12 @@ -- | Skein512 (384 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_384 = Skein512_384 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_384 where + type HashBlockSize Skein512_384 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Skein512_384 = 48 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein512_384 = 160 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 48 hashInternalContextSize _ = 160 @@ -59,9 +69,12 @@ -- | Skein512 (512 bits) cryptographic hash algorithm data Skein512_512 = Skein512_512 - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Skein512_512 where + type HashBlockSize Skein512_512 = 64 + type HashDigestSize Skein512_512 = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize Skein512_512 = 160 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 64 hashInternalContextSize _ = 160 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Tiger.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Tiger.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Tiger.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Tiger.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Tiger cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Tiger ( Tiger (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Tiger cryptographic hash algorithm data Tiger = Tiger - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Tiger where + type HashBlockSize Tiger = 64 + type HashDigestSize Tiger = 24 + type HashInternalContextSize Tiger = 96 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 24 hashInternalContextSize _ = 96 diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Types.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Types.hs @@ -8,8 +8,13 @@ -- Crypto hash types definitions -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Types ( HashAlgorithm(..) + , HashAlgorithmPrefix(..) , Context(..) , Digest(..) ) where @@ -17,7 +22,15 @@ import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Control.Monad.ST +import Data.Char (digitToInt, isHexDigit) import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Basement.Block (Block, unsafeFreeze) +import Basement.Block.Mutable (MutableBlock, new, unsafeWrite) +import Basement.NormalForm (deepseq) +import Basement.Types.OffsetSize (CountOf(..), Offset(..)) +import GHC.TypeLits (Nat) +import Data.Data (Data) -- | Class representing hashing algorithms. -- @@ -25,6 +38,13 @@ -- and lowlevel. the Hash module takes care of -- hidding the mutable interface properly. class HashAlgorithm a where + -- | Associated type for the block size of the hash algorithm + type HashBlockSize a :: Nat + -- | Associated type for the digest size of the hash algorithm + type HashDigestSize a :: Nat + -- | Associated type for the internal context size of the hash algorithm + type HashInternalContextSize a :: Nat + -- | Get the block size of a hash algorithm hashBlockSize :: a -> Int -- | Get the digest size of a hash algorithm @@ -40,19 +60,64 @@ -- | Finalize the context and set the digest raw memory to the right value hashInternalFinalize :: Ptr (Context a) -> Ptr (Digest a) -> IO () +-- | Hashing algorithms with a constant-time implementation. +class HashAlgorithm a => HashAlgorithmPrefix a where + -- | Update the context with the first N bytes of a buffer and finalize this + -- context. The code path executed is independent from N and depends only + -- on the complete buffer length. + hashInternalFinalizePrefix :: Ptr (Context a) + -> Ptr Word8 -> Word32 + -> Word32 + -> Ptr (Digest a) + -> IO () + {- hashContextGetAlgorithm :: HashAlgorithm a => Context a -> a hashContextGetAlgorithm = undefined -} -- | Represent a context for a given hash algorithm. +-- +-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal +-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments, +-- and change in future versions. The bytearray should not be used as input to +-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype Context a = Context Bytes deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData) -- | Represent a digest for a given hash algorithm. -newtype Digest a = Digest Bytes - deriving (Eq,Ord,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) +-- +-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' from package +-- . +-- Module "Data.ByteArray" provides many primitives to work with those values +-- including conversion to other types. +-- +-- Creating a digest from a bytearray is also possible with function +-- 'Crypto.Hash.digestFromByteString'. +newtype Digest a = Digest (Block Word8) + deriving (Eq,Ord,ByteArrayAccess, Data) +instance NFData (Digest a) where + rnf (Digest u) = u `deepseq` () + instance Show (Digest a) where show (Digest bs) = map (toEnum . fromIntegral) $ B.unpack (B.convertToBase B.Base16 bs :: Bytes) + +instance HashAlgorithm a => Read (Digest a) where + readsPrec _ str = runST $ do mut <- new (CountOf len) + loop mut len str + where + len = hashDigestSize (undefined :: a) + + loop :: MutableBlock Word8 s -> Int -> String -> ST s [(Digest a, String)] + loop mut 0 cs = (\b -> [(Digest b, cs)]) <$> unsafeFreeze mut + loop _ _ [] = return [] + loop _ _ [_] = return [] + loop mut n (c:(d:ds)) + | not (isHexDigit c) = return [] + | not (isHexDigit d) = return [] + | otherwise = do + let w8 = fromIntegral $ digitToInt c * 16 + digitToInt d + unsafeWrite mut (Offset $ len - n) w8 + loop mut (n - 1) ds diff --git a/Crypto/Hash/Whirlpool.hs b/Crypto/Hash/Whirlpool.hs --- a/Crypto/Hash/Whirlpool.hs +++ b/Crypto/Hash/Whirlpool.hs @@ -5,24 +5,28 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- module containing the binding functions to work with the +-- Module containing the binding functions to work with the -- Whirlpool cryptographic hash. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} {-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} module Crypto.Hash.Whirlpool ( Whirlpool (..) ) where import Crypto.Hash.Types import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) import Data.Data -import Data.Typeable import Data.Word (Word8, Word32) -- | Whirlpool cryptographic hash algorithm data Whirlpool = Whirlpool - deriving (Show,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Data) instance HashAlgorithm Whirlpool where + type HashBlockSize Whirlpool = 64 + type HashDigestSize Whirlpool = 64 + type HashInternalContextSize Whirlpool = 168 hashBlockSize _ = 64 hashDigestSize _ = 64 hashInternalContextSize _ = 168 diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/Builder.hs b/Crypto/Internal/Builder.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Internal/Builder.hs @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Internal.Builder +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : stable +-- Portability : Good +-- +-- Delaying and merging ByteArray allocations. This is similar to module +-- "Data.ByteArray.Pack" except the total length is computed automatically based +-- on what is appended. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +module Crypto.Internal.Builder + ( Builder + , buildAndFreeze + , builderLength + , byte + , bytes + , zero + ) where + +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memSet) + +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, plusPtr) +import Foreign.Storable (poke) + +import Crypto.Internal.Imports hiding (empty) + +data Builder = Builder !Int (Ptr Word8 -> IO ()) -- size and initializer + +instance Semigroup Builder where + (Builder s1 f1) <> (Builder s2 f2) = Builder (s1 + s2) f + where f p = f1 p >> f2 (p `plusPtr` s1) + +builderLength :: Builder -> Int +builderLength (Builder s _) = s + +buildAndFreeze :: ByteArray ba => Builder -> ba +buildAndFreeze (Builder s f) = B.allocAndFreeze s f + +byte :: Word8 -> Builder +byte !b = Builder 1 (`poke` b) + +bytes :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Builder +bytes bs = Builder (B.length bs) (B.copyByteArrayToPtr bs) + +zero :: Int -> Builder +zero s = if s > 0 then Builder s (\p -> memSet p 0 s) else empty + +empty :: Builder +empty = Builder 0 (const $ return ()) diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/ByteArray.hs b/Crypto/Internal/ByteArray.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/ByteArray.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/ByteArray.hs @@ -7,13 +7,33 @@ -- -- Simple and efficient byte array types -- +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# OPTIONS_HADDOCK hide #-} module Crypto.Internal.ByteArray ( module Data.ByteArray , module Data.ByteArray.Mapping , module Data.ByteArray.Encoding + , constAllZero ) where import Data.ByteArray import Data.ByteArray.Mapping import Data.ByteArray.Encoding + +import Data.Bits ((.|.)) +import Data.Word (Word8) +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Foreign.Storable (peekByteOff) + +import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) + +constAllZero :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Bool +constAllZero b = unsafeDoIO $ withByteArray b $ \p -> loop p 0 0 + where + loop :: Ptr b -> Int -> Word8 -> IO Bool + loop p i !acc + | i == len = return $! acc == 0 + | otherwise = do + e <- peekByteOff p i + loop p (i+1) (acc .|. e) + len = Data.ByteArray.length b diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/Compat.hs b/Crypto/Internal/Compat.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/Compat.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/Compat.hs @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ -- Stability : stable -- Portability : Good -- --- This module try to keep all the difference between versions of base --- or other needed packages, so that modules don't need to use CPP +-- This module tries to keep all the difference between versions of base +-- or other needed packages, so that modules don't need to use CPP. -- {-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} module Crypto.Internal.Compat @@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ import Data.Word import Data.Bits --- | perform io for hashes that do allocation and ffi. --- unsafeDupablePerformIO is used when possible as the +-- | Perform io for hashes that do allocation and FFI. +-- 'unsafeDupablePerformIO' is used when possible as the -- computation is pure and the output is directly linked --- to the input. we also do not modify anything after it has +-- to the input. We also do not modify anything after it has -- been returned to the user. unsafeDoIO :: IO a -> a #if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ > 704 diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/CompatPrim.hs b/Crypto/Internal/CompatPrim.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/CompatPrim.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/CompatPrim.hs @@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ -- Stability : stable -- Portability : Compat -- --- This module try to keep all the difference between versions of ghc primitive +-- This module tries to keep all the difference between versions of ghc primitive -- or other needed packages, so that modules don't need to use CPP. -- -- Note that MagicHash and CPP conflicts in places, making it "more interesting" --- to write compat code for primitives +-- to write compat code for primitives. -- {-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} @@ -23,15 +23,21 @@ , convert4To32 ) where -import GHC.Prim #if !defined(ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && !defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) import Data.Memory.Endian (getSystemEndianness, Endianness(..)) #endif --- | byteswap Word# to or from Big Endian +#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 902 +import GHC.Prim +#else +import GHC.Prim hiding (Word32#) +type Word32# = Word# +#endif + +-- | Byteswap Word# to or from Big Endian -- --- on a big endian machine, this function is a nop. -be32Prim :: Word# -> Word# +-- On a big endian machine, this function is a nop. +be32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32# #ifdef ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN be32Prim = byteswap32Prim #elif defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) @@ -40,10 +46,10 @@ be32Prim w = if getSystemEndianness == LittleEndian then byteswap32Prim w else w #endif --- | byteswap Word# to or from Little Endian +-- | Byteswap Word# to or from Little Endian -- --- on a little endian machine, this function is a nop. -le32Prim :: Word# -> Word# +-- On a little endian machine, this function is a nop. +le32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32# #ifdef ARCH_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN le32Prim w = w #elif defined(ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) @@ -54,19 +60,14 @@ -- | Simple compatibility for byteswap the lower 32 bits of a Word# -- at the primitive level -byteswap32Prim :: Word# -> Word# -#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 708 -byteswap32Prim w = byteSwap32# w +byteswap32Prim :: Word32# -> Word32# +#if __GLASGOW_HASKELL__ >= 902 +byteswap32Prim w = wordToWord32# (byteSwap32# (word32ToWord# w)) #else -byteswap32Prim w = - let !a = uncheckedShiftL# w 24# - !b = and# (uncheckedShiftL# w 8#) 0x00ff0000## - !c = and# (uncheckedShiftRL# w 8#) 0x0000ff00## - !d = and# (uncheckedShiftRL# w 24#) 0x000000ff## - in or# a (or# b (or# c d)) +byteswap32Prim w = byteSwap32# w #endif --- | combine 4 word8 [a,b,c,d] to a word32 representing [a,b,c,d] +-- | Combine 4 word8 [a,b,c,d] to a word32 representing [a,b,c,d] convert4To32 :: Word# -> Word# -> Word# -> Word# -> Word# convert4To32 a b c d = or# (or# c1 c2) (or# c3 c4) diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/DeepSeq.hs b/Crypto/Internal/DeepSeq.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/DeepSeq.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/DeepSeq.hs @@ -30,4 +30,6 @@ instance NFData Bytes where rnf b = b `seq` () instance NFData ScrubbedBytes where rnf b = b `seq` () +instance NFData Integer where rnf i = i `seq` () + #endif diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/Imports.hs b/Crypto/Internal/Imports.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/Imports.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/Imports.hs @@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} module Crypto.Internal.Imports ( module X ) where import Data.Word as X +#if !(MIN_VERSION_base(4,11,0)) +import Data.Semigroup as X (Semigroup(..)) +#endif import Control.Applicative as X import Control.Monad as X (forM, forM_, void) import Control.Arrow as X (first, second) diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/Nat.hs b/Crypto/Internal/Nat.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/Nat.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/Nat.hs @@ -6,12 +6,122 @@ {-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-} module Crypto.Internal.Nat ( type IsDivisibleBy8 + , type IsAtMost, type IsAtLeast + , byteLen + , integralNatVal + , type IsDiv8 + , type Div8 + , type Mod8 ) where import GHC.TypeLits +byteLen :: (KnownNat bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a +byteLen d = fromInteger ((natVal d + 7) `div` 8) + +integralNatVal :: (KnownNat bitlen, Num a) => proxy bitlen -> a +integralNatVal = fromInteger . natVal + +type family IsLE (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) (c :: Bool) where + IsLE _ _ 'True = 'True +#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0) + IsLE bitlen n 'False = TypeError + ( ('Text "bitlen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitlen ':<>: 'Text " is greater than " ':<>: 'ShowType n) + ':$$: ('Text "You have tried to use an invalid Digest size. Please, refer to the documentation.") + ) +#else + IsLE bitlen n 'False = 'False +#endif + +-- | ensure the given `bitlen` is lesser or equal to `n` +-- +type IsAtMost (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) = IsLE bitlen n (bitlen <=? n) ~ 'True + +type family IsGE (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) (c :: Bool) where + IsGE _ _ 'True = 'True +#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0) + IsGE bitlen n 'False = TypeError + ( ('Text "bitlen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitlen ':<>: 'Text " is lesser than " ':<>: 'ShowType n) + ':$$: ('Text "You have tried to use an invalid Digest size. Please, refer to the documentation.") + ) +#else + IsGE bitlen n 'False = 'False +#endif + +-- | ensure the given `bitlen` is greater or equal to `n` +-- +type IsAtLeast (bitlen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) = IsGE bitlen n (n <=? bitlen) ~ 'True + +type family Div8 (bitLen :: Nat) where + Div8 0 = 0 + Div8 1 = 0 + Div8 2 = 0 + Div8 3 = 0 + Div8 4 = 0 + Div8 5 = 0 + Div8 6 = 0 + Div8 7 = 0 + Div8 8 = 1 + Div8 9 = 1 + Div8 10 = 1 + Div8 11 = 1 + Div8 12 = 1 + Div8 13 = 1 + Div8 14 = 1 + Div8 15 = 1 + Div8 16 = 2 + Div8 17 = 2 + Div8 18 = 2 + Div8 19 = 2 + Div8 20 = 2 + Div8 21 = 2 + Div8 22 = 2 + Div8 23 = 2 + Div8 24 = 3 + Div8 25 = 3 + Div8 26 = 3 + Div8 27 = 3 + Div8 28 = 3 + Div8 29 = 3 + Div8 30 = 3 + Div8 31 = 3 + Div8 32 = 4 + Div8 33 = 4 + Div8 34 = 4 + Div8 35 = 4 + Div8 36 = 4 + Div8 37 = 4 + Div8 38 = 4 + Div8 39 = 4 + Div8 40 = 5 + Div8 41 = 5 + Div8 42 = 5 + Div8 43 = 5 + Div8 44 = 5 + Div8 45 = 5 + Div8 46 = 5 + Div8 47 = 5 + Div8 48 = 6 + Div8 49 = 6 + Div8 50 = 6 + Div8 51 = 6 + Div8 52 = 6 + Div8 53 = 6 + Div8 54 = 6 + Div8 55 = 6 + Div8 56 = 7 + Div8 57 = 7 + Div8 58 = 7 + Div8 59 = 7 + Div8 60 = 7 + Div8 61 = 7 + Div8 62 = 7 + Div8 63 = 7 + Div8 64 = 8 + Div8 n = 8 + Div8 (n - 64) + type family IsDiv8 (bitLen :: Nat) (n :: Nat) where - IsDiv8 bitLen 0 = 'True + IsDiv8 _ 0 = 'True #if MIN_VERSION_base(4,9,0) IsDiv8 bitLen 1 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8") IsDiv8 bitLen 2 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8") @@ -21,15 +131,15 @@ IsDiv8 bitLen 6 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8") IsDiv8 bitLen 7 = TypeError ('Text "bitLen " ':<>: 'ShowType bitLen ':<>: 'Text " is not divisible by 8") #else - IsDiv8 bitLen 1 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 2 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 3 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 4 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 5 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 6 = 'False - IsDiv8 bitLen 7 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 1 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 2 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 3 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 4 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 5 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 6 = 'False + IsDiv8 _ 7 = 'False #endif - IsDiv8 bitLen n = IsDiv8 n (Mod8 n) + IsDiv8 _ n = IsDiv8 n (Mod8 n) type family Mod8 (n :: Nat) where Mod8 0 = 0 @@ -98,4 +208,6 @@ Mod8 63 = 7 Mod8 n = Mod8 (n - 64) +-- | ensure the given `bitlen` is divisible by 8 +-- type IsDivisibleBy8 bitLen = IsDiv8 bitLen bitLen ~ 'True diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/Proxy.hs b/Crypto/Internal/Proxy.hs deleted file mode 100644 --- a/Crypto/Internal/Proxy.hs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ --- | --- Module : Crypto.Internal.Proxy --- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez --- Stability : experimental --- Portability : Good --- -module Crypto.Internal.Proxy - ( Proxy(..) - ) where - --- | A type witness for 'a' as phantom type -data Proxy a = Proxy diff --git a/Crypto/Internal/WordArray.hs b/Crypto/Internal/WordArray.hs --- a/Crypto/Internal/WordArray.hs +++ b/Crypto/Internal/WordArray.hs @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -- | --- Module : Crypto.Internal.Compat +-- Module : Crypto.Internal.WordArray -- License : BSD-style -- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez -- Stability : stable @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ -- Small and self contained array representation -- with limited safety for internal use. -- --- the array produced should never be exposed to the user directly +-- The array produced should never be exposed to the user directly. -- {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ , MutableArray32 , array8 , array32 + , array32FromAddrBE + , allocArray32AndFreeze , mutableArray32 , array64 , arrayRead8 @@ -58,20 +60,20 @@ -- | Create an Array of Word32 of specific size from a list of Word32 array32 :: Int -> [Word32] -> Array32 -array32 (I# n) l = unsafeDoIO $ IO $ \s -> - case newAlignedPinnedByteArray# (n *# 4#) 4# s of - (# s', mbarr #) -> loop 0# s' mbarr l - where - loop _ st mb [] = freezeArray mb st - loop i st mb ((W32# x):xs) - | booleanPrim (i ==# n) = freezeArray mb st - | otherwise = - let !st' = writeWord32Array# mb i x st - in loop (i +# 1#) st' mb xs - freezeArray mb st = - case unsafeFreezeByteArray# mb st of - (# st', b #) -> (# st', Array32 b #) +array32 n l = unsafeDoIO (mutableArray32 n l >>= mutableArray32Freeze) {-# NOINLINE array32 #-} + +-- | Create an Array of BE Word32 aliasing an Addr +array32FromAddrBE :: Int -> Addr# -> Array32 +array32FromAddrBE n a = + unsafeDoIO (mutableArray32FromAddrBE n a >>= mutableArray32Freeze) +{-# NOINLINE array32FromAddrBE #-} + +-- | Create an Array of Word32 using an initializer +allocArray32AndFreeze :: Int -> (MutableArray32 -> IO ()) -> Array32 +allocArray32AndFreeze n f = + unsafeDoIO (mutableArray32 n [] >>= \m -> f m >> mutableArray32Freeze m) +{-# NOINLINE allocArray32AndFreeze #-} -- | Create an Array of Word64 of specific size from a list of Word64 array64 :: Int -> [Word64] -> Array64 diff --git a/Crypto/KDF/Argon2.hs b/Crypto/KDF/Argon2.hs --- a/Crypto/KDF/Argon2.hs +++ b/Crypto/KDF/Argon2.hs @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ , hash ) where -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Error import Control.Monad (when) @@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ -- | Which variant of Argon2 to use. You should choose the variant that is most -- applicable to your intention to hash inputs. data Variant = - Argon2d -- ^ Argon2i uses data-independent memory access, which is preferred + Argon2d -- ^ Argon2d is faster than Argon2i and uses data-depending memory access, + -- which makes it suitable for cryptocurrencies and applications with no + -- threats from side-channel timing attacks. + | Argon2i -- ^ Argon2i uses data-independent memory access, which is preferred -- for password hashing and password-based key derivation. Argon2i -- is slower as it makes more passes over the memory to protect from -- tradeoff attacks. - | Argon2i -- ^ Argon2d is faster and uses data-depending memory access, which - -- makes it suitable for cryptocurrencies and applications with no - -- threats from side-channel timing attacks. | Argon2id -- ^ Argon2id is a hybrid of Argon2i and Argon2d, using a combination -- of data-depending and data-independent memory accesses, which gives -- some of Argon2i's resistance to side-channel cache timing attacks @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ -- max 'FFI.ARGON2_MIN_MEMORY' (8 * 'hashParallelism') <= 'hashMemory' <= 'FFI.ARGON2_MAX_MEMORY' type MemoryCost = Word32 --- \ A parallelism degree, which defines the number of parallel threads. +-- | A parallelism degree, which defines the number of parallel threads. -- -- 'FFI.ARGON2_MIN_LANES' <= 'hashParallelism' <= 'FFI.ARGON2_MAX_LANES' && 'FFI.ARGON_MIN_THREADS' <= 'hashParallelism' <= 'FFI.ARGON2_MAX_THREADS' type Parallelism = Word32 @@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ outputMinLength :: Int outputMinLength = 4 +-- specification allows up to 2^32-1 but this is too big for a signed Int +-- on a 32-bit architecture, so we limit tag length to 2^31-1 bytes outputMaxLength :: Int -outputMaxLength = 0xffffffff +outputMaxLength = 0x7fffffff defaultOptions :: Options defaultOptions = diff --git a/Crypto/KDF/BCrypt.hs b/Crypto/KDF/BCrypt.hs --- a/Crypto/KDF/BCrypt.hs +++ b/Crypto/KDF/BCrypt.hs @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ -- >>> validatePassword password bcryptHash -- >>> True -- >>> let otherPassword = B.pack "otherpassword" --- >>> otherHash <- hashPassword 12 otherPasssword :: IO B.ByteString +-- >>> otherHash <- hashPassword 12 otherPassword :: IO B.ByteString -- >>> validatePassword otherPassword otherHash -- >>> True -- @@ -27,13 +27,16 @@ -- salt and hash bytes (each separately Base64 encoded. Incrementing the -- cost parameter approximately doubles the time taken to calculate the hash. -- --- The different version numbers have evolved because of bugs in the standard --- C implementations. The most up to date version is @2b@ and this --- implementation the @2b@ version prefix, but will also attempt to validate +-- The different version numbers evolved to account for bugs in the standard +-- C implementations. They don't represent different versions of the algorithm +-- itself and in most cases should produce identical results. +-- The most up to date version is @2b@ and this implementation uses the +-- @2b@ version prefix, but will also attempt to validate -- against hashes with versions @2a@ and @2y@. Version @2@ or @2x@ will be -- rejected. No attempt is made to differentiate between the different versions -- when validating a password, but in practice this shouldn't cause any problems --- if passwords are UTF-8 encoded (which they should be). +-- if passwords are UTF-8 encoded (which they should be) and less than 256 +-- characters long. -- -- The cost parameter can be between 4 and 31 inclusive, but anything less than -- 10 is probably not strong enough. High values may be prohibitively slow @@ -49,11 +52,16 @@ ) where -import Control.Monad (unless, when) -import Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive (eksBlowfish, encrypt) -import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes) -import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes) -import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Control.Monad (forM_, unless, when) +import Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive (Context, createKeySchedule, + encrypt, expandKey, + expandKeyWithSalt, + freezeKeySchedule) +import Crypto.Internal.Compat +import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes) +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, + Bytes) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Data.ByteArray.Encoding import Data.Char @@ -93,7 +101,7 @@ bcrypt cost salt password = B.concat [header, B.snoc costBytes dollar, b64 salt, b64 hash] where hash = rawHash 'b' realCost salt password - header = B.pack [dollar, fromIntegral (ord '2'), fromIntegral (ord 'a'), dollar] + header = B.pack [dollar, fromIntegral (ord '2'), fromIntegral (ord 'b'), dollar] dollar = fromIntegral (ord '$') zero = fromIntegral (ord '0') costBytes = B.pack [zero + fromIntegral (realCost `div` 10), zero + fromIntegral (realCost `mod` 10)] @@ -133,7 +141,7 @@ -- Truncate the password if necessary and append a null byte for C compatibility key = B.snoc (B.take 72 password) 0 - ctx = eksBlowfish cost salt key + ctx = expensiveBlowfishContext key salt cost -- The BCrypt plaintext: "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" orpheanBeholder = B.pack [79,114,112,104,101,97,110,66,101,104,111,108,100,101,114,83,99,114,121,68,111,117,98,116] @@ -156,10 +164,26 @@ costTens = fromIntegral (B.index bc 4) - zero costUnits = fromIntegral (B.index bc 5) - zero version = chr (fromIntegral (B.index bc 2)) - cost = costUnits + (if costTens == 0 then 0 else 10^costTens) :: Int + cost = costUnits + 10*costTens :: Int decodeSaltHash saltHash = do let (s, h) = B.splitAt 22 saltHash salt <- convertFromBase Base64OpenBSD s hash <- convertFromBase Base64OpenBSD h return (salt, hash) + +-- | Create a key schedule for the BCrypt "EKS" version. +-- +-- Salt must be a 128-bit byte array. +-- Cost must be between 4 and 31 inclusive +-- See +expensiveBlowfishContext :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess salt) => key-> salt -> Int -> Context +expensiveBlowfishContext keyBytes saltBytes cost + | B.length saltBytes /= 16 = error "bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes" + | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do + ks <- createKeySchedule + expandKeyWithSalt ks keyBytes saltBytes + forM_ [1..2^cost :: Int] $ \_ -> do + expandKey ks keyBytes + expandKey ks saltBytes + freezeKeySchedule ks diff --git a/Crypto/KDF/BCryptPBKDF.hs b/Crypto/KDF/BCryptPBKDF.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/KDF/BCryptPBKDF.hs @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF +-- License : BSD-style +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : Good +-- +-- Port of the bcrypt_pbkdf key derivation function from OpenBSD +-- as described at . +module Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF + ( Parameters (..) + , generate + , hashInternal + ) +where + +import Basement.Block (MutableBlock) +import qualified Basement.Block as Block +import qualified Basement.Block.Mutable as Block +import Basement.Monad (PrimState) +import Basement.Types.OffsetSize (CountOf (..), Offset (..)) +import Control.Exception (finally) +import Control.Monad (when) +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box as Blowfish +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive as Blowfish +import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms (SHA512 (..)) +import Crypto.Hash.Types (Context, + hashDigestSize, + hashInternalContextSize, + hashInternalFinalize, + hashInternalInit, + hashInternalUpdate) +import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) +import Data.Bits +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Data.Foldable (forM_) +import Data.Memory.PtrMethods (memCopy, memSet, memXor) +import Data.Word +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr, castPtr) +import Foreign.Storable (peekByteOff, pokeByteOff) + +data Parameters = Parameters + { iterCounts :: Int -- ^ The number of user-defined iterations for the algorithm + -- (must be > 0) + , outputLength :: Int -- ^ The number of bytes to generate out of BCryptPBKDF + -- (must be in 1..1024) + } deriving (Eq, Ord, Show) + +-- | Derive a key of specified length using the bcrypt_pbkdf algorithm. +generate :: (B.ByteArray pass, B.ByteArray salt, B.ByteArray output) + => Parameters + -> pass + -> salt + -> output +generate params pass salt + | iterCounts params < 1 = error "BCryptPBKDF: iterCounts must be > 0" + | keyLen < 1 || keyLen > 1024 = error "BCryptPBKDF: outputLength must be in 1..1024" + | otherwise = B.unsafeCreate keyLen deriveKey + where + outLen, tmpLen, blkLen, keyLen, passLen, saltLen, ctxLen, hashLen, blocks :: Int + outLen = 32 + tmpLen = 32 + blkLen = 4 + passLen = B.length pass + saltLen = B.length salt + keyLen = outputLength params + ctxLen = hashInternalContextSize SHA512 + hashLen = hashDigestSize SHA512 -- 64 + blocks = (keyLen + outLen - 1) `div` outLen + + deriveKey :: Ptr Word8 -> IO () + deriveKey keyPtr = do + -- Allocate all necessary memory. The algorihm shall not allocate + -- any more dynamic memory after this point. Blocks need to be pinned + -- as pointers to them are passed to the SHA512 implementation. + ksClean <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule + ksDirty <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule + ctxMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf ctxLen :: CountOf Word8) + outMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf outLen :: CountOf Word8) + tmpMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf tmpLen :: CountOf Word8) + blkMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf blkLen :: CountOf Word8) + passHashMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf hashLen :: CountOf Word8) + saltHashMBlock <- Block.newPinned (CountOf hashLen :: CountOf Word8) + -- Finally erase all memory areas that contain information from + -- which the derived key could be reconstructed. + -- As all MutableBlocks are pinned it shall be guaranteed that + -- no temporary trampoline buffers are allocated. + finallyErase outMBlock $ finallyErase passHashMBlock $ + B.withByteArray pass $ \passPtr-> + B.withByteArray salt $ \saltPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr ctxMBlock $ \ctxPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr outMBlock $ \outPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr tmpMBlock $ \tmpPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr blkMBlock $ \blkPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr passHashMBlock $ \passHashPtr-> + Block.withMutablePtr saltHashMBlock $ \saltHashPtr-> do + -- Hash the password. + let shaPtr = castPtr ctxPtr :: Ptr (Context SHA512) + hashInternalInit shaPtr + hashInternalUpdate shaPtr passPtr (fromIntegral passLen) + hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr passHashPtr) + passHashBlock <- Block.unsafeFreeze passHashMBlock + forM_ [1..blocks] $ \block-> do + -- Poke the increased block counter. + Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 0 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 24) + Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 1 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 16) + Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 2 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 8) + Block.unsafeWrite blkMBlock 3 (fromIntegral $ block `shiftR` 0) + -- First round (slightly different). + hashInternalInit shaPtr + hashInternalUpdate shaPtr saltPtr (fromIntegral saltLen) + hashInternalUpdate shaPtr blkPtr (fromIntegral blkLen) + hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr saltHashPtr) + Block.unsafeFreeze saltHashMBlock >>= \x-> do + Blowfish.copyKeySchedule ksDirty ksClean + hashInternalMutable ksDirty passHashBlock x tmpMBlock + memCopy outPtr tmpPtr outLen + -- Remaining rounds. + forM_ [2..iterCounts params] $ const $ do + hashInternalInit shaPtr + hashInternalUpdate shaPtr tmpPtr (fromIntegral tmpLen) + hashInternalFinalize shaPtr (castPtr saltHashPtr) + Block.unsafeFreeze saltHashMBlock >>= \x-> do + Blowfish.copyKeySchedule ksDirty ksClean + hashInternalMutable ksDirty passHashBlock x tmpMBlock + memXor outPtr outPtr tmpPtr outLen + -- Spread the current out buffer evenly over the key buffer. + -- After both loops have run every byte of the key buffer + -- will have been written to exactly once and every byte + -- of the output will have been used. + forM_ [0..outLen - 1] $ \outIdx-> do + let keyIdx = outIdx * blocks + block - 1 + when (keyIdx < keyLen) $ do + w8 <- peekByteOff outPtr outIdx :: IO Word8 + pokeByteOff keyPtr keyIdx w8 + +-- | Internal hash function used by `generate`. +-- +-- Normal users should not need this. +hashInternal :: (B.ByteArrayAccess pass, B.ByteArrayAccess salt, B.ByteArray output) + => pass + -> salt + -> output +hashInternal passHash saltHash + | B.length passHash /= 64 = error "passHash must be 512 bits" + | B.length saltHash /= 64 = error "saltHash must be 512 bits" + | otherwise = unsafeDoIO $ do + ks0 <- Blowfish.createKeySchedule + outMBlock <- Block.newPinned 32 + hashInternalMutable ks0 passHash saltHash outMBlock + B.convert `fmap` Block.freeze outMBlock + +hashInternalMutable :: (B.ByteArrayAccess pass, B.ByteArrayAccess salt) + => Blowfish.KeySchedule + -> pass + -> salt + -> MutableBlock Word8 (PrimState IO) + -> IO () +hashInternalMutable bfks passHash saltHash outMBlock = do + Blowfish.expandKeyWithSalt bfks passHash saltHash + forM_ [0..63 :: Int] $ const $ do + Blowfish.expandKey bfks saltHash + Blowfish.expandKey bfks passHash + -- "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" represented as 4 Word64 in big-endian. + store 0 =<< cipher 64 0x4f78796368726f6d + store 8 =<< cipher 64 0x61746963426c6f77 + store 16 =<< cipher 64 0x6669736853776174 + store 24 =<< cipher 64 0x44796e616d697465 + where + store :: Offset Word8 -> Word64 -> IO () + store o w64 = do + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 0) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 32) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 1) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 40) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 2) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 48) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 3) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 56) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 4) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 0) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 5) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 8) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 6) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 16) + Block.unsafeWrite outMBlock (o + 7) (fromIntegral $ w64 `shiftR` 24) + cipher :: Int -> Word64 -> IO Word64 + cipher 0 block = return block + cipher i block = Blowfish.cipherBlockMutable bfks block >>= cipher (i - 1) + +finallyErase :: MutableBlock Word8 (PrimState IO) -> IO () -> IO () +finallyErase mblock action = + action `finally` Block.withMutablePtr mblock (\ptr-> memSet ptr 0 len) + where + CountOf len = Block.mutableLengthBytes mblock diff --git a/Crypto/KDF/PBKDF2.hs b/Crypto/KDF/PBKDF2.hs --- a/Crypto/KDF/PBKDF2.hs +++ b/Crypto/KDF/PBKDF2.hs @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import Data.Bits import Foreign.Marshal.Alloc import Foreign.Ptr (plusPtr, Ptr) -import Foreign.C.Types (CUInt(..), CInt(..), CSize(..)) +import Foreign.C.Types (CUInt(..), CSize(..)) import Crypto.Hash (HashAlgorithm) import qualified Crypto.MAC.HMAC as HMAC diff --git a/Crypto/MAC/CMAC.hs b/Crypto/MAC/CMAC.hs --- a/Crypto/MAC/CMAC.hs +++ b/Crypto/MAC/CMAC.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- provide the CMAC (Cipher based Message Authentification Code) base algorithm. +-- Provide the CMAC (Cipher based Message Authentification Code) base algorithm. -- -- -- @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ cipherIPT :: BlockCipher k => k -> [Word8] -cipherIPT = expandIPT . blockSize where +cipherIPT = expandIPT . blockSize -- Data type which represents the smallest irreducibule binary polynomial -- against specified degree. diff --git a/Crypto/MAC/HMAC.hs b/Crypto/MAC/HMAC.hs --- a/Crypto/MAC/HMAC.hs +++ b/Crypto/MAC/HMAC.hs @@ -5,15 +5,16 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- --- provide the HMAC (Hash based Message Authentification Code) base algorithm. +-- Provide the HMAC (Hash based Message Authentification Code) base algorithm. -- -- {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} module Crypto.MAC.HMAC ( hmac + , hmacLazy , HMAC(..) - -- * incremental + -- * Incremental , Context(..) , initialize , update @@ -24,27 +25,35 @@ import Crypto.Hash hiding (Context) import qualified Crypto.Hash as Hash (Context) import Crypto.Hash.IO -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArrayAccess) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Data.Memory.PtrMethods import Crypto.Internal.Compat -import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L -- | Represent an HMAC that is a phantom type with the hash used to produce the mac. -- --- The Eq instance is constant time. +-- The Eq instance is constant time. No Show instance is provided, to avoid +-- printing by mistake. newtype HMAC a = HMAC { hmacGetDigest :: Digest a } deriving (ByteArrayAccess) instance Eq (HMAC a) where (HMAC b1) == (HMAC b2) = B.constEq b1 b2 --- | compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function +-- | Compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function hmac :: (ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess message, HashAlgorithm a) => key -- ^ Secret key -> message -- ^ Message to MAC -> HMAC a hmac secret msg = finalize $ updates (initialize secret) [msg] + +-- | Compute a MAC using the supplied hashing function, for a lazy input +hmacLazy :: (ByteArrayAccess key, HashAlgorithm a) + => key -- ^ Secret key + -> L.ByteString -- ^ Message to MAC + -> HMAC a +hmacLazy secret msg = finalize $ updates (initialize secret) (L.toChunks msg) -- | Represent an ongoing HMAC state, that can be appended with 'update' -- and finalize to an HMAC with 'hmacFinalize' diff --git a/Crypto/MAC/KMAC.hs b/Crypto/MAC/KMAC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/MAC/KMAC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.MAC.KMAC +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Provide the KMAC (Keccak Message Authentication Code) algorithm, derived from +-- the SHA-3 base algorithm Keccak and defined in NIST SP800-185. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +module Crypto.MAC.KMAC + ( HashSHAKE + , kmac + , KMAC(..) + -- * Incremental + , Context + , initialize + , update + , updates + , finalize + ) where + +import qualified Crypto.Hash as H +import Crypto.Hash.SHAKE (HashSHAKE(..)) +import Crypto.Hash.Types (HashAlgorithm(..), Digest(..)) +import qualified Crypto.Hash.Types as H +import Crypto.Internal.Builder +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Data.Bits (shiftR) +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B + + +-- cSHAKE + +cshakeInit :: forall a name string prefix . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess name, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess prefix) + => name -> string -> prefix -> H.Context a +cshakeInit n s p = H.Context $ B.allocAndFreeze c $ \(ptr :: Ptr (H.Context a)) -> do + hashInternalInit ptr + B.withByteArray b $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ptr d (fromIntegral $ B.length b) + B.withByteArray p $ \d -> hashInternalUpdate ptr d (fromIntegral $ B.length p) + where + c = hashInternalContextSize (undefined :: a) + w = hashBlockSize (undefined :: a) + x = encodeString n <> encodeString s + b = buildAndFreeze (bytepad x w) :: B.Bytes + +cshakeUpdate :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => H.Context a -> ba -> H.Context a +cshakeUpdate = H.hashUpdate + +cshakeUpdates :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => H.Context a -> [ba] -> H.Context a +cshakeUpdates = H.hashUpdates + +cshakeFinalize :: forall a suffix . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess suffix) + => H.Context a -> suffix -> Digest a +cshakeFinalize !c s = + Digest $ B.allocAndFreeze (hashDigestSize (undefined :: a)) $ \dig -> do + ((!_) :: B.Bytes) <- B.copy c $ \(ctx :: Ptr (H.Context a)) -> do + B.withByteArray s $ \d -> + hashInternalUpdate ctx d (fromIntegral $ B.length s) + cshakeInternalFinalize ctx dig + return () + + +-- KMAC + +-- | Represent a KMAC that is a phantom type with the hash used to produce the +-- mac. +-- +-- The Eq instance is constant time. No Show instance is provided, to avoid +-- printing by mistake. +newtype KMAC a = KMAC { kmacGetDigest :: Digest a } + deriving (ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +instance Eq (KMAC a) where + (KMAC b1) == (KMAC b2) = B.constEq b1 b2 + +-- | Compute a KMAC using the supplied customization string and key. +kmac :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess key, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => string -> key -> ba -> KMAC a +kmac str key msg = finalize $ updates (initialize str key) [msg] + +-- | Represent an ongoing KMAC state, that can be appended with 'update' and +-- finalized to a 'KMAC' with 'finalize'. +newtype Context a = Context (H.Context a) + +-- | Initialize a new incremental KMAC context with the supplied customization +-- string and key. +initialize :: forall a string key . (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess string, ByteArrayAccess key) + => string -> key -> Context a +initialize str key = Context $ cshakeInit n str p + where + n = B.pack [75,77,65,67] :: B.Bytes -- "KMAC" + w = hashBlockSize (undefined :: a) + p = buildAndFreeze (bytepad (encodeString key) w) :: B.ScrubbedBytes + +-- | Incrementally update a KMAC context. +update :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Context a -> ba -> Context a +update (Context ctx) = Context . cshakeUpdate ctx + +-- | Incrementally update a KMAC context with multiple inputs. +updates :: (HashSHAKE a, ByteArrayAccess ba) => Context a -> [ba] -> Context a +updates (Context ctx) = Context . cshakeUpdates ctx + +-- | Finalize a KMAC context and return the KMAC. +finalize :: forall a . HashSHAKE a => Context a -> KMAC a +finalize (Context ctx) = KMAC $ cshakeFinalize ctx suffix + where + l = cshakeOutputLength (undefined :: a) + suffix = buildAndFreeze (rightEncode l) :: B.Bytes + + +-- Utilities + +bytepad :: Builder -> Int -> Builder +bytepad x w = prefix <> x <> zero padLen + where + prefix = leftEncode w + padLen = (w - builderLength prefix - builderLength x) `mod` w + +encodeString :: ByteArrayAccess bin => bin -> Builder +encodeString s = leftEncode (8 * B.length s) <> bytes s + +leftEncode :: Int -> Builder +leftEncode x = byte len <> digits + where + digits = i2osp x + len = fromIntegral (builderLength digits) + +rightEncode :: Int -> Builder +rightEncode x = digits <> byte len + where + digits = i2osp x + len = fromIntegral (builderLength digits) + +i2osp :: Int -> Builder +i2osp i | i >= 256 = i2osp (shiftR i 8) <> byte (fromIntegral i) + | otherwise = byte (fromIntegral i) diff --git a/Crypto/MAC/Poly1305.hs b/Crypto/MAC/Poly1305.hs --- a/Crypto/MAC/Poly1305.hs +++ b/Crypto/MAC/Poly1305.hs @@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ import Crypto.Error -- | Poly1305 State +-- +-- This type is an instance of 'ByteArrayAccess' for debugging purpose. Internal +-- layout is architecture dependent, may contain uninitialized data fragments, +-- and change in future versions. The bytearray should not be used as input to +-- cryptographic algorithms. newtype State = State ScrubbedBytes deriving (ByteArrayAccess) diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Basic.hs b/Crypto/Number/Basic.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Basic.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Basic.hs @@ -13,12 +13,15 @@ , log2 , numBits , numBytes + , asPowerOf2AndOdd ) where +import Data.Bits + import Crypto.Number.Compat --- | sqrti returns two integer (l,b) so that l <= sqrt i <= b --- the implementation is quite naive, use an approximation for the first number +-- | @sqrti@ returns two integers @(l,b)@ so that @l <= sqrt i <= b@. +-- The implementation is quite naive, use an approximation for the first number -- and use a dichotomy algorithm to compute the bound relatively efficiently. sqrti :: Integer -> (Integer, Integer) sqrti i @@ -49,7 +52,7 @@ else iter (lb+d) ub sq a = a * a --- | get the extended GCD of two integer using integer divMod +-- | Get the extended GCD of two integer using integer divMod -- -- gcde 'a' 'b' find (x,y,gcd(a,b)) where ax + by = d -- @@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ let (q, r) = a' `divMod` b' in f t (r, sa - (q * sb), ta - (q * tb)) --- | check if a list of integer are all even +-- | Check if a list of integer are all even areEven :: [Integer] -> Bool areEven = and . map even @@ -98,3 +101,16 @@ -- | Compute the number of bytes for an integer numBytes :: Integer -> Int numBytes n = gmpSizeInBytes n `onGmpUnsupported` ((numBits n + 7) `div` 8) + +-- | Express an integer as an odd number and a power of 2 +asPowerOf2AndOdd :: Integer -> (Int, Integer) +asPowerOf2AndOdd a + | a == 0 = (0, 0) + | odd a = (0, a) + | a < 0 = let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd $ abs a in (e, -a1) + | isPowerOf2 a = (log2 a, 1) + | otherwise = loop a 0 + where + isPowerOf2 n = (n /= 0) && ((n .&. (n - 1)) == 0) + loop n pw = if n `mod` 2 == 0 then loop (n `div` 2) (pw + 1) + else (pw, n) diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Compat.hs b/Crypto/Number/Compat.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Compat.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Compat.hs @@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ , gmpSizeInBytes , gmpSizeInBits , gmpExportInteger + , gmpExportIntegerLE , gmpImportInteger + , gmpImportIntegerLE ) where #ifndef MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp @@ -70,8 +72,12 @@ -- | Compute the power modulus using extra security to remain constant -- time wise through GMP gmpPowModSecInteger :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> GmpSupported Integer -#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) +#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0) gmpPowModSecInteger _ _ _ = GmpUnsupported +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,2) +gmpPowModSecInteger b e m = GmpSupported (powModSecInteger b e m) +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) +gmpPowModSecInteger _ _ _ = GmpUnsupported #elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpPowModSecInteger b e m = GmpSupported (powModSecInteger b e m) #else @@ -99,7 +105,9 @@ -- | Get the next prime from a specific value through GMP gmpNextPrime :: Integer -> GmpSupported Integer -#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) +#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0) +gmpNextPrime _ = GmpUnsupported +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpNextPrime n = GmpSupported (nextPrimeInteger n) #else gmpNextPrime _ = GmpUnsupported @@ -107,7 +115,9 @@ -- | Test if a number is prime using Miller Rabin gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin :: Int -> Integer -> GmpSupported Bool -#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) +#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,1,0) +gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin _ _ = GmpUnsupported +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) gmpTestPrimeMillerRabin (I# tries) !n = GmpSupported $ case testPrimeInteger n tries of 0# -> False @@ -132,7 +142,7 @@ gmpSizeInBits _ = GmpUnsupported #endif --- | Export an integer to a memory +-- | Export an integer to a memory (big-endian) gmpExportInteger :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO ()) #if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) gmpExportInteger n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ do @@ -146,7 +156,21 @@ gmpExportInteger _ _ = GmpUnsupported #endif --- | Import an integer from a memory +-- | Export an integer to a memory (little-endian) +gmpExportIntegerLE :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO ()) +#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) +gmpExportIntegerLE n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ do + _ <- exportIntegerToAddr n addr 0# + return () +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) +gmpExportIntegerLE n (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ IO $ \s -> + case exportIntegerToAddr n addr 0# s of + (# s2, _ #) -> (# s2, () #) +#else +gmpExportIntegerLE _ _ = GmpUnsupported +#endif + +-- | Import an integer from a memory (big-endian) gmpImportInteger :: Int -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO Integer) #if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) gmpImportInteger (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ @@ -156,4 +180,16 @@ importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 1# s #else gmpImportInteger _ _ = GmpUnsupported +#endif + +-- | Import an integer from a memory (little-endian) +gmpImportIntegerLE :: Int -> Ptr Word8 -> GmpSupported (IO Integer) +#if MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(1,0,0) +gmpImportIntegerLE (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ + importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 0# +#elif MIN_VERSION_integer_gmp(0,5,1) +gmpImportIntegerLE (I# n) (Ptr addr) = GmpSupported $ IO $ \s -> + importIntegerFromAddr addr (int2Word# n) 0# s +#else +gmpImportIntegerLE _ _ = GmpUnsupported #endif diff --git a/Crypto/Number/F2m.hs b/Crypto/Number/F2m.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/F2m.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/F2m.hs @@ -16,14 +16,15 @@ , mulF2m , squareF2m' , squareF2m + , powF2m , modF2m + , sqrtF2m , invF2m , divF2m ) where import Data.Bits (xor, shift, testBit, setBit) import Data.List -import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Number.Basic -- | Binary Polynomial represented by an integer @@ -67,8 +68,8 @@ mulF2m fx n1 n2 | fx < 0 || n1 < 0 - || n2 < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary binary polynomial" - | fx == 0 = error "modF2m: cannot multiply modulo zero polynomial" + || n2 < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary polynomial" + | fx == 0 = error "mulF2m: cannot multiply modulo zero polynomial" | otherwise = modF2m fx $ go (if n2 `mod` 2 == 1 then n1 else 0) (log2 n2) where go n s | s == 0 = n @@ -97,9 +98,36 @@ squareF2m' :: Integer -> Integer squareF2m' n - | n < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary binary polynomial" + | n < 0 = error "mulF2m: negative number represent no binary polynomial" | otherwise = foldl' (\acc s -> if testBit n s then setBit acc (2 * s) else acc) 0 [0 .. log2 n] {-# INLINE squareF2m' #-} + +-- | Exponentiation in F₂m by computing @a^b mod fx@. +-- +-- This implements an exponentiation by squaring based solution. It inherits the +-- same restrictions as 'squareF2m'. Negative exponents are disallowed. +powF2m :: BinaryPolynomial -- ^Modulus + -> Integer -- ^a + -> Integer -- ^b + -> Integer +powF2m fx a b + | b < 0 = error "powF2m: negative exponents disallowed" + | b == 0 = if fx > 1 then 1 else 0 + | even b = squareF2m fx x + | otherwise = mulF2m fx a (squareF2m' x) + where x = powF2m fx a (b `div` 2) + +-- | Square rooot in F₂m. +-- +-- We exploit the fact that @a^(2^m) = a@, or in particular, @a^(2^m - 1) = 1@ +-- from a classical result by Lagrange. Thus the square root is simply @a^(2^(m +-- - 1))@. +sqrtF2m :: BinaryPolynomial -- ^Modulus + -> Integer -- ^a + -> Integer +sqrtF2m fx a = go (log2 fx - 1) a + where go 0 x = x + go n x = go (n - 1) (squareF2m fx x) -- | Extended GCD algorithm for polynomials. For @a@ and @b@ returns @(g, u, v)@ such that @a * u + b * v == g@. -- diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Generate.hs b/Crypto/Number/Generate.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Generate.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Generate.hs @@ -120,6 +120,4 @@ -- | generate a number between the inclusive bound [low,high]. generateBetween :: MonadRandom m => Integer -> Integer -> m Integer -generateBetween low high - | low == 1 = generateMax high >>= \r -> if r == 0 then generateBetween low high else return r - | otherwise = (low +) <$> generateMax (high - low + 1) +generateBetween low high = (low +) <$> generateMax (high - low + 1) diff --git a/Crypto/Number/ModArithmetic.hs b/Crypto/Number/ModArithmetic.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/ModArithmetic.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/ModArithmetic.hs @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} -{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} -- | -- Module : Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic -- License : BSD-style @@ -9,26 +8,29 @@ module Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic ( - -- * exponentiation + -- * Exponentiation expSafe , expFast - -- * inverse computing + -- * Inverse computing , inverse , inverseCoprimes + , inverseFermat + -- * Squares + , jacobi + , squareRoot ) where import Control.Exception (throw, Exception) -import Data.Typeable import Crypto.Number.Basic import Crypto.Number.Compat -- | Raised when two numbers are supposed to be coprimes but are not. data CoprimesAssertionError = CoprimesAssertionError - deriving (Show,Typeable) + deriving (Show) instance Exception CoprimesAssertionError --- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponant using +-- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponent using -- algorithms design to avoid side channels and timing measurement -- -- Modulo need to be odd otherwise the normal fast modular exponentiation @@ -38,11 +40,10 @@ -- from expFast, and thus provide the same unstudied and dubious -- timing and side channels claims. -- --- with GHC 7.10, the powModSecInteger is missing from integer-gmp --- (which is now integer-gmp2), so is has the same security as old --- ghc version. +-- Before GHC 8.4.2, powModSecInteger is missing from integer-gmp, +-- so expSafe has the same security as expFast. expSafe :: Integer -- ^ base - -> Integer -- ^ exponant + -> Integer -- ^ exponent -> Integer -- ^ modulo -> Integer -- ^ result expSafe b e m @@ -52,30 +53,30 @@ | otherwise = gmpPowModInteger b e m `onGmpUnsupported` exponentiation b e m --- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponant using +-- | Compute the modular exponentiation of base^exponent using -- the fastest algorithm without any consideration for -- hiding parameters. -- -- Use this function when all the parameters are public, --- otherwise 'expSafe' should be prefered. +-- otherwise 'expSafe' should be preferred. expFast :: Integer -- ^ base - -> Integer -- ^ exponant + -> Integer -- ^ exponent -> Integer -- ^ modulo -> Integer -- ^ result expFast b e m = gmpPowModInteger b e m `onGmpUnsupported` exponentiation b e m --- | exponentiation computes modular exponentiation as b^e mod m +-- | @exponentiation@ computes modular exponentiation as /b^e mod m/ -- using repetitive squaring. exponentiation :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer exponentiation b e m | b == 1 = b | e == 0 = 1 | e == 1 = b `mod` m - | even e = let p = (exponentiation b (e `div` 2) m) `mod` m + | even e = let p = exponentiation b (e `div` 2) m `mod` m in (p^(2::Integer)) `mod` m | otherwise = (b * exponentiation b (e-1) m) `mod` m --- | inverse computes the modular inverse as in g^(-1) mod m +-- | @inverse@ computes the modular inverse as in /g^(-1) mod m/. inverse :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer inverse g m = gmpInverse g m `onGmpUnsupported` v where @@ -84,14 +85,133 @@ | otherwise = Just (x `mod` m) (x,_,d) = gcde g m --- | Compute the modular inverse of 2 coprime numbers. +-- | Compute the modular inverse of two coprime numbers. -- This is equivalent to inverse except that the result -- is known to exists. -- --- if the numbers are not defined as coprime, this function --- will raise a CoprimesAssertionError. +-- If the numbers are not defined as coprime, this function +-- will raise a 'CoprimesAssertionError'. inverseCoprimes :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer inverseCoprimes g m = case inverse g m of Nothing -> throw CoprimesAssertionError Just i -> i + +-- | Computes the Jacobi symbol (a/n). +-- 0 ≤ a < n; n ≥ 3 and odd. +-- +-- The Legendre and Jacobi symbols are indistinguishable exactly when the +-- lower argument is an odd prime, in which case they have the same value. +-- +-- See algorithm 2.149 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +jacobi :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer +jacobi a n + | n < 3 || even n = Nothing + | a == 0 || a == 1 = Just a + | n <= a = jacobi (a `mod` n) n + | a < 0 = + let b = if n `mod` 4 == 1 then 1 else -1 + in fmap (*b) (jacobi (-a) n) + | otherwise = + let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd a + nMod8 = n `mod` 8 + nMod4 = n `mod` 4 + a1Mod4 = a1 `mod` 4 + s' = if even e || nMod8 == 1 || nMod8 == 7 then 1 else -1 + s = if nMod4 == 3 && a1Mod4 == 3 then -s' else s' + n1 = n `mod` a1 + in if a1 == 1 then Just s + else fmap (*s) (jacobi n1 a1) + +-- | Modular inverse using Fermat's little theorem. This works only when +-- the modulus is prime but avoids side channels like in 'expSafe'. +inverseFermat :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer +inverseFermat g p = expSafe g (p - 2) p + +-- | Raised when the assumption about the modulus is invalid. +data ModulusAssertionError = ModulusAssertionError + deriving (Show) + +instance Exception ModulusAssertionError + +-- | Modular square root of @g@ modulo a prime @p@. +-- +-- If the modulus is found not to be prime, the function will raise a +-- 'ModulusAssertionError'. +-- +-- This implementation is variable time and should be used with public +-- parameters only. +squareRoot :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer +squareRoot p + | p < 2 = throw ModulusAssertionError + | otherwise = + case p `divMod` 8 of + (v, 3) -> method1 (2 * v + 1) + (v, 7) -> method1 (2 * v + 2) + (u, 5) -> method2 u + (_, 1) -> tonelliShanks p + (0, 2) -> \a -> Just (if even a then 0 else 1) + _ -> throw ModulusAssertionError + + where + x `eqMod` y = (x - y) `mod` p == 0 + + validate g y | (y * y) `eqMod` g = Just y + | otherwise = Nothing + + -- p == 4u + 3 and u' == u + 1 + method1 u' g = + let y = expFast g u' p + in validate g y + + -- p == 8u + 5 + method2 u g = + let gamma = expFast (2 * g) u p + g_gamma = g * gamma + i = (2 * g_gamma * gamma) `mod` p + y = (g_gamma * (i - 1)) `mod` p + in validate g y + +tonelliShanks :: Integer -> Integer -> Maybe Integer +tonelliShanks p a + | aa == 0 = Just 0 + | otherwise = + case expFast aa p2 p of + b | b == p1 -> Nothing + | b == 1 -> Just $ go (expFast aa ((s + 1) `div` 2) p) + (expFast aa s p) + (expFast n s p) + e + | otherwise -> throw ModulusAssertionError + where + aa = a `mod` p + p1 = p - 1 + p2 = p1 `div` 2 + n = findN 2 + + x `mul` y = (x * y) `mod` p + + pow2m 0 x = x + pow2m i x = pow2m (i - 1) (x `mul` x) + + (e, s) = asPowerOf2AndOdd p1 + + -- find a quadratic non-residue + findN i + | expFast i p2 p == p1 = i + | otherwise = findN (i + 1) + + -- find m such that b^(2^m) == 1 (mod p) + findM b i + | b == 1 = i + | otherwise = findM (b `mul` b) (i + 1) + + go !x b g !r + | b == 1 = x + | otherwise = + let r' = findM b 0 + z = pow2m (r - r' - 1) g + x' = x `mul` z + b' = b `mul` g' + g' = z `mul` z + in go x' b' g' r' diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Nat.hs b/Crypto/Number/Nat.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Number/Nat.hs @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Number.Nat +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : Good +-- +-- Numbers at type level. +-- +-- This module provides extensions to "GHC.TypeLits" and "GHC.TypeNats" useful +-- to work with cryptographic algorithms parameterized with a variable bit +-- length. Constraints like @'IsDivisibleBy8' n@ ensure that the type-level +-- parameter is applicable to the algorithm. +-- +-- Functions are also provided to test whether constraints are satisfied from +-- values known at runtime. The following example shows how to discharge +-- 'IsDivisibleBy8' in a computation @fn@ requiring this constraint: +-- +-- > withDivisibleBy8 :: Integer +-- > -> (forall proxy n . (KnownNat n, IsDivisibleBy8 n) => proxy n -> a) +-- > -> Maybe a +-- > withDivisibleBy8 len fn = do +-- > SomeNat p <- someNatVal len +-- > Refl <- isDivisibleBy8 p +-- > pure (fn p) +-- +-- Function @withDivisibleBy8@ above returns 'Nothing' when the argument @len@ +-- is negative or not divisible by 8. +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeOperators #-} +module Crypto.Number.Nat + ( type IsDivisibleBy8 + , type IsAtMost, type IsAtLeast + , isDivisibleBy8 + , isAtMost + , isAtLeast + ) where + +import Data.Type.Equality +import GHC.TypeLits +import Unsafe.Coerce (unsafeCoerce) + +import Crypto.Internal.Nat + +-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsDivisibleBy8' n@ is satified +isDivisibleBy8 :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> Maybe (IsDiv8 n n :~: 'True) +isDivisibleBy8 n + | mod (natVal n) 8 == 0 = Just (unsafeCoerce Refl) + | otherwise = Nothing + +-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsAtMost' value bound@ is +-- satified +isAtMost :: (KnownNat value, KnownNat bound) + => proxy value -> proxy' bound -> Maybe ((value <=? bound) :~: 'True) +isAtMost x y + | natVal x <= natVal y = Just (unsafeCoerce Refl) + | otherwise = Nothing + +-- | get a runtime proof that the constraint @'IsAtLeast' value bound@ is +-- satified +isAtLeast :: (KnownNat value, KnownNat bound) + => proxy value -> proxy' bound -> Maybe ((bound <=? value) :~: 'True) +isAtLeast = flip isAtMost diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Prime.hs b/Crypto/Number/Prime.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Prime.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Prime.hs @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ , isCoprime ) where -import Crypto.Internal.Imports - import Crypto.Number.Compat import Crypto.Number.Generate import Crypto.Number.Basic (sqrti, gcde) @@ -31,10 +29,10 @@ import Data.Bits --- | returns if the number is probably prime. --- first a list of small primes are implicitely tested for divisibility, +-- | Returns if the number is probably prime. +-- First a list of small primes are implicitely tested for divisibility, -- then a fermat primality test is used with arbitrary numbers and --- then the Miller Rabin algorithm is used with an accuracy of 30 recursions +-- then the Miller Rabin algorithm is used with an accuracy of 30 recursions. isProbablyPrime :: Integer -> Bool isProbablyPrime !n | any (\p -> p `divides` n) (filter (< n) firstPrimes) = False @@ -42,14 +40,14 @@ | primalityTestFermat 50 (n `div` 2) n = primalityTestMillerRabin 30 n | otherwise = False --- | generate a prime number of the required bitsize (i.e. in the range --- [2^(b-1)+2^(b-2), 2^b)). +-- | Generate a prime number of the required bitsize (i.e. in the range +-- [2^(b-1)+2^(b-2), 2^b)). -- --- May throw a CryptoError_PrimeSizeInvalid if the requested size is less --- than 5 bits, as the smallest prime meeting these conditions is 29. --- This function requires that the two highest bits are set, so that when --- multiplied with another prime to create a key, it is guaranteed to be of --- the proper size. +-- May throw a 'CryptoError_PrimeSizeInvalid' if the requested size is less +-- than 5 bits, as the smallest prime meeting these conditions is 29. +-- This function requires that the two highest bits are set, so that when +-- multiplied with another prime to create a key, it is guaranteed to be of +-- the proper size. generatePrime :: MonadRandom m => Int -> m Integer generatePrime bits = do if bits < 5 then @@ -61,13 +59,13 @@ return $ prime else generatePrime bits --- | generate a prime number of the form 2p+1 where p is also prime. +-- | Generate a prime number of the form 2p+1 where p is also prime. -- it is also knowed as a Sophie Germaine prime or safe prime. -- -- The number of safe prime is significantly smaller to the number of prime, -- as such it shouldn't be used if this number is supposed to be kept safe. -- --- May throw a CryptoError_PrimeSizeInvalid if the requested size is less than +-- May throw a 'CryptoError_PrimeSizeInvalid' if the requested size is less than -- 6 bits, as the smallest safe prime with the two highest bits set is 59. generateSafePrime :: MonadRandom m => Int -> m Integer generateSafePrime bits = do @@ -81,7 +79,7 @@ return $ val else generateSafePrime bits --- | find a prime from a starting point where the property hold. +-- | Find a prime from a starting point where the property hold. findPrimeFromWith :: (Integer -> Bool) -> Integer -> Integer findPrimeFromWith prop !n | even n = findPrimeFromWith prop (n+1) @@ -93,7 +91,7 @@ then n else findPrimeFromWith prop (n+2) --- | find a prime from a starting point with no specific property. +-- | Find a prime from a starting point with no specific property. findPrimeFrom :: Integer -> Integer findPrimeFrom n = case gmpNextPrime n of @@ -129,7 +127,7 @@ factorise :: Integer -> Integer -> (Integer, Integer) factorise !si !vi | vi `testBit` 0 = (si, vi) - | otherwise = factorise (si+1) (vi `shiftR` 1) -- probably faster to not shift v continously, but just once. + | otherwise = factorise (si+1) (vi `shiftR` 1) -- probably faster to not shift v continuously, but just once. expmod = expSafe -- when iteration reach zero, we have a probable prime @@ -185,7 +183,7 @@ isCoprime :: Integer -> Integer -> Bool isCoprime m n = case gcde m n of (_,_,d) -> d == 1 --- | list of the first primes till 2903.. +-- | List of the first primes till 2903. firstPrimes :: [Integer] firstPrimes = [ 2 , 3 , 5 , 7 , 11 , 13 , 17 , 19 , 23 , 29 diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Serialize.hs b/Crypto/Number/Serialize.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Serialize.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Serialize.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : Good -- --- fast serialization primitives for integer +-- Fast serialization primitives for integer {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.Number.Serialize ( i2osp @@ -19,22 +19,23 @@ import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal as Internal --- | os2ip converts a byte string into a positive integer +-- | @os2ip@ converts a byte string into a positive integer. os2ip :: B.ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Integer os2ip bs = unsafeDoIO $ B.withByteArray bs (\p -> Internal.os2ip p (B.length bs)) --- | i2osp converts a positive integer into a byte string +-- | @i2osp@ converts a positive integer into a byte string. -- --- first byte is MSB (most significant byte), last byte is the LSB (least significant byte) +-- The first byte is MSB (most significant byte); the last byte is the LSB (least significant byte) i2osp :: B.ByteArray ba => Integer -> ba i2osp 0 = B.allocAndFreeze 1 (\p -> Internal.i2osp 0 p 1 >> return ()) i2osp m = B.allocAndFreeze sz (\p -> Internal.i2osp m p sz >> return ()) where !sz = numBytes m --- | just like i2osp, but take an extra parameter for size. --- if the number is too big to fit in @len@ bytes, 'Nothing' is returned +-- | Just like 'i2osp', but takes an extra parameter for size. +-- If the number is too big to fit in @len@ bytes, 'Nothing' is returned -- otherwise the number is padded with 0 to fit the @len@ required. +{-# INLINABLE i2ospOf #-} i2ospOf :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> Maybe ba i2ospOf len m | len <= 0 = Nothing @@ -44,10 +45,10 @@ where !sz = numBytes m --- | just like i2ospOf except that it doesn't expect a failure: i.e. --- an integer larger than the number of output bytes requested +-- | Just like 'i2ospOf' except that it doesn't expect a failure: i.e. +-- an integer larger than the number of output bytes requested. -- --- for example if you just took a modulo of the number that represent +-- For example if you just took a modulo of the number that represent -- the size (example the RSA modulo n). i2ospOf_ :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> ba i2ospOf_ len = maybe (error "i2ospOf_: integer is larger than expected") id . i2ospOf len diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal.hs b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal.hs --- a/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal.hs +++ b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : Good -- --- fast serialization primitives for integer using raw pointers +-- Fast serialization primitives for integer using raw pointers {-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal ( i2osp @@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ import Foreign.Ptr import Foreign.Storable --- | fill a pointer with the big endian binary representation of an integer +-- | Fill a pointer with the big endian binary representation of an integer -- --- if the room available @ptrSz is less than the number of bytes needed, +-- If the room available @ptrSz@ is less than the number of bytes needed, -- 0 is returned. Likewise if a parameter is invalid, 0 is returned. -- --- returns the number of bytes written +-- Returns the number of bytes written i2osp :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int i2osp m ptr ptrSz | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0 @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ pokeByteOff p ofs (fromIntegral b :: Word8) export (ofs-1) i' --- | transform a big endian binary integer representation pointed by a pointer and a size +-- | Transform a big endian binary integer representation pointed by a pointer and a size -- into an integer os2ip :: Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Integer os2ip ptr ptrSz @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ | otherwise = gmpImportInteger ptrSz ptr `onGmpUnsupported` loop 0 0 ptr where loop :: Integer -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO Integer - loop !acc i p + loop !acc i !p | i == ptrSz = return acc | otherwise = do w <- peekByteOff p i :: IO Word8 diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal/LE.hs b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal/LE.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/Internal/LE.hs @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : Good +-- +-- Fast serialization primitives for integer using raw pointers (little endian) +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +module Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE + ( i2osp + , i2ospOf + , os2ip + ) where + +import Crypto.Number.Compat +import Crypto.Number.Basic +import Data.Bits +import Data.Memory.PtrMethods +import Data.Word (Word8) +import Foreign.Ptr +import Foreign.Storable + +-- | Fill a pointer with the little endian binary representation of an integer +-- +-- If the room available @ptrSz@ is less than the number of bytes needed, +-- 0 is returned. Likewise if a parameter is invalid, 0 is returned. +-- +-- Returns the number of bytes written +i2osp :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int +i2osp m ptr ptrSz + | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0 + | m < 0 = return 0 + | m == 0 = pokeByteOff ptr 0 (0 :: Word8) >> return 1 + | ptrSz < sz = return 0 + | otherwise = fillPtr ptr sz m >> return sz + where + !sz = numBytes m + +-- | Similar to 'i2osp', except it will pad any remaining space with zero. +i2ospOf :: Integer -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int +i2ospOf m ptr ptrSz + | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0 + | m < 0 = return 0 + | ptrSz < sz = return 0 + | otherwise = do + memSet ptr 0 ptrSz + fillPtr ptr sz m + return ptrSz + where + !sz = numBytes m + +fillPtr :: Ptr Word8 -> Int -> Integer -> IO () +fillPtr p sz m = gmpExportIntegerLE m p `onGmpUnsupported` export 0 m + where + export ofs i + | ofs >= sz = return () + | otherwise = do + let (i', b) = i `divMod` 256 + pokeByteOff p ofs (fromIntegral b :: Word8) + export (ofs+1) i' + +-- | Transform a little endian binary integer representation pointed by a +-- pointer and a size into an integer +os2ip :: Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Integer +os2ip ptr ptrSz + | ptrSz <= 0 = return 0 + | otherwise = gmpImportIntegerLE ptrSz ptr `onGmpUnsupported` loop 0 (ptrSz-1) ptr + where + loop :: Integer -> Int -> Ptr Word8 -> IO Integer + loop !acc i !p + | i < 0 = return acc + | otherwise = do + w <- peekByteOff p i :: IO Word8 + loop ((acc `shiftL` 8) .|. fromIntegral w) (i-1) p diff --git a/Crypto/Number/Serialize/LE.hs b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/LE.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/Number/Serialize/LE.hs @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : Good +-- +-- Fast serialization primitives for integer (little endian) +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +module Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE + ( i2osp + , os2ip + , i2ospOf + , i2ospOf_ + ) where + +import Crypto.Number.Basic +import Crypto.Internal.Compat (unsafeDoIO) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE as Internal + +-- | @os2ip@ converts a byte string into a positive integer. +os2ip :: B.ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> Integer +os2ip bs = unsafeDoIO $ B.withByteArray bs (\p -> Internal.os2ip p (B.length bs)) + +-- | @i2osp@ converts a positive integer into a byte string. +-- +-- The first byte is LSB (least significant byte); the last byte is the MSB (most significant byte) +i2osp :: B.ByteArray ba => Integer -> ba +i2osp 0 = B.allocAndFreeze 1 (\p -> Internal.i2osp 0 p 1 >> return ()) +i2osp m = B.allocAndFreeze sz (\p -> Internal.i2osp m p sz >> return ()) + where + !sz = numBytes m + +-- | Just like 'i2osp', but takes an extra parameter for size. +-- If the number is too big to fit in @len@ bytes, 'Nothing' is returned +-- otherwise the number is padded with 0 to fit the @len@ required. +{-# INLINABLE i2ospOf #-} +i2ospOf :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> Maybe ba +i2ospOf len m + | len <= 0 = Nothing + | m < 0 = Nothing + | sz > len = Nothing + | otherwise = Just $ B.unsafeCreate len (\p -> Internal.i2ospOf m p len >> return ()) + where + !sz = numBytes m + +-- | Just like 'i2ospOf' except that it doesn't expect a failure: i.e. +-- an integer larger than the number of output bytes requested. +-- +-- For example if you just took a modulo of the number that represent +-- the size (example the RSA modulo n). +i2ospOf_ :: B.ByteArray ba => Int -> Integer -> ba +i2ospOf_ len = maybe (error "i2ospOf_: integer is larger than expected") id . i2ospOf len diff --git a/Crypto/OTP.hs b/Crypto/OTP.hs --- a/Crypto/OTP.hs +++ b/Crypto/OTP.hs @@ -42,15 +42,14 @@ ) where -import Data.Bits (shiftL, shiftR, (.&.), (.|.)) +import Data.Bits (shiftL, (.&.), (.|.)) import Data.ByteArray.Mapping (fromW64BE) import Data.List (elemIndex) import Data.Word -import Foreign.Storable (poke) import Control.Monad (unless) import Crypto.Hash (HashAlgorithm, SHA1(..)) import Crypto.MAC.HMAC -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, Bytes) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Curve25519.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Curve25519.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/Curve25519.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Curve25519.hs @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ , dhSecret , publicKey , secretKey - -- * methods + -- * Methods , dh , toPublic , generateSecretKey @@ -33,9 +33,8 @@ import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Internal.Compat import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray, ScrubbedBytes, Bytes, withByteArray) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes, Bytes, withByteArray) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B -import Crypto.Error (CryptoFailable(..)) import Crypto.Random -- | A Curve25519 Secret key @@ -92,7 +91,10 @@ | B.length bs == 32 = CryptoPassed $ DhSecret $ B.copyAndFreeze bs (\_ -> return ()) | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SharedSecretSizeInvalid --- | Compute the Diffie Hellman secret from a public key and a secret key +-- | Compute the Diffie Hellman secret from a public key and a secret key. +-- +-- This implementation may return an all-zero value as it does not check for +-- the condition. dh :: PublicKey -> SecretKey -> DhSecret dh (PublicKey pub) (SecretKey sec) = DhSecret <$> B.allocAndFreeze 32 $ \result -> diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Curve448.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Curve448.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/Curve448.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Curve448.hs @@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ -- -- Curve448 support -- +-- Internally uses Decaf point compression to omit the cofactor +-- and implementation by Mike Hamburg. Externally API and +-- data types are compatible with the encoding specified in RFC 7748. +-- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} -{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 ( SecretKey , PublicKey @@ -17,7 +20,7 @@ , dhSecret , publicKey , secretKey - -- * methods + -- * Methods , dh , toPublic , generateSecretKey @@ -25,7 +28,6 @@ import Data.Word import Foreign.Ptr -import GHC.Ptr import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Random @@ -75,13 +77,16 @@ | B.length bs == x448_bytes = CryptoPassed $ DhSecret $ B.copyAndFreeze bs (\_ -> return ()) | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SharedSecretSizeInvalid --- | Compute the Diffie Hellman secret from a public key and a secret key +-- | Compute the Diffie Hellman secret from a public key and a secret key. +-- +-- This implementation may return an all-zero value as it does not check for +-- the condition. dh :: PublicKey -> SecretKey -> DhSecret dh (PublicKey pub) (SecretKey sec) = DhSecret <$> B.allocAndFreeze x448_bytes $ \result -> withByteArray sec $ \psec -> withByteArray pub $ \ppub -> - ccryptonite_ed448 result psec ppub + decaf_x448 result ppub psec {-# NOINLINE dh #-} -- | Create a public key from a secret key @@ -89,9 +94,7 @@ toPublic (SecretKey sec) = PublicKey <$> B.allocAndFreeze x448_bytes $ \result -> withByteArray sec $ \psec -> - ccryptonite_ed448 result psec basePoint - where - basePoint = Ptr "\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"# + decaf_x448_derive_public_key result psec {-# NOINLINE toPublic #-} -- | Generate a secret key. @@ -101,8 +104,13 @@ x448_bytes :: Int x448_bytes = 448 `quot` 8 -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_x448" - ccryptonite_ed448 :: Ptr Word8 -- ^ public - -> Ptr Word8 -- ^ secret - -> Ptr Word8 -- ^ basepoint - -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_decaf_x448" + decaf_x448 :: Ptr Word8 -- ^ public + -> Ptr Word8 -- ^ basepoint + -> Ptr Word8 -- ^ secret + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key" + decaf_x448_derive_public_key :: Ptr Word8 -- ^ public + -> Ptr Word8 -- ^ secret + -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/DH.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/DH.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/DH.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/DH.hs @@ -33,19 +33,22 @@ { params_p :: Integer , params_g :: Integer , params_bits :: Int - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) +instance NFData Params where + rnf (Params p g bits) = rnf p `seq` rnf g `seq` bits `seq` () + -- | Represent Diffie Hellman public number Y. newtype PublicNumber = PublicNumber Integer - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Enum,Real,Num,Ord) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Enum,Real,Num,Ord,NFData) -- | Represent Diffie Hellman private number X. newtype PrivateNumber = PrivateNumber Integer - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Enum,Real,Num,Ord) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Enum,Real,Num,Ord,NFData) -- | Represent Diffie Hellman shared secret. newtype SharedKey = SharedKey ScrubbedBytes - deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess) + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) -- | generate params from a specific generator (2 or 5 are common values) -- we generate a safe prime (a prime number of the form 2p+1 where p is also prime) diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/DSA.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/DSA.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/DSA.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/DSA.hs @@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ , PrivateKey(..) , PublicNumber , PrivateNumber - -- * generation + -- * Generation , generatePrivate , calculatePublic - -- * signature primitive + -- * Signature primitive , sign , signWith - -- * verification primitive + -- * Verification primitive , verify -- * Key pair , KeyPair(..) @@ -28,19 +28,18 @@ , toPrivateKey ) where -import Crypto.Random.Types -import Data.Bits (testBit) -import Data.Data -import Data.Maybe -import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) -import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expFast, expSafe, inverse) -import Crypto.Number.Serialize -import Crypto.Number.Generate -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess(length), convert, index, dropView, takeView) -import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Hash -import Prelude hiding (length) +import Data.Data +import Data.Maybe + +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expFast, expSafe, inverse) +import Crypto.Number.Generate +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.PubKey.Internal (dsaTruncHash) +import Crypto.Random.Types + -- | DSA Public Number, usually embedded in DSA Public Key type PublicNumber = Integer @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ { params_p :: Integer -- ^ DSA p , params_g :: Integer -- ^ DSA g , params_q :: Integer -- ^ DSA q - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData Params where rnf (Params p g q) = p `seq` g `seq` q `seq` () @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ data Signature = Signature { sign_r :: Integer -- ^ DSA r , sign_s :: Integer -- ^ DSA s - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData Signature where rnf (Signature r s) = r `seq` s `seq` () @@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ data PublicKey = PublicKey { public_params :: Params -- ^ DSA parameters , public_y :: PublicNumber -- ^ DSA public Y - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData PublicKey where rnf (PublicKey params y) = y `seq` params `seq` () @@ -82,14 +81,14 @@ data PrivateKey = PrivateKey { private_params :: Params -- ^ DSA parameters , private_x :: PrivateNumber -- ^ DSA private X - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData PrivateKey where rnf (PrivateKey params x) = x `seq` params `seq` () -- | Represent a DSA key pair data KeyPair = KeyPair Params PublicNumber PrivateNumber - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData KeyPair where rnf (KeyPair params y x) = x `seq` y `seq` params `seq` () @@ -126,7 +125,7 @@ x = private_x pk -- compute r,s kInv = fromJust $ inverse k q - hm = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg msg + hm = dsaTruncHash hashAlg msg q r = expSafe g k p `mod` q s = (kInv * (hm + x * r)) `mod` q @@ -148,11 +147,8 @@ | otherwise = v == r where (Params p g q) = public_params pk y = public_y pk - hm = os2ip . truncateHash $ hashWith hashAlg m - + hm = dsaTruncHash hashAlg m q w = fromJust $ inverse s q u1 = (hm*w) `mod` q u2 = (r*w) `mod` q v = ((expFast g u1 p) * (expFast y u2 p)) `mod` p `mod` q - -- if the hash is larger than the size of q, truncate it; FIXME: deal with the case of a q not evenly divisible by 8 - truncateHash h = if numBits (os2ip h) > numBits q then takeView h (numBits q `div` 8) else dropView h 0 diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/ECDSA.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/ECDSA.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/ECDSA.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/ECDSA.hs @@ -11,45 +11,46 @@ , toPublicKey , toPrivateKey , signWith + , signDigestWith , sign + , signDigest , verify + , verifyDigest ) where import Control.Monad -import Crypto.Random.Types -import Data.Bits (shiftR) -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import Data.Data -import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverse) -import Crypto.Number.Serialize import Crypto.Number.Generate import Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types import Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim -import Crypto.Hash -import Crypto.Hash.Types (hashDigestSize) +import Crypto.PubKey.Internal (dsaTruncHashDigest) +import Crypto.Random.Types -- | Represent a ECDSA signature namely R and S. data Signature = Signature { sign_r :: Integer -- ^ ECDSA r , sign_s :: Integer -- ^ ECDSA s - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | ECDSA Private Key. data PrivateKey = PrivateKey { private_curve :: Curve , private_d :: PrivateNumber - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | ECDSA Public Key. data PublicKey = PublicKey { public_curve :: Curve , public_q :: PublicPoint - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | ECDSA Key Pair. data KeyPair = KeyPair Curve PublicPoint PrivateNumber - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | Public key of a ECDSA Key pair. toPublicKey :: KeyPair -> PublicKey @@ -59,17 +60,16 @@ toPrivateKey :: KeyPair -> PrivateKey toPrivateKey (KeyPair curve _ priv) = PrivateKey curve priv --- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k number. +-- | Sign digest using the private key and an explicit k number. -- -- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks. -signWith :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) - => Integer -- ^ k random number - -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key - -> hash -- ^ hash function - -> msg -- ^ message to sign - -> Maybe Signature -signWith k (PrivateKey curve d) hashAlg msg = do - let z = tHash hashAlg msg n +signDigestWith :: HashAlgorithm hash + => Integer -- ^ k random number + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> Digest hash -- ^ digest to sign + -> Maybe Signature +signDigestWith k (PrivateKey curve d) digest = do + let z = dsaTruncHashDigest digest n CurveCommon _ _ g n _ = common_curve curve let point = pointMul curve k g r <- case point of @@ -80,26 +80,44 @@ when (r == 0 || s == 0) Nothing return $ Signature r s --- | Sign message using the private key. +-- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k number. -- -- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks. -sign :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) - => PrivateKey -> hash -> msg -> m Signature -sign pk hashAlg msg = do +signWith :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) + => Integer -- ^ k random number + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> msg -- ^ message to sign + -> Maybe Signature +signWith k pk hashAlg msg = signDigestWith k pk (hashWith hashAlg msg) + +-- | Sign digest using the private key. +-- +-- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks. +signDigest :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => PrivateKey -> Digest hash -> m Signature +signDigest pk digest = do k <- generateBetween 1 (n - 1) - case signWith k pk hashAlg msg of - Nothing -> sign pk hashAlg msg + case signDigestWith k pk digest of + Nothing -> signDigest pk digest Just sig -> return sig where n = ecc_n . common_curve $ private_curve pk --- | Verify a bytestring using the public key. -verify :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> PublicKey -> Signature -> msg -> Bool -verify _ (PublicKey _ PointO) _ _ = False -verify hashAlg pk@(PublicKey curve q) (Signature r s) msg +-- | Sign message using the private key. +-- +-- /WARNING:/ Vulnerable to timing attacks. +sign :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => PrivateKey -> hash -> msg -> m Signature +sign pk hashAlg msg = signDigest pk (hashWith hashAlg msg) + +-- | Verify a digest using the public key. +verifyDigest :: HashAlgorithm hash => PublicKey -> Signature -> Digest hash -> Bool +verifyDigest (PublicKey _ PointO) _ _ = False +verifyDigest pk@(PublicKey curve q) (Signature r s) digest | r < 1 || r >= n || s < 1 || s >= n = False | otherwise = maybe False (r ==) $ do w <- inverse s n - let z = tHash hashAlg msg n + let z = dsaTruncHashDigest digest n u1 = z * w `mod` n u2 = r * w `mod` n x = pointAddTwoMuls curve u1 g u2 q @@ -110,10 +128,6 @@ g = ecc_g cc cc = common_curve $ public_curve pk --- | Truncate and hash. -tHash :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> msg -> Integer -> Integer -tHash hashAlg m n - | d > 0 = shiftR e d - | otherwise = e - where e = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m - d = hashDigestSize hashAlg * 8 - numBits n +-- | Verify a bytestring using the public key. +verify :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> PublicKey -> Signature -> msg -> Bool +verify hashAlg pk sig msg = verifyDigest pk sig (hashWith hashAlg msg) diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/P256.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/P256.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/P256.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/P256.hs @@ -8,31 +8,37 @@ -- P256 support -- {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} -{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE EmptyDataDecls #-} {-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unused-binds #-} module Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 ( Scalar , Point - -- * point arithmetic + -- * Point arithmetic , pointBase , pointAdd + , pointNegate , pointMul , pointDh , pointsMulVarTime , pointIsValid + , pointIsAtInfinity , toPoint + , pointX , pointToIntegers , pointFromIntegers , pointToBinary , pointFromBinary - -- * scalar arithmetic + , unsafePointFromBinary + -- * Scalar arithmetic , scalarGenerate , scalarZero + , scalarN , scalarIsZero , scalarAdd , scalarSub + , scalarMul , scalarInv + , scalarInvSafe , scalarCmp , scalarFromBinary , scalarToBinary @@ -43,7 +49,6 @@ import Data.Word import Foreign.Ptr import Foreign.C.Types -import Control.Monad import Crypto.Internal.Compat import Crypto.Internal.Imports @@ -57,11 +62,11 @@ -- | A P256 scalar newtype Scalar = Scalar ScrubbedBytes - deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess) + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) -- | A P256 point newtype Point = Point Bytes - deriving (Show,Eq) + deriving (Show,Eq,NFData) scalarSize :: Int scalarSize = 32 @@ -75,6 +80,9 @@ data P256Y data P256X +order :: Integer +order = 0xffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551 + ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Point methods ------------------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -105,20 +113,27 @@ withPoint a $ \ax ay -> withPoint b $ \bx by -> ccryptonite_p256e_point_add ax ay bx by dx dy +-- | Negate a point +pointNegate :: Point -> Point +pointNegate a = withNewPoint $ \dx dy -> + withPoint a $ \ax ay -> + ccryptonite_p256e_point_negate ax ay dx dy + -- | Multiply a point by a scalar -- -- warning: variable time pointMul :: Scalar -> Point -> Point pointMul scalar p = withNewPoint $ \dx dy -> - withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> withScalarZero $ \nzero -> - ccryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime nzero n px py dx dy + withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> + ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul n px py dx dy --- | Similar to 'pointMul', serializing the x coordinate as binary +-- | Similar to 'pointMul', serializing the x coordinate as binary. +-- When scalar is multiple of point order the result is all zero. pointDh :: ByteArray binary => Scalar -> Point -> binary pointDh scalar p = B.unsafeCreate scalarSize $ \dst -> withTempPoint $ \dx dy -> do - withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> withScalarZero $ \nzero -> - ccryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime nzero n px py dx dy + withScalar scalar $ \n -> withPoint p $ \px py -> + ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul n px py dx dy ccryptonite_p256_to_bin (castPtr dx) dst -- | multiply the point @p with @n2 and add a lifted to curve value @n1 @@ -137,6 +152,19 @@ r <- ccryptonite_p256_is_valid_point px py return (r /= 0) +-- | Check if a 'Point' is the point at infinity +pointIsAtInfinity :: Point -> Bool +pointIsAtInfinity (Point b) = constAllZero b + +-- | Return the x coordinate as a 'Scalar' if the point is not at infinity +pointX :: Point -> Maybe Scalar +pointX p + | pointIsAtInfinity p = Nothing + | otherwise = Just $ + withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> + withPoint p $ \px _ -> + ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n (castPtr px) (castPtr d) + -- | Convert a point to (x,y) Integers pointToIntegers :: Point -> (Integer, Integer) pointToIntegers p = unsafeDoIO $ withPoint p $ \px py -> @@ -172,10 +200,19 @@ ccryptonite_p256_to_bin (castPtr px) dst ccryptonite_p256_to_bin (castPtr py) (dst `plusPtr` 32) --- | Convert from binary to a point +-- | Convert from binary to a valid point pointFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Point -pointFromBinary ba - | B.length ba /= pointSize = CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid +pointFromBinary ba = unsafePointFromBinary ba >>= validatePoint + where + validatePoint :: Point -> CryptoFailable Point + validatePoint p + | pointIsValid p = CryptoPassed p + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + +-- | Convert from binary to a point, possibly invalid +unsafePointFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Point +unsafePointFromBinary ba + | B.length ba /= pointSize = CryptoFailed CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid | otherwise = CryptoPassed $ withNewPoint $ \px py -> B.withByteArray ba $ \src -> do ccryptonite_p256_from_bin src (castPtr px) @@ -198,41 +235,40 @@ scalarZero :: Scalar scalarZero = withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> ccryptonite_p256_init d +-- | The scalar representing the curve order +scalarN :: Scalar +scalarN = throwCryptoError (scalarFromInteger order) + -- | Check if the scalar is 0 scalarIsZero :: Scalar -> Bool scalarIsZero s = unsafeDoIO $ withScalar s $ \d -> do result <- ccryptonite_p256_is_zero d return $ result /= 0 -scalarNeedReducing :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO Bool -scalarNeedReducing d = do - c <- ccryptonite_p256_cmp d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n - return (c >= 0) - -- | Perform addition between two scalars -- -- > a + b scalarAdd :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar scalarAdd a b = - withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> do - carry <- ccryptonite_p256_add pa pb d - when (carry /= 0) $ void $ ccryptonite_p256_sub d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d - needReducing <- scalarNeedReducing d - when needReducing $ do - ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d d + withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> + ccryptonite_p256e_modadd ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa pb d -- | Perform subtraction between two scalars -- -- > a - b scalarSub :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar scalarSub a b = - withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> do - borrow <- ccryptonite_p256_sub pa pb d - when (borrow /= 0) $ void $ ccryptonite_p256_add d ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d - --needReducing <- scalarNeedReducing d - --when needReducing $ do - -- ccryptonite_p256_mod ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n d d + withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> + ccryptonite_p256e_modsub ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa pb d +-- | Perform multiplication between two scalars +-- +-- > a * b +scalarMul :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Scalar +scalarMul a b = + withNewScalarFreeze $ \d -> withScalar a $ \pa -> withScalar b $ \pb -> + ccryptonite_p256_modmul ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa 0 pb d + -- | Give the inverse of the scalar -- -- > 1 / a @@ -243,6 +279,14 @@ withNewScalarFreeze $ \b -> withScalar a $ \pa -> ccryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime ccryptonite_SECP256r1_n pa b +-- | Give the inverse of the scalar using safe exponentiation +-- +-- > 1 / a +scalarInvSafe :: Scalar -> Scalar +scalarInvSafe a = + withNewScalarFreeze $ \b -> withScalar a $ \pa -> + ccryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert pa b + -- | Compare 2 Scalar scalarCmp :: Scalar -> Scalar -> Ordering scalarCmp a b = unsafeDoIO $ @@ -253,7 +297,7 @@ -- | convert a scalar from binary scalarFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Scalar scalarFromBinary ba - | B.length ba /= scalarSize = CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid + | B.length ba /= scalarSize = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeySizeInvalid | otherwise = CryptoPassed $ withNewScalarFreeze $ \p -> B.withByteArray ba $ \b -> ccryptonite_p256_from_bin b p @@ -292,20 +336,11 @@ {-# NOINLINE withNewScalarFreeze #-} withTempPoint :: (Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -> IO a) -> IO a -withTempPoint f = allocTempScrubbed scalarSize (\p -> let px = castPtr p in f px (pxToPy px)) - -withTempScalar :: (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a -withTempScalar f = allocTempScrubbed scalarSize (f . castPtr) +withTempPoint f = allocTempScrubbed pointSize (\p -> let px = castPtr p in f px (pxToPy px)) withScalar :: Scalar -> (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a withScalar (Scalar d) f = B.withByteArray d f -withScalarZero :: (Ptr P256Scalar -> IO a) -> IO a -withScalarZero f = - withTempScalar $ \d -> do - ccryptonite_p256_init d - f d - allocTemp :: Int -> (Ptr Word8 -> IO a) -> IO a allocTemp n f = ignoreSnd <$> B.allocRet n f where @@ -334,18 +369,20 @@ ccryptonite_p256_is_zero :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_clear" ccryptonite_p256_clear :: Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_add" - ccryptonite_p256_add :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_modadd" + ccryptonite_p256e_modadd :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_add_d" ccryptonite_p256_add_d :: Ptr P256Scalar -> P256Digit -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt -foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_sub" - ccryptonite_p256_sub :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_modsub" + ccryptonite_p256e_modsub :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_cmp" ccryptonite_p256_cmp :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO CInt foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_mod" ccryptonite_p256_mod :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modmul" ccryptonite_p256_modmul :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> P256Digit -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert" + ccryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () --foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modinv" -- ccryptonite_p256_modinv :: Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> Ptr P256Scalar -> IO () foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime" @@ -359,6 +396,18 @@ ccryptonite_p256e_point_add :: Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_point_negate" + ccryptonite_p256e_point_negate :: Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y + -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y + -> IO () + +-- compute (out_x,out_y) = n * (in_x,in_y) +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_p256e_point_mul" + ccryptonite_p256e_point_mul :: Ptr P256Scalar -- n + -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -- in_{x,y} + -> Ptr P256X -> Ptr P256Y -- out_{x,y} -> IO () -- compute (out_x,out,y) = n1 * G + n2 * (in_x,in_y) diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Prim.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Prim.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Prim.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Prim.hs @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ module Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim ( scalarGenerate , pointAdd + , pointNegate , pointDouble , pointBaseMul , pointMul @@ -30,9 +31,9 @@ -- | Elliptic Curve point negation: -- @pointNegate c p@ returns point @q@ such that @pointAdd c p q == PointO@. pointNegate :: Curve -> Point -> Point -pointNegate _ PointO = PointO -pointNegate CurveFP{} (Point x y) = Point x (-y) -pointNegate CurveF2m{} (Point x y) = Point x (x `addF2m` y) +pointNegate _ PointO = PointO +pointNegate (CurveFP c) (Point x y) = Point x (ecc_p c - y) +pointNegate CurveF2m{} (Point x y) = Point x (x `addF2m` y) -- | Elliptic Curve point addition. -- diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Types.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECC/Types.hs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ -- Stability : Experimental -- Portability : Excellent -- --- references: +-- References: -- -- module Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ , ecc_fx , ecc_p , CurveCommon(..) - -- * recommended curves definition + -- * Recommended curves definition , CurveName(..) , getCurveByName ) where @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ -- | Define either a binary curve or a prime curve. data Curve = CurveF2m CurveBinary -- ^ 𝔽(2^m) | CurveFP CurvePrime -- ^ 𝔽p - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | ECC Public Point type PublicPoint = Point @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ -- | Define a point on a curve. data Point = Point Integer Integer | PointO -- ^ Point at Infinity - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData Point where rnf (Point x y) = x `seq` y `seq` () @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ -- | Define an elliptic curve in 𝔽(2^m). -- The firt parameter is the Integer representatioin of the irreducible polynomial f(x). data CurveBinary = CurveBinary Integer CurveCommon - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData CurveBinary where rnf (CurveBinary i cc) = i `seq` cc `seq` () @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ -- | Define an elliptic curve in 𝔽p. -- The first parameter is the Prime Number. data CurvePrime = CurvePrime Integer CurveCommon - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | Parameters in common between binary and prime curves. common_curve :: Curve -> CurveCommon @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ , ecc_g :: Point -- ^ base point , ecc_n :: Integer -- ^ order of G , ecc_h :: Integer -- ^ cofactor - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) -- | Define names for known recommended curves. data CurveName = @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ | SEC_t409r1 | SEC_t571k1 | SEC_t571r1 - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Ord,Enum,Bounded,Data,Typeable) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Ord,Enum,Bounded,Data) {- curvesOIDs :: [ (CurveName, [Integer]) ] diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECDSA.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECDSA.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECDSA.hs @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, with the parameterized +-- curve implementations provided by module "Crypto.ECC". +-- +-- Public/private key pairs can be generated using +-- 'curveGenerateKeyPair' or decoded from binary. +-- +-- /WARNING:/ Only curve P-256 has constant-time implementation. +-- Signature operations with P-384 and P-521 may leak the private key. +-- +-- Signature verification should be safe for all curves. +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# LANGUAGE StandaloneDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} +{-# LANGUAGE UndecidableInstances #-} +module Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA + ( EllipticCurveECDSA (..) + -- * Public keys + , PublicKey + , encodePublic + , decodePublic + , toPublic + -- * Private keys + , PrivateKey + , encodePrivate + , decodePrivate + -- * Signatures + , Signature(..) + , signatureFromIntegers + , signatureToIntegers + -- * Generation and verification + , signWith + , signDigestWith + , sign + , signDigest + , verify + , verifyDigest + ) where + +import Control.Monad + +import Crypto.ECC +import qualified Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types as Simple +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Hash.Types +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess) +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverseFermat) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 as P256 +import Crypto.Random.Types + +import Data.Bits +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Data.Data + +import Foreign.Ptr (Ptr) +import Foreign.Storable (peekByteOff, pokeByteOff) + +-- | Represent a ECDSA signature namely R and S. +data Signature curve = Signature + { sign_r :: Scalar curve -- ^ ECDSA r + , sign_s :: Scalar curve -- ^ ECDSA s + } + +deriving instance Eq (Scalar curve) => Eq (Signature curve) +deriving instance Show (Scalar curve) => Show (Signature curve) + +instance NFData (Scalar curve) => NFData (Signature curve) where + rnf (Signature r s) = rnf r `seq` rnf s `seq` () + +-- | ECDSA Public Key. +type PublicKey curve = Point curve + +-- | ECDSA Private Key. +type PrivateKey curve = Scalar curve + +-- | Elliptic curves with ECDSA capabilities. +class EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve => EllipticCurveECDSA curve where + -- | Is a scalar in the accepted range for ECDSA + scalarIsValid :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Bool + + -- | Test whether the scalar is zero + scalarIsZero :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Bool + scalarIsZero prx s = s == throwCryptoError (scalarFromInteger prx 0) + + -- | Scalar inversion modulo the curve order + scalarInv :: proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> Maybe (Scalar curve) + + -- | Return the point X coordinate as a scalar + pointX :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> Maybe (Scalar curve) + +instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P256R1 where + scalarIsValid _ s = not (P256.scalarIsZero s) + && P256.scalarCmp s P256.scalarN == LT + + scalarIsZero _ = P256.scalarIsZero + + scalarInv _ s = let inv = P256.scalarInvSafe s + in if P256.scalarIsZero inv then Nothing else Just inv + + pointX _ = P256.pointX + +instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P384R1 where + scalarIsValid _ = ecScalarIsValid (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1) + + scalarIsZero _ = ecScalarIsZero + + scalarInv _ = ecScalarInv (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1) + + pointX _ = ecPointX (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p384r1) + +instance EllipticCurveECDSA Curve_P521R1 where + scalarIsValid _ = ecScalarIsValid (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1) + + scalarIsZero _ = ecScalarIsZero + + scalarInv _ = ecScalarInv (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1) + + pointX _ = ecPointX (Proxy :: Proxy Simple.SEC_p521r1) + + +-- | Create a signature from integers (R, S). +signatureFromIntegers :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => proxy curve -> (Integer, Integer) -> CryptoFailable (Signature curve) +signatureFromIntegers prx (r, s) = + liftA2 Signature (scalarFromInteger prx r) (scalarFromInteger prx s) + +-- | Get integers (R, S) from a signature. +-- +-- The values can then be used to encode the signature to binary with +-- ASN.1. +signatureToIntegers :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => proxy curve -> Signature curve -> (Integer, Integer) +signatureToIntegers prx sig = + (scalarToInteger prx $ sign_r sig, scalarToInteger prx $ sign_s sig) + +-- | Encode a public key into binary form, i.e. the uncompressed encoding +-- referenced from section 2.2. +encodePublic :: (EllipticCurve curve, ByteArray bs) + => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve -> bs +encodePublic = encodePoint + +-- | Try to decode the binary form of a public key. +decodePublic :: (EllipticCurve curve, ByteArray bs) + => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (PublicKey curve) +decodePublic = decodePoint + +-- | Encode a private key into binary form, i.e. the @privateKey@ field +-- described in . +encodePrivate :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArray bs) + => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> bs +encodePrivate = encodeScalar + +-- | Try to decode the binary form of a private key. +decodePrivate :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArray bs) + => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (PrivateKey curve) +decodePrivate = decodeScalar + +-- | Create a public key from a private key. +toPublic :: EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> PublicKey curve +toPublic = pointBaseSmul + +-- | Sign digest using the private key and an explicit k scalar. +signDigestWith :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> PrivateKey curve -> Digest hash -> Maybe (Signature curve) +signDigestWith prx k d digest = do + let z = tHashDigest prx digest + point = pointBaseSmul prx k + r <- pointX prx point + kInv <- scalarInv prx k + let s = scalarMul prx kInv (scalarAdd prx z (scalarMul prx r d)) + when (scalarIsZero prx r || scalarIsZero prx s) Nothing + return $ Signature r s + +-- | Sign message using the private key and an explicit k scalar. +signWith :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> PrivateKey curve -> hash -> msg -> Maybe (Signature curve) +signWith prx k d hashAlg msg = signDigestWith prx k d (hashWith hashAlg msg) + +-- | Sign a digest using hash and private key. +signDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, MonadRandom m, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> Digest hash -> m (Signature curve) +signDigest prx pk digest = do + k <- curveGenerateScalar prx + case signDigestWith prx k pk digest of + Nothing -> signDigest prx pk digest + Just sig -> return sig + +-- | Sign a message using hash and private key. +sign :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, MonadRandom m, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> PrivateKey curve -> hash -> msg -> m (Signature curve) +sign prx pk hashAlg msg = signDigest prx pk (hashWith hashAlg msg) + +-- | Verify a digest using hash and public key. +verifyDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve -> Signature curve -> Digest hash -> Bool +verifyDigest prx q (Signature r s) digest + | not (scalarIsValid prx r) = False + | not (scalarIsValid prx s) = False + | otherwise = maybe False (r ==) $ do + w <- scalarInv prx s + let z = tHashDigest prx digest + u1 = scalarMul prx z w + u2 = scalarMul prx r w + x = pointsSmulVarTime prx u1 u2 q + pointX prx x + -- Note: precondition q /= PointO is not tested because we assume + -- point decoding never decodes point at infinity. + +-- | Verify a signature using hash and public key. +verify :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> hash -> PublicKey curve -> Signature curve -> msg -> Bool +verify prx hashAlg q sig msg = verifyDigest prx q sig (hashWith hashAlg msg) + +-- | Truncate a digest based on curve order size. +tHashDigest :: (EllipticCurveECDSA curve, HashAlgorithm hash) + => proxy curve -> Digest hash -> Scalar curve +tHashDigest prx (Digest digest) = throwCryptoError $ decodeScalar prx encoded + where m = curveOrderBits prx + d = m - B.length digest * 8 + (n, r) = m `divMod` 8 + n' = if r > 0 then succ n else n + + encoded + | d > 0 = B.zero (n' - B.length digest) `B.append` digest + | d == 0 = digest + | r == 0 = B.take n digest + | otherwise = shiftBytes digest + + shiftBytes bs = B.allocAndFreeze n' $ \dst -> + B.withByteArray bs $ \src -> go dst src 0 0 + + go :: Ptr Word8 -> Ptr Word8 -> Word8 -> Int -> IO () + go dst src !a i + | i >= n' = return () + | otherwise = do + b <- peekByteOff src i + pokeByteOff dst i (unsafeShiftR b (8 - r) .|. unsafeShiftL a r) + go dst src b (succ i) + + +ecScalarIsValid :: Simple.Curve c => proxy c -> Simple.Scalar c -> Bool +ecScalarIsValid prx (Simple.Scalar s) = s > 0 && s < n + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx + +ecScalarIsZero :: forall curve . Simple.Curve curve + => Simple.Scalar curve -> Bool +ecScalarIsZero (Simple.Scalar a) = a == 0 + +ecScalarInv :: Simple.Curve c + => proxy c -> Simple.Scalar c -> Maybe (Simple.Scalar c) +ecScalarInv prx (Simple.Scalar s) + | i == 0 = Nothing + | otherwise = Just $ Simple.Scalar i + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx + i = inverseFermat s n + +ecPointX :: Simple.Curve c + => proxy c -> Simple.Point c -> Maybe (Simple.Scalar c) +ecPointX _ Simple.PointO = Nothing +ecPointX prx (Simple.Point x _) = Just (Simple.Scalar $ x `mod` n) + where n = Simple.curveEccN $ Simple.curveParameters prx diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ECIES.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ECIES.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ECIES.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ECIES.hs @@ -25,18 +25,18 @@ ) where import Crypto.ECC +import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Random -import Crypto.Internal.Proxy -- | Generate random a new Shared secret and the associated point -- to do a ECIES style encryption deriveEncrypt :: (MonadRandom randomly, EllipticCurveDH curve) => proxy curve -- ^ representation of the curve -> Point curve -- ^ the public key of the receiver - -> randomly (Point curve, SharedSecret) + -> randomly (CryptoFailable (Point curve, SharedSecret)) deriveEncrypt proxy pub = do (KeyPair rPoint rScalar) <- curveGenerateKeyPair proxy - return (rPoint, ecdh proxy rScalar pub) + return $ (\s -> (rPoint, s)) `fmap` ecdh proxy rScalar pub -- | Derive the shared secret with the receiver key -- and the R point of the scheme. @@ -44,5 +44,5 @@ => proxy curve -- ^ representation of the curve -> Point curve -- ^ The received R (supposedly, randomly generated on the encrypt side) -> Scalar curve -- ^ The secret key of the receiver - -> SharedSecret + -> CryptoFailable SharedSecret deriveDecrypt proxy point secret = ecdh proxy secret point diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Ed25519.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Ed25519.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/Ed25519.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Ed25519.hs @@ -7,35 +7,42 @@ -- -- Ed25519 support -- +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} -{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 ( SecretKey , PublicKey , Signature + -- * Size constants + , publicKeySize + , secretKeySize + , signatureSize -- * Smart constructors , signature , publicKey , secretKey - -- * methods + -- * Methods , toPublic , sign , verify + , generateSecretKey ) where import Data.Word -import Foreign.Ptr import Foreign.C.Types +import Foreign.Ptr +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes, + ScrubbedBytes, withByteArray) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Internal.Compat import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, withByteArray, ScrubbedBytes, Bytes) -import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B -import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Random -- | An Ed25519 Secret key newtype SecretKey = SecretKey ScrubbedBytes - deriving (Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) -- | An Ed25519 public key newtype PublicKey = PublicKey Bytes @@ -106,12 +113,19 @@ where !msgLen = B.length message +-- | Generate a secret key +generateSecretKey :: MonadRandom m => m SecretKey +generateSecretKey = SecretKey <$> getRandomBytes secretKeySize + +-- | A public key is 32 bytes publicKeySize :: Int publicKeySize = 32 +-- | A secret key is 32 bytes secretKeySize :: Int secretKeySize = 32 +-- | A signature is 64 bytes signatureSize :: Int signatureSize = 64 diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Ed448.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Ed448.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/Ed448.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Ed448.hs @@ -1,20 +1,163 @@ -- | -- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 -- License : BSD-style --- Maintainer : John Galt +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- -- Ed448 support -- --- /Functions and types exported here will be DEPRECATED in a future version./ --- For Diffie-Hellman over curve448 please use module "Crypto.PubKey.Curve448" --- instead. +-- Internally uses Decaf point compression to omit the cofactor +-- and implementation by Mike Hamburg. Externally API and +-- data types are compatible with the encoding specified in RFC 8032. -- +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} -{-# LANGUAGE MagicHash #-} module Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 - ( module Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 + ( SecretKey + , PublicKey + , Signature + -- * Size constants + , publicKeySize + , secretKeySize + , signatureSize + -- * Smart constructors + , signature + , publicKey + , secretKey + -- * Methods + , toPublic + , sign + , verify + , generateSecretKey ) where -import Crypto.PubKey.Curve448 +import Data.Word +import Foreign.C.Types +import Foreign.Ptr + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, Bytes, + ScrubbedBytes, withByteArray) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B +import Crypto.Internal.Compat +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Crypto.Random + +-- | An Ed448 Secret key +newtype SecretKey = SecretKey ScrubbedBytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | An Ed448 public key +newtype PublicKey = PublicKey Bytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | An Ed448 signature +newtype Signature = Signature Bytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | Try to build a public key from a bytearray +publicKey :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable PublicKey +publicKey bs + | B.length bs == publicKeySize = + CryptoPassed $ PublicKey $ B.copyAndFreeze bs (\_ -> return ()) + | otherwise = + CryptoFailed $ CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + +-- | Try to build a secret key from a bytearray +secretKey :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable SecretKey +secretKey bs + | B.length bs == secretKeySize = unsafeDoIO $ withByteArray bs initialize + | otherwise = CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid + where + initialize inp = do + valid <- isValidPtr inp + if valid + then (CryptoPassed . SecretKey) <$> B.copy bs (\_ -> return ()) + else return $ CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid + isValidPtr _ = + return True +{-# NOINLINE secretKey #-} + +-- | Try to build a signature from a bytearray +signature :: ByteArrayAccess ba => ba -> CryptoFailable Signature +signature bs + | B.length bs == signatureSize = + CryptoPassed $ Signature $ B.copyAndFreeze bs (\_ -> return ()) + | otherwise = + CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid + +-- | Create a public key from a secret key +toPublic :: SecretKey -> PublicKey +toPublic (SecretKey sec) = PublicKey <$> + B.allocAndFreeze publicKeySize $ \result -> + withByteArray sec $ \psec -> + decaf_ed448_derive_public_key result psec +{-# NOINLINE toPublic #-} + +-- | Sign a message using the key pair +sign :: ByteArrayAccess ba => SecretKey -> PublicKey -> ba -> Signature +sign secret public message = + Signature $ B.allocAndFreeze signatureSize $ \sig -> + withByteArray secret $ \sec -> + withByteArray public $ \pub -> + withByteArray message $ \msg -> + decaf_ed448_sign sig sec pub msg (fromIntegral msgLen) 0 no_context 0 + where + !msgLen = B.length message + +-- | Verify a message +verify :: ByteArrayAccess ba => PublicKey -> ba -> Signature -> Bool +verify public message signatureVal = unsafeDoIO $ + withByteArray signatureVal $ \sig -> + withByteArray public $ \pub -> + withByteArray message $ \msg -> do + r <- decaf_ed448_verify sig pub msg (fromIntegral msgLen) 0 no_context 0 + return (r /= 0) + where + !msgLen = B.length message + +-- | Generate a secret key +generateSecretKey :: MonadRandom m => m SecretKey +generateSecretKey = SecretKey <$> getRandomBytes secretKeySize + +-- | A public key is 57 bytes +publicKeySize :: Int +publicKeySize = 57 + +-- | A secret key is 57 bytes +secretKeySize :: Int +secretKeySize = 57 + +-- | A signature is 114 bytes +signatureSize :: Int +signatureSize = 114 + +no_context :: Ptr Word8 +no_context = nullPtr -- not supported yet + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_decaf_ed448_derive_public_key" + decaf_ed448_derive_public_key :: Ptr PublicKey -- public key + -> Ptr SecretKey -- secret key + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign" + decaf_ed448_sign :: Ptr Signature -- signature + -> Ptr SecretKey -- secret + -> Ptr PublicKey -- public + -> Ptr Word8 -- message + -> CSize -- message len + -> Word8 -- prehashed + -> Ptr Word8 -- context + -> Word8 -- context len + -> IO () + +foreign import ccall "cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify" + decaf_ed448_verify :: Ptr Signature -- signature + -> Ptr PublicKey -- public + -> Ptr Word8 -- message + -> CSize -- message len + -> Word8 -- prehashed + -> Ptr Word8 -- context + -> Word8 -- context len + -> IO CInt diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/EdDSA.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/EdDSA.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/EdDSA.hs @@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- EdDSA signature generation and verification, implemented in Haskell and +-- parameterized with elliptic curve and hash algorithm. Only edwards25519 is +-- supported at the moment. +-- +-- The module provides \"context\" and \"prehash\" variants defined in +-- . +-- +-- This implementation is most useful when wanting to customize the hash +-- algorithm. See module "Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519" for faster Ed25519 with +-- SHA-512. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} +module Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA + ( SecretKey + , PublicKey + , Signature + -- * Curves with EdDSA implementation + , EllipticCurveEdDSA(CurveDigestSize) + , publicKeySize + , secretKeySize + , signatureSize + -- * Smart constructors + , signature + , publicKey + , secretKey + -- * Methods + , toPublic + , sign + , signCtx + , signPh + , verify + , verifyCtx + , verifyPh + , generateSecretKey + ) where + +import Data.Bits +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, Bytes, ScrubbedBytes, View) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import Data.Proxy + +import Crypto.ECC +import qualified Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 as Edwards25519 +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Hash (Digest) +import Crypto.Hash.IO +import Crypto.Random + +import GHC.TypeLits (KnownNat, Nat) + +import Crypto.Internal.Builder +import Crypto.Internal.Compat +import Crypto.Internal.Imports +import Crypto.Internal.Nat (integralNatVal) + +import Foreign.Storable + + +-- API + +-- | An EdDSA Secret key +newtype SecretKey curve = SecretKey ScrubbedBytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | An EdDSA public key +newtype PublicKey curve hash = PublicKey Bytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | An EdDSA signature +newtype Signature curve hash = Signature Bytes + deriving (Show,Eq,ByteArrayAccess,NFData) + +-- | Elliptic curves with an implementation of EdDSA +class ( EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve + , KnownNat (CurveDigestSize curve) + ) => EllipticCurveEdDSA curve where + + -- | Size of the digest for this curve (in bytes) + type CurveDigestSize curve :: Nat + + -- | Size of secret keys for this curve (in bytes) + secretKeySize :: proxy curve -> Int + + -- hash with specified parameters + hashWithDom :: (HashAlgorithm hash, ByteArrayAccess ctx, ByteArrayAccess msg) + => proxy curve -> hash -> Bool -> ctx -> Builder -> msg -> Bytes + + -- conversion between scalar, point and public key + pointPublic :: proxy curve -> Point curve -> PublicKey curve hash + publicPoint :: proxy curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> CryptoFailable (Point curve) + encodeScalarLE :: ByteArray bs => proxy curve -> Scalar curve -> bs + decodeScalarLE :: ByteArrayAccess bs => proxy curve -> bs -> CryptoFailable (Scalar curve) + + -- how to use bits in a secret key + scheduleSecret :: ( HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + ) + => proxy curve + -> hash + -> SecretKey curve + -> (Scalar curve, View Bytes) + +-- | Size of public keys for this curve (in bytes) +publicKeySize :: EllipticCurveEdDSA curve => proxy curve -> Int +publicKeySize prx = signatureSize prx `div` 2 + +-- | Size of signatures for this curve (in bytes) +signatureSize :: forall proxy curve . EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + => proxy curve -> Int +signatureSize _ = integralNatVal (Proxy :: Proxy (CurveDigestSize curve)) + + +-- Constructors + +-- | Try to build a public key from a bytearray +publicKey :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ba + ) + => proxy curve -> hash -> ba -> CryptoFailable (PublicKey curve hash) +publicKey prx _ bs + | B.length bs == publicKeySize prx = + CryptoPassed (PublicKey $ B.convert bs) + | otherwise = + CryptoFailed CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + +-- | Try to build a secret key from a bytearray +secretKey :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess ba) + => proxy curve -> ba -> CryptoFailable (SecretKey curve) +secretKey prx bs + | B.length bs == secretKeySize prx = + CryptoPassed (SecretKey $ B.convert bs) + | otherwise = + CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid + +-- | Try to build a signature from a bytearray +signature :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ba + ) + => proxy curve -> hash -> ba -> CryptoFailable (Signature curve hash) +signature prx _ bs + | B.length bs == signatureSize prx = + CryptoPassed (Signature $ B.convert bs) + | otherwise = + CryptoFailed CryptoError_SecretKeyStructureInvalid + + +-- Conversions + +-- | Generate a secret key +generateSecretKey :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, MonadRandom m) + => proxy curve -> m (SecretKey curve) +generateSecretKey prx = SecretKey <$> getRandomBytes (secretKeySize prx) + +-- | Create a public key from a secret key +toPublic :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + ) + => proxy curve -> hash -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash +toPublic prx alg priv = + let p = pointBaseSmul prx (secretScalar prx alg priv) + in pointPublic prx p + +secretScalar :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + ) + => proxy curve -> hash -> SecretKey curve -> Scalar curve +secretScalar prx alg priv = fst (scheduleSecret prx alg priv) + + +-- EdDSA signature generation & verification + +-- | Sign a message using the key pair +sign :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash +sign prx = signCtx prx emptyCtx + +-- | Verify a message +verify :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool +verify prx = verifyCtx prx emptyCtx + +-- | Sign a message using the key pair under context @ctx@ +signCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash +signCtx prx = signPhCtx prx False + +-- | Verify a message under context @ctx@ +verifyCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool +verifyCtx prx = verifyPhCtx prx False + +-- | Sign a prehashed message using the key pair under context @ctx@ +signPh :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + ) + => proxy curve -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> Digest prehash -> Signature curve hash +signPh prx = signPhCtx prx True + +-- | Verify a prehashed message under context @ctx@ +verifyPh :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + ) + => proxy curve -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> Digest prehash -> Signature curve hash -> Bool +verifyPh prx = verifyPhCtx prx True + +signPhCtx :: forall proxy curve hash ctx msg . + ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> SecretKey curve -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash +signPhCtx prx ph ctx priv pub msg = + let alg = undefined :: hash + (s, prefix) = scheduleSecret prx alg priv + digR = hashWithDom prx alg ph ctx (bytes prefix) msg + r = decodeScalarNoErr prx digR + pR = pointBaseSmul prx r + bsR = encodePoint prx pR + sK = getK prx ph ctx pub bsR msg + sS = scalarAdd prx r (scalarMul prx sK s) + in encodeSignature prx (bsR, pR, sS) + +verifyPhCtx :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> msg -> Signature curve hash -> Bool +verifyPhCtx prx ph ctx pub msg sig = + case doVerify of + CryptoPassed verified -> verified + CryptoFailed _ -> False + where + doVerify = do + (bsR, pR, sS) <- decodeSignature prx sig + nPub <- pointNegate prx `fmap` publicPoint prx pub + let sK = getK prx ph ctx pub bsR msg + pR' = pointsSmulVarTime prx sS sK nPub + return (pR == pR') + +emptyCtx :: Bytes +emptyCtx = B.empty + +getK :: forall proxy curve hash ctx msg . + ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + , ByteArrayAccess ctx + , ByteArrayAccess msg + ) + => proxy curve -> Bool -> ctx -> PublicKey curve hash -> Bytes -> msg -> Scalar curve +getK prx ph ctx (PublicKey pub) bsR msg = + let alg = undefined :: hash + digK = hashWithDom prx alg ph ctx (bytes bsR <> bytes pub) msg + in decodeScalarNoErr prx digK + +encodeSignature :: EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + => proxy curve + -> (Bytes, Point curve, Scalar curve) + -> Signature curve hash +encodeSignature prx (bsR, _, sS) = Signature $ buildAndFreeze $ + bytes bsR <> bytes bsS <> zero len0 + where + bsS = encodeScalarLE prx sS :: Bytes + len0 = signatureSize prx - B.length bsR - B.length bsS + +decodeSignature :: ( EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashDigestSize hash ~ CurveDigestSize curve + ) + => proxy curve + -> Signature curve hash + -> CryptoFailable (Bytes, Point curve, Scalar curve) +decodeSignature prx (Signature bs) = do + let (bsR, bsS) = B.splitAt (publicKeySize prx) bs + pR <- decodePoint prx bsR + sS <- decodeScalarLE prx bsS + return (bsR, pR, sS) + +-- implementations are supposed to decode any scalar up to the size of the digest +decodeScalarNoErr :: (EllipticCurveEdDSA curve, ByteArrayAccess bs) + => proxy curve -> bs -> Scalar curve +decodeScalarNoErr prx = unwrap "decodeScalarNoErr" . decodeScalarLE prx + +unwrap :: String -> CryptoFailable a -> a +unwrap name (CryptoFailed _) = error (name ++ ": assumption failed") +unwrap _ (CryptoPassed x) = x + + +-- Ed25519 implementation + +instance EllipticCurveEdDSA Curve_Edwards25519 where + type CurveDigestSize Curve_Edwards25519 = 64 + secretKeySize _ = 32 + + hashWithDom _ alg ph ctx bss + | not ph && B.null ctx = digestDomMsg alg bss + | otherwise = digestDomMsg alg (dom <> bss) + where dom = bytes ("SigEd25519 no Ed25519 collisions" :: ByteString) <> + byte (if ph then 1 else 0) <> + byte (fromIntegral $ B.length ctx) <> + bytes ctx + + pointPublic _ = PublicKey . Edwards25519.pointEncode + publicPoint _ = Edwards25519.pointDecode + encodeScalarLE _ = Edwards25519.scalarEncode + decodeScalarLE _ = Edwards25519.scalarDecodeLong + + scheduleSecret prx alg priv = + (decodeScalarNoErr prx clamped, B.dropView hashed 32) + where + hashed = digest alg $ \update -> update priv + + clamped :: Bytes + clamped = B.copyAndFreeze (B.takeView hashed 32) $ \p -> do + b0 <- peekElemOff p 0 :: IO Word8 + b31 <- peekElemOff p 31 :: IO Word8 + pokeElemOff p 31 ((b31 .&. 0x7F) .|. 0x40) + pokeElemOff p 0 (b0 .&. 0xF8) + + +{- + Optimize hashing by limiting the number of roundtrips between Haskell and C. + Hash "update" functions do not use unsafe FFI call, so better concanetate + small fragments together and call the update function once. + + Using the IO hash interface avoids context buffer copies. + + Data type Digest is not used directly but converted to Bytes early. Any use of + withByteArray on the unpinned Digest backend would require copy through a + pinned trampoline. +-} + +digestDomMsg :: (HashAlgorithm alg, ByteArrayAccess msg) + => alg -> Builder -> msg -> Bytes +digestDomMsg alg bss bs = digest alg $ \update -> + update (buildAndFreeze bss :: Bytes) >> update bs + +digest :: HashAlgorithm alg + => alg + -> ((forall bs . ByteArrayAccess bs => bs -> IO ()) -> IO ()) + -> Bytes +digest alg fn = B.convert $ unsafeDoIO $ do + mc <- hashMutableInitWith alg + fn (hashMutableUpdate mc) + hashMutableFinalize mc diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/ElGamal.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/ElGamal.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/ElGamal.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/ElGamal.hs @@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ , EphemeralKey(..) , SharedKey , Signature - -- * generation + -- * Generation , generatePrivate , generatePublic - -- * encryption and decryption with no scheme + -- * Encryption and decryption with no scheme , encryptWith , encrypt , decrypt - -- * signature primitives + -- * Signature primitives , signWith , sign - -- * verification primitives + -- * Verification primitives , verify ) where diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Internal.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Internal.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/Internal.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Internal.hs @@ -8,10 +8,18 @@ module Crypto.PubKey.Internal ( and' , (&&!) + , dsaTruncHash + , dsaTruncHashDigest ) where +import Data.Bits (shiftR) import Data.List (foldl') +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess) +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) +import Crypto.Number.Serialize + -- | This is a strict version of and and' :: [Bool] -> Bool and' l = foldl' (&&!) True l @@ -22,3 +30,18 @@ True &&! False = False False &&! True = False False &&! False = False + +-- | Truncate and hash for DSA and ECDSA. +dsaTruncHash :: (ByteArrayAccess msg, HashAlgorithm hash) => hash -> msg -> Integer -> Integer +dsaTruncHash hashAlg = dsaTruncHashDigest . hashWith hashAlg + +-- | Truncate a digest for DSA and ECDSA. +dsaTruncHashDigest :: HashAlgorithm hash => Digest hash -> Integer -> Integer +dsaTruncHashDigest digest n + | d > 0 = shiftR e d + | otherwise = e + where e = os2ip digest + d = hashDigestSize (getHashAlg digest) * 8 - numBits n + +getHashAlg :: Digest hash -> hash +getHashAlg _ = undefined diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA.hs @@ -10,13 +10,12 @@ , PublicKey(..) , PrivateKey(..) , Blinder(..) - -- * generation function + -- * Generation function , generateWith , generate , generateBlinder ) where -import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Crypto.Random.Types import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (inverse, inverseCoprimes) import Crypto.Number.Generate (generateMax) @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ -- generateWith :: (Integer, Integer) -- ^ chosen distinct primes p and q -> Int -- ^ size in bytes - -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponant 'e' + -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponent 'e' -> Maybe (PublicKey, PrivateKey) generateWith (p,q) size e = case inverse e phi of @@ -81,7 +80,7 @@ -- | generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes. generate :: MonadRandom m => Int -- ^ size in bytes - -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponant 'e' + -> Integer -- ^ RSA public exponent 'e' -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey) generate size e = loop where diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PKCS15.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PKCS15.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PKCS15.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PKCS15.hs @@ -7,19 +7,19 @@ -- module Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 ( - -- * padding and unpadding + -- * Padding and unpadding pad , padSignature , unpad - -- * private key operations + -- * Private key operations , decrypt , decryptSafer , sign , signSafer - -- * public key operations + -- * Public key operations , encrypt , verify - -- * hash ASN1 description + -- * Hash ASN1 description , HashAlgorithmASN1 ) where @@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ -- | Produce a standard PKCS1.5 padding for signature padSignature :: ByteArray signature => Int -> signature -> Either Error signature padSignature klen signature - | klen < siglen+1 = Left SignatureTooLong - | otherwise = Right (B.pack padding `B.append` signature) + | klen < siglen + 11 = Left SignatureTooLong + | otherwise = Right (B.pack padding `B.append` signature) where siglen = B.length signature padding = 0 : 1 : (replicate (klen - siglen - 3) 0xff ++ [0]) @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ -- information from the timing of the operation, the blinder can be set to None. -- -- If unsure always set a blinder or use decryptSafer +-- +-- The message is returned un-padded. decrypt :: Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder -> PrivateKey -- ^ RSA private key -> ByteString -- ^ cipher text @@ -156,7 +158,8 @@ -- | encrypt a bytestring using the public key. -- --- the message needs to be smaller than the key size - 11 +-- The message needs to be smaller than the key size - 11. +-- The message should not be padded. encrypt :: MonadRandom m => PublicKey -> ByteString -> m (Either Error ByteString) encrypt pk m = do r <- pad (public_size pk) m diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PSS.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PSS.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PSS.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/PSS.hs @@ -11,9 +11,13 @@ , defaultPSSParamsSHA1 -- * Sign and verify functions , signWithSalt + , signDigestWithSalt , sign + , signDigest , signSafer + , signDigestSafer , verify + , verifyDigest ) where import Crypto.Random.Types @@ -22,11 +26,13 @@ import Crypto.PubKey.RSA (generateBlinder) import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) import Data.Bits (xor, shiftR, (.&.)) import Data.Word import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray) -import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert, eq) + import Data.ByteString (ByteString) import qualified Data.ByteString as B @@ -56,30 +62,43 @@ -- | Sign using the PSS parameters and the salt explicitely passed as parameters. -- -- the function ignore SaltLength from the PSS Parameters -signWithSalt :: HashAlgorithm hash - => ByteString -- ^ Salt to use - -> Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder to use - -> PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use - -> PrivateKey -- ^ RSA Private Key - -> ByteString -- ^ Message to sign - -> Either Error ByteString -signWithSalt salt blinder params pk m - | k < hashLen + saltLen + 2 = Left InvalidParameters - | otherwise = Right $ dp blinder pk em - where mHash = B.convert $ hashWith (pssHash params) m - k = private_size pk - dbLen = k - hashLen - 1 +signDigestWithSalt :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ Salt to use + -> Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder to use + -> PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use + -> PrivateKey -- ^ RSA Private Key + -> Digest hash -- ^ Message digest + -> Either Error ByteString +signDigestWithSalt salt blinder params pk digest + | emLen < hashLen + saltLen + 2 = Left InvalidParameters + | otherwise = Right $ dp blinder pk em + where k = private_size pk + emLen = if emTruncate pubBits then k - 1 else k + mHash = B.convert digest + dbLen = emLen - hashLen - 1 saltLen = B.length salt hashLen = hashDigestSize (pssHash params) - pubBits = private_size pk * 8 -- to change if public_size is converted in bytes - + pubBits = numBits (private_n pk) m' = B.concat [B.replicate 8 0,mHash,salt] h = B.convert $ hashWith (pssHash params) m' db = B.concat [B.replicate (dbLen - saltLen - 1) 0,B.singleton 1,salt] - dbmask = (pssMaskGenAlg params) h dbLen + dbmask = pssMaskGenAlg params h dbLen maskedDB = B.pack $ normalizeToKeySize pubBits $ B.zipWith xor db dbmask em = B.concat [maskedDB, h, B.singleton (pssTrailerField params)] +-- | Sign using the PSS parameters and the salt explicitely passed as parameters. +-- +-- the function ignore SaltLength from the PSS Parameters +signWithSalt :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ Salt to use + -> Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder to use + -> PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use + -> PrivateKey -- ^ RSA Private Key + -> ByteString -- ^ Message to sign + -> Either Error ByteString +signWithSalt salt blinder params pk m = signDigestWithSalt salt blinder params pk mHash + where mHash = hashWith (pssHash params) m + -- | Sign using the PSS Parameters sign :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) => Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder to use @@ -91,6 +110,17 @@ salt <- getRandomBytes (pssSaltLength params) return (signWithSalt salt blinder params pk m) +-- | Sign using the PSS Parameters +signDigest :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => Maybe Blinder -- ^ optional blinder to use + -> PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use + -> PrivateKey -- ^ RSA Private Key + -> Digest hash -- ^ Message digest + -> m (Either Error ByteString) +signDigest blinder params pk digest = do + salt <- getRandomBytes (pssSaltLength params) + return (signDigestWithSalt salt blinder params pk digest) + -- | Sign using the PSS Parameters and an automatically generated blinder. signSafer :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) => PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use @@ -101,6 +131,16 @@ blinder <- generateBlinder (private_n pk) sign (Just blinder) params pk m +-- | Sign using the PSS Parameters and an automatically generated blinder. +signDigestSafer :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ PSS Parameters to use + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> Digest hash -- ^ message digst + -> m (Either Error ByteString) +signDigestSafer params pk digest = do + blinder <- generateBlinder (private_n pk) + signDigest (Just blinder) params pk digest + -- | Verify a signature using the PSS Parameters verify :: HashAlgorithm hash => PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString @@ -110,30 +150,50 @@ -> ByteString -- ^ Message to verify -> ByteString -- ^ Signature -> Bool -verify params pk m s - | public_size pk /= B.length s = False +verify params pk m = verifyDigest params pk mHash + where mHash = hashWith (pssHash params) m + +-- | Verify a signature using the PSS Parameters +verifyDigest :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PSSParams hash ByteString ByteString + -- ^ PSS Parameters to use to verify, + -- this need to be identical to the parameters when signing + -> PublicKey -- ^ RSA Public Key + -> Digest hash -- ^ Digest to verify + -> ByteString -- ^ Signature + -> Bool +verifyDigest params pk digest s + | B.length s /= k = False + | B.any (/= 0) pre = False | B.last em /= pssTrailerField params = False - | not (B.all (== 0) ps0) = False + | B.any (/= 0) ps0 = False | b1 /= B.singleton 1 = False - | otherwise = h == B.convert h' + | otherwise = B.eq h h' where -- parameters hashLen = hashDigestSize (pssHash params) - dbLen = public_size pk - hashLen - 1 - pubBits = public_size pk * 8 -- to change if public_size is converted in bytes + mHash = B.convert digest + k = public_size pk + emLen = if emTruncate pubBits then k - 1 else k + dbLen = emLen - hashLen - 1 + pubBits = numBits (public_n pk) -- unmarshall fields - em = ep pk s - maskedDB = B.take (B.length em - hashLen - 1) em + (pre, em) = B.splitAt (k - emLen) (ep pk s) -- drop 0..1 byte + maskedDB = B.take dbLen em h = B.take hashLen $ B.drop (B.length maskedDB) em - dbmask = (pssMaskGenAlg params) h dbLen + dbmask = pssMaskGenAlg params h dbLen db = B.pack $ normalizeToKeySize pubBits $ B.zipWith xor maskedDB dbmask (ps0,z) = B.break (== 1) db (b1,salt) = B.splitAt 1 z - mHash = B.convert $ hashWith (pssHash params) m m' = B.concat [B.replicate 8 0,mHash,salt] h' = hashWith (pssHash params) m' +-- When the modulus has bit length 1 modulo 8 we drop the first byte. +emTruncate :: Int -> Bool +emTruncate bits = ((bits-1) .&. 0x7) == 0 + normalizeToKeySize :: Int -> [Word8] -> [Word8] normalizeToKeySize _ [] = [] -- very unlikely normalizeToKeySize bits (x:xs) = x .&. mask : xs where mask = if sh > 0 then 0xff `shiftR` (8-sh) else 0xff - sh = ((bits-1) .&. 0x7) + sh = (bits-1) .&. 0x7 + diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Prim.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Prim.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Prim.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Prim.hs @@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ -- module Crypto.PubKey.RSA.Prim ( - -- * decrypt primitive + -- * Decrypt primitive dp - -- * encrypt primitive + -- * Encrypt primitive , ep ) where diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Types.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/RSA/Types.hs @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ data PublicKey = PublicKey { public_size :: Int -- ^ size of key in bytes , public_n :: Integer -- ^ public p*q - , public_e :: Integer -- ^ public exponant e - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + , public_e :: Integer -- ^ public exponent e + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData PublicKey where rnf (PublicKey sz n e) = rnf n `seq` rnf e `seq` sz `seq` () @@ -59,13 +59,13 @@ -- data PrivateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub :: PublicKey -- ^ public part of a private key (size, n and e) - , private_d :: Integer -- ^ private exponant d + , private_d :: Integer -- ^ private exponent d , private_p :: Integer -- ^ p prime number , private_q :: Integer -- ^ q prime number , private_dP :: Integer -- ^ d mod (p-1) , private_dQ :: Integer -- ^ d mod (q-1) , private_qinv :: Integer -- ^ q^(-1) mod p - } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable) + } deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data) instance NFData PrivateKey where rnf (PrivateKey pub d p q dp dq qinv) = @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ -- -- note the RSA private key contains already an instance of public key for efficiency newtype KeyPair = KeyPair PrivateKey - deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,Typeable,NFData) + deriving (Show,Read,Eq,Data,NFData) -- | Public key of a RSA KeyPair toPublicKey :: KeyPair -> PublicKey diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Basic.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Basic.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Basic.hs @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Rabin cryptosystem for public-key cryptography and digital signature. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic + ( PublicKey(..) + , PrivateKey(..) + , Signature(..) + , generate + , encrypt + , encryptWithSeed + , decrypt + , sign + , signWith + , verify + ) where + +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.Data +import Data.Either (rights) + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Number.Basic (gcde, numBytes) +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi) +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2osp, i2ospOf_, os2ip) +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types +import Crypto.Random (MonadRandom, getRandomBytes) + +-- | Represent a Rabin public key. +data PublicKey = PublicKey + { public_size :: Int -- ^ size of key in bytes + , public_n :: Integer -- ^ public p*q + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Represent a Rabin private key. +data PrivateKey = PrivateKey + { private_pub :: PublicKey + , private_p :: Integer -- ^ p prime number + , private_q :: Integer -- ^ q prime number + , private_a :: Integer + , private_b :: Integer + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Rabin Signature. +data Signature = Signature (Integer, Integer) deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes. +-- Primes p and q are both congruent 3 mod 4. +-- +-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +generate :: MonadRandom m + => Int + -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey) +generate size = do + (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 4 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 4 == 3) + return $ generateKeys p q + where + generateKeys p q = + let n = p*q + (a, b, _) = gcde p q + publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size + , public_n = n } + privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey + , private_p = p + , private_q = q + , private_a = a + , private_b = b } + in (publicKey, privateKey) + +-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key an a predefined OAEP seed. +-- +-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +encryptWithSeed :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ Seed + -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding + -> PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> ByteString -- ^ plaintext + -> Either Error ByteString +encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m = + let n = public_n pk + k = numBytes n + in do + m' <- pad seed oaep k m + let m'' = os2ip m' + return $ i2osp $ expSafe m'' 2 n + +-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key. +encrypt :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding parameters + -> PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> ByteString -- ^ plaintext + -> m (Either Error ByteString) +encrypt oaep pk m = do + seed <- getRandomBytes hashLen + return $ encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m + where + hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep) + +-- | Decrypt ciphertext using private key. +-- +-- See algorithm 8.12 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +decrypt :: HashAlgorithm hash + => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding parameters + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> ByteString -- ^ ciphertext + -> Maybe ByteString +decrypt oaep pk c = + let p = private_p pk + q = private_q pk + a = private_a pk + b = private_b pk + n = public_n $ private_pub pk + k = numBytes n + c' = os2ip c + solutions = rights $ toList $ mapTuple (unpad oaep k . i2ospOf_ k) $ sqroot' c' p q a b n + in if length solutions /= 1 then Nothing + else Just $ head solutions + where toList (w, x, y, z) = w:x:y:z:[] + mapTuple f (w, x, y, z) = (f w, f x, f y, f z) + +-- | Sign message using padding, hash algorithm and private key. +-- +-- See . +signWith :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ padding + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message to sign + -> Either Error Signature +signWith padding pk hashAlg m = do + h <- calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m + signature <- calculateSignature h + return signature + where + calculateSignature h = + let p = private_p pk + q = private_q pk + a = private_a pk + b = private_b pk + n = public_n $ private_pub pk + in if h >= n then Left MessageTooLong + else let (r, _, _, _) = sqroot' h p q a b n + in Right $ Signature (os2ip padding, r) + +-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key. +-- +-- See . +sign :: (MonadRandom m, HashAlgorithm hash) + => PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message to sign + -> m (Either Error Signature) +sign pk hashAlg m = do + padding <- findPadding + return $ signWith padding pk hashAlg m + where + findPadding = do + padding <- getRandomBytes 8 + case calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m of + Right _ -> return padding + _ -> findPadding + +-- | Calculate hash of message and padding. +-- If the padding is valid, then the result of the hash operation is returned, otherwise an error. +calculateHash :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ padding + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message to sign + -> Either Error Integer +calculateHash padding pk hashAlg m = + let p = private_p pk + q = private_q pk + h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg $ B.append padding m + in case (jacobi (h `mod` p) p, jacobi (h `mod` q) q) of + (Just 1, Just 1) -> Right h + _ -> Left InvalidParameters + +-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key. +-- +-- See . +verify :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PublicKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message + -> Signature -- ^ signature + -> Bool +verify pk hashAlg m (Signature (padding, s)) = + let n = public_n pk + p = i2osp padding + h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg $ B.append p m + h' = expSafe s 2 n + in h' == h + +-- | Square roots modulo prime p where p is congruent 3 mod 4 +-- Value a must be a quadratic residue modulo p (i.e. jacobi symbol (a/n) = 1). +-- +-- See algorithm 3.36 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +sqroot :: Integer + -> Integer -- ^ prime p + -> (Integer, Integer) +sqroot a p = + let r = expSafe a ((p + 1) `div` 4) p + in (r, -r) + +-- | Square roots modulo n given its prime factors p and q (both congruent 3 mod 4) +-- Value a must be a quadratic residue of both modulo p and modulo q (i.e. jacobi symbols (a/p) = (a/q) = 1). +-- +-- See algorithm 3.44 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +sqroot' :: Integer + -> Integer -- ^ prime p + -> Integer -- ^ prime q + -> Integer -- ^ c such that c*p + d*q = 1 + -> Integer -- ^ d such that c*p + d*q = 1 + -> Integer -- ^ n = p*q + -> (Integer, Integer, Integer, Integer) +sqroot' a p q c d n = + let (r, _) = sqroot a p + (s, _) = sqroot a q + x = (r*d*q + s*c*p) `mod` n + y = (r*d*q - s*c*p) `mod` n + in (x, (-x) `mod` n, y, (-y) `mod` n) diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Modified.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Modified.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Modified.hs @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Modified-Rabin public-key digital signature algorithm. +-- See algorithm 11.30 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified + ( PublicKey(..) + , PrivateKey(..) + , generate + , sign + , verify + ) where + +import Data.ByteString +import Data.Data + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi) +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (os2ip) +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types +import Crypto.Random.Types + +-- | Represent a Modified-Rabin public key. +data PublicKey = PublicKey + { public_size :: Int -- ^ size of key in bytes + , public_n :: Integer -- ^ public p*q + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Represent a Modified-Rabin private key. +data PrivateKey = PrivateKey + { private_pub :: PublicKey + , private_p :: Integer -- ^ p prime number + , private_q :: Integer -- ^ q prime number + , private_d :: Integer + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes. +-- Prime p is congruent 3 mod 8 and prime q is congruent 7 mod 8. +generate :: MonadRandom m + => Int + -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey) +generate size = do + (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 8 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 8 == 7) + return $ generateKeys p q + where + generateKeys p q = + let n = p*q + d = (n - p - q + 5) `div` 8 + publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size + , public_n = n } + privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey + , private_p = p + , private_q = q + , private_d = d } + in (publicKey, privateKey) + +-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key. +sign :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message to sign + -> Either Error Integer +sign pk hashAlg m = + let d = private_d pk + n = public_n $ private_pub pk + h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m + limit = (n - 6) `div` 16 + in if h > limit then Left MessageTooLong + else let h' = 16*h + 6 + in case jacobi h' n of + Just 1 -> Right $ expSafe h' d n + Just (-1) -> Right $ expSafe (h' `div` 2) d n + _ -> Left InvalidParameters + +-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key. +verify :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message + -> Integer -- ^ signature + -> Bool +verify pk hashAlg m s = + let n = public_n pk + h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m + s' = expSafe s 2 n + s'' = case s' `mod` 8 of + 6 -> s' + 3 -> 2*s' + 7 -> n - s' + 2 -> 2*(n - s') + _ -> 0 + in case s'' `mod` 16 of + 6 -> let h' = (s'' - 6) `div` 16 + in h' == h + _ -> False diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/OAEP.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/OAEP.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/OAEP.hs @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- OAEP padding scheme. +-- See . +-- +module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP + ( OAEPParams(..) + , defaultOAEPParams + , pad + , unpad + ) where + +import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.Bits (xor) + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArrayAccess, ByteArray) +import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B (convert) +import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction +import Crypto.PubKey.Internal (and') +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types + +-- | Parameters for OAEP padding. +data OAEPParams hash seed output = OAEPParams + { oaepHash :: hash -- ^ hash function to use + , oaepMaskGenAlg :: MaskGenAlgorithm seed output -- ^ mask Gen algorithm to use + , oaepLabel :: Maybe ByteString -- ^ optional label prepended to message + } + +-- | Default Params with a specified hash function. +defaultOAEPParams :: (ByteArrayAccess seed, ByteArray output, HashAlgorithm hash) + => hash + -> OAEPParams hash seed output +defaultOAEPParams hashAlg = + OAEPParams { oaepHash = hashAlg + , oaepMaskGenAlg = mgf1 hashAlg + , oaepLabel = Nothing + } + +-- | Pad a message using OAEP. +pad :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ Seed + -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP params to use + -> Int -- ^ size of public key in bytes + -> ByteString -- ^ Message pad + -> Either Error ByteString +pad seed oaep k msg + | k < 2*hashLen+2 = Left InvalidParameters + | B.length seed /= hashLen = Left InvalidParameters + | mLen > k - 2*hashLen-2 = Left MessageTooLong + | otherwise = Right em + where -- parameters + mLen = B.length msg + mgf = oaepMaskGenAlg oaep + labelHash = hashWith (oaepHash oaep) (maybe B.empty id $ oaepLabel oaep) + hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep) + -- put fields + ps = B.replicate (k - mLen - 2*hashLen - 2) 0 + db = B.concat [B.convert labelHash, ps, B.singleton 0x1, msg] + dbmask = mgf seed (k - hashLen - 1) + maskedDB = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor db dbmask + seedMask = mgf maskedDB hashLen + maskedSeed = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor seed seedMask + em = B.concat [B.singleton 0x0, maskedSeed, maskedDB] + +-- | Un-pad a OAEP encoded message. +unpad :: HashAlgorithm hash + => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP params to use + -> Int -- ^ size of public key in bytes + -> ByteString -- ^ encoded message (not encrypted) + -> Either Error ByteString +unpad oaep k em + | paddingSuccess = Right msg + | otherwise = Left MessageNotRecognized + where -- parameters + mgf = oaepMaskGenAlg oaep + labelHash = B.convert $ hashWith (oaepHash oaep) (maybe B.empty id $ oaepLabel oaep) + hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep) + -- getting em's fields + (pb, em0) = B.splitAt 1 em + (maskedSeed, maskedDB) = B.splitAt hashLen em0 + seedMask = mgf maskedDB hashLen + seed = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor maskedSeed seedMask + dbmask = mgf seed (k - hashLen - 1) + db = B.pack $ B.zipWith xor maskedDB dbmask + -- getting db's fields + (labelHash', db1) = B.splitAt hashLen db + (_, db2) = B.break (/= 0) db1 + (ps1, msg) = B.splitAt 1 db2 + + paddingSuccess = and' [ labelHash' == labelHash -- no need for constant eq + , ps1 == B.replicate 1 0x1 + , pb == B.replicate 1 0x0 + ] diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/RW.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/RW.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/RW.hs @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Rabin-Williams cryptosystem for public-key encryption and digital signature. +-- See pages 323 - 324 in "Computational Number Theory and Modern Cryptography" by Song Y. Yan. +-- Also inspired by https://github.com/vanilala/vncrypt/blob/master/vncrypt/vnrw_gmp.c. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW + ( PublicKey(..) + , PrivateKey(..) + , generate + , encrypt + , encryptWithSeed + , decrypt + , sign + , verify + ) where + +import Data.ByteString +import Data.Data + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBytes) +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic (expSafe, jacobi) +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (i2osp, i2ospOf_, os2ip) +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP +import Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types +import Crypto.Random.Types + +-- | Represent a Rabin-Williams public key. +data PublicKey = PublicKey + { public_size :: Int -- ^ size of key in bytes + , public_n :: Integer -- ^ public p*q + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Represent a Rabin-Williams private key. +data PrivateKey = PrivateKey + { private_pub :: PublicKey + , private_p :: Integer -- ^ p prime number + , private_q :: Integer -- ^ q prime number + , private_d :: Integer + } deriving (Show, Read, Eq, Data) + +-- | Generate a pair of (private, public) key of size in bytes. +-- Prime p is congruent 3 mod 8 and prime q is congruent 7 mod 8. +generate :: MonadRandom m + => Int + -> m (PublicKey, PrivateKey) +generate size = do + (p, q) <- generatePrimes size (\p -> p `mod` 8 == 3) (\q -> q `mod` 8 == 7) + return (generateKeys p q) + where + generateKeys p q = + let n = p*q + d = ((p - 1)*(q - 1) `div` 4 + 1) `div` 2 + publicKey = PublicKey { public_size = size + , public_n = n } + privateKey = PrivateKey { private_pub = publicKey + , private_p = p + , private_q = q + , private_d = d } + in (publicKey, privateKey) + +-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key an a predefined OAEP seed. +-- +-- See algorithm 8.11 in "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Alfred J. Menezes et al. +encryptWithSeed :: HashAlgorithm hash + => ByteString -- ^ Seed + -> OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding + -> PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> ByteString -- ^ plaintext + -> Either Error ByteString +encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m = + let n = public_n pk + k = numBytes n + in do + m' <- pad seed oaep k m + m'' <- ep1 n $ os2ip m' + return $ i2osp $ ep2 n m'' + +-- | Encrypt plaintext using public key. +encrypt :: (HashAlgorithm hash, MonadRandom m) + => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding parameters + -> PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> ByteString -- ^ plaintext + -> m (Either Error ByteString) +encrypt oaep pk m = do + seed <- getRandomBytes hashLen + return $ encryptWithSeed seed oaep pk m + where + hashLen = hashDigestSize (oaepHash oaep) + +-- | Decrypt ciphertext using private key. +decrypt :: HashAlgorithm hash + => OAEPParams hash ByteString ByteString -- ^ OAEP padding parameters + -> PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> ByteString -- ^ ciphertext + -> Maybe ByteString +decrypt oaep pk c = + let d = private_d pk + n = public_n $ private_pub pk + k = numBytes n + c' = i2ospOf_ k $ dp2 n $ dp1 d n $ os2ip c + in case unpad oaep k c' of + Left _ -> Nothing + Right p -> Just p + +-- | Sign message using hash algorithm and private key. +sign :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PrivateKey -- ^ private key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message to sign + -> Either Error Integer +sign pk hashAlg m = + let d = private_d pk + n = public_n $ private_pub pk + in do + m' <- ep1 n $ os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m + return $ dp1 d n m' + +-- | Verify signature using hash algorithm and public key. +verify :: HashAlgorithm hash + => PublicKey -- ^ public key + -> hash -- ^ hash function + -> ByteString -- ^ message + -> Integer -- ^ signature + -> Bool +verify pk hashAlg m s = + let n = public_n pk + h = os2ip $ hashWith hashAlg m + h' = dp2 n $ ep2 n s + in h' == h + +-- | Encryption primitive 1 +ep1 :: Integer -> Integer -> Either Error Integer +ep1 n m = + let m' = 2*m + 1 + m'' = 2*m' + m''' = 2*m'' + in case jacobi m' n of + Just (-1) | m'' < n -> Right m'' + Just 1 | m''' < n -> Right m''' + _ -> Left InvalidParameters + +-- | Encryption primitive 2 +ep2 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer +ep2 n m = expSafe m 2 n + +-- | Decryption primitive 1 +dp1 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer -> Integer +dp1 d n c = expSafe c d n + +-- | Decryption primitive 2 +dp2 :: Integer -> Integer -> Integer +dp2 n c = let c' = c `div` 2 + c'' = (n - c) `div` 2 + in case c `mod` 4 of + 0 -> ((c' `div` 2 - 1) `div` 2) + 1 -> ((c'' `div` 2 - 1) `div` 2) + 2 -> ((c' - 1) `div` 2) + _ -> ((c'' - 1) `div` 2) diff --git a/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Types.hs b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Types.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/PubKey/Rabin/Types.hs @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Carlos Rodriguez-Vega +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +module Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types + ( Error(..) + , generatePrimes + ) where + +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) +import Crypto.Number.Prime (generatePrime, findPrimeFromWith) +import Crypto.Random.Types + +type PrimeCondition = Integer -> Bool + +-- | Error possible during encryption, decryption or signing. +data Error = MessageTooLong -- ^ the message to encrypt is too long + | MessageNotRecognized -- ^ the message decrypted doesn't have a OAEP structure + | InvalidParameters -- ^ some parameters lead to breaking assumptions + deriving (Show, Eq) + +-- | Generate primes p & q +generatePrimes :: MonadRandom m + => Int -- ^ size in bytes + -> PrimeCondition -- ^ condition prime p must satisfy + -> PrimeCondition -- ^ condition prime q must satisfy + -> m (Integer, Integer) -- ^ chosen distinct primes p and q +generatePrimes size pCond qCond = + let pBits = (8*(size `div` 2)) + qBits = (8*(size - (size `div` 2))) + in do + p <- generatePrime' pBits pCond + q <- generatePrime' qBits qCond + return (p, q) + where + generatePrime' bits cond = do + pr' <- generatePrime bits + let pr = findPrimeFromWith cond pr' + if numBits pr == bits then return pr + else generatePrime' bits cond diff --git a/Crypto/Random.hs b/Crypto/Random.hs --- a/Crypto/Random.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random.hs @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ , seedNew , seedFromInteger , seedToInteger + , seedFromBinary -- * Deterministic Random class , getSystemDRG , drgNew @@ -29,10 +30,12 @@ , MonadPseudoRandom ) where +import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Random.Types import Crypto.Random.ChaChaDRG import Crypto.Random.SystemDRG import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Internal.Imports import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize as Serialize @@ -56,6 +59,12 @@ seedFromInteger :: Integer -> Seed seedFromInteger i = Seed $ Serialize.i2ospOf_ seedLength (i `mod` 2^(seedLength * 8)) +-- | Convert a binary to a seed +seedFromBinary :: ByteArrayAccess b => b -> CryptoFailable Seed +seedFromBinary b + | B.length b /= 40 = CryptoFailed (CryptoError_SeedSizeInvalid) + | otherwise = CryptoPassed $ Seed $ B.convert b + -- | Create a new DRG from system entropy drgNew :: MonadRandom randomly => randomly ChaChaDRG drgNew = drgNewSeed `fmap` seedNew @@ -71,6 +80,13 @@ -- -- It can also be used in other contexts provided the input -- has been properly randomly generated. +-- +-- Note that the @Arbitrary@ instance provided by QuickCheck for 'Word64' does +-- not have a uniform distribution. It is often better to use instead +-- @arbitraryBoundedRandom@. +-- +-- System endianness impacts how the tuple is interpreted and therefore changes +-- the resulting DRG. drgNewTest :: (Word64, Word64, Word64, Word64, Word64) -> ChaChaDRG drgNewTest = initializeWords diff --git a/Crypto/Random/ChaChaDRG.hs b/Crypto/Random/ChaChaDRG.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/ChaChaDRG.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/ChaChaDRG.hs @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import Crypto.Random.Types import Crypto.Internal.Imports -import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ScrubbedBytes) +import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray (ByteArray, ByteArrayAccess, ScrubbedBytes) import qualified Crypto.Internal.ByteArray as B import Foreign.Storable (pokeElemOff) @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ -- | Initialize a new ChaCha context with the number of rounds, -- the key and the nonce associated. -initialize :: ByteArray seed +initialize :: ByteArrayAccess seed => seed -- ^ 40 bytes of seed -> ChaChaDRG -- ^ the initial ChaCha state initialize seed = ChaChaDRG $ C.initializeSimple seed diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Backend.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Backend.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Backend.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Backend.hs @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ) where import Foreign.Ptr +import Data.Proxy import Data.Word (Word8) import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Source #ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND @@ -30,12 +31,12 @@ supportedBackends = [ #ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND - openBackend (undefined :: RDRand), + openBackend (Proxy :: Proxy RDRand), #endif #ifdef WINDOWS - openBackend (undefined :: WinCryptoAPI) + openBackend (Proxy :: Proxy WinCryptoAPI) #else - openBackend (undefined :: DevRandom), openBackend (undefined :: DevURandom) + openBackend (Proxy :: Proxy DevRandom), openBackend (Proxy :: Proxy DevURandom) #endif ] @@ -43,9 +44,9 @@ data EntropyBackend = forall b . EntropySource b => EntropyBackend b -- | Open a backend handle -openBackend :: EntropySource b => b -> IO (Maybe EntropyBackend) +openBackend :: EntropySource b => Proxy b -> IO (Maybe EntropyBackend) openBackend b = fmap EntropyBackend `fmap` callOpen b - where callOpen :: EntropySource b => b -> IO (Maybe b) + where callOpen :: EntropySource b => Proxy b -> IO (Maybe b) callOpen _ = entropyOpen -- | Gather randomness from an open handle diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/RDRand.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/RDRand.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/RDRand.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/RDRand.hs @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_get_rand_bytes" c_get_rand_bytes :: Ptr Word8 -> CInt -> IO CInt --- | fake handle to Intel RDRand entropy cpu instruction +-- | Fake handle to Intel RDRand entropy CPU instruction data RDRand = RDRand instance EntropySource RDRand where diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Source.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Source.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Source.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Source.hs @@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ -- | A handle to an entropy maker, either a system capability -- or a hardware generator. class EntropySource a where - -- | try to open an handle for this source + -- | Try to open an handle for this source entropyOpen :: IO (Maybe a) - -- | try to gather a number of entropy bytes into a buffer. - -- return the number of actual bytes gathered + -- | Try to gather a number of entropy bytes into a buffer. + -- Return the number of actual bytes gathered entropyGather :: a -> Ptr Word8 -> Int -> IO Int -- | Close an open handle entropyClose :: a -> IO () diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unix.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unix.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unix.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unix.hs @@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ type H = Handle type DeviceName = String --- | Entropy device /dev/random on unix system +-- | Entropy device @/dev/random@ on unix system newtype DevRandom = DevRandom DeviceName --- | Entropy device /dev/urandom on unix system +-- | Entropy device @/dev/urandom@ on unix system newtype DevURandom = DevURandom DeviceName instance EntropySource DevRandom where @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ withDev filepath f = openDev filepath >>= \h -> case h of Nothing -> error ("device " ++ filepath ++ " cannot be grabbed") - Just fd -> f fd >>= \r -> (closeDev fd >> return r) + Just fd -> f fd `E.finally` closeDev fd closeDev :: H -> IO () closeDev h = hClose h diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unsafe.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unsafe.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unsafe.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Unsafe.hs @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ -- | Refill the entropy in a buffer -- --- call each entropy backend in turn until the buffer has --- been replenish. +-- Call each entropy backend in turn until the buffer has +-- been replenished. -- -- If the buffer cannot be refill after 3 loopings, this will raise -- an User Error exception diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Windows.hs b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Windows.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Windows.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Entropy/Windows.hs @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : Good -- --- code originally from the entropy package and thus is: +-- Code originally from the entropy package and thus is: -- Copyright (c) Thomas DuBuisson. -- {-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Source --- | handle to windows crypto API for random generation +-- | Handle to Windows crypto API for random generation data WinCryptoAPI = WinCryptoAPI instance EntropySource WinCryptoAPI where diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Probabilistic.hs b/Crypto/Random/Probabilistic.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Probabilistic.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Probabilistic.hs @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ -- This is useful for probabilistic algorithm like Miller Rabin -- probably prime algorithm, given appropriate choice of the heuristic -- --- Generally, it's advise not to use this function. +-- Generally, it's advised not to use this function. probabilistic :: MonadPseudoRandom ChaChaDRG a -> a probabilistic f = fst $ withDRG drg f where {-# NOINLINE drg #-} diff --git a/Crypto/Random/SystemDRG.hs b/Crypto/Random/SystemDRG.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/SystemDRG.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/SystemDRG.hs @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import Crypto.Random.Types import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Unsafe import Crypto.Internal.Compat -import Crypto.Internal.Imports import Data.ByteArray (ScrubbedBytes, ByteArray) import Data.Memory.PtrMethods as B (memCopy) import Data.Maybe (catMaybes) diff --git a/Crypto/Random/Types.hs b/Crypto/Random/Types.hs --- a/Crypto/Random/Types.hs +++ b/Crypto/Random/Types.hs @@ -15,10 +15,9 @@ import Crypto.Random.Entropy import Crypto.Internal.ByteArray -import Crypto.Internal.Imports -- | A monad constraint that allows to generate random bytes -class (Functor m, Monad m) => MonadRandom m where +class Monad m => MonadRandom m where getRandomBytes :: ByteArray byteArray => Int -> m byteArray -- | A Deterministic Random Generator (DRG) class @@ -47,7 +46,7 @@ in (f a, g3) instance DRG gen => Monad (MonadPseudoRandom gen) where - return a = MonadPseudoRandom $ \g -> (a, g) + return = pure (>>=) m1 m2 = MonadPseudoRandom $ \g1 -> let (a, g2) = runPseudoRandom m1 g1 in runPseudoRandom (m2 a) g2 diff --git a/Crypto/System/CPU.hs b/Crypto/System/CPU.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/Crypto/System/CPU.hs @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +-- | +-- Module : Crypto.System.CPU +-- License : BSD-style +-- Maintainer : Olivier Chéron +-- Stability : experimental +-- Portability : unknown +-- +-- Gives information about cryptonite runtime environment. +-- +{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} +{-# LANGUAGE DeriveDataTypeable #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ForeignFunctionInterface #-} +module Crypto.System.CPU + ( ProcessorOption (..) + , processorOptions + ) where + +import Data.Data +import Data.List (findIndices) +#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND +import Data.Maybe (isJust) +#endif +import Data.Word (Word8) +import Foreign.Ptr +import Foreign.Storable + +import Crypto.Internal.Compat + +#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND +import Crypto.Random.Entropy.RDRand +import Crypto.Random.Entropy.Source +#endif + +-- | CPU options impacting cryptography implementation and library performance. +data ProcessorOption + = AESNI -- ^ Support for AES instructions, with flag @support_aesni@ + | PCLMUL -- ^ Support for CLMUL instructions, with flag @support_pclmuldq@ + | RDRAND -- ^ Support for RDRAND instruction, with flag @support_rdrand@ + deriving (Show,Eq,Enum,Data) + +-- | Options which have been enabled at compile time and are supported by the +-- current CPU. +processorOptions :: [ProcessorOption] +processorOptions = unsafeDoIO $ do + p <- cryptonite_aes_cpu_init + options <- traverse (getOption p) aesOptions + rdrand <- hasRDRand + return (decodeOptions options ++ [ RDRAND | rdrand ]) + where + aesOptions = [ AESNI .. PCLMUL ] + getOption p = peekElemOff p . fromEnum + decodeOptions = map toEnum . findIndices (> 0) +{-# NOINLINE processorOptions #-} + +hasRDRand :: IO Bool +#ifdef SUPPORT_RDRAND +hasRDRand = fmap isJust getRDRand + where getRDRand = entropyOpen :: IO (Maybe RDRand) +#else +hasRDRand = return False +#endif + +foreign import ccall unsafe "cryptonite_aes_cpu_init" + cryptonite_aes_cpu_init :: IO (Ptr Word8) diff --git a/Crypto/Tutorial.hs b/Crypto/Tutorial.hs --- a/Crypto/Tutorial.hs +++ b/Crypto/Tutorial.hs @@ -1,34 +1,195 @@ -{-# OPTIONS_GHC -fno-warn-unused-imports #-} -{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +-- | Examples of how to use @cryptonite@. +module Crypto.Tutorial + ( -- * API design + -- $api_design -{-| How to use @cryptonite@ + -- * Hash algorithms + -- $hash_algorithms -> -- | Beware MUST BE 256bits as we use AES256 -> import Data.ByteString (ByteString) -> import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES256) -> import Crypto.Cipher.Types (BlockCipher(..), Cipher(..),nullIV) -> import Crypto.Error (CryptoFailable(..)) -> -> secretKey :: ByteString -> secretKey = "012-456-89A-CDE-012-456-89A-CDE-" -> -> encrypt :: ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString -> encrypt secret = ctrCombine ctx nullIV -> where -> ctx = cipherInitNoErr (cipherMakeKey (undefined :: AES256) secret) -> cipherInitNoErr :: BlockCipher c => Key c -> c -> cipherInitNoErr (Key k) = case cipherInit k of -> CryptoPassed a -> a -> CryptoFailed e -> error (show e) -> cipherMakeKey :: Cipher cipher => cipher -> ByteString -> Key cipher -> cipherMakeKey _ = Key -- Yeah Lazyness!!!!!! -> -> -> decrypt :: ByteString -> ByteString -> ByteString -> decrypt = encrypt + -- * Symmetric block ciphers + -- $symmetric_block_ciphers -|-} + -- * Combining primitives + -- $combining_primitives + ) where -module Crypto.Tutorial () where +-- $api_design +-- +-- APIs in cryptonite are often based on type classes from package +-- , notably +-- 'Data.ByteArray.ByteArrayAccess' and 'Data.ByteArray.ByteArray'. +-- Module "Data.ByteArray" provides many primitives that are useful to +-- work with cryptonite types. For example function 'Data.ByteArray.convert' +-- can transform one 'Data.ByteArray.ByteArrayAccess' concrete type like +-- 'Crypto.Hash.Digest' to a 'Data.ByteString.ByteString'. +-- +-- Algorithms and functions needing random bytes are based on type class +-- 'Crypto.Random.Types.MonadRandom'. Implementation 'IO' uses a system source +-- of entropy. It is also possible to use a 'Crypto.Random.Types.DRG' with +-- 'Crypto.Random.Types.MonadPseudoRandom' +-- +-- Error conditions are returned with data type 'Crypto.Error.CryptoFailable'. +-- Functions in module "Crypto.Error" can convert those values to runtime +-- exceptions, 'Maybe' or 'Either' values. -import Crypto.Cipher.Types +-- $hash_algorithms +-- +-- Hashing a complete message: +-- +-- > import Crypto.Hash +-- > +-- > import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +-- > +-- > exampleHashWith :: ByteString -> IO () +-- > exampleHashWith msg = do +-- > putStrLn $ " sha1(" ++ show msg ++ ") = " ++ show (hashWith SHA1 msg) +-- > putStrLn $ "sha256(" ++ show msg ++ ") = " ++ show (hashWith SHA256 msg) +-- +-- Hashing incrementally, with intermediate context allocations: +-- +-- > {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +-- > +-- > import Crypto.Hash +-- > +-- > import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +-- > +-- > exampleIncrWithAllocs :: IO () +-- > exampleIncrWithAllocs = do +-- > let ctx0 = hashInitWith SHA3_512 +-- > ctx1 = hashUpdate ctx0 ("The " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx2 = hashUpdate ctx1 ("quick " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx3 = hashUpdate ctx2 ("brown " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx4 = hashUpdate ctx3 ("fox " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx5 = hashUpdate ctx4 ("jumps " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx6 = hashUpdate ctx5 ("over " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx7 = hashUpdate ctx6 ("the " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx8 = hashUpdate ctx7 ("lazy " :: ByteString) +-- > ctx9 = hashUpdate ctx8 ("dog" :: ByteString) +-- > print (hashFinalize ctx9) +-- +-- Hashing incrementally, updating context in place: +-- +-- > {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +-- > +-- > import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms +-- > import Crypto.Hash.IO +-- > +-- > import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +-- > +-- > exampleIncrInPlace :: IO () +-- > exampleIncrInPlace = do +-- > ctx <- hashMutableInitWith SHA3_512 +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("The " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("quick " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("brown " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("fox " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("jumps " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("over " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("the " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("lazy " :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableUpdate ctx ("dog" :: ByteString) +-- > hashMutableFinalize ctx >>= print + +-- $symmetric_block_ciphers +-- +-- > {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +-- > {-# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #-} +-- > {-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-} +-- > +-- > import Crypto.Cipher.AES (AES256) +-- > import Crypto.Cipher.Types (BlockCipher(..), Cipher(..), nullIV, KeySizeSpecifier(..), IV, makeIV) +-- > import Crypto.Error (CryptoFailable(..), CryptoError(..)) +-- > +-- > import qualified Crypto.Random.Types as CRT +-- > +-- > import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray) +-- > import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +-- > +-- > -- | Not required, but most general implementation +-- > data Key c a where +-- > Key :: (BlockCipher c, ByteArray a) => a -> Key c a +-- > +-- > -- | Generates a string of bytes (key) of a specific length for a given block cipher +-- > genSecretKey :: forall m c a. (CRT.MonadRandom m, BlockCipher c, ByteArray a) => c -> Int -> m (Key c a) +-- > genSecretKey _ = fmap Key . CRT.getRandomBytes +-- > +-- > -- | Generate a random initialization vector for a given block cipher +-- > genRandomIV :: forall m c. (CRT.MonadRandom m, BlockCipher c) => c -> m (Maybe (IV c)) +-- > genRandomIV _ = do +-- > bytes :: ByteString <- CRT.getRandomBytes $ blockSize (undefined :: c) +-- > return $ makeIV bytes +-- > +-- > -- | Initialize a block cipher +-- > initCipher :: (BlockCipher c, ByteArray a) => Key c a -> Either CryptoError c +-- > initCipher (Key k) = case cipherInit k of +-- > CryptoFailed e -> Left e +-- > CryptoPassed a -> Right a +-- > +-- > encrypt :: (BlockCipher c, ByteArray a) => Key c a -> IV c -> a -> Either CryptoError a +-- > encrypt secretKey initIV msg = +-- > case initCipher secretKey of +-- > Left e -> Left e +-- > Right c -> Right $ ctrCombine c initIV msg +-- > +-- > decrypt :: (BlockCipher c, ByteArray a) => Key c a -> IV c -> a -> Either CryptoError a +-- > decrypt = encrypt +-- > +-- > exampleAES256 :: ByteString -> IO () +-- > exampleAES256 msg = do +-- > -- secret key needs 256 bits (32 * 8) +-- > secretKey <- genSecretKey (undefined :: AES256) 32 +-- > mInitIV <- genRandomIV (undefined :: AES256) +-- > case mInitIV of +-- > Nothing -> error "Failed to generate and initialization vector." +-- > Just initIV -> do +-- > let encryptedMsg = encrypt secretKey initIV msg +-- > decryptedMsg = decrypt secretKey initIV =<< encryptedMsg +-- > case (,) <$> encryptedMsg <*> decryptedMsg of +-- > Left err -> error $ show err +-- > Right (eMsg, dMsg) -> do +-- > putStrLn $ "Original Message: " ++ show msg +-- > putStrLn $ "Message after encryption: " ++ show eMsg +-- > putStrLn $ "Message after decryption: " ++ show dMsg + +-- $combining_primitives +-- +-- This example shows how to use Curve25519, XSalsa and Poly1305 primitives to +-- emulate NaCl's @crypto_box@ construct. +-- +-- > import qualified Data.ByteArray as BA +-- > import Data.ByteString (ByteString) +-- > import qualified Data.ByteString as B +-- > +-- > import qualified Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa as XSalsa +-- > import qualified Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 as Poly1305 +-- > import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Curve25519 as X25519 +-- > +-- > -- | Build a @crypto_box@ packet encrypting the specified content with a +-- > -- 192-bit nonce, receiver public key and sender private key. +-- > crypto_box content nonce pk sk = BA.convert tag `B.append` c +-- > where +-- > zero = B.replicate 16 0 +-- > shared = X25519.dh pk sk +-- > (iv0, iv1) = B.splitAt 8 nonce +-- > state0 = XSalsa.initialize 20 shared (zero `B.append` iv0) +-- > state1 = XSalsa.derive state0 iv1 +-- > (rs, state2) = XSalsa.generate state1 32 +-- > (c, _) = XSalsa.combine state2 content +-- > tag = Poly1305.auth (rs :: ByteString) c +-- > +-- > -- | Try to open a @crypto_box@ packet and recover the content using the +-- > -- 192-bit nonce, sender public key and receiver private key. +-- > crypto_box_open packet nonce pk sk +-- > | B.length packet < 16 = Nothing +-- > | BA.constEq tag' tag = Just content +-- > | otherwise = Nothing +-- > where +-- > (tag', c) = B.splitAt 16 packet +-- > zero = B.replicate 16 0 +-- > shared = X25519.dh pk sk +-- > (iv0, iv1) = B.splitAt 8 nonce +-- > state0 = XSalsa.initialize 20 shared (zero `B.append` iv0) +-- > state1 = XSalsa.derive state0 iv1 +-- > (rs, state2) = XSalsa.generate state1 32 +-- > (content, _) = XSalsa.combine state2 c +-- > tag = Poly1305.auth (rs :: ByteString) c diff --git a/README.md b/README.md --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -16,13 +16,23 @@ Documentation: [cryptonite on hackage](http://hackage.haskell.org/package/cryptonite) +Stability +--------- + +Cryptonite APIs are stable, and we only strive to add, not change or remove. +Note that because the API exposed is wide and also expose internals things (for +power users and flexibility), certains APIs can be revised in extreme cases +where we can't just add. + Versioning ---------- -Development versions are an incremental number prefixed by 0. There is no -API stability between development versions. +Next version of `0.x` is `0.(x+1)`. There's no exceptions, or API related meaning +behind the numbers. -Production versions : TBD +Each versions of stackage (going back 3 stable LTS) has a cryptonite version +that we maintain with security fixes when necessary and are versioned with the +following `0.x.y` scheme. Coding Style ------------ @@ -33,29 +43,7 @@ Support ------- -cryptonite supports the following platforms: - -* Windows >= 8 -* OSX >= 10.8 -* Linux -* BSDs - -On the following architectures: - -* x86-64 -* i386 - -On the following haskell versions: - -* GHC 7.0.x -* GHC 7.4.x -* GHC 7.6.x -* GHC 7.8.x -* GHC 7.10.x - -Further platforms and architectures probably work too, but since the -maintainer(s) don't have regular access to them, we can't commit to -further support. +See [Haskell packages guidelines](https://github.com/vincenthz/haskell-pkg-guidelines/blob/master/README.md#support) Known Building Issues --------------------- @@ -64,6 +52,10 @@ with the lack of autodetection feature builtin in .cabal file, it is left on the user to disable the aesni. See the [Disabling AESNI] section +On CentOS 7 the default C compiler includes intrinsic header files incompatible +with per-function target options. Solutions are to use GCC >= 4.9 or disable +flag *use_target_attributes* (see flag configuration examples below). + Disabling AESNI --------------- @@ -84,6 +76,13 @@ For help with cabal flags, see: [stackoverflow : is there a way to define flags for cabal](http://stackoverflow.com/questions/23523869/is-there-any-way-to-define-flags-for-cabal-dependencies) +Enabling PCLMULDQ +----------------- + +When the C toolchain supports it, enabling flag *support_pclmuldq* can bring +additional security and performance for AES GCM. A CPU with the necessary +instruction set will use an alternate implementation selected at runtime. + Links ----- @@ -100,5 +99,7 @@ * [Scrypt](http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html) * [Curve25519](http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html) * [Ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/papers.html) +* [Ed448-Goldilocks](http://ed448goldilocks.sourceforge.net/) +* [EdDSA-test-vectors](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc8032.txt) * [AFIS](http://clemens.endorphin.org/cryptography) diff --git a/benchs/Bench.hs b/benchs/Bench.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/benchs/Bench.hs @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE TypeFamilies #-} +module Main where + +import Gauge.Main + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV as AESGCMSIV +import Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish +import Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 as CP +import Crypto.Cipher.DES +import Crypto.Cipher.Twofish +import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.ECC +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.Hash +import qualified Crypto.KDF.BCrypt as BCrypt +import qualified Crypto.KDF.PBKDF2 as PBKDF2 +import Crypto.Number.Basic (numBits) +import Crypto.Number.Generate +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DH as DH +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Prim as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA as EdDSA +import Crypto.Random + +import Control.DeepSeq (NFData) +import Data.ByteArray (ByteArray, Bytes) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 as P256 + +import Number.F2m + +data HashAlg = forall alg . HashAlgorithm alg => HashAlg alg + +benchHash = + [ env oneKB $ \b -> bgroup "1KB" $ map (doHashBench b) hashAlgs + , env oneMB $ \b -> bgroup "1MB" $ map (doHashBench b) hashAlgs + ] + where + doHashBench b (name, HashAlg alg) = bench name $ nf (hashWith alg) b + + oneKB :: IO Bytes + oneKB = getRandomBytes 1024 + + oneMB :: IO Bytes + oneMB = getRandomBytes $ 1024 * 1024 + + hashAlgs = + [ ("MD2", HashAlg MD2) + , ("MD4", HashAlg MD4) + , ("MD5", HashAlg MD5) + , ("SHA1", HashAlg SHA1) + , ("SHA224", HashAlg SHA224) + , ("SHA256", HashAlg SHA256) + , ("SHA384", HashAlg SHA384) + , ("SHA512", HashAlg SHA512) + , ("SHA512t_224", HashAlg SHA512t_224) + , ("SHA512t_256", HashAlg SHA512t_256) + , ("RIPEMD160", HashAlg RIPEMD160) + , ("Tiger", HashAlg Tiger) + --, ("Skein256-160", HashAlg Skein256_160) + , ("Skein256-256", HashAlg Skein256_256) + --, ("Skein512-160", HashAlg Skein512_160) + , ("Skein512-384", HashAlg Skein512_384) + , ("Skein512-512", HashAlg Skein512_512) + --, ("Skein512-896", HashAlg Skein512_896) + , ("Whirlpool", HashAlg Whirlpool) + , ("Keccak-224", HashAlg Keccak_224) + , ("Keccak-256", HashAlg Keccak_256) + , ("Keccak-384", HashAlg Keccak_384) + , ("Keccak-512", HashAlg Keccak_512) + , ("SHA3-224", HashAlg SHA3_224) + , ("SHA3-256", HashAlg SHA3_256) + , ("SHA3-384", HashAlg SHA3_384) + , ("SHA3-512", HashAlg SHA3_512) + , ("Blake2b-160", HashAlg Blake2b_160) + , ("Blake2b-224", HashAlg Blake2b_224) + , ("Blake2b-256", HashAlg Blake2b_256) + , ("Blake2b-384", HashAlg Blake2b_384) + , ("Blake2b-512", HashAlg Blake2b_512) + , ("Blake2s-160", HashAlg Blake2s_160) + , ("Blake2s-224", HashAlg Blake2s_224) + , ("Blake2s-256", HashAlg Blake2s_256) + ] + +benchPBKDF2 = + [ bgroup "64" + [ bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-100-64" $ nf (pbkdf2 64) 100 + , bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-1000-64" $ nf (pbkdf2 64) 1000 + , bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-10000-64" $ nf (pbkdf2 64) 10000 + ] + , bgroup "128" + [ bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-100-128" $ nf (pbkdf2 128) 100 + , bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-1000-128" $ nf (pbkdf2 128) 1000 + , bench "cryptonite-PBKDF2-10000-128" $ nf (pbkdf2 128) 10000 + ] + ] + where + pbkdf2 :: Int -> Int -> B.ByteString + pbkdf2 n iter = PBKDF2.generate (PBKDF2.prfHMAC SHA512) (params n iter) mypass mysalt + + mypass, mysalt :: B.ByteString + mypass = "password" + mysalt = "salt" + + params n iter = PBKDF2.Parameters iter n + +benchBCrypt = + [ bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-4" $ nf bcrypt 4 + , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-5" $ nf bcrypt 5 + , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-7" $ nf bcrypt 7 + , bench "cryptonite-BCrypt-11" $ nf bcrypt 11 + ] + where + bcrypt :: Int -> B.ByteString + bcrypt cost = BCrypt.bcrypt cost mysalt mypass + + mypass, mysalt :: B.ByteString + mypass = "password" + mysalt = "saltsaltsaltsalt" + +benchBlockCipher = + [ bgroup "ECB" benchECB + , bgroup "CBC" benchCBC + ] + where + benchECB = + [ bench "DES-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: DES) cipherInit key8) input1024 + , bench "Blowfish128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: Blowfish128) cipherInit key16) input1024 + , bench "Twofish128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: Twofish128) cipherInit key16) input1024 + , bench "CAST5-128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: CAST5) cipherInit key16) input1024 + , bench "AES128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: AES128) cipherInit key16) input1024 + , bench "AES256-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: AES256) cipherInit key32) input1024 + ] + where run :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArray key, BlockCipher c) + => c -> (key -> CryptoFailable c) -> key -> ba -> ba + run _witness initF key input = + (ecbEncrypt (throwCryptoError (initF key))) input + + benchCBC = + [ bench "DES-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: DES) cipherInit key8 iv8) input1024 + , bench "Blowfish128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: Blowfish128) cipherInit key16 iv8) input1024 + , bench "Twofish128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: Twofish128) cipherInit key16 iv16) input1024 + , bench "CAST5-128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: CAST5) cipherInit key16 iv8) input1024 + , bench "AES128-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: AES128) cipherInit key16 iv16) input1024 + , bench "AES256-input=1024" $ nf (run (undefined :: AES256) cipherInit key32 iv16) input1024 + ] + where run :: (ByteArray ba, ByteArray key, BlockCipher c) + => c -> (key -> CryptoFailable c) -> key -> IV c -> ba -> ba + run _witness initF key iv input = + (cbcEncrypt (throwCryptoError (initF key))) iv input + + key8 = B.replicate 8 0 + key16 = B.replicate 16 0 + key32 = B.replicate 32 0 + input1024 = B.replicate 1024 0 + + iv8 :: BlockCipher c => IV c + iv8 = maybe (error "iv size 8") id $ makeIV key8 + + iv16 :: BlockCipher c => IV c + iv16 = maybe (error "iv size 16") id $ makeIV key16 + +benchAE = + [ bench "ChaChaPoly1305" $ nf (cp key32) (input64, input1024) + , bench "AES-GCM" $ nf (gcm key32) (input64, input1024) + , bench "AES-CCM" $ nf (ccm key32) (input64, input1024) + , bench "AES-GCM-SIV" $ nf (gcmsiv key32) (input64, input1024) + ] + where cp k (ini, plain) = + let iniState = throwCryptoError $ CP.initialize k (throwCryptoError $ CP.nonce12 nonce12) + afterAAD = CP.finalizeAAD (CP.appendAAD ini iniState) + (out, afterEncrypt) = CP.encrypt plain afterAAD + outtag = CP.finalize afterEncrypt + in (outtag, out) + + gcm k (ini, plain) = + let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256 + state = throwCryptoError $ aeadInit AEAD_GCM ctx nonce12 + in aeadSimpleEncrypt state ini plain 16 + + ccm k (ini, plain) = + let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256 + mode = AEAD_CCM 1024 CCM_M16 CCM_L3 + state = throwCryptoError $ aeadInit mode ctx nonce12 + in aeadSimpleEncrypt state ini plain 16 + + gcmsiv k (ini, plain) = + let ctx = throwCryptoError (cipherInit k) :: AES256 + iv = throwCryptoError (AESGCMSIV.nonce nonce12) + in AESGCMSIV.encrypt ctx iv ini plain + + input64 = B.replicate 64 0 + input1024 = B.replicate 1024 0 + + nonce12 :: B.ByteString + nonce12 = B.replicate 12 0 + + key32 = B.replicate 32 0 + +benchECC = + [ bench "pointAddTwoMuls-baseline" $ nf run_b (n1, p1, n2, p2) + , bench "pointAddTwoMuls-optimized" $ nf run_o (n1, p1, n2, p2) + , bench "pointAdd-ECC" $ nf run_c (p1, p2) + , bench "pointMul-ECC" $ nf run_d (n1, p2) + ] + where run_b (n, p, k, q) = ECC.pointAdd c (ECC.pointMul c n p) + (ECC.pointMul c k q) + + run_o (n, p, k, q) = ECC.pointAddTwoMuls c n p k q + run_c (p, q) = ECC.pointAdd c p q + run_d (n, p) = ECC.pointMul c n p + + c = ECC.getCurveByName ECC.SEC_p256r1 + p1 = ECC.pointBaseMul c n1 + p2 = ECC.pointBaseMul c n2 + n1 = 0x2ba9daf2363b2819e69b34a39cf496c2458a9b2a21505ea9e7b7cbca42dc7435 + n2 = 0xf054a7f60d10b8c2cf847ee90e9e029f8b0e971b09ca5f55c4d49921a11fadc1 + +benchP256 = + [ bench "pointAddTwoMuls-P256" $ nf run_p (n1, p1, n2, p2) + , bench "pointAdd-P256" $ nf run_q (p1, p2) + , bench "pointMul-P256" $ nf run_t (n1, p1) + ] + where run_p (n, p, k, q) = P256.pointAdd (P256.pointMul n p) (P256.pointMul k q) + run_q (p, q) = P256.pointAdd p q + run_t (n, p) = P256.pointMul n p + + xS = 0xde2444bebc8d36e682edd27e0f271508617519b3221a8fa0b77cab3989da97c9 + yS = 0xc093ae7ff36e5380fc01a5aad1e66659702de80f53cec576b6350b243042a256 + xT = 0x55a8b00f8da1d44e62f6b3b25316212e39540dc861c89575bb8cf92e35e0986b + yT = 0x5421c3209c2d6c704835d82ac4c3dd90f61a8a52598b9e7ab656e9d8c8b24316 + p1 = P256.pointFromIntegers (xS, yS) + p2 = P256.pointFromIntegers (xT, yT) + n1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger 0x2ba9daf2363b2819e69b34a39cf496c2458a9b2a21505ea9e7b7cbca42dc7435 + n2 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger 0xf054a7f60d10b8c2cf847ee90e9e029f8b0e971b09ca5f55c4d49921a11fadc1 + + + +benchFFDH = map doFFDHBench primes + where + doFFDHBench (e, p) = + let bits = numBits p + params = DH.Params { DH.params_p = p, DH.params_g = 2, DH.params_bits = bits } + in env (generate e params) $ bench (show bits) . nf (run params) + + generate e params = do + aPriv <- DH.PrivateNumber `fmap` generatePriv e + bPriv <- DH.PrivateNumber `fmap` generatePriv e + return (aPriv, DH.calculatePublic params bPriv) + + generatePriv e = generateParams e (Just SetHighest) False + + run params (priv, pub) = DH.getShared params priv pub + + -- RFC 7919: prime p with minimal size of exponent + primes = [ (225, 0x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+ ] + +data CurveDH = forall c . (EllipticCurveDH c, NFData (Scalar c), NFData (Point c)) => CurveDH c + +benchECDH = map doECDHBench curves + where + doECDHBench (name, CurveDH c) = + let proxy = Just c -- using Maybe as Proxy + in env (generate proxy) $ bench name . nf (run proxy) + + generate proxy = do + KeyPair _ aScalar <- curveGenerateKeyPair proxy + KeyPair bPoint _ <- curveGenerateKeyPair proxy + return (aScalar, bPoint) + + run proxy (s, p) = throwCryptoError (ecdh proxy s p) + + curves = [ ("P256R1", CurveDH Curve_P256R1) + , ("P384R1", CurveDH Curve_P384R1) + , ("P521R1", CurveDH Curve_P521R1) + , ("X25519", CurveDH Curve_X25519) + , ("X448", CurveDH Curve_X448) + ] + +data CurveHashECDSA = + forall curve hashAlg . (ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve, + NFData (Scalar curve), + NFData (Point curve), + HashAlgorithm hashAlg) => CurveHashECDSA curve hashAlg + +benchECDSA = map doECDSABench curveHashes + where + doECDSABench (name, CurveHashECDSA c hashAlg) = + let proxy = Just c -- using Maybe as Proxy + in bgroup name + [ env (signGenerate proxy) $ bench "sign" . nfIO . signRun proxy hashAlg + , env (verifyGenerate proxy hashAlg) $ bench "verify" . nf (verifyRun proxy hashAlg) + ] + + signGenerate proxy = do + m <- tenKB + s <- curveGenerateScalar proxy + return (s, m) + + signRun proxy hashAlg (priv, msg) = ECDSA.sign proxy priv hashAlg msg + + verifyGenerate proxy hashAlg = do + m <- tenKB + KeyPair p s <- curveGenerateKeyPair proxy + sig <- ECDSA.sign proxy s hashAlg m + return (p, sig, m) + + verifyRun proxy hashAlg (pub, sig, msg) = ECDSA.verify proxy hashAlg pub sig msg + + tenKB :: IO Bytes + tenKB = getRandomBytes 10240 + + curveHashes = [ ("secp256r1_sha256", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P256R1 SHA256) + , ("secp384r1_sha384", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P384R1 SHA384) + , ("secp521r1_sha512", CurveHashECDSA Curve_P521R1 SHA512) + ] + +benchEdDSA = + [ bgroup "EdDSA-Ed25519" benchGenEd25519 + , bgroup "Ed25519" benchEd25519 + ] + where + benchGen prx alg = + [ bench "sign" $ perBatchEnv (genEnv prx alg) (run_gen_sign prx) + , bench "verify" $ perBatchEnv (genEnv prx alg) (run_gen_verify prx) + ] + + benchGenEd25519 = benchGen (Just Curve_Edwards25519) SHA512 + benchEd25519 = + [ bench "sign" $ perBatchEnv ed25519Env run_ed25519_sign + , bench "verify" $ perBatchEnv ed25519Env run_ed25519_verify + ] + + msg = B.empty -- empty message = worst-case scenario showing API overhead + + genEnv prx alg _ = do + sec <- EdDSA.generateSecretKey prx + let pub = EdDSA.toPublic prx alg sec + sig = EdDSA.sign prx sec pub msg + return (sec, pub, sig) + + run_gen_sign prx (sec, pub, _) = return (EdDSA.sign prx sec pub msg) + + run_gen_verify prx (_, pub, sig) = return (EdDSA.verify prx pub msg sig) + + ed25519Env _ = do + sec <- Ed25519.generateSecretKey + let pub = Ed25519.toPublic sec + sig = Ed25519.sign sec pub msg + return (sec, pub, sig) + + run_ed25519_sign (sec, pub, _) = return (Ed25519.sign sec pub msg) + + run_ed25519_verify (_, pub, sig) = return (Ed25519.verify pub msg sig) + +main = defaultMain + [ bgroup "hash" benchHash + , bgroup "block-cipher" benchBlockCipher + , bgroup "AE" benchAE + , bgroup "pbkdf2" benchPBKDF2 + , bgroup "bcrypt" benchBCrypt + , bgroup "ECC" benchECC + , bgroup "P256" benchP256 + , bgroup "DH" + [ bgroup "FFDH" benchFFDH + , bgroup "ECDH" benchECDH + ] + , bgroup "ECDSA" benchECDSA + , bgroup "EdDSA" benchEdDSA + , bgroup "F2m" benchF2m + ] diff --git a/benchs/Number/F2m.hs b/benchs/Number/F2m.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/benchs/Number/F2m.hs @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE PackageImports #-} + +module Number.F2m (benchF2m) where + +import Gauge.Main +import System.Random + +import Crypto.Number.Basic (log2) +import Crypto.Number.F2m + +genInteger :: Int -> Int -> Integer +genInteger salt bits + = head + . dropWhile ((< bits) . log2) + . scanl (\a r -> a * 2^(31 :: Int) + abs r) 0 + . randoms + . mkStdGen + $ salt + bits + +benchMod :: Int -> Benchmark +benchMod bits = bench (show bits) $ nf (modF2m m) a + where + m = genInteger 0 bits + a = genInteger 1 (2 * bits) + +benchMul :: Int -> Benchmark +benchMul bits = bench (show bits) $ nf (mulF2m m a) b + where + m = genInteger 0 bits + a = genInteger 1 bits + b = genInteger 2 bits + +benchSquare :: Int -> Benchmark +benchSquare bits = bench (show bits) $ nf (squareF2m m) a + where + m = genInteger 0 bits + a = genInteger 1 bits + +benchInv :: Int -> Benchmark +benchInv bits = bench (show bits) $ nf (invF2m m) a + where + m = genInteger 0 bits + a = genInteger 1 bits + +bitsList :: [Int] +bitsList = [64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048] + +benchF2m = + [ bgroup "modF2m" $ map benchMod bitsList + , bgroup "mulF2m" $ map benchMul bitsList + , bgroup "squareF2m" $ map benchSquare bitsList + , bgroup "invF2m" $ map benchInv bitsList + ] diff --git a/cbits/aes/block128.h b/cbits/aes/block128.h --- a/cbits/aes/block128.h +++ b/cbits/aes/block128.h @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #define BLOCK128_H #include +#include typedef union { uint64_t q[2]; @@ -40,40 +41,80 @@ uint8_t b[16]; } block128; -static inline void block128_copy_bytes(block128 *block, uint8_t *src, uint32_t len) +static inline void block128_copy_bytes(block128 *block, const uint8_t *src, uint32_t len) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) block->b[i] = src[i]; } -static inline void block128_copy(block128 *d, const block128 *s) +static inline void block128_copy_aligned(block128 *d, const block128 *s) { d->q[0] = s->q[0]; d->q[1] = s->q[1]; } +static inline void block128_copy(block128 *d, const block128 *s) +{ + if (need_alignment(d, 8) || need_alignment(s, 8)) { + block128_copy_bytes(d, (const uint8_t *) s, 16); + } else { + block128_copy_aligned(d, s); + } +} + static inline void block128_zero(block128 *d) { d->q[0] = 0; d->q[1] = 0; } -static inline void block128_xor(block128 *d, const block128 *s) +static inline void block128_xor_bytes(block128 *block, const uint8_t *src, uint32_t len) { + int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) block->b[i] ^= src[i]; +} + +static inline void block128_xor_aligned(block128 *d, const block128 *s) +{ d->q[0] ^= s->q[0]; d->q[1] ^= s->q[1]; } -static inline void block128_vxor(block128 *d, const block128 *s1, const block128 *s2) +static inline void block128_xor(block128 *d, const block128 *s) { + if (need_alignment(d, 8) || need_alignment(s, 8)) { + block128_xor_bytes(d, (const uint8_t *) s, 16); + } else { + block128_xor_aligned(d, s); + } +} + +static inline void block128_vxor_bytes(block128 *block, const uint8_t *src1, const uint8_t *src2, uint32_t len) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) block->b[i] = src1[i] ^ src2[i]; +} + +static inline void block128_vxor_aligned(block128 *d, const block128 *s1, const block128 *s2) +{ d->q[0] = s1->q[0] ^ s2->q[0]; d->q[1] = s1->q[1] ^ s2->q[1]; } -static inline void block128_xor_bytes(block128 *block, uint8_t *src, uint32_t len) +static inline void block128_vxor(block128 *d, const block128 *s1, const block128 *s2) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) block->b[i] ^= src[i]; + if (need_alignment(d, 8) || need_alignment(s1, 8) || need_alignment(s2, 8)) { + block128_vxor_bytes(d, (const uint8_t *) s1, (const uint8_t *) s2, 16); + } else { + block128_vxor_aligned(d, s1, s2); + } } +static inline void block128_byte_reverse(block128 *a) +{ + uint64_t s0 = a->q[0], s1 = a->q[1]; + a->q[0] = bitfn_swap64(s1); + a->q[1] = bitfn_swap64(s0); +} + static inline void block128_inc_be(block128 *b) { uint64_t v = be64_to_cpu(b->q[1]); @@ -82,6 +123,16 @@ b->q[1] = 0; } else b->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(v); +} + +static inline void block128_inc32_be(block128 *b) +{ + b->d[3] = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(b->d[3]) + 1); +} + +static inline void block128_inc32_le(block128 *b) +{ + b->d[0] = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(b->d[0]) + 1); } #ifdef IMPL_DEBUG diff --git a/cbits/aes/generic.c b/cbits/aes/generic.c --- a/cbits/aes/generic.c +++ b/cbits/aes/generic.c @@ -324,21 +324,22 @@ static void aes_main(aes_key *key, uint8_t *state) { int i = 0; - uint8_t rk[16]; + uint32_t rk[4]; + uint8_t *rkptr = (uint8_t *) rk; - create_round_key(key->data, rk); - add_round_key(state, rk); + create_round_key(key->data, rkptr); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); for (i = 1; i < key->nbr; i++) { - create_round_key(key->data + 16 * i, rk); + create_round_key(key->data + 16 * i, rkptr); shift_rows(state); mix_columns(state); - add_round_key(state, rk); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); } - create_round_key(key->data + 16 * key->nbr, rk); + create_round_key(key->data + 16 * key->nbr, rkptr); shift_rows(state); - add_round_key(state, rk); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); } static void shift_rows_inv(uint8_t *state) @@ -374,21 +375,22 @@ static void aes_main_inv(aes_key *key, uint8_t *state) { int i = 0; - uint8_t rk[16]; + uint32_t rk[4]; + uint8_t *rkptr = (uint8_t *) rk; - create_round_key(key->data + 16 * key->nbr, rk); - add_round_key(state, rk); + create_round_key(key->data + 16 * key->nbr, rkptr); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); for (i = key->nbr - 1; i > 0; i--) { - create_round_key(key->data + 16 * i, rk); + create_round_key(key->data + 16 * i, rkptr); shift_rows_inv(state); - add_round_key(state, rk); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); mix_columns_inv(state); } - create_round_key(key->data, rk); + create_round_key(key->data, rkptr); shift_rows_inv(state); - add_round_key(state, rk); + add_round_key(state, rkptr); } /* Set the block values, for the block: @@ -405,26 +407,28 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_block(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *input) { - uint8_t block[16]; - uint8_t *iptr, *optr; + uint32_t block[4]; + uint8_t *iptr, *optr, *bptr; iptr = (uint8_t *) input; optr = (uint8_t *) output; - swap_block(block, iptr); - aes_main(key, block); - swap_block(optr, block); + bptr = (uint8_t *) block; + swap_block(bptr, iptr); + aes_main(key, bptr); + swap_block(optr, bptr); } void cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_block(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *input) { - uint8_t block[16]; - uint8_t *iptr, *optr; + uint32_t block[4]; + uint8_t *iptr, *optr, *bptr; iptr = (uint8_t *) input; optr = (uint8_t *) output; - swap_block(block, iptr); - aes_main_inv(key, block); - swap_block(optr, block); + bptr = (uint8_t *) block; + swap_block(bptr, iptr); + aes_main_inv(key, bptr); + swap_block(optr, bptr); } void cryptonite_aes_generic_init(aes_key *key, uint8_t *origkey, uint8_t size) diff --git a/cbits/aes/gf.c b/cbits/aes/gf.c --- a/cbits/aes/gf.c +++ b/cbits/aes/gf.c @@ -34,39 +34,113 @@ #include #include -/* this is a really inefficient way to GF multiply. - * the alternative without hw accel is building small tables - * to speed up the multiplication. - * TODO: optimise with tables +/* inplace GFMUL for xts mode */ +void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(block128 *a) +{ + const uint64_t gf_mask = cpu_to_le64(0x8000000000000000ULL); + uint64_t r = ((a->q[1] & gf_mask) ? cpu_to_le64(0x87) : 0); + a->q[1] = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(a->q[1]) << 1) | (a->q[0] & gf_mask ? 1 : 0)); + a->q[0] = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->q[0]) << 1) ^ r; +} + + +/* + * GF multiplication with Shoup's method and 4-bit table. + * + * We precompute the products of H with all 4-bit polynomials and store them in + * a 'table_4bit' array. To avoid unnecessary byte swapping, the 16 blocks are + * written to the table with qwords already converted to CPU order. Table + * indices use the reflected bit ordering, i.e. polynomials X^0, X^1, X^2, X^3 + * map to bit positions 3, 2, 1, 0 respectively. + * + * To multiply an arbitrary block with H, the input block is decomposed in 4-bit + * segments. We get the final result after 32 table lookups and additions, one + * for each segment, interleaving multiplication by P(X)=X^4. */ -void cryptonite_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b) + +/* convert block128 qwords between BE and CPU order */ +static inline void block128_cpu_swap_be(block128 *a, const block128 *b) { - uint64_t a0, a1, v0, v1; + a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(b->q[1]); + a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(b->q[0]); +} + +/* multiplication by P(X)=X, assuming qwords already in CPU order */ +static inline void cpu_gf_mulx(block128 *a, const block128 *b) +{ + uint64_t v0 = b->q[0]; + uint64_t v1 = b->q[1]; + a->q[1] = v1 >> 1 | v0 << 63; + a->q[0] = v0 >> 1 ^ ((0-(v1 & 1)) & 0xe100000000000000ULL); +} + +static const uint64_t r4_0[] = + { 0x0000000000000000ULL, 0x1c20000000000000ULL + , 0x3840000000000000ULL, 0x2460000000000000ULL + , 0x7080000000000000ULL, 0x6ca0000000000000ULL + , 0x48c0000000000000ULL, 0x54e0000000000000ULL + , 0xe100000000000000ULL, 0xfd20000000000000ULL + , 0xd940000000000000ULL, 0xc560000000000000ULL + , 0x9180000000000000ULL, 0x8da0000000000000ULL + , 0xa9c0000000000000ULL, 0xb5e0000000000000ULL + }; + +/* multiplication by P(X)=X^4, assuming qwords already in CPU order */ +static inline void cpu_gf_mulx4(block128 *a, const block128 *b) +{ + uint64_t v0 = b->q[0]; + uint64_t v1 = b->q[1]; + a->q[1] = v1 >> 4 | v0 << 60; + a->q[0] = v0 >> 4 ^ r4_0[v1 & 0xf]; +} + +/* initialize the 4-bit table given H */ +void cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h) +{ + block128 v, *p; int i, j; - a0 = a1 = 0; - v0 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[0]); - v1 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[1]); + /* multiplication by 0 is 0 */ + block128_zero(&htable[0]); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - for (j = 0x80; j != 0; j >>= 1) { - uint8_t x = b->b[i] & j; - a0 ^= x ? v0 : 0; - a1 ^= x ? v1 : 0; - x = (uint8_t) v1 & 1; - v1 = (v1 >> 1) | (v0 << 63); - v0 = (v0 >> 1) ^ (x ? (0xe1ULL << 56) : 0); + /* at index 8=2^3 we have H.X^0 = H */ + i = 8; + block128_cpu_swap_be(&htable[i], h); /* in CPU order */ + p = &htable[i]; + + /* for other powers of 2, repeat multiplication by P(X)=X */ + for (i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) + { + cpu_gf_mulx(&htable[i], p); + p = &htable[i]; + } + + /* remaining elements are linear combinations */ + for (i = 2; i < 16; i <<= 1) { + p = &htable[i]; + v = *p; + for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { + p[j] = v; + block128_xor_aligned(&p[j], &htable[j]); } - a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(a0); - a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(a1); + } } -/* inplace GFMUL for xts mode */ -void cryptonite_gf_mulx(block128 *a) +/* multiply a block with H */ +void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable) { - const uint64_t gf_mask = cpu_to_le64(0x8000000000000000ULL); - uint64_t r = ((a->q[1] & gf_mask) ? cpu_to_le64(0x87) : 0); - a->q[1] = cpu_to_le64((le64_to_cpu(a->q[1]) << 1) | (a->q[0] & gf_mask ? 1 : 0)); - a->q[0] = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(a->q[0]) << 1) ^ r; + block128 b; + int i; + block128_zero(&b); + for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) + { + uint8_t v = a->b[i]; + block128_xor_aligned(&b, &htable[v & 0xf]); /* high bits (reflected) */ + cpu_gf_mulx4(&b, &b); + block128_xor_aligned(&b, &htable[v >> 4]); /* low bits (reflected) */ + if (i > 0) + cpu_gf_mulx4(&b, &b); + else + block128_cpu_swap_be(a, &b); /* restore BE order when done */ + } } - diff --git a/cbits/aes/gf.h b/cbits/aes/gf.h --- a/cbits/aes/gf.h +++ b/cbits/aes/gf.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ #include "aes/block128.h" -void cryptonite_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b); -void cryptonite_gf_mulx(block128 *a); +typedef block128 table_4bit[16]; + +void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(block128 *a); + +void cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h); +void cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable); #endif diff --git a/cbits/aes/x86ni.c b/cbits/aes/x86ni.c --- a/cbits/aes/x86ni.c +++ b/cbits/aes/x86ni.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ /* old GCC version doesn't cope with the shuffle parameters, that can take 2 values (0xff and 0xaa) * in our case, passed as argument despite being a immediate 8 bits constant anyway. * un-factorise aes_128_key_expansion into 2 version that have the shuffle parameter explicitly set */ +TARGET_AESNI static __m128i aes_128_key_expansion_ff(__m128i key, __m128i keygened) { keygened = _mm_shuffle_epi32(keygened, 0xff); @@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ return _mm_xor_si128(key, keygened); } +TARGET_AESNI static __m128i aes_128_key_expansion_aa(__m128i key, __m128i keygened) { keygened = _mm_shuffle_epi32(keygened, 0xaa); @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ return _mm_xor_si128(key, keygened); } +TARGET_AESNI void cryptonite_aesni_init(aes_key *key, uint8_t *ikey, uint8_t size) { __m128i k[28]; @@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ /* TO OPTIMISE: use pcmulqdq... or some faster code. * this is the lamest way of doing it, but i'm out of time. * this is basically a copy of gf_mulx in gf.c */ +TARGET_AESNI static __m128i gfmulx(__m128i v) { uint64_t v_[2] ALIGNMENT(16); @@ -157,38 +162,113 @@ return v; } -static void unopt_gf_mul(block128 *a, block128 *b) +TARGET_AESNI +static __m128i gfmul_generic(__m128i tag, const table_4bit htable) { - uint64_t a0, a1, v0, v1; - int i, j; + aes_block _t; + _mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_t, tag); + cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(&_t, htable); + tag = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *) &_t); + return tag; +} - a0 = a1 = 0; - v0 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[0]); - v1 = cpu_to_be64(a->q[1]); +#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) - for (j = 0x80; j != 0; j >>= 1) { - uint8_t x = b->b[i] & j; - a0 ^= x ? v0 : 0; - a1 ^= x ? v1 : 0; - x = (uint8_t) v1 & 1; - v1 = (v1 >> 1) | (v0 << 63); - v0 = (v0 >> 1) ^ (x ? (0xe1ULL << 56) : 0); - } - a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(a0); - a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(a1); +__m128i (*gfmul_branch_ptr)(__m128i a, const table_4bit t) = gfmul_generic; +#define gfmul(a,t) ((*gfmul_branch_ptr)(a,t)) + +/* See Intel carry-less-multiplication-instruction-in-gcm-mode-paper.pdf + * + * Adapted from figure 5, with additional byte swapping so that interface + * is simimar to cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul. + */ +TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL +static __m128i gfmul_pclmuldq(__m128i a, const table_4bit htable) +{ + __m128i b, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4, tmp5, tmp6, tmp7, tmp8, tmp9; + __m128i bswap_mask = _mm_set_epi8(0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15); + + a = _mm_shuffle_epi8(a, bswap_mask); + b = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) htable); + + tmp3 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x00); + tmp4 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x10); + tmp5 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x01); + tmp6 = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(a, b, 0x11); + + tmp4 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp4, tmp5); + tmp5 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp4, 8); + tmp4 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp4, 8); + tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp5); + tmp6 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp6, tmp4); + + tmp7 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 31); + tmp8 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp6, 31); + tmp3 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 1); + tmp6 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp6, 1); + + tmp9 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp7, 12); + tmp8 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp8, 4); + tmp7 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp7, 4); + tmp3 = _mm_or_si128(tmp3, tmp7); + tmp6 = _mm_or_si128(tmp6, tmp8); + tmp6 = _mm_or_si128(tmp6, tmp9); + + tmp7 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 31); + tmp8 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 30); + tmp9 = _mm_slli_epi32(tmp3, 25); + + tmp7 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp7, tmp8); + tmp7 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp7, tmp9); + tmp8 = _mm_srli_si128(tmp7, 4); + tmp7 = _mm_slli_si128(tmp7, 12); + tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp7); + + tmp2 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 1); + tmp4 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 2); + tmp5 = _mm_srli_epi32(tmp3, 7); + tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp4); + tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp5); + tmp2 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp2, tmp8); + tmp3 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp3, tmp2); + tmp6 = _mm_xor_si128(tmp6, tmp3); + + return _mm_shuffle_epi8(tmp6, bswap_mask); } -static __m128i ghash_add(__m128i tag, __m128i h, __m128i m) +void cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h) { - aes_block _t, _h; - tag = _mm_xor_si128(tag, m); + /* When pclmul is active we don't need to fill the table. Instead we just + * store H at index 0. It is written in reverse order, so function + * gfmul_pclmuldq will not byte-swap this value. + */ + htable->q[0] = bitfn_swap64(h->q[1]); + htable->q[1] = bitfn_swap64(h->q[0]); +} - _mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_t, tag); - _mm_store_si128((__m128i *) &_h, h); - unopt_gf_mul(&_t, &_h); - tag = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *) &_t); - return tag; +TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL +void cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable) +{ + __m128i _a, _b; + _a = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) a); + _b = gfmul_pclmuldq(_a, htable); + _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) a, _b); +} + +void cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul(void) +{ + gfmul_branch_ptr = gfmul_pclmuldq; +} + +#else +#define gfmul(a,t) (gfmul_generic(a,t)) +#endif + +TARGET_AESNI +static inline __m128i ghash_add(__m128i tag, const table_4bit htable, __m128i m) +{ + tag = _mm_xor_si128(tag, m); + return gfmul(tag, htable); } #define PRELOAD_ENC_KEYS128(k) \ diff --git a/cbits/aes/x86ni.h b/cbits/aes/x86ni.h --- a/cbits/aes/x86ni.h +++ b/cbits/aes/x86ni.h @@ -40,7 +40,16 @@ #include #include +#ifdef WITH_TARGET_ATTRIBUTES +#define TARGET_AESNI __attribute__((target("ssse3,aes"))) +#define TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL __attribute__((target("sse4.1,aes,pclmul"))) +#else +#define TARGET_AESNI +#define TARGET_AESNI_PCLMUL +#endif + #ifdef IMPL_DEBUG +TARGET_AESNI static void block128_sse_print(__m128i m) { block128 b; @@ -64,6 +73,8 @@ void cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_cbc256(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr128(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr256(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_128(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_256(uint8_t *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts128(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2, aes_block *_tweak, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks); void cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts256(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2, @@ -72,7 +83,11 @@ void cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt128(uint8_t *out, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt256(uint8_t *out, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *in, uint32_t length); -void gf_mul_x86ni(block128 *res, block128 *a_, block128 *b_); +#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL +void cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul(void); +void cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h); +void cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable); +#endif #endif diff --git a/cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c b/cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c --- a/cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c +++ b/cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_block)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) out, m); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_block)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) out, m); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ecb)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ } } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_ecb)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -71,6 +75,7 @@ } } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_cbc)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ } } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_decrypt_cbc)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ } } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr)(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -151,6 +158,49 @@ return ; } +TARGET_AESNI +void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_)(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *_iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) +{ + __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; + __m128i one = _mm_set_epi32(0,0,0,1); + uint32_t nb_blocks = len / 16; + uint32_t part_block_len = len % 16; + + /* get the IV */ + __m128i iv = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) _iv); + + PRELOAD_ENC(k); + + for (; nb_blocks-- > 0; output += 16, input += 16) { + /* encrypt the iv and and xor it the input block */ + __m128i tmp = iv; + DO_ENC_BLOCK(tmp); + __m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) input); + m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); + + _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) output, m); + /* iv += 1 */ + iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one); + } + + if (part_block_len != 0) { + aes_block block; + memset(&block.b, 0, 16); + memcpy(&block.b, input, part_block_len); + + __m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &block); + __m128i tmp = iv; + + DO_ENC_BLOCK(tmp); + m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); + _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) &block.b, m); + memcpy(output, &block.b, part_block_len); + } + + return ; +} + +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts)(aes_block *out, aes_key *key1, aes_key *key2, aes_block *_tweak, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *in, uint32_t blocks) { @@ -181,6 +231,7 @@ } while (0); } +TARGET_AESNI void SIZED(cryptonite_aesni_gcm_encrypt)(uint8_t *output, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { __m128i *k = (__m128i *) key->data; @@ -191,7 +242,6 @@ gcm->length_input += length; - __m128i h = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->h); __m128i tag = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->tag); __m128i iv = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) &gcm->civ); iv = _mm_shuffle_epi8(iv, bswap_mask); @@ -200,7 +250,7 @@ for (; nb_blocks-- > 0; output += 16, input += 16) { /* iv += 1 */ - iv = _mm_add_epi64(iv, one); + iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one); /* put back iv in big endian, encrypt it, * and xor it to input */ @@ -209,7 +259,7 @@ __m128i m = _mm_loadu_si128((__m128i *) input); m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); - tag = ghash_add(tag, h, m); + tag = ghash_add(tag, gcm->htable, m); /* store it out */ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) output, m); @@ -240,7 +290,7 @@ block128_copy_bytes(&block, input, part_block_len); /* iv += 1 */ - iv = _mm_add_epi64(iv, one); + iv = _mm_add_epi32(iv, one); /* put back iv in big endian mode, encrypt it and xor it with input */ __m128i tmp = _mm_shuffle_epi8(iv, bswap_mask); @@ -250,7 +300,7 @@ m = _mm_xor_si128(m, tmp); m = _mm_shuffle_epi8(m, mask); - tag = ghash_add(tag, h, m); + tag = ghash_add(tag, gcm->htable, m); /* make output */ _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *) &block.b, m); diff --git a/cbits/argon2/core.c b/cbits/argon2/core.c --- a/cbits/argon2/core.c +++ b/cbits/argon2/core.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Copyright 2015 * Daniel Dinu, Dmitry Khovratovich, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, and Samuel Neves * - * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 + * You may use this work under the terms of a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 * License/Waiver or the Apache Public License 2.0, at your option. The terms of * these licenses can be found at: * @@ -83,25 +83,25 @@ } while ((void)0, 0) if (outlen <= BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) { - TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen)); - TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes))); - TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen)); - TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_init(&blake_state, outlen)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes))); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_final(&blake_state, out, outlen)); } else { uint32_t toproduce; uint8_t out_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; uint8_t in_buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; - TRY(blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)); - TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes))); - TRY(blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen)); - TRY(blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_init(&blake_state, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, outlen_bytes, sizeof(outlen_bytes))); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_update(&blake_state, in, inlen)); + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b_final(&blake_state, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)); memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2); out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2; toproduce = (uint32_t)outlen - BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2; while (toproduce > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES) { memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES); - TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer, + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b(out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0)); memcpy(out, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2); out += BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES / 2; @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ } memcpy(in_buffer, out_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES); - TRY(blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, + TRY(_cryptonite_blake2b(out_buffer, toproduce, in_buffer, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, NULL, 0)); memcpy(out, out_buffer, toproduce); } @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ } /***************Memory functions*****************/ -static +static int allocate_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t **memory, size_t num, size_t size) { size_t memory_size = num*size; @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ return ARGON2_OK; } -static +static void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory, size_t num, size_t size) { size_t memory_size = num*size; @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ } #endif /* ARGON2_NO_THREADS */ -static +static int fill_memory_blocks(argon2_instance_t *instance) { if (instance == NULL || instance->lanes == 0) { return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER; @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ fill_memory_blocks_st(instance) : fill_memory_blocks_mt(instance); #endif } -static +static int validate_inputs(const argon2_context *context) { if (NULL == context) { return ARGON2_INCORRECT_PARAMETER; @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ return ARGON2_OK; } -static +static void fill_first_blocks(uint8_t *blockhash, const argon2_instance_t *instance) { uint32_t l; /* Make the first and second block in each lane as G(H0||i||0) or @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ } clear_internal_memory(blockhash_bytes, ARGON2_BLOCK_SIZE); } -static +static void initial_hash(uint8_t *blockhash, argon2_context *context, argon2_type type) { blake2b_state BlakeHash; @@ -597,31 +597,31 @@ return; } - blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH); + _cryptonite_blake2b_init(&BlakeHash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH); store32(&value, context->lanes); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, context->outlen); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, context->m_cost); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, context->t_cost); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, context->version); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, (uint32_t)type); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); store32(&value, context->pwdlen); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); if (context->pwd != NULL) { - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd, + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->pwd, context->pwdlen); if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_PASSWORD) { @@ -631,18 +631,18 @@ } store32(&value, context->saltlen); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); if (context->salt != NULL) { - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt, + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->salt, context->saltlen); } store32(&value, context->secretlen); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); if (context->secret != NULL) { - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret, + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->secret, context->secretlen); if (context->flags & ARGON2_FLAG_CLEAR_SECRET) { @@ -652,16 +652,16 @@ } store32(&value, context->adlen); - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)&value, sizeof(value)); if (context->ad != NULL) { - blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad, + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&BlakeHash, (const uint8_t *)context->ad, context->adlen); } - blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&BlakeHash, blockhash, ARGON2_PREHASH_DIGEST_LENGTH); } -static +static int initialize(argon2_instance_t *instance, argon2_context *context) { uint8_t blockhash[ARGON2_PREHASH_SEED_LENGTH]; int result = ARGON2_OK; diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2-impl.h b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2-impl.h --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2-impl.h +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2-impl.h @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ return w; #else const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )src; - return (( uint16_t )( p[0] ) << 0) | - (( uint16_t )( p[1] ) << 8) ; + return ( uint16_t )((( uint32_t )( p[0] ) << 0) | + (( uint32_t )( p[1] ) << 8)); #endif } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2.h b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2.h --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2.h +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2.h @@ -142,51 +142,51 @@ }; /* Streaming API */ - int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ); - int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ); - int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); /* Variable output length API */ - int blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen ); - int blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); - int blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen ); - int blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); /* Simple API */ - int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); /* This is simply an alias for blake2b */ - int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); #if defined(__cplusplus) } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2b-ref.c b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2b-ref.c --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2b-ref.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2b-ref.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ } /* init xors IV with input parameter block */ -int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) { const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )( P ); size_t i; @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ -int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) { blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) ); memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2b_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - if( blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1; { uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES]; memset( block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); memcpy( block, key, keylen ); - blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } return 0; @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ #undef G #undef ROUND -int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; if( inlen > 0 ) @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0}; size_t i; @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ } /* inlen, at least, should be uint64_t. Others can be size_t. */ -int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2b_state S[1]; @@ -287,26 +287,26 @@ if( keylen > 0 ) { - if( blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; } else { - if( blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; } - blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); - blake2b_final( S, out, outlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S, out, outlen ); return 0; } -int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { - return blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); +int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { + return _cryptonite_blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); } #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) { - return blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -329,9 +329,9 @@ for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i ) { uint8_t hash[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; - blake2b( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES ); - if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) ) + if( 0 != memcmp( hash, _cryptonite_blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) ) { goto fail; } @@ -346,25 +346,25 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if (0 != memcmp(hash, blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) { + if (0 != memcmp(hash, _cryptonite_blake2b_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) { goto fail; } } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2bp-ref.c b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2bp-ref.c --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2bp-ref.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2bp-ref.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ */ static int blake2bp_init_leaf_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) { - int err = blake2b_init_param(S, P); + int err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param(S, P); S->outlen = P->inner_length; return err; } @@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) ); memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2b_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) { size_t i; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { size_t i; @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ } -int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; size_t left = S->buflen; @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in += fill; inlen -= fill; @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; size_t i; @@ -201,19 +201,19 @@ if( left > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left ); } - blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); } for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; blake2b_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1]; @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -273,10 +273,10 @@ { const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len ); } - blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); } if( blake2bp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 ) @@ -285,9 +285,9 @@ FS->last_node = 1; /* Mark as last node */ for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen );; + return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen );; } #if defined(BLAKE2BP_SELFTEST) @@ -326,21 +326,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2s-ref.c b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2s-ref.c --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2s-ref.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2s-ref.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ } /* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */ -int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) { const unsigned char *p = ( const unsigned char * )( P ); size_t i; @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ /* Sequential blake2s initialization */ -int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) { blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ /* memset(P->reserved, 0, sizeof(P->reserved) ); */ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2s_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - if( blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1; { uint8_t block[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES]; memset( block, 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); memcpy( block, key, keylen ); - blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } return 0; @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ #undef G #undef ROUND -int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; if( inlen > 0 ) @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = {0}; size_t i; @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2s_state S[1]; @@ -279,22 +279,22 @@ if( keylen > 0 ) { - if( blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; } else { - if( blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; } - blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); - blake2s_final( S, out, outlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S, out, outlen ); return 0; } #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) { - return blake2s( out, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s( out, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i ) { uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; - blake2s( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2s_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) ) { @@ -334,21 +334,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2sp-ref.c b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2sp-ref.c --- a/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2sp-ref.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/ref/blake2sp-ref.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ static int blake2sp_init_leaf_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) { - int err = blake2s_init_param(S, P); + int err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param(S, P); S->outlen = P->inner_length; return err; } @@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ P->inner_length = BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES; memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2s_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) { size_t i; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { size_t i; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ } -int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; size_t left = S->buflen; @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in += fill; inlen -= fill; @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ } -int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; size_t i; @@ -198,20 +198,20 @@ if( left > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left ); } - blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); } for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; blake2s_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1]; @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -271,10 +271,10 @@ { const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len ); } - blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); } if( blake2sp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 ) @@ -283,9 +283,9 @@ FS->last_node = 1; for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); } @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i ) { uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; - blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2sp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) ) { @@ -326,21 +326,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2-impl.h b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2-impl.h --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2-impl.h +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2-impl.h @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ return w; #else const uint8_t *p = ( const uint8_t * )src; - return (( uint16_t )( p[0] ) << 0) | - (( uint16_t )( p[1] ) << 8) ; + return ( uint16_t )((( uint32_t )( p[0] ) << 0) | + (( uint32_t )( p[1] ) << 8)); #endif } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2.h b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2.h --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2.h +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2.h @@ -142,51 +142,51 @@ }; /* Streaming API */ - int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ); - int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ); - int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); - int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ); - int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ); /* Variable output length API */ - int blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen ); - int blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_init_key( blake2xs_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_update( blake2xs_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs_final(blake2xs_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); - int blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen ); - int blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); - int blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_init_key( blake2xb_state *S, const size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_update( blake2xb_state *S, const void *in, size_t inlen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb_final(blake2xb_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen); /* Simple API */ - int blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2s( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); - int blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xs( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2xb( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); /* This is simply an alias for blake2b */ - int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); + int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ); #if defined(__cplusplus) } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ } /* init xors IV with input parameter block */ -int blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) { size_t i; /*blake2b_init0( S ); */ @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ /* Some sort of default parameter block initialization, for sequential blake2b */ -int blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen ) { blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2b_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2b_param P[1]; @@ -135,14 +135,14 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - if( blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return 0; { uint8_t block[BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES]; memset( block, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); memcpy( block, key, keylen ); - blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } return 0; @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ } -int blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_update( blake2b_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; if( inlen > 0 ) @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ } -int blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b_final( blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { if( out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen ) return -1; @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ } -int blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2b( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2b_state S[1]; @@ -281,26 +281,26 @@ if( keylen ) { - if( blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; } else { - if( blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2b_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; } - blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); - blake2b_final( S, out, outlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S, out, outlen ); return 0; } -int blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { - return blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); +int _cryptonite_blake2( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { + return _cryptonite_blake2b(out, outlen, in, inlen, key, keylen); } #if defined(SUPERCOP) int crypto_hash( unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen ) { - return blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b( out, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, in, inlen, NULL, 0 ); } #endif @@ -340,21 +340,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2b_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2bp.c b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2bp.c --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2bp.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2bp.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ */ static int blake2bp_init_leaf_param( blake2b_state *S, const blake2b_param *P ) { - int err = blake2b_init_param(S, P); + int err = _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param(S, P); S->outlen = P->inner_length; return err; } @@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ memset( P->reserved, 0, sizeof( P->reserved ) ); memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2b_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen ) { size_t i; if( !outlen || outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) return -1; @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key( blake2bp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { size_t i; @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ } -int blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_update( blake2bp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; size_t left = S->buflen; @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in += fill; inlen -= fill; @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ -int blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp_final( blake2bp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; size_t i; @@ -202,19 +202,19 @@ if( left > BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES, left ); } - blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); } for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2bp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; blake2b_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1]; @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -274,10 +274,10 @@ { const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( S[i], in__, len ); } - blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); } if( blake2bp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 ) @@ -286,9 +286,9 @@ FS->last_node = 1; /* Mark as last node */ for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2b_final( FS, out, outlen ); } @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i ) { uint8_t hash[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES]; - blake2bp( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2bp( hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES ); if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2bp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES ) ) { @@ -328,21 +328,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2bp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ } /* init2 xors IV with input parameter block */ -int blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) { size_t i; /*blake2s_init0( S ); */ @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ /* Some sort of default parameter block initialization, for sequential blake2s */ -int blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen ) { blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -110,11 +110,11 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2s_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( blake2s_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { blake2s_param P[1]; @@ -136,14 +136,14 @@ memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - if( blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ) < 0 ) return -1; { uint8_t block[BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES]; memset( block, 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); memcpy( block, key, keylen ); - blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } return 0; @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ STOREU( &S->h[4], _mm_xor_si128( ff1, _mm_xor_si128( row2, row4 ) ) ); } -int blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_update( blake2s_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; if( inlen > 0 ) @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2s_final( blake2s_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t buffer[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES] = {0}; size_t i; @@ -275,15 +275,15 @@ if( keylen > 0 ) { - if( blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key( S, outlen, key, keylen ) < 0 ) return -1; } else { - if( blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; + if( _cryptonite_blake2s_init( S, outlen ) < 0 ) return -1; } - blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); - blake2s_final( S, out, outlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S, ( const uint8_t * )in, inlen ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S, out, outlen ); return 0; } @@ -330,21 +330,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2s_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c --- a/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c +++ b/cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ */ static int blake2sp_init_leaf_param( blake2s_state *S, const blake2s_param *P ) { - int err = blake2s_init_param(S, P); + int err = _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param(S, P); S->outlen = P->inner_length; return err; } @@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ P->inner_length = BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES; memset( P->salt, 0, sizeof( P->salt ) ); memset( P->personal, 0, sizeof( P->personal ) ); - return blake2s_init_param( S, P ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_init_param( S, P ); } -int blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen ) { size_t i; @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ return 0; } -int blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key( blake2sp_state *S, size_t outlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { size_t i; @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ } -int blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_update( blake2sp_state *S, const void *pin, size_t inlen ) { const unsigned char * in = (const unsigned char *)pin; size_t left = S->buflen; @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ memcpy( S->buf + left, in, fill ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in += fill; inlen -= fill; @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ } -int blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp_final( blake2sp_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; size_t i; @@ -199,20 +199,20 @@ if( left > BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) left = BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->S[i], S->buf + i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES, left ); } - blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); } for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S->R, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S->R, out, S->outlen ); } -int blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) +int _cryptonite_blake2sp( void *out, size_t outlen, const void *in, size_t inlen, const void *key, size_t keylen ) { uint8_t hash[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; blake2s_state S[PARALLELISM_DEGREE][1]; @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ memcpy( block, key, keylen ); for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); secure_zero_memory( block, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); /* Burn the key from stack */ } @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ while( inlen__ >= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ) { - blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ); in__ += PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; inlen__ -= PARALLELISM_DEGREE * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; } @@ -272,10 +272,10 @@ { const size_t left = inlen__ - i * BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; const size_t len = left <= BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES ? left : BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES; - blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( S[i], in__, len ); } - blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final( S[i], hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); } if( blake2sp_init_root( FS, outlen, keylen ) < 0 ) @@ -284,9 +284,9 @@ FS->last_node = 1; for( i = 0; i < PARALLELISM_DEGREE; ++i ) - blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update( FS, hash[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ); - return blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); + return _cryptonite_blake2s_final( FS, out, outlen ); } #if defined(BLAKE2SP_SELFTEST) @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ for( i = 0; i < BLAKE2_KAT_LENGTH; ++i ) { uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES]; - blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); + _cryptonite_blake2sp( hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, buf, i, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES ); if( 0 != memcmp( hash, blake2sp_keyed_kat[i], BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES ) ) { @@ -325,21 +325,21 @@ size_t mlen = i; int err = 0; - if( (err = blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { + if( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_init_key(&S, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES, key, BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } while (mlen >= step) { - if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, step)) < 0 ) { goto fail; } mlen -= step; p += step; } - if ( (err = blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(&S, p, mlen)) < 0) { goto fail; } - if ( (err = blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { + if ( (err = _cryptonite_blake2sp_final(&S, hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES)) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c b/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_aes.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_cbc(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_cbc(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); void cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit, @@ -52,6 +53,8 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_gcm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); enum { /* init */ @@ -67,6 +70,8 @@ DECRYPT_CBC_128, DECRYPT_CBC_192, DECRYPT_CBC_256, /* ctr */ ENCRYPT_CTR_128, ENCRYPT_CTR_192, ENCRYPT_CTR_256, + /* ctr with 32-bit wrapping */ + ENCRYPT_C32_128, ENCRYPT_C32_192, ENCRYPT_C32_256, /* xts */ ENCRYPT_XTS_128, ENCRYPT_XTS_192, ENCRYPT_XTS_256, DECRYPT_XTS_128, DECRYPT_XTS_192, DECRYPT_XTS_256, @@ -76,6 +81,11 @@ /* ocb */ ENCRYPT_OCB_128, ENCRYPT_OCB_192, ENCRYPT_OCB_256, DECRYPT_OCB_128, DECRYPT_OCB_192, DECRYPT_OCB_256, + /* ccm */ + ENCRYPT_CCM_128, ENCRYPT_CCM_192, ENCRYPT_CCM_256, + DECRYPT_CCM_128, DECRYPT_CCM_192, DECRYPT_CCM_256, + /* ghash */ + GHASH_HINIT, GHASH_GF_MUL, }; void *cryptonite_aes_branch_table[] = { @@ -108,6 +118,10 @@ [ENCRYPT_CTR_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr, [ENCRYPT_CTR_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr, [ENCRYPT_CTR_256] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr, + /* CTR with 32-bit wrapping */ + [ENCRYPT_C32_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32, + [ENCRYPT_C32_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32, + [ENCRYPT_C32_256] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32, /* XTS */ [ENCRYPT_XTS_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts, [ENCRYPT_XTS_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts, @@ -129,6 +143,16 @@ [DECRYPT_OCB_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt, [DECRYPT_OCB_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt, [DECRYPT_OCB_256] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt, + /* CCM */ + [ENCRYPT_CCM_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt, + [ENCRYPT_CCM_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt, + [ENCRYPT_CCM_256] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt, + [DECRYPT_CCM_128] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt, + [DECRYPT_CCM_192] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt, + [DECRYPT_CCM_256] = cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt, + /* GHASH */ + [GHASH_HINIT] = cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit, + [GHASH_GF_MUL] = cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul, }; typedef void (*init_f)(aes_key *, uint8_t *, uint8_t); @@ -138,7 +162,10 @@ typedef void (*xts_f)(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks); typedef void (*gcm_crypt_f)(uint8_t *output, aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); typedef void (*ocb_crypt_f)(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +typedef void (*ccm_crypt_f)(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); typedef void (*block_f)(aes_block *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *input); +typedef void (*hinit_f)(table_4bit htable, const block128 *h); +typedef void (*gf_mul_f)(block128 *a, const table_4bit htable); #ifdef WITH_AESNI #define GET_INIT(strength) \ @@ -153,6 +180,8 @@ ((cbc_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_CBC_128 + strength])) #define GET_CTR_ENCRYPT(strength) \ ((ctr_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_128 + strength])) +#define GET_C32_ENCRYPT(strength) \ + ((ctr_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_128 + strength])) #define GET_XTS_ENCRYPT(strength) \ ((xts_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_128 + strength])) #define GET_XTS_DECRYPT(strength) \ @@ -165,10 +194,18 @@ ((ocb_crypt_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_OCB_128 + strength])) #define GET_OCB_DECRYPT(strength) \ ((ocb_crypt_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_OCB_128 + strength])) +#define GET_CCM_ENCRYPT(strength) \ + ((ccm_crypt_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CCM_128 + strength])) +#define GET_CCM_DECRYPT(strength) \ + ((ccm_crypt_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_CCM_128 + strength])) #define cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(o,k,i) \ (((block_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_BLOCK_128 + k->strength]))(o,k,i)) #define cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(o,k,i) \ (((block_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[DECRYPT_BLOCK_128 + k->strength]))(o,k,i)) +#define cryptonite_hinit(t,h) \ + (((hinit_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_HINIT]))(t,h)) +#define cryptonite_gf_mul(a,t) \ + (((gf_mul_f) (cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_GF_MUL]))(a,t)) #else #define GET_INIT(strenght) cryptonite_aes_generic_init #define GET_ECB_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ecb @@ -176,21 +213,34 @@ #define GET_CBC_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_cbc #define GET_CBC_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_cbc #define GET_CTR_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_ctr +#define GET_C32_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32 #define GET_XTS_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts #define GET_XTS_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_xts #define GET_GCM_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_gcm_encrypt #define GET_GCM_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_gcm_decrypt #define GET_OCB_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_encrypt #define GET_OCB_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt +#define GET_CCM_ENCRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt +#define GET_CCM_DECRYPT(strength) cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt #define cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(o,k,i) cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_block(o,k,i) #define cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(o,k,i) cryptonite_aes_generic_decrypt_block(o,k,i) +#define cryptonite_hinit(t,h) cryptonite_aes_generic_hinit(t,h) +#define cryptonite_gf_mul(a,t) cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mul(a,t) #endif +#define CPU_AESNI 0 +#define CPU_PCLMUL 1 +#define CPU_OPTION_COUNT 2 + +static uint8_t cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_OPTION_COUNT] = {}; + #if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI) static void initialize_table_ni(int aesni, int pclmul) { if (!aesni) return; + cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_AESNI] = 1; + cryptonite_aes_branch_table[INIT_128] = cryptonite_aesni_init; cryptonite_aes_branch_table[INIT_256] = cryptonite_aesni_init; @@ -211,6 +261,9 @@ /* CTR */ cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr128; cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_CTR_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_ctr256; + /* CTR with 32-bit wrapping */ + cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_128; + cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_C32_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_c32_256; /* XTS */ cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_128] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts128; cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_XTS_256] = cryptonite_aesni_encrypt_xts256; @@ -222,9 +275,27 @@ cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_OCB_128] = cryptonite_aesni_ocb_encrypt128; cryptonite_aes_branch_table[ENCRYPT_OCB_256] = cryptonite_aesni_ocb_encrypt256; */ +#ifdef WITH_PCLMUL + if (!pclmul) + return; + cryptonite_aes_cpu_options[CPU_PCLMUL] = 1; + + /* GHASH */ + cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_HINIT] = cryptonite_aesni_hinit_pclmul, + cryptonite_aes_branch_table[GHASH_GF_MUL] = cryptonite_aesni_gf_mul_pclmul, + cryptonite_aesni_init_pclmul(); +#endif } #endif +uint8_t *cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(void) +{ +#if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI) + cryptonite_aesni_initialize_hw(initialize_table_ni); +#endif + return cryptonite_aes_cpu_options; +} + void cryptonite_aes_initkey(aes_key *key, uint8_t *origkey, uint8_t size) { switch (size) { @@ -232,9 +303,7 @@ case 24: key->nbr = 12; key->strength = 1; break; case 32: key->nbr = 14; key->strength = 2; break; } -#if defined(ARCH_X86) && defined(WITH_AESNI) - cryptonite_aesni_initialize_hw(initialize_table_ni); -#endif + cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(); init_f _init = GET_INIT(key->strength); _init(key, origkey, size); } @@ -296,6 +365,12 @@ e(output, key, iv, input, len); } +void cryptonite_aes_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) +{ + ctr_f e = GET_C32_ENCRYPT(key->strength); + e(output, key, iv, input, len); +} + void cryptonite_aes_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks) { @@ -321,6 +396,18 @@ d(output, gcm, key, input, length); } +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + ccm_crypt_f e = GET_CCM_ENCRYPT(key->strength); + e(output, ccm, key, input, length); +} + +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + ccm_crypt_f d = GET_CCM_DECRYPT(key->strength); + d(output, ccm, key, input, length); +} + void cryptonite_aes_ocb_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { ocb_crypt_f e = GET_OCB_ENCRYPT(key->strength); @@ -336,20 +423,22 @@ static void gcm_ghash_add(aes_gcm *gcm, block128 *b) { block128_xor(&gcm->tag, b); - cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->tag, &gcm->h); + cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->tag, gcm->htable); } void cryptonite_aes_gcm_init(aes_gcm *gcm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *iv, uint32_t len) { + block128 h; gcm->length_aad = 0; gcm->length_input = 0; - block128_zero(&gcm->h); + block128_zero(&h); block128_zero(&gcm->tag); block128_zero(&gcm->iv); /* prepare H : encrypt_K(0^128) */ - cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&gcm->h, key, &gcm->h); + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&h, key, &h); + cryptonite_hinit(gcm->htable, &h); if (len == 12) { block128_copy_bytes(&gcm->iv, iv, 12); @@ -359,18 +448,18 @@ int i; for (; len >= 16; len -= 16, iv += 16) { block128_xor(&gcm->iv, (block128 *) iv); - cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h); + cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); } if (len > 0) { block128_xor_bytes(&gcm->iv, iv, len); - cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h); + cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); } for (i = 15; origlen; --i, origlen >>= 8) gcm->iv.b[i] ^= (uint8_t) origlen; - cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, &gcm->h); + cryptonite_gf_mul(&gcm->iv, gcm->htable); } - block128_copy(&gcm->civ, &gcm->iv); + block128_copy_aligned(&gcm->civ, &gcm->iv); } void cryptonite_aes_gcm_aad(aes_gcm *gcm, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) @@ -399,13 +488,147 @@ gcm_ghash_add(gcm, &lblock); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&lblock, key, &gcm->iv); - block128_xor(&gcm->tag, &lblock); + block128_xor_aligned(&gcm->tag, &lblock); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { tag[i] = gcm->tag.b[i]; } } +static inline uint8_t ccm_b0_flags(uint32_t has_adata, uint32_t m, uint32_t l) +{ + return 8*m + l + (has_adata? 64: 0); +} + +/* depends on input size */ +static void ccm_encode_b0(block128* output, aes_ccm* ccm, uint32_t has_adata) +{ + int last = 15; + uint32_t m = ccm->length_M; + uint32_t l = ccm->length_L; + uint32_t msg_len = ccm->length_input; + + block128_zero(output); + block128_copy_aligned(output, &ccm->nonce); + output->b[0] = ccm_b0_flags(has_adata, (m-2)/2, l-1); + while (msg_len > 0) { + output->b[last--] = msg_len & 0xff; + msg_len >>= 8; + } +} + +/* encode adata length */ +static int ccm_encode_la(block128* output, uint32_t la) +{ + if (la < ( (1 << 16) - (1 << 8)) ) { + output->b[0] = (la >> 8) & 0xff; + output->b[1] = la & 0xff; + return 2; + } else { + output->b[0] = 0xff; + output->b[1] = 0xfe; + output->b[2] = (la >> 24) & 0xff; + output->b[3] = (la >> 16) & 0xff; + output->b[4] = (la >> 8) & 0xff; + output->b[5] = la & 0xff; + return 6; + } +} + +static void ccm_encode_ctr(block128* out, aes_ccm* ccm, unsigned int cnt) +{ + int last = 15; + block128_copy_aligned(out, &ccm->nonce); + out->b[0] = ccm->length_L - 1; + + while (cnt > 0) { + out->b[last--] = cnt & 0xff; + cnt >>= 8; + } +} + +static void ccm_cbcmac_add(aes_ccm* ccm, aes_key* key, block128* bi) +{ + block128_xor_aligned(&ccm->xi, bi); + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->xi); +} + +/* even though it is possible to support message size as large as 2^64, we support up to 2^32 only */ +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_init(aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *nonce, uint32_t nonce_len, uint32_t input_size, int m, int l) +{ + memset(ccm, 0, sizeof(aes_ccm)); + + if (l < 2 || l > 4) return; + if (m != 4 && m != 6 && m != 8 && m != 10 + && m != 12 && m != 14 && m != 16) return; + + if (nonce_len > 15 - l) { + nonce_len = 15 - l; + } + + if (l <= 4) { + if (input_size >= (1ull << (8*l))) return; + } + + ccm->length_L = l; + ccm->length_M = m; + ccm->length_input = input_size; + + memcpy(&ccm->nonce.b[1], nonce, nonce_len); + + ccm_encode_b0(&ccm->b0, ccm, 1); /* assume aad is present */ + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->b0); +} + +/* even though l(a) can be as large as 2^64, we only handle aad up to 2 ^ 32 for practical reasons. + Also we don't support incremental aad add, because the 1st encoded adata has length information + */ +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_aad(aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + block128 tmp; + + if (ccm->length_aad != 0) return; + + ccm->length_aad = length; + int len_len; + + block128_zero(&tmp); + len_len = ccm_encode_la(&tmp, length); + + if (length < 16 - len_len) { + memcpy(&tmp.b[len_len], input, length); + length = 0; + } else { + memcpy(&tmp.b[len_len], input, 16 - len_len); + input += 16 - len_len; + length -= 16 - len_len; + } + + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + + for (; length >= 16; input += 16, length -= 16) { + block128_copy(&tmp, (block128*)input); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + + } + if (length > 0) { + block128_zero(&tmp); + block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + } + block128_copy_aligned(&ccm->header_cbcmac, &ccm->xi); +} + +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_finish(uint8_t *tag, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key) +{ + block128 iv, s0; + + block128_zero(&iv); + ccm_encode_ctr(&iv, ccm, 0); + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&s0, key, &iv); + block128_vxor((block128*)tag, &ccm->xi, &s0); +} + static inline void ocb_block_double(block128 *d, block128 *s) { unsigned int i; @@ -464,7 +687,7 @@ memcpy(stretch, ktop.b, 16); memcpy(tmp.b, ktop.b + 1, 8); - block128_xor(&tmp, &ktop); + block128_xor_aligned(&tmp, &ktop); memcpy(stretch + 16, tmp.b, 8); /* initialize the encryption offset from stretch */ @@ -490,22 +713,22 @@ for (i=1; i<= length/16; i++, input=input+16) { ocb_get_L_i(&tmp, ocb->li, i); - block128_xor(&ocb->offset_aad, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->offset_aad, &tmp); block128_vxor(&tmp, &ocb->offset_aad, (block128 *) input); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&tmp, key, &tmp); - block128_xor(&ocb->sum_aad, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->sum_aad, &tmp); } length = length % 16; /* Bytes in final block */ if (length > 0) { - block128_xor(&ocb->offset_aad, &ocb->lstar); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->offset_aad, &ocb->lstar); block128_zero(&tmp); block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); tmp.b[length] = 0x80; - block128_xor(&tmp, &ocb->offset_aad); + block128_xor_aligned(&tmp, &ocb->offset_aad); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&tmp, key, &tmp); - block128_xor(&ocb->sum_aad, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->sum_aad, &tmp); } } @@ -513,8 +736,8 @@ { block128 tmp; - block128_vxor(&tmp, &ocb->sum_enc, &ocb->offset_enc); - block128_xor(&tmp, &ocb->ldollar); + block128_vxor_aligned(&tmp, &ocb->sum_enc, &ocb->offset_enc); + block128_xor_aligned(&tmp, &ocb->ldollar); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block((block128 *) tag, key, &tmp); block128_xor((block128 *) tag, &ocb->sum_aad); } @@ -585,6 +808,30 @@ } } +void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_c32(uint8_t *output, aes_key *key, aes_block *iv, uint8_t *input, uint32_t len) +{ + aes_block block, o; + uint32_t nb_blocks = len / 16; + int i; + + /* preload IV in block */ + block128_copy(&block, iv); + + for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; block128_inc32_le(&block), output += 16, input += 16) { + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&o, key, &block); + block128_vxor((block128 *) output, &o, (block128 *) input); + } + + if ((len % 16) != 0) { + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&o, key, &block); + for (i = 0; i < (len % 16); i++) { + *output = ((uint8_t *) &o)[i] ^ *input; + output++; + input++; + } + } +} + void cryptonite_aes_generic_encrypt_xts(aes_block *output, aes_key *k1, aes_key *k2, aes_block *dataunit, uint32_t spoint, aes_block *input, uint32_t nb_blocks) { @@ -596,9 +843,9 @@ /* TO OPTIMISE: this is really inefficient way to do that */ while (spoint-- > 0) - cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak); + cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak); - for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { + for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { block128_vxor(&block, input, &tweak); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&block, k1, &block); block128_vxor(output, &block, &tweak); @@ -616,9 +863,9 @@ /* TO OPTIMISE: this is really inefficient way to do that */ while (spoint-- > 0) - cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak); + cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak); - for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { + for ( ; nb_blocks-- > 0; input++, output++, cryptonite_aes_generic_gf_mulx(&tweak)) { block128_vxor(&block, input, &tweak); cryptonite_aes_decrypt_block(&block, k1, &block); block128_vxor(output, &block, &tweak); @@ -631,7 +878,7 @@ gcm->length_input += length; for (; length >= 16; input += 16, output += 16, length -= 16) { - block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ); + block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); block128_xor(&out, (block128 *) input); @@ -642,7 +889,7 @@ aes_block tmp; int i; - block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ); + block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ); /* create e(civ) in out */ cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); /* initialize a tmp as input and xor it to e(civ) */ @@ -664,7 +911,7 @@ gcm->length_input += length; for (; length >= 16; input += 16, output += 16, length -= 16) { - block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ); + block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&out, key, &gcm->civ); gcm_ghash_add(gcm, (block128 *) input); @@ -675,7 +922,7 @@ aes_block tmp; int i; - block128_inc_be(&gcm->civ); + block128_inc32_be(&gcm->civ); block128_zero(&tmp); block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); @@ -699,7 +946,7 @@ for (i = 1; i <= length/16; i++, input += 16, output += 16) { /* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */ ocb_get_L_i(&tmp, ocb->li, i); - block128_xor(&ocb->offset_enc, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->offset_enc, &tmp); block128_vxor(&tmp, &ocb->offset_enc, (block128 *) input); if (encrypt) { @@ -716,29 +963,89 @@ /* process the last partial block if any */ length = length % 16; if (length > 0) { - block128_xor(&ocb->offset_enc, &ocb->lstar); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->offset_enc, &ocb->lstar); cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&pad, key, &ocb->offset_enc); if (encrypt) { block128_zero(&tmp); block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); tmp.b[length] = 0x80; - block128_xor(&ocb->sum_enc, &tmp); - block128_xor(&pad, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->sum_enc, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&pad, &tmp); memcpy(output, pad.b, length); output += length; } else { - block128_copy(&tmp, &pad); + block128_copy_aligned(&tmp, &pad); block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); - block128_xor(&tmp, &pad); + block128_xor_aligned(&tmp, &pad); tmp.b[length] = 0x80; memcpy(output, tmp.b, length); - block128_xor(&ocb->sum_enc, &tmp); + block128_xor_aligned(&ocb->sum_enc, &tmp); input += length; } } } +void cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + block128 tmp, ctr; + + /* when aad is absent, reset b0 block */ + if (ccm->length_aad == 0) { + ccm_encode_b0(&ccm->b0, ccm, 0); /* assume aad is present */ + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->b0); + block128_copy_aligned(&ccm->header_cbcmac, &ccm->xi); + } + + if (length != ccm->length_input) { + return; + } + + ccm_encode_ctr(&ctr, ccm, 1); + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_ctr(output, key, &ctr, input, length); + + for (;length >= 16; input += 16, length -= 16) { + block128_copy(&tmp, (block128*)input); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + } + if (length > 0) { + block128_zero(&tmp); + block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + } +} + +void cryptonite_aes_generic_ccm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + block128 tmp, ctr; + + if (length != ccm->length_input) { + return; + } + + /* when aad is absent, reset b0 block */ + if (ccm->length_aad == 0) { + ccm_encode_b0(&ccm->b0, ccm, 0); /* assume aad is present */ + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_block(&ccm->xi, key, &ccm->b0); + block128_copy_aligned(&ccm->header_cbcmac, &ccm->xi); + } + + ccm_encode_ctr(&ctr, ccm, 1); + cryptonite_aes_encrypt_ctr(output, key, &ctr, input, length); + block128_copy_aligned(&ccm->xi, &ccm->header_cbcmac); + input = output; + + for (;length >= 16; input += 16, length -= 16) { + block128_copy(&tmp, (block128*)input); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + } + if (length > 0) { + block128_zero(&tmp); + block128_copy_bytes(&tmp, input, length); + ccm_cbcmac_add(ccm, key, &tmp); + } +} + void cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { ocb_generic_crypt(output, ocb, key, input, length, 1); @@ -747,4 +1054,56 @@ void cryptonite_aes_generic_ocb_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) { ocb_generic_crypt(output, ocb, key, input, length, 0); +} + +static inline void gf_mulx_rev(block128 *a, const block128 *h) +{ + uint64_t v1 = cpu_to_le64(h->q[0]); + uint64_t v0 = cpu_to_le64(h->q[1]); + a->q[1] = cpu_to_be64(v1 >> 1 | v0 << 63); + a->q[0] = cpu_to_be64(v0 >> 1 ^ ((0-(v1 & 1)) & 0xe100000000000000ULL)); +} + +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_init(aes_polyval *ctx, const aes_block *h) +{ + aes_block r; + + /* ByteReverse(S_0) = 0 */ + block128_zero(&ctx->s); + + /* ByteReverse(H) * x */ + gf_mulx_rev(&r, h); + cryptonite_hinit(ctx->htable, &r); +} + +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_update(aes_polyval *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t length) +{ + aes_block r; + const uint8_t *p; + uint32_t sz; + + /* This automatically pads with zeros if input is not a multiple of the + block size. */ + for (p = input; length > 0; p += 16, length -= sz) + { + sz = length < 16 ? length : 16; + + /* ByteReverse(X_j) */ + block128_zero(&r); + memcpy(&r, p, sz); + block128_byte_reverse(&r); + + /* ByteReverse(S_{j-1}) + ByteReverse(X_j) */ + block128_xor_aligned(&ctx->s, &r); + + /* ByteReverse(S_j) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(&ctx->s, ctx->htable); + } +} + +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize(aes_polyval *ctx, aes_block *dst) +{ + /* S_s */ + block128_copy_aligned(dst, &ctx->s); + block128_byte_reverse(dst); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_aes.h b/cbits/cryptonite_aes.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_aes.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_aes.h @@ -45,17 +45,29 @@ uint8_t data[16*14*2]; } aes_key; -/* size = 4*16+2*8= 80 */ +/* size = 19*16+2*8= 320 */ typedef struct { aes_block tag; - aes_block h; + aes_block htable[16]; aes_block iv; aes_block civ; uint64_t length_aad; uint64_t length_input; } aes_gcm; +/* size = 4*16+4*4= 80 */ typedef struct { + aes_block xi; + aes_block header_cbcmac; + aes_block b0; + aes_block nonce; + uint32_t length_aad; + uint32_t length_input; + uint32_t length_M; + uint32_t length_L; +} aes_ccm; + +typedef struct { block128 offset_aad; block128 offset_enc; block128 sum_aad; @@ -65,6 +77,12 @@ block128 li[4]; } aes_ocb; +/* size = 17*16= 272 */ +typedef struct { + aes_block htable[16]; + aes_block s; +} aes_polyval; + /* in bytes: either 16,24,32 */ void cryptonite_aes_initkey(aes_key *ctx, uint8_t *key, uint8_t size); @@ -96,5 +114,17 @@ void cryptonite_aes_ocb_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_ocb_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); void cryptonite_aes_ocb_finish(uint8_t *tag, aes_ocb *ocb, aes_key *key); + +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_init(aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *nonce, uint32_t len, uint32_t msg_size, int m, int l); +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_aad(aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_encrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_decrypt(uint8_t *output, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key, uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_ccm_finish(uint8_t *tag, aes_ccm *ccm, aes_key *key); + +uint8_t *cryptonite_aes_cpu_init(void); + +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_init(aes_polyval *ctx, const aes_block *h); +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_update(aes_polyval *ctx, const uint8_t *input, uint32_t length); +void cryptonite_aes_polyval_finalize(aes_polyval *ctx, aes_block *dst); #endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_align.h b/cbits/cryptonite_align.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_align.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_align.h @@ -44,11 +44,21 @@ *((uint32_t *) dst) = cpu_to_le32(v); } +static inline void xor_le32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) +{ + *((uint32_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_le32(v); +} + static inline void store_be32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { *((uint32_t *) dst) = cpu_to_be32(v); } +static inline void xor_be32_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) +{ + *((uint32_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_be32(v); +} + static inline void store_le64_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) { *((uint64_t *) dst) = cpu_to_le64(v); @@ -59,6 +69,11 @@ *((uint64_t *) dst) = cpu_to_be64(v); } +static inline void xor_be64_aligned(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) +{ + *((uint64_t *) dst) ^= cpu_to_be64(v); +} + #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define load_le32(a) load_le32_aligned(a) #else @@ -70,20 +85,30 @@ #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_le32(a, b) store_le32_aligned(a, b) +#define xor_le32(a, b) xor_le32_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_le32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { dst[0] = v; dst[1] = v >> 8; dst[2] = v >> 16; dst[3] = v >> 24; } +static inline void xor_le32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) +{ + dst[0] ^= v; dst[1] ^= v >> 8; dst[2] ^= v >> 16; dst[3] ^= v >> 24; +} #endif #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_be32(a, b) store_be32_aligned(a, b) +#define xor_be32(a, b) xor_be32_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_be32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) { dst[3] = v; dst[2] = v >> 8; dst[1] = v >> 16; dst[0] = v >> 24; } +static inline void xor_be32(uint8_t *dst, const uint32_t v) +{ + dst[3] ^= v; dst[2] ^= v >> 8; dst[1] ^= v >> 16; dst[0] ^= v >> 24; +} #endif #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK @@ -98,11 +123,17 @@ #ifdef UNALIGNED_ACCESS_OK #define store_be64(a, b) store_be64_aligned(a, b) +#define xor_be64(a, b) xor_be64_aligned(a, b) #else static inline void store_be64(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) { dst[7] = v ; dst[6] = v >> 8 ; dst[5] = v >> 16; dst[4] = v >> 24; dst[3] = v >> 32; dst[2] = v >> 40; dst[1] = v >> 48; dst[0] = v >> 56; +} +static inline void xor_be64(uint8_t *dst, const uint64_t v) +{ + dst[7] ^= v ; dst[6] ^= v >> 8 ; dst[5] ^= v >> 16; dst[4] ^= v >> 24; + dst[3] ^= v >> 32; dst[2] ^= v >> 40; dst[1] ^= v >> 48; dst[0] ^= v >> 56; } #endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2b.c b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2b.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2b.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2b.c @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ void cryptonite_blake2b_init(blake2b_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) { - blake2b_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2b_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); } void cryptonite_blake2b_update(blake2b_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { - blake2b_update(ctx, data, len); + _cryptonite_blake2b_update(ctx, data, len); } void cryptonite_blake2b_finalize(blake2b_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { - blake2b_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2b_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2bp.c b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2bp.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2bp.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2bp.c @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ void cryptonite_blake2bp_init(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) { - blake2bp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2bp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); } void cryptonite_blake2bp_update(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { - blake2bp_update(ctx, data, len); + _cryptonite_blake2bp_update(ctx, data, len); } void cryptonite_blake2bp_finalize(blake2bp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { - blake2bp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2bp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ void cryptonite_blake2s_init(blake2s_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) { - blake2s_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2s_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); } void cryptonite_blake2s_update(blake2s_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { - blake2s_update(ctx, data, len); + _cryptonite_blake2s_update(ctx, data, len); } void cryptonite_blake2s_finalize(blake2s_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { - blake2s_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2s_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2sp.c b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2sp.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_blake2sp.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_blake2sp.c @@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ void cryptonite_blake2sp_init(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) { - blake2sp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2sp_init(ctx, hashlen / 8); } void cryptonite_blake2sp_update(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { - blake2sp_update(ctx, data, len); + _cryptonite_blake2sp_update(ctx, data, len); } void cryptonite_blake2sp_finalize(blake2sp_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { - blake2sp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); + _cryptonite_blake2sp_final(ctx, out, hashlen / 8); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_chacha.c b/cbits/cryptonite_chacha.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_chacha.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_chacha.c @@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv) { const uint8_t *constants = (keylen == 32) ? sigma : tau; - int i; ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(constants, 4); diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c b/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Olivier Chéron + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +void CRYPTONITE_HASHED(finalize_prefix)(struct HASHED_LOWER(ctx) *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out) +{ + uint64_t bits[HASHED(BITS_ELEMS)]; + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) &bits; + uint32_t index, padidx, padlen, pos, out_mask; + static const uint32_t cut_off = HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) - sizeof(bits); + + /* Make sure n <= len */ + n += (len - n) & constant_time_lt(len, n); + + /* Initial index, based on current context state */ + index = CRYPTONITE_HASHED(get_index)(ctx); + + /* Final size after n bytes */ + CRYPTONITE_HASHED(incr_sz)(ctx, bits, n); + + /* Padding index and length */ + padidx = CRYPTONITE_HASHED(get_index)(ctx); + padlen = HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) + cut_off - padidx; + padlen -= HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) & constant_time_lt(padidx, cut_off); + + /* Initialize buffers because we will XOR into them */ + memset(ctx->buf + index, 0, HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) - index); + memset(out, 0, HASHED(DIGEST_SIZE)); + pos = 0; + + /* Iterate based on the full buffer length, regardless of n, and include + * the maximum overhead with padding and size bytes + */ + while (pos < len + HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE) + sizeof(bits)) { + uint8_t b; + + /* Take as many bytes from the input buffer as possible */ + if (pos < len) + b = *(data++) & (uint8_t) constant_time_lt(pos, n); + else + b = 0; + + /* First padding byte */ + b |= 0x80 & (uint8_t) constant_time_eq(pos, n); + + /* Size bytes are always at the end of a block */ + if (index >= cut_off) + b |= p[index - cut_off] & (uint8_t) constant_time_ge(pos, n + padlen); + + /* Store this byte into the buffer */ + ctx->buf[index++] ^= b; + pos++; + + /* Process a full block, at a boundary which is independent from n */ + if (index >= HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE)) { + index = 0; + HASHED_LOWER(do_chunk)(ctx, (void *) ctx->buf); + memset(ctx->buf, 0, HASHED(BLOCK_SIZE)); + + /* Try to store the result: this is a no-op except when we reach the + * actual size based on n, more iterations may continue after that + * when len is really larger + */ + out_mask = constant_time_eq(pos, n + padlen + sizeof(bits)); + CRYPTONITE_HASHED(select_digest)(ctx, out, out_mask); + } + } +} diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.h b/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Olivier Chéron + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef CRYPTONITE_HASH_PREFIX_H +#define CRYPTONITE_HASH_PREFIX_H + +#include + +static inline uint32_t constant_time_msb(uint32_t a) +{ + return 0 - (a >> 31); +} + +static inline uint32_t constant_time_lt(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); +} + +static inline uint32_t constant_time_ge(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + return ~constant_time_lt(a, b); +} + +static inline uint32_t constant_time_is_zero(uint32_t a) +{ + return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1)); +} + +static inline uint32_t constant_time_eq(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b); +} + +static inline uint64_t constant_time_msb_64(uint64_t a) +{ + return 0 - (a >> 63); +} + +static inline uint64_t constant_time_lt_64(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + return constant_time_msb_64(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b))); +} + +#endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_md4.c b/cbits/cryptonite_md4.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_md4.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_md4.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include "cryptonite_md4.h" void cryptonite_md4_init(struct md4_ctx *ctx) @@ -130,9 +131,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - md4_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 4)) { + uint32_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 4); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + md4_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + md4_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -157,5 +167,8 @@ cryptonite_md4_update(ctx, (uint8_t *) &bits, sizeof(bits)); /* output hash */ - le32_to_cpu_array((uint32_t *) out, ctx->h, 4); + store_le32(out , ctx->h[0]); + store_le32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1]); + store_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2]); + store_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_md5.c b/cbits/cryptonite_md5.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_md5.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_md5.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include "cryptonite_md5.h" void cryptonite_md5_init(struct md5_ctx *ctx) @@ -143,9 +144,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - md5_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 4)) { + uint32_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 4); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + md5_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + md5_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -157,7 +167,6 @@ static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x80, }; uint64_t bits; uint32_t index, padlen; - uint32_t *p = (uint32_t *) out; /* add padding and update data with it */ bits = cpu_to_le64(ctx->sz << 3); @@ -171,8 +180,35 @@ cryptonite_md5_update(ctx, (uint8_t *) &bits, sizeof(bits)); /* output hash */ - p[0] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[0]); - p[1] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[1]); - p[2] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[2]); - p[3] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[3]); + store_le32(out , ctx->h[0]); + store_le32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1]); + store_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2]); + store_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); } + +#define HASHED(m) MD5_##m +#define HASHED_LOWER(m) md5_##m +#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_md5_##m +#define MD5_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#define MD5_BITS_ELEMS 1 + +static inline uint32_t cryptonite_md5_get_index(const struct md5_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_md5_incr_sz(struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n) +{ + ctx->sz += n; + *bits = cpu_to_le64(ctx->sz << 3); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_md5_select_digest(const struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask) +{ + xor_le32(out , ctx->h[0] & out_mask); + xor_le32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1] & out_mask); + xor_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2] & out_mask); + xor_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3] & out_mask); +} + +#include diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_md5.h b/cbits/cryptonite_md5.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_md5.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_md5.h @@ -39,5 +39,6 @@ void cryptonite_md5_init(struct md5_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_md5_update(struct md5_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_md5_finalize(struct md5_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_md5_finalize_prefix(struct md5_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); #endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_poly1305.c b/cbits/cryptonite_poly1305.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_poly1305.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_poly1305.c @@ -37,11 +37,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_poly1305.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" - -static inline uint32_t load32(uint8_t *p) -{ - return (le32_to_cpu(*((uint32_t *) p))); -} +#include "cryptonite_align.h" static void poly1305_do_chunk(poly1305_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *data, int blocks, int final) { @@ -61,11 +57,11 @@ s1 = r1 * 5; s2 = r2 * 5; s3 = r3 * 5; s4 = r4 * 5; while (blocks--) { - h0 += (load32(data+ 0) ) & 0x3ffffff; - h1 += (load32(data+ 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff; - h2 += (load32(data+ 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff; - h3 += (load32(data+ 9) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff; - h4 += (load32(data+12) >> 8) | hibit; + h0 += (load_le32(data+ 0) ) & 0x3ffffff; + h1 += (load_le32(data+ 3) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff; + h2 += (load_le32(data+ 6) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff; + h3 += (load_le32(data+ 9) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff; + h4 += (load_le32(data+12) >> 8) | hibit; d0 = ((uint64_t)h0 * r0) + ((uint64_t)h1 * s4) + ((uint64_t)h2 * s3) + ((uint64_t)h3 * s2) + ((uint64_t)h4 * s1); d1 = ((uint64_t)h0 * r1) + ((uint64_t)h1 * r0) + ((uint64_t)h2 * s4) + ((uint64_t)h3 * s3) + ((uint64_t)h4 * s2); @@ -94,16 +90,16 @@ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(poly1305_ctx)); - ctx->r[0] = (load32(&k[ 0]) ) & 0x3ffffff; - ctx->r[1] = (load32(&k[ 3]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; - ctx->r[2] = (load32(&k[ 6]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; - ctx->r[3] = (load32(&k[ 9]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; - ctx->r[4] = (load32(&k[12]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; + ctx->r[0] = (load_le32(&k[ 0]) ) & 0x3ffffff; + ctx->r[1] = (load_le32(&k[ 3]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03; + ctx->r[2] = (load_le32(&k[ 6]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff; + ctx->r[3] = (load_le32(&k[ 9]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff; + ctx->r[4] = (load_le32(&k[12]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff; - ctx->pad[0] = load32(&k[16]); - ctx->pad[1] = load32(&k[20]); - ctx->pad[2] = load32(&k[24]); - ctx->pad[3] = load32(&k[28]); + ctx->pad[0] = load_le32(&k[16]); + ctx->pad[1] = load_le32(&k[20]); + ctx->pad[2] = load_le32(&k[24]); + ctx->pad[3] = load_le32(&k[28]); ctx->index = 0; } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c b/cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ } #endif -/* Returns the number of bytes succesfully generated */ +/* Returns the number of bytes successfully generated */ int cryptonite_get_rand_bytes(uint8_t *buffer, size_t len) { RDRAND_T tmp; diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_ripemd.c b/cbits/cryptonite_ripemd.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_ripemd.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_ripemd.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "cryptonite_ripemd.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include void cryptonite_ripemd160_init(struct ripemd160_ctx *ctx) @@ -265,9 +266,20 @@ index = 0; } - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - ripemd160_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 4)) { + uint32_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 4); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + ripemd160_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + ripemd160_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + } + /* append data into buf */ if (len) memcpy(ctx->buf + index, data, len); } @@ -277,7 +289,6 @@ static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x80, }; uint64_t bits; uint32_t index, padlen; - uint32_t *p = (uint32_t *) out; /* add padding and update data with it */ bits = cpu_to_le64(ctx->sz << 3); @@ -291,9 +302,9 @@ cryptonite_ripemd160_update(ctx, (uint8_t *) &bits, sizeof(bits)); /* output digest */ - p[0] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[0]); - p[1] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[1]); - p[2] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[2]); - p[3] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[3]); - p[4] = cpu_to_le32(ctx->h[4]); + store_le32(out , ctx->h[0]); + store_le32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1]); + store_le32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2]); + store_le32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); + store_le32(out+16, ctx->h[4]); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_salsa.c b/cbits/cryptonite_salsa.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_salsa.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_salsa.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_salsa.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" static const uint8_t sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; static const uint8_t tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; @@ -58,11 +59,6 @@ QR (x15,x12,x13,x14); \ } -static inline uint32_t load32(const uint8_t *p) -{ - return le32_to_cpu(*((uint32_t *) p)); -} - static void salsa_core(int rounds, block *out, const cryptonite_salsa_state *in) { uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; @@ -124,36 +120,35 @@ uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv) { const uint8_t *constants = (keylen == 32) ? sigma : tau; - int i; - st->d[0] = load32(constants + 0); - st->d[5] = load32(constants + 4); - st->d[10] = load32(constants + 8); - st->d[15] = load32(constants + 12); + st->d[0] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 0); + st->d[5] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 4); + st->d[10] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 8); + st->d[15] = load_le32_aligned(constants + 12); - st->d[1] = load32(key + 0); - st->d[2] = load32(key + 4); - st->d[3] = load32(key + 8); - st->d[4] = load32(key + 12); + st->d[1] = load_le32(key + 0); + st->d[2] = load_le32(key + 4); + st->d[3] = load_le32(key + 8); + st->d[4] = load_le32(key + 12); /* we repeat the key on 128 bits */ if (keylen == 32) key += 16; - st->d[11] = load32(key + 0); - st->d[12] = load32(key + 4); - st->d[13] = load32(key + 8); - st->d[14] = load32(key + 12); + st->d[11] = load_le32(key + 0); + st->d[12] = load_le32(key + 4); + st->d[13] = load_le32(key + 8); + st->d[14] = load_le32(key + 12); st->d[9] = 0; switch (ivlen) { case 8: - st->d[6] = load32(iv + 0); - st->d[7] = load32(iv + 4); + st->d[6] = load_le32(iv + 0); + st->d[7] = load_le32(iv + 4); st->d[8] = 0; break; case 12: - st->d[6] = load32(iv + 0); - st->d[7] = load32(iv + 4); - st->d[8] = load32(iv + 8); + st->d[6] = load_le32(iv + 0); + st->d[7] = load_le32(iv + 4); + st->d[8] = load_le32(iv + 8); default: return; } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_scrypt.c b/cbits/cryptonite_scrypt.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_scrypt.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_scrypt.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include "cryptonite_salsa.h" static void blockmix_salsa8(uint32_t *in, uint32_t *out, uint32_t *X, const uint32_t r) @@ -49,16 +50,6 @@ return B[(2*r-1) * 16] | (uint64_t)B[(2*r-1) * 16 + 1] << 32; } -static inline uint32_t load32(const uint8_t *p) -{ - return le32_to_cpu(*((uint32_t *) p)); -} - -static inline void store32(const uint8_t *p, uint32_t val) -{ - *((uint32_t *) p) = cpu_to_le32(val); -} - void cryptonite_scrypt_smix(uint8_t *B, const uint32_t r, const uint64_t N, uint32_t *V, uint32_t *XY) { uint32_t *X = XY; @@ -69,7 +60,7 @@ const int r32 = 32*r; for (k = 0; k < r32; k++) - X[k] = load32(&B[4 * k]); + X[k] = load_le32_aligned(&B[4 * k]); for (i = 0; i < N; i += 2) { array_copy32(&V[i * r32], X, r32); blockmix_salsa8(X, Y, Z, r); @@ -86,5 +77,5 @@ blockmix_salsa8(Y, X, Z, r); } for (k = 0; k < r32; k++) - store32(&B[4*k], X[k]); + store_le32_aligned(&B[4*k], X[k]); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.c b/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_sha1.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" void cryptonite_sha1_init(struct sha1_ctx *ctx) { @@ -173,9 +174,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - sha1_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 4)) { + uint32_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 4); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + sha1_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + sha1_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -187,7 +197,6 @@ static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x80, }; uint64_t bits; uint32_t index, padlen; - uint32_t *p = (uint32_t *) out; /* add padding and update data with it */ bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3); @@ -201,9 +210,37 @@ cryptonite_sha1_update(ctx, (uint8_t *) &bits, sizeof(bits)); /* output hash */ - p[0] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[0]); - p[1] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[1]); - p[2] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[2]); - p[3] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[3]); - p[4] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[4]); + store_be32(out , ctx->h[0]); + store_be32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1]); + store_be32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2]); + store_be32(out+12, ctx->h[3]); + store_be32(out+16, ctx->h[4]); } + +#define HASHED(m) SHA1_##m +#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha1_##m +#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha1_##m +#define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#define SHA1_BITS_ELEMS 1 + +static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha1_get_index(const struct sha1_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha1_incr_sz(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n) +{ + ctx->sz += n; + *bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha1_select_digest(const struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask) +{ + xor_be32(out , ctx->h[0] & out_mask); + xor_be32(out+ 4, ctx->h[1] & out_mask); + xor_be32(out+ 8, ctx->h[2] & out_mask); + xor_be32(out+12, ctx->h[3] & out_mask); + xor_be32(out+16, ctx->h[4] & out_mask); +} + +#include diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.h b/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha1.h @@ -41,5 +41,6 @@ void cryptonite_sha1_init(struct sha1_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha1_update(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha1_finalize(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_sha1_finalize_prefix(struct sha1_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); #endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.c b/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_sha256.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" void cryptonite_sha224_init(struct sha224_ctx *ctx) { @@ -134,9 +135,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - sha256_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 4)) { + uint32_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 4); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + sha256_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + sha256_do_chunk(ctx, (uint32_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -151,12 +161,19 @@ memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE); } +void cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out) +{ + uint8_t intermediate[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix(ctx, data, len, n, intermediate); + memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE); +} + void cryptonite_sha256_finalize(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out) { static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x80, }; uint64_t bits; uint32_t i, index, padlen; - uint32_t *p = (uint32_t *) out; /* cpu -> big endian */ bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3); @@ -171,5 +188,31 @@ /* store to digest */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - p[i] = cpu_to_be32(ctx->h[i]); + store_be32(out+4*i, ctx->h[i]); } + +#define HASHED(m) SHA256_##m +#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha256_##m +#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha256_##m +#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#define SHA256_BITS_ELEMS 1 + +static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha256_get_index(const struct sha256_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz & 0x3f); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha256_incr_sz(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n) +{ + ctx->sz += n; + *bits = cpu_to_be64(ctx->sz << 3); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha256_select_digest(const struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask) +{ + uint32_t i; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + xor_be32(out+4*i, ctx->h[i] & out_mask); +} + +#include diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.h b/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha256.h @@ -47,9 +47,11 @@ void cryptonite_sha224_init(struct sha224_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha224_update(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha224_finalize(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_sha224_finalize_prefix(struct sha224_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); void cryptonite_sha256_init(struct sha256_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha256_update(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha256_finalize(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_sha256_finalize_prefix(struct sha256_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); #endif diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.c b/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.c @@ -99,8 +99,11 @@ } /* - * Initialize a SHA-3 / SHAKE context: hashlen is the security level (and - * half the capacity) in bits + * Initialize a SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context: hashlen is the security level + * (and half the capacity) in bits. + * + * In case of cSHAKE, the message prefix with encoded N and S must be added with + * cryptonite_sha3_update. */ void cryptonite_sha3_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) { @@ -110,7 +113,7 @@ ctx->bufsz = bufsz; } -/* Update a SHA-3 / SHAKE context */ +/* Update a SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context */ void cryptonite_sha3_update(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len) { uint32_t to_fill; @@ -135,8 +138,8 @@ uint64_t tramp[SHA3_BUF_SIZE_MAX/8]; ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 8); for (; len >= ctx->bufsz; len -= ctx->bufsz, data += ctx->bufsz) { - memcpy(tramp, data, ctx->bufsz / 8); - sha3_do_chunk(ctx->state, (uint64_t *) data, ctx->bufsz / 8); + memcpy(tramp, data, ctx->bufsz); + sha3_do_chunk(ctx->state, tramp, ctx->bufsz / 8); } } else { /* process as much ctx->bufsz-block */ @@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ } /* - * Extract some bytes from a finalized SHA-3 / SHAKE context. + * Extract some bytes from a finalized SHA-3 / SHAKE / cSHAKE context. * May be called multiple times. */ void cryptonite_sha3_output(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t len) @@ -224,6 +227,12 @@ void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx) { cryptonite_sha3_finalize_with_pad_byte(ctx, 0x1F); +} + +/* Finalize a cSHAKE context. Output is read using cryptonite_sha3_output. */ +void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx) +{ + cryptonite_sha3_finalize_with_pad_byte(ctx, 0x04); } void cryptonite_keccak_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen) diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.h b/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha3.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ void cryptonite_sha3_finalize(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out); void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx); +void cryptonite_sha3_finalize_cshake(struct sha3_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha3_output(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_keccak_init(struct sha3_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen); diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.c b/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include "cryptonite_sha512.h" void cryptonite_sha384_init(struct sha512_ctx *ctx) @@ -153,9 +154,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 128-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 128; len -= 128, data += 128) - sha512_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 8)) { + uint64_t tramp[16]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 8); + for (; len >= 128; len -= 128, data += 128) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 128); + sha512_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 128-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 128; len -= 128, data += 128) + sha512_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -170,12 +180,19 @@ memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE); } +void cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out) +{ + uint8_t intermediate[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + + cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix(ctx, data, len, n, intermediate); + memcpy(out, intermediate, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE); +} + void cryptonite_sha512_finalize(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out) { static uint8_t padding[128] = { 0x80, }; uint32_t i, index, padlen; uint64_t bits[2]; - uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; /* cpu -> big endian */ bits[0] = cpu_to_be64((ctx->sz[1] << 3 | ctx->sz[0] >> 61)); @@ -191,8 +208,40 @@ /* store to digest */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) - p[i] = cpu_to_be64(ctx->h[i]); + store_be64(out+8*i, ctx->h[i]); } + +#define HASHED(m) SHA512_##m +#define HASHED_LOWER(m) sha512_##m +#define CRYPTONITE_HASHED(m) cryptonite_sha512_##m +#define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#define SHA512_BITS_ELEMS 2 + +#include + +static inline uint32_t cryptonite_sha512_get_index(const struct sha512_ctx *ctx) +{ + return (uint32_t) (ctx->sz[0] & 0x7f); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha512_incr_sz(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint64_t *bits, uint32_t n) +{ + ctx->sz[0] += n; + ctx->sz[1] += 1 & constant_time_lt_64(ctx->sz[0], n); + bits[0] = cpu_to_be64((ctx->sz[1] << 3 | ctx->sz[0] >> 61)); + bits[1] = cpu_to_be64((ctx->sz[0] << 3)); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_sha512_select_digest(const struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_mask) +{ + uint32_t i; + uint64_t out_mask_64 = out_mask; + out_mask_64 |= out_mask_64 << 32; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + xor_be64(out+8*i, ctx->h[i] & out_mask_64); +} + +#include #include diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.h b/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_sha512.h @@ -46,10 +46,12 @@ void cryptonite_sha384_init(struct sha384_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha384_update(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha384_finalize(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_sha384_finalize_prefix(struct sha384_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); void cryptonite_sha512_init(struct sha512_ctx *ctx); void cryptonite_sha512_update(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len); void cryptonite_sha512_finalize(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *out); +void cryptonite_sha512_finalize_prefix(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t len, uint32_t n, uint8_t *out); /* only multiples of 8 are supported as valid t values */ void cryptonite_sha512t_init(struct sha512_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen); diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_skein256.c b/cbits/cryptonite_skein256.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_skein256.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_skein256.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include "cryptonite_skein.h" #include "cryptonite_skein256.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" static const uint8_t K256_0[2] = { 14, 16, }; static const uint8_t K256_1[2] = { 52, 57, }; @@ -143,9 +144,18 @@ ctx->bufindex = 0; } - /* process as much 32-block as possible except the last one in case we finalize */ - for (; len > 32; len -= 32, data += 32) - skein256_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data, 32); + if (need_alignment(data, 8)) { + uint64_t tramp[4]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 8); + for (; len > 32; len -= 32, data += 32) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 32); + skein256_do_chunk(ctx, tramp, 32); + } + } else { + /* process as much 32-block as possible except the last one in case we finalize */ + for (; len > 32; len -= 32, data += 32) + skein256_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data, 32); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) { @@ -157,7 +167,6 @@ void cryptonite_skein256_finalize(struct skein256_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { uint32_t outsize; - uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; uint64_t x[4]; int i, j, n; diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_skein512.c b/cbits/cryptonite_skein512.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_skein512.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_skein512.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include "cryptonite_skein.h" #include "cryptonite_skein512.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" static const uint8_t K512_0[4] = { 46, 36, 19, 37, }; static const uint8_t K512_1[4] = { 33, 27, 14, 42, }; @@ -161,9 +162,18 @@ ctx->bufindex = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible except the last one in case we finalize */ - for (; len > 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - skein512_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data, 64); + if (need_alignment(data, 8)) { + uint64_t tramp[8]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 8); + for (; len > 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + skein512_do_chunk(ctx, tramp, 64); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible except the last one in case we finalize */ + for (; len > 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + skein512_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data, 64); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) { @@ -175,7 +185,6 @@ void cryptonite_skein512_finalize(struct skein512_ctx *ctx, uint32_t hashlen, uint8_t *out) { uint32_t outsize; - uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; uint64_t x[8]; int i, j, n; diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_tiger.c b/cbits/cryptonite_tiger.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_tiger.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_tiger.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include "cryptonite_tiger.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" static const uint64_t t1[256] = { 0x02aab17cf7e90c5eULL,0xac424b03e243a8ecULL,0x72cd5be30dd5fcd3ULL,0x6d019b93f6f97f3aULL, @@ -381,9 +382,18 @@ index = 0; } - /* process as much 64-block as possible */ - for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) - tiger_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data); + if (need_alignment(data, 8)) { + uint64_t tramp[8]; + ASSERT_ALIGNMENT(tramp, 8); + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) { + memcpy(tramp, data, 64); + tiger_do_chunk(ctx, tramp); + } + } else { + /* process as much 64-block as possible */ + for (; len >= 64; len -= 64, data += 64) + tiger_do_chunk(ctx, (uint64_t *) data); + } /* append data into buf */ if (len) @@ -395,7 +405,6 @@ static uint8_t padding[64] = { 0x01, }; uint64_t bits; uint32_t index, padlen; - uint64_t *p = (uint64_t *) out; /* add padding and update data with it */ bits = cpu_to_le64(ctx->sz << 3); @@ -409,7 +418,7 @@ cryptonite_tiger_update(ctx, (uint8_t *) &bits, sizeof(bits)); /* output hash */ - p[0] = cpu_to_le64(ctx->h[0]); - p[1] = cpu_to_le64(ctx->h[1]); - p[2] = cpu_to_le64(ctx->h[2]); + store_le64(out , ctx->h[0]); + store_le64(out+ 8, ctx->h[1]); + store_le64(out+16, ctx->h[2]); } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c b/cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c @@ -777,7 +777,6 @@ uint64_t K[8]; /* the round key */ uint64_t block[8]; /* mu(buffer) */ uint64_t state[8]; /* the cipher state */ - uint64_t L[8]; uint8_t *buffer = ctx->buffer; /* diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c b/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c --- a/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c @@ -30,13 +30,9 @@ #include #include #include "cryptonite_xsalsa.h" +#include "cryptonite_align.h" #include "cryptonite_bitfn.h" -static inline uint32_t load32(const uint8_t *p) -{ - return le32_to_cpu(*((uint32_t *) p)); -} - /* XSalsa20 algorithm as described in https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20081128.pdf */ void cryptonite_xsalsa_init(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, uint8_t nb_rounds, uint32_t keylen, const uint8_t *key, @@ -51,13 +47,27 @@ (x6, x7, x8, x9) is the first 128 bits of a 192-bit nonce */ cryptonite_salsa_init_core(&ctx->st, keylen, key, 8, iv); - ctx->st.d[ 8] = load32(iv + 8); - ctx->st.d[ 9] = load32(iv + 12); + /* Continue initialization in a separate function that may also + be called independently */ + cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(ctx, ivlen - 8, iv + 8); +} + +void cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, + uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv) +{ + /* Finish creating initial 512-bit input block: + (x6, x7, x8, x9) is the first 128 bits of a 192-bit nonce + + Except iv has been shifted by 64 bits so there are now only 128 bits ahead. + */ + ctx->st.d[ 8] += load_le32(iv + 0); + ctx->st.d[ 9] += load_le32(iv + 4); + /* Compute (z0, z1, . . . , z15) = doubleround ^(r/2) (x0, x1, . . . , x15) */ block hSalsa; memset(&hSalsa, 0, sizeof(block)); - cryptonite_salsa_core_xor(nb_rounds, &hSalsa, &ctx->st); + cryptonite_salsa_core_xor(ctx->nb_rounds, &hSalsa, &ctx->st); /* Build a new 512-bit input block (x′0, x′1, . . . , x′15): (x′0, x′5, x′10, x′15) is the Salsa20 constant @@ -73,8 +83,8 @@ ctx->st.d[12] = hSalsa.d[ 7] - ctx->st.d[ 7]; ctx->st.d[13] = hSalsa.d[ 8] - ctx->st.d[ 8]; ctx->st.d[14] = hSalsa.d[ 9] - ctx->st.d[ 9]; - ctx->st.d[ 6] = load32(iv + 16); - ctx->st.d[ 7] = load32(iv + 20); + ctx->st.d[ 6] = load_le32(iv + 8); + ctx->st.d[ 7] = load_le32(iv + 12); ctx->st.d[ 8] = 0; ctx->st.d[ 9] = 0; } diff --git a/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.h b/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.h --- a/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.h +++ b/cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.h @@ -33,5 +33,6 @@ #include "cryptonite_salsa.h" void cryptonite_xsalsa_init(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, uint8_t nb_rounds, uint32_t keylen, const uint8_t *key, uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv); +void cryptonite_xsalsa_derive(cryptonite_salsa_context *ctx, uint32_t ivlen, const uint8_t *iv); #endif diff --git a/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf.c b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf.c @@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ +/** + * @file ed448goldilocks/decaf.c + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief Decaf high-level functions. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* for posix_memalign */ +#include "word.h" +#include "field.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Template stuff */ +#define API_NS(_id) cryptonite_decaf_448_##_id +#define SCALAR_BITS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BITS +#define SCALAR_SER_BYTES CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BYTES +#define SCALAR_LIMBS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_LIMBS +#define scalar_t API_NS(scalar_t) +#define point_t API_NS(point_t) +#define precomputed_s API_NS(precomputed_s) +#define IMAGINE_TWIST 0 +#define COFACTOR 4 + +/* Comb config: number of combs, n, t, s. */ +#define COMBS_N 5 +#define COMBS_T 5 +#define COMBS_S 18 +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WINDOW_BITS 5 +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WNAF_FIXED_TABLE_BITS 5 +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WNAF_VAR_TABLE_BITS 3 + +#define EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY 0 + +static const int EDWARDS_D = -39081; +static const scalar_t point_scalarmul_adjustment = {{{ + SC_LIMB(0xc873d6d54a7bb0cf), SC_LIMB(0xe933d8d723a70aad), SC_LIMB(0xbb124b65129c96fd), SC_LIMB(0x00000008335dc163) +}}}, precomputed_scalarmul_adjustment = {{{ + SC_LIMB(0xc873d6d54a7bb0cf), SC_LIMB(0xe933d8d723a70aad), SC_LIMB(0xbb124b65129c96fd), SC_LIMB(0x00000008335dc163) +}}}; + +const uint8_t cryptonite_decaf_x448_base_point[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = { 0x05 }; + +#if COFACTOR==8 || EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY + static const gf SQRT_ONE_MINUS_D = {FIELD_LITERAL( + /* NONE */ + )}; +#endif + +/* End of template stuff */ + +/* Sanity */ +#if (COFACTOR == 8) && !IMAGINE_TWIST && !UNSAFE_CURVE_HAS_POINTS_AT_INFINITY +/* FUTURE MAGIC: Curve41417 doesn't have these properties. */ +#error "Currently require IMAGINE_TWIST (and thus p=5 mod 8) for cofactor 8" + /* OK, but why? + * Two reasons: #1: There are bugs when COFACTOR == && IMAGINE_TWIST + # #2: + */ +#endif + +#if IMAGINE_TWIST && (P_MOD_8 != 5) + #error "Cannot use IMAGINE_TWIST except for p == 5 mod 8" +#endif + +#if (COFACTOR != 8) && (COFACTOR != 4) + #error "COFACTOR must be 4 or 8" +#endif + +#if IMAGINE_TWIST + extern const gf SQRT_MINUS_ONE; +#endif + +#define WBITS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS /* NB this may be different from ARCH_WORD_BITS */ + +extern const point_t API_NS(point_base); + +/* Projective Niels coordinates */ +typedef struct { gf a, b, c; } niels_s, niels_t[1]; +typedef struct { niels_t n; gf z; } VECTOR_ALIGNED pniels_s, pniels_t[1]; + +/* Precomputed base */ +struct precomputed_s { niels_t table [COMBS_N<<(COMBS_T-1)]; }; + +extern const gf API_NS(precomputed_base_as_fe)[]; +const precomputed_s *API_NS(precomputed_base) = + (const precomputed_s *) &API_NS(precomputed_base_as_fe); + +const size_t API_NS(sizeof_precomputed_s) = sizeof(precomputed_s); +const size_t API_NS(alignof_precomputed_s) = sizeof(big_register_t); + +/** Inverse. */ +static void +cryptonite_gf_invert(gf y, const gf x, int assert_nonzero) { + gf t1, t2; + cryptonite_gf_sqr(t1, x); // o^2 + mask_t ret = cryptonite_gf_isr(t2, t1); // +-1/sqrt(o^2) = +-1/o + (void)ret; + if (assert_nonzero) assert(ret); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(t1, t2); + cryptonite_gf_mul(t2, t1, x); // not direct to y in case of alias. + cryptonite_gf_copy(y, t2); +} + +/** Return high bit of x = low bit of 2x mod p */ +static mask_t cryptonite_gf_lobit(const gf x) { + gf y; + cryptonite_gf_copy(y,x); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(y); + return -(y->limb[0]&1); +} + +/** identity = (0,1) */ +const point_t API_NS(point_identity) = {{{{{0}}},{{{1}}},{{{1}}},{{{0}}}}}; + +void API_NS(deisogenize) ( + cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ s, + cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ minus_t_over_s, + const point_t p, + mask_t toggle_hibit_s, + mask_t toggle_hibit_t_over_s, + mask_t toggle_rotation +); + +void API_NS(deisogenize) ( + cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ s, + cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ minus_t_over_s, + const point_t p, + mask_t toggle_hibit_s, + mask_t toggle_hibit_t_over_s, + mask_t toggle_rotation +) { +#if COFACTOR == 4 && !IMAGINE_TWIST + (void) toggle_rotation; + + gf b, d; + cryptonite_gf_s *c = s, *a = minus_t_over_s; + cryptonite_gf_mulw(a, p->y, 1-EDWARDS_D); + cryptonite_gf_mul(c, a, p->t); /* -dYT, with EDWARDS_D = d-1 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(a, p->x, p->z); + cryptonite_gf_sub(d, c, a); /* aXZ-dYT with a=-1 */ + cryptonite_gf_add(a, p->z, p->y); + cryptonite_gf_sub(b, p->z, p->y); + cryptonite_gf_mul(c, b, a); + cryptonite_gf_mulw(b, c, -EDWARDS_D); /* (a-d)(Z+Y)(Z-Y) */ + mask_t ok = cryptonite_gf_isr (a,b); /* r in the paper */ + (void)ok; assert(ok | cryptonite_gf_eq(b,ZERO)); + cryptonite_gf_mulw (b, a, -EDWARDS_D); /* u in the paper */ + + cryptonite_gf_mul(c,a,d); /* r(aZX-dYT) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(a,b,p->z); /* uZ */ + cryptonite_gf_add(a,a,a); /* 2uZ */ + + mask_t tg = toggle_hibit_t_over_s ^ ~cryptonite_gf_hibit(minus_t_over_s); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(minus_t_over_s, tg); /* t/s <-? -t/s */ + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(c, tg); /* u <- -u if negative. */ + + cryptonite_gf_add(d,c,p->y); + cryptonite_gf_mul(s,b,d); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(s, toggle_hibit_s ^ cryptonite_gf_hibit(s)); +#else + /* More complicated because of rotation */ + /* MAGIC This code is wrong for certain non-Curve25519 curves; + * check if it's because of Cofactor==8 or IMAGINE_TWIST */ + + gf c, d; + cryptonite_gf_s *b = s, *a = minus_t_over_s; + + #if IMAGINE_TWIST + gf x, t; + cryptonite_gf_div_qnr(x,p->x); + cryptonite_gf_div_qnr(t,p->t); + cryptonite_gf_add ( a, p->z, x ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( b, p->z, x ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( c, a, b ); /* "zx" = Z^2 - aX^2 = Z^2 - X^2 */ + #else + const cryptonite_gf_s *x = p->x, *t = p->t; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( a, p->z ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( c, a, b ); /* "zx" = Z^2 - aX^2 = Z^2 + X^2 */ + #endif + /* Here: c = "zx" in the SAGE code = Z^2 - aX^2 */ + + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, p->z, t ); /* "tz" = T*Z */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, a ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d, b, c ); /* (TZ)^2 * (Z^2-aX^2) */ + mask_t ok = cryptonite_gf_isr(b, d); + (void)ok; assert(ok | cryptonite_gf_eq(d,ZERO)); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d, b, a ); /* "osx" = 1 / sqrt(z^2-ax^2) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, b, c ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, a, d ); /* 1/tz */ + + mask_t rotate; + #if (COFACTOR == 8) + gf e; + cryptonite_gf_sqr(e, p->z); + cryptonite_gf_mul(a, e, b); /* z^2 / tz = z/t = 1/xy */ + rotate = cryptonite_gf_hibit(a) ^ toggle_rotation; + /* Curve25519: cond select between zx * 1/tz or sqrt(1-d); y=-x */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, b, c ); + cryptonite_gf_cond_sel ( a, a, SQRT_ONE_MINUS_D, rotate ); + cryptonite_gf_cond_sel ( e, p->y, x, rotate ); + #else + const cryptonite_gf_s *e = x; + (void)toggle_rotation; + rotate = 0; + #endif + + cryptonite_gf_mul ( c, a, d ); // new "osx" + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, c, p->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( minus_t_over_s, a, a ); // 2 * "osx" * Z + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d, b, p->z ); + + mask_t tg = toggle_hibit_t_over_s ^~ cryptonite_gf_hibit(minus_t_over_s); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg ( minus_t_over_s, tg ); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg ( c, rotate ^ tg ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( d, d, c ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( s, d, e ); /* here "x" = y unless rotate */ + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg ( s, toggle_hibit_s ^ cryptonite_gf_hibit(s) ); +#endif +} + +void API_NS(point_encode)( unsigned char ser[SER_BYTES], const point_t p ) { + gf s, mtos; + API_NS(deisogenize)(s,mtos,p,0,0,0); + cryptonite_gf_serialize(ser,s,0); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t API_NS(point_decode) ( + point_t p, + const unsigned char ser[SER_BYTES], + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t allow_identity +) { + gf s, a, b, c, d, e, f; + mask_t succ = cryptonite_gf_deserialize(s, ser, 0); + mask_t zero = cryptonite_gf_eq(s, ZERO); + succ &= bool_to_mask(allow_identity) | ~zero; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( a, s ); /* s^2 */ +#if IMAGINE_TWIST + cryptonite_gf_sub ( f, ONE, a ); /* f = 1-as^2 = 1-s^2*/ +#else + cryptonite_gf_add ( f, ONE, a ); /* f = 1-as^2 = 1+s^2 */ +#endif + succ &= ~ cryptonite_gf_eq( f, ZERO ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, f ); /* (1-as^2)^2 = 1 - 2as^2 + a^2 s^4 */ + cryptonite_gf_mulw ( c, a, 4*IMAGINE_TWIST-4*EDWARDS_D ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( c, c, b ); /* t^2 = 1 + (2a-4d) s^2 + s^4 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d, f, s ); /* s * (1-as^2) for denoms */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( e, d ); /* s^2 * (1-as^2)^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, c, e ); /* t^2 * s^2 * (1-as^2)^2 */ + + succ &= cryptonite_gf_isr(e,b) | cryptonite_gf_eq(b,ZERO); /* e = 1/(t s (1-as^2)) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, e, d ); /* 1 / t */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d, e, c ); /* t / (s(1-as^2)) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( e, d, f ); /* t / s */ + mask_t negtos = cryptonite_gf_hibit(e); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(b, negtos); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(d, negtos); + +#if IMAGINE_TWIST + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->z, ONE, a); /* Z = 1+as^2 = 1-s^2 */ +#else + cryptonite_gf_sub ( p->z, ONE, a); /* Z = 1+as^2 = 1-s^2 */ +#endif + +#if COFACTOR == 8 + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, p->z, d); /* t(1+s^2) / s(1-s^2) = 2/xy */ + succ &= ~cryptonite_gf_lobit(a); /* = ~cryptonite_gf_hibit(a/2), since cryptonite_gf_hibit(x) = cryptonite_gf_lobit(2x) */ +#endif + + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, f, b ); /* y = (1-s^2) / t */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, p->z, a ); /* Y = yZ */ +#if IMAGINE_TWIST + cryptonite_gf_add ( b, s, s ); + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->x, b, SQRT_MINUS_ONE); /* Curve25519 */ +#else + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->x, s, s ); +#endif + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, p->x, a ); /* T = 2s (1-as^2)/t */ + +#if UNSAFE_CURVE_HAS_POINTS_AT_INFINITY + /* This can't happen for any of the supported configurations. + * + * If it can happen (because s=1), it's because the curve has points + * at infinity, which means that there may be critical security bugs + * elsewhere in the library. In that case, it's better that you hit + * the assertion in point_valid, which will happen in the test suite + * since it tests s=1. + * + * This debugging option is to allow testing of IMAGINE_TWIST = 0 on + * Ed25519, without hitting that assertion. Don't use it in + * production. + */ + succ &= ~cryptonite_gf_eq(p->z,ZERO); +#endif + + p->y->limb[0] -= zero; + assert(API_NS(point_valid)(p) | ~succ); + + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(mask_to_bool(succ)); +} + +#if IMAGINE_TWIST +#define TWISTED_D (-(EDWARDS_D)) +#else +#define TWISTED_D ((EDWARDS_D)-1) +#endif + +#if TWISTED_D < 0 +#define EFF_D (-(TWISTED_D)) +#define NEG_D 1 +#else +#define EFF_D TWISTED_D +#define NEG_D 0 +#endif + +void API_NS(point_sub) ( + point_t p, + const point_t q, + const point_t r +) { + gf a, b, c, d; + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, q->y, q->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( d, r->y, r->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( c, r->y, r->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, c, b ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, q->y, q->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, d, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, r->t, q->t ); + cryptonite_gf_mulw ( p->x, b, 2*EFF_D ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, a, p->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( c, p->y, a ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, q->z, r->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( a, a, a ); /* 2+e */ + if (GF_HEADROOM <= 3) cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(a); /* or 1+e */ +#if NEG_D + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( p->y, a, p->x ); /* 4+e or 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( a, a, p->x ); /* 3+e or 2+e */ +#else + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( p->y, a, p->x ); /* 3+e or 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( a, a, p->x ); /* 4+e or 3+e */ +#endif + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->z, a, p->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->x, p->y, c ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, b, c ); +} + +void API_NS(point_add) ( + point_t p, + const point_t q, + const point_t r +) { + gf a, b, c, d; + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, q->y, q->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( c, r->y, r->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( d, r->y, r->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, c, b ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, q->y, q->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, d, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, r->t, q->t ); + cryptonite_gf_mulw ( p->x, b, 2*EFF_D ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, a, p->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( c, p->y, a ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, q->z, r->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( a, a, a ); /* 2+e */ + if (GF_HEADROOM <= 3) cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(a); /* or 1+e */ +#if NEG_D + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( p->y, a, p->x ); /* 3+e or 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( a, a, p->x ); /* 4+e or 3+e */ +#else + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( p->y, a, p->x ); /* 4+e or 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( a, a, p->x ); /* 3+e or 2+e */ +#endif + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->z, a, p->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->x, p->y, c ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, b, c ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void +point_double_internal ( + point_t p, + const point_t q, + int before_double +) { + gf a, b, c, d; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( c, q->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( a, q->y ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( d, c, a ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( p->t, q->y, q->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, p->t ); + cryptonite_gf_subx_nr ( b, b, d, 3 ); /* 4+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( p->t, a, c ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( p->x, q->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( p->z, p->x, p->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_subx_nr ( a, p->z, p->t, 4 ); /* 6+e */ + if (GF_HEADROOM == 5) cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(a); /* or 1+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->x, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->z, p->t, a ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, p->t, d ); + if (!before_double) cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, b, d ); +} + +void API_NS(point_double)(point_t p, const point_t q) { + point_double_internal(p,q,0); +} + +void API_NS(point_negate) ( + point_t nega, + const point_t a +) { + cryptonite_gf_sub(nega->x, ZERO, a->x); + cryptonite_gf_copy(nega->y, a->y); + cryptonite_gf_copy(nega->z, a->z); + cryptonite_gf_sub(nega->t, ZERO, a->t); +} + +/* Operations on [p]niels */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void +cond_neg_niels ( + niels_t n, + mask_t neg +) { + cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(n->a, n->b, neg); + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(n->c, neg); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void pt_to_pniels ( + pniels_t b, + const point_t a +) { + cryptonite_gf_sub ( b->n->a, a->y, a->x ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( b->n->b, a->x, a->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mulw ( b->n->c, a->t, 2*TWISTED_D ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( b->z, a->z, a->z ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void pniels_to_pt ( + point_t e, + const pniels_t d +) { + gf eu; + cryptonite_gf_add ( eu, d->n->b, d->n->a ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( e->y, d->n->b, d->n->a ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( e->t, e->y, eu); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( e->x, d->z, e->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( e->y, d->z, eu ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( e->z, d->z ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void +niels_to_pt ( + point_t e, + const niels_t n +) { + cryptonite_gf_add ( e->y, n->b, n->a ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( e->x, n->b, n->a ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( e->t, e->y, e->x ); + cryptonite_gf_copy ( e->z, ONE ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void +add_niels_to_pt ( + point_t d, + const niels_t e, + int before_double +) { + gf a, b, c; + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, d->y, d->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, e->a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, d->x, d->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->y, e->b, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->x, e->c, d->t ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( c, a, d->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, d->y, a ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( d->y, d->z, d->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( a, d->x, d->z ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->z, a, d->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->x, d->y, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->y, a, c ); + if (!before_double) cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->t, b, c ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void +sub_niels_from_pt ( + point_t d, + const niels_t e, + int before_double +) { + gf a, b, c; + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, d->y, d->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, e->b, b ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( b, d->x, d->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->y, e->a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->x, e->c, d->t ); + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( c, a, d->y ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( b, d->y, a ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr ( d->y, d->z, d->x ); /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( a, d->z, d->x ); /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->z, a, d->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->x, d->y, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->y, a, c ); + if (!before_double) cryptonite_gf_mul ( d->t, b, c ); +} + +static void +add_pniels_to_pt ( + point_t p, + const pniels_t pn, + int before_double +) { + gf L0; + cryptonite_gf_mul ( L0, p->z, pn->z ); + cryptonite_gf_copy ( p->z, L0 ); + add_niels_to_pt( p, pn->n, before_double ); +} + +static void +sub_pniels_from_pt ( + point_t p, + const pniels_t pn, + int before_double +) { + gf L0; + cryptonite_gf_mul ( L0, p->z, pn->z ); + cryptonite_gf_copy ( p->z, L0 ); + sub_niels_from_pt( p, pn->n, before_double ); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void +prepare_fixed_window( + pniels_t *multiples, + const point_t b, + int ntable +) { + point_t tmp; + pniels_t pn; + int i; + + point_double_internal(tmp, b, 0); + pt_to_pniels(pn, tmp); + pt_to_pniels(multiples[0], b); + API_NS(point_copy)(tmp, b); + for (i=1; i> 1, + NTABLE = 1<<(WINDOW-1); + + scalar_t scalar1x; + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar1x, scalar, point_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar1x,scalar1x); + + /* Set up a precomputed table with odd multiples of b. */ + pniels_t pn, multiples[NTABLE]; + point_t tmp; + prepare_fixed_window(multiples, b, NTABLE); + + /* Initialize. */ + int i,j,first=1; + i = SCALAR_BITS - ((SCALAR_BITS-1) % WINDOW) - 1; + + for (; i>=0; i-=WINDOW) { + /* Fetch another block of bits */ + word_t bits = scalar1x->limb[i/WBITS] >> (i%WBITS); + if (i%WBITS >= WBITS-WINDOW && i/WBITSlimb[i/WBITS+1] << (WBITS - (i%WBITS)); + } + bits &= WINDOW_MASK; + mask_t inv = (bits>>(WINDOW-1))-1; + bits ^= inv; + + /* Add in from table. Compute t only on last iteration. */ + constant_time_lookup(pn, multiples, sizeof(pn), NTABLE, bits & WINDOW_T_MASK); + cond_neg_niels(pn->n, inv); + if (first) { + pniels_to_pt(tmp, pn); + first = 0; + } else { + /* Using Hisil et al's lookahead method instead of extensible here + * for no particular reason. Double WINDOW times, but only compute t on + * the last one. + */ + for (j=0; j> 1, + NTABLE = 1<<(WINDOW-1); + + scalar_t scalar1x, scalar2x; + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar1x, scalarb, point_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar1x,scalar1x); + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar2x, scalarc, point_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar2x,scalar2x); + + /* Set up a precomputed table with odd multiples of b. */ + pniels_t pn, multiples1[NTABLE], multiples2[NTABLE]; + point_t tmp; + prepare_fixed_window(multiples1, b, NTABLE); + prepare_fixed_window(multiples2, c, NTABLE); + + /* Initialize. */ + int i,j,first=1; + i = SCALAR_BITS - ((SCALAR_BITS-1) % WINDOW) - 1; + + for (; i>=0; i-=WINDOW) { + /* Fetch another block of bits */ + word_t bits1 = scalar1x->limb[i/WBITS] >> (i%WBITS), + bits2 = scalar2x->limb[i/WBITS] >> (i%WBITS); + if (i%WBITS >= WBITS-WINDOW && i/WBITSlimb[i/WBITS+1] << (WBITS - (i%WBITS)); + bits2 ^= scalar2x->limb[i/WBITS+1] << (WBITS - (i%WBITS)); + } + bits1 &= WINDOW_MASK; + bits2 &= WINDOW_MASK; + mask_t inv1 = (bits1>>(WINDOW-1))-1; + mask_t inv2 = (bits2>>(WINDOW-1))-1; + bits1 ^= inv1; + bits2 ^= inv2; + + /* Add in from table. Compute t only on last iteration. */ + constant_time_lookup(pn, multiples1, sizeof(pn), NTABLE, bits1 & WINDOW_T_MASK); + cond_neg_niels(pn->n, inv1); + if (first) { + pniels_to_pt(tmp, pn); + first = 0; + } else { + /* Using Hisil et al's lookahead method instead of extensible here + * for no particular reason. Double WINDOW times, but only compute t on + * the last one. + */ + for (j=0; jn, inv2); + add_pniels_to_pt(tmp, pn, i?-1:0); + } + + /* Write out the answer */ + API_NS(point_copy)(a,tmp); + + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar1x,sizeof(scalar1x)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar2x,sizeof(scalar2x)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(pn,sizeof(pn)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(multiples1,sizeof(multiples1)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(multiples2,sizeof(multiples2)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(tmp,sizeof(tmp)); +} + +void API_NS(point_dual_scalarmul) ( + point_t a1, + point_t a2, + const point_t b, + const scalar_t scalar1, + const scalar_t scalar2 +) { + const int WINDOW = CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WINDOW_BITS, + WINDOW_MASK = (1<> 1, + NTABLE = 1<<(WINDOW-1); + + scalar_t scalar1x, scalar2x; + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar1x, scalar1, point_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar1x,scalar1x); + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar2x, scalar2, point_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar2x,scalar2x); + + /* Set up a precomputed table with odd multiples of b. */ + point_t multiples1[NTABLE], multiples2[NTABLE], working, tmp; + pniels_t pn; + + API_NS(point_copy)(working, b); + + /* Initialize. */ + int i,j; + + for (i=0; ilimb[i/WBITS] >> (i%WBITS), + bits2 = scalar2x->limb[i/WBITS] >> (i%WBITS); + if (i%WBITS >= WBITS-WINDOW && i/WBITSlimb[i/WBITS+1] << (WBITS - (i%WBITS)); + bits2 ^= scalar2x->limb[i/WBITS+1] << (WBITS - (i%WBITS)); + } + bits1 &= WINDOW_MASK; + bits2 &= WINDOW_MASK; + mask_t inv1 = (bits1>>(WINDOW-1))-1; + mask_t inv2 = (bits2>>(WINDOW-1))-1; + bits1 ^= inv1; + bits2 ^= inv2; + + pt_to_pniels(pn, working); + + constant_time_lookup(tmp, multiples1, sizeof(tmp), NTABLE, bits1 & WINDOW_T_MASK); + cond_neg_niels(pn->n, inv1); + /* add_pniels_to_pt(multiples1[bits1 & WINDOW_T_MASK], pn, 0); */ + add_pniels_to_pt(tmp, pn, 0); + constant_time_insert(multiples1, tmp, sizeof(tmp), NTABLE, bits1 & WINDOW_T_MASK); + + + constant_time_lookup(tmp, multiples2, sizeof(tmp), NTABLE, bits2 & WINDOW_T_MASK); + cond_neg_niels(pn->n, inv1^inv2); + /* add_pniels_to_pt(multiples2[bits2 & WINDOW_T_MASK], pn, 0); */ + add_pniels_to_pt(tmp, pn, 0); + constant_time_insert(multiples2, tmp, sizeof(tmp), NTABLE, bits2 & WINDOW_T_MASK); + } + + if (NTABLE > 1) { + API_NS(point_copy)(working, multiples1[NTABLE-1]); + API_NS(point_copy)(tmp , multiples2[NTABLE-1]); + + for (i=NTABLE-1; i>1; i--) { + API_NS(point_add)(multiples1[i-1], multiples1[i-1], multiples1[i]); + API_NS(point_add)(multiples2[i-1], multiples2[i-1], multiples2[i]); + API_NS(point_add)(working, working, multiples1[i-1]); + API_NS(point_add)(tmp, tmp, multiples2[i-1]); + } + + API_NS(point_add)(multiples1[0], multiples1[0], multiples1[1]); + API_NS(point_add)(multiples2[0], multiples2[0], multiples2[1]); + point_double_internal(working, working, 0); + point_double_internal(tmp, tmp, 0); + API_NS(point_add)(a1, working, multiples1[0]); + API_NS(point_add)(a2, tmp, multiples2[0]); + } else { + API_NS(point_copy)(a1, multiples1[0]); + API_NS(point_copy)(a2, multiples2[0]); + } + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar1x,sizeof(scalar1x)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar2x,sizeof(scalar2x)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(pn,sizeof(pn)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(multiples1,sizeof(multiples1)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(multiples2,sizeof(multiples2)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(tmp,sizeof(tmp)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(working,sizeof(working)); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t API_NS(point_eq) ( const point_t p, const point_t q ) { + /* equality mod 2-torsion compares x/y */ + gf a, b; + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, p->y, q->x ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, q->y, p->x ); + mask_t succ = cryptonite_gf_eq(a,b); + + #if (COFACTOR == 8) && IMAGINE_TWIST + cryptonite_gf_mul ( a, p->y, q->y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( b, q->x, p->x ); + #if !(IMAGINE_TWIST) + cryptonite_gf_sub ( a, ZERO, a ); + #else + /* Interesting note: the 4tor would normally be rotation. + * But because of the *i twist, it's actually + * (x,y) <-> (iy,ix) + */ + + /* No code, just a comment. */ + #endif + succ |= cryptonite_gf_eq(a,b); + #endif + + return mask_to_bool(succ); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t API_NS(point_valid) ( + const point_t p +) { + gf a,b,c; + cryptonite_gf_mul(a,p->x,p->y); + cryptonite_gf_mul(b,p->z,p->t); + mask_t out = cryptonite_gf_eq(a,b); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(a,p->x); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(b,p->y); + cryptonite_gf_sub(a,b,a); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(b,p->t); + cryptonite_gf_mulw(c,b,TWISTED_D); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(b,p->z); + cryptonite_gf_add(b,b,c); + out &= cryptonite_gf_eq(a,b); + out &= ~cryptonite_gf_eq(p->z,ZERO); + return mask_to_bool(out); +} + +void API_NS(point_debugging_torque) ( + point_t q, + const point_t p +) { +#if COFACTOR == 8 && IMAGINE_TWIST + gf tmp; + cryptonite_gf_mul(tmp,p->x,SQRT_MINUS_ONE); + cryptonite_gf_mul(q->x,p->y,SQRT_MINUS_ONE); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->y,tmp); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->z,p->z); + cryptonite_gf_sub(q->t,ZERO,p->t); +#else + cryptonite_gf_sub(q->x,ZERO,p->x); + cryptonite_gf_sub(q->y,ZERO,p->y); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->z,p->z); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->t,p->t); +#endif +} + +void API_NS(point_debugging_pscale) ( + point_t q, + const point_t p, + const uint8_t factor[SER_BYTES] +) { + gf gfac,tmp; + /* NB this means you'll never pscale by negative numbers for p521 */ + ignore_result(cryptonite_gf_deserialize(gfac,factor,0)); + cryptonite_gf_cond_sel(gfac,gfac,ONE,cryptonite_gf_eq(gfac,ZERO)); + cryptonite_gf_mul(tmp,p->x,gfac); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->x,tmp); + cryptonite_gf_mul(tmp,p->y,gfac); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->y,tmp); + cryptonite_gf_mul(tmp,p->z,gfac); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->z,tmp); + cryptonite_gf_mul(tmp,p->t,gfac); + cryptonite_gf_copy(q->t,tmp); +} + +static void cryptonite_gf_batch_invert ( + gf *__restrict__ out, + const gf *in, + unsigned int n +) { + gf t1; + assert(n>1); + + cryptonite_gf_copy(out[1], in[0]); + int i; + for (i=1; i<(int) (n-1); i++) { + cryptonite_gf_mul(out[i+1], out[i], in[i]); + } + cryptonite_gf_mul(out[0], out[n-1], in[n-1]); + + cryptonite_gf_invert(out[0], out[0], 1); + + for (i=n-1; i>0; i--) { + cryptonite_gf_mul(t1, out[i], out[0]); + cryptonite_gf_copy(out[i], t1); + cryptonite_gf_mul(t1, out[0], in[i]); + cryptonite_gf_copy(out[0], t1); + } +} + +static void batch_normalize_niels ( + niels_t *table, + const gf *zs, + gf *__restrict__ zis, + int n +) { + int i; + gf product; + cryptonite_gf_batch_invert(zis, zs, n); + + for (i=0; ia, zis[i]); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(product); + cryptonite_gf_copy(table[i]->a, product); + + cryptonite_gf_mul(product, table[i]->b, zis[i]); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(product); + cryptonite_gf_copy(table[i]->b, product); + + cryptonite_gf_mul(product, table[i]->c, zis[i]); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(product); + cryptonite_gf_copy(table[i]->c, product); + } + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(product,sizeof(product)); +} + +void API_NS(precompute) ( + precomputed_s *table, + const point_t base +) { + const unsigned int n = COMBS_N, t = COMBS_T, s = COMBS_S; + assert(n*t*s >= SCALAR_BITS); + + point_t working, start, doubles[t-1]; + API_NS(point_copy)(working, base); + pniels_t pn_tmp; + + gf zs[n<<(t-1)], zis[n<<(t-1)]; + + unsigned int i,j,k; + + /* Compute n tables */ + for (i=0; i>1); + int idx = (((i+1)<<(t-1))-1) ^ gray; + + pt_to_pniels(pn_tmp, start); + memcpy(table->table[idx], pn_tmp->n, sizeof(pn_tmp->n)); + cryptonite_gf_copy(zs[idx], pn_tmp->z); + + if (j >= (1u<<(t-1)) - 1) break; + int delta = (j+1) ^ ((j+1)>>1) ^ gray; + + for (k=0; delta>1; k++) + delta >>=1; + + if (gray & (1<table,(const gf *)zs,zis,n<<(t-1)); + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(zs,sizeof(zs)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(zis,sizeof(zis)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(pn_tmp,sizeof(pn_tmp)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(working,sizeof(working)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(start,sizeof(start)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(doubles,sizeof(doubles)); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void +constant_time_lookup_niels ( + niels_s *__restrict__ ni, + const niels_t *table, + int nelts, + int idx +) { + constant_time_lookup(ni, table, sizeof(niels_s), nelts, idx); +} + +void API_NS(precomputed_scalarmul) ( + point_t out, + const precomputed_s *table, + const scalar_t scalar +) { + int i; + unsigned j,k; + const unsigned int n = COMBS_N, t = COMBS_T, s = COMBS_S; + + scalar_t scalar1x; + API_NS(scalar_add)(scalar1x, scalar, precomputed_scalarmul_adjustment); + API_NS(scalar_halve)(scalar1x,scalar1x); + + niels_t ni; + + for (i=s-1; i>=0; i--) { + if (i != (int)s-1) point_double_internal(out,out,0); + + for (j=0; jlimb[bit/WBITS] >> (bit%WBITS) & 1) << k; + } + } + + mask_t invert = (tab>>(t-1))-1; + tab ^= invert; + tab &= (1<<(t-1)) - 1; + + constant_time_lookup_niels(ni, &table->table[j<<(t-1)], 1<<(t-1), tab); + + cond_neg_niels(ni, invert); + if ((i!=(int)s-1)||j) { + add_niels_to_pt(out, ni, j==n-1 && i); + } else { + niels_to_pt(out, ni); + } + } + } + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(ni,sizeof(ni)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar1x,sizeof(scalar1x)); +} + +void API_NS(point_cond_sel) ( + point_t out, + const point_t a, + const point_t b, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t pick_b +) { + constant_time_select(out,a,b,sizeof(point_t),bool_to_mask(pick_b),0); +} + +/* FUTURE: restore Curve25519 Montgomery ladder? */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t API_NS(direct_scalarmul) ( + uint8_t scaled[SER_BYTES], + const uint8_t base[SER_BYTES], + const scalar_t scalar, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t allow_identity, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t short_circuit +) { + point_t basep; + cryptonite_decaf_error_t succ = API_NS(point_decode)(basep, base, allow_identity); + if (short_circuit && succ != CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS) return succ; + API_NS(point_cond_sel)(basep, API_NS(point_base), basep, succ); + API_NS(point_scalarmul)(basep, basep, scalar); + API_NS(point_encode)(scaled, basep); + API_NS(point_destroy)(basep); + return succ; +} + +void API_NS(point_mul_by_cofactor_and_encode_like_eddsa) ( + uint8_t enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const point_t p +) { + + /* The point is now on the twisted curve. Move it to untwisted. */ + gf x, y, z, t; + point_t q; +#if COFACTOR == 8 + API_NS(point_double)(q,p); +#else + API_NS(point_copy)(q,p); +#endif + +#if EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY + { + /* Use 4-isogeny like ed25519: + * 2*x*y*sqrt(d/a-1)/(ax^2 + y^2 - 2) + * (y^2 - ax^2)/(y^2 + ax^2) + * with a = -1, d = -EDWARDS_D: + * -2xysqrt(EDWARDS_D-1)/(2z^2-y^2+x^2) + * (y^2+x^2)/(y^2-x^2) + */ + gf u; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( x, q->x ); // x^2 + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( t, q->y ); // y^2 + cryptonite_gf_add( u, x, t ); // x^2 + y^2 + cryptonite_gf_add( z, q->y, q->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( y, z); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( y, u, y ); // -2xy + cryptonite_gf_sub ( z, t, x ); // y^2 - x^2 + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( x, q->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( t, x, x); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( t, t, z); // 2z^2 - y^2 + x^2 + cryptonite_gf_mul ( x, y, z ); // 2xy(y^2-x^2) + cryptonite_gf_mul ( y, u, t ); // (x^2+y^2)(2z^2-y^2+x^2) + cryptonite_gf_mul ( u, z, t ); + cryptonite_gf_copy( z, u ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( u, x, SQRT_ONE_MINUS_D ); + cryptonite_gf_copy( x, u ); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(u,sizeof(u)); + } +#elif IMAGINE_TWIST + { + API_NS(point_double)(q,q); + API_NS(point_double)(q,q); + cryptonite_gf_mul_qnr(x, q->x); + cryptonite_gf_copy(y, q->y); + cryptonite_gf_copy(z, q->z); + } +#else + { + /* 4-isogeny: 2xy/(y^+x^2), (y^2-x^2)/(2z^2-y^2+x^2) */ + gf u; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( x, q->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( t, q->y ); + cryptonite_gf_add( u, x, t ); + cryptonite_gf_add( z, q->y, q->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( y, z); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( y, u, y ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( z, t, x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( x, q->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( t, x, x); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( t, t, z); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( x, t, y ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( y, z, u ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( z, u, t ); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(u,sizeof(u)); + } +#endif + /* Affinize */ + cryptonite_gf_invert(z,z,1); + cryptonite_gf_mul(t,x,z); + cryptonite_gf_mul(x,y,z); + + /* Encode */ + enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] = 0; + cryptonite_gf_serialize(enc, x, 1); + enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] |= 0x80 & cryptonite_gf_lobit(t); + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(x,sizeof(x)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(y,sizeof(y)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(z,sizeof(z)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(t,sizeof(t)); + API_NS(point_destroy)(q); +} + + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t API_NS(point_decode_like_eddsa_and_ignore_cofactor) ( + point_t p, + const uint8_t enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] +) { + uint8_t enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES]; + memcpy(enc2,enc,sizeof(enc2)); + + mask_t low = ~word_is_zero(enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] & 0x80); + enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] &= ~0x80; + + mask_t succ = cryptonite_gf_deserialize(p->y, enc2, 1); +#if 0 == 0 + succ &= word_is_zero(enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES-1]); +#endif + + cryptonite_gf_sqr(p->x,p->y); + cryptonite_gf_sub(p->z,ONE,p->x); /* num = 1-y^2 */ + #if EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY + cryptonite_gf_mulw(p->t,p->z,EDWARDS_D); /* d-dy^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mulw(p->x,p->z,EDWARDS_D-1); /* num = (1-y^2)(d-1) */ + cryptonite_gf_copy(p->z,p->x); + #else + cryptonite_gf_mulw(p->t,p->x,EDWARDS_D); /* dy^2 */ + #endif + cryptonite_gf_sub(p->t,ONE,p->t); /* denom = 1-dy^2 or 1-d + dy^2 */ + + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->x,p->z,p->t); + succ &= cryptonite_gf_isr(p->t,p->x); /* 1/sqrt(num * denom) */ + + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->x,p->t,p->z); /* sqrt(num / denom) */ + cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(p->x,~cryptonite_gf_lobit(p->x)^low); + cryptonite_gf_copy(p->z,ONE); + + #if EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY + { + /* Use 4-isogeny like ed25519: + * 2*x*y/sqrt(1-d/a)/(ax^2 + y^2 - 2) + * (y^2 - ax^2)/(y^2 + ax^2) + * (MAGIC: above formula may be off by a factor of -a + * or something somewhere; check it for other a) + * + * with a = -1, d = -EDWARDS_D: + * -2xy/sqrt(1-EDWARDS_D)/(2z^2-y^2+x^2) + * (y^2+x^2)/(y^2-x^2) + */ + gf a, b, c, d; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( c, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( a, p->y ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( d, c, a ); // x^2 + y^2 + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->t, p->y, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, p->t ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( b, b, d ); // 2xy + cryptonite_gf_sub ( p->t, a, c ); // y^2 - x^2 + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( p->x, p->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->z, p->x, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( a, p->z, p->t ); // 2z^2 - y^2 + x^2 + cryptonite_gf_mul ( c, a, SQRT_ONE_MINUS_D ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->x, b, p->t); // (2xy)(y^2-x^2) + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->z, p->t, c ); // (y^2-x^2)sd(2z^2 - y^2 + x^2) + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, d, c ); // (y^2+x^2)sd(2z^2 - y^2 + x^2) + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, d, b ); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(a,sizeof(a)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(b,sizeof(b)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(c,sizeof(c)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(d,sizeof(d)); + } + #elif IMAGINE_TWIST + { + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->t,p->x,SQRT_MINUS_ONE); + cryptonite_gf_copy(p->x,p->t); + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->t,p->x,p->y); + } + #else + { + /* 4-isogeny 2xy/(y^2-ax^2), (y^2+ax^2)/(2-y^2-ax^2) */ + gf a, b, c, d; + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( c, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( a, p->y ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( d, c, a ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->t, p->y, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( b, p->t ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( b, b, d ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( p->t, a, c ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr ( p->x, p->z ); + cryptonite_gf_add ( p->z, p->x, p->x ); + cryptonite_gf_sub ( a, p->z, d ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->x, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->z, p->t, a ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->y, p->t, d ); + cryptonite_gf_mul ( p->t, b, d ); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(a,sizeof(a)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(b,sizeof(b)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(c,sizeof(c)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(d,sizeof(d)); + } + #endif + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(enc2,sizeof(enc2)); + assert(API_NS(point_valid)(p) || ~succ); + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(mask_to_bool(succ)); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_x448 ( + uint8_t out[X_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t base[X_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[X_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + gf x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, t1, t2; + ignore_result(cryptonite_gf_deserialize(x1,base,1)); + cryptonite_gf_copy(x2,ONE); + cryptonite_gf_copy(z2,ZERO); + cryptonite_gf_copy(x3,x1); + cryptonite_gf_copy(z3,ONE); + + int t; + mask_t swap = 0; + + for (t = X_PRIVATE_BITS-1; t>=0; t--) { + uint8_t sb = scalar[t/8]; + + /* Scalar conditioning */ + if (t/8==0) sb &= -(uint8_t)COFACTOR; + else if (t == X_PRIVATE_BITS-1) sb = -1; + + mask_t k_t = (sb>>(t%8)) & 1; + k_t = -k_t; /* set to all 0s or all 1s */ + + swap ^= k_t; + cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(x2,x3,swap); + cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(z2,z3,swap); + swap = k_t; + + cryptonite_gf_add_nr(t1,x2,z2); /* A = x2 + z2 */ /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr(t2,x2,z2); /* B = x2 - z2 */ /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr(z2,x3,z3); /* D = x3 - z3 */ /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(x2,t1,z2); /* DA */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr(z2,z3,x3); /* C = x3 + z3 */ /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(x3,t2,z2); /* CB */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr(z3,x2,x3); /* DA-CB */ /* 3+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr(z2,z3); /* (DA-CB)^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(z3,x1,z2); /* z3 = x1(DA-CB)^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr(z2,x2,x3); /* (DA+CB) */ /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr(x3,z2); /* x3 = (DA+CB)^2 */ + + cryptonite_gf_sqr(z2,t1); /* AA = A^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr(t1,t2); /* BB = B^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(x2,z2,t1); /* x2 = AA*BB */ + cryptonite_gf_sub_nr(t2,z2,t1); /* E = AA-BB */ /* 3+e */ + + cryptonite_gf_mulw(t1,t2,-EDWARDS_D); /* E*-d = a24*E */ + cryptonite_gf_add_nr(t1,t1,z2); /* AA + a24*E */ /* 2+e */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(z2,t2,t1); /* z2 = E(AA+a24*E) */ + } + + /* Finish */ + cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(x2,x3,swap); + cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(z2,z3,swap); + cryptonite_gf_invert(z2,z2,0); + cryptonite_gf_mul(x1,x2,z2); + cryptonite_gf_serialize(out,x1,1); + mask_t nz = ~cryptonite_gf_eq(x1,ZERO); + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(x1,sizeof(x1)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(x2,sizeof(x2)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(z2,sizeof(z2)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(x3,sizeof(x3)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(z3,sizeof(z3)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(t1,sizeof(t1)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(t2,sizeof(t2)); + + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(mask_to_bool(nz)); +} + +/* Thanks Johan Pascal */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_convert_public_key_to_x448 ( + uint8_t x[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t ed[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] +) { + gf y; + { + uint8_t enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES]; + memcpy(enc2,ed,sizeof(enc2)); + + /* retrieve y from the ed compressed point */ + enc2[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES-1] &= ~0x80; + ignore_result(cryptonite_gf_deserialize(y, enc2, 0)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(enc2,sizeof(enc2)); + } + + { + gf n,d; + +#if EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY + /* u = (1+y)/(1-y)*/ + cryptonite_gf_add(n, y, ONE); /* n = y+1 */ + cryptonite_gf_sub(d, ONE, y); /* d = 1-y */ + cryptonite_gf_invert(d, d, 0); /* d = 1/(1-y) */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(y, n, d); /* u = (y+1)/(1-y) */ + cryptonite_gf_serialize(x,y,1); +#else /* EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY */ + /* u = y^2 * (1-dy^2) / (1-y^2) */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr(n,y); /* y^2*/ + cryptonite_gf_sub(d,ONE,n); /* 1-y^2*/ + cryptonite_gf_invert(d,d,0); /* 1/(1-y^2)*/ + cryptonite_gf_mul(y,n,d); /* y^2 / (1-y^2) */ + cryptonite_gf_mulw(d,n,EDWARDS_D); /* dy^2*/ + cryptonite_gf_sub(d, ONE, d); /* 1-dy^2*/ + cryptonite_gf_mul(n, y, d); /* y^2 * (1-dy^2) / (1-y^2) */ + cryptonite_gf_serialize(x,n,1); +#endif /* EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY */ + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(y,sizeof(y)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(n,sizeof(n)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(d,sizeof(d)); + } +} + +void cryptonite_decaf_x448_generate_key ( + uint8_t out[X_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[X_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key(out,scalar); +} + +void cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key ( + uint8_t out[X_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[X_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + /* Scalar conditioning */ + uint8_t scalar2[X_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + memcpy(scalar2,scalar,sizeof(scalar2)); + scalar2[0] &= -(uint8_t)COFACTOR; + + scalar2[X_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] &= ~(-1u<<((X_PRIVATE_BITS+7)%8)); + scalar2[X_PRIVATE_BYTES-1] |= 1<<((X_PRIVATE_BITS+7)%8); + + scalar_t the_scalar; + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(the_scalar,scalar2,sizeof(scalar2)); + + /* We're gonna isogenize by 2, so divide by 2. + * + * Why by 2, even though it's a 4-isogeny? + * + * The isogeny map looks like + * Montgomery <-2-> Jacobi <-2-> Edwards + * + * Since the Jacobi base point is the PREimage of the iso to + * the Montgomery curve, and we're going + * Jacobi -> Edwards -> Jacobi -> Montgomery, + * we pick up only a factor of 2 over Jacobi -> Montgomery. + */ + API_NS(scalar_halve)(the_scalar,the_scalar); + point_t p; + API_NS(precomputed_scalarmul)(p,API_NS(precomputed_base),the_scalar); + + /* Isogenize to Montgomery curve. + * + * Why isn't this just a separate function, eg cryptonite_decaf_encode_like_x448? + * Basically because in general it does the wrong thing if there is a cofactor + * component in the input. In this function though, there isn't a cofactor + * component in the input. + */ + cryptonite_gf_invert(p->t,p->x,0); /* 1/x */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(p->z,p->t,p->y); /* y/x */ + cryptonite_gf_sqr(p->y,p->z); /* (y/x)^2 */ +#if IMAGINE_TWIST + cryptonite_gf_sub(p->y,ZERO,p->y); +#endif + cryptonite_gf_serialize(out,p->y,1); + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar2,sizeof(scalar2)); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(the_scalar); + API_NS(point_destroy)(p); +} + +/** + * @cond internal + * Control for variable-time scalar multiply algorithms. + */ +struct smvt_control { + int power, addend; +}; + +static int recode_wnaf ( + struct smvt_control *control, /* [nbits/(table_bits+1) + 3] */ + const scalar_t scalar, + unsigned int table_bits +) { + unsigned int table_size = SCALAR_BITS/(table_bits+1) + 3; + int position = table_size - 1; /* at the end */ + + /* place the end marker */ + control[position].power = -1; + control[position].addend = 0; + position--; + + /* PERF: Could negate scalar if it's large. But then would need more cases + * in the actual code that uses it, all for an expected reduction of like 1/5 op. + * Probably not worth it. + */ + + uint64_t current = scalar->limb[0] & 0xFFFF; + uint32_t mask = (1<<(table_bits+1))-1; + + unsigned int w; + const unsigned int B_OVER_16 = sizeof(scalar->limb[0]) / 2; + for (w = 1; w<(SCALAR_BITS-1)/16+3; w++) { + if (w < (SCALAR_BITS-1)/16+1) { + /* Refill the 16 high bits of current */ + current += (uint32_t)((scalar->limb[w/B_OVER_16]>>(16*(w%B_OVER_16)))<<16); + } + + while (current & 0xFFFF) { + assert(position >= 0); + uint32_t pos = __builtin_ctz((uint32_t)current), odd = (uint32_t)current >> pos; + int32_t delta = odd & mask; + if (odd & 1<<(table_bits+1)) delta -= (1<<(table_bits+1)); + current -= delta << pos; + control[position].power = pos + 16*(w-1); + control[position].addend = delta; + position--; + } + current >>= 16; + } + assert(current==0); + + position++; + unsigned int n = table_size - position; + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; in, sizeof(niels_t)); + cryptonite_gf_copy(zs[i], tmp[i]->z); + } + batch_normalize_niels(out, (const gf *)zs, zis, 1< control_pre[0].power) { + pniels_to_pt(combo, precmp_var[control_var[0].addend >> 1]); + contv++; + } else if (i == control_pre[0].power && i >=0 ) { + pniels_to_pt(combo, precmp_var[control_var[0].addend >> 1]); + add_niels_to_pt(combo, API_NS(wnaf_base)[control_pre[0].addend >> 1], i); + contv++; contp++; + } else { + i = control_pre[0].power; + niels_to_pt(combo, API_NS(wnaf_base)[control_pre[0].addend >> 1]); + contp++; + } + + for (i--; i >= 0; i--) { + int cv = (i==control_var[contv].power), cp = (i==control_pre[contp].power); + point_double_internal(combo,combo,i && !(cv||cp)); + + if (cv) { + assert(control_var[contv].addend); + + if (control_var[contv].addend > 0) { + add_pniels_to_pt(combo, precmp_var[control_var[contv].addend >> 1], i&&!cp); + } else { + sub_pniels_from_pt(combo, precmp_var[(-control_var[contv].addend) >> 1], i&&!cp); + } + contv++; + } + + if (cp) { + assert(control_pre[contp].addend); + + if (control_pre[contp].addend > 0) { + add_niels_to_pt(combo, API_NS(wnaf_base)[control_pre[contp].addend >> 1], i); + } else { + sub_niels_from_pt(combo, API_NS(wnaf_base)[(-control_pre[contp].addend) >> 1], i); + } + contp++; + } + } + + /* This function is non-secret, but whatever this is cheap. */ + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(control_var,sizeof(control_var)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(control_pre,sizeof(control_pre)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(precmp_var,sizeof(precmp_var)); + + assert(contv == ncb_var); (void)ncb_var; + assert(contp == ncb_pre); (void)ncb_pre; +} + +void API_NS(point_destroy) ( + point_t point +) { + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(point, sizeof(point_t)); +} + +void API_NS(precomputed_destroy) ( + precomputed_s *pre +) { + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(pre, API_NS(sizeof_precomputed_s)); +} diff --git a/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_all.c b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_all.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_all.c @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +/* Combined to avoid link failure on OpenBSD with --strip-unneeded, see #186 */ +#include "decaf.c" +#include "decaf_tables.c" diff --git a/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_tables.c b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_tables.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_tables.c @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +/** @warning: this file was automatically generated. */ +#include "field.h" + +#include + +#define API_NS(_id) cryptonite_decaf_448_##_id +const API_NS(point_t) API_NS(point_base) = {{ +{FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fffffffffffffe,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x0000000000000003,0x0000000000000000,0x0000000000000000,0x0000000000000000)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0081e6d37f752992,0x003078ead1c28721,0x00135cfd2394666c,0x0041149c50506061,0x0031d30e4f5490b3,0x00902014990dc141,0x0052341b04c1e328,0x0014237853c10a1b)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fffffffffffffb,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00fffffffffffffe,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff,0x00ffffffffffffff)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008f205b70660415,0x00881c60cfd3824f,0x00377a638d08500d,0x008c66d5d4672615,0x00e52fa558e08e13,0x0087770ae1b6983d,0x004388f55a0aa7ff,0x00b4d9a785cf1a91)} +}}; +const gf API_NS(precomputed_base_as_fe)[240] +VECTOR_ALIGNED = { + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e614a9f7278dc5,0x002e454ad04c5124,0x00d8f58cee1436f3,0x00c83ed46e4180ec,0x00a41e93274a38fa,0x00c1e7e53257771e,0x0043e0ff03c0392f,0x002c7c6405ce61df)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0033c4f9dc990b33,0x00c291cb1ceb55c3,0x002ae3f58ade88b2,0x006b1f9f11395474,0x002ded6e4b27ff7c,0x0041012ed4aa10e1,0x003c22d20a36bae7,0x001f584eed472b19)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c3514779ee6f60,0x001574c873b20c2b,0x004cd6a46a5a5e65,0x0059a068aeb4204a,0x004c610458bc354d,0x00e94567479d02d2,0x00feaf77ed118e28,0x00f58a8bf115eeb5)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0046110878fcb20f,0x00df43db21cc6f32,0x00ffdde9f4516644,0x00519917791686b9,0x00b72b441fd34473,0x008d45684cb1c72b,0x0015181370fc17a5,0x00a456d1307f74d3)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001430f149b607dc,0x00e992ccd16715fc,0x00a62209b0a32a09,0x00b889cedc26b8e4,0x0059bf9a3ac109cf,0x006871bb3b7feac2,0x00f4a4d5fd9a0e6b,0x00b95db460cd69a5)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0036304418bda702,0x007bc56861561558,0x00f344bc8e30416f,0x00a64537080f59d7,0x00b4c20077d00ace,0x00ee79620b26f8cc,0x00a6a558e0b5403d,0x008f1d2c766f3d19)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ef21c0297d3112,0x0073f89bd27c35b1,0x00ec44f9b1ff5e33,0x006bee51d878f1ee,0x001571a4b2aceddb,0x00cd0182d55131d1,0x0026761dbc1844be,0x00f01865af716474)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0021dfef3f5fe8cc,0x0038c659ed1dbd68,0x0058ded9bcebe283,0x00077bbb094983ee,0x00b7b484e913d70c,0x0063e477a9506397,0x0000b996a6e01629,0x00ab68b41f75cd37)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00a1fbd946403a4e,0x00be5a4e2d611b05,0x00ea4f210888bc6e,0x0043e9b0e0ae50fe,0x002abc4f6bd86845,0x00c3ed649c67f663,0x00d4eeb391a520e7,0x004b19cf1bfe7584)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0099a75e6f22999e,0x001f16454c79f659,0x00d776a37fddc812,0x0095fdd63b6b0a78,0x00d232169366e947,0x002ea77dd21e9de7,0x00e8c46e85f97a90,0x00358758651f8cd9)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x002b6f5036a07bdf,0x004f6940af3e2646,0x00866028f8986799,0x00838b26ccb50415,0x0010557417f00b11,0x008a3b6bc447e96b,0x003de3d035e9e0c9,0x00188fca2b6d4011)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001ca4038635312b,0x0078dc75c1e01c44,0x004340f00b3100a4,0x005e63e36bf6646e,0x008e1efd4b624688,0x00a61c2ffb1525e1,0x0072587505a75b81,0x00a8637140d96e78)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x004a7c41ffac8a41,0x005bf37075b1c20b,0x00c053b570a42408,0x002bb7e278d328e7,0x00b2378b63245100,0x003318bf2a1a368a,0x00f4e3e0bdbe02de,0x0058921e4b1e32f8)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x005e93d6fa1118a0,0x0062b43515d381e2,0x002c42864052e620,0x00af258bae6ccbd3,0x00954247094d654d,0x005db01f5b010810,0x009c8cf25efa8204,0x005f73ced3714ef7)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0085f89aff2cf49d,0x00f591ee8480f6f0,0x00378ed518114265,0x00f04293e2a09008,0x00c58688db9140ed,0x00e9912696399ff1,0x0055bd1b96367413,0x0023a70cf830f999)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001c83772944584e,0x00c1ba881e472bcc,0x00af2715a0aef13f,0x00bd0360d25610a6,0x00c42f8b3eebebde,0x00a9e474849788b1,0x00dcd1a1a2efec5c,0x009480d34c2818c0)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b4b6e09a565d74,0x0095efcf6175aa48,0x00498defe7ae7810,0x00309b684ed26470,0x007a8873a91d4e44,0x00ea4b3f857eb27a,0x00979b8619d25a9e,0x00721a2770eeb6e9)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b422f0f4be195f,0x00e88cfa83bfa2db,0x009fd60666ea4268,0x0095a458f5e801d0,0x00b9eee6882081f6,0x00b27edb37604948,0x00a7f67c4d44d8db,0x00df840ccf290c01)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c9fed0d47c9103,0x00ba73ed9294a043,0x005cbbc928e652e1,0x0068419e98ee8215,0x00f63de63786300b,0x009aa9bb6c19f8aa,0x0066c536b573213f,0x00d2b77a5b2f2450)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00810236c68d5b74,0x00d0a1af1872a011,0x007f23ee29e3801a,0x009a55a678f8dba4,0x0065445dcff9be40,0x00f3978789a9abc5,0x00001f010d23f5e8,0x00ff80042934b0c5)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00a6749f4b3f9745,0x003ab85f4180e502,0x006a7de9b530ed50,0x0050b5353b0441bf,0x00a093583ac6ede4,0x00c4918ad1406299,0x000f75cf2a353a2b,0x001c6644a0683a56)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e8694156c09bfe,0x00f6f3a5bd17ad96,0x0098dbed45edad12,0x00edfe2b84921821,0x0097884330199b67,0x004aab02685b3e9e,0x0068ac0bd2453c30,0x00167c1c1c87d8f5)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008bba5fbf63f599,0x0059a3c960c7d63f,0x00ce2db75b08b7d9,0x0097e80cb2104171,0x009b68be26a140d0,0x002b9b9954e94c68,0x00023ca8fc411beb,0x00cbc4bcccbada07)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0053c100e77b678d,0x000f115c400fa96f,0x005928d3de22afa2,0x00e47cd9bdbdbe96,0x00597ecfe84abf19,0x0058bb428e4c7a32,0x00dd582f76ecf584,0x00b1211365eccb79)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00dbfb9a00a58e68,0x004468189350d82f,0x00b4b12407ee92c6,0x00e27a7908f73455,0x00f071170071b5ae,0x00221a5e6ba229dd,0x001903e3f6a81f83,0x00be36325402775f)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x004d298d6e691756,0x00775644dfce310b,0x00a861887823ea98,0x00cf0b6014fa6e6f,0x005f4e296380826f,0x00bf423392627f90,0x002893bfc8122f6a,0x00440dbc89bea228)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00acbb4f40a4ab73,0x00d6a82f48fa3366,0x000a7958fc6faac2,0x008a4cdd60a7c33c,0x005e5587dd8b6f1a,0x00e40f63086a88e8,0x0030940cbbcda0ad,0x009a42e3dc35c130)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00d37716cad825f1,0x00883870cba9552a,0x008ef785f5c762e3,0x006cb253e0469242,0x007b8f17fee9d967,0x00a43de6932b52b6,0x001aca9fe2af783c,0x008967778ff0b680)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x006400c4cdc6c9c3,0x001e8c978691083f,0x00ad74f01f68e0c5,0x00f7feb0372b5f6a,0x002f60d175ade13a,0x0098ec54a221a678,0x00fcfea8a71f244e,0x00dea6660e45ded2)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x002585b4aa8d6752,0x00e62da7615a2089,0x0010c1c741f39b68,0x00569bb1eced9f65,0x00ba6d09e4daa724,0x007d3e20aef281b9,0x00bd7f65aca3ffdc,0x00dea434a50288a8)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x007ba92a2489170f,0x00cd356354d31e9c,0x00a60d47406e5430,0x009c3d5fde8ed877,0x00079eaa50dd08d1,0x0024674d593ffa5f,0x005391be9596c53b,0x00856ca8d50acdd9)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00d4620aa5e5bdec,0x002303c4b9b5d941,0x003b061f857ebb2a,0x00371f9e856d49fd,0x0071c36c5335051e,0x0040e4346a4d359f,0x00b31dbd959ec40c,0x00d99353a71bf6de)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0078898adf0f21dd,0x006e09bfedd8604a,0x00efaf0e0f9bb666,0x00b0f685db8852c3,0x0094c86ec566b841,0x00e5c2879ba50dbe,0x00a87cd444cff758,0x00d3e26fd47f23df)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b82c07fb1854f8,0x0057f654a06fad9f,0x004c00383250cf92,0x008b91713d291af6,0x002f2521777859b9,0x00533111421f22c8,0x00643da86fab9794,0x00dc7fb0680e3d40)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e59ffd40e87788,0x006431e9755a50af,0x00a03ce700fb580a,0x00ad7e70aa3c9b9e,0x0078970a2b4db503,0x00c800451849637a,0x00e7e6a5b49e123f,0x00e1ed15f77bcb4d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00bc1d1d1af47f28,0x00ebc5501bbd81f0,0x00aa6b5513547aa4,0x0074ed33551343fe,0x00d2114f6ef7d43b,0x006335b41d518aeb,0x00ebd46919692fb8,0x0052d5d4e3fada95)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ebfc9f489799a4,0x00497535b6980688,0x00fef76499e6a51b,0x00018eedde7a18da,0x00f435d9e72b69c7,0x005ab0faa8281675,0x003232d06e290be8,0x005473ec8be0286c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c6eb0d0ebb4874,0x00856a2274119097,0x00380bc7b29e3719,0x00b1ae149f0e424d,0x0009b41855b9de26,0x0098684013d0f53f,0x0082e8554c38a6ff,0x00e76c18c353743a)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008da1194e1ab61f,0x008edb5f89688805,0x00f4970252f851bd,0x007a46f632b6ad20,0x006d2d1c37e9f90a,0x0060dd09353f665f,0x000a625a80d86657,0x000f93f6fedd0888)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003b019b31992fb4,0x004f6a2ad1f64c28,0x008a744134e5c571,0x000ca33172f9af3f,0x00d478755a67bb8b,0x009d1f5c48abb223,0x004da4d6f12ee901,0x0084f09541f4140d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0031f412f5cacd43,0x00e5afb75dd20e94,0x001ce24b3452740e,0x00176d6dedf30ff1,0x0082e22e564fffca,0x001d56fbe007097f,0x0095b37c851a6918,0x008ec50ef97f8f4c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x007e2b1c52251f57,0x00cbef37c9380033,0x0037ed652761bceb,0x00f1c2a5dc6dd232,0x0026e1b90d63ce0b,0x00938d732173a6b8,0x00d439aa45da993f,0x00d356b8deaccef7)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ed32377f56c67d,0x00c3b6a4de32e4a7,0x00481a36c0dd5d91,0x00bb557d20466ba7,0x00645f6d3200163e,0x005eb4c54df7c48c,0x00fd8e3d08f1e3b4,0x001156353f099147)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ae1b4c089b2756,0x00e686d2b916fb5f,0x007ac43ec2437dd8,0x00f7bfdf7e860ed2,0x0097dbcb8b786dc9,0x00ec7a90401c8b2f,0x00425ed017989bdb,0x00444bc9ca6d914d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e5e7b83b53ab7f,0x004e4bed6ca44fc5,0x0008bd7a67c40d4d,0x009dbec74a4a2f0e,0x0077df3f4fc2c73f,0x0046b1af5e73ea8d,0x009f096cb7be8670,0x003ad0a29929141d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00991a1222e9b2e1,0x00be7583901d7dc7,0x00fd1d0c8169d3da,0x000fe0a94a68acf9,0x00b77bd05afc78a2,0x00a84f1697f87ebc,0x000097cfdb0c2ecb,0x007d51d70352ed1b)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0025dc2a60643159,0x001f0d8ff85f95b4,0x00ed74a4bc598a73,0x00f30afe6f0574a9,0x0003788545d4d28c,0x009dc410ad120ac0,0x001950947e69961d,0x001ceb23cb0355b0)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ee2202ded9f1bd,0x002fa4fce658976d,0x00e7c15bc9716470,0x004f7ea99d500369,0x004b995a18318376,0x00246c4f8af91911,0x00cc77a07d09dbfe,0x007906f6f1364be6)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003c97e6384da36e,0x00423d53eac81a09,0x00b70d68f3cdce35,0x00ee7959b354b92c,0x00f4e9718819c8ca,0x009349f12acbffe9,0x005aee7b62cb7da6,0x00d97764154ffc86)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00d95d1c5fcb435a,0x0016d1ed6b5086f9,0x00792aa0b7e54d71,0x0067b65715f1925d,0x00a219755ec6176b,0x00bc3f026b12c28f,0x00700c897ffeb93e,0x0089b83f6ec50b46)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ad9cdb4544b923,0x00d11664c7284061,0x00815ae86b8f910b,0x005414fb2591c3c6,0x0094ba83e2d7ef9e,0x0001dbc16599386c,0x00c8721f0493911b,0x00c1be6b463c346c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0079680ce111ed3b,0x001a1ed82806122c,0x000c2e7466d15df3,0x002c407f6f7150fd,0x00c5e7c96b1b0ce3,0x009aa44626863ff9,0x00887b8b5b80be42,0x00b6023cec964825)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fed3cd80ca2292,0x0015b043a73ca613,0x000a9fd7bf9be227,0x003b5e03de2db983,0x005af72d46904ef7,0x00c0f1b5c49faa99,0x00dc86fc3bd305e1,0x00c92f08c1cb1797)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001b571efb768f37,0x009d778487cf5cfd,0x00430e37327ebfd4,0x00a92447e5970a41,0x00eb13127c0edbac,0x00ec61e5aefeaf20,0x00447eebf57d2e5c,0x00f01433e550e558)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0039dd7ce7fc6860,0x00d64f6425653da1,0x003e037c7f57d0af,0x0063477a06e2bcf2,0x001727dbb7ac67e6,0x0049589f5efafe2e,0x00fc0fef2e813d54,0x008baa5d087fb50d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00a7527958238159,0x0013ec9537a84cd6,0x001d7fee7d562525,0x00b9eefa6191d5e5,0x00dbc97db70bcb8a,0x00481affc7a4d395,0x006f73d3e70c31bb,0x00183f324ed96a61)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00db04a6264ba838,0x00582b1f9fddc1b3,0x003ee72e4aaa027f,0x007d1de938cd0dd5,0x0032d5d66cf76afa,0x00c9c717c95c1ec2,0x00f27aa11764b8d6,0x00713a482b7ef36e)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ece96f95f2b66f,0x00ece7952813a27b,0x0026fc36592e489e,0x007157d1a2de0f66,0x00759dc111d86ddf,0x0012881e5780bb0f,0x00c8ccc83ad29496,0x0012b9bd1929eb71)}, + 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{FIELD_LITERAL(0x0051207abd179101,0x00fc2a5c20d9c5da,0x00fb9d5f2701b6df,0x002dd040fdea82b8,0x00f163b0738442ff,0x00d9736bd68855b8,0x00e0d8e93005e61c,0x00df5a40b3988570)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ee563d6f53acc9,0x00d465d2b5959acc,0x006575973bba26c8,0x00c9e4d84f81a1a3,0x00c3fbc4e8aa468a,0x0048149930eeaa11,0x008850a6f611000d,0x006709f6788337f9)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b373076597455f,0x00e83f1af53ac0f5,0x0041f63c01dc6840,0x0097dea19b0c6f4b,0x007f9d63b4c1572c,0x00e692d492d0f5f0,0x00cbcb392e83b4ad,0x0069c0f39ed9b1a8)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ab13af436bf8f4,0x000bcf0a0dac8574,0x00d50c864f705045,0x00c40e611debc842,0x0085010489bd5caa,0x007c5050acec026f,0x00f67d943c8da6d1,0x00de1da0278074c6)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0079efcffed8f836,0x00604423802b5504,0x0070a6e294aab7dd,0x0020f75be15e7521,0x0062827c19bd5414,0x006738e425c48700,0x00dd37618fde0ffa,0x00bb2d65c01e1c3b)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c903ee6d825540,0x00add6c4cf98473e,0x007636efed4227f1,0x00905124ae55e772,0x00e6b38fab12ed53,0x0045e132b863fe55,0x003974662edb366a,0x00b1787052be8208)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e748cd7b5c52f2,0x00ea9df883f89cc3,0x0018970df156b6c7,0x00c5a46c2a33a847,0x00cbde395e32aa09,0x0072474ebb423140,0x00fb00053086a23d,0x001dafcfe22d4e1f)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0059eb4ff288a383,0x00283876be3388ab,0x00bdd22974a2543b,0x0059eef0fe982d74,0x0097a5cf63dad778,0x004bc6002aebc99f,0x00c9a91d6118c690,0x0038364612a527ab)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00006e34a35d9fbc,0x00eee4e48b2f019a,0x006b344743003a5f,0x00541d514f04a7e3,0x00e81f9ee7647455,0x005e2b916c438f81,0x00116f8137b7eff0,0x009bd3decc7039d1)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0040f7e7c5b37bf2,0x0064e4dc81181bba,0x00a8767ae2a366b6,0x001496b4f90546f2,0x002a28493f860441,0x0021f59513049a3a,0x00852d369a8b7ee3,0x00dd2e7d8b7d30a9)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fa2dd90bcbeef2,0x00507d774710de2a,0x00b585ad10e7e373,0x0041f487e4b4f921,0x00191c9d8212f81d,0x001bc55cbdd8d474,0x0017954bdba8827b,0x0004d6d3a991ca44)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e38abece3c82ab,0x005a51f18a2c7a86,0x009dafa2e86d592e,0x00495a62eb688678,0x00b79df74c0eb212,0x0023e8cc78b75982,0x005998cb91075e13,0x00735aa9ba61bc76)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00334f5303ea1222,0x00dfb3dbeb0a5d3e,0x002940d9592335c1,0x00706a7a63e8938a,0x005a533558bc4caf,0x00558e33192022a9,0x00970d9faf74c133,0x002979fcb63493ca)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00260857d22419d7,0x005e0387d77651f0,0x008e0025ed2eb499,0x00c830b135804c2a,0x0037f43dbd3a77f6,0x008a4073d2f7379c,0x0072be0ce503ad58,0x00e6869d130c78be)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00bfc5fa1e4ea21f,0x00c21d7b6bb892e6,0x00cf043f3acf0291,0x00c13f2f849b3c90,0x00d1a97ebef10891,0x0061e130a445e7fe,0x0019513fdedbf22b,0x001d60c813bff841)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x006e9f475cccf2ee,0x00454b9cd506430c,0x00224a4fb79ee479,0x0062e3347ef0b5e2,0x0034fd2a3512232a,0x00b8b3cb0f457046,0x00eb20165daa38ec,0x00128eebc2d9c0f7)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e6a9e38030fdec,0x001c23597bc14288,0x0097156a46356df1,0x00642048f0daca6a,0x003970a6e7955fd4,0x00a511e335e3cfc6,0x0054865756c85e31,0x00465f1ab66a6190)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003e4964fa8a8fc8,0x00f6a1cdbcf41689,0x00943cb18fe7fda7,0x00606dafbf34440a,0x005d37a86399c789,0x00e79a2a69417403,0x00fe34f7e68b8866,0x0011f448ed2df10e)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c79e0b6d97dfbd,0x00917c71fd2bc6e8,0x00db7529ccfb63d8,0x00be5be957f17866,0x00a9e11fdc2cdac1,0x007b91a8e1f44443,0x00a3065e4057d80f,0x004825f5b8d5f6d4)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x000e0a81033e033b,0x00aec986ee821eab,0x00d1a4a48379273c,0x00609b79a9e06304,0x00e9618b4fe8f307,0x006ffdfa50b50969,0x009530224887ac0c,0x0020e7b36f0cef97)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fd579ffb691713,0x00b76af4f81c412d,0x00f239de96110f82,0x00e965fb437f0306,0x00ca7e9436900921,0x00e487f1325fa24a,0x00633907de476380,0x00721c62ac5b8ea0)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b37396c3320791,0x00fc7b67175c5783,0x00c36d2cd73ecc38,0x0080ebcc0b328fc5,0x0043a5b22b35d35d,0x00466c9f1713c9da,0x0026ad346dcaa8da,0x007c684e701183a6)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003f2ab1abd14b06,0x00b129a8e8e37230,0x0048bc5b083d5c64,0x0002606c12933a98,0x00cf8051ceec1a73,0x00a755a8836c3ce6,0x002dabaa90ca4cb9,0x00b6e5525ddfc0f2)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c4a1fb48635413,0x00b5dd54423ad59f,0x009ff5d53fd24a88,0x003c98d267fc06a7,0x002db7cb20013641,0x00bd1d6716e191f2,0x006dbc8b29094241,0x0044bbf233dafa2c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00dff3103786ff34,0x000144553b1f20c3,0x0095613baeb930e4,0x00098058275ea5d4,0x007cd1402b046756,0x0074d74e4d58aee3,0x005f93fc343ff69b,0x00873df17296b3b0)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00aa7c72be0ace19,0x004095d22fc37e4d,0x00a7d85f9e3b7c61,0x00ff21d344c9553c,0x00d105d6268e8b86,0x000616d733758845,0x003ecb4ba7210610,0x006a75e7dddc03b7)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x007860d99db787cf,0x00fda8983018f4a8,0x008c8866bac4743c,0x00ef471f84c82a3f,0x00abea5976d3b8e7,0x00714882896cd015,0x00b49fae584ddac5,0x008e33a1a0b69c81)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x000a9ee23c06881f,0x002c727d3d871945,0x00f47d971512d24a,0x00671e816f9ef31a,0x00883af2cfaad673,0x00601f98583d6c9a,0x00b435f5adc79655,0x00ad87b71c04bff2)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0084911d36175613,0x00dbaa24427629dd,0x009b6f30b1554fc7,0x0026da093cf7ea9e,0x00eac4cfb8218c7c,0x00c4bde074231490,0x0089e5b5afb62587,0x0067fcb73adfdbcc)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00eebfd4e2312cc3,0x00474b2564e4fc8c,0x003303ef14b1da9b,0x003c93e0e66beb1d,0x0013619b0566925a,0x008817c24d901bf3,0x00b62bd8898d218b,0x0075a7716f1e88a2)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x007f8a43da97dd5c,0x00058539c800fc7b,0x0040f3cf5a28414a,0x00d68dd0d95283d6,0x004adce9da90146e,0x00befa41c7d4f908,0x007603bc2e3c3060,0x00bdf360ab3545db)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00f6de725e1976f0,0x00d96f80a02fda8a,0x00b25412a0e629fa,0x00c540e7e78fdb62,0x004ad02fb7336d3a,0x004922ae1bea5a3a,0x0026147d42d4bfeb,0x00d379a5bc4b94bc)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c338b915d8fef0,0x00a893292045c39a,0x0028ab4f2eba6887,0x0060743cb519fd61,0x0006213964093ac0,0x007c0b7a43f6266d,0x008e3557c4fa5bda,0x002da976de7b8d9d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0070047189452f4c,0x00f7ad12e1ce78d5,0x00af1ba51ec44a8b,0x005f39f63e667cd6,0x00058eac4648425e,0x00d7fdab42bea03b,0x0028576a5688de15,0x00af973209e77c10)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b78d6075749232,0x0001dc47a33b2cdc,0x0018c7b2e91b24f1,0x00b5bdc68f9876bd,0x0013f489ccba2b44,0x003b8846066128de,0x003d6252c8884dcf,0x00e3ae84b9908209)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00aa2261022d883f,0x00ebcca4548010ac,0x002528512e28a437,0x0070ca7676b66082,0x0084bda170f7c6d3,0x00581b4747c9b8bb,0x005c96a01061c7e2,0x00fb7c4a362b5273)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x006366c380f7b574,0x001c7d1f09ff0438,0x003e20a7301f5b22,0x00d3efb1916d28f6,0x0049f4f81060ce83,0x00c69d91ea43ced1,0x002b6f3e5cd269ed,0x005b0fb22ce9ec65)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003cffdf14aed2fd,0x009f0d77d7c5b2d9,0x004812ec41321d9f,0x008a1448bddf0916,0x008fef86030175df,0x00e3d703200a76c7,0x00d1babb470b2094,0x009f3a43b0e5828c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00a94700032a093f,0x0076e96c225216e7,0x00a63a4316e45f91,0x007d8bbb4645d3b2,0x00340a6ff22793eb,0x006f935d4572aeb7,0x00b1fb69f00afa28,0x009e8f3423161ed3)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ae307cf069f701,0x005859f222dd618b,0x00212d6c46ec0b0d,0x00a0fe4642afb62d,0x00420d8e4a0a8903,0x00a80ff639bdf7b0,0x0019bee1490b5d8e,0x007439e4b9c27a86)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00610b6394a312e8,0x005aaa19d96160f5,0x008190e286138c4a,0x006538796a5cd53b,0x00fe28804432a97c,0x007315e011f55112,0x000bd4157d5acb9d,0x00d1b95469350336)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0060db815bc4786c,0x006fab25beedc434,0x00c610d06084797c,0x000c48f08537bec0,0x0031aba51c5b93da,0x007968fa6e01f347,0x0030070da52840c6,0x00c043c225a4837f)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0051cfcc5885377a,0x00dce566cb1803ca,0x00430c7643f2c7d4,0x00dce1a1337bdcc0,0x0010d5bd7283c128,0x003b1b547f9b46fe,0x000f245e37e770ab,0x007b72511f022b37)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e4302ff9b6116c,0x0092314b81d5f02a,0x000d31425f30702f,0x004946262e04213c,0x007ead9d19b6f9ed,0x001080a31ce8989f,0x001b632f36672a74,0x00a03933d9645a83)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x004a2902926f8d3f,0x00ad79b42637ab75,0x0088f60b90f2d4e8,0x0030f54ef0e398c4,0x00021dc9bf99681e,0x007ebf66fde74ee3,0x004ade654386e9a4,0x00e7485066be4c27)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008940211aa0d633,0x00addae28136571d,0x00d68fdbba20d673,0x003bc6129bc9e21a,0x000346cf184ebe9a,0x0068774d741ebc7f,0x0019d5e9e6966557,0x0003cbd7f981b651)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00bba0ed9c67c41f,0x00b30c8e225ba195,0x008bb5762a5cef18,0x00e0df31b06fb7cc,0x0018b912141991d5,0x00f6ed54e093eac2,0x0009e288264dbbb3,0x00feb663299b89ef)} +}; +const gf API_NS(precomputed_wnaf_as_fe)[96] +VECTOR_ALIGNED = { + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00cfc32590115acd,0x0079f0e2a5c7af1b,0x00dd94605b8d7332,0x0097dd6c75f5f3f3,0x00d9c59e36156de9,0x00edfbfd6cde47d7,0x0095b97c9f67c39a,0x007d7b90f587debc)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00cfc32590115acd,0x0079f0e2a5c7af1b,0x00dd94605b8d7332,0x0017dd6c75f5f3f3,0x00d9c59e36156de8,0x00edfbfd6cde47d7,0x0095b97c9f67c39a,0x00fd7b90f587debc)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001071dd4d8ae672,0x004f14ebe5f4f174,0x00e0987625c34c73,0x0092d00712c6f8c1,0x009ef424965e980b,0x00a8e0cf9369764b,0x000aa81907b4d207,0x00d5002c74d37924)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00f3c4efe62b8b17,0x001e6acc1b6add7b,0x003367ef45836df5,0x000efc2d87a6ba53,0x00405a96933964ca,0x00572c2ae16357c6,0x00a9dc34ba6a7946,0x00151831e32ad161)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00315f0372d1774a,0x007de9ed2960e79d,0x008b3d7c4c198add,0x00a5e6a45fa57892,0x00f32201aa80115a,0x007fb9386a433a1a,0x00abf6960b291ee6,0x002d8069294ebc2a)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00fa5e878ae22827,0x00d33c7bb3963bd0,0x0053401a101efac6,0x0063df0bcbce59a5,0x007bca269c8b584b,0x00611a8a9978842c,0x00bb96e8da12b8a8,0x00e17844d01d394d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c107c50e9b4d0d,0x00f6b65a5fada2f2,0x000bb67e79353fae,0x0018853f610ed92d,0x008c51f4d36d6915,0x00e3e9c096dd1c12,0x009d6b9ea6cde415,0x00304864dd66f4c6)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00f3123b214085fb,0x00d005bafffb8f53,0x00d1606987dfe6ea,0x00e825edf73b018d,0x0082aa733829a933,0x00c857d8d7830d76,0x00ebdb8d2cbbe7e6,0x0063de0e9930722e)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x004ffebce35619ab,0x00d281a1543365c5,0x00ad17eeb3d098b8,0x008653b06bb7806d,0x0040026e64a28b62,0x00d9e06d52ea19df,0x008e7c684856876a,0x003ebbc191443f3b)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00c0a062813b8884,0x0054d18cc36e636b,0x00e4493fcadba51a,0x005cda5b6577c9cf,0x00cc165615c315cf,0x001bbd5e155f17bb,0x004dee92a4f18e47,0x003e95412929bfb8)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0015326f3e1f5fb6,0x0076886ca4eb6041,0x00fb34645ee36c23,0x006042a4cb8f7bb2,0x00b43e736403dd2f,0x00a8986566e7c60c,0x0010ea48904bf6d1,0x008b5ae8c5ddafbe)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003a9f4a12faee9a,0x00e6ba523a29af6b,0x001dde79a8ef06ef,0x0033ed4361647314,0x00b0556ae76eb1c9,0x00e8b892762bd092,0x004709c83705e374,0x0077382d86f79b47)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x006638c5cee4113d,0x005c100c7276ed52,0x00d10562e281768d,0x0008e851e1eb2ed9,0x00d7cc086a7af373,0x00993ed528eb7942,0x0051677625b7df14,0x0029fbbcf6aaa3f7)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x001081503e396419,0x007a2c7aa8870415,0x00d372a4baf3490a,0x00b18821a1e18013,0x00b83fa876c54211,0x00e4bcf47a2ae1e9,0x0069a384ba9bf3c3,0x00b784d44ee9d468)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b4e3ad7c2ea1be,0x009962715cf7008a,0x00fbc6fdcc089d5e,0x001e29847c349313,0x00c1145569b3874d,0x0094f50069a1499b,0x004cec2bb8f423c8,0x0077eb0034c34627)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008f00d279b21a44,0x00a5c81149c8116a,0x00cc8be3da721e9f,0x001935a34e6770b9,0x00e315426d5db99d,0x00cf6a842aff01bf,0x00e3cc9d5016ed3a,0x00ae78776098742d)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0068db473197248f,0x0089874a12ff90c2,0x00420b4763f5428c,0x00d668b71fb38392,0x0022279b6d3c3687,0x003a5801405cf566,0x00127b8ea4b4fd44,0x00ce6a975208fb79)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00797ca039d44238,0x0063cae935b6ef5e,0x006a938e072ff87c,0x006a3870309cdca0,0x0003800945fa3ddc,0x0032274c0728b5ad,0x0053a51e9217da91,0x00162b41712b79db)}, + 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{FIELD_LITERAL(0x0055076a513d05ee,0x00f076d43cec14ad,0x00a4e386b252faf4,0x00c0713b79b313eb,0x00507efa72f46f19,0x00141bc1e7c66844,0x005629ef060c19ea,0x0085327113d1772c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00ed490108514e35,0x006bed897e6b4958,0x0000f2cae0dc546c,0x008175eb3e5008e4,0x0093e3fe8f3aed42,0x00e9dbc15fd54d1a,0x00844979a4cfc0c1,0x00ea3194d64ea60b)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00b64d054ec7ed5c,0x007b924cd329fbce,0x00fe8805a8737293,0x00fb82f1d52b43ae,0x004ea745c72e1a76,0x0095ba2552861c0c,0x00f66846c3547784,0x003b815bd05dc23c)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00669e32fd197ef7,0x001dfca2c5e2f7c9,0x00a2ae0964a1e5e2,0x00b4334b15c91232,0x0096419585110d96,0x009c0b2262172a58,0x009d7c87cf6d35ca,0x008a5ce50d3cabf6)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00888b9c1cf73530,0x00375346c6afecd2,0x00142240b35b74d3,0x00d952835f86a5f5,0x000665c2658eaf9a,0x00f29f43062b2033,0x00a19a58c5bc85f9,0x00e62ac95724a937)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003bedc9ae9d1730,0x00fedd7c04cbc775,0x00c19abc4540c61d,0x00115294c57fb687,0x00663fceb174cd8f,0x001671f572b885b0,0x002d14694ed85978,0x00127282078a8e44)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00e6d2822aa72eca,0x00d832957cdc0058,0x00dc60e5bed23e18,0x00b94b4c418b03a3,0x00df3b85d410a430,0x0055e81b70bc79d4,0x00081d9369cbd1a0,0x00f7fee3acf0c656)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x003baba41b5abffb,0x00661ee09fca8193,0x00e0c6c92e6aea59,0x00886c207bcbe591,0x00aef9e7798e8004,0x00164f599f4d707a,0x00bb1597a76d21f2,0x00fda82d5e025626)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x00552b53a9640f0e,0x005985236f4d88bf,0x00b7aaec965a8ae5,0x00cedada7b5ccf95,0x007b1ea2088f1902,0x0028445e38b4a7fa,0x0057f10ddc50efed,0x007637a3147bc5cb)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x008174fe4db53757,0x00930c4f4a35ecc8,0x000e9f82c1c95a8f,0x00c6480547d66e5e,0x00dce888f9a7bf39,0x006671a5022cb906,0x004823c19b5337a0,0x00455338b7fec529)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x005ac123fdc45964,0x00395057c2221d17,0x003c09c74cf84eb1,0x00b5ca859bbebf9d,0x001b26b274a7d235,0x00e8c63508e96a48,0x00edbce4d51d721e,0x00c49436797d6f83)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0071595be88a7f40,0x00a05e6ac1c0fc87,0x00a01bf6538b29eb,0x00badcd80b881fb8,0x005bfe7af8049f8b,0x0084918e6ae35537,0x00ed4bd54759316e,0x007f135988d6b548)}, + {FIELD_LITERAL(0x0075656c41e06629,0x0086059d83396637,0x004f304ecb457b37,0x00e3b4887db6be65,0x0020b54c263bb0be,0x0060a69193e561c3,0x00e6863f20dc8ce9,0x00afe16ac56e6478)} +}; diff --git a/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,326 @@ +/** + * @file ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @cond internal + * @brief EdDSA routines. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ +#include "word.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define API_NAME "cryptonite_decaf_448" +#define API_NS(_id) cryptonite_decaf_448_##_id + +#define hash_ctx_t cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t +#define hash_init cryptonite_decaf_shake256_init +#define hash_update cryptonite_decaf_shake256_update +#define hash_final cryptonite_decaf_shake256_final +#define hash_destroy cryptonite_decaf_shake256_destroy +#define hash_hash cryptonite_decaf_shake256_hash + +#define NO_CONTEXT CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SUPPORTS_CONTEXTLESS_SIGS +#define EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY 0 +#define COFACTOR 4 + +#if NO_CONTEXT +const uint8_t CRYPTONITE_NO_CONTEXT_POINTS_HERE = 0; +const uint8_t * const CRYPTONITE_DECAF_ED448_NO_CONTEXT = &CRYPTONITE_NO_CONTEXT_POINTS_HERE; +#endif + +/* EDDSA_BASE_POINT_RATIO = 1 or 2 + * Because EdDSA25519 is not on E_d but on the isogenous E_sigma_d, + * its base point is twice ours. + */ +#define EDDSA_BASE_POINT_RATIO (1+EDDSA_USE_SIGMA_ISOGENY) + +static void clamp ( + uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + /* Blarg */ + secret_scalar_ser[0] &= -COFACTOR; + uint8_t hibit = (1<<0)>>1; + if (hibit == 0) { + secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] = 0; + secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 2] |= 0x80; + } else { + secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] &= hibit-1; + secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES - 1] |= hibit; + } +} + +static void hash_init_with_dom( + hash_ctx_t hash, + uint8_t prehashed, + uint8_t for_prehash, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) { + hash_init(hash); + +#if NO_CONTEXT + if (context_len == 0 && context == CRYPTONITE_DECAF_ED448_NO_CONTEXT) { + (void)prehashed; + (void)for_prehash; + (void)context; + (void)context_len; + return; + } +#endif + const char *dom_s = "SigEd448"; + const uint8_t dom[2] = {2+word_is_zero(prehashed)+word_is_zero(for_prehash), context_len}; + hash_update(hash,(const unsigned char *)dom_s, strlen(dom_s)); + hash_update(hash,dom,2); + hash_update(hash,context,context_len); +} + +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_init ( + hash_ctx_t hash +) { + hash_init(hash); +} + +/* In this file because it uses the hash */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_convert_private_key_to_x448 ( + uint8_t x[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t ed[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + /* pass the private key through hash_hash function */ + /* and keep the first CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES bytes */ + hash_hash( + x, + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES, + ed, + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES + ); +} + +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_derive_public_key ( + uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) { + /* only this much used for keygen */ + uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + + hash_hash( + secret_scalar_ser, + sizeof(secret_scalar_ser), + privkey, + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES + ); + clamp(secret_scalar_ser); + + API_NS(scalar_t) secret_scalar; + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(secret_scalar, secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser)); + + /* Since we are going to mul_by_cofactor during encoding, divide by it here. + * However, the EdDSA base point is not the same as the decaf base point if + * the sigma isogeny is in use: the EdDSA base point is on Etwist_d/(1-d) and + * the decaf base point is on Etwist_d, and when converted it effectively + * picks up a factor of 2 from the isogenies. So we might start at 2 instead of 1. + */ + for (unsigned int c = EDDSA_BASE_POINT_RATIO; c < COFACTOR; c <<= 1) { + API_NS(scalar_halve)(secret_scalar,secret_scalar); + } + + API_NS(point_t) p; + API_NS(precomputed_scalarmul)(p,API_NS(precomputed_base),secret_scalar); + + API_NS(point_mul_by_cofactor_and_encode_like_eddsa)(pubkey, p); + + /* Cleanup */ + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(secret_scalar); + API_NS(point_destroy)(p); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(secret_scalar_ser)); +} + +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign ( + uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t *message, + size_t message_len, + uint8_t prehashed, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) { + API_NS(scalar_t) secret_scalar; + hash_ctx_t hash; + { + /* Schedule the secret key */ + struct { + uint8_t secret_scalar_ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + uint8_t seed[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + } __attribute__((packed)) expanded; + hash_hash( + (uint8_t *)&expanded, + sizeof(expanded), + privkey, + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES + ); + clamp(expanded.secret_scalar_ser); + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(secret_scalar, expanded.secret_scalar_ser, sizeof(expanded.secret_scalar_ser)); + + /* Hash to create the nonce */ + hash_init_with_dom(hash,prehashed,0,context,context_len); + hash_update(hash,expanded.seed,sizeof(expanded.seed)); + hash_update(hash,message,message_len); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(&expanded, sizeof(expanded)); + } + + /* Decode the nonce */ + API_NS(scalar_t) nonce_scalar; + { + uint8_t nonce[2*CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + hash_final(hash,nonce,sizeof(nonce)); + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(nonce_scalar, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + } + + uint8_t nonce_point[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] = {0}; + { + /* Scalarmul to create the nonce-point */ + API_NS(scalar_t) nonce_scalar_2; + API_NS(scalar_halve)(nonce_scalar_2,nonce_scalar); + for (unsigned int c = 2*EDDSA_BASE_POINT_RATIO; c < COFACTOR; c <<= 1) { + API_NS(scalar_halve)(nonce_scalar_2,nonce_scalar_2); + } + + API_NS(point_t) p; + API_NS(precomputed_scalarmul)(p,API_NS(precomputed_base),nonce_scalar_2); + API_NS(point_mul_by_cofactor_and_encode_like_eddsa)(nonce_point, p); + API_NS(point_destroy)(p); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(nonce_scalar_2); + } + + API_NS(scalar_t) challenge_scalar; + { + /* Compute the challenge */ + hash_init_with_dom(hash,prehashed,0,context,context_len); + hash_update(hash,nonce_point,sizeof(nonce_point)); + hash_update(hash,pubkey,CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES); + hash_update(hash,message,message_len); + uint8_t challenge[2*CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + hash_final(hash,challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + hash_destroy(hash); + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(challenge_scalar,challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + } + + API_NS(scalar_mul)(challenge_scalar,challenge_scalar,secret_scalar); + API_NS(scalar_add)(challenge_scalar,challenge_scalar,nonce_scalar); + + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(signature,CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES); + memcpy(signature,nonce_point,sizeof(nonce_point)); + API_NS(scalar_encode)(&signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES],challenge_scalar); + + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(secret_scalar); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(nonce_scalar); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(challenge_scalar); +} + + +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign_prehash ( + uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) { + uint8_t hash_output[64]; /* MAGIC but true for all existing schemes */ + { + cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash_too; + memcpy(hash_too,hash,sizeof(hash_too)); + hash_final(hash_too,hash_output,sizeof(hash_output)); + hash_destroy(hash_too); + } + + cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign(signature,privkey,pubkey,hash_output,sizeof(hash_output),1,context,context_len); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(hash_output,sizeof(hash_output)); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify ( + const uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t *message, + size_t message_len, + uint8_t prehashed, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) { + API_NS(point_t) pk_point, r_point; + cryptonite_decaf_error_t error = API_NS(point_decode_like_eddsa_and_ignore_cofactor)(pk_point,pubkey); + if (CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS != error) { return error; } + + error = API_NS(point_decode_like_eddsa_and_ignore_cofactor)(r_point,signature); + if (CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS != error) { return error; } + + API_NS(scalar_t) challenge_scalar; + { + /* Compute the challenge */ + hash_ctx_t hash; + hash_init_with_dom(hash,prehashed,0,context,context_len); + hash_update(hash,signature,CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES); + hash_update(hash,pubkey,CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES); + hash_update(hash,message,message_len); + uint8_t challenge[2*CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES]; + hash_final(hash,challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + hash_destroy(hash); + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)(challenge_scalar,challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(challenge,sizeof(challenge)); + } + API_NS(scalar_sub)(challenge_scalar, API_NS(scalar_zero), challenge_scalar); + + API_NS(scalar_t) response_scalar; + API_NS(scalar_decode_long)( + response_scalar, + &signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES + ); +#if EDDSA_BASE_POINT_RATIO == 2 + API_NS(scalar_add)(response_scalar,response_scalar,response_scalar); +#endif + + + /* pk_point = -c(x(P)) + (cx + k)G = kG */ + API_NS(base_double_scalarmul_non_secret)( + pk_point, + response_scalar, + pk_point, + challenge_scalar + ); + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(API_NS(point_eq(pk_point,r_point))); +} + + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify_prehash ( + const uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) { + cryptonite_decaf_error_t ret; + + uint8_t hash_output[64]; /* MAGIC but true for all existing schemes */ + { + cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash_too; + memcpy(hash_too,hash,sizeof(hash_too)); + hash_final(hash_too,hash_output,sizeof(hash_output)); + hash_destroy(hash_too); + } + + ret = cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify(signature,pubkey,hash_output,sizeof(hash_output),1,context,context_len); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/scalar.c b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/scalar.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/scalar.c @@ -0,0 +1,341 @@ +/** + * @file ed448goldilocks/scalar.c + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief Decaf high-level functions. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ +#include "word.h" +#include "constant_time.h" +#include + +/* Template stuff */ +#define API_NS(_id) cryptonite_decaf_448_##_id +#define SCALAR_BITS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BITS +#define SCALAR_SER_BYTES CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BYTES +#define SCALAR_LIMBS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_LIMBS +#define scalar_t API_NS(scalar_t) + +static const cryptonite_decaf_word_t MONTGOMERY_FACTOR = (cryptonite_decaf_word_t)0x3bd440fae918bc5ull; +static const scalar_t sc_p = {{{ + SC_LIMB(0x2378c292ab5844f3), SC_LIMB(0x216cc2728dc58f55), SC_LIMB(0xc44edb49aed63690), SC_LIMB(0xffffffff7cca23e9), SC_LIMB(0xffffffffffffffff), SC_LIMB(0xffffffffffffffff), SC_LIMB(0x3fffffffffffffff) +}}}, sc_r2 = {{{ + SC_LIMB(0xe3539257049b9b60), SC_LIMB(0x7af32c4bc1b195d9), SC_LIMB(0x0d66de2388ea1859), SC_LIMB(0xae17cf725ee4d838), SC_LIMB(0x1a9cc14ba3c47c44), SC_LIMB(0x2052bcb7e4d070af), SC_LIMB(0x3402a939f823b729) +}}}; +/* End of template stuff */ + +#define WBITS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS /* NB this may be different from ARCH_WORD_BITS */ + +const scalar_t API_NS(scalar_one) = {{{1}}}, API_NS(scalar_zero) = {{{0}}}; + +/** {extra,accum} - sub +? p + * Must have extra <= 1 + */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void sc_subx( + scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_word_t accum[SCALAR_LIMBS], + const scalar_t sub, + const scalar_t p, + cryptonite_decaf_word_t extra +) { + cryptonite_decaf_dsword_t chain = 0; + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; ilimb[i]; + out->limb[i] = chain; + chain >>= WBITS; + } + cryptonite_decaf_word_t borrow = chain+extra; /* = 0 or -1 */ + + chain = 0; + for (i=0; ilimb[i]) + (p->limb[i] & borrow); + out->limb[i] = chain; + chain >>= WBITS; + } +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE void sc_montmul ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b +) { + unsigned int i,j; + cryptonite_decaf_word_t accum[SCALAR_LIMBS+1] = {0}; + cryptonite_decaf_word_t hi_carry = 0; + + for (i=0; ilimb[i]; + const cryptonite_decaf_word_t *mier = b->limb; + + cryptonite_decaf_dword_t chain = 0; + for (j=0; j>= WBITS; + } + accum[j] = chain; + + mand = accum[0] * MONTGOMERY_FACTOR; + chain = 0; + mier = sc_p->limb; + for (j=0; j>= WBITS; + } + chain += accum[j]; + chain += hi_carry; + accum[j-1] = chain; + hi_carry = chain >> WBITS; + } + + sc_subx(out, accum, sc_p, sc_p, hi_carry); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_mul) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b +) { + sc_montmul(out,a,b); + sc_montmul(out,out,sc_r2); +} + +/* PERF: could implement this */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void sc_montsqr (scalar_t out, const scalar_t a) { + sc_montmul(out,a,a); +} + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t API_NS(scalar_invert) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a +) { + /* Fermat's little theorem, sliding window. + * Sliding window is fine here because the modulus isn't secret. + */ + const int SCALAR_WINDOW_BITS = 3; + scalar_t precmp[1< 0) sc_montmul(precmp[LAST],precmp[0],precmp[0]); + + int i; + for (i=1; i<=LAST; i++) { + sc_montmul(precmp[i],precmp[i-1],precmp[LAST]); + } + + /* Sliding window */ + unsigned residue = 0, trailing = 0, started = 0; + for (i=SCALAR_BITS-1; i>=-SCALAR_WINDOW_BITS; i--) { + + if (started) sc_montsqr(out,out); + + cryptonite_decaf_word_t w = (i>=0) ? sc_p->limb[i/WBITS] : 0; + if (i >= 0 && i= 2); + w-=2; + } + + residue = (residue<<1) | ((w>>(i%WBITS))&1); + if (residue>>SCALAR_WINDOW_BITS != 0) { + assert(trailing == 0); + trailing = residue; + residue = 0; + } + + if (trailing > 0 && (trailing & ((1<>(SCALAR_WINDOW_BITS+1)]); + } else { + API_NS(scalar_copy)(out,precmp[trailing>>(SCALAR_WINDOW_BITS+1)]); + started = 1; + } + trailing = 0; + } + trailing <<= 1; + + } + assert(residue==0); + assert(trailing==0); + + /* Demontgomerize */ + sc_montmul(out,out,API_NS(scalar_one)); + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(precmp, sizeof(precmp)); + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(~API_NS(scalar_eq)(out,API_NS(scalar_zero))); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_sub) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b +) { + sc_subx(out, a->limb, b, sc_p, 0); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_add) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b +) { + cryptonite_decaf_dword_t chain = 0; + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; ilimb[i]) + b->limb[i]; + out->limb[i] = chain; + chain >>= WBITS; + } + sc_subx(out, out->limb, sc_p, sc_p, chain); +} + +void +API_NS(scalar_set_unsigned) ( + scalar_t out, + uint64_t w +) { + memset(out,0,sizeof(scalar_t)); + unsigned int i = 0; + for (; ilimb[i] = w; +#if CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS < 64 + w >>= 8*sizeof(cryptonite_decaf_word_t); +#endif + } +} + +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t +API_NS(scalar_eq) ( + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b +) { + cryptonite_decaf_word_t diff = 0; + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; ilimb[i] ^ b->limb[i]; + } + return mask_to_bool(word_is_zero(diff)); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void scalar_decode_short ( + scalar_t s, + const unsigned char *ser, + unsigned int nbytes +) { + unsigned int i,j,k=0; + for (i=0; ilimb[i] = out; + } +} + +cryptonite_decaf_error_t API_NS(scalar_decode)( + scalar_t s, + const unsigned char ser[SCALAR_SER_BYTES] +) { + unsigned int i; + scalar_decode_short(s, ser, SCALAR_SER_BYTES); + cryptonite_decaf_dsword_t accum = 0; + for (i=0; ilimb[i] - sc_p->limb[i]) >> WBITS; + } + /* Here accum == 0 or -1 */ + + API_NS(scalar_mul)(s,s,API_NS(scalar_one)); /* ham-handed reduce */ + + return cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(~word_is_zero(accum)); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_destroy) ( + scalar_t scalar +) { + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(scalar, sizeof(scalar_t)); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_decode_long)( + scalar_t s, + const unsigned char *ser, + size_t ser_len +) { + if (ser_len == 0) { + API_NS(scalar_copy)(s, API_NS(scalar_zero)); + return; + } + + size_t i; + scalar_t t1, t2; + + i = ser_len - (ser_len%SCALAR_SER_BYTES); + if (i==ser_len) i -= SCALAR_SER_BYTES; + + scalar_decode_short(t1, &ser[i], ser_len-i); + + if (ser_len == sizeof(scalar_t)) { + assert(i==0); + /* ham-handed reduce */ + API_NS(scalar_mul)(s,t1,API_NS(scalar_one)); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(t1); + return; + } + + while (i) { + i -= SCALAR_SER_BYTES; + sc_montmul(t1,t1,sc_r2); + ignore_result( API_NS(scalar_decode)(t2, ser+i) ); + API_NS(scalar_add)(t1, t1, t2); + } + + API_NS(scalar_copy)(s, t1); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(t1); + API_NS(scalar_destroy)(t2); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_encode)( + unsigned char ser[SCALAR_SER_BYTES], + const scalar_t s +) { + unsigned int i,j,k=0; + for (i=0; ilimb[i] >> (8*j); + } + } +} + +void API_NS(scalar_cond_sel) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a, + const scalar_t b, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t pick_b +) { + constant_time_select(out,a,b,sizeof(scalar_t),bool_to_mask(pick_b),sizeof(out->limb[0])); +} + +void API_NS(scalar_halve) ( + scalar_t out, + const scalar_t a +) { + cryptonite_decaf_word_t mask = -(a->limb[0] & 1); + cryptonite_decaf_dword_t chain = 0; + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; ilimb[i]) + (sc_p->limb[i] & mask); + out->limb[i] = chain; + chain >>= CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS; + } + for (i=0; ilimb[i] = out->limb[i]>>1 | out->limb[i+1]<<(WBITS-1); + } + out->limb[i] = out->limb[i]>>1 | chain<<(WBITS-1); +} + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/arch_32/arch_intrinsics.h b/cbits/decaf/include/arch_32/arch_intrinsics.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/arch_32/arch_intrinsics.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#ifndef __ARCH_ARCH_32_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ +#define __ARCH_ARCH_32_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ + +#define ARCH_WORD_BITS 32 + +static __inline__ __attribute((always_inline,unused)) +uint32_t word_is_zero(uint32_t a) { + /* let's hope the compiler isn't clever enough to optimize this. */ + return (((uint64_t)a)-1)>>32; +} + +static __inline__ __attribute((always_inline,unused)) +uint64_t widemul(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) { + return ((uint64_t)a) * b; +} + +#endif /* __ARCH_ARM_32_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ */ + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/arch_ref64/arch_intrinsics.h b/cbits/decaf/include/arch_ref64/arch_intrinsics.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/arch_ref64/arch_intrinsics.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#ifndef __ARCH_REF64_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ +#define __ARCH_REF64_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ + +#define ARCH_WORD_BITS 64 + +static __inline__ __attribute((always_inline,unused)) +uint64_t word_is_zero(uint64_t a) { + /* let's hope the compiler isn't clever enough to optimize this. */ + return (((__uint128_t)a)-1)>>64; +} + +static __inline__ __attribute((always_inline,unused)) +__uint128_t widemul(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) { + return ((__uint128_t)a) * b; +} + +#endif /* ARCH_REF64_ARCH_INTRINSICS_H__ */ + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/constant_time.h b/cbits/decaf/include/constant_time.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/constant_time.h @@ -0,0 +1,362 @@ +/** + * @file constant_time.h + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @brief Constant-time routines. + */ + +#ifndef __CONSTANT_TIME_H__ +#define __CONSTANT_TIME_H__ 1 + +#include "word.h" +#include + +/* + * Constant-time operations on hopefully-compile-time-sized memory + * regions. Needed for flexibility / demagication: not all fields + * have sizes which are multiples of the vector width, necessitating + * a change from the Ed448 versions. + * + * These routines would be much simpler to define at the byte level, + * but if not vectorized they would be a significant fraction of the + * runtime. Eg on NEON-less ARM, constant_time_lookup is like 15% of + * signing time, vs 6% on Haswell with its fancy AVX2 vectors. + * + * If the compiler could do a good job of autovectorizing the code, + * we could just leave it with the byte definition. But that's unlikely + * on most deployed compilers, especially if you consider that pcmpeq[size] + * is much faster than moving a scalar to the vector unit (which is what + * a naive autovectorizer will do with constant_time_lookup on Intel). + * + * Instead, we're putting our trust in the loop unroller and unswitcher. + */ + + +/** + * Unaligned big (vector?) register. + */ +typedef struct { + big_register_t unaligned; +} __attribute__((packed)) unaligned_br_t; + +/** + * Unaligned word register, for architectures where that matters. + */ +typedef struct { + word_t unaligned; +} __attribute__((packed)) unaligned_word_t; + +/** + * @brief Constant-time conditional swap. + * + * If doswap, then swap elem_bytes between *a and *b. + * + * *a and *b must not alias. Also, they must be at least as aligned + * as their sizes, if the CPU cares about that sort of thing. + */ +static __inline__ void +__attribute__((unused,always_inline)) +constant_time_cond_swap ( + void *__restrict__ a_, + void *__restrict__ b_, + word_t elem_bytes, + mask_t doswap +) { + word_t k; + unsigned char *a = (unsigned char *)a_; + unsigned char *b = (unsigned char *)b_; + + big_register_t br_mask = br_set_to_mask(doswap); + for (k=0; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(big_register_t); k+=sizeof(big_register_t)) { + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t)) { + /* unaligned */ + big_register_t xor = + ((unaligned_br_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned + ^ ((unaligned_br_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned; + xor &= br_mask; + ((unaligned_br_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned ^= xor; + ((unaligned_br_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned ^= xor; + } else { + /* aligned */ + big_register_t xor = + *((big_register_t*)(&a[k])) + ^ *((big_register_t*)(&b[k])); + xor &= br_mask; + *((big_register_t*)(&a[k])) ^= xor; + *((big_register_t*)(&b[k])) ^= xor; + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t) >= sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(word_t); k+=sizeof(word_t)) { + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + /* unaligned */ + word_t xor = + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned + ^ ((unaligned_word_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned; + xor &= doswap; + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned ^= xor; + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned ^= xor; + } else { + /* aligned */ + word_t xor = + *((word_t*)(&a[k])) + ^ *((word_t*)(&b[k])); + xor &= doswap; + *((word_t*)(&a[k])) ^= xor; + *((word_t*)(&b[k])) ^= xor; + } + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; kunaligned + |= br_mask & ((const unaligned_br_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]))->unaligned; + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(big_register_t *)(out+k) |= br_mask & *(const big_register_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]); + } + } + + word_t mask = word_is_zero(idx^j); + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t) >= sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(word_t); k+=sizeof(word_t)) { + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + /* input unaligned, output aligned */ + *(word_t *)(out+k) |= mask & ((const unaligned_word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]))->unaligned; + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(word_t *)(out+k) |= mask & *(const word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]); + } + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; kunaligned + = ( ((unaligned_br_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]))->unaligned & ~br_mask ) + | ( ((const unaligned_br_t *)(in+k))->unaligned & br_mask ); + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(big_register_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]) + = ( *(big_register_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]) & ~br_mask ) + | ( *(const big_register_t *)(in+k) & br_mask ); + } + } + + word_t mask = word_is_zero(idx^j); + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t) >= sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(word_t); k+=sizeof(word_t)) { + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + /* output unaligned, input aligned */ + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]))->unaligned + = ( ((unaligned_word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]))->unaligned & ~mask ) + | ( *(const word_t *)(in+k) & mask ); + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]) + = ( *(word_t*)(&table[k+j*elem_bytes]) & ~mask ) + | ( *(const word_t *)(in+k) & mask ); + } + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; kunaligned = br_mask & ((const unaligned_br_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned; + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(big_register_t *)(a+k) = br_mask & *(const big_register_t*)(&b[k]); + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t) >= sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(word_t); k+=sizeof(word_t)) { + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + /* unaligned */ + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned = mask & ((const unaligned_word_t*)(&b[k]))->unaligned; + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(word_t *)(a+k) = mask & *(const word_t*)(&b[k]); + } + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; kunaligned = + ( br_mask & ((const unaligned_br_t*)(&bTrue [k]))->unaligned) + | (~br_mask & ((const unaligned_br_t*)(&bFalse[k]))->unaligned); + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(big_register_t *)(a+k) = + ( br_mask & *(const big_register_t*)(&bTrue [k])) + | (~br_mask & *(const big_register_t*)(&bFalse[k])); + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(big_register_t) >= sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k<=elem_bytes-sizeof(word_t); k+=sizeof(word_t)) { + if (alignment_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + /* unaligned */ + ((unaligned_word_t*)(&a[k]))->unaligned = + ( mask & ((const unaligned_word_t*)(&bTrue [k]))->unaligned) + | (~mask & ((const unaligned_word_t*)(&bFalse[k]))->unaligned); + } else { + /* aligned */ + *(word_t *)(a+k) = + ( mask & *(const word_t*)(&bTrue [k])) + | (~mask & *(const word_t*)(&bFalse[k])); + } + } + } + + if (elem_bytes % sizeof(word_t)) { + for (; k +#include + +#endif /* __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_H__ */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/common.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/common.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +/** + * @file decaf/common.h + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief Common utility headers for Decaf library. + */ + +#ifndef __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_COMMON_H__ +#define __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_COMMON_H__ 1 + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Goldilocks' build flags default to hidden and stripping executables. */ +/** @cond internal */ +#if defined(DOXYGEN) && !defined(__attribute__) +#define __attribute__((x)) +#endif +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((visibility("default"))) +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE __attribute__((noinline)) +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED __attribute__((warn_unused_result)) +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL __attribute__((nonnull)) +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline,unused)) +// Cribbed from libnotmuch +#if defined (__clang_major__) && __clang_major__ >= 3 \ + || defined (__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 5 \ + || defined (__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5 +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_DEPRECATED(msg) __attribute__ ((deprecated(msg))) +#else +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_DEPRECATED(msg) __attribute__ ((deprecated)) +#endif +/** @endcond */ + +/* Internal word types. + * + * Somewhat tricky. This could be decided separately per platform. However, + * the structs do need to be all the same size and alignment on a given + * platform to support dynamic linking, since even if you header was built + * with eg arch_neon, you might end up linking a library built with arch_arm32. + */ +#ifndef CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS + #if (defined(__ILP64__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || (((__UINT_FAST32_MAX__)>>30)>>30)) + #define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS 64 /**< The number of bits in a word */ + #else + #define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS 32 /**< The number of bits in a word */ + #endif +#endif + +#if CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS == 64 +typedef uint64_t cryptonite_decaf_word_t; /**< Word size for internal computations */ +typedef int64_t cryptonite_decaf_sword_t; /**< Signed word size for internal computations */ +typedef uint64_t cryptonite_decaf_bool_t; /**< "Boolean" type, will be set to all-zero or all-one (i.e. -1u) */ +typedef __uint128_t cryptonite_decaf_dword_t; /**< Double-word size for internal computations */ +typedef __int128_t cryptonite_decaf_dsword_t; /**< Signed double-word size for internal computations */ +#elif CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS == 32 /**< The number of bits in a word */ +typedef uint32_t cryptonite_decaf_word_t; /**< Word size for internal computations */ +typedef int32_t cryptonite_decaf_sword_t; /**< Signed word size for internal computations */ +typedef uint32_t cryptonite_decaf_bool_t; /**< "Boolean" type, will be set to all-zero or all-one (i.e. -1u) */ +typedef uint64_t cryptonite_decaf_dword_t; /**< Double-word size for internal computations */ +typedef int64_t cryptonite_decaf_dsword_t; /**< Signed double-word size for internal computations */ +#else +#error "Only supporting CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS = 32 or 64 for now" +#endif + +/** CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE = -1 so that CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE & x = x */ +static const cryptonite_decaf_bool_t CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE = -(cryptonite_decaf_bool_t)1; + +/** CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE = 0 so that CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE & x = 0 */ +static const cryptonite_decaf_bool_t CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE = 0; + +/** Another boolean type used to indicate success or failure. */ +typedef enum { + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS = -1, /**< The operation succeeded. */ + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE = 0 /**< The operation failed. */ +} cryptonite_decaf_error_t; + + +/** Return success if x is true */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE cryptonite_decaf_error_t +cryptonite_decaf_succeed_if(cryptonite_decaf_bool_t x) { + return (cryptonite_decaf_error_t)x; +} + +/** Return CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE iff x == CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE cryptonite_decaf_bool_t +cryptonite_decaf_successful(cryptonite_decaf_error_t e) { + cryptonite_decaf_dword_t w = ((cryptonite_decaf_word_t)e) ^ ((cryptonite_decaf_word_t)CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS); + return (w-1)>>CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS; +} + +/** Overwrite data with zeros. Uses memset_s if available. */ +void cryptonite_decaf_bzero ( + void *data, + size_t size +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** Compare two buffers, returning CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE if they are equal. */ +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t cryptonite_decaf_memeq ( + const void *data1, + const void *data2, + size_t size +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} /* extern "C" */ +#endif + +#endif /* __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_COMMON_H__ */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/ed448.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/ed448.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/ed448.h @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +/** + * @file decaf/ed448.h + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief A group of prime order p, based on Ed448-Goldilocks. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ + +#ifndef __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_ED448_H__ +#define __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_ED448_H__ 1 + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** Number of bytes in an EdDSA public key. */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES 57 + +/** Number of bytes in an EdDSA private key. */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES + +/** Number of bytes in an EdDSA private key. */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES (CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES + CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES) + +/** Does EdDSA support non-contextual signatures? */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SUPPORTS_CONTEXTLESS_SIGS 0 + +/** Prehash context renaming macros. */ +#define cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_s cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_s +#define cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t +#define cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_update cryptonite_decaf_shake256_update +#define cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_destroy cryptonite_decaf_shake256_destroy + +/** + * @brief EdDSA key generation. This function uses a different (non-Decaf) + * encoding. + * + * @param [out] pubkey The public key. + * @param [in] privkey The private key. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_derive_public_key ( + uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA signing. + * + * @param [out] signature The signature. + * @param [in] privkey The private key. + * @param [in] pubkey The public key. + * @param [in] message The message to sign. + * @param [in] message_len The length of the message. + * @param [in] prehashed Nonzero if the message is actually the hash of something you want to sign. + * @param [in] context A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes. + * @param [in] context_len Length of the context. + * + * @warning For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and non-prehashed + * messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level disambiguation. For Ed448 it is + * safe. The C++ wrapper is designed to make it harder to screw this up, but this C code gives + * you no seat belt. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign ( + uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t *message, + size_t message_len, + uint8_t prehashed, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((nonnull(1,2,3))) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA signing with prehash. + * + * @param [out] signature The signature. + * @param [in] privkey The private key. + * @param [in] pubkey The public key. + * @param [in] hash The hash of the message. This object will not be modified by the call. + * @param [in] context A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes. Must be the same as what was used for the prehash. + * @param [in] context_len Length of the context. + * + * @warning For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and non-prehashed + * messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level disambiguation. For Ed448 it is + * safe. The C++ wrapper is designed to make it harder to screw this up, but this C code gives + * you no seat belt. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_sign_prehash ( + uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t privkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((nonnull(1,2,3,4))) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Prehash initialization, with contexts if supported. + * + * @param [out] hash The hash object to be initialized. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_init ( + cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((nonnull(1))) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA signature verification. + * + * Uses the standard (i.e. less-strict) verification formula. + * + * @param [in] signature The signature. + * @param [in] pubkey The public key. + * @param [in] message The message to verify. + * @param [in] message_len The length of the message. + * @param [in] prehashed Nonzero if the message is actually the hash of something you want to verify. + * @param [in] context A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes. + * @param [in] context_len Length of the context. + * + * @warning For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and non-prehashed + * messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level disambiguation. For Ed448 it is + * safe. The C++ wrapper is designed to make it harder to screw this up, but this C code gives + * you no seat belt. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify ( + const uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t *message, + size_t message_len, + uint8_t prehashed, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((nonnull(1,2))) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA signature verification. + * + * Uses the standard (i.e. less-strict) verification formula. + * + * @param [in] signature The signature. + * @param [in] pubkey The public key. + * @param [in] hash The hash of the message. This object will not be modified by the call. + * @param [in] context A "context" for this signature of up to 255 bytes. Must be the same as what was used for the prehash. + * @param [in] context_len Length of the context. + * + * @warning For Ed25519, it is unsafe to use the same key for both prehashed and non-prehashed + * messages, at least without some very careful protocol-level disambiguation. For Ed448 it is + * safe. The C++ wrapper is designed to make it harder to screw this up, but this C code gives + * you no seat belt. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_ed448_verify_prehash ( + const uint8_t signature[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_SIGNATURE_BYTES], + const uint8_t pubkey[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_ed448_prehash_ctx_t hash, + const uint8_t *context, + uint8_t context_len +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS __attribute__((nonnull(1,2))) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA point encoding. Used internally, exposed externally. + * Multiplies the point by the current cofactor first. + * + * @param [out] enc The encoded point. + * @param [in] p The point. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_mul_by_cofactor_and_encode_like_eddsa ( + uint8_t enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t p +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA point decoding. Remember that while points on the + * EdDSA curves have cofactor information, Decaf ignores (quotients + * out) all cofactor information. + * + * @param [out] enc The encoded point. + * @param [in] p The point. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_decode_like_eddsa_and_ignore_cofactor ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t p, + const uint8_t enc[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA to ECDH public key conversion + * Deserialize the point to get y on Edwards curve, + * Convert it to u coordinate on Montgomery curve. + * + * @warning This function does not check that the public key being converted + * is a valid EdDSA public key (FUTURE?) + * + * @param[out] x The ECDH public key as in RFC7748(point on Montgomery curve) + * @param[in] ed The EdDSA public key(point on Edwards curve) + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_convert_public_key_to_x448 ( + uint8_t x[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t ed[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PUBLIC_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief EdDSA to ECDH private key conversion + * Using the appropriate hash function, hash the EdDSA private key + * and keep only the lower bytes to get the ECDH private key + * + * @param[out] x The ECDH private key as in RFC7748 + * @param[in] ed The EdDSA private key + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_ed448_convert_private_key_to_x448 ( + uint8_t x[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES], + const uint8_t ed[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_EDDSA_448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} /* extern "C" */ +#endif + +#endif /* __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_ED448_H__ */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_255.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_255.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_255.h @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ +/* Not needed if 448-only */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_448.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_448.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/point_448.h @@ -0,0 +1,724 @@ +/** + * @file decaf/point_448.h + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief A group of prime order p, based on Ed448-Goldilocks. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ + +#ifndef __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_POINT_448_H__ +#define __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_POINT_448_H__ 1 + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** @cond internal */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_LIMBS ((446-1)/CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS+1) +/** @endcond */ + +/** The number of bits in a scalar */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BITS 446 + +/** @cond internal */ +#ifndef __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_GF_DEFINED__ +#define __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_GF_DEFINED__ 1 +/** @brief Galois field element internal structure */ +typedef struct cryptonite_gf_448_s { + cryptonite_decaf_word_t limb[512/CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS]; +} __attribute__((aligned(16))) cryptonite_gf_448_s, cryptonite_gf_448_t[1]; +#endif /* __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_GF_DEFINED__ */ +/** @endcond */ + +/** Number of bytes in a serialized point. */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES 56 + +/** Number of bytes in an elligated point. For now set the same as SER_BYTES + * but could be different for other curves. + */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_HASH_BYTES 56 + +/** Number of bytes in a serialized scalar. */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BYTES 56 + +/** Number of bits in the "which" field of an elligator inverse */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_INVERT_ELLIGATOR_WHICH_BITS 3 + +/** Number of bytes in an x448 public key */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES 56 + +/** Number of bytes in an x448 private key */ +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES 56 + +/** Twisted Edwards extended homogeneous coordinates */ +typedef struct cryptonite_decaf_448_point_s { + /** @cond internal */ + cryptonite_gf_448_t x,y,z,t; + /** @endcond */ +} cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t[1]; + +/** Precomputed table based on a point. Can be trivial implementation. */ +struct cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s; + +/** Precomputed table based on a point. Can be trivial implementation. */ +typedef struct cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s; + +/** Size and alignment of precomputed point tables. */ +extern const size_t cryptonite_decaf_448_sizeof_precomputed_s CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS, cryptonite_decaf_448_alignof_precomputed_s CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** Scalar is stored packed, because we don't need the speed. */ +typedef struct cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_s { + /** @cond internal */ + cryptonite_decaf_word_t limb[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_LIMBS]; + /** @endcond */ +} cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t[1]; + +/** A scalar equal to 1. */ +extern const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_one CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** A scalar equal to 0. */ +extern const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_zero CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** The identity point on the curve. */ +extern const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_identity CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** An arbitrarily chosen base point on the curve. */ +extern const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_base CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** Precomputed table for the base point on the curve. */ +extern const struct cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s *cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_base CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** + * @brief Read a scalar from wire format or from bytes. + * + * @param [in] ser Serialized form of a scalar. + * @param [out] out Deserialized form. + * + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The scalar was correctly encoded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The scalar was greater than the modulus, + * and has been reduced modulo that modulus. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_decode ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const unsigned char ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Read a scalar from wire format or from bytes. Reduces mod + * scalar prime. + * + * @param [in] ser Serialized form of a scalar. + * @param [in] ser_len Length of serialized form. + * @param [out] out Deserialized form. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_decode_long ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const unsigned char *ser, + size_t ser_len +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Serialize a scalar to wire format. + * + * @param [out] ser Serialized form of a scalar. + * @param [in] s Deserialized scalar. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_encode ( + unsigned char ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SCALAR_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t s +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Add two scalars. The scalars may use the same memory. + * @param [in] a One scalar. + * @param [in] b Another scalar. + * @param [out] out a+b. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_add ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Compare two scalars. + * @param [in] a One scalar. + * @param [in] b Another scalar. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE The scalars are equal. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE The scalars are not equal. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_eq ( + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Subtract two scalars. The scalars may use the same memory. + * @param [in] a One scalar. + * @param [in] b Another scalar. + * @param [out] out a-b. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_sub ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Multiply two scalars. The scalars may use the same memory. + * @param [in] a One scalar. + * @param [in] b Another scalar. + * @param [out] out a*b. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_mul ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** +* @brief Halve a scalar. The scalars may use the same memory. +* @param [in] a A scalar. +* @param [out] out a/2. +*/ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_halve ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Invert a scalar. When passed zero, return 0. The input and output may alias. + * @param [in] a A scalar. + * @param [out] out 1/a. + * @return CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The input is nonzero. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_invert ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Copy a scalar. The scalars may use the same memory, in which + * case this function does nothing. + * @param [in] a A scalar. + * @param [out] out Will become a copy of a. + */ +static inline void CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_copy ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a +) { + *out = *a; +} + +/** + * @brief Set a scalar to an unsigned 64-bit integer. + * @param [in] a An integer. + * @param [out] out Will become equal to a. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_set_unsigned ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + uint64_t a +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL; + +/** + * @brief Encode a point as a sequence of bytes. + * + * @param [out] ser The byte representation of the point. + * @param [in] pt The point to encode. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_encode ( + uint8_t ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Decode a point from a sequence of bytes. + * + * Every point has a unique encoding, so not every + * sequence of bytes is a valid encoding. If an invalid + * encoding is given, the output is undefined. + * + * @param [out] pt The decoded point. + * @param [in] ser The serialized version of the point. + * @param [in] allow_identity CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE if the identity is a legal input. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The decoding succeeded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The decoding didn't succeed, because + * ser does not represent a point. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_decode ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt, + const uint8_t ser[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES], + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t allow_identity +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Copy a point. The input and output may alias, + * in which case this function does nothing. + * + * @param [out] a A copy of the point. + * @param [in] b Any point. + */ +static inline void CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL cryptonite_decaf_448_point_copy ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b +) { + *a=*b; +} + +/** + * @brief Test whether two points are equal. If yes, return + * CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE, else return CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE. + * + * @param [in] a A point. + * @param [in] b Another point. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE The points are equal. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE The points are not equal. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_eq ( + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Add two points to produce a third point. The + * input points and output point can be pointers to the same + * memory. + * + * @param [out] sum The sum a+b. + * @param [in] a An addend. + * @param [in] b An addend. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_add ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t sum, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL; + +/** + * @brief Double a point. Equivalent to + * cryptonite_decaf_448_point_add(two_a,a,a), but potentially faster. + * + * @param [out] two_a The sum a+a. + * @param [in] a A point. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_double ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t two_a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL; + +/** + * @brief Subtract two points to produce a third point. The + * input points and output point can be pointers to the same + * memory. + * + * @param [out] diff The difference a-b. + * @param [in] a The minuend. + * @param [in] b The subtrahend. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_sub ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t diff, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL; + +/** + * @brief Negate a point to produce another point. The input + * and output points can use the same memory. + * + * @param [out] nega The negated input point + * @param [in] a The input point. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_negate ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t nega, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL; + +/** + * @brief Multiply a base point by a scalar: scaled = scalar*base. + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] base The point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_scalarmul ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t scaled, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t base, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Multiply a base point by a scalar: scaled = scalar*base. + * This function operates directly on serialized forms. + * + * @warning This function is experimental. It may not be supported + * long-term. + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] base The point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + * @param [in] allow_identity Allow the input to be the identity. + * @param [in] short_circuit Allow a fast return if the input is illegal. + * + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The scalarmul succeeded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The scalarmul didn't succeed, because + * base does not represent a point. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_448_direct_scalarmul ( + uint8_t scaled[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES], + const uint8_t base[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t allow_identity, + cryptonite_decaf_bool_t short_circuit +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman scalarmul. This function uses a different + * (non-Decaf) encoding. + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] base The point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + * + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The scalarmul succeeded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The scalarmul didn't succeed, because the base + * point is in a small subgroup. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t cryptonite_decaf_x448 ( + uint8_t out[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t base[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** The base point for X448 Diffie-Hellman */ +extern const uint8_t cryptonite_decaf_x448_base_point[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES] CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** + * @brief RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman base point scalarmul. This function uses + * a different (non-Decaf) encoding. + * + * @deprecated Renamed to cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key. + * I have no particular timeline for removing this name. + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_x448_generate_key ( + uint8_t out[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE CRYPTONITE_DECAF_DEPRECATED("Renamed to cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key"); + +/** + * @brief RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman base point scalarmul. This function uses + * a different (non-Decaf) encoding. + * + * Does exactly the same thing as cryptonite_decaf_x448_generate_key, + * but has a better name. + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_x448_derive_public_key ( + uint8_t out[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PUBLIC_BYTES], + const uint8_t scalar[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_X448_PRIVATE_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/* FUTURE: uint8_t cryptonite_decaf_448_encode_like_curve448) */ + +/** + * @brief Precompute a table for fast scalar multiplication. + * Some implementations do not include precomputed points; for + * those implementations, this implementation simply copies the + * point. + * + * @param [out] a A precomputed table of multiples of the point. + * @param [in] b Any point. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_precompute ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s *a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Multiply a precomputed base point by a scalar: + * scaled = scalar*base. + * Some implementations do not include precomputed points; for + * those implementations, this function is the same as + * cryptonite_decaf_448_point_scalarmul + * + * @param [out] scaled The scaled point base*scalar + * @param [in] base The point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar The scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_scalarmul ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t scaled, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s *base, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Multiply two base points by two scalars: + * scaled = scalar1*base1 + scalar2*base2. + * + * Equivalent to two calls to cryptonite_decaf_448_point_scalarmul, but may be + * faster. + * + * @param [out] combo The linear combination scalar1*base1 + scalar2*base2. + * @param [in] base1 A first point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar1 A first scalar to multiply by. + * @param [in] base2 A second point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar2 A second scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_double_scalarmul ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t combo, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t base1, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar1, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t base2, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar2 +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * Multiply one base point by two scalars: + * + * a1 = scalar1 * base + * a2 = scalar2 * base + * + * Equivalent to two calls to cryptonite_decaf_448_point_scalarmul, but may be + * faster. + * + * @param [out] a1 The first multiple. It may be the same as the input point. + * @param [out] a2 The second multiple. It may be the same as the input point. + * @param [in] base1 A point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar1 A first scalar to multiply by. + * @param [in] scalar2 A second scalar to multiply by. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_dual_scalarmul ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a1, + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a2, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t base1, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar1, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar2 +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Multiply two base points by two scalars: + * scaled = scalar1*cryptonite_decaf_448_point_base + scalar2*base2. + * + * Otherwise equivalent to cryptonite_decaf_448_point_double_scalarmul, but may be + * faster at the expense of being variable time. + * + * @param [out] combo The linear combination scalar1*base + scalar2*base2. + * @param [in] scalar1 A first scalar to multiply by. + * @param [in] base2 A second point to be scaled. + * @param [in] scalar2 A second scalar to multiply by. + * + * @warning: This function takes variable time, and may leak the scalars + * used. It is designed for signature verification. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_base_double_scalarmul_non_secret ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t combo, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar1, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t base2, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar2 +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Constant-time decision between two points. If pick_b + * is zero, out = a; else out = b. + * + * @param [out] out The output. It may be the same as either input. + * @param [in] a Any point. + * @param [in] b Any point. + * @param [in] pick_b If nonzero, choose point b. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_cond_sel ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t b, + cryptonite_decaf_word_t pick_b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Constant-time decision between two scalars. If pick_b + * is zero, out = a; else out = b. + * + * @param [out] out The output. It may be the same as either input. + * @param [in] a Any scalar. + * @param [in] b Any scalar. + * @param [in] pick_b If nonzero, choose scalar b. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_cond_sel ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t out, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t a, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t b, + cryptonite_decaf_word_t pick_b +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Test that a point is valid, for debugging purposes. + * + * @param [in] to_test The point to test. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_TRUE The point is valid. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FALSE The point is invalid. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t cryptonite_decaf_448_point_valid ( + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t to_test +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Torque a point, for debugging purposes. The output + * will be equal to the input. + * + * @param [out] q The point to torque. + * @param [in] p The point to torque. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_debugging_torque ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t q, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t p +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Projectively scale a point, for debugging purposes. + * The output will be equal to the input, and will be valid + * even if the factor is zero. + * + * @param [out] q The point to scale. + * @param [in] p The point to scale. + * @param [in] factor Serialized GF factor to scale. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_debugging_pscale ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t q, + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t p, + const unsigned char factor[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_SER_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Almost-Elligator-like hash to curve. + * + * Call this function with the output of a hash to make a hash to the curve. + * + * This function runs Elligator2 on the cryptonite_decaf_448 Jacobi quartic model. It then + * uses the isogeny to put the result in twisted Edwards form. As a result, + * it is safe (cannot produce points of order 4), and would be compatible with + * hypothetical other implementations of Decaf using a Montgomery or untwisted + * Edwards model. + * + * Unlike Elligator, this function may be up to 4:1 on [0,(p-1)/2]: + * A factor of 2 due to the isogeny. + * A factor of 2 because we quotient out the 2-torsion. + * + * This makes it about 8:1 overall, or 16:1 overall on curves with cofactor 8. + * + * Negating the input (mod q) results in the same point. Inverting the input + * (mod q) results in the negative point. This is the same as Elligator. + * + * This function isn't quite indifferentiable from a random oracle. + * However, it is suitable for many protocols, including SPEKE and SPAKE2 EE. + * Furthermore, calling it twice with independent seeds and adding the results + * is indifferentiable from a random oracle. + * + * @param [in] hashed_data Output of some hash function. + * @param [out] pt The data hashed to the curve. + */ +void +cryptonite_decaf_448_point_from_hash_nonuniform ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt, + const unsigned char hashed_data[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_HASH_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Indifferentiable hash function encoding to curve. + * + * Equivalent to calling cryptonite_decaf_448_point_from_hash_nonuniform twice and adding. + * + * @param [in] hashed_data Output of some hash function. + * @param [out] pt The data hashed to the curve. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_from_hash_uniform ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt, + const unsigned char hashed_data[2*CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_HASH_BYTES] +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE; + +/** + * @brief Inverse of elligator-like hash to curve. + * + * This function writes to the buffer, to make it so that + * cryptonite_decaf_448_point_from_hash_nonuniform(buffer) = pt if + * possible. Since there may be multiple preimages, the + * "which" parameter chooses between them. To ensure uniform + * inverse sampling, this function succeeds or fails + * independently for different "which" values. + * + * @param [out] recovered_hash Encoded data. + * @param [in] pt The point to encode. + * @param [in] which A value determining which inverse point + * to return. + * + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The inverse succeeded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The inverse failed. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t +cryptonite_decaf_448_invert_elligator_nonuniform ( + unsigned char recovered_hash[CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_HASH_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt, + uint32_t which +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED; + +/** + * @brief Inverse of elligator-like hash to curve. + * + * This function writes to the buffer, to make it so that + * cryptonite_decaf_448_point_from_hash_uniform(buffer) = pt if + * possible. Since there may be multiple preimages, the + * "which" parameter chooses between them. To ensure uniform + * inverse sampling, this function succeeds or fails + * independently for different "which" values. + * + * @param [out] recovered_hash Encoded data. + * @param [in] pt The point to encode. + * @param [in] which A value determining which inverse point + * to return. + * + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SUCCESS The inverse succeeded. + * @retval CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FAILURE The inverse failed. + */ +cryptonite_decaf_error_t +cryptonite_decaf_448_invert_elligator_uniform ( + unsigned char recovered_hash[2*CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_HASH_BYTES], + const cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t pt, + uint32_t which +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NOINLINE CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WARN_UNUSED; + +/** + * @brief Overwrite scalar with zeros. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_destroy ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_scalar_t scalar +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** + * @brief Overwrite point with zeros. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_point_destroy ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_point_t point +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +/** + * @brief Overwrite precomputed table with zeros. + */ +void cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_destroy ( + cryptonite_decaf_448_precomputed_s *pre +) CRYPTONITE_DECAF_NONNULL CRYPTONITE_DECAF_API_VIS; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} /* extern "C" */ +#endif + +#endif /* __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_POINT_448_H__ */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/sha512.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/sha512.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/sha512.h @@ -0,0 +1,1 @@ +/* Not needed if 448-only */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/shake.h b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/shake.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/decaf/shake.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2006-2009 Vincent Hanquez + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SHAKE_H +#define CRYPTONITE_DECAF_SHAKE_H + +#include "cryptonite_sha3.h" + +#include + +#define CHUNK_SIZE_32 0x80000000 + +typedef struct sha3_shake256_ctx +{ + struct sha3_ctx sc[1]; + uint8_t filler[136]; // 200 - 2*(256/8) +} +cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t[1]; + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_init(cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx) +{ + cryptonite_sha3_init(ctx -> sc, 256); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_update(cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) +{ +#if __SIZE_MAX__ > UINT32_MAX + // split data over 4 GB in 2-GB chunks + while (inlen > UINT32_MAX) { + cryptonite_sha3_update(ctx -> sc, in, CHUNK_SIZE_32); + inlen -= CHUNK_SIZE_32; + in += CHUNK_SIZE_32; + } +#endif + cryptonite_sha3_update(ctx -> sc, in, (uint32_t) inlen); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_output(cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen) { +#if __SIZE_MAX__ > UINT32_MAX + // split data over 4 GB in 2-GB chunks + while (outlen > UINT32_MAX) { + cryptonite_sha3_output(ctx -> sc, out, CHUNK_SIZE_32); + outlen -= CHUNK_SIZE_32; + out += CHUNK_SIZE_32; + } +#endif + cryptonite_sha3_output(ctx -> sc, out, (uint32_t) outlen); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_final(cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen) +{ + cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(ctx -> sc); + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_output(ctx, out, outlen); + + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_init(ctx); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_destroy(cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx) +{ + cryptonite_decaf_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +static inline void cryptonite_decaf_shake256_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t outlen, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) +{ + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_ctx_t ctx; + + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_init(ctx); + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_update(ctx, in, inlen); + + cryptonite_sha3_finalize_shake(ctx -> sc); + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_output(ctx, out, outlen); + + cryptonite_decaf_shake256_destroy(ctx); +} + +#endif diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/field.h b/cbits/decaf/include/field.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/field.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/** + * @file field.h + * @brief Generic gf header. + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * @author Mike Hamburg + */ + +#ifndef __GF_H__ +#define __GF_H__ + +#include "constant_time.h" +#include "f_field.h" +#include + +/** Square x, n times. */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void cryptonite_gf_sqrn ( + cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ y, + const gf x, + int n +) { + gf tmp; + assert(n>0); + if (n&1) { + cryptonite_gf_sqr(y,x); + n--; + } else { + cryptonite_gf_sqr(tmp,x); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(y,tmp); + n-=2; + } + for (; n; n-=2) { + cryptonite_gf_sqr(tmp,y); + cryptonite_gf_sqr(y,tmp); + } +} + +#define cryptonite_gf_add_nr cryptonite_gf_add_RAW + +/** Subtract mod p. Bias by 2 and don't reduce */ +static inline void cryptonite_gf_sub_nr ( gf c, const gf a, const gf b ) { + cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW(c,a,b); + cryptonite_gf_bias(c, 2); + if (GF_HEADROOM < 3) cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(c); +} + +/** Subtract mod p. Bias by amt but don't reduce. */ +static inline void cryptonite_gf_subx_nr ( gf c, const gf a, const gf b, int amt ) { + cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW(c,a,b); + cryptonite_gf_bias(c, amt); + if (GF_HEADROOM < amt+1) cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(c); +} + +/** Mul by signed int. Not constant-time WRT the sign of that int. */ +static inline void cryptonite_gf_mulw(gf c, const gf a, int32_t w) { + if (w>0) { + cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned(c, a, w); + } else { + cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned(c, a, -w); + cryptonite_gf_sub(c,ZERO,c); + } +} + +/** Constant time, x = is_z ? z : y */ +static inline void cryptonite_gf_cond_sel(gf x, const gf y, const gf z, mask_t is_z) { + constant_time_select(x,y,z,sizeof(gf),is_z,0); +} + +/** Constant time, if (neg) x=-x; */ +static inline void cryptonite_gf_cond_neg(gf x, mask_t neg) { + gf y; + cryptonite_gf_sub(y,ZERO,x); + cryptonite_gf_cond_sel(x,x,y,neg); +} + +/** Constant time, if (swap) (x,y) = (y,x); */ +static inline void +cryptonite_gf_cond_swap(gf x, cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ y, mask_t swap) { + constant_time_cond_swap(x,y,sizeof(cryptonite_gf_s),swap); +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void cryptonite_gf_mul_qnr(cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ out, const gf x) { +#if P_MOD_8 == 5 + /* r = QNR * r0^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(out,x,SQRT_MINUS_ONE); +#elif P_MOD_8 == 3 || P_MOD_8 == 7 + cryptonite_gf_sub(out,ZERO,x); +#else + #error "Only supporting p=3,5,7 mod 8" +#endif +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void cryptonite_gf_div_qnr(cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ out, const gf x) { +#if P_MOD_8 == 5 + /* r = QNR * r0^2 */ + cryptonite_gf_mul(out,x,SQRT_MINUS_ONE); + cryptonite_gf_sub(out,ZERO,out); +#elif P_MOD_8 == 3 || P_MOD_8 == 7 + cryptonite_gf_sub(out,ZERO,x); +#else + #error "Only supporting p=3,5,7 mod 8" +#endif +} + + +#endif // __GF_H__ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/portable_endian.h b/cbits/decaf/include/portable_endian.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/portable_endian.h @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +/* portable_endian.h not used */ + +#if defined(__MINGW32__) +// does not exist on MinGW, but unused anyway +extern int posix_memalign(void **, size_t, size_t); +#endif diff --git a/cbits/decaf/include/word.h b/cbits/decaf/include/word.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/include/word.h @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#ifndef __WORD_H__ +#define __WORD_H__ + +/* for posix_memalign */ +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 +#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1 /* for memset_s */ +#include +#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4) +extern int posix_memalign(void **, size_t, size_t); +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "arch_intrinsics.h" + +#include + +#ifndef _BSD_SOURCE +#define _BSD_SOURCE 1 +#endif + +#ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE +#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE 1 +#endif + +#include "portable_endian.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(__ARM_NEON__) +#include +#elif defined(__SSE2__) + #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __clang__ || __GNUC__ >= 5 || (__GNUC__==4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 4) + #include + #else + #include + #endif +#endif + +#if (ARCH_WORD_BITS == 64) + typedef uint64_t word_t, mask_t; + typedef __uint128_t dword_t; + typedef int32_t hsword_t; + typedef int64_t sword_t; + typedef __int128_t dsword_t; +#elif (ARCH_WORD_BITS == 32) + typedef uint32_t word_t, mask_t; + typedef uint64_t dword_t; + typedef int16_t hsword_t; + typedef int32_t sword_t; + typedef int64_t dsword_t; +#else + #error "For now, libdecaf only supports 32- and 64-bit architectures." +#endif + +/* Scalar limbs are keyed off of the API word size instead of the arch word size. */ +#if CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS == 64 + #define SC_LIMB(x) (x##ull) +#elif CRYPTONITE_DECAF_WORD_BITS == 32 + #define SC_LIMB(x) ((uint32_t)x##ull),(x##ull>>32) +#else + #error "For now, libdecaf only supports 32- and 64-bit architectures." +#endif + +#ifdef __ARM_NEON__ + typedef uint32x4_t vecmask_t; +#elif __clang__ + typedef uint64_t uint64x2_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(2))); + typedef int64_t int64x2_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(2))); + typedef uint64_t uint64x4_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(4))); + typedef int64_t int64x4_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(4))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x4_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(4))); + typedef int32_t int32x4_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(4))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x2_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(2))); + typedef int32_t int32x2_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(2))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x8_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(8))); + typedef int32_t int32x8_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(8))); + typedef word_t vecmask_t __attribute__((ext_vector_type(4))); +#else /* GCC, hopefully? */ + typedef uint64_t uint64x2_t __attribute__((vector_size(16))); + typedef int64_t int64x2_t __attribute__((vector_size(16))); + typedef uint64_t uint64x4_t __attribute__((vector_size(32))); + typedef int64_t int64x4_t __attribute__((vector_size(32))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x4_t __attribute__((vector_size(16))); + typedef int32_t int32x4_t __attribute__((vector_size(16))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x2_t __attribute__((vector_size(8))); + typedef int32_t int32x2_t __attribute__((vector_size(8))); + typedef uint32_t uint32x8_t __attribute__((vector_size(32))); + typedef int32_t int32x8_t __attribute__((vector_size(32))); + typedef word_t vecmask_t __attribute__((vector_size(32))); +#endif + +#if __AVX2__ + #define VECTOR_ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(32))) + typedef uint32x8_t big_register_t; + typedef uint64x4_t uint64xn_t; + typedef uint32x8_t uint32xn_t; + + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_set_to_mask(mask_t x) { + uint32_t y = (uint32_t)x; + big_register_t ret = {y,y,y,y,y,y,y,y}; + return ret; + } +#elif __SSE2__ + #define VECTOR_ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(16))) + typedef uint32x4_t big_register_t; + typedef uint64x2_t uint64xn_t; + typedef uint32x4_t uint32xn_t; + + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_set_to_mask(mask_t x) { + uint32_t y = x; + big_register_t ret = {y,y,y,y}; + return ret; + } +#elif __ARM_NEON__ + #define VECTOR_ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(16))) + typedef uint32x4_t big_register_t; + typedef uint64x2_t uint64xn_t; + typedef uint32x4_t uint32xn_t; + + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_set_to_mask(mask_t x) { + return vdupq_n_u32(x); + } +#elif _WIN64 || __amd64__ || __X86_64__ || __aarch64__ + #define VECTOR_ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(8))) + typedef uint64_t big_register_t, uint64xn_t; + + typedef uint32_t uint32xn_t; + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_set_to_mask(mask_t x) { + return (big_register_t)x; + } +#else + #define VECTOR_ALIGNED __attribute__((aligned(4))) + typedef uint64_t uint64xn_t; + typedef uint32_t uint32xn_t; + typedef uint32_t big_register_t; + + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_set_to_mask(mask_t x) { + return (big_register_t)x; + } +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint64xn_t unaligned; +} __attribute__((packed)) unaligned_uint64xn_t; + +typedef struct { + uint32xn_t unaligned; +} __attribute__((packed)) unaligned_uint32xn_t; + +#if __AVX2__ + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_is_zero(big_register_t x) { + return (big_register_t)(x == br_set_to_mask(0)); + } +#elif __SSE2__ + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_is_zero(big_register_t x) { + return (big_register_t)_mm_cmpeq_epi32((__m128i)x, _mm_setzero_si128()); + //return (big_register_t)(x == br_set_to_mask(0)); + } +#elif __ARM_NEON__ + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE big_register_t + br_is_zero(big_register_t x) { + return vceqq_u32(x,x^x); + } +#else + #define br_is_zero word_is_zero +#endif + +/** + * Really call memset, in a way that prevents the compiler from optimizing it out. + * @param p The object to zeroize. + * @param c The char to set it to (probably zero). + * @param s The size of the object. + */ +#if defined(__DARWIN_C_LEVEL) || defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) +#define HAS_MEMSET_S +#endif + +#if !defined(__STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__) || __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ != 1 +#define NEED_MEMSET_S_EXTERN +#endif + +#ifdef HAS_MEMSET_S + #ifdef NEED_MEMSET_S_EXTERN + extern int memset_s(void *, size_t, int, size_t); + #endif + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void + really_memset(void *p, char c, size_t s) { + memset_s(p, s, c, s); + } +#else + /* PERF: use words? */ + static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void + really_memset(void *p, char c, size_t s) { + volatile char *pv = (volatile char *)p; + size_t i; + for (i=0; i 305 +#define UNROLL _Pragma("clang loop unroll(full)") +#endif +#endif + +#ifndef UNROLL +#define UNROLL +#endif + +/* The plan on booleans: + * + * The external interface uses cryptonite_decaf_bool_t, but this might be a different + * size than our particular arch's word_t (and thus mask_t). Also, the caller + * isn't guaranteed to pass it as nonzero. So bool_to_mask converts word sizes + * and checks nonzero. + * + * On the flip side, mask_t is always -1 or 0, but it might be a different size + * than cryptonite_decaf_bool_t. + * + * On the third hand, we have success vs boolean types, but that's handled in + * common.h: it converts between cryptonite_decaf_bool_t and cryptonite_decaf_error_t. + */ +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE cryptonite_decaf_bool_t mask_to_bool (mask_t m) { + return (cryptonite_decaf_sword_t)(sword_t)m; +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE mask_t bool_to_mask (cryptonite_decaf_bool_t m) { + /* On most arches this will be optimized to a simple cast. */ + mask_t ret = 0; + unsigned int limit = sizeof(cryptonite_decaf_bool_t)/sizeof(mask_t); + if (limit < 1) limit = 1; + for (unsigned int i=0; i> (i*8*sizeof(word_t))); + } + return ret; +} + +static CRYPTONITE_DECAF_INLINE void ignore_result ( cryptonite_decaf_bool_t boo ) { + (void)boo; +} + +#endif /* __WORD_H__ */ diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.c b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.c @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#include "f_field.h" + +#if (defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) && !I_HATE_UNROLLED_LOOPS) \ + || defined(CRYPTONITE_DECAF_FORCE_UNROLL) +#define REPEAT8(_x) _x _x _x _x _x _x _x _x +#define FOR_LIMB(_i,_start,_end,_x) do { _i=_start; REPEAT8( if (_i<_end) { _x; } _i++;) } while (0) +#else +#define FOR_LIMB(_i,_start,_end,_x) do { for (_i=_start; _i<_end; _i++) _x; } while (0) +#endif + +void cryptonite_gf_mul (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as, const gf bs) { + const uint32_t *a = as->limb, *b = bs->limb; + uint32_t *c = cs->limb; + + uint64_t accum0 = 0, accum1 = 0, accum2 = 0; + uint32_t mask = (1<<28) - 1; + + uint32_t aa[8], bb[8]; + + int i,j; + for (i=0; i<8; i++) { + aa[i] = a[i] + a[i+8]; + bb[i] = b[i] + b[i+8]; + } + + FOR_LIMB(j,0,8,{ + accum2 = 0; + + FOR_LIMB (i,0,j+1,{ + accum2 += widemul(a[j-i],b[i]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[j-i],bb[i]); + accum0 += widemul(a[8+j-i], b[8+i]); + }); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + accum2 = 0; + + FOR_LIMB (i,j+1,8,{ + accum0 -= widemul(a[8+j-i], b[i]); + accum2 += widemul(aa[8+j-i], bb[i]); + accum1 += widemul(a[16+j-i], b[8+i]); + }); + + accum1 += accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[j] = ((uint32_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[j+8] = ((uint32_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 28; + accum1 >>= 28; + }); + + accum0 += accum1; + accum0 += c[8]; + accum1 += c[0]; + c[8] = ((uint32_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[0] = ((uint32_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 28; + accum1 >>= 28; + c[9] += ((uint32_t)(accum0)); + c[1] += ((uint32_t)(accum1)); +} + +void cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as, uint32_t b) { + assert(b<1<<28); + + const uint32_t *a = as->limb; + uint32_t *c = cs->limb; + + uint64_t accum0 = 0, accum8 = 0; + uint32_t mask = (1ull<<28)-1; + + int i; + FOR_LIMB(i,0,8,{ + accum0 += widemul(b, a[i]); + accum8 += widemul(b, a[i+8]); + + c[i] = accum0 & mask; accum0 >>= 28; + c[i+8] = accum8 & mask; accum8 >>= 28; + }); + + accum0 += accum8 + c[8]; + c[8] = accum0 & mask; + c[9] += accum0 >> 28; + + accum8 += c[0]; + c[0] = accum8 & mask; + c[1] += accum8 >> 28; +} + +void cryptonite_gf_sqr (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as) { + cryptonite_gf_mul(cs,as,as); /* Performs better with a dedicated square */ +} + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.h b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#define GF_HEADROOM 2 +#define LIMB(x) (x##ull)&((1ull<<28)-1), (x##ull)>>28 +#define FIELD_LITERAL(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) \ + {{LIMB(a),LIMB(b),LIMB(c),LIMB(d),LIMB(e),LIMB(f),LIMB(g),LIMB(h)}} + +#define LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(i) 28 + +void cryptonite_gf_add_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b) { + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[0]); i++) { + out->limb[i] = a->limb[i] + b->limb[i]; + } +} + +void cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b) { + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[0]); i++) { + out->limb[i] = a->limb[i] - b->limb[i]; + } +} + +void cryptonite_gf_bias (gf a, int amt) { + uint32_t co1 = ((1ull<<28)-1)*amt, co2 = co1-amt; + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[0]); i++) { + a->limb[i] += (i==sizeof(*a)/sizeof(a->limb[0])/2) ? co2 : co1; + } +} + +void cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce (gf a) { + uint32_t mask = (1ull<<28) - 1; + uint32_t tmp = a->limb[15] >> 28; + a->limb[8] += tmp; + for (unsigned int i=15; i>0; i--) { + a->limb[i] = (a->limb[i] & mask) + (a->limb[i-1]>>28); + } + a->limb[0] = (a->limb[0] & mask) + tmp; +} + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.c b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.c @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#include "f_field.h" + +void cryptonite_gf_mul (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as, const gf bs) { + const uint64_t *a = as->limb, *b = bs->limb; + uint64_t *c = cs->limb; + + __uint128_t accum0 = 0, accum1 = 0, accum2; + uint64_t mask = (1ull<<56) - 1; + + uint64_t aa[4], bb[4], bbb[4]; + + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; i<4; i++) { + aa[i] = a[i] + a[i+4]; + bb[i] = b[i] + b[i+4]; + bbb[i] = bb[i] + b[i+4]; + } + + int I_HATE_UNROLLED_LOOPS = 0; + + if (I_HATE_UNROLLED_LOOPS) { + /* The compiler probably won't unroll this, + * so it's like 80% slower. + */ + for (i=0; i<4; i++) { + accum2 = 0; + + unsigned int j; + for (j=0; j<=i; j++) { + accum2 += widemul(a[j], b[i-j]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[j], bb[i-j]); + accum0 += widemul(a[j+4], b[i-j+4]); + } + for (; j<4; j++) { + accum2 += widemul(a[j], b[i-j+8]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[j], bbb[i-j+4]); + accum0 += widemul(a[j+4], bb[i-j+4]); + } + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[i] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[i+4] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + } + } else { + accum2 = widemul(a[0], b[0]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[0], bb[0]); + accum0 += widemul(a[4], b[4]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], b[7]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[1], bbb[3]); + accum0 += widemul(a[5], bb[3]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[2], b[6]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[2], bbb[2]); + accum0 += widemul(a[6], bb[2]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[3], b[5]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[3], bbb[1]); + accum0 += widemul(a[7], bb[1]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[0] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[4] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum2 = widemul(a[0], b[1]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[0], bb[1]); + accum0 += widemul(a[4], b[5]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], b[0]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[1], bb[0]); + accum0 += widemul(a[5], b[4]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[2], b[7]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[2], bbb[3]); + accum0 += widemul(a[6], bb[3]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[3], b[6]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[3], bbb[2]); + accum0 += widemul(a[7], bb[2]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[1] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[5] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum2 = widemul(a[0], b[2]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[0], bb[2]); + accum0 += widemul(a[4], b[6]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], b[1]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[1], bb[1]); + accum0 += widemul(a[5], b[5]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[2], b[0]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[2], bb[0]); + accum0 += widemul(a[6], b[4]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[3], b[7]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[3], bbb[3]); + accum0 += widemul(a[7], bb[3]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[2] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[6] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum2 = widemul(a[0], b[3]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[0], bb[3]); + accum0 += widemul(a[4], b[7]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], b[2]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[1], bb[2]); + accum0 += widemul(a[5], b[6]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[2], b[1]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[2], bb[1]); + accum0 += widemul(a[6], b[5]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[3], b[0]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[3], bb[0]); + accum0 += widemul(a[7], b[4]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[3] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[7] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + } /* !I_HATE_UNROLLED_LOOPS */ + + accum0 += accum1; + accum0 += c[4]; + accum1 += c[0]; + c[4] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[0] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + c[5] += ((uint64_t)(accum0)); + c[1] += ((uint64_t)(accum1)); +} + +void cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as, uint32_t b) { + const uint64_t *a = as->limb; + uint64_t *c = cs->limb; + + __uint128_t accum0 = 0, accum4 = 0; + uint64_t mask = (1ull<<56) - 1; + + int i; + for (i=0; i<4; i++) { + accum0 += widemul(b, a[i]); + accum4 += widemul(b, a[i+4]); + c[i] = accum0 & mask; accum0 >>= 56; + c[i+4] = accum4 & mask; accum4 >>= 56; + } + + accum0 += accum4 + c[4]; + c[4] = accum0 & mask; + c[5] += accum0 >> 56; + + accum4 += c[0]; + c[0] = accum4 & mask; + c[1] += accum4 >> 56; +} + +void cryptonite_gf_sqr (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ cs, const gf as) { + const uint64_t *a = as->limb; + uint64_t *c = cs->limb; + + __uint128_t accum0 = 0, accum1 = 0, accum2; + uint64_t mask = (1ull<<56) - 1; + + uint64_t aa[4]; + + /* For some reason clang doesn't vectorize this without prompting? */ + unsigned int i; + for (i=0; i<4; i++) { + aa[i] = a[i] + a[i+4]; + } + + accum2 = widemul(a[0],a[3]); + accum0 = widemul(aa[0],aa[3]); + accum1 = widemul(a[4],a[7]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], a[2]); + accum0 += widemul(aa[1], aa[2]); + accum1 += widemul(a[5], a[6]); + + accum0 -= accum2; + accum1 += accum2; + + c[3] = ((uint64_t)(accum1))<<1 & mask; + c[7] = ((uint64_t)(accum0))<<1 & mask; + + accum0 >>= 55; + accum1 >>= 55; + + accum0 += widemul(2*aa[1],aa[3]); + accum1 += widemul(2*a[5], a[7]); + accum0 += widemul(aa[2], aa[2]); + accum1 += accum0; + + accum0 -= widemul(2*a[1], a[3]); + accum1 += widemul(a[6], a[6]); + + accum2 = widemul(a[0],a[0]); + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + accum0 -= widemul(a[2], a[2]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[0], aa[0]); + accum0 += widemul(a[4], a[4]); + + c[0] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[4] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum2 = widemul(2*aa[2],aa[3]); + accum0 -= widemul(2*a[2], a[3]); + accum1 += widemul(2*a[6], a[7]); + + accum1 += accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + accum2 = widemul(2*a[0],a[1]); + accum1 += widemul(2*aa[0], aa[1]); + accum0 += widemul(2*a[4], a[5]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[1] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[5] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum2 = widemul(aa[3],aa[3]); + accum0 -= widemul(a[3], a[3]); + accum1 += widemul(a[7], a[7]); + + accum1 += accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + accum2 = widemul(2*a[0],a[2]); + accum1 += widemul(2*aa[0], aa[2]); + accum0 += widemul(2*a[4], a[6]); + + accum2 += widemul(a[1], a[1]); + accum1 += widemul(aa[1], aa[1]); + accum0 += widemul(a[5], a[5]); + + accum1 -= accum2; + accum0 += accum2; + + c[2] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[6] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + + accum0 += c[3]; + accum1 += c[7]; + c[3] = ((uint64_t)(accum0)) & mask; + c[7] = ((uint64_t)(accum1)) & mask; + + /* we could almost stop here, but it wouldn't be stable, so... */ + + accum0 >>= 56; + accum1 >>= 56; + c[4] += ((uint64_t)(accum0)) + ((uint64_t)(accum1)); + c[0] += ((uint64_t)(accum1)); +} + diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.h b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2014-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +#define GF_HEADROOM 9999 /* Everything is reduced anyway */ +#define FIELD_LITERAL(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) {{a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h}} + +#define LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(i) 56 + +void cryptonite_gf_add_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b) { + for (unsigned int i=0; i<8; i++) { + out->limb[i] = a->limb[i] + b->limb[i]; + } + cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(out); +} + +void cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b) { + uint64_t co1 = ((1ull<<56)-1)*2, co2 = co1-2; + for (unsigned int i=0; i<8; i++) { + out->limb[i] = a->limb[i] - b->limb[i] + ((i==4) ? co2 : co1); + } + cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(out); +} + +void cryptonite_gf_bias (gf a, int amt) { + (void) a; + (void) amt; +} + +void cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce (gf a) { + uint64_t mask = (1ull<<56) - 1; + uint64_t tmp = a->limb[7] >> 56; + a->limb[4] += tmp; + for (unsigned int i=7; i>0; i--) { + a->limb[i] = (a->limb[i] & mask) + (a->limb[i-1]>>56); + } + a->limb[0] = (a->limb[0] & mask) + tmp; +} diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c b/cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * @cond internal + * @file f_arithmetic.c + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * @author Mike Hamburg + * @brief Field-specific arithmetic. + */ + +#include "field.h" + +mask_t cryptonite_gf_isr ( + gf a, + const gf x +) { + gf L0, L1, L2; + cryptonite_gf_sqr (L1, x ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L2, x, L1 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr (L1, L2 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L2, x, L1 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L1, L2, 3 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L0, L2, L1 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L1, L0, 3 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L0, L2, L1 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L2, L0, 9 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L1, L0, L2 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr (L0, L1 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L2, x, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L0, L2, 18 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L2, L1, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L0, L2, 37 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L1, L2, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L0, L1, 37 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L1, L2, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L0, L1, 111 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L2, L1, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr (L0, L2 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L1, x, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqrn (L0, L1, 223 ); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L1, L2, L0 ); + cryptonite_gf_sqr (L2, L1); + cryptonite_gf_mul (L0, L2, x); + cryptonite_gf_copy(a,L1); + return cryptonite_gf_eq(L0,ONE); +} diff --git a/cbits/decaf/p448/f_field.h b/cbits/decaf/p448/f_field.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/p448/f_field.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/** + * @file p448/f_field.h + * @author Mike Hamburg + * + * @copyright + * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Cryptography Research, Inc. \n + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + * + * @brief Field-specific code for 2^448 - 2^224 - 1. + * + * @warning This file was automatically generated in Python. + * Please do not edit it. + */ + +#ifndef __P448_F_FIELD_H__ +#define __P448_F_FIELD_H__ 1 + +#include "constant_time.h" +#include +#include + +#include "word.h" + +#define __CRYPTONITE_DECAF_448_GF_DEFINED__ 1 +#define NLIMBS (64/sizeof(word_t)) +#define X_SER_BYTES 56 +#define SER_BYTES 56 +typedef struct cryptonite_gf_448_s { + word_t limb[NLIMBS]; +} __attribute__((aligned(16))) cryptonite_gf_448_s, cryptonite_gf_448_t[1]; + +#define GF_LIT_LIMB_BITS 56 +#define GF_BITS 448 +#define ZERO cryptonite_gf_448_ZERO +#define ONE cryptonite_gf_448_ONE +#define MODULUS cryptonite_gf_448_MODULUS +#define gf cryptonite_gf_448_t +#define cryptonite_gf_s cryptonite_gf_448_s +#define cryptonite_gf_eq cryptonite_gf_448_eq +#define cryptonite_gf_hibit cryptonite_gf_448_hibit +#define cryptonite_gf_copy cryptonite_gf_448_copy +#define cryptonite_gf_add cryptonite_gf_448_add +#define cryptonite_gf_sub cryptonite_gf_448_sub +#define cryptonite_gf_add_RAW cryptonite_gf_448_add_RAW +#define cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW cryptonite_gf_448_sub_RAW +#define cryptonite_gf_bias cryptonite_gf_448_bias +#define cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce cryptonite_gf_448_weak_reduce +#define cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce cryptonite_gf_448_strong_reduce +#define cryptonite_gf_mul cryptonite_gf_448_mul +#define cryptonite_gf_sqr cryptonite_gf_448_sqr +#define cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned cryptonite_gf_448_mulw_unsigned +#define cryptonite_gf_isr cryptonite_gf_448_isr +#define cryptonite_gf_serialize cryptonite_gf_448_serialize +#define cryptonite_gf_deserialize cryptonite_gf_448_deserialize + +/* RFC 7748 support */ +#define X_PUBLIC_BYTES X_SER_BYTES +#define X_PRIVATE_BYTES X_PUBLIC_BYTES +#define X_PRIVATE_BITS 448 + +#define SQRT_MINUS_ONE P448_SQRT_MINUS_ONE /* might not be defined */ + +#define INLINE_UNUSED __inline__ __attribute__((unused,always_inline)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Defined below in f_impl.h */ +static INLINE_UNUSED void cryptonite_gf_copy (gf out, const gf a) { *out = *a; } +static INLINE_UNUSED void cryptonite_gf_add_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b); +static INLINE_UNUSED void cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW (gf out, const gf a, const gf b); +static INLINE_UNUSED void cryptonite_gf_bias (gf inout, int amount); +static INLINE_UNUSED void cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce (gf inout); + +void cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce (gf inout); +void cryptonite_gf_add (gf out, const gf a, const gf b); +void cryptonite_gf_sub (gf out, const gf a, const gf b); +void cryptonite_gf_mul (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ out, const gf a, const gf b); +void cryptonite_gf_mulw_unsigned (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ out, const gf a, uint32_t b); +void cryptonite_gf_sqr (cryptonite_gf_s *__restrict__ out, const gf a); +mask_t cryptonite_gf_isr(gf a, const gf x); /** a^2 x = 1, QNR, or 0 if x=0. Return true if successful */ +mask_t cryptonite_gf_eq (const gf x, const gf y); +mask_t cryptonite_gf_hibit (const gf x); + +void cryptonite_gf_serialize (uint8_t *serial, const gf x,int with_highbit); +mask_t cryptonite_gf_deserialize (gf x, const uint8_t serial[SER_BYTES],int with_highbit); + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} /* extern "C" */ +#endif + +#include "f_impl.h" /* Bring in the inline implementations */ + +#define P_MOD_8 7 +#if P_MOD_8 == 5 + extern const gf SQRT_MINUS_ONE; +#endif + +#ifndef LIMBPERM + #define LIMBPERM(i) (i) +#endif +#define LIMB_MASK(i) (((1ull)<limb[LIMBPERM(j)]) << fill; + fill += LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(LIMBPERM(j)); + j++; + } + serial[i] = buffer; + fill -= 8; + buffer >>= 8; + } +} + +/** Return high bit of x = low bit of 2x mod p */ +mask_t cryptonite_gf_hibit(const gf x) { + gf y; + cryptonite_gf_add(y,x,x); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(y); + return -(y->limb[0]&1); +} + +/** Deserialize from wire format; return -1 on success and 0 on failure. */ +mask_t cryptonite_gf_deserialize (gf x, const uint8_t serial[SER_BYTES], int with_hibit) { + unsigned int j=0, fill=0; + dword_t buffer = 0; + dsword_t scarry = 0; + UNROLL for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[LIMBPERM(i)] = (i>= LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(LIMBPERM(i)); + scarry = (scarry + x->limb[LIMBPERM(i)] - MODULUS->limb[LIMBPERM(i)]) >> (8*sizeof(word_t)); + } + mask_t succ = with_hibit ? -(mask_t)1 : ~cryptonite_gf_hibit(x); + return succ & word_is_zero(buffer) & ~word_is_zero(scarry); +} + +/** Reduce to canonical form. */ +void cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce (gf a) { + /* first, clear high */ + cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce(a); /* Determined to have negligible perf impact. */ + + /* now the total is less than 2p */ + + /* compute total_value - p. No need to reduce mod p. */ + dsword_t scarry = 0; + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[LIMBPERM(i)] - MODULUS->limb[LIMBPERM(i)]; + a->limb[LIMBPERM(i)] = scarry & LIMB_MASK(LIMBPERM(i)); + scarry >>= LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(LIMBPERM(i)); + } + + /* uncommon case: it was >= p, so now scarry = 0 and this = x + * common case: it was < p, so now scarry = -1 and this = x - p + 2^255 + * so let's add back in p. will carry back off the top for 2^255. + */ + assert(word_is_zero(scarry) | word_is_zero(scarry+1)); + + word_t scarry_0 = scarry; + dword_t carry = 0; + + /* add it back */ + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[LIMBPERM(i)] + (scarry_0 & MODULUS->limb[LIMBPERM(i)]); + a->limb[LIMBPERM(i)] = carry & LIMB_MASK(LIMBPERM(i)); + carry >>= LIMB_PLACE_VALUE(LIMBPERM(i)); + } + + assert(word_is_zero(carry + scarry_0)); +} + +/** Subtract two gf elements d=a-b */ +void cryptonite_gf_sub (gf d, const gf a, const gf b) { + cryptonite_gf_sub_RAW ( d, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_bias( d, 2 ); + cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce ( d ); +} + +/** Add two field elements d = a+b */ +void cryptonite_gf_add (gf d, const gf a, const gf b) { + cryptonite_gf_add_RAW ( d, a, b ); + cryptonite_gf_weak_reduce ( d ); +} + +/** Compare a==b */ +mask_t cryptonite_gf_eq(const gf a, const gf b) { + gf c; + cryptonite_gf_sub(c,a,b); + cryptonite_gf_strong_reduce(c); + mask_t ret=0; + for (unsigned int i=0; ilimb[LIMBPERM(i)]; + } + + return word_is_zero(ret); +} diff --git a/cbits/decaf/utils.c b/cbits/decaf/utils.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/decaf/utils.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2015 Cryptography Research, Inc. + * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. + */ + +/** + * @file utils.c + * @author Mike Hamburg + * @brief Decaf utility functions. + */ + +#include + +void cryptonite_decaf_bzero ( + void *s, + size_t size +) { +#ifdef __STDC_LIB_EXT1__ + memset_s(s, size, 0, size); +#else + const size_t sw = sizeof(cryptonite_decaf_word_t); + volatile uint8_t *destroy = (volatile uint8_t *)s; + for (; size && ((uintptr_t)destroy)%sw; size--, destroy++) + *destroy = 0; + for (; size >= sw; size -= sw, destroy += sw) + *(volatile cryptonite_decaf_word_t *)destroy = 0; + for (; size; size--, destroy++) + *destroy = 0; +#endif +} + +cryptonite_decaf_bool_t cryptonite_decaf_memeq ( + const void *data1_, + const void *data2_, + size_t size +) { + const unsigned char *data1 = (const unsigned char *)data1_; + const unsigned char *data2 = (const unsigned char *)data2_; + unsigned char ret = 0; + for (; size; size--, data1++, data2++) { + ret |= *data1 ^ *data2; + } + return (((cryptonite_decaf_dword_t)ret) - 1) >> 8; +} diff --git a/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-cryptonite-exts.h b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-cryptonite-exts.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-cryptonite-exts.h @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +/* + Public domain by Olivier Chéron + + Arithmetic extensions to Ed25519-donna +*/ + + +/* + Scalar functions +*/ + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_scalar_encode) (unsigned char out[32], const bignum256modm in) { + contract256_modm(out, in); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_scalar_decode_long) (bignum256modm out, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { + expand256_modm(out, in, len); +} + +int +ED25519_FN(ed25519_scalar_eq) (const bignum256modm a, const bignum256modm b) { + bignum256modm_element_t e = 0; + + for (int i = 0; i < bignum256modm_limb_size; i++) { + e |= a[i] ^ b[i]; + } + + return (int) (1 & ((e - 1) >> bignum256modm_bits_per_limb)); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_scalar_add) (bignum256modm r, const bignum256modm x, const bignum256modm y) { + add256_modm(r, x, y); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_scalar_mul) (bignum256modm r, const bignum256modm x, const bignum256modm y) { + mul256_modm(r, x, y); +} + + +/* + Point functions +*/ + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_encode) (unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p) { + ge25519_pack(r, p); +} + +int +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_decode_vartime) (ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]) { + unsigned char p_neg[32]; + + // invert parity bit of X coordinate so the point is negated twice + // (once here, once in ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime) + for (int i = 0; i < 31; i++) { + p_neg[i] = p[i]; + } + p_neg[31] = p[31] ^ 0x80; + + return ge25519_unpack_negative_vartime(r, p_neg); +} + +int +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_eq) (const ge25519 *p, const ge25519 *q) { + bignum25519 a, b; + unsigned char contract_a[32], contract_b[32]; + int eq; + + // pX * qZ = qX * pZ + curve25519_mul(a, p->x, q->z); + curve25519_contract(contract_a, a); + curve25519_mul(b, q->x, p->z); + curve25519_contract(contract_b, b); + eq = ed25519_verify(contract_a, contract_b, 32); + + // pY * qZ = qY * pZ + curve25519_mul(a, p->y, q->z); + curve25519_contract(contract_a, a); + curve25519_mul(b, q->y, p->z); + curve25519_contract(contract_b, b); + eq &= ed25519_verify(contract_a, contract_b, 32); + + return eq; +} + +static int +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_is_identity) (const ge25519 *p) { + static const unsigned char zero[32] = {0}; + unsigned char check[32]; + bignum25519 d; + int eq; + + // pX = 0 + curve25519_contract(check, p->x); + eq = ed25519_verify(check, zero, 32); + + // pY - pZ = 0 + curve25519_sub_reduce(d, p->y, p->z); + curve25519_contract(check, d); + eq &= ed25519_verify(check, zero, 32); + + return eq; +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_negate) (ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p) { + curve25519_neg(r->x, p->x); + curve25519_copy(r->y, p->y); + curve25519_copy(r->z, p->z); + curve25519_neg(r->t, p->t); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_add) (ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p, const ge25519 *q) { + ge25519_add(r, p, q); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_double) (ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p) { + ge25519_double(r, p); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_mul_by_cofactor) (ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p) { + ge25519_double_partial(r, p); + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double(r, r); +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_base_scalarmul) (ge25519 *r, const bignum256modm s) { + ge25519_scalarmult_base_niels(r, ge25519_niels_base_multiples, s); +} + +#if defined(ED25519_64BIT) +typedef uint64_t ed25519_move_cond_word; +#else +typedef uint32_t ed25519_move_cond_word; +#endif + +/* out = (flag) ? in : out */ +DONNA_INLINE static void +ed25519_move_cond_pniels(ge25519_pniels *out, const ge25519_pniels *in, uint32_t flag) { + const int word_count = sizeof(ge25519_pniels) / sizeof(ed25519_move_cond_word); + const ed25519_move_cond_word nb = (ed25519_move_cond_word) flag - 1, b = ~nb; + + ed25519_move_cond_word *outw = (ed25519_move_cond_word *) out; + const ed25519_move_cond_word *inw = (const ed25519_move_cond_word *) in; + + // ge25519_pniels has 4 coordinates, so word_count is divisible by 4 + for (int i = 0; i < word_count; i += 4) { + outw[i + 0] = (outw[i + 0] & nb) | (inw[i + 0] & b); + outw[i + 1] = (outw[i + 1] & nb) | (inw[i + 1] & b); + outw[i + 2] = (outw[i + 2] & nb) | (inw[i + 2] & b); + outw[i + 3] = (outw[i + 3] & nb) | (inw[i + 3] & b); + } +} + +static void +ed25519_point_scalarmul_w_choose_pniels(ge25519_pniels *t, const ge25519_pniels table[15], uint32_t pos) { + // initialize t to identity, i.e. (1, 1, 1, 0) + memset(t, 0, sizeof(ge25519_pniels)); + t->ysubx[0] = 1; + t->xaddy[0] = 1; + t->z[0] = 1; + + // move one entry from table matching requested position, + // scanning all table to avoid cache-timing attack + // + // when pos == 0, no entry matches and this returns + // identity as expected + for (uint32_t i = 1; i < 16; i++) { + uint32_t flag = ((i ^ pos) - 1) >> 31; + ed25519_move_cond_pniels(t, table + i - 1, flag); + } +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_scalarmul) (ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p, const bignum256modm s) { + ge25519_pniels mult[15]; + ge25519_pniels pn; + ge25519_p1p1 t; + unsigned char ss[32]; + + // transform scalar as little-endian number + contract256_modm(ss, s); + + // initialize r to identity, i.e. ge25519 (0, 1, 1, 0) + memset(r, 0, sizeof(ge25519)); + r->y[0] = 1; + r->z[0] = 1; + + // precompute multiples of P: 1.P, 2.P, ..., 15.P + ge25519_full_to_pniels(&mult[0], p); + for (int i = 1; i < 15; i++) { + ge25519_pnielsadd(&mult[i], p, &mult[i-1]); + } + + // 4-bit fixed window, still 256 doublings but 64 additions + for (int i = 31; i >= 0; i--) { + // higher bits in ss[i] + ed25519_point_scalarmul_w_choose_pniels(&pn, mult, ss[i] >> 4); + ge25519_pnielsadd_p1p1(&t, r, &pn, 0); + ge25519_p1p1_to_partial(r, &t); + + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double(r, r); + + // lower bits in ss[i] + ed25519_point_scalarmul_w_choose_pniels(&pn, mult, ss[i] & 0x0F); + ge25519_pnielsadd_p1p1(&t, r, &pn, 0); + if (i > 0) { + ge25519_p1p1_to_partial(r, &t); + + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double_partial(r, r); + ge25519_double(r, r); + } else { + ge25519_p1p1_to_full(r, &t); + } + } +} + +void +ED25519_FN(ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime) (ge25519 *r, const bignum256modm s1, const ge25519 *p2, const bignum256modm s2) { + // computes [s1]basepoint + [s2]p2 + ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(r, p2, s2, s1); +} + +int +ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_has_prime_order) (const ge25519 *p) { + static const bignum256modm sc_zero = {0}; + ge25519 q; + + // computes Q = m.P, vartime allowed because m is not secret + ED25519_FN(ed25519_base_double_scalarmul_vartime) (&q, sc_zero, p, modm_m); + + return ED25519_FN(ed25519_point_is_identity) (&q); +} diff --git a/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-donna-impl-base.h b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-donna-impl-base.h --- a/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-donna-impl-base.h +++ b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519-donna-impl-base.h @@ -287,7 +287,13 @@ ge25519_nielsadd2_p1p1(&t, r, &ge25519_niels_sliding_multiples[abs(slide2[i]) / 2], (unsigned char)slide2[i] >> 7); } - ge25519_p1p1_to_partial(r, &t); + // diverges from the original source code and resolves bug explained + // in + if (i == 0) { + ge25519_p1p1_to_full(r, &t); + } else { + ge25519_p1p1_to_partial(r, &t); + } } } diff --git a/cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c --- a/cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c +++ b/cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "ed25519.h" #include "ed25519-randombytes.h" #include "ed25519-hash.h" +#include "ed25519-cryptonite-exts.h" /* Generates a (extsk[0..31]) and aExt (extsk[32..63]) diff --git a/cbits/ed448/x448.c b/cbits/ed448/x448.c deleted file mode 100644 --- a/cbits/ed448/x448.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,311 +0,0 @@ -/* Copyright (c) 2015 Cryptography Research, Inc. - * Released under the MIT License. See LICENSE.txt for license information. - */ - -/** - * @file decaf.c - * @author Mike Hamburg - * @brief Decaf high-level functions. - */ - -#include -#include "x448.h" - -#ifdef ARCH_X86_64 -#define WBITS 64 -#else -#define WBITS 32 -#endif - -#define LBITS (WBITS * 7 / 8) -#define X448_LIMBS (448/LBITS) - -#if WBITS == 64 -typedef uint64_t decaf_word_t; -typedef int64_t decaf_sword_t; -typedef __uint128_t decaf_dword_t; -typedef __int128_t decaf_sdword_t; -#elif WBITS == 32 -typedef uint32_t decaf_word_t; -typedef int32_t decaf_sword_t; -typedef uint64_t decaf_dword_t; -typedef int64_t decaf_sdword_t; -#else -#error "WBITS must be 32 or 64" -#endif - -typedef struct { decaf_word_t limb[X448_LIMBS]; } gf_s, gf[1]; - -static const unsigned char X448_BASE_POINT[X448_BYTES] = {5}; - -static const gf ZERO = {{{0}}}, ONE = {{{1}}}; - -#define LMASK ((((decaf_word_t)1)<limb[i] = y->limb[i]); -} - -/** Mostly-unoptimized multiply (PERF), but at least it's unrolled. */ -static void -gf_mul (gf c, const gf a, const gf b) { - gf aa; - gf_cpy(aa,a); - - decaf_dword_t accum[X448_LIMBS] = {0}; - FOR_LIMB_U(i, { - FOR_LIMB_U(j,{ accum[(i+j)%X448_LIMBS] += (decaf_dword_t)b->limb[i] * aa->limb[j]; }); - aa->limb[(X448_LIMBS-1-i)^(X448_LIMBS/2)] += aa->limb[X448_LIMBS-1-i]; - }); - - accum[X448_LIMBS-1] += accum[X448_LIMBS-2] >> LBITS; - accum[X448_LIMBS-2] &= LMASK; - accum[X448_LIMBS/2] += accum[X448_LIMBS-1] >> LBITS; - FOR_LIMB_U(j,{ - accum[j] += accum[(j-1)%X448_LIMBS] >> LBITS; - accum[(j-1)%X448_LIMBS] &= LMASK; - }); - FOR_LIMB_U(j, c->limb[j] = accum[j] ); -} - -/** No dedicated square (PERF) */ -#define gf_sqr(c,a) gf_mul(c,a,a) - -/** Inverse square root using addition chain. */ -static void -gf_isqrt(gf y, const gf x) { - int i; -#define STEP(s,m,n) gf_mul(s,m,c); gf_cpy(c,s); for (i=0;ilimb[X448_LIMBS/2] += x->limb[X448_LIMBS-1] >> LBITS; - FOR_LIMB_U(j,{ - x->limb[j] += x->limb[(j-1)%X448_LIMBS] >> LBITS; - x->limb[(j-1)%X448_LIMBS] &= LMASK; - }); -} - -/** Add mod p. Conservatively always weak-reduce. (PERF) */ -static void -gf_add ( gf x, const gf y, const gf z ) { - FOR_LIMB_U(i, x->limb[i] = y->limb[i] + z->limb[i] ); - gf_reduce(x); -} - -/** Subtract mod p. Conservatively always weak-reduce. (PERF) */ -static void -gf_sub ( gf x, const gf y, const gf z ) { - FOR_LIMB_U(i, x->limb[i] = y->limb[i] - z->limb[i] + 2*P->limb[i] ); - gf_reduce(x); -} - -/** Constant time, if (swap) (x,y) = (y,x); */ -static void -cond_swap(gf x, gf_s *__restrict__ y, decaf_word_t swap) { - FOR_LIMB_U(i, { - decaf_word_t s = (x->limb[i] ^ y->limb[i]) & swap; - x->limb[i] ^= s; - y->limb[i] ^= s; - }); -} - -/** - * Mul by signed int. Not constant-time WRT the sign of that int. - * Just uses a full mul (PERF) - */ -static inline void -gf_mlw(gf a, const gf b, int w) { - if (w>0) { - gf ww = {{{w}}}; - gf_mul(a,b,ww); - } else { - gf ww = {{{-w}}}; - gf_mul(a,b,ww); - gf_sub(a,ZERO,a); - } -} - -/** Canonicalize */ -static void gf_canon ( gf a ) { - gf_reduce(a); - - /* subtract p with borrow */ - decaf_sdword_t carry = 0; - FOR_LIMB(i, { - carry = carry + a->limb[i] - P->limb[i]; - a->limb[i] = carry & LMASK; - carry >>= LBITS; - }); - - decaf_word_t addback = carry; - carry = 0; - - /* add it back */ - FOR_LIMB(i, { - carry = carry + a->limb[i] + (P->limb[i] & addback); - a->limb[i] = carry & LMASK; - carry >>= LBITS; - }); -} - -/* Deserialize */ -static decaf_word_t -gf_deser(gf s, const unsigned char ser[X448_BYTES]) { - unsigned int i, k=0, bits=0; - decaf_dword_t buf=0; - for (i=0; i=LBITS || i==X448_BYTES-1) && k>=LBITS) { - s->limb[k++] = buf & LMASK; - } - } - - decaf_sdword_t accum = 0; - FOR_LIMB(i, accum = (accum + s->limb[i] - P->limb[i]) >> WBITS ); - return accum; -} - -/* Serialize */ -static void -gf_ser(uint8_t ser[X448_BYTES], gf a) { - gf_canon(a); - int k=0, bits=0; - decaf_dword_t buf=0; - FOR_LIMB(i, { - buf |= (decaf_dword_t)a->limb[i]<=8 || i==X448_LIMBS-1) && k>=8) { - ser[k++]=buf; - } - }); -} - -int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) cryptonite_x448 ( - unsigned char out[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char scalar[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char base[X448_BYTES] -) { - gf x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, t1, t2; - gf_deser(x1,base); - gf_cpy(x2,ONE); - gf_cpy(z2,ZERO); - gf_cpy(x3,x1); - gf_cpy(z3,ONE); - - int t; - decaf_word_t swap = 0; - - for (t = 448-1; t>=0; t--) { - uint8_t sb = scalar[t/8]; - - /* Scalar conditioning */ - if (t/8==0) sb &= 0xFC; - else if (t/8 == X448_BYTES-1) sb |= 0x80; - - decaf_word_t k_t = (sb>>(t%8)) & 1; - k_t = -k_t; /* set to all 0s or all 1s */ - - swap ^= k_t; - cond_swap(x2,x3,swap); - cond_swap(z2,z3,swap); - swap = k_t; - - gf_add(t1,x2,z2); /* A = x2 + z2 */ - gf_sub(t2,x2,z2); /* B = x2 - z2 */ - gf_sub(z2,x3,z3); /* D = x3 - z3 */ - gf_mul(x2,t1,z2); /* DA */ - gf_add(z2,z3,x3); /* C = x3 + z3 */ - gf_mul(x3,t2,z2); /* CB */ - gf_sub(z3,x2,x3); /* DA-CB */ - gf_sqr(z2,z3); /* (DA-CB)^2 */ - gf_mul(z3,x1,z2); /* z3 = x1(DA-CB)^2 */ - gf_add(z2,x2,x3); /* (DA+CB) */ - gf_sqr(x3,z2); /* x3 = (DA+CB)^2 */ - - gf_sqr(z2,t1); /* AA = A^2 */ - gf_sqr(t1,t2); /* BB = B^2 */ - gf_mul(x2,z2,t1); /* x2 = AA*BB */ - gf_sub(t2,z2,t1); /* E = AA-BB */ - - gf_mlw(t1,t2,-EDWARDS_D); /* E*-d = a24*E */ - gf_add(t1,t1,z2); /* AA + a24*E */ - gf_mul(z2,t2,t1); /* z2 = E(AA+a24*E) */ - } - - /* Finish */ - cond_swap(x2,x3,swap); - cond_swap(z2,z3,swap); - gf_inv(z2,z2); - gf_mul(x1,x2,z2); - gf_ser(out,x1); - - decaf_sword_t nz = 0; - for (t=0; t>8; /* 0 = succ, -1 = fail */ - - /* return value: 0 = succ, -1 = fail */ - return nz; -} - -int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) -cryptonite_x448_base ( - unsigned char out[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char scalar[X448_BYTES] -) { - return cryptonite_x448(out,scalar,X448_BASE_POINT); -} diff --git a/cbits/ed448/x448.h b/cbits/ed448/x448.h deleted file mode 100644 --- a/cbits/ed448/x448.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@ - -#define X448_BYTES (448/8) - -/* The base point (5) */ -//extern const unsigned char X448_BASE_POINT[X448_BYTES]; - -/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */ -int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) -cryptonite_x448 ( - unsigned char out[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char scalar[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char base[X448_BYTES] -); - -/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure - * - * Same as x448(out,scalar,X448_BASE_POINT), except that - * an implementation may optimize it. - */ -int __attribute__((visibility("default"))) -cryptonite_x448_base ( - unsigned char out[X448_BYTES], - const unsigned char scalar[X448_BYTES] -); - diff --git a/cbits/include32/p256/p256.h b/cbits/include32/p256/p256.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/include32/p256/p256.h @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ +#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ + +// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers. +// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms. + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 32 +#define P256_NDIGITS 8 +#define P256_NBYTES 32 + +// n' such as n * n' = -1 mod (2^32) +#define P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR 0xEE00BC4F + +#define P256_LITERAL(lo,hi) (lo), (hi) + +typedef int cryptonite_p256_err; +typedef uint32_t cryptonite_p256_digit; +typedef int32_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit; +typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit; +typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit; + +// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment. +typedef struct { + cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS]; +} cryptonite_p256_int; + +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n; // Curve order +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p; // Curve prime +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b; // Curve param + +// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. +void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. +void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant. +int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index); + +// b := a % MOD +void cryptonite_p256_mod( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD +void cryptonite_p256_modmul( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b, + const cryptonite_p256_int* b, + cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// b := 1 / a % MOD +// MOD best be SECP256r1_n +void cryptonite_p256_modinv( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := 1 / a % MOD +// MOD best be SECP256r1_n +// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv() +void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) +// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit. +cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) +void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); +int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); +int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Returns -1, 0 or 1. +int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b); + +// c: = a - b +// Returns -1 on borrow. +int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// c := a + b +// Returns 1 on carry. +int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// c := a + (single digit)b +// Returns carry 1 on carry. +int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// ec routines. + +// {out_x,out_y} := nG +void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y} +void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y} +void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime( + const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve. +int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y); + +// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips. +void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]); + +// Reads from big-endian binary form, +// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short. +void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst); + +#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a) +#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y]) + +#define P256_ZERO {{0}} +#define P256_ONE {{1}} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ diff --git a/cbits/include32/p256/p256_gf.h b/cbits/include32/p256/p256_gf.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/include32/p256/p256_gf.h @@ -0,0 +1,779 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +// This is an implementation of the P256 finite field. It's written to be +// portable and still constant-time. +// +// WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from +// obvious. Be careful when touching this code. +// +// See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background. + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "p256/p256.h" + +typedef uint8_t u8; +typedef uint32_t u32; +typedef int32_t s32; +typedef uint64_t u64; + +/* Our field elements are represented as nine 32-bit limbs. + * + * The value of an felem (field element) is: + * x[0] + (x[1] * 2**29) + (x[2] * 2**57) + ... + (x[8] * 2**228) + * + * That is, each limb is alternately 29 or 28-bits wide in little-endian + * order. + * + * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like. A + * 28, 29, ... pattern would cause us to hit 2**256, but that causes problems + * when multiplying as terms end up one bit short of a limb which would require + * much bit-shifting to correct. + * + * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value + * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257. + */ +typedef u32 limb; +#define NLIMBS 9 +typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; + +static const limb kBottom28Bits = 0xfffffff; +static const limb kBottom29Bits = 0x1fffffff; + +/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 29 and + * 28-bit words. */ +static const felem kOne = { + 2, 0, 0, 0xffff800, + 0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fbfffff, 0x1ffffff, + 0 +}; +static const felem kZero = {0}; +static const felem kP = { + 0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x3ff, + 0, 0, 0x200000, 0xf000000, + 0xfffffff +}; +static const felem k2P = { + 0x1ffffffe, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x7ff, + 0, 0, 0x400000, 0xe000000, + 0x1fffffff +}; +/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar + * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables + * concatenated. + * + * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base + * point, G. + * + * Index | Index (binary) | Value + * 0 | 0000 | 0G (all zeros, omitted) + * 1 | 0001 | G + * 2 | 0010 | 2**64G + * 3 | 0011 | 2**64G + G + * 4 | 0100 | 2**128G + * 5 | 0101 | 2**128G + G + * 6 | 0110 | 2**128G + 2**64G + * 7 | 0111 | 2**128G + 2**64G + G + * 8 | 1000 | 2**192G + * 9 | 1001 | 2**192G + G + * 10 | 1010 | 2**192G + 2**64G + * 11 | 1011 | 2**192G + 2**64G + G + * 12 | 1100 | 2**192G + 2**128G + * 13 | 1101 | 2**192G + 2**128G + G + * 14 | 1110 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + * 15 | 1111 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G + * + * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G, + * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G. + * + * This is ~2KB of data. */ +static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = { + 0x11522878, 0xe730d41, 0xdb60179, 0x4afe2ff, 0x12883add, 0xcaddd88, 0x119e7edc, 0xd4a6eab, 0x3120bee, + 0x1d2aac15, 0xf25357c, 0x19e45cdd, 0x5c721d0, 0x1992c5a5, 0xa237487, 0x154ba21, 0x14b10bb, 0xae3fe3, + 0xd41a576, 0x922fc51, 0x234994f, 0x60b60d3, 0x164586ae, 0xce95f18, 0x1fe49073, 0x3fa36cc, 0x5ebcd2c, + 0xb402f2f, 0x15c70bf, 0x1561925c, 0x5a26704, 0xda91e90, 0xcdc1c7f, 0x1ea12446, 0xe1ade1e, 0xec91f22, + 0x26f7778, 0x566847e, 0xa0bec9e, 0x234f453, 0x1a31f21a, 0xd85e75c, 0x56c7109, 0xa267a00, 0xb57c050, + 0x98fb57, 0xaa837cc, 0x60c0792, 0xcfa5e19, 0x61bab9e, 0x589e39b, 0xa324c5, 0x7d6dee7, 0x2976e4b, + 0x1fc4124a, 0xa8c244b, 0x1ce86762, 0xcd61c7e, 0x1831c8e0, 0x75774e1, 0x1d96a5a9, 0x843a649, 0xc3ab0fa, + 0x6e2e7d5, 0x7673a2a, 0x178b65e8, 0x4003e9b, 0x1a1f11c2, 0x7816ea, 0xf643e11, 0x58c43df, 0xf423fc2, + 0x19633ffa, 0x891f2b2, 0x123c231c, 0x46add8c, 0x54700dd, 0x59e2b17, 0x172db40f, 0x83e277d, 0xb0dd609, + 0xfd1da12, 0x35c6e52, 0x19ede20c, 0xd19e0c0, 0x97d0f40, 0xb015b19, 0x449e3f5, 0xe10c9e, 0x33ab581, + 0x56a67ab, 0x577734d, 0x1dddc062, 0xc57b10d, 0x149b39d, 0x26a9e7b, 0xc35df9f, 0x48764cd, 0x76dbcca, + 0xca4b366, 0xe9303ab, 0x1a7480e7, 0x57e9e81, 0x1e13eb50, 0xf466cf3, 0x6f16b20, 0x4ba3173, 0xc168c33, + 0x15cb5439, 0x6a38e11, 0x73658bd, 0xb29564f, 0x3f6dc5b, 0x53b97e, 0x1322c4c0, 0x65dd7ff, 0x3a1e4f6, + 0x14e614aa, 0x9246317, 0x1bc83aca, 0xad97eed, 0xd38ce4a, 0xf82b006, 0x341f077, 0xa6add89, 0x4894acd, + 0x9f162d5, 0xf8410ef, 0x1b266a56, 0xd7f223, 0x3e0cb92, 0xe39b672, 0x6a2901a, 0x69a8556, 0x7e7c0, + 0x9b7d8d3, 0x309a80, 0x1ad05f7f, 0xc2fb5dd, 0xcbfd41d, 0x9ceb638, 0x1051825c, 0xda0cf5b, 0x812e881, + 0x6f35669, 0x6a56f2c, 0x1df8d184, 0x345820, 0x1477d477, 0x1645db1, 0xbe80c51, 0xc22be3e, 0xe35e65a, + 0x1aeb7aa0, 0xc375315, 0xf67bc99, 0x7fdd7b9, 0x191fc1be, 0x61235d, 0x2c184e9, 0x1c5a839, 0x47a1e26, + 0xb7cb456, 0x93e225d, 0x14f3c6ed, 0xccc1ac9, 0x17fe37f3, 0x4988989, 0x1a90c502, 0x2f32042, 0xa17769b, + 0xafd8c7c, 0x8191c6e, 0x1dcdb237, 0x16200c0, 0x107b32a1, 0x66c08db, 0x10d06a02, 0x3fc93, 0x5620023, + 0x16722b27, 0x68b5c59, 0x270fcfc, 0xfad0ecc, 0xe5de1c2, 0xeab466b, 0x2fc513c, 0x407f75c, 0xbaab133, + 0x9705fe9, 0xb88b8e7, 0x734c993, 0x1e1ff8f, 0x19156970, 0xabd0f00, 0x10469ea7, 0x3293ac0, 0xcdc98aa, + 0x1d843fd, 0xe14bfe8, 0x15be825f, 0x8b5212, 0xeb3fb67, 0x81cbd29, 0xbc62f16, 0x2b6fcc7, 0xf5a4e29, + 0x13560b66, 0xc0b6ac2, 0x51ae690, 0xd41e271, 0xf3e9bd4, 0x1d70aab, 0x1029f72, 0x73e1c35, 0xee70fbc, + 0xad81baf, 0x9ecc49a, 0x86c741e, 0xfe6be30, 0x176752e7, 0x23d416, 0x1f83de85, 0x27de188, 0x66f70b8, + 0x181cd51f, 0x96b6e4c, 0x188f2335, 0xa5df759, 0x17a77eb6, 0xfeb0e73, 0x154ae914, 0x2f3ec51, 0x3826b59, + 0xb91f17d, 0x1c72949, 0x1362bf0a, 0xe23fddf, 0xa5614b0, 0xf7d8f, 0x79061, 0x823d9d2, 0x8213f39, + 0x1128ae0b, 0xd095d05, 0xb85c0c2, 0x1ecb2ef, 0x24ddc84, 0xe35e901, 0x18411a4a, 0xf5ddc3d, 0x3786689, + 0x52260e8, 0x5ae3564, 0x542b10d, 0x8d93a45, 0x19952aa4, 0x996cc41, 0x1051a729, 0x4be3499, 0x52b23aa, + 0x109f307e, 0x6f5b6bb, 0x1f84e1e7, 0x77a0cfa, 0x10c4df3f, 0x25a02ea, 0xb048035, 0xe31de66, 0xc6ecaa3, + 0x28ea335, 0x2886024, 0x1372f020, 0xf55d35, 0x15e4684c, 0xf2a9e17, 0x1a4a7529, 0xcb7beb1, 0xb2a78a1, + 0x1ab21f1f, 0x6361ccf, 0x6c9179d, 0xb135627, 0x1267b974, 0x4408bad, 0x1cbff658, 0xe3d6511, 0xc7d76f, + 0x1cc7a69, 0xe7ee31b, 0x54fab4f, 0x2b914f, 0x1ad27a30, 0xcd3579e, 0xc50124c, 0x50daa90, 0xb13f72, + 0xb06aa75, 0x70f5cc6, 0x1649e5aa, 0x84a5312, 0x329043c, 0x41c4011, 0x13d32411, 0xb04a838, 0xd760d2d, + 0x1713b532, 0xbaa0c03, 0x84022ab, 0x6bcf5c1, 0x2f45379, 0x18ae070, 0x18c9e11e, 0x20bca9a, 0x66f496b, + 0x3eef294, 0x67500d2, 0xd7f613c, 0x2dbbeb, 0xb741038, 0xe04133f, 0x1582968d, 0xbe985f7, 0x1acbc1a, + 0x1a6a939f, 0x33e50f6, 0xd665ed4, 0xb4b7bd6, 0x1e5a3799, 0x6b33847, 0x17fa56ff, 0x65ef930, 0x21dc4a, + 0x2b37659, 0x450fe17, 0xb357b65, 0xdf5efac, 0x15397bef, 0x9d35a7f, 0x112ac15f, 0x624e62e, 0xa90ae2f, + 0x107eecd2, 0x1f69bbe, 0x77d6bce, 0x5741394, 0x13c684fc, 0x950c910, 0x725522b, 0xdc78583, 0x40eeabb, + 0x1fde328a, 0xbd61d96, 0xd28c387, 0x9e77d89, 0x12550c40, 0x759cb7d, 0x367ef34, 0xae2a960, 0x91b8bdc, + 0x93462a9, 0xf469ef, 0xb2e9aef, 0xd2ca771, 0x54e1f42, 0x7aaa49, 0x6316abb, 0x2413c8e, 0x5425bf9, + 0x1bed3e3a, 0xf272274, 0x1f5e7326, 0x6416517, 0xea27072, 0x9cedea7, 0x6e7633, 0x7c91952, 0xd806dce, + 0x8e2a7e1, 0xe421e1a, 0x418c9e1, 0x1dbc890, 0x1b395c36, 0xa1dc175, 0x1dc4ef73, 0x8956f34, 0xe4b5cf2, + 0x1b0d3a18, 0x3194a36, 0x6c2641f, 0xe44124c, 0xa2f4eaa, 0xa8c25ba, 0xf927ed7, 0x627b614, 0x7371cca, + 0xba16694, 0x417bc03, 0x7c0a7e3, 0x9c35c19, 0x1168a205, 0x8b6b00d, 0x10e3edc9, 0x9c19bf2, 0x5882229, + 0x1b2b4162, 0xa5cef1a, 0x1543622b, 0x9bd433e, 0x364e04d, 0x7480792, 0x5c9b5b3, 0xe85ff25, 0x408ef57, + 0x1814cfa4, 0x121b41b, 0xd248a0f, 0x3b05222, 0x39bb16a, 0xc75966d, 0xa038113, 0xa4a1769, 0x11fbc6c, + 0x917e50e, 0xeec3da8, 0x169d6eac, 0x10c1699, 0xa416153, 0xf724912, 0x15cd60b7, 0x4acbad9, 0x5efc5fa, + 0xf150ed7, 0x122b51, 0x1104b40a, 0xcb7f442, 0xfbb28ff, 0x6ac53ca, 0x196142cc, 0x7bf0fa9, 0x957651, + 0x4e0f215, 0xed439f8, 0x3f46bd5, 0x5ace82f, 0x110916b6, 0x6db078, 0xffd7d57, 0xf2ecaac, 0xca86dec, + 0x15d6b2da, 0x965ecc9, 0x1c92b4c2, 0x1f3811, 0x1cb080f5, 0x2d8b804, 0x19d1c12d, 0xf20bd46, 0x1951fa7, + 0xa3656c3, 0x523a425, 0xfcd0692, 0xd44ddc8, 0x131f0f5b, 0xaf80e4a, 0xcd9fc74, 0x99bb618, 0x2db944c, + 0xa673090, 0x1c210e1, 0x178c8d23, 0x1474383, 0x10b8743d, 0x985a55b, 0x2e74779, 0x576138, 0x9587927, + 0x133130fa, 0xbe05516, 0x9f4d619, 0xbb62570, 0x99ec591, 0xd9468fe, 0x1d07782d, 0xfc72e0b, 0x701b298, + 0x1863863b, 0x85954b8, 0x121a0c36, 0x9e7fedf, 0xf64b429, 0x9b9d71e, 0x14e2f5d8, 0xf858d3a, 0x942eea8, + 0xda5b765, 0x6edafff, 0xa9d18cc, 0xc65e4ba, 0x1c747e86, 0xe4ea915, 0x1981d7a1, 0x8395659, 0x52ed4e2, + 0x87d43b7, 0x37ab11b, 0x19d292ce, 0xf8d4692, 0x18c3053f, 0x8863e13, 0x4c146c0, 0x6bdf55a, 0x4e4457d, + 0x16152289, 0xac78ec2, 0x1a59c5a2, 0x2028b97, 0x71c2d01, 0x295851f, 0x404747b, 0x878558d, 0x7d29aa4, + 0x13d8341f, 0x8daefd7, 0x139c972d, 0x6b7ea75, 0xd4a9dde, 0xff163d8, 0x81d55d7, 0xa5bef68, 0xb7b30d8, + 0xbe73d6f, 0xaa88141, 0xd976c81, 0x7e7a9cc, 0x18beb771, 0xd773cbd, 0x13f51951, 0x9d0c177, 0x1c49a78, +}; + + +/* Field element operations: */ + +/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns: + * 0xffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**31 + * 0 for x == 0 or x > 2**31. + * + * x must be a u32 or an equivalent type such as limb. */ +#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u32)(x) - 1) >> 31) - 1) + +/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|, + * which is a term at 2**257. + * + * On entry: carry < 2**3, inout[0,2,...] < 2**29, inout[1,3,...] < 2**28. + * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**30, inout[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) { + const u32 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry); + + inout[0] += carry << 1; + inout[3] += 0x10000000 & carry_mask; + /* carry < 2**3 thus (carry << 11) < 2**14 and we added 2**28 in the + * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */ + inout[3] -= carry << 11; + inout[4] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask; + inout[5] += (0x10000000 - 1) & carry_mask; + inout[6] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask; + inout[6] -= carry << 22; + /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the + * next line. */ + inout[7] -= 1 & carry_mask; + inout[7] += carry << 25; +} + +/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2. + * + * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 32-bit word. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */ +static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 29; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 28; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +#define two31m3 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 3) +#define two30m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two30p13m2 (((limb)1) << 30) + (((limb)1) << 13) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two31m2 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two31p24m2 (((limb)1) << 31) + (((limb)1) << 24) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two30m27m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 27) - (((limb)1) << 2) + +/* zero31 is 0 mod p. */ +static const felem zero31 = { two31m3, two30m2, two31m2, two30p13m2, two31m2, two30m2, two31p24m2, two30m27m2, two31m2 }; + +/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and + * in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; + out[i] += zero31[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 29; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; + out[i] += zero31[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 28; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words + * with the same 29,28,... bit positions as an felem. + * + * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257. + * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is + * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be + * in Montgomery form. + * + * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**64 + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */ +static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u64 tmp[17]) { + /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code: + * + * Limb number: 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10... + * Width (bits): 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29 + * Start bit: 0 | 29| 57| 86|114|143|171|200|228|257|285 + * (odd phase): 0 | 28| 57| 85|114|142|171|199|228|256|285 */ + limb tmp2[18], carry, x, xMask; + unsigned i; + + /* tmp contains 64-bit words with the same 29,28,29-bit positions as an + * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another + * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this + * overlap. */ + tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom29Bits); + + /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>32)" to try + * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting + * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating + * afterwards. */ + tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 29; + tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom28Bits; + carry = tmp2[1] >> 28; + tmp2[1] &= kBottom28Bits; + + for (i = 2; i < 17; i++) { + tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25; + tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 28; + tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 4) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i] += carry; + carry = tmp2[i] >> 29; + tmp2[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == 17) + break; + tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25; + tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 29; + tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[i] += carry; + carry = tmp2[i] >> 28; + tmp2[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + tmp2[17] = ((limb)(tmp[15] >> 32)) >> 25; + tmp2[17] += ((limb)(tmp[16])) >> 29; + tmp2[17] += (((limb)(tmp[16] >> 32)) << 3); + tmp2[17] += carry; + + /* Montgomery elimination of terms. + * + * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can + * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by + * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value. + * + * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 29 bits of p + * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0. + * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the + * extra factor of R. */ + for (i = 0;; i += 2) { + tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 29; + x = tmp2[i] & kBottom29Bits; + xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x); + tmp2[i] = 0; + + /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of + * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their + * right. + * + * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an + * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are + * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately + * and are written as, for example, 28 to mean a value <2**28. + * + * Word: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 + * Added in top half: 28 11 29 21 29 28 + * 28 29 + * 29 + * Added in bottom half: 29 10 28 21 28 28 + * 29 + * + * The value that is currently offset 7 will be offset 5 for the next + * iteration and then offset 3 for the iteration after that. Therefore + * the total value added will be the values added at 7, 5 and 3. + * + * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom + * are written as, for example, 29+28, to mean a value < 2**29+2**28. + * + * Word: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 + * 28 11 10 29 21 29 28 28 28 28 28 + * 29 28 11 28 29 28 29 28 29 28 + * 29 28 21 21 29 21 29 21 + * 10 29 28 21 28 21 28 + * 28 29 28 29 28 29 28 + * 11 10 29 10 29 10 + * 29 28 11 28 11 + * 29 29 + * -------------------------------------------- + * 30+ 31+ 30+ 31+ 30+ + * 28+ 29+ 28+ 29+ 21+ + * 21+ 28+ 21+ 28+ 10 + * 10 21+ 10 21+ + * 11 11 + * + * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[10] and tmp2[12]. If + * tmp2[10/12] has an initial value of <2**29, then the maximum value + * will be < 2**31 + 2**30 + 2**28 + 2**21 + 2**11, which is < 2**32, + * as required. */ + tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 10) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[i + 4] += (x >> 18); + + tmp2[i + 6] += (x << 21) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i + 7] += x >> 8; + + /* At position 200, which is the starting bit position for word 7, we + * have a factor of 0xf000000 = 2**28 - 2**24. */ + tmp2[i + 7] += 0x10000000 & xMask; + /* Word 7 is 28 bits wide, so the 2**28 term exactly hits word 8. */ + tmp2[i + 8] += (x - 1) & xMask; + tmp2[i + 7] -= (x << 24) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[i + 8] -= x >> 4; + + tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask; + tmp2[i + 8] -= x; + tmp2[i + 8] += (x << 28) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i + 9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask; + + if (i+1 == NLIMBS) + break; + tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 28; + x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom28Bits; + xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x); + tmp2[i + 1] = 0; + + tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 11) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 18); + + tmp2[i + 7] += (x << 21) & kBottom28Bits; + tmp2[i + 8] += x >> 7; + + /* At position 199, which is the starting bit of the 8th word when + * dealing with a context starting on an odd word, we have a factor of + * 0x1e000000 = 2**29 - 2**25. Since we have not updated i, the 8th + * word from i+1 is i+8. */ + tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask; + tmp2[i + 9] += (x - 1) & xMask; + tmp2[i + 8] -= (x << 25) & kBottom29Bits; + tmp2[i + 9] -= x >> 4; + + tmp2[i + 9] += 0x10000000 & xMask; + tmp2[i + 9] -= x; + tmp2[i + 10] += (x - 1) & xMask; + } + + /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have + * widths of 28,29,... which we need to correct when copying them down. */ + carry = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + /* The maximum value of tmp2[i + 9] occurs on the first iteration and + * is < 2**30+2**29+2**28. Adding 2**29 (from tmp2[i + 10]) is + * therefore safe. */ + out[i] = tmp2[i + 9]; + out[i] += carry; + out[i] += (tmp2[i + 10] << 28) & kBottom29Bits; + carry = out[i] >> 29; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + out[i] = tmp2[i + 9] >> 1; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 28; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + out[8] = tmp2[17]; + out[8] += carry; + carry = out[8] >> 29; + out[8] &= kBottom29Bits; + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_square sets out=in*in. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) { + u64 tmp[17]; + + tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in[0]; + tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1); + tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) + + ((u64) in[1]) * (in[1] << 1); + tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) + + ((u64) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1); + tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) + + ((u64) in[1]) * (in[3] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * in[2]; + tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in[4] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1); + tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[3] << 1); + tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[5] << 1) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1); + /* tmp[8] has the greatest value of 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**60, + * which is < 2**64 as required. */ + tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[6] << 1) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * in[4]; + tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * + (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[6] << 1) + + ((u64) in[4]) * (in[5] << 1); + tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * + (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in[6] << 1) + + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[5] << 1); + tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[6] << 1); + tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in[8] << 1) + + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[6]) * in[6]; + tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in[8] << 1) + + ((u64) in[6]) * (in[7] << 1); + tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in[8] << 1) + + ((u64) in[7]) * (in[7] << 1); + tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in[8] << 1); + tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * in[8]; + + felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); +} + +/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and + * in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + u64 tmp[17]; + + tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in2[0]; + tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[1] << 0) + + ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[1] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[2] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[1] << 1) + + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[3] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in2[1] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[4] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[1] << 1) + + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[5] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[2] << 0) + + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[1] << 0) + + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[0] << 0); + /* tmp[8] has the greatest value but doesn't overflow. See logic in + * felem_square. */ + tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * + (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[3] << 1) + + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * + (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[0] << 0); + tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * + (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * + (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[3] << 0) + + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[2] << 0) + + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[1] << 0); + tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * + (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * + (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[3] << 1) + + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[2] << 0); + tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * + (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * + (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[3] << 0); + tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * + (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[5] << 1) + + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[4] << 0); + tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * + (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[6] << 0) + + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[5] << 0); + tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * + (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[6] << 0); + tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[8] << 0) + + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[7] << 0); + tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[8] << 0); + + felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); +} + +static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { + memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem)); +} + +/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] *= 3; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 29; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] *= 3; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 28; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) { + limb carry = 0, next_carry; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + next_carry = out[i] >> 27; + out[i] <<= 2; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29); + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + next_carry = out[i] >> 26; + out[i] <<= 2; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28); + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ +static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) { + limb carry = 0, next_carry; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + next_carry = out[i] >> 26; + out[i] <<= 3; + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29); + out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + next_carry = out[i] >> 25; + out[i] <<= 3; + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28); + out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of + * time depending on the value of |in|. */ +static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) { + limb carry; + int i; + limb tmp[NLIMBS]; + + felem_assign(tmp, in); + + /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */ + do { + carry = 0; + for (i = 0;; i++) { + tmp[i] += carry; + carry = tmp[i] >> 29; + tmp[i] &= kBottom29Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + tmp[i] += carry; + carry = tmp[i] >> 28; + tmp[i] &= kBottom28Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry); + } while (carry); + + /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */ + return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || + memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || + memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0; +} + + +/* Montgomery operations: */ + +#define kRDigits {2, 0, 0, 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 1} // 2^257 mod p256.p + +#define kRInvDigits {0x80000000, 1, 0xffffffff, 0, 0x80000001, 0xfffffffe, 1, 0x7fffffff} // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p + +static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits }; +static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits }; + +/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */ +static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) { + cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted; + int i; + + cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted); + cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted); + + for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) { + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom29Bits; + cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 29, &in_shifted); + } else { + out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom28Bits; + cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 28, &in_shifted); + } + } + + cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted); +} + +/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */ +static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) { + cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp; + int i, top; + + cryptonite_p256_init(&result); + cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp); + + cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result); + for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) { + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 29, &tmp); + } else { + top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 28, &tmp); + } + top |= cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result); + } + + cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out); + + cryptonite_p256_clear(&result); + cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp); +} diff --git a/cbits/include64/p256/p256.h b/cbits/include64/p256/p256.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/include64/p256/p256.h @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ +#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ + +// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers. +// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms. + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 64 +#define P256_NDIGITS 4 +#define P256_NBYTES 32 + +// n' such as n * n' = -1 mod (2^64) +#define P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR 0xCCD1C8AAEE00BC4F + +#define P256_LITERAL(lo,hi) (((uint32_t) (lo)) + (((uint64_t) (hi)) << 32)) + +typedef int cryptonite_p256_err; +typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_digit; +typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit; +typedef __uint128_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit; +typedef __int128_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit; + +// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment. +typedef struct { + cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS]; +} cryptonite_p256_int; + +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n; // Curve order +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p; // Curve prime +extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b; // Curve param + +// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. +void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. +void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant. +int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index); + +// b := a % MOD +void cryptonite_p256_mod( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD +void cryptonite_p256_modmul( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b, + const cryptonite_p256_int* b, + cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// b := 1 / a % MOD +// MOD best be SECP256r1_n +void cryptonite_p256_modinv( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := 1 / a % MOD +// MOD best be SECP256r1_n +// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv() +void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime( + const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, + const cryptonite_p256_int* a, + cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) +// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit. +cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) +void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); + +int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); +int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); +int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); + +// Returns -1, 0 or 1. +int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b); + +// c: = a - b +// Returns -1 on borrow. +int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// c := a + b +// Returns 1 on carry. +int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// c := a + (single digit)b +// Returns carry 1 on carry. +int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); + +// ec routines. + +// {out_x,out_y} := nG +void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y} +void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y} +void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime( + const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2, + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); + +// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve. +int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y); + +// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips. +void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]); + +// Reads from big-endian binary form, +// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short. +void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst); + +#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a) +#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y]) + +#define P256_ZERO {{0}} +#define P256_ONE {{1}} + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ diff --git a/cbits/include64/p256/p256_gf.h b/cbits/include64/p256/p256_gf.h new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/cbits/include64/p256/p256_gf.h @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may + * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO + * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; + * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +// This is an implementation of the P256 finite field. It's written to be +// portable and still constant-time. +// +// WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from +// obvious. Be careful when touching this code. +// +// See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background. + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "p256/p256.h" + +typedef uint8_t u8; +typedef uint32_t u32; +typedef uint64_t u64; +typedef int64_t s64; +typedef __uint128_t u128; + +/* Our field elements are represented as five 64-bit limbs. + * + * The value of an felem (field element) is: + * x[0] + (x[1] * 2**51) + (x[2] * 2**103) + ... + (x[4] * 2**206) + * + * That is, each limb is alternately 51 or 52-bits wide in little-endian + * order. + * + * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like. + * + * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value + * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257. + */ +typedef u64 limb; +#define NLIMBS 5 +typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; + +static const limb kBottom51Bits = 0x7ffffffffffff; +static const limb kBottom52Bits = 0xfffffffffffff; + +/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 51 and + * 52-bit words. */ +static const felem kOne = { + 2, 0xfc00000000000, 0x7ffffffffffff, 0xfff7fffffffff, 0x7ffff +}; +static const felem kZero = {0}; +static const felem kP = { + 0x7ffffffffffff, 0x1fffffffffff, 0, 0x4000000000, 0x3fffffffc0000 +}; +static const felem k2P = { + 0x7fffffffffffe, 0x3fffffffffff, 0, 0x8000000000, 0x7fffffff80000 +}; +/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar + * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables + * concatenated. + * + * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base + * point, G. + * + * Index | Index (binary) | Value + * 0 | 0000 | 0G (all zeros, omitted) + * 1 | 0001 | G + * 2 | 0010 | 2**64G + * 3 | 0011 | 2**64G + G + * 4 | 0100 | 2**128G + * 5 | 0101 | 2**128G + G + * 6 | 0110 | 2**128G + 2**64G + * 7 | 0111 | 2**128G + 2**64G + G + * 8 | 1000 | 2**192G + * 9 | 1001 | 2**192G + G + * 10 | 1010 | 2**192G + 2**64G + * 11 | 1011 | 2**192G + 2**64G + G + * 12 | 1100 | 2**192G + 2**128G + * 13 | 1101 | 2**192G + 2**128G + G + * 14 | 1110 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + * 15 | 1111 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G + * + * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G, + * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G. + * + * This is ~2KB of data. */ +static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = { + 0x661a831522878, 0xf17fb6d805e79, 0x5889441d6ea57, 0xae33cfdb995bb, 0xc482fbb529ba, + 0x4a6af9d2aac15, 0x90e867917377c, 0x487cc962d2ae3, 0xec2a97443446e, 0x2b8ff8c52c42, + 0x45f8a2d41a576, 0xb06988d2653e4, 0x718b22c357305, 0x33fc920e79d2b, 0x17af34b0fe8db, + 0x38e17eb402f2f, 0x3382558649705, 0x47f6d48f482d1, 0x7bd42488d9b83, 0x3b247c8b86b78, + 0x4d08fc26f7778, 0x7a29a82fb2795, 0x75cd18f90d11a, 0xad8e213b0bc, 0x2d5f0142899e8, + 0x506f98098fb57, 0x2f0c98301e4aa, 0x39b30dd5cf67d, 0x9c146498ab13c, 0xa5db92df5b7b, + 0x184897fc4124a, 0xe3f73a19d8aa, 0x4e1c18e47066b, 0x27b2d4b52eaee, 0x30eac3ea10e99, + 0x4e74546e2e7d5, 0x1f4dde2d97a1d, 0x6ead0f88e1200, 0x7dec87c220f02, 0x3d08ff096310f, + 0x23e5659633ffa, 0x6ec648f08c722, 0x3172a3806ea35, 0xf6e5b681eb3c5, 0x2c3758260f89d, + 0x38dca4fd1da12, 0xf06067b78830d, 0x3194be87a068c, 0x78893c7eb602b, 0xcead60438432, + 0x6ee69a56a67ab, 0xd886f77701895, 0x67b0a4d9cee2b, 0x3586bbf3e4d53, 0x1db6f32921d93, + 0x260756ca4b366, 0x4f40e9d2039fa, 0x4f3f09f5a82bf, 0xccde2d641e8cd, 0x305a30cd2e8c5, + 0x471c235cb5439, 0xab279cd962f5a, 0x17e1fb6e2dd94, 0xfe64589800a77, 0xe8793d99775f, + 0x48c62f4e614aa, 0xbf76ef20eb2a4, 0x669c672556c, 0x24683e0eff056, 0x12252b369ab76, + 0x821de9f162d5, 0xf911ec99a95be, 0x6721f065c906b, 0x58d452035c736, 0x1f9f01a6a15, + 0x6135009b7d8d3, 0xdaeeeb417dfc0, 0x63865fea0ee17, 0x6e0a304b939d6, 0x204ba2076833d, + 0x4ade586f35669, 0x2c1077e34611a, 0x5b1a3bea3b81a, 0xf97d018a22c8b, 0x38d7996b08af8, + 0x6ea62baeb7aa0, 0xebdcbd9ef2670, 0x35dc8fe0df3fe, 0xe458309d20c24, 0x11e87898716a0, + 0x7c44bab7cb456, 0xd64d3cf1bb64, 0x189bff1bf9e66, 0xb5218a049311, 0x285dda6cbcc81, + 0x3238dcafd8c7c, 0x607736c8de0, 0xdb83d99508b1, 0x4e1a0d404cd81, 0x1588008c00ff2, + 0x16b8b36722b27, 0x876609c3f3f1a, 0x66b72ef0e17d6, 0x705f8a279d568, 0x2eaac4cd01fdd, + 0x1171ce9705fe9, 0xffc79cd3264ee, 0x700c8ab4b80f0, 0x208d3d4f57a1, 0x337262a8ca4eb, + 0x297fd01d843fd, 0xa90956fa097f8, 0x529759fdb3845, 0x1d78c5e2d0397, 0x3d6938a4adbf3, + 0x16d5853560b66, 0xf138946b9a430, 0x2ab79f4dea6a0, 0xd42053ee43ae1, 0x3b9c3ef1cf870, + 0x598934ad81baf, 0x5f1821b1d07a7, 0x416bb3a973ff3, 0x23f07bd0a047a, 0x19bdc2e09f786, + 0x56dc9981cd51f, 0xfbace23c8cd65, 0x673bd3bf5b52e, 0x46a95d229fd61, 0xe09ad64bcfb1, + 0xe5292b91f17d, 0xfeefcd8afc287, 0x58f52b0a58711, 0x4800f20c201ef, 0x2084fce608f67, + 0x12ba0b128ae0b, 0x5977ae17030b4, 0x101126ee420f6, 0xf70823495c6bd, 0xde19a27d7770, + 0x5c6ac852260e8, 0x9d22950ac4356, 0x441cca955246c, 0x660a34e5332d9, 0x14ac8ea92f8d2, + 0x6b6d7709f307e, 0x67d7e13879db, 0x2ea8626f9fbbd, 0x99609006a4b40, 0x31bb2a8f8c779, + 0x10c04828ea335, 0xae9acdcbc080a, 0x617af2342607a, 0xc7494ea53e553, 0x2ca9e2872defa, + 0x6c399fab21f1f, 0xab139b245e758, 0x3ad933dcba589, 0x4797fecb08811, 0x31f5dbf8f594, + 0x7dc6361cc7a69, 0xc8a7953ead3f9, 0x79ed693d18015, 0x418a024999a6a, 0x2c4fdc9436aa, + 0x1eb98cb06aa75, 0x2989592796a9c, 0x11194821e425, 0xe27a648228388, 0x35d834b6c12a0, + 0x541807713b532, 0x7ae0a1008aaee, 0x7017a29bcb5e, 0x6b193c23c315c, 0x19bd25ac82f2a, + 0x6a01a43eef294, 0xddf5b5fd84f19, 0x33f5ba081c016, 0xdeb052d1bc082, 0x6b2f06afa617, + 0x7ca1eda6a939f, 0xbdeb35997b50c, 0x47f2d1bccda5, 0xc2ff4adfed667, 0x87712997be4, + 0x21fc2e2b37659, 0xf7d62cd5ed951, 0x27fa9cbdf7efa, 0xba25582bf3a6b, 0x2a42b8bd89398, + 0x6d377d07eecd2, 0x9ca1df5af387, 0x1109e3427e2ba, 0xce4aa4572a19, 0x103baaef71e16, + 0x2c3b2dfde328a, 0xbec4b4a30e1ef, 0x37d92a86204f3, 0x806cfde68eb39, 0x246e2f72b8aa5, + 0x68d3de93462a9, 0x53b8acba6bbc3, 0x2492a70fa1696, 0x38c62d5760f55, 0x15096fe4904f2, + 0x4e44e9bed3e3a, 0xb28bfd79cc9bc, 0x6a77513839320, 0x480dcec6739db, 0x3601b739f2465, + 0x43c348e2a7e1, 0xe448106327879, 0x175d9cae1b0ed, 0xd3b89dee743b8, 0x392d73ca255bc, + 0x32946db0d3a18, 0x9261b09907cc, 0x5ba517a755722, 0x51f24fdaf5184, 0x1cdc732989ed8, + 0x2f7806ba16694, 0xae0c9f029f8d0, 0xd8b45102ce1, 0xca1c7db9316d6, 0x162088a67066f, + 0x39de35b2b4162, 0xa19f550d88ae9, 0x7921b27026cde, 0x94b936b66e900, 0x1023bd5fa17fc, + 0x436837814cfa4, 0x29113492283c4, 0x66d1cdd8b51d8, 0xa540702278eb2, 0x47ef1b29285d, + 0x587b50917e50e, 0xb4cda75bab3b, 0x112520b0a9886, 0x66b9ac16fee49, 0x17bf17e92b2eb, + 0x2456a2f150ed7, 0xfa214412d0280, 0x3ca7dd947fe5b, 0xa72c28598d58a, 0x255d945efc3e, + 0x2873f04e0f215, 0x74178fd1af57b, 0x788848b5b2d6, 0xb1ffafaae0db6, 0x32a1b7b3cbb2a, + 0x4bd9935d6b2da, 0x9c08f24ad30a5, 0x4e58407a80f, 0x1b3a3825a5b17, 0x6547e9fc82f5, + 0x47484aa3656c3, 0x6ee43f341a494, 0x64a98f87adea2, 0x619b3f8e95f01, 0xb6e513266ed8, + 0x421c2a673090, 0xa1c1de32348c7, 0x55b85c3a1e8a3, 0xe05ce8ef330b4, 0x2561e49c15d84, + 0x40aa2d33130fa, 0x12b827d35866f, 0xfe4cf62c8ddb, 0x2fa0ef05bb28d, 0x1c06ca63f1cb8, + 0x32a971863863b, 0xff6fc86830da1, 0x71e7b25a14cf3, 0xea9c5ebb1373a, 0x250bbaa3e1634, + 0x5b5ffeda5b765, 0xf25d2a746331b, 0x115e3a3f43632, 0x67303af43c9d5, 0x14bb538a0e559, + 0x75623687d43b7, 0xa349674a4b38d, 0x613c61829ffc6, 0x689828d8110c7, 0x139115f5af7d5, + 0xf1d856152289, 0x45cbe967168ab, 0x51f38e1680901, 0x34808e8f652b0, 0x1f4a6a921e156, + 0x35dfaf3d8341f, 0xf53ace725cb63, 0x3d86a54eef35b, 0xa103aabaffe2c, 0x2decc36296fbd, + 0x510282be73d6f, 0xd4e6365db206a, 0x4bdc5f5bb8bf3, 0xde7ea32a3aee7, 0x71269e274305, +}; + + +/* Field element operations: */ + +/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns: + * 0xffffffffffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**63 + * 0 for x == 0 or x > 2**63. + * + * x must be a u64 or an equivalent type such as limb. */ +#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u64)(x) - 1) >> 63) - 1) + +/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|, + * which is a term at 2**257. + * + * On entry: carry < 2**6, inout[0,2,...] < 2**51, inout[1,3,...] < 2**52. + * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**52, inout[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) { + const u64 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry); + + inout[0] += carry << 1; + inout[1] += 0x10000000000000 & carry_mask; + /* carry < 2**6 thus (carry << 46) < 2**52 and we added 2**52 in the + * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */ + inout[1] -= carry << 46; + inout[2] += (0x8000000000000 - 1) & carry_mask; + inout[3] += (0x10000000000000 - 1) & carry_mask; + inout[3] -= carry << 39; + /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the + * next line. */ + inout[4] -= 1 & carry_mask; + inout[4] += carry << 19; +} + +/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2. + * + * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 64-bit word. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53 */ +static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 51; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 52; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +#define two53m3 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 3) +#define two54m52p48m2 (((limb)1) << 54) - (((limb)1) << 52) + (((limb)1) << 48) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two53m2p0 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 2) + (((limb)1) << 0) +#define two54m52p41m2 (((limb)1) << 54) - (((limb)1) << 52) + (((limb)1) << 41) - (((limb)1) << 2) +#define two53m21m2p0 (((limb)1) << 53) - (((limb)1) << 21) - (((limb)1) << 2) + (((limb)1) << 0) + +/* zero53 is 0 mod p. */ +static const felem zero53 = { two53m3, two54m52p48m2, two53m2p0, two54m52p41m2, two53m21m2p0 }; + +/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53 and + * in2[0,2,...] < 2**52, in2[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; + out[i] += zero53[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 51; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; + out[i] += zero53[i]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 52; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words + * with the same 51,52,... bit positions as an felem. + * + * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257. + * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is + * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be + * in Montgomery form. + * + * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**128 + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53 */ +static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u128 tmp[9]) { + /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code: + * + * Limb number: 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 + * Width (bits): 51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51| 52| 51 + * Start bit: 0 | 51|103|154|206|257|309|360|412|463|515 + * (odd phase): 0 | 52|103|155|206|258|309|361|412|464|515 */ + limb tmp2[10], carry, x, xShiftedMask; + unsigned i; + + /* tmp contains 128-bit words with the same 51,52,51-bit positions as an + * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another + * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this + * overlap. */ + tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom51Bits); + + /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>64)" to try + * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting + * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating + * afterwards. */ + tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 51; + tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 64)) << 13) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom52Bits; + carry = tmp2[1] >> 52; + tmp2[1] &= kBottom52Bits; + + for (i = 2; i < 9; i++) { + tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 64)) >> 39; + tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 52; + tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 64)) << 12) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i] += carry; + carry = tmp2[i] >> 51; + tmp2[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == 9) + break; + tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 64)) >> 39; + tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 51; + tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 64)) << 13) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i] += carry; + carry = tmp2[i] >> 52; + tmp2[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + tmp2[9] = ((limb)(tmp[7] >> 64)) >> 39; + tmp2[9] += ((limb)(tmp[8])) >> 51; + tmp2[9] += (((limb)(tmp[8] >> 64)) << 13); + tmp2[9] += carry; + + /* Montgomery elimination of terms. + * + * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can + * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by + * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value. + * + * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 51 bits of p + * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0. + * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the + * extra factor of R. */ + for (i = 0;; i += 2) { + tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 51; + x = tmp2[i] & kBottom51Bits; + xShiftedMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x >> 1); + tmp2[i] = 0; + + /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of + * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their + * right. + * + * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an + * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are + * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately + * and are written as, for example, 51 to mean a value <2**51. + * + * Word: 1 2 3 4 5 6 + * Added in top half: 52 44 52 37 50 + * 51 + * 51 + * Added in bottom half: 51 45 51 38 50 + * 52 + * 52 + * + * The value that is currently offset 5 will be offset 3 for the next + * iteration and then offset 1 for the iteration after that. Therefore + * the total value added will be the values added at 5, 3 and 1. + * + * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom + * are written as, for example, 53+45, to mean a value < 2**53+2**45. + * + * Word: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + * 52 44 52 37 50 50 50 50 50 + * 51 45 51 38 37 38 37 + * 52 51 52 51 52 51 + * 51 52 51 52 51 + * 44 52 51 52 + * 51 45 44 + * 52 + * ------------------------------------ + * 53+ 53+ 54+ 52+ 53+ 52+ + * 45 44+ 50+ 51+ 52+ 50+ + * 37 45+ 50+ 50+ 37 + * 38 44+ 38 + * 37 + * + * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[5]. If tmp2[5] has an initial + * value of <2**52, then the maximum value will be < 2**54 + 2**52 + 2**50 + + * 2**45 + 2**38, which is < 2**64, as required. */ + tmp2[i + 1] += (x << 45) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i + 2] += x >> 7; + + tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 38) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i + 4] += x >> 14; + + /* On tmp2[i + 4], when x < 2**1, the subtraction with (x << 18) will not + * underflow because it is balanced with the (x << 50) term. On the next + * word tmp2[i + 5], terms with (x >> 1) and (x >> 33) are both zero and + * there is no underflow either. + * + * When x >= 2**1, we add 2**51 to tmp2[i + 4] to avoid an underflow. + * Removing 1 from tmp2[i + 5] is safe because (x >> 1) - (x >> 33) is + * strictly positive. + */ + tmp2[i + 4] += 0x8000000000000 & xShiftedMask; + tmp2[i + 5] -= 1 & xShiftedMask; + + tmp2[i + 4] -= (x << 18) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 50) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 1) - (x >> 33); + + if (i+1 == NLIMBS) + break; + tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 52; + x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom52Bits; + xShiftedMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x >> 2); + tmp2[i + 1] = 0; + + tmp2[i + 2] += (x << 44) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i + 3] += x >> 7; + + tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 37) & kBottom51Bits; + tmp2[i + 5] += x >> 14; + + /* On tmp2[i + 5], when x < 2**2, the subtraction with (x << 18) will not + * underflow because it is balanced with the (x << 50) term. On the next + * word tmp2[i + 6], terms with (x >> 2) and (x >> 34) are both zero and + * there is no underflow either. + * + * When x >= 2**2, we add 2**52 to tmp2[i + 5] to avoid an underflow. + * Removing 1 from tmp2[i + 6] is safe because (x >> 2) - (x >> 34) is + * stricly positive. + */ + tmp2[i + 5] += 0x10000000000000 & xShiftedMask; + tmp2[i + 6] -= 1 & xShiftedMask; + + tmp2[i + 5] -= (x << 18) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i + 5] += (x << 50) & kBottom52Bits; + tmp2[i + 6] += (x >> 2) - (x >> 34); + } + + /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have + * widths of 52,51,... which we need to correct when copying them down. */ + carry = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + out[i] = tmp2[i + 5]; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 51; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + out[i] = tmp2[i + 5] << 1; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 52; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + out[4] = tmp2[9]; + out[4] += carry; + carry = out[4] >> 51; + out[4] &= kBottom51Bits; + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_square sets out=in*in. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) { + u128 tmp[9], x1x1, x3x3; + + x1x1 = ((u128) in[1]) * in[1]; + x3x3 = ((u128) in[3]) * in[3]; + + tmp[0] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[0] << 0); + tmp[1] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1) + ((x1x1 & 1) << 51); + tmp[2] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) + (x1x1 >> 1); + tmp[3] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) + + ((u128) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1); + tmp[4] = ((u128) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) + + ((u128) in[1]) * (in[3] << 0) + + ((u128) in[2]) * (in[2] << 0); + tmp[5] = ((u128) in[1]) * (in[4] << 1) + + ((u128) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1) + ((x3x3 & 1) << 51); + tmp[6] = ((u128) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) + (x3x3 >> 1); + tmp[7] = ((u128) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1); + tmp[8] = ((u128) in[4]) * (in[4] << 0); + + felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); +} + +/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2. + * + * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**52, in[1,3,...] < 2**53 and + * in2[0,2,...] < 2**52, in2[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { + u128 tmp[9], x1y1, x1y3, x3y1, x3y3; + + x1y1 = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[1]; + x1y3 = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[3]; + x3y1 = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[1]; + x3y3 = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[3]; + + tmp[0] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[0]; + tmp[1] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[1] + + ((u128) in[1]) * in2[0] + ((x1y1 & 1) << 51); + tmp[2] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[2] + (x1y1 >> 1) + + ((u128) in[2]) * in2[0]; + tmp[3] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[3] + + ((u128) in[1]) * in2[2] + + ((u128) in[2]) * in2[1] + ((x1y3 & 1) << 51) + + ((u128) in[3]) * in2[0] + ((x3y1 & 1) << 51); + tmp[4] = ((u128) in[0]) * in2[4] + (x1y3 >> 1) + + ((u128) in[2]) * in2[2] + (x3y1 >> 1) + + ((u128) in[4]) * in2[0]; + tmp[5] = ((u128) in[1]) * in2[4] + + ((u128) in[2]) * in2[3] + + ((u128) in[3]) * in2[2] + + ((u128) in[4]) * in2[1] + ((x3y3 & 1) << 51); + tmp[6] = ((u128) in[2]) * in2[4] + (x3y3 >> 1) + + ((u128) in[4]) * in2[2]; + tmp[7] = ((u128) in[3]) * in2[4] + + ((u128) in[4]) * in2[3]; + tmp[8] = ((u128) in[4]) * in2[4]; + + felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); +} + +static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { + memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem)); +} + +/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) { + limb carry = 0; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + out[i] *= 3; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 51; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + out[i] *= 3; + out[i] += carry; + carry = out[i] >> 52; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) { + limb carry = 0, next_carry; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + next_carry = out[i] >> 49; + out[i] <<= 2; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 51); + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + next_carry = out[i] >> 50; + out[i] <<= 2; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 52); + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out. + * + * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. + * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**52, out[1,3,...] < 2**53. */ +static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) { + limb carry = 0, next_carry; + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0;; i++) { + next_carry = out[i] >> 48; + out[i] <<= 3; + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 51); + out[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + next_carry = out[i] >> 49; + out[i] <<= 3; + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + out[i] += carry; + carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 52); + out[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); +} + +/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of + * time depending on the value of |in|. */ +static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) { + limb carry; + int i; + limb tmp[NLIMBS]; + + felem_assign(tmp, in); + + /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */ + do { + carry = 0; + for (i = 0;; i++) { + tmp[i] += carry; + carry = tmp[i] >> 51; + tmp[i] &= kBottom51Bits; + + i++; + if (i == NLIMBS) + break; + + tmp[i] += carry; + carry = tmp[i] >> 52; + tmp[i] &= kBottom52Bits; + } + + felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry); + } while (carry); + + /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */ + return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || + memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || + memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0; +} + + +/* Montgomery operations: */ + +#define kRDigits {2, 0xfffffffe00000000, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0x1fffffffd} // 2^257 mod p256.p + +#define kRInvDigits {0x180000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffe80000001, 0x7fffffff00000001} // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p + +static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits }; +static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits }; + +/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */ +static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) { + cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted; + int i; + + cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted); + cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted); + + for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) { + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom51Bits; + cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 51, &in_shifted); + } else { + out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom52Bits; + cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 52, &in_shifted); + } + } + + cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted); +} + +/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */ +static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) { + cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp; + int i, top; + + cryptonite_p256_init(&result); + cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp); + + cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result); + for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) { + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 51, &tmp); + } else { + top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 52, &tmp); + } + top += cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result); + } + + cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out); + + cryptonite_p256_clear(&result); + cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp); +} diff --git a/cbits/p256/p256.c b/cbits/p256/p256.c --- a/cbits/p256/p256.c +++ b/cbits/p256/p256.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ */ // This is an implementation of the P256 elliptic curve group. It's written to -// be portable 32-bit, although it's still constant-time. +// be portable and still constant-time. // // WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from // obvious. Be careful when touching this code. @@ -40,14 +40,16 @@ #include "p256/p256.h" const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n = // curve order - {{0xfc632551, 0xf3b9cac2, 0xa7179e84, 0xbce6faad, -1, -1, 0, -1}}; + {{P256_LITERAL(0xfc632551, 0xf3b9cac2), P256_LITERAL(0xa7179e84, 0xbce6faad), + P256_LITERAL(-1, -1), P256_LITERAL(0, -1)}}; const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p = // curve field size - {{-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 1, -1 }}; + {{P256_LITERAL(-1, -1), P256_LITERAL(-1, 0), + P256_LITERAL(0, 0), P256_LITERAL(1, -1) }}; const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b = // curve b - {{0x27d2604b, 0x3bce3c3e, 0xcc53b0f6, 0x651d06b0, - 0x769886bc, 0xb3ebbd55, 0xaa3a93e7, 0x5ac635d8}}; + {{P256_LITERAL(0x27d2604b, 0x3bce3c3e), P256_LITERAL(0xcc53b0f6, 0x651d06b0), + P256_LITERAL(0x769886bc, 0xb3ebbd55), P256_LITERAL(0xaa3a93e7, 0x5ac635d8)}}; void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a) { memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); @@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ } int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a) { - int i, result = 0; + cryptonite_p256_digit result = 0; + int i = 0; for (i = 0; i < P256_NDIGITS; ++i) result |= P256_DIGIT(a, i); - return !result; + return result == 0; } // top, c[] += a[] * b @@ -167,6 +170,10 @@ // top can be any value at this point. // Guestimate reducer as top * MOD, since msw of MOD is -1. top_reducer = mulAdd(MOD, top, 0, reducer); +#if P256_BITSPERDIGIT > 32 + // Correction when msw of MOD has only high 32 bits set + top_reducer += mulAdd(MOD, top >> 32, 0, reducer); +#endif // Subtract reducer from top | tmp. top = subTop(top_reducer, reducer, top, tmp + i); @@ -229,7 +236,7 @@ P256_DIGIT(b, i) = accu; } P256_DIGIT(b, i) = (P256_DIGIT(a, i) >> 1) | - (highbit << (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1)); + (((cryptonite_p256_sdigit) highbit) << (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1)); } // Return -1, 0, 1 for a < b, a == b or a > b respectively. @@ -359,30 +366,163 @@ } void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst) { - int i; + int i, n; const uint8_t* p = &src[0]; for (i = P256_NDIGITS - 1; i >= 0; --i) { - P256_DIGIT(dst, i) = - (p[0] << 24) | - (p[1] << 16) | - (p[2] << 8) | - p[3]; - p += 4; + cryptonite_p256_digit dig = 0; + n = P256_BITSPERDIGIT; + while (n > 0) { + n -= 8; + dig |= ((cryptonite_p256_digit) *(p++)) << n; + } + P256_DIGIT(dst, i) = dig; } } void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]) { - int i; + int i, n; uint8_t* p = &dst[0]; for (i = P256_NDIGITS -1; i >= 0; --i) { const cryptonite_p256_digit dig = P256_DIGIT(src, i); - p[0] = dig >> 24; - p[1] = dig >> 16; - p[2] = dig >> 8; - p[3] = dig; - p += 4; + n = P256_BITSPERDIGIT; + while (n > 0) { + n -= 8; + *(p++) = dig >> n; + } } +} + +/* + "p256e" functions are not part of the original source +*/ + +#define MSB_COMPLEMENT(x) (((x) >> (P256_BITSPERDIGIT - 1)) - 1) + +// c = a + b mod MOD +void cryptonite_p256e_modadd(const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) { + assert(c); /* avoid repeated checks inside inlined cryptonite_p256_add */ + cryptonite_p256_digit top = cryptonite_p256_add(a, b, c); + top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), -1); + top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), MSB_COMPLEMENT(top)); + addM(MOD, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), top); +} + +// c = a - b mod MOD +void cryptonite_p256e_modsub(const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) { + assert(c); /* avoid repeated checks inside inlined cryptonite_p256_sub */ + cryptonite_p256_digit top = cryptonite_p256_sub(a, b, c); + top = addM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), ~MSB_COMPLEMENT(top)); + top = subM(MOD, top, P256_DIGITS(c), MSB_COMPLEMENT(top)); + addM(MOD, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), top); +} + +#define NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, a, nth, b, out) \ + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(a, a, out); \ + for (i = 1; i < nth; i++) \ + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(out, out, out); \ + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(out, b, out); + +const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_r2 = // r^2 mod n + {{P256_LITERAL(0xBE79EEA2, 0x83244C95), P256_LITERAL(0x49BD6FA6, 0x4699799C), + P256_LITERAL(0x2B6BEC59, 0x2845B239), P256_LITERAL(0xF3D95620, 0x66E12D94)}}; + +const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_one = {{1}}; + +// Montgomery multiplication, i.e. c = ab/r mod n with r = 2^256. +// Implementation is adapted from 'sc_montmul' in libdecaf. +static void cryptonite_p256e_montmul(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c) { + int i, j, borrow; + cryptonite_p256_digit accum[P256_NDIGITS+1] = {0}; + cryptonite_p256_digit hi_carry = 0; + + for (i=0; i>= P256_BITSPERDIGIT; + } + accum[j] = chain; + + mand = accum[0] * P256_MONTGOMERY_FACTOR; + chain = 0; + mier = P256_DIGITS(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_n); + for (j=0; j>= P256_BITSPERDIGIT; + } + chain += accum[j]; + chain += hi_carry; + accum[j-1] = chain; + hi_carry = chain >> P256_BITSPERDIGIT; + } + + memcpy(P256_DIGITS(c), accum, sizeof(*c)); + borrow = cryptonite_p256_sub(c, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_n, c); + addM(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_n, 0, P256_DIGITS(c), borrow + hi_carry); +} + +// b = 1/a mod n, using Fermat's little theorem. +void cryptonite_p256e_scalar_invert(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_int* b) { + cryptonite_p256_int _1, _10, _11, _101, _111, _1010, _1111; + cryptonite_p256_int _10101, _101010, _101111, x6, x8, x16, x32; + int i; + + // Montgomerize + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(a, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_r2, &_1); + + // P-256 (secp256r1) Scalar Inversion + // + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_1 , &_1 , &_10); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10 , &_1 , &_11); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10 , &_11 , &_101); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10 , &_101 , &_111); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101 , &_101 , &_1010); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101 , &_1010 , &_1111); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &_1010, 1 , &_1 , &_10101); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10101 , &_10101 , &_101010); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_101 , &_101010, &_101111); + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(&_10101 , &_101010, &x6); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x6 , 2 , &_11 , &x8); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x8 , 8 , &x8 , &x16); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x16 , 16 , &x16 , &x32); + + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, &x32 , 32+32, &x32 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 32, &x32 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 6, &_101111, b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 3, &_111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 2, &_11 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 1 + 4, &_1111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 5, &_10101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 1 + 3, &_101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 3, &_101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 3, &_101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 3, &_111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 3 + 6, &_101111, b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 4, &_1111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 1 + 1, &_1 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 4 + 1, &_1 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 4, &_1111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 3, &_111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 1 + 3, &_111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 3, &_111 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 3, &_101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 1 + 2, &_11 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 4 + 6, &_101111, b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2, &_11 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 3 + 2, &_11 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 3 + 2, &_11 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 1, &_1 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 5, &_10101 , b); + NTH_DOUBLE_THEN_ADD(i, b , 2 + 4, &_1111 , b); + + // Demontgomerize + cryptonite_p256e_montmul(b, &cryptonite_SECP256r1_one, b); } diff --git a/cbits/p256/p256.h b/cbits/p256/p256.h deleted file mode 100644 --- a/cbits/p256/p256.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,162 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright 2013 The Android Open Source Project - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: - * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its contributors may - * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software - * without specific prior written permission. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Google Inc. ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO - * EVENT SHALL Google Inc. BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, - * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; - * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR - * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF - * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - */ - -#ifndef SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ -#define SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ - -// Collection of routines manipulating 256 bit unsigned integers. -// Just enough to implement ecdsa-p256 and related algorithms. - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#define P256_BITSPERDIGIT 32 -#define P256_NDIGITS 8 -#define P256_NBYTES 32 - -typedef int cryptonite_p256_err; -typedef uint32_t cryptonite_p256_digit; -typedef int32_t cryptonite_p256_sdigit; -typedef uint64_t cryptonite_p256_ddigit; -typedef int64_t cryptonite_p256_sddigit; - -// Defining cryptonite_p256_int as struct to leverage struct assigment. -typedef struct { - cryptonite_p256_digit a[P256_NDIGITS]; -} cryptonite_p256_int; - -extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_n; // Curve order -extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_p; // Curve prime -extern const cryptonite_p256_int cryptonite_SECP256r1_b; // Curve param - -// Initialize a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. -void cryptonite_p256_init(cryptonite_p256_int* a); - -// Clear a cryptonite_p256_int to zero. -void cryptonite_p256_clear(cryptonite_p256_int* a); - -// Return bit. Index 0 is least significant. -int cryptonite_p256_get_bit(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int index); - -// b := a % MOD -void cryptonite_p256_mod( - const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, - const cryptonite_p256_int* a, - cryptonite_p256_int* b); - -// c := a * (top_b | b) % MOD -void cryptonite_p256_modmul( - const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, - const cryptonite_p256_int* a, - const cryptonite_p256_digit top_b, - const cryptonite_p256_int* b, - cryptonite_p256_int* c); - -// b := 1 / a % MOD -// MOD best be SECP256r1_n -void cryptonite_p256_modinv( - const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, - const cryptonite_p256_int* a, - cryptonite_p256_int* b); - -// b := 1 / a % MOD -// MOD best be SECP256r1_n -// Faster than cryptonite_p256_modinv() -void cryptonite_p256_modinv_vartime( - const cryptonite_p256_int* MOD, - const cryptonite_p256_int* a, - cryptonite_p256_int* b); - -// b := a << (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) -// Returns the bits shifted out of most significant digit. -cryptonite_p256_digit cryptonite_p256_shl(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); - -// b := a >> (n % P256_BITSPERDIGIT) -void cryptonite_p256_shr(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, int n, cryptonite_p256_int* b); - -int cryptonite_p256_is_zero(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); -int cryptonite_p256_is_odd(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); -int cryptonite_p256_is_even(const cryptonite_p256_int* a); - -// Returns -1, 0 or 1. -int cryptonite_p256_cmp(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int *b); - -// c: = a - b -// Returns -1 on borrow. -int cryptonite_p256_sub(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); - -// c := a + b -// Returns 1 on carry. -int cryptonite_p256_add(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, const cryptonite_p256_int* b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); - -// c := a + (single digit)b -// Returns carry 1 on carry. -int cryptonite_p256_add_d(const cryptonite_p256_int* a, cryptonite_p256_digit b, cryptonite_p256_int* c); - -// ec routines. - -// {out_x,out_y} := nG -void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, - cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, - cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); - -// {out_x,out_y} := n{in_x,in_y} -void cryptonite_p256_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int *n, - const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, - const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, - cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, - cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); - -// {out_x,out_y} := n1G + n2{in_x,in_y} -void cryptonite_p256_points_mul_vartime( - const cryptonite_p256_int *n1, const cryptonite_p256_int *n2, - const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, - cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y); - -// Return whether point {x,y} is on curve. -int cryptonite_p256_is_valid_point(const cryptonite_p256_int* x, const cryptonite_p256_int* y); - -// Outputs big-endian binary form. No leading zero skips. -void cryptonite_p256_to_bin(const cryptonite_p256_int* src, uint8_t dst[P256_NBYTES]); - -// Reads from big-endian binary form, -// thus pre-pad with leading zeros if short. -void cryptonite_p256_from_bin(const uint8_t src[P256_NBYTES], cryptonite_p256_int* dst); - -#define P256_DIGITS(x) ((x)->a) -#define P256_DIGIT(x,y) ((x)->a[y]) - -#define P256_ZERO {{0}} -#define P256_ONE {{1}} - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif // SYSTEM_CORE_INCLUDE_MINCRYPT_LITE_P256_H_ diff --git a/cbits/p256/p256_ec.c b/cbits/p256/p256_ec.c --- a/cbits/p256/p256_ec.c +++ b/cbits/p256/p256_ec.c @@ -25,580 +25,18 @@ */ // This is an implementation of the P256 elliptic curve group. It's written to -// be portable 32-bit, although it's still constant-time. +// be portable and still constant-time. // // WARNING: Implementing these functions in a constant-time manner is far from // obvious. Be careful when touching this code. // // See http://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html ([1]) for background. -#include -#include - -#include -#include - -#include "p256/p256.h" - -typedef uint8_t u8; -typedef uint32_t u32; -typedef int32_t s32; -typedef uint64_t u64; - -/* Our field elements are represented as nine 32-bit limbs. - * - * The value of an felem (field element) is: - * x[0] + (x[1] * 2**29) + (x[2] * 2**57) + ... + (x[8] * 2**228) - * - * That is, each limb is alternately 29 or 28-bits wide in little-endian - * order. - * - * This means that an felem hits 2**257, rather than 2**256 as we would like. A - * 28, 29, ... pattern would cause us to hit 2**256, but that causes problems - * when multiplying as terms end up one bit short of a limb which would require - * much bit-shifting to correct. - * - * Finally, the values stored in an felem are in Montgomery form. So the value - * |y| is stored as (y*R) mod p, where p is the P-256 prime and R is 2**257. - */ -typedef u32 limb; -#define NLIMBS 9 -typedef limb felem[NLIMBS]; - -static const limb kBottom28Bits = 0xfffffff; -static const limb kBottom29Bits = 0x1fffffff; - -/* kOne is the number 1 as an felem. It's 2**257 mod p split up into 29 and - * 28-bit words. */ -static const felem kOne = { - 2, 0, 0, 0xffff800, - 0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fbfffff, 0x1ffffff, - 0 -}; -static const felem kZero = {0}; -static const felem kP = { - 0x1fffffff, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x3ff, - 0, 0, 0x200000, 0xf000000, - 0xfffffff -}; -static const felem k2P = { - 0x1ffffffe, 0xfffffff, 0x1fffffff, 0x7ff, - 0, 0, 0x400000, 0xe000000, - 0x1fffffff -}; -/* kPrecomputed contains precomputed values to aid the calculation of scalar - * multiples of the base point, G. It's actually two, equal length, tables - * concatenated. - * - * The first table contains (x,y) felem pairs for 16 multiples of the base - * point, G. - * - * Index | Index (binary) | Value - * 0 | 0000 | 0G (all zeros, omitted) - * 1 | 0001 | G - * 2 | 0010 | 2**64G - * 3 | 0011 | 2**64G + G - * 4 | 0100 | 2**128G - * 5 | 0101 | 2**128G + G - * 6 | 0110 | 2**128G + 2**64G - * 7 | 0111 | 2**128G + 2**64G + G - * 8 | 1000 | 2**192G - * 9 | 1001 | 2**192G + G - * 10 | 1010 | 2**192G + 2**64G - * 11 | 1011 | 2**192G + 2**64G + G - * 12 | 1100 | 2**192G + 2**128G - * 13 | 1101 | 2**192G + 2**128G + G - * 14 | 1110 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G - * 15 | 1111 | 2**192G + 2**128G + 2**64G + G - * - * The second table follows the same style, but the terms are 2**32G, - * 2**96G, 2**160G, 2**224G. - * - * This is ~2KB of data. */ -static const limb kPrecomputed[NLIMBS * 2 * 15 * 2] = { - 0x11522878, 0xe730d41, 0xdb60179, 0x4afe2ff, 0x12883add, 0xcaddd88, 0x119e7edc, 0xd4a6eab, 0x3120bee, - 0x1d2aac15, 0xf25357c, 0x19e45cdd, 0x5c721d0, 0x1992c5a5, 0xa237487, 0x154ba21, 0x14b10bb, 0xae3fe3, - 0xd41a576, 0x922fc51, 0x234994f, 0x60b60d3, 0x164586ae, 0xce95f18, 0x1fe49073, 0x3fa36cc, 0x5ebcd2c, - 0xb402f2f, 0x15c70bf, 0x1561925c, 0x5a26704, 0xda91e90, 0xcdc1c7f, 0x1ea12446, 0xe1ade1e, 0xec91f22, - 0x26f7778, 0x566847e, 0xa0bec9e, 0x234f453, 0x1a31f21a, 0xd85e75c, 0x56c7109, 0xa267a00, 0xb57c050, - 0x98fb57, 0xaa837cc, 0x60c0792, 0xcfa5e19, 0x61bab9e, 0x589e39b, 0xa324c5, 0x7d6dee7, 0x2976e4b, - 0x1fc4124a, 0xa8c244b, 0x1ce86762, 0xcd61c7e, 0x1831c8e0, 0x75774e1, 0x1d96a5a9, 0x843a649, 0xc3ab0fa, - 0x6e2e7d5, 0x7673a2a, 0x178b65e8, 0x4003e9b, 0x1a1f11c2, 0x7816ea, 0xf643e11, 0x58c43df, 0xf423fc2, - 0x19633ffa, 0x891f2b2, 0x123c231c, 0x46add8c, 0x54700dd, 0x59e2b17, 0x172db40f, 0x83e277d, 0xb0dd609, - 0xfd1da12, 0x35c6e52, 0x19ede20c, 0xd19e0c0, 0x97d0f40, 0xb015b19, 0x449e3f5, 0xe10c9e, 0x33ab581, - 0x56a67ab, 0x577734d, 0x1dddc062, 0xc57b10d, 0x149b39d, 0x26a9e7b, 0xc35df9f, 0x48764cd, 0x76dbcca, - 0xca4b366, 0xe9303ab, 0x1a7480e7, 0x57e9e81, 0x1e13eb50, 0xf466cf3, 0x6f16b20, 0x4ba3173, 0xc168c33, - 0x15cb5439, 0x6a38e11, 0x73658bd, 0xb29564f, 0x3f6dc5b, 0x53b97e, 0x1322c4c0, 0x65dd7ff, 0x3a1e4f6, - 0x14e614aa, 0x9246317, 0x1bc83aca, 0xad97eed, 0xd38ce4a, 0xf82b006, 0x341f077, 0xa6add89, 0x4894acd, - 0x9f162d5, 0xf8410ef, 0x1b266a56, 0xd7f223, 0x3e0cb92, 0xe39b672, 0x6a2901a, 0x69a8556, 0x7e7c0, - 0x9b7d8d3, 0x309a80, 0x1ad05f7f, 0xc2fb5dd, 0xcbfd41d, 0x9ceb638, 0x1051825c, 0xda0cf5b, 0x812e881, - 0x6f35669, 0x6a56f2c, 0x1df8d184, 0x345820, 0x1477d477, 0x1645db1, 0xbe80c51, 0xc22be3e, 0xe35e65a, - 0x1aeb7aa0, 0xc375315, 0xf67bc99, 0x7fdd7b9, 0x191fc1be, 0x61235d, 0x2c184e9, 0x1c5a839, 0x47a1e26, - 0xb7cb456, 0x93e225d, 0x14f3c6ed, 0xccc1ac9, 0x17fe37f3, 0x4988989, 0x1a90c502, 0x2f32042, 0xa17769b, - 0xafd8c7c, 0x8191c6e, 0x1dcdb237, 0x16200c0, 0x107b32a1, 0x66c08db, 0x10d06a02, 0x3fc93, 0x5620023, - 0x16722b27, 0x68b5c59, 0x270fcfc, 0xfad0ecc, 0xe5de1c2, 0xeab466b, 0x2fc513c, 0x407f75c, 0xbaab133, - 0x9705fe9, 0xb88b8e7, 0x734c993, 0x1e1ff8f, 0x19156970, 0xabd0f00, 0x10469ea7, 0x3293ac0, 0xcdc98aa, - 0x1d843fd, 0xe14bfe8, 0x15be825f, 0x8b5212, 0xeb3fb67, 0x81cbd29, 0xbc62f16, 0x2b6fcc7, 0xf5a4e29, - 0x13560b66, 0xc0b6ac2, 0x51ae690, 0xd41e271, 0xf3e9bd4, 0x1d70aab, 0x1029f72, 0x73e1c35, 0xee70fbc, - 0xad81baf, 0x9ecc49a, 0x86c741e, 0xfe6be30, 0x176752e7, 0x23d416, 0x1f83de85, 0x27de188, 0x66f70b8, - 0x181cd51f, 0x96b6e4c, 0x188f2335, 0xa5df759, 0x17a77eb6, 0xfeb0e73, 0x154ae914, 0x2f3ec51, 0x3826b59, - 0xb91f17d, 0x1c72949, 0x1362bf0a, 0xe23fddf, 0xa5614b0, 0xf7d8f, 0x79061, 0x823d9d2, 0x8213f39, - 0x1128ae0b, 0xd095d05, 0xb85c0c2, 0x1ecb2ef, 0x24ddc84, 0xe35e901, 0x18411a4a, 0xf5ddc3d, 0x3786689, - 0x52260e8, 0x5ae3564, 0x542b10d, 0x8d93a45, 0x19952aa4, 0x996cc41, 0x1051a729, 0x4be3499, 0x52b23aa, - 0x109f307e, 0x6f5b6bb, 0x1f84e1e7, 0x77a0cfa, 0x10c4df3f, 0x25a02ea, 0xb048035, 0xe31de66, 0xc6ecaa3, - 0x28ea335, 0x2886024, 0x1372f020, 0xf55d35, 0x15e4684c, 0xf2a9e17, 0x1a4a7529, 0xcb7beb1, 0xb2a78a1, - 0x1ab21f1f, 0x6361ccf, 0x6c9179d, 0xb135627, 0x1267b974, 0x4408bad, 0x1cbff658, 0xe3d6511, 0xc7d76f, - 0x1cc7a69, 0xe7ee31b, 0x54fab4f, 0x2b914f, 0x1ad27a30, 0xcd3579e, 0xc50124c, 0x50daa90, 0xb13f72, - 0xb06aa75, 0x70f5cc6, 0x1649e5aa, 0x84a5312, 0x329043c, 0x41c4011, 0x13d32411, 0xb04a838, 0xd760d2d, - 0x1713b532, 0xbaa0c03, 0x84022ab, 0x6bcf5c1, 0x2f45379, 0x18ae070, 0x18c9e11e, 0x20bca9a, 0x66f496b, - 0x3eef294, 0x67500d2, 0xd7f613c, 0x2dbbeb, 0xb741038, 0xe04133f, 0x1582968d, 0xbe985f7, 0x1acbc1a, - 0x1a6a939f, 0x33e50f6, 0xd665ed4, 0xb4b7bd6, 0x1e5a3799, 0x6b33847, 0x17fa56ff, 0x65ef930, 0x21dc4a, - 0x2b37659, 0x450fe17, 0xb357b65, 0xdf5efac, 0x15397bef, 0x9d35a7f, 0x112ac15f, 0x624e62e, 0xa90ae2f, - 0x107eecd2, 0x1f69bbe, 0x77d6bce, 0x5741394, 0x13c684fc, 0x950c910, 0x725522b, 0xdc78583, 0x40eeabb, - 0x1fde328a, 0xbd61d96, 0xd28c387, 0x9e77d89, 0x12550c40, 0x759cb7d, 0x367ef34, 0xae2a960, 0x91b8bdc, - 0x93462a9, 0xf469ef, 0xb2e9aef, 0xd2ca771, 0x54e1f42, 0x7aaa49, 0x6316abb, 0x2413c8e, 0x5425bf9, - 0x1bed3e3a, 0xf272274, 0x1f5e7326, 0x6416517, 0xea27072, 0x9cedea7, 0x6e7633, 0x7c91952, 0xd806dce, - 0x8e2a7e1, 0xe421e1a, 0x418c9e1, 0x1dbc890, 0x1b395c36, 0xa1dc175, 0x1dc4ef73, 0x8956f34, 0xe4b5cf2, - 0x1b0d3a18, 0x3194a36, 0x6c2641f, 0xe44124c, 0xa2f4eaa, 0xa8c25ba, 0xf927ed7, 0x627b614, 0x7371cca, - 0xba16694, 0x417bc03, 0x7c0a7e3, 0x9c35c19, 0x1168a205, 0x8b6b00d, 0x10e3edc9, 0x9c19bf2, 0x5882229, - 0x1b2b4162, 0xa5cef1a, 0x1543622b, 0x9bd433e, 0x364e04d, 0x7480792, 0x5c9b5b3, 0xe85ff25, 0x408ef57, - 0x1814cfa4, 0x121b41b, 0xd248a0f, 0x3b05222, 0x39bb16a, 0xc75966d, 0xa038113, 0xa4a1769, 0x11fbc6c, - 0x917e50e, 0xeec3da8, 0x169d6eac, 0x10c1699, 0xa416153, 0xf724912, 0x15cd60b7, 0x4acbad9, 0x5efc5fa, - 0xf150ed7, 0x122b51, 0x1104b40a, 0xcb7f442, 0xfbb28ff, 0x6ac53ca, 0x196142cc, 0x7bf0fa9, 0x957651, - 0x4e0f215, 0xed439f8, 0x3f46bd5, 0x5ace82f, 0x110916b6, 0x6db078, 0xffd7d57, 0xf2ecaac, 0xca86dec, - 0x15d6b2da, 0x965ecc9, 0x1c92b4c2, 0x1f3811, 0x1cb080f5, 0x2d8b804, 0x19d1c12d, 0xf20bd46, 0x1951fa7, - 0xa3656c3, 0x523a425, 0xfcd0692, 0xd44ddc8, 0x131f0f5b, 0xaf80e4a, 0xcd9fc74, 0x99bb618, 0x2db944c, - 0xa673090, 0x1c210e1, 0x178c8d23, 0x1474383, 0x10b8743d, 0x985a55b, 0x2e74779, 0x576138, 0x9587927, - 0x133130fa, 0xbe05516, 0x9f4d619, 0xbb62570, 0x99ec591, 0xd9468fe, 0x1d07782d, 0xfc72e0b, 0x701b298, - 0x1863863b, 0x85954b8, 0x121a0c36, 0x9e7fedf, 0xf64b429, 0x9b9d71e, 0x14e2f5d8, 0xf858d3a, 0x942eea8, - 0xda5b765, 0x6edafff, 0xa9d18cc, 0xc65e4ba, 0x1c747e86, 0xe4ea915, 0x1981d7a1, 0x8395659, 0x52ed4e2, - 0x87d43b7, 0x37ab11b, 0x19d292ce, 0xf8d4692, 0x18c3053f, 0x8863e13, 0x4c146c0, 0x6bdf55a, 0x4e4457d, - 0x16152289, 0xac78ec2, 0x1a59c5a2, 0x2028b97, 0x71c2d01, 0x295851f, 0x404747b, 0x878558d, 0x7d29aa4, - 0x13d8341f, 0x8daefd7, 0x139c972d, 0x6b7ea75, 0xd4a9dde, 0xff163d8, 0x81d55d7, 0xa5bef68, 0xb7b30d8, - 0xbe73d6f, 0xaa88141, 0xd976c81, 0x7e7a9cc, 0x18beb771, 0xd773cbd, 0x13f51951, 0x9d0c177, 0x1c49a78, -}; +#include "p256/p256_gf.h" /* Field element operations: */ -/* NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES returns: - * 0xffffffff for 0 < x <= 2**31 - * 0 for x == 0 or x > 2**31. - * - * x must be a u32 or an equivalent type such as limb. */ -#define NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x) ((((u32)(x) - 1) >> 31) - 1) - -/* felem_reduce_carry adds a multiple of p in order to cancel |carry|, - * which is a term at 2**257. - * - * On entry: carry < 2**3, inout[0,2,...] < 2**29, inout[1,3,...] < 2**28. - * On exit: inout[0,2,..] < 2**30, inout[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_reduce_carry(felem inout, limb carry) { - const u32 carry_mask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(carry); - - inout[0] += carry << 1; - inout[3] += 0x10000000 & carry_mask; - /* carry < 2**3 thus (carry << 11) < 2**14 and we added 2**28 in the - * previous line therefore this doesn't underflow. */ - inout[3] -= carry << 11; - inout[4] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask; - inout[5] += (0x10000000 - 1) & carry_mask; - inout[6] += (0x20000000 - 1) & carry_mask; - inout[6] -= carry << 22; - /* This may underflow if carry is non-zero but, if so, we'll fix it in the - * next line. */ - inout[7] -= 1 & carry_mask; - inout[7] += carry << 25; -} - -/* felem_sum sets out = in+in2. - * - * On entry, in[i]+in2[i] must not overflow a 32-bit word. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */ -static void felem_sum(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { - limb carry = 0; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0;; i++) { - out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 29; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - out[i] = in[i] + in2[i]; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 28; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -#define two31m3 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 3) -#define two30m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 2) -#define two30p13m2 (((limb)1) << 30) + (((limb)1) << 13) - (((limb)1) << 2) -#define two31m2 (((limb)1) << 31) - (((limb)1) << 2) -#define two31p24m2 (((limb)1) << 31) + (((limb)1) << 24) - (((limb)1) << 2) -#define two30m27m2 (((limb)1) << 30) - (((limb)1) << 27) - (((limb)1) << 2) - -/* zero31 is 0 mod p. */ -static const felem zero31 = { two31m3, two30m2, two31m2, two30p13m2, two31m2, two30m2, two31p24m2, two30m27m2, two31m2 }; - -/* felem_diff sets out = in-in2. - * - * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and - * in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { - limb carry = 0; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0;; i++) { - out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; - out[i] += zero31[i]; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 29; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - out[i] = in[i] - in2[i]; - out[i] += zero31[i]; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 28; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -/* felem_reduce_degree sets out = tmp/R mod p where tmp contains 64-bit words - * with the same 29,28,... bit positions as an felem. - * - * The values in felems are in Montgomery form: x*R mod p where R = 2**257. - * Since we just multiplied two Montgomery values together, the result is - * x*y*R*R mod p. We wish to divide by R in order for the result also to be - * in Montgomery form. - * - * On entry: tmp[i] < 2**64 - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29 */ -static void felem_reduce_degree(felem out, u64 tmp[17]) { - /* The following table may be helpful when reading this code: - * - * Limb number: 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10... - * Width (bits): 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29| 28| 29 - * Start bit: 0 | 29| 57| 86|114|143|171|200|228|257|285 - * (odd phase): 0 | 28| 57| 85|114|142|171|199|228|256|285 */ - limb tmp2[18], carry, x, xMask; - unsigned i; - - /* tmp contains 64-bit words with the same 29,28,29-bit positions as an - * felem. So the top of an element of tmp might overlap with another - * element two positions down. The following loop eliminates this - * overlap. */ - tmp2[0] = (limb)(tmp[0] & kBottom29Bits); - - /* In the following we use "(limb) tmp[x]" and "(limb) (tmp[x]>>32)" to try - * and hint to the compiler that it can do a single-word shift by selecting - * the right register rather than doing a double-word shift and truncating - * afterwards. */ - tmp2[1] = ((limb) tmp[0]) >> 29; - tmp2[1] |= (((limb)(tmp[0] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[1] += ((limb) tmp[1]) & kBottom28Bits; - carry = tmp2[1] >> 28; - tmp2[1] &= kBottom28Bits; - - for (i = 2; i < 17; i++) { - tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25; - tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 28; - tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 4) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i] += carry; - carry = tmp2[i] >> 29; - tmp2[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == 17) - break; - tmp2[i] = ((limb)(tmp[i - 2] >> 32)) >> 25; - tmp2[i] += ((limb)(tmp[i - 1])) >> 29; - tmp2[i] += (((limb)(tmp[i - 1] >> 32)) << 3) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[i] += ((limb) tmp[i]) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[i] += carry; - carry = tmp2[i] >> 28; - tmp2[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - tmp2[17] = ((limb)(tmp[15] >> 32)) >> 25; - tmp2[17] += ((limb)(tmp[16])) >> 29; - tmp2[17] += (((limb)(tmp[16] >> 32)) << 3); - tmp2[17] += carry; - - /* Montgomery elimination of terms. - * - * Since R is 2**257, we can divide by R with a bitwise shift if we can - * ensure that the right-most 257 bits are all zero. We can make that true by - * adding multiplies of p without affecting the value. - * - * So we eliminate limbs from right to left. Since the bottom 29 bits of p - * are all ones, then by adding tmp2[0]*p to tmp2 we'll make tmp2[0] == 0. - * We can do that for 8 further limbs and then right shift to eliminate the - * extra factor of R. */ - for (i = 0;; i += 2) { - tmp2[i + 1] += tmp2[i] >> 29; - x = tmp2[i] & kBottom29Bits; - xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x); - tmp2[i] = 0; - - /* The bounds calculations for this loop are tricky. Each iteration of - * the loop eliminates two words by adding values to words to their - * right. - * - * The following table contains the amounts added to each word (as an - * offset from the value of i at the top of the loop). The amounts are - * accounted for from the first and second half of the loop separately - * and are written as, for example, 28 to mean a value <2**28. - * - * Word: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 - * Added in top half: 28 11 29 21 29 28 - * 28 29 - * 29 - * Added in bottom half: 29 10 28 21 28 28 - * 29 - * - * The value that is currently offset 7 will be offset 5 for the next - * iteration and then offset 3 for the iteration after that. Therefore - * the total value added will be the values added at 7, 5 and 3. - * - * The following table accumulates these values. The sums at the bottom - * are written as, for example, 29+28, to mean a value < 2**29+2**28. - * - * Word: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 - * 28 11 10 29 21 29 28 28 28 28 28 - * 29 28 11 28 29 28 29 28 29 28 - * 29 28 21 21 29 21 29 21 - * 10 29 28 21 28 21 28 - * 28 29 28 29 28 29 28 - * 11 10 29 10 29 10 - * 29 28 11 28 11 - * 29 29 - * -------------------------------------------- - * 30+ 31+ 30+ 31+ 30+ - * 28+ 29+ 28+ 29+ 21+ - * 21+ 28+ 21+ 28+ 10 - * 10 21+ 10 21+ - * 11 11 - * - * So the greatest amount is added to tmp2[10] and tmp2[12]. If - * tmp2[10/12] has an initial value of <2**29, then the maximum value - * will be < 2**31 + 2**30 + 2**28 + 2**21 + 2**11, which is < 2**32, - * as required. */ - tmp2[i + 3] += (x << 10) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[i + 4] += (x >> 18); - - tmp2[i + 6] += (x << 21) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i + 7] += x >> 8; - - /* At position 200, which is the starting bit position for word 7, we - * have a factor of 0xf000000 = 2**28 - 2**24. */ - tmp2[i + 7] += 0x10000000 & xMask; - /* Word 7 is 28 bits wide, so the 2**28 term exactly hits word 8. */ - tmp2[i + 8] += (x - 1) & xMask; - tmp2[i + 7] -= (x << 24) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[i + 8] -= x >> 4; - - tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask; - tmp2[i + 8] -= x; - tmp2[i + 8] += (x << 28) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i + 9] += ((x >> 1) - 1) & xMask; - - if (i+1 == NLIMBS) - break; - tmp2[i + 2] += tmp2[i + 1] >> 28; - x = tmp2[i + 1] & kBottom28Bits; - xMask = NON_ZERO_TO_ALL_ONES(x); - tmp2[i + 1] = 0; - - tmp2[i + 4] += (x << 11) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i + 5] += (x >> 18); - - tmp2[i + 7] += (x << 21) & kBottom28Bits; - tmp2[i + 8] += x >> 7; - - /* At position 199, which is the starting bit of the 8th word when - * dealing with a context starting on an odd word, we have a factor of - * 0x1e000000 = 2**29 - 2**25. Since we have not updated i, the 8th - * word from i+1 is i+8. */ - tmp2[i + 8] += 0x20000000 & xMask; - tmp2[i + 9] += (x - 1) & xMask; - tmp2[i + 8] -= (x << 25) & kBottom29Bits; - tmp2[i + 9] -= x >> 4; - - tmp2[i + 9] += 0x10000000 & xMask; - tmp2[i + 9] -= x; - tmp2[i + 10] += (x - 1) & xMask; - } - - /* We merge the right shift with a carry chain. The words above 2**257 have - * widths of 28,29,... which we need to correct when copying them down. */ - carry = 0; - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - /* The maximum value of tmp2[i + 9] occurs on the first iteration and - * is < 2**30+2**29+2**28. Adding 2**29 (from tmp2[i + 10]) is - * therefore safe. */ - out[i] = tmp2[i + 9]; - out[i] += carry; - out[i] += (tmp2[i + 10] << 28) & kBottom29Bits; - carry = out[i] >> 29; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - out[i] = tmp2[i + 9] >> 1; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 28; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - out[8] = tmp2[17]; - out[8] += carry; - carry = out[8] >> 29; - out[8] &= kBottom29Bits; - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -/* felem_square sets out=in*in. - * - * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_square(felem out, const felem in) { - u64 tmp[17]; - - tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in[0]; - tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[1] << 1); - tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[2] << 1) + - ((u64) in[1]) * (in[1] << 1); - tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[3] << 1) + - ((u64) in[1]) * (in[2] << 1); - tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[4] << 1) + - ((u64) in[1]) * (in[3] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * in[2]; - tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in[4] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[3] << 1); - tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[4] << 1) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in[3] << 1); - tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in[6] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[5] << 1) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in[4] << 1); - /* tmp[8] has the greatest value of 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**61 + 2**60 + 2**60, - * which is < 2**64 as required. */ - tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in[6] << 1) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in[5] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * in[4]; - tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * - (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in[6] << 1) + - ((u64) in[4]) * (in[5] << 1); - tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[3]) * - (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in[6] << 1) + - ((u64) in[5]) * (in[5] << 1); - tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in[8] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in[6] << 1); - tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in[8] << 1) + - ((u64) in[5]) * (in[7] << 2) + ((u64) in[6]) * in[6]; - tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in[8] << 1) + - ((u64) in[6]) * (in[7] << 1); - tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in[8] << 1) + - ((u64) in[7]) * (in[7] << 1); - tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in[8] << 1); - tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * in[8]; - - felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); -} - -/* felem_mul sets out=in*in2. - * - * On entry: in[0,2,...] < 2**30, in[1,3,...] < 2**29 and - * in2[0,2,...] < 2**30, in2[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_mul(felem out, const felem in, const felem in2) { - u64 tmp[17]; - - tmp[0] = ((u64) in[0]) * in2[0]; - tmp[1] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[1] << 0) + - ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[2] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[3] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[1] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[4] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[2] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[1] << 1) + - ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[5] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[3] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in2[1] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[6] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[4] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[3] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[1] << 1) + - ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[7] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[6] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[5] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in2[3] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[2] << 0) + - ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[1] << 0) + - ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[0] << 0); - /* tmp[8] has the greatest value but doesn't overflow. See logic in - * felem_square. */ - tmp[8] = ((u64) in[0]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[1]) * - (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[3] << 1) + - ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[2] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * - (in2[1] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[0] << 0); - tmp[9] = ((u64) in[1]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[2]) * - (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * - (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[3] << 0) + - ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[2] << 0) + - ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[1] << 0); - tmp[10] = ((u64) in[2]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[3]) * - (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[5] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * - (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[3] << 1) + - ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[2] << 0); - tmp[11] = ((u64) in[3]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[4]) * - (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[5] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * - (in2[4] << 0) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[3] << 0); - tmp[12] = ((u64) in[4]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[5]) * - (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[5] << 1) + - ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[4] << 0); - tmp[13] = ((u64) in[5]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[6]) * - (in2[7] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[6] << 0) + - ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[5] << 0); - tmp[14] = ((u64) in[6]) * (in2[8] << 0) + ((u64) in[7]) * - (in2[7] << 1) + ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[6] << 0); - tmp[15] = ((u64) in[7]) * (in2[8] << 0) + - ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[7] << 0); - tmp[16] = ((u64) in[8]) * (in2[8] << 0); - - felem_reduce_degree(out, tmp); -} - -static void felem_assign(felem out, const felem in) { - memcpy(out, in, sizeof(felem)); -} - /* felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} * * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: @@ -667,131 +105,7 @@ felem_mul(out, ftmp2, ftmp); /* 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 3 */ } -/* felem_scalar_3 sets out=3*out. - * - * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_scalar_3(felem out) { - limb carry = 0; - unsigned i; - for (i = 0;; i++) { - out[i] *= 3; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 29; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - out[i] *= 3; - out[i] += carry; - carry = out[i] >> 28; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -/* felem_scalar_4 sets out=4*out. - * - * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_scalar_4(felem out) { - limb carry = 0, next_carry; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0;; i++) { - next_carry = out[i] >> 27; - out[i] <<= 2; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - out[i] += carry; - carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29); - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - next_carry = out[i] >> 26; - out[i] <<= 2; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - out[i] += carry; - carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28); - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -/* felem_scalar_8 sets out=8*out. - * - * On entry: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. - * On exit: out[0,2,...] < 2**30, out[1,3,...] < 2**29. */ -static void felem_scalar_8(felem out) { - limb carry = 0, next_carry; - unsigned i; - - for (i = 0;; i++) { - next_carry = out[i] >> 26; - out[i] <<= 3; - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - out[i] += carry; - carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 29); - out[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - next_carry = out[i] >> 25; - out[i] <<= 3; - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - out[i] += carry; - carry = next_carry + (out[i] >> 28); - out[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(out, carry); -} - -/* felem_is_zero_vartime returns 1 iff |in| == 0. It takes a variable amount of - * time depending on the value of |in|. */ -static char felem_is_zero_vartime(const felem in) { - limb carry; - int i; - limb tmp[NLIMBS]; - - felem_assign(tmp, in); - - /* First, reduce tmp to a minimal form. */ - do { - carry = 0; - for (i = 0;; i++) { - tmp[i] += carry; - carry = tmp[i] >> 29; - tmp[i] &= kBottom29Bits; - - i++; - if (i == NLIMBS) - break; - - tmp[i] += carry; - carry = tmp[i] >> 28; - tmp[i] &= kBottom28Bits; - } - - felem_reduce_carry(tmp, carry); - } while (carry); - - /* tmp < 2**257, so the only possible zero values are 0, p and 2p. */ - return memcmp(tmp, kZero, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || - memcmp(tmp, kP, sizeof(tmp)) == 0 || - memcmp(tmp, k2P, sizeof(tmp)) == 0; -} - - /* Group operations: * * Elements of the elliptic curve group are represented in Jacobian @@ -971,9 +285,9 @@ felem_diff(y_out, y_out, tmp); } -/* copy_conditional sets out=in if mask = 0xffffffff in constant time. +/* copy_conditional sets out=in if mask = -1 in constant time. * - * On entry: mask is either 0 or 0xffffffff. */ + * On entry: mask is either 0 or -1. */ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) { int i; @@ -1168,58 +482,6 @@ } } -#define kRDigits {2, 0, 0, 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 1} // 2^257 mod p256.p - -#define kRInvDigits {0x80000000, 1, 0xffffffff, 0, 0x80000001, 0xfffffffe, 1, 0x7fffffff} // 1 / 2^257 mod p256.p - -static const cryptonite_p256_int kR = { kRDigits }; -static const cryptonite_p256_int kRInv = { kRInvDigits }; - -/* to_montgomery sets out = R*in. */ -static void to_montgomery(felem out, const cryptonite_p256_int* in) { - cryptonite_p256_int in_shifted; - int i; - - cryptonite_p256_init(&in_shifted); - cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in, 0, &kR, &in_shifted); - - for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) { - if ((i & 1) == 0) { - out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom29Bits; - cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 29, &in_shifted); - } else { - out[i] = P256_DIGIT(&in_shifted, 0) & kBottom28Bits; - cryptonite_p256_shr(&in_shifted, 28, &in_shifted); - } - } - - cryptonite_p256_clear(&in_shifted); -} - -/* from_montgomery sets out=in/R. */ -static void from_montgomery(cryptonite_p256_int* out, const felem in) { - cryptonite_p256_int result, tmp; - int i, top; - - cryptonite_p256_init(&result); - cryptonite_p256_init(&tmp); - - cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[NLIMBS - 1], &result); - for (i = NLIMBS - 2; i >= 0; i--) { - if ((i & 1) == 0) { - top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 29, &tmp); - } else { - top = cryptonite_p256_shl(&result, 28, &tmp); - } - top |= cryptonite_p256_add_d(&tmp, in[i], &result); - } - - cryptonite_p256_modmul(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, &kRInv, top, &result, out); - - cryptonite_p256_clear(&result); - cryptonite_p256_clear(&tmp); -} - /* cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul sets {out_x,out_y} = nG, where n is < the * order of the group. */ void cryptonite_p256_base_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int* n, cryptonite_p256_int* out_x, cryptonite_p256_int* out_y) { @@ -1287,19 +549,44 @@ const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x2, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y2, cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y) { - felem x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2, px1, py1, px2, py2; - const cryptonite_p256_int one = P256_ONE; + felem x, y, z, px1, py1, px2, py2; to_montgomery(px1, in_x1); to_montgomery(py1, in_y1); to_montgomery(px2, in_x2); to_montgomery(py2, in_y2); - scalar_mult(x1, y1, z1, px1, py1, &one); - scalar_mult(x2, y2, z2, px2, py2, &one); - point_add_or_double_vartime(x1, y1, z1, x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, z2); + point_add_or_double_vartime(x, y, z, px1, py1, kOne, px2, py2, kOne); - point_to_affine(px1, py1, x1, y1, z1); + point_to_affine(px1, py1, x, y, z); from_montgomery(out_x, px1); from_montgomery(out_y, py1); +} + +/* this function is not part of the original source + negate a point, i.e. (out_x, out_y) = (in_x, -in_y) + */ +void cryptonite_p256e_point_negate( + const cryptonite_p256_int *in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int *in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int *out_x, cryptonite_p256_int *out_y) +{ + memcpy(out_x, in_x, P256_NBYTES); + cryptonite_p256_sub(&cryptonite_SECP256r1_p, in_y, out_y); +} + +/* this function is not part of the original source + cryptonite_p256e_point_mul sets {out_x,out_y} = n*{in_x,in_y}, where + n is < the order of the group. + */ +void cryptonite_p256e_point_mul(const cryptonite_p256_int* n, + const cryptonite_p256_int* in_x, const cryptonite_p256_int* in_y, + cryptonite_p256_int* out_x, cryptonite_p256_int* out_y) { + felem x, y, z, px, py; + + to_montgomery(px, in_x); + to_montgomery(py, in_y); + scalar_mult(x, y, z, px, py, n); + point_to_affine(px, py, x, y, z); + from_montgomery(out_x, px); + from_montgomery(out_y, py); } diff --git a/cryptonite.cabal b/cryptonite.cabal --- a/cryptonite.cabal +++ b/cryptonite.cabal @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ Name: cryptonite -Version: 0.22 +version: 0.30 Synopsis: Cryptography Primitives sink Description: A repository of cryptographic primitives. . - * Symmetric ciphers: AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, Camellia, RC4, Salsa, XSalsa, ChaCha. + * Symmetric ciphers: AES, DES, 3DES, CAST5, Blowfish, Twofish, Camellia, RC4, Salsa, XSalsa, ChaCha. . * Hash: SHA1, SHA2, SHA3, SHAKE, MD2, MD4, MD5, Keccak, Skein, Ripemd, Tiger, Whirlpool, Blake2 . - * MAC: HMAC, Poly1305 + * MAC: HMAC, KMAC, Poly1305 . - * Asymmetric crypto: DSA, RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, ECC, Curve25519, Curve448, Ed25519 + * Asymmetric crypto: DSA, RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, ECC, Curve25519, Curve448, Ed25519, Ed448 . - * Key Derivation Function: PBKDF2, Scrypt, HKDF, Argon2 + * Key Derivation Function: PBKDF2, Scrypt, HKDF, Argon2, BCrypt, BCryptPBKDF . * Cryptographic Random generation: System Entropy, Deterministic Random Generator . * Data related: Anti-Forensic Information Splitter (AFIS) . If anything cryptographic related is missing from here, submit - a pull request to have it added. This package strive to be a + a pull request to have it added. This package strives to be a cryptographic kitchen sink that provides cryptography for everyone. . Evaluate the security related to your requirements before using. @@ -35,18 +35,29 @@ Build-Type: Simple Homepage: https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite Bug-reports: https://github.com/haskell-crypto/cryptonite/issues -Cabal-Version: >=1.18 +Cabal-Version: 1.18 +tested-with: GHC==9.2.2, GHC==9.0.2, GHC==8.10.7, GHC==8.8.4 extra-doc-files: README.md CHANGELOG.md extra-source-files: cbits/*.h cbits/aes/*.h cbits/ed25519/*.h - cbits/ed448/*.h - cbits/p256/*.h + cbits/decaf/include/*.h + cbits/decaf/include/decaf/*.h + cbits/decaf/include/arch_32/*.h + cbits/decaf/include/arch_ref64/*.h + cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/*.h + cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/*.h + cbits/decaf/p448/*.h + cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_tables.c + cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf.c + cbits/include32/p256/*.h + cbits/include64/p256/*.h cbits/blake2/ref/*.h cbits/blake2/sse/*.h cbits/argon2/*.h cbits/argon2/*.c cbits/aes/x86ni_impl.c + cbits/cryptonite_hash_prefix.c tests/*.hs source-repository head @@ -69,12 +80,7 @@ Manual: True Flag support_sse - Description: Use SSE optimized version when existing (BLAKE2, ARGON2) - Default: False - Manual: True - -Flag support_blake2_sse - Description: Use SSE optimized version of BLAKE2. + Description: Use SSE optimized version of (BLAKE2, ARGON2) Default: False Manual: True @@ -98,9 +104,16 @@ Default: False Manual: True +Flag use_target_attributes + Description: use GCC / clang function attributes instead of global target options. + Default: True + Manual: True + Library Exposed-modules: Crypto.Cipher.AES + Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish + Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 Crypto.Cipher.Camellia Crypto.Cipher.ChaCha Crypto.Cipher.ChaChaPoly1305 @@ -108,27 +121,35 @@ Crypto.Cipher.RC4 Crypto.Cipher.Salsa Crypto.Cipher.TripleDES + Crypto.Cipher.Twofish Crypto.Cipher.Types + Crypto.Cipher.Utils Crypto.Cipher.XSalsa Crypto.ConstructHash.MiyaguchiPreneel Crypto.Data.AFIS Crypto.Data.Padding Crypto.ECC + Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 Crypto.Error Crypto.MAC.CMAC Crypto.MAC.Poly1305 Crypto.MAC.HMAC + Crypto.MAC.KMAC Crypto.Number.Basic Crypto.Number.F2m Crypto.Number.Generate Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic + Crypto.Number.Nat Crypto.Number.Prime Crypto.Number.Serialize + Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal + Crypto.Number.Serialize.Internal.LE Crypto.KDF.Argon2 Crypto.KDF.PBKDF2 Crypto.KDF.Scrypt Crypto.KDF.BCrypt + Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF Crypto.KDF.HKDF Crypto.Hash Crypto.Hash.IO @@ -145,26 +166,36 @@ Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA Crypto.PubKey.ECC.P256 Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types + Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA Crypto.PubKey.ECIES Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 + Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA Crypto.PubKey.RSA Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 Crypto.PubKey.RSA.Prim Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS Crypto.PubKey.RSA.OAEP Crypto.PubKey.RSA.Types + Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP + Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic + Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified + Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW + Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Types Crypto.Random Crypto.Random.Types Crypto.Random.Entropy Crypto.Random.EntropyPool Crypto.Random.Entropy.Unsafe + Crypto.System.CPU Crypto.Tutorial Other-modules: Crypto.Cipher.AES.Primitive Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Box Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.Primitive + Crypto.Cipher.CAST5.Primitive Crypto.Cipher.Camellia.Primitive Crypto.Cipher.DES.Primitive + Crypto.Cipher.Twofish.Primitive Crypto.Cipher.Types.AEAD Crypto.Cipher.Types.Base Crypto.Cipher.Types.Block @@ -174,6 +205,7 @@ Crypto.Error.Types Crypto.Number.Compat Crypto.Hash.Types + Crypto.Hash.Blake2 Crypto.Hash.Blake2s Crypto.Hash.Blake2sp Crypto.Hash.Blake2b @@ -185,6 +217,7 @@ Crypto.Hash.SHA512 Crypto.Hash.SHA512t Crypto.Hash.SHA3 + Crypto.Hash.SHAKE Crypto.Hash.Keccak Crypto.Hash.MD2 Crypto.Hash.MD4 @@ -203,22 +236,27 @@ Crypto.PubKey.ElGamal Crypto.ECC.Simple.Types Crypto.ECC.Simple.Prim - Crypto.Internal.Proxy + Crypto.Internal.Builder Crypto.Internal.ByteArray Crypto.Internal.Compat Crypto.Internal.CompatPrim Crypto.Internal.DeepSeq Crypto.Internal.Imports + Crypto.Internal.Nat Crypto.Internal.Words Crypto.Internal.WordArray - if impl(ghc >= 7.8) - Other-modules: Crypto.Hash.SHAKE - Crypto.Internal.Nat - Build-depends: base >= 4.3 && < 5 - , bytestring - , memory >= 0.12 + if impl(ghc < 8.8) + Buildable: False + else + Build-depends: base + + Build-depends: bytestring + , memory >= 0.14.18 + , basement >= 0.0.6 , ghc-prim - ghc-options: -Wall -fwarn-tabs -optc-O3 -fno-warn-unused-imports + ghc-options: -Wall -fwarn-tabs -optc-O3 + if os(linux) + extra-libraries: pthread default-language: Haskell2010 cc-options: -std=gnu99 if flag(old_toolchain_inliner) @@ -228,8 +266,6 @@ , cbits/cryptonite_xsalsa.c , cbits/cryptonite_rc4.c , cbits/cryptonite_cpu.c - , cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c - , cbits/ed448/x448.c , cbits/p256/p256.c , cbits/p256/p256_ec.c , cbits/cryptonite_blake2s.c @@ -251,9 +287,41 @@ , cbits/cryptonite_whirlpool.c , cbits/cryptonite_scrypt.c , cbits/cryptonite_pbkdf2.c - include-dirs: cbits cbits/ed25519 + , cbits/ed25519/ed25519.c + include-dirs: cbits + , cbits/ed25519 + , cbits/decaf/include + , cbits/decaf/p448 - if arch(x86_64) + if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64) + include-dirs: cbits/include64 + else + include-dirs: cbits/include32 + + if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64) + C-sources: cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64/f_impl.c + , cbits/decaf/p448/f_generic.c + , cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c + , cbits/decaf/utils.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/scalar.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_all.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c + + include-dirs: cbits/decaf/include/arch_ref64 + , cbits/decaf/p448/arch_ref64 + else + C-sources: cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32/f_impl.c + , cbits/decaf/p448/f_generic.c + , cbits/decaf/p448/f_arithmetic.c + , cbits/decaf/utils.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/scalar.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/decaf_all.c + , cbits/decaf/ed448goldilocks/eddsa.c + + include-dirs: cbits/decaf/include/arch_32 + , cbits/decaf/p448/arch_32 + + if arch(x86_64) || arch(aarch64) C-sources: cbits/curve25519/curve25519-donna-c64.c else C-sources: cbits/curve25519/curve25519-donna.c @@ -276,9 +344,13 @@ c-sources: cbits/cryptonite_rdrand.c if flag(support_aesni) && (os(linux) || os(freebsd) || os(osx)) && (arch(i386) || arch(x86_64)) - CC-options: -mssse3 -maes -DWITH_AESNI + CC-options: -DWITH_AESNI + if !flag(use_target_attributes) + CC-options: -mssse3 -maes if flag(support_pclmuldq) - CC-options: -msse4.1 -mpclmul -DWITH_PCLMUL + CC-options: -DWITH_PCLMUL + if !flag(use_target_attributes) + CC-options: -msse4.1 -mpclmul C-sources: cbits/aes/x86ni.c , cbits/aes/generic.c , cbits/aes/gf.c @@ -288,7 +360,7 @@ , cbits/aes/gf.c , cbits/cryptonite_aes.c - if arch(x86_64) || flag(support_blake2_sse) + if arch(x86_64) || flag(support_sse) C-sources: cbits/blake2/sse/blake2s.c , cbits/blake2/sse/blake2sp.c , cbits/blake2/sse/blake2b.c @@ -303,6 +375,8 @@ if arch(x86_64) || flag(support_sse) CPP-options: -DSUPPORT_SSE + if arch(i386) + CC-options: -msse2 C-sources: cbits/argon2/argon2.c include-dirs: cbits/argon2 @@ -323,6 +397,8 @@ Build-depends: deepseq if flag(check_alignment) cc-options: -DWITH_ASSERT_ALIGNMENT + if flag(use_target_attributes) + cc-options: -DWITH_TARGET_ATTRIBUTES Test-Suite test-cryptonite type: exitcode-stdio-1.0 @@ -331,25 +407,35 @@ Other-modules: BlockCipher ChaCha BCrypt + BCryptPBKDF + ECC + ECC.Edwards25519 + ECDSA Hash Imports KAT_AES.KATCBC KAT_AES.KATECB KAT_AES.KATGCM + KAT_AES.KATCCM KAT_AES.KATOCB3 KAT_AES.KATXTS KAT_AES + KAT_AESGCMSIV KAT_AFIS KAT_Argon2 KAT_Blowfish + KAT_CAST5 KAT_Camellia KAT_Curve25519 KAT_Curve448 KAT_DES KAT_Ed25519 + KAT_Ed448 + KAT_EdDSA KAT_CMAC KAT_HKDF KAT_HMAC + KAT_KMAC KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel KAT_PBKDF2 KAT_OTP @@ -359,10 +445,13 @@ KAT_PubKey.OAEP KAT_PubKey.PSS KAT_PubKey.P256 + KAT_PubKey.RSA + KAT_PubKey.Rabin KAT_PubKey KAT_RC4 KAT_Scrypt KAT_TripleDES + KAT_Twofish ChaChaPoly1305 Number Number.F2m @@ -371,7 +460,7 @@ Salsa Utils XSalsa - Build-Depends: base >= 3 && < 5 + Build-Depends: base >= 0 && < 10 , bytestring , memory , tasty @@ -379,5 +468,20 @@ , tasty-hunit , tasty-kat , cryptonite - ghc-options: -Wall -fno-warn-orphans -fno-warn-missing-signatures -fno-warn-unused-imports -rtsopts + ghc-options: -Wall -fno-warn-orphans -fno-warn-missing-signatures -rtsopts + default-language: Haskell2010 + +Benchmark bench-cryptonite + type: exitcode-stdio-1.0 + hs-source-dirs: benchs + Main-is: Bench.hs + Other-modules: Number.F2m + Build-Depends: base + , bytestring + , deepseq + , memory + , gauge + , random + , cryptonite + ghc-options: -Wall -fno-warn-missing-signatures default-language: Haskell2010 diff --git a/tests/BCrypt.hs b/tests/BCrypt.hs --- a/tests/BCrypt.hs +++ b/tests/BCrypt.hs @@ -75,4 +75,8 @@ tests = testGroup "bcrypt" [ testGroup "KATs" makeKATs , testCase "Invalid hash length" (assertEqual "" (Left "Invalid hash format") (validatePasswordEither B.empty ("$2a$06$DCq7YPn5Rq63x1Lad4cll.TV4S6ytwfsfvkgY8jIucDrjc8deX1s" :: B.ByteString))) + , testCase "Hash and validate" (assertBool "Hashed password should validate" (validatePassword somePassword (bcrypt 5 aSalt somePassword :: B.ByteString))) ] + where + somePassword = "some password" :: B.ByteString + aSalt = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f" :: B.ByteString diff --git a/tests/BCryptPBKDF.hs b/tests/BCryptPBKDF.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/BCryptPBKDF.hs @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} + +module BCryptPBKDF (tests) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Test.Tasty +import Test.Tasty.HUnit + +import Crypto.KDF.BCryptPBKDF (Parameters (..), generate, + hashInternal) + +tests :: TestTree +tests = testGroup "BCryptPBKDF" + [ testGroup "generate" + [ testCase "1" generate1 + , testCase "2" generate2 + , testCase "3" generate3 + ] + , testGroup "hashInternal" + [ testCase "1" hashInternal1 + ] + ] + where + -- test vector taken from the go implementation by @dchest + generate1 = expected @=? generate params pass salt + where + params = Parameters 12 32 + pass = "password" :: B.ByteString + salt = "salt" :: B.ByteString + expected = B.pack + [ 0x1a, 0xe4, 0x2c, 0x05, 0xd4, 0x87, 0xbc, 0x02 + , 0xf6, 0x49, 0x21, 0xa4, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xea, 0x93 + , 0xbc, 0xac, 0xfe, 0x13, 0x5f, 0xda, 0x99, 0x97 + , 0x4c, 0x06, 0xb7, 0xb0, 0x1f, 0xae, 0x14, 0x9a + ] :: B.ByteString + + -- test vector generated with the go implemenation by @dchest + generate2 = expected @=? generate params pass salt + where + params = Parameters 7 71 + pass = "DieWuerdeDesMenschenIstUnantastbar" :: B.ByteString + salt = "Tafelsalz" :: B.ByteString + expected = B.pack + [ 0x17, 0xb4, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd7, 0x42, 0x33, 0x49 + , 0x5c, 0xe8, 0x79, 0x49, 0x15, 0x74, 0x4c, 0x71 + , 0xf9, 0x99, 0x66, 0x89, 0x7a, 0x60, 0xc3, 0x70 + , 0xb4, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x83, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x56, 0xde + , 0x38, 0xbc, 0x51, 0x8c, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0xd1, 0xcf + , 0x46, 0x0a, 0x68, 0x3d, 0xc8, 0x12, 0xcf, 0xf8 + , 0x43, 0xce, 0x21, 0x9d, 0x98, 0x81, 0x20, 0x26 + , 0x6e, 0x42, 0x0f, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x5d, 0x09, 0x8d + , 0x45, 0xda, 0xd5, 0x15, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x1d + ] :: B.ByteString + + -- test vector generated with the go implemenation by @dchest + generate3 = expected @=? generate params pass salt + where + params = Parameters 5 5 + pass = "ABC" :: B.ByteString + salt = "DEF" :: B.ByteString + expected = B.pack + [ 0xdd, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x29 + ] :: B.ByteString + + hashInternal1 = expected @=? hashInternal passHash saltHash + where + passHash = B.pack [ 0 .. 63 ] :: B.ByteString + saltHash = B.pack [ 64 .. 127 ] :: B.ByteString + expected = B.pack + [ 0x87, 0x90, 0x48, 0x70, 0xee, 0xf9, 0xde, 0xdd + , 0xf8, 0xe7, 0x61, 0x1a, 0x14, 0x01, 0x06, 0xe6 + , 0xaa, 0xf1, 0xa3, 0x63, 0xd9, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0x04 + , 0xdb, 0x35, 0x64, 0x43, 0x72, 0x1e, 0xb5, 0x55 + ] :: B.ByteString diff --git a/tests/BlockCipher.hs b/tests/BlockCipher.hs --- a/tests/BlockCipher.hs +++ b/tests/BlockCipher.hs @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ import Data.Maybe import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Cipher.Types -import Data.ByteArray as B hiding (pack, null) -import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.ByteArray as B hiding (pack, null, length) +import qualified Data.ByteString as B hiding (all, take, replicate) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- KAT @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ++ maybeGroup makeCFBTest "CFB" (kat_CFB kats) ++ maybeGroup makeCTRTest "CTR" (kat_CTR kats) -- ++ maybeGroup makeXTSTest "XTS" (kat_XTS kats) - -- ++ maybeGroup makeAEADTest "AEAD" (kat_AEAD kats) + ++ maybeGroup makeAEADTest "AEAD" (kat_AEAD kats) ) where makeECBTest i d = [ testCase ("E" ++ i) (ecbEncrypt ctx (ecbPlaintext d) @?= ecbCiphertext d) @@ -191,25 +191,24 @@ [ testCase ("E" ++ i) (xtsEncrypt ctx iv 0 (xtsPlaintext d) @?= xtsCiphertext d) , testCase ("D" ++ i) (xtsDecrypt ctx iv 0 (xtsCiphertext d) @?= xtsPlaintext d) ] - where ctx1 = cipherInit (cipherMakeKey cipher $ xtsKey1 d) - ctx2 = cipherInit (cipherMakeKey cipher $ xtsKey2 d) + where ctx1 = cipherInitNoErr (cipherMakeKey cipher $ xtsKey1 d) + ctx2 = cipherInitNoErr (cipherMakeKey cipher $ xtsKey2 d) ctx = (ctx1, ctx2) iv = cipherMakeIV cipher $ xtsIV d +-} makeAEADTest i d = - [ testCase ("AE" ++ i) (etag @?= aeadTag d) - , testCase ("AD" ++ i) (dtag @?= aeadTag d) + [ testCase ("AE" ++ i) (etag @?= AuthTag (B.convert (aeadTag d))) + , testCase ("AD" ++ i) (dtag @?= AuthTag (B.convert (aeadTag d))) , testCase ("E" ++ i) (ebs @?= aeadCiphertext d) , testCase ("D" ++ i) (dbs @?= aeadPlaintext d) ] - where ctx = cipherInit (cipherMakeKey cipher $ aeadKey d) - aead = maybe (error $ "cipher doesn't support aead mode: " ++ show (aeadMode d)) id - $ aeadInit (aeadMode d) ctx (aeadIV d) + where ctx = cipherInitNoErr (cipherMakeKey cipher $ aeadKey d) + aead = aeadInitNoErr (aeadMode d) ctx (aeadIV d) aeadHeaded = aeadAppendHeader aead (aeadHeader d) (ebs,aeadEFinal) = aeadEncrypt aeadHeaded (aeadPlaintext d) (dbs,aeadDFinal) = aeadDecrypt aeadHeaded (aeadCiphertext d) etag = aeadFinalize aeadEFinal (aeadTaglen d) dtag = aeadFinalize aeadDFinal (aeadTaglen d) --} cipherInitNoErr :: BlockCipher c => Key c -> c cipherInitNoErr (Key k) = @@ -217,6 +216,11 @@ CryptoPassed a -> a CryptoFailed e -> error (show e) + aeadInitNoErr :: (ByteArrayAccess iv, BlockCipher cipher) => AEADMode -> cipher -> iv -> AEAD cipher + aeadInitNoErr mode ct iv = + case aeadInit mode ct iv of + CryptoPassed a -> a + CryptoFailed _ -> error $ "cipher doesn't support aead mode: " ++ show mode ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Properties ------------------------------------------------------------------------ @@ -389,7 +393,7 @@ testBlockCipherAEAD :: BlockCipher a => a -> [TestTree] testBlockCipherAEAD cipher = [ testProperty "OCB" (aeadProp AEAD_OCB) - , testProperty "CCM" (aeadProp AEAD_CCM) + , testProperty "CCM" (aeadProp (AEAD_CCM 0 CCM_M16 CCM_L2)) , testProperty "EAX" (aeadProp AEAD_EAX) , testProperty "CWC" (aeadProp AEAD_CWC) , testProperty "GCM" (aeadProp AEAD_GCM) @@ -398,7 +402,7 @@ toTests :: BlockCipher a => a -> (AEADMode -> AEADUnit a -> Bool) toTests _ = testProperty_AEAD testProperty_AEAD mode (AEADUnit key testIV (unPlaintext -> aad) (unPlaintext -> plaintext)) = withCtx key $ \ctx -> - case aeadInit mode ctx testIV of + case aeadInit mode' ctx iv' of CryptoPassed iniAead -> let aead = aeadAppendHeader iniAead aad (eText, aeadE) = aeadEncrypt aead plaintext @@ -409,6 +413,10 @@ CryptoFailed err | err == CryptoError_AEADModeNotSupported -> True | otherwise -> error ("testProperty_AEAD: " ++ show err) + where (mode', iv') = updateCcmInputSize mode (B.length plaintext) testIV + updateCcmInputSize aeadmode k iv = case aeadmode of + AEAD_CCM _ m l -> (AEAD_CCM k m l, B.take 13 (iv <> (B.replicate 15 0))) + aeadOther -> (aeadOther, iv) withCtx :: Cipher c => Key c -> (c -> a) -> a withCtx (Key key) f = @@ -437,11 +445,33 @@ (testBlockCipherBasic cipher ++ testBlockCipherModes cipher ++ testBlockCipherAEAD cipher) ] +-- | Test IV arithmetic (based on the cipher block size) +testIvArith :: BlockCipher a => a -> [TestTree] +testIvArith cipher = + [ testCase "nullIV is null" $ + True @=? B.all (== 0) (ivNull cipher) + , testProperty "ivAdd is linear" $ \a b -> do + iv <- generateIvFromCipher cipher + return $ ivAdd iv (a + b) `propertyEq` ivAdd (ivAdd iv a) b + ] + where + ivNull :: BlockCipher a => a -> IV a + ivNull = const nullIV + + -- uses IV pattern <00 .. 00 FF .. FF> to test carry propagation + generateIvFromCipher :: BlockCipher a => a -> Gen (IV a) + generateIvFromCipher c = do + let n = blockSize c + i <- choose (0, n) + let zeros = Prelude.replicate (n - i) 0x00 + ones = Prelude.replicate i 0xFF + return $ cipherMakeIV c (B.pack $ zeros ++ ones) + -- | Return tests for a specific blockcipher and a list of KATs testBlockCipher :: BlockCipher a => KATs -> a -> TestTree testBlockCipher kats cipher = testGroup (cipherName cipher) ( (if kats == defaultKATs then [] else [testKATs kats cipher]) - ++ testModes cipher + ++ testModes cipher ++ testIvArith cipher ) cipherMakeKey :: Cipher cipher => cipher -> ByteString -> Key cipher diff --git a/tests/ECC.hs b/tests/ECC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/ECC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module ECC (tests) where + +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Crypto.ECC as ECC + +import Data.ByteArray.Encoding + +import Imports + +data Curve = forall curve. (ECC.EllipticCurveDH curve, Show curve, Eq (ECC.Point curve)) => Curve curve + +instance Show Curve where + showsPrec d (Curve curve) = showsPrec d curve + +instance Arbitrary Curve where + arbitrary = elements + [ Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + ] + +data CurveArith = forall curve. (ECC.EllipticCurveBasepointArith curve, Show curve) => CurveArith curve + +instance Show CurveArith where + showsPrec d (CurveArith curve) = showsPrec d curve + +instance Arbitrary CurveArith where + arbitrary = elements + [ CurveArith ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , CurveArith ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , CurveArith ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , CurveArith ECC.Curve_Edwards25519 + ] + +data VectorPoint = VectorPoint + { vpCurve :: Curve + , vpHex :: ByteString + , vpError :: Maybe CryptoError + } + +vectorsPoint = + [ VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "00" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "0408edd7b50085a952172228aca391beebe9ba942a0ae9eb15bcc8d50795d1a5505221c7b9b3bb4310f165fc3ac3114339db8170ceae6697e0f9736698b33551b8" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "04216f25b00717d46deef3402628f6abf265bfa12aea515ae8f100ce415e251e72cd5cd8f47f613a0f4e0f4f9410dd9c85c149cffcb320c2d52bf550a397ec92e5" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "0421eba6080610926609bb8d52afd3331ed1b07e0ba4c1441a118b62497d3e85f39a50c865027cdd84298cdf094b7818f2a65ae59f46c971a32ab4ea3c2c93c959" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "0400d7fc4050dfe73475502d5d1fadc105d7725508f48da2cd4729bf191fd6490a0001a16f417a27530e756efeb4a228f02db878072b9f833e99a2821d85fa78fc" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "040000fc4050dfe73475502d5d1fadc105d7725508f48da2cd4729bf191fd6490a0001a16f417a27530e756efeb4a228f02db878072b9f833e99a2821d85fa78fc" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "04d7fc4050dfe73475502d5d1fadc105d7725508f48da2cd4729bf191fd6490a01a16f417a27530e756efeb4a228f02db878072b9f833e99a2821d85fa78fc" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid -- tests leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P256R1 + , vpHex = "040000d7fc4050dfe73475502d5d1fadc105d7725508f48da2cd4729bf191fd6490a000001a16f417a27530e756efeb4a228f02db878072b9f833e99a2821d85fa78fc" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid -- tests leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "00" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "0409281a103fb1773445e16eec86adb095e32928ccc9c806bd210c649712813bdb6cab40163a8cb163b578ea8dda5eb32cfb5208ebf0d31a6c590fa92f5a61f32dbc0d518b166ea5a9adf9dd21c1bd09932ca21c6a5725ca89542ac57b6a9eca6f" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "040c7b3fb575c1db7bc61fe7a456cc34a8289f41e167938a56e5ba2787723f3de2c645112705e13ed24f477730173935ca4e0ff468e7e0acf78a9f59dadff8193a0e23789eb3737730c089b27a0f94de7d95b8db4466d017fb21a5710d6ca85775" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "0438e7705220b60460194be63d21c8945be2a211957168fa60f26b2ad4e8f5cd96a7779e7edff4deda9ded63243c2127e273d4444edaaba03b79b6caafc5033432af13776f851c0c7e1080c60d7ee3b61740720ab98461813dab5fb8c31bfa9ed9" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "04000836bf09614bf5b3c0ffe9b0822a2cc109a90b13d4d3510ce14f766e7d90875ec4bc8d6bee11fc1fdf97473a67884c00b1e2685367bdb846c95181b0f35a35cfbee04451122cc55a1e363acaa6c002e71b0b6ff7d0f5dc830a32f0e5086189" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "04000036bf09614bf5b3c0ffe9b0822a2cc109a90b13d4d3510ce14f766e7d90875ec4bc8d6bee11fc1fdf97473a67884c00b1e2685367bdb846c95181b0f35a35cfbee04451122cc55a1e363acaa6c002e71b0b6ff7d0f5dc830a32f0e5086189" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "040836bf09614bf5b3c0ffe9b0822a2cc109a90b13d4d3510ce14f766e7d90875ec4bc8d6bee11fc1fdf97473a67884cb1e2685367bdb846c95181b0f35a35cfbee04451122cc55a1e363acaa6c002e71b0b6ff7d0f5dc830a32f0e5086189" + , vpError = Nothing -- ignores leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P384R1 + , vpHex = "0400000836bf09614bf5b3c0ffe9b0822a2cc109a90b13d4d3510ce14f766e7d90875ec4bc8d6bee11fc1fdf97473a67884c0000b1e2685367bdb846c95181b0f35a35cfbee04451122cc55a1e363acaa6c002e71b0b6ff7d0f5dc830a32f0e5086189" + , vpError = Nothing -- ignores leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointSizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "00" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointFormatInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "04000ce5c207335134567026063743df82c1b551a009cf616471f0e23fa9767a50cc7f8771ef13a65c49ce7e1cd1ac3ad721dcc3ddd35f98ae5d380a0832f87a9f0ca4012914911d6bea7f3c481d694fb1645be27c7b66b09b28e261f8030b3fb8206f6a95f6ad73db755765b64f592a799234f8f451cb787abe95b1a54991a799ad0d69da" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "04003a5e6c1ce3a6a323757005da17b357db991bd1ad835e6201411f458b5c2edb3c66786b727b7e15fbad7dd74a4b0eb542183b5242e5952061cb85e7229353eb0dc300aac2dbd5232d582481ba7a59a993eb04c4466a1b17ba0015b65c616ce8703e70880969d8d58e633acb29c3ca017eb1b88649387b867466090ce1a57c2b4f8376bb" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "04003e0659fe9498695a3d8c88b8e25fa8133c30ab10eccbe9094344c99924f89fb69d9b3acf03bf438328f9cba55fa28a05be9a7e18780706b3728abfee2592aeb86d0001ea5ff64f2ca7a6453c79f80550e971843e073f4f8fec75bad2e52a4483ebf1f16f43d0de27e1967ea22f9722527652fa74439fdc03a569fba29e2d6f7c012db6" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "040043f91fd92d9ccd6d5584b265a2a775d222f4a41ff98190677d985e0889737cbe631d525835fe04faffcdebeccb783538280f4600ae82347b0470583abd9def306000a2e9bdc34f42b134517fc1e961befea0affd1f9666361a039192082a892dd722931d5865b62b69d7369e74895120e540cb10030cccb6049d809fbcf3f54537b378" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "040000f91fd92d9ccd6d5584b265a2a775d222f4a41ff98190677d985e0889737cbe631d525835fe04faffcdebeccb783538280f4600ae82347b0470583abd9def306000a2e9bdc34f42b134517fc1e961befea0affd1f9666361a039192082a892dd722931d5865b62b69d7369e74895120e540cb10030cccb6049d809fbcf3f54537b378" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PointCoordinatesInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "0443f91fd92d9ccd6d5584b265a2a775d222f4a41ff98190677d985e0889737cbe631d525835fe04faffcdebeccb783538280f4600ae82347b0470583abd9def3060a2e9bdc34f42b134517fc1e961befea0affd1f9666361a039192082a892dd722931d5865b62b69d7369e74895120e540cb10030cccb6049d809fbcf3f54537b378" + , vpError = Nothing -- ignores leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_P521R1 + , vpHex = "04000043f91fd92d9ccd6d5584b265a2a775d222f4a41ff98190677d985e0889737cbe631d525835fe04faffcdebeccb783538280f4600ae82347b0470583abd9def30600000a2e9bdc34f42b134517fc1e961befea0affd1f9666361a039192082a892dd722931d5865b62b69d7369e74895120e540cb10030cccb6049d809fbcf3f54537b378" + , vpError = Nothing -- ignores leading zeros + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "22cd98c65fb50db3be0d6d359456c0cd3516952a6e7229ff672893944f703f10" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "23cd98c65fb50db3be0d6d359456c0cd3516952a6e7229ff672893944f703f10" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "0023cd98c65fb50db3be0d6d359456c0cd3516952a6e7229ff672893944f703f10" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "2b162c2fef165ecbb203e40975ae4424f0f8db25ab582cb96b2e5ffe90a31798b35480b594c99dc32b437e61a74f792d8ecf5fc3e8cfeb75" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "2c162c2fef165ecbb203e40975ae4424f0f8db25ab582cb96b2e5ffe90a31798b35480b594c99dc32b437e61a74f792d8ecf5fc3e8cfeb75" + , vpError = Nothing + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "002c162c2fef165ecbb203e40975ae4424f0f8db25ab582cb96b2e5ffe90a31798b35480b594c99dc32b437e61a74f792d8ecf5fc3e8cfeb75" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_PublicKeySizeInvalid + } + ] + +vectorsWeakPoint = + [ VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "e0eb7a7c3b41b8ae1656e3faf19fc46ada098deb9c32b1fd866205165f49b800" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "5f9c95bca3508c24b1d0b1559c83ef5b04445cc4581c8e86d8224eddd09f1157" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "ecffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "edffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X25519 + , vpHex = "eeffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff7f" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + , VectorPoint + { vpCurve = Curve ECC.Curve_X448 + , vpHex = "0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" + , vpError = Just CryptoError_ScalarMultiplicationInvalid + } + ] + +vpEncodedPoint :: VectorPoint -> ByteString +vpEncodedPoint vector = let Right bs = convertFromBase Base16 (vpHex vector) in bs + +cryptoError :: CryptoFailable a -> Maybe CryptoError +cryptoError = onCryptoFailure Just (const Nothing) + +doPointDecodeTest i vector = + case vpCurve vector of + Curve curve -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + in testCase (show i) (vpError vector @=? cryptoError (ECC.decodePoint prx $ vpEncodedPoint vector)) + +doWeakPointECDHTest i vector = + case vpCurve vector of + Curve curve -> testCase (show i) $ do + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + CryptoPassed public = ECC.decodePoint prx $ vpEncodedPoint vector + keyPair <- ECC.curveGenerateKeyPair prx + vpError vector @=? cryptoError (ECC.ecdh prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate keyPair) public) + +tests = testGroup "ECC" + [ testGroup "decodePoint" $ zipWith doPointDecodeTest [katZero..] vectorsPoint + , testGroup "ECDH weak points" $ zipWith doWeakPointECDHTest [katZero..] vectorsWeakPoint + , testGroup "property" + [ testProperty "decodePoint.encodePoint==id" $ \testDRG (Curve curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + keyPair = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateKeyPair prx + p1 = ECC.keypairGetPublic keyPair + bs = ECC.encodePoint prx p1 :: ByteString + p2 = ECC.decodePoint prx bs + in CryptoPassed p1 == p2 + , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testProperty "ECDH commutes" $ \testDRG (Curve curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + (alice, bob) = withTestDRG testDRG $ + (,) <$> ECC.curveGenerateKeyPair prx + <*> ECC.curveGenerateKeyPair prx + aliceShared = ECC.ecdh prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate alice) (ECC.keypairGetPublic bob) + bobShared = ECC.ecdh prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate bob) (ECC.keypairGetPublic alice) + aliceShared' = ECC.ecdhRaw prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate alice) (ECC.keypairGetPublic bob) + bobShared' = ECC.ecdhRaw prx (ECC.keypairGetPrivate bob) (ECC.keypairGetPublic alice) + in aliceShared == bobShared && aliceShared == CryptoPassed aliceShared' + && bobShared == CryptoPassed bobShared' + , testProperty "decodeScalar.encodeScalar==id" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + s1 = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + bs = ECC.encodeScalar prx s1 :: ByteString + s2 = ECC.decodeScalar prx bs + in CryptoPassed s1 == s2 + , testProperty "scalarFromInteger.scalarToInteger==id" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + s1 = withTestDRG testDRG $ ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + bs = ECC.scalarToInteger prx s1 + s2 = ECC.scalarFromInteger prx bs + in CryptoPassed s1 == s2 + , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testProperty "(a + b).P = a.P + b.P" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + (s, a, b) = withTestDRG testDRG $ + (,,) <$> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + p = ECC.pointBaseSmul prx s + in ECC.pointSmul prx (ECC.scalarAdd prx a b) p == ECC.pointAdd prx (ECC.pointSmul prx a p) (ECC.pointSmul prx b p) + , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testProperty "(a * b).P = a.(b.P)" $ \testDRG (CurveArith curve) -> + let prx = Just curve -- using Maybe as Proxy + (s, a, b) = withTestDRG testDRG $ + (,,) <$> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + <*> ECC.curveGenerateScalar prx + p = ECC.pointBaseSmul prx s + in ECC.pointSmul prx (ECC.scalarMul prx a b) p == ECC.pointSmul prx a (ECC.pointSmul prx b p) + ] + ] diff --git a/tests/ECC/Edwards25519.hs b/tests/ECC/Edwards25519.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/ECC/Edwards25519.hs @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module ECC.Edwards25519 ( tests ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.ECC.Edwards25519 +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.Word (Word8) +import Imports + +instance Arbitrary Scalar where + arbitrary = fmap (throwCryptoError . scalarDecodeLong) + (arbitraryBS 64) + +smallScalar :: Word8 -> Scalar +smallScalar = throwCryptoError . scalarDecodeLong . B.singleton + +newtype PrimeOrder = PrimeOrder Point + deriving Show + +-- points in the prime-order subgroup +instance Arbitrary PrimeOrder where + arbitrary = (PrimeOrder . toPoint) `fmap` arbitrary + +-- arbitrary curve point, including points with a torsion component +instance Arbitrary Point where + arbitrary = do a <- arbitrary + b <- elements $ map smallScalar [0 .. 7] + return (pointsMulVarTime a b torsion8) + +-- an 8-torsion point +torsion8 :: Point +torsion8 = throwCryptoError $ pointDecode ("\199\ETBjp=M\216O\186<\vv\r\DLEg\SI* S\250,9\204\198N\199\253w\146\172\ETXz" :: ByteString) + +tests = testGroup "ECC.Edwards25519" + [ testGroup "vectors" + [ testCase "11*G" $ p011 @=? toPoint s011 + , testCase "123*G" $ p123 @=? toPoint s123 + , testCase "134*G" $ p134 @=? toPoint s134 + , testCase "123*G + 11*G" $ p134 @=? pointAdd p123 p011 + ] + , testGroup "scalar arithmetic" + [ testProperty "scalarDecodeLong.scalarEncode==id" $ \s -> + let bs = scalarEncode s :: ByteString + ss = scalarDecodeLong bs + in CryptoPassed s `propertyEq` ss + , testCase "curve order" $ s0 @=? sN + , testProperty "addition with zero" $ \s -> + propertyHold [ eqTest "zero left" s (scalarAdd s0 s) + , eqTest "zero right" s (scalarAdd s s0) + ] + , testProperty "addition associative" $ \sa sb sc -> + scalarAdd sa (scalarAdd sb sc) === scalarAdd (scalarAdd sa sb) sc + , testProperty "addition commutative" $ \sa sb -> + scalarAdd sa sb === scalarAdd sb sa + , testProperty "multiplication with zero" $ \s -> + propertyHold [ eqTest "zero left" s0 (scalarMul s0 s) + , eqTest "zero right" s0 (scalarMul s s0) + ] + , testProperty "multiplication with one" $ \s -> + propertyHold [ eqTest "one left" s (scalarMul s1 s) + , eqTest "one right" s (scalarMul s s1) + ] + , testProperty "multiplication associative" $ \sa sb sc -> + scalarMul sa (scalarMul sb sc) === scalarMul (scalarMul sa sb) sc + , testProperty "multiplication commutative" $ \sa sb -> + scalarMul sa sb === scalarMul sb sa + , testProperty "multiplication distributive" $ \sa sb sc -> + propertyHold [ eqTest "distributive left" ((sa `scalarMul` sb) `scalarAdd` (sa `scalarMul` sc)) + (sa `scalarMul` (sb `scalarAdd` sc)) + , eqTest "distributive right" ((sb `scalarMul` sa) `scalarAdd` (sc `scalarMul` sa)) + ((sb `scalarAdd` sc) `scalarMul` sa) + ] + ] + , testGroup "point arithmetic" + [ testProperty "pointDecode.pointEncode==id" $ \p -> + let bs = pointEncode p :: ByteString + p' = pointDecode bs + in CryptoPassed p `propertyEq` p' + , testProperty "pointEncode.pointDecode==id" $ \p -> + let b = pointEncode p :: ByteString + p' = pointDecode b + b' = pointEncode `fmap` p' + in CryptoPassed b `propertyEq` b' + , testProperty "addition with identity" $ \p -> + propertyHold [ eqTest "identity left" p (pointAdd p0 p) + , eqTest "identity right" p (pointAdd p p0) + ] + , testProperty "addition associative" $ \pa pb pc -> + pointAdd pa (pointAdd pb pc) === pointAdd (pointAdd pa pb) pc + , testProperty "addition commutative" $ \pa pb -> + pointAdd pa pb === pointAdd pb pa + , testProperty "negation" $ \p -> + p0 `propertyEq` pointAdd p (pointNegate p) + , testProperty "doubling" $ \p -> + pointAdd p p `propertyEq` pointDouble p + , testProperty "multiplication by cofactor" $ \p -> + pointMul s8 p `propertyEq` pointMulByCofactor p + , testProperty "prime order" $ \(PrimeOrder p) -> + True `propertyEq` pointHasPrimeOrder p + , testCase "8-torsion point" $ do + assertBool "mul by 4" $ p0 /= pointMul s4 torsion8 + assertBool "mul by 8" $ p0 == pointMul s8 torsion8 + , testProperty "scalarmult with zero" $ \p -> + p0 `propertyEq` pointMul s0 p + , testProperty "scalarmult with one" $ \p -> + p `propertyEq` pointMul s1 p + , testProperty "scalarmult with two" $ \p -> + pointDouble p `propertyEq` pointMul s2 p + , testProperty "scalarmult with curve order - 1" $ \p -> + pointHasPrimeOrder p === (pointNegate p == pointMul sI p) + , testProperty "scalarmult commutative" $ \a b -> + pointMul a (toPoint b) === pointMul b (toPoint a) + , testProperty "scalarmult distributive" $ \x y (PrimeOrder p) -> + let pR = pointMul x p `pointAdd` pointMul y p + in pR `propertyEq` pointMul (x `scalarAdd` y) p + , testProperty "double scalarmult" $ \n1 n2 p -> + let pR = pointAdd (toPoint n1) (pointMul n2 p) + in pR `propertyEq` pointsMulVarTime n1 n2 p + ] + ] + where + p0 = toPoint s0 + s0 = smallScalar 0 + s1 = smallScalar 1 + s2 = smallScalar 2 + s4 = smallScalar 4 + s8 = smallScalar 8 + sI = throwCryptoError $ scalarDecodeLong ("\236\211\245\\\SUBc\DC2X\214\156\247\162\222\249\222\DC4\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\DLE" :: ByteString) + sN = throwCryptoError $ scalarDecodeLong ("\237\211\245\\\SUBc\DC2X\214\156\247\162\222\249\222\DC4\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\NUL\DLE" :: ByteString) + + s011 = throwCryptoError $ scalarDecodeLong ("\011" :: ByteString) + s123 = throwCryptoError $ scalarDecodeLong ("\123" :: ByteString) + s134 = throwCryptoError $ scalarDecodeLong ("\134" :: ByteString) + + p011 = throwCryptoError $ pointDecode ("\x13\x37\x03\x6a\xc3\x2d\x8f\x30\xd4\x58\x9c\x3c\x1c\x59\x58\x12\xce\x0f\xff\x40\xe3\x7c\x6f\x5a\x97\xab\x21\x3f\x31\x82\x90\xad" :: ByteString) + p123 = throwCryptoError $ pointDecode ("\xc4\xb8\x00\xc8\x70\x10\xf9\x46\x83\x03\xde\xea\x87\x65\x03\xe8\x86\xbf\xde\x19\x00\xe9\xe8\x46\xfd\x4c\x3c\xd0\x9c\x1c\xbc\x9f" :: ByteString) + p134 = throwCryptoError $ pointDecode ("\x51\x20\xab\xe0\x3c\xa2\xaf\x66\xc7\x7c\xa3\x20\xf0\xb2\x1f\xb5\x56\xf6\xb6\x5f\xdd\x7e\x32\x64\xc1\x4a\x30\xd9\x7b\xf7\xa7\x6f" :: ByteString) + + -- Using : + -- + -- >>> import ed25519 + -- >>> encodepoint(scalarmult(B, 11)).encode('hex') + -- '1337036ac32d8f30d4589c3c1c595812ce0fff40e37c6f5a97ab213f318290ad' + -- >>> encodepoint(scalarmult(B, 123)).encode('hex') + -- 'c4b800c87010f9468303deea876503e886bfde1900e9e846fd4c3cd09c1cbc9f' + -- >>> encodepoint(scalarmult(B, 134)).encode('hex') + -- '5120abe03ca2af66c77ca320f0b21fb556f6b65fdd7e3264c14a30d97bf7a76f' diff --git a/tests/ECDSA.hs b/tests/ECDSA.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/ECDSA.hs @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +module ECDSA (tests) where + +import qualified Crypto.ECC as ECDSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECDSA as ECDSA +import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Imports + +data Curve = forall curve. (ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve, Show (ECDSA.Scalar curve)) => Curve curve ECC.Curve ECC.CurveName + +instance Show Curve where + showsPrec d (Curve _ _ name) = showsPrec d name + +instance Arbitrary Curve where + arbitrary = elements + [ makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P256R1 ECC.SEC_p256r1 + , makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P384R1 ECC.SEC_p384r1 + , makeCurve ECDSA.Curve_P521R1 ECC.SEC_p521r1 + ] + where + makeCurve c name = Curve c (ECC.getCurveByName name) name + +arbitraryScalar curve = choose (1, n - 1) + where n = ECC.ecc_n (ECC.common_curve curve) + +sigECCToECDSA :: ECDSA.EllipticCurveECDSA curve + => proxy curve -> ECC.Signature -> ECDSA.Signature curve +sigECCToECDSA prx (ECC.Signature r s) = + ECDSA.Signature (throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx r) + (throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx s) + +tests = localOption (QuickCheckTests 5) $ testGroup "ECDSA" + [ testProperty "SHA1" $ propertyECDSA SHA1 + , testProperty "SHA224" $ propertyECDSA SHA224 + , testProperty "SHA256" $ propertyECDSA SHA256 + , testProperty "SHA384" $ propertyECDSA SHA384 + , testProperty "SHA512" $ propertyECDSA SHA512 + ] + where + propertyECDSA hashAlg (Curve c curve _) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 msg) = do + d <- arbitraryScalar curve + kECC <- arbitraryScalar curve + let privECC = ECC.PrivateKey curve d + prx = Just c -- using Maybe as Proxy + kECDSA = throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx kECC + privECDSA = throwCryptoError $ ECDSA.scalarFromInteger prx d + pubECDSA = ECDSA.toPublic prx privECDSA + Just sigECC = ECC.signWith kECC privECC hashAlg msg + Just sigECDSA = ECDSA.signWith prx kECDSA privECDSA hashAlg msg + sigECDSA' = sigECCToECDSA prx sigECC + msg' = msg `B.append` B.singleton 42 + return $ propertyHold [ eqTest "signature" sigECDSA sigECDSA' + , eqTest "verification" True (ECDSA.verify prx hashAlg pubECDSA sigECDSA' msg) + , eqTest "alteration" False (ECDSA.verify prx hashAlg pubECDSA sigECDSA msg') + ] diff --git a/tests/Hash.hs b/tests/Hash.hs --- a/tests/Hash.hs +++ b/tests/Hash.hs @@ -1,10 +1,6 @@ -{-# LANGUAGE CPP #-} {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} -{-# LANGUAGE ViewPatterns #-} -#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) {-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} {-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} -#endif module Hash ( tests ) where @@ -12,7 +8,9 @@ import Crypto.Hash import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Data.ByteArray (convert) import qualified Data.ByteArray.Encoding as B (convertToBase, Base(..)) +import GHC.TypeLits import Imports v0,v1,v2 :: ByteString @@ -174,7 +172,6 @@ "69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9", "606beeec743ccbeff6cbcdf5d5302aa855c256c29b88c8ed331ea1a6bf3c8812", "94662583a600a12dff357c0a6f1b514a710ef0f587a38e8d2e4d7f67e9c81667" ]) -#if MIN_VERSION_base(4,7,0) , ("SHAKE128_4096", HashAlg (SHAKE128 :: SHAKE128 4096), [ "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", "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", @@ -183,7 +180,38 @@ "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", "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", "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" ]) -#endif + , ("Blake2b 160", HashAlg (Blake2b :: Blake2b 160), [ + "3345524abf6bbe1809449224b5972c41790b6cf2", + "3c523ed102ab45a37d54f5610d5a983162fde84f", + "a3d365b5fba5d36fbb19c03b7fde496058969c5a" ]) + , ("Blake2b 224", HashAlg (Blake2b :: Blake2b 224), [ + "836cc68931c2e4e3e838602eca1902591d216837bafddfe6f0c8cb07", + "477c3985751dd4d1b8c93827ea5310b33bb02a26463a050dffd3e857", + "a4a1b6851be66891a3deff406c4d7556879ebf952407450755f90eb6" ]) + , ("Blake2b 256", HashAlg (Blake2b :: Blake2b 256), [ + "0e5751c026e543b2e8ab2eb06099daa1d1e5df47778f7787faab45cdf12fe3a8", + "01718cec35cd3d796dd00020e0bfecb473ad23457d063b75eff29c0ffa2e58a9", + "036c13096926b3dfccfe3f233bd1b2f583b818b8b15c01be65af69238e900b2c" ]) + , ("Blake2b 384", HashAlg (Blake2b :: Blake2b 384), [ + "b32811423377f52d7862286ee1a72ee540524380fda1724a6f25d7978c6fd3244a6caf0498812673c5e05ef583825100", + "b7c81b228b6bd912930e8f0b5387989691c1cee1e65aade4da3b86a3c9f678fc8018f6ed9e2906720c8d2a3aeda9c03d", + "927a1f297873cbe887a93b2183c4e2eba53966ba92c6db8b87029a1d8c673471d09740676cced79c5016838973f630c3" ]) + , ("Blake2b 512", HashAlg (Blake2b :: Blake2b 512), [ + "786a02f742015903c6c6fd852552d272912f4740e15847618a86e217f71f5419d25e1031afee585313896444934eb04b903a685b1448b755d56f701afe9be2ce", + "a8add4bdddfd93e4877d2746e62817b116364a1fa7bc148d95090bc7333b3673f82401cf7aa2e4cb1ecd90296e3f14cb5413f8ed77be73045b13914cdcd6a918", + "af438eea5d8cdb209336a7e85bf58090dc21b49d823f89a7d064c119f127bd361af9c7d109edda0f0e91bdce078d1d86b8e6f25727c98f6d3bb6f50acb2dd376" ]) + , ("Blake2s 160", HashAlg (Blake2s :: Blake2s 160), [ + "354c9c33f735962418bdacb9479873429c34916f", + "5a604fec9713c369e84b0ed68daed7d7504ef240", + "759bef6d041bcbd861b8b51baaece6c8fffd0acf" ]) + , ("Blake2s 224", HashAlg (Blake2s :: Blake2s 224), [ + "1fa1291e65248b37b3433475b2a0dd63d54a11ecc4e3e034e7bc1ef4", + "e4e5cb6c7cae41982b397bf7b7d2d9d1949823ae78435326e8db4912", + "e220025fd46a9a635c3f7f60bb96a84c01019ac0817f5901e7eeaa2c" ]) + , ("Blake2s 256", HashAlg (Blake2s ::Blake2s 256), [ + "69217a3079908094e11121d042354a7c1f55b6482ca1a51e1b250dfd1ed0eef9", + "606beeec743ccbeff6cbcdf5d5302aa855c256c29b88c8ed331ea1a6bf3c8812", + "94662583a600a12dff357c0a6f1b514a710ef0f587a38e8d2e4d7f67e9c81667" ]) ] runhash :: HashAlg -> ByteString -> ByteString @@ -193,6 +221,24 @@ runhashinc (HashAlg hashAlg) v = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashinc $ v where hashinc = hashFinalize . foldl hashUpdate (hashInitWith hashAlg) +data HashPrefixAlg = forall alg . HashAlgorithmPrefix alg => HashPrefixAlg alg + +expectedPrefix :: [ (String, HashPrefixAlg) ] +expectedPrefix = + [ ("MD5", HashPrefixAlg MD5) + , ("SHA1", HashPrefixAlg SHA1) + , ("SHA224", HashPrefixAlg SHA224) + , ("SHA256", HashPrefixAlg SHA256) + , ("SHA384", HashPrefixAlg SHA384) + , ("SHA512", HashPrefixAlg SHA512) + ] + +runhashpfx :: HashPrefixAlg -> ByteString -> ByteString +runhashpfx (HashPrefixAlg hashAlg) v = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashWith hashAlg v + +runhashpfxpfx :: HashPrefixAlg -> ByteString -> Int -> ByteString +runhashpfxpfx (HashPrefixAlg hashAlg) v len = B.convertToBase B.Base16 $ hashPrefixWith hashAlg v len + makeTestAlg (name, hashAlg, results) = testGroup name $ concatMap maketest (zip3 is vectors results) where @@ -208,7 +254,40 @@ runhash hashAlg inp `propertyEq` runhashinc hashAlg (chunkS ckLen inp) ] +makeTestPrefix (hashName, hashAlg) = + [ testProperty hashName $ \(ArbitraryBS0_2901 inp) (Int0_2901 len) -> + runhashpfx hashAlg (B.take len inp) `propertyEq` runhashpfxpfx hashAlg inp len + ] + +makeTestHybrid (hashName, HashPrefixAlg alg) = + [ testProperty hashName $ \(ArbitraryBS0_2901 start) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 end) -> do + len <- choose (0, B.length end) + let ref = hashWith alg (start `B.append` B.take len end) + hyb = hashFinalizePrefix (hashUpdate (hashInitWith alg) start) end len + return (ref `propertyEq` hyb) + ] + +-- SHAKE128 truncation example with expected byte at final position +-- +shake128TruncationBytes = [0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x2f, 0x6f, 0x6f] + +makeTestSHAKE128Truncation i byte = + testCase (show i) $ xof 4088 `B.snoc` byte @=? xof (4088 + i) + where + hashEmpty :: KnownNat n => proxy n -> Digest (SHAKE128 n) + hashEmpty _ = hash B.empty + + xof n = case someNatVal n of + Nothing -> error ("invalid Nat: " ++ show n) + Just (SomeNat p) -> convert (hashEmpty p) + tests = testGroup "hash" [ testGroup "KATs" (map makeTestAlg expected) , testGroup "Chunking" (concatMap makeTestChunk expected) + , testGroup "Prefix" (concatMap makeTestPrefix expectedPrefix) + , testGroup "Hybrid" (concatMap makeTestHybrid expectedPrefix) + , testGroup "Truncating" + [ testGroup "SHAKE128" + (zipWith makeTestSHAKE128Truncation [1..] shake128TruncationBytes) + ] ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_AES.hs b/tests/KAT_AES.hs --- a/tests/KAT_AES.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_AES.hs @@ -3,13 +3,16 @@ import Imports import BlockCipher +import Data.Maybe import Crypto.Cipher.Types import qualified Crypto.Cipher.AES as AES +import qualified Data.ByteString as B import qualified KAT_AES.KATECB as KATECB import qualified KAT_AES.KATCBC as KATCBC import qualified KAT_AES.KATXTS as KATXTS import qualified KAT_AES.KATGCM as KATGCM +import qualified KAT_AES.KATCCM as KATCCM import qualified KAT_AES.KATOCB3 as KATOCB3 {- @@ -37,6 +40,23 @@ toKatGCM = toKatAEAD AEAD_GCM toKatOCB = toKatAEAD AEAD_OCB +toKatCCM (k,iv,h,i,o,m) = + KAT_AEAD { aeadMode = AEAD_CCM (B.length i) (ccmMVal m) CCM_L2 + , aeadKey = k + , aeadIV = iv + , aeadHeader = h + , aeadPlaintext = i + , aeadCiphertext = ct + , aeadTaglen = m + , aeadTag = at + } + where ccmMVal x = fromMaybe (error $ "unsupported CCM tag length: " ++ show x) $ + lookup x [ (4, CCM_M4), (6, CCM_M6), (8, CCM_M8), (10, CCM_M10) + , (12, CCM_M12), (14, CCM_M14), (16, CCM_M16) + ] + ctWithTag = B.drop (B.length h) o + (ct, at) = B.splitAt (B.length ctWithTag - m) ctWithTag + kats128 = defaultKATs { kat_ECB = map toKatECB KATECB.vectors_aes128_enc , kat_CBC = map toKatCBC KATCBC.vectors_aes128_enc @@ -48,7 +68,8 @@ ] , kat_XTS = map toKatXTS KATXTS.vectors_aes128_enc , kat_AEAD = map toKatGCM KATGCM.vectors_aes128_enc ++ - map toKatOCB KATOCB3.vectors_aes128_enc + map toKatOCB KATOCB3.vectors_aes128_enc ++ + map toKatCCM KATCCM.vectors_aes128_enc } kats192 = defaultKATs diff --git a/tests/KAT_AES/KATCCM.hs b/tests/KAT_AES/KATCCM.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_AES/KATCCM.hs @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module KAT_AES.KATCCM where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +-- (key, iv, header, in, out+atag, taglen) +type KATCCM = (B.ByteString, B.ByteString, B.ByteString, B.ByteString, B.ByteString, Int) + +vectors_aes128_enc :: [KATCCM] +vectors_aes128_enc = + [ ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x03\x02\x01\x00\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x58\x8c\x97\x9a\x61\xc6\x63\xd2\xf0\x66\xd0\xc2\xc0\xf9\x89\x80\x6d\x5f\x6b\x61\xda\xc3\x84\x17\xe8\xd1\x2c\xfd\xf9\x26\xe0" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x04\x03\x02\x01\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x72\xc9\x1a\x36\xe1\x35\xf8\xcf\x29\x1c\xa8\x94\x08\x5c\x87\xe3\xcc\x15\xc4\x39\xc9\xe4\x3a\x3b\xa0\x91\xd5\x6e\x10\x40\x09\x16" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x05\x04\x03\x02\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x51\xb1\xe5\xf4\x4a\x19\x7d\x1d\xa4\x6b\x0f\x8e\x2d\x28\x2a\xe8\x71\xe8\x38\xbb\x64\xda\x85\x96\x57\x4a\xda\xa7\x6f\xbd\x9f\xb0\xc5" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x06\x05\x04\x03\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\xa2\x8c\x68\x65\x93\x9a\x9a\x79\xfa\xaa\x5c\x4c\x2a\x9d\x4a\x91\xcd\xac\x8c\x96\xc8\x61\xb9\xc9\xe6\x1e\xf1" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x07\x06\x05\x04\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\xdc\xf1\xfb\x7b\x5d\x9e\x23\xfb\x9d\x4e\x13\x12\x53\x65\x8a\xd8\x6e\xbd\xca\x3e\x51\xe8\x3f\x07\x7d\x9c\x2d\x93" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x08\x07\x06\x05\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x6f\xc1\xb0\x11\xf0\x06\x56\x8b\x51\x71\xa4\x2d\x95\x3d\x46\x9b\x25\x70\xa4\xbd\x87\x40\x5a\x04\x43\xac\x91\xcb\x94" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x09\x08\x07\x06\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x01\x35\xd1\xb2\xc9\x5f\x41\xd5\xd1\xd4\xfe\xc1\x85\xd1\x66\xb8\x09\x4e\x99\x9d\xfe\xd9\x6c\x04\x8c\x56\x60\x2c\x97\xac\xbb\x74\x90" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x0a\x09\x08\x07\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x7b\x75\x39\x9a\xc0\x83\x1d\xd2\xf0\xbb\xd7\x58\x79\xa2\xfd\x8f\x6c\xae\x6b\x6c\xd9\xb7\xdb\x24\xc1\x7b\x44\x33\xf4\x34\x96\x3f\x34\xb4" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x0a\x09\x08\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07" + , {- in = -} "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x82\x53\x1a\x60\xcc\x24\x94\x5a\x4b\x82\x79\x18\x1a\xb5\xc8\x4d\xf2\x1c\xe7\xf9\xb7\x3f\x42\xe1\x97\xea\x9c\x07\xe5\x6b\x5e\xb1\x7e\x5f\x4e" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0b\x0a\x09\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x07\x34\x25\x94\x15\x77\x85\x15\x2b\x07\x40\x98\x33\x0a\xbb\x14\x1b\x94\x7b\x56\x6a\xa9\x40\x6b\x4d\x99\x99\x88\xdd" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x0d\x0c\x0b\x0a\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x67\x6b\xb2\x03\x80\xb0\xe3\x01\xe8\xab\x79\x59\x0a\x39\x6d\xa7\x8b\x83\x49\x34\xf5\x3a\xa2\xe9\x10\x7a\x8b\x6c\x02\x2c" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x00\x00\x0e\x0d\x0c\x0b\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5" + , {- hdr = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b" + , {- in = -} "\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20" + , {- out = -} "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\xc0\xff\xa0\xd6\xf0\x5b\xdb\x67\xf2\x4d\x43\xa4\x33\x8d\x2a\xa4\xbe\xd7\xb2\x0e\x43\xcd\x1a\xa3\x16\x62\xe7\xad\x65\xd6\xdb" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x41\x2b\x4e\xa9\xcd\xbe\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x0b\xe1\xa8\x8b\xac\xe0\x18\xb1" + , {- in = -} "\x08\xe8\xcf\x97\xd8\x20\xea\x25\x84\x60\xe9\x6a\xd9\xcf\x52\x89\x05\x4d\x89\x5c\xea\xc4\x7c" + , {- out = -} "\x0b\xe1\xa8\x8b\xac\xe0\x18\xb1\x4c\xb9\x7f\x86\xa2\xa4\x68\x9a\x87\x79\x47\xab\x80\x91\xef\x53\x86\xa6\xff\xbd\xd0\x80\xf8\xe7\x8c\xf7\xcb\x0c\xdd\xd7\xb3" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x33\x56\x8e\xf7\xb2\x63\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x63\x01\x8f\x76\xdc\x8a\x1b\xcb" + , {- in = -} "\x90\x20\xea\x6f\x91\xbd\xd8\x5a\xfa\x00\x39\xba\x4b\xaf\xf9\xbf\xb7\x9c\x70\x28\x94\x9c\xd0\xec" + , {- out = -} "\x63\x01\x8f\x76\xdc\x8a\x1b\xcb\x4c\xcb\x1e\x7c\xa9\x81\xbe\xfa\xa0\x72\x6c\x55\xd3\x78\x06\x12\x98\xc8\x5c\x92\x81\x4a\xbc\x33\xc5\x2e\xe8\x1d\x7d\x77\xc0\x8a" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x10\x3f\xe4\x13\x36\x71\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\xaa\x6c\xfa\x36\xca\xe8\x6b\x40" + , {- in = -} "\xb9\x16\xe0\xea\xcc\x1c\x00\xd7\xdc\xec\x68\xec\x0b\x3b\xbb\x1a\x02\xde\x8a\x2d\x1a\xa3\x46\x13\x2e" + , {- out = -} "\xaa\x6c\xfa\x36\xca\xe8\x6b\x40\xb1\xd2\x3a\x22\x20\xdd\xc0\xac\x90\x0d\x9a\xa0\x3c\x61\xfc\xf4\xa5\x59\xa4\x41\x77\x67\x08\x97\x08\xa7\x76\x79\x6e\xdb\x72\x35\x06" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x76\x4c\x63\xb8\x05\x8e\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\xd0\xd0\x73\x5c\x53\x1e\x1b\xec\xf0\x49\xc2\x44" + , {- in = -} "\x12\xda\xac\x56\x30\xef\xa5\x39\x6f\x77\x0c\xe1\xa6\x6b\x21\xf7\xb2\x10\x1c" + , {- out = -} "\xd0\xd0\x73\x5c\x53\x1e\x1b\xec\xf0\x49\xc2\x44\x14\xd2\x53\xc3\x96\x7b\x70\x60\x9b\x7c\xbb\x7c\x49\x91\x60\x28\x32\x45\x26\x9a\x6f\x49\x97\x5b\xca\xde\xaf" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\xf8\xb6\x78\x09\x4e\x3b\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x77\xb6\x0f\x01\x1c\x03\xe1\x52\x58\x99\xbc\xae" + , {- in = -} "\xe8\x8b\x6a\x46\xc7\x8d\x63\xe5\x2e\xb8\xc5\x46\xef\xb5\xde\x6f\x75\xe9\xcc\x0d" + , {- out = -} "\x77\xb6\x0f\x01\x1c\x03\xe1\x52\x58\x99\xbc\xae\x55\x45\xff\x1a\x08\x5e\xe2\xef\xbf\x52\xb2\xe0\x4b\xee\x1e\x23\x36\xc7\x3e\x3f\x76\x2c\x0c\x77\x44\xfe\x7e\x3c" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\xd5\x60\x91\x2d\x3f\x70\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\xcd\x90\x44\xd2\xb7\x1f\xdb\x81\x20\xea\x60\xc0" + , {- in = -} "\x64\x35\xac\xba\xfb\x11\xa8\x2e\x2f\x07\x1d\x7c\xa4\xa5\xeb\xd9\x3a\x80\x3b\xa8\x7f" + , {- out = -} "\xcd\x90\x44\xd2\xb7\x1f\xdb\x81\x20\xea\x60\xc0\x00\x97\x69\xec\xab\xdf\x48\x62\x55\x94\xc5\x92\x51\xe6\x03\x57\x22\x67\x5e\x04\xc8\x47\x09\x9e\x5a\xe0\x70\x45\x51" + , {- M = -} 8) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x42\xff\xf8\xf1\x95\x1c\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\xd8\x5b\xc7\xe6\x9f\x94\x4f\xb8" + , {- in = -} "\x8a\x19\xb9\x50\xbc\xf7\x1a\x01\x8e\x5e\x67\x01\xc9\x17\x87\x65\x98\x09\xd6\x7d\xbe\xdd\x18" + , {- out = -} "\xd8\x5b\xc7\xe6\x9f\x94\x4f\xb8\xbc\x21\x8d\xaa\x94\x74\x27\xb6\xdb\x38\x6a\x99\xac\x1a\xef\x23\xad\xe0\xb5\x29\x39\xcb\x6a\x63\x7c\xf9\xbe\xc2\x40\x88\x97\xc6\xba" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x92\x0f\x40\xe5\x6c\xdc\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x74\xa0\xeb\xc9\x06\x9f\x5b\x37" + , {- in = -} "\x17\x61\x43\x3c\x37\xc5\xa3\x5f\xc1\xf3\x9f\x40\x63\x02\xeb\x90\x7c\x61\x63\xbe\x38\xc9\x84\x37" + , {- out = -} "\x74\xa0\xeb\xc9\x06\x9f\x5b\x37\x58\x10\xe6\xfd\x25\x87\x40\x22\xe8\x03\x61\xa4\x78\xe3\xe9\xcf\x48\x4a\xb0\x4f\x44\x7e\xff\xf6\xf0\xa4\x77\xcc\x2f\xc9\xbf\x54\x89\x44" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x27\xca\x0c\x71\x20\xbc\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x44\xa3\xaa\x3a\xae\x64\x75\xca" + , {- in = -} "\xa4\x34\xa8\xe5\x85\x00\xc6\xe4\x15\x30\x53\x88\x62\xd6\x86\xea\x9e\x81\x30\x1b\x5a\xe4\x22\x6b\xfa" + , {- out = -} "\x44\xa3\xaa\x3a\xae\x64\x75\xca\xf2\xbe\xed\x7b\xc5\x09\x8e\x83\xfe\xb5\xb3\x16\x08\xf8\xe2\x9c\x38\x81\x9a\x89\xc8\xe7\x76\xf1\x54\x4d\x41\x51\xa4\xed\x3a\x8b\x87\xb9\xce" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x5b\x8c\xcb\xcd\x9a\xf8\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\xec\x46\xbb\x63\xb0\x25\x20\xc3\x3c\x49\xfd\x70" + , {- in = -} "\xb9\x6b\x49\xe2\x1d\x62\x17\x41\x63\x28\x75\xdb\x7f\x6c\x92\x43\xd2\xd7\xc2" + , {- out = -} "\xec\x46\xbb\x63\xb0\x25\x20\xc3\x3c\x49\xfd\x70\x31\xd7\x50\xa0\x9d\xa3\xed\x7f\xdd\xd4\x9a\x20\x32\xaa\xbf\x17\xec\x8e\xbf\x7d\x22\xc8\x08\x8c\x66\x6b\xe5\xc1\x97" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x3e\xbe\x94\x04\x4b\x9a\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x47\xa6\x5a\xc7\x8b\x3d\x59\x42\x27\xe8\x5e\x71" + , {- in = -} "\xe2\xfc\xfb\xb8\x80\x44\x2c\x73\x1b\xf9\x51\x67\xc8\xff\xd7\x89\x5e\x33\x70\x76" + , {- out = -} "\x47\xa6\x5a\xc7\x8b\x3d\x59\x42\x27\xe8\x5e\x71\xe8\x82\xf1\xdb\xd3\x8c\xe3\xed\xa7\xc2\x3f\x04\xdd\x65\x07\x1e\xb4\x13\x42\xac\xdf\x7e\x00\xdc\xce\xc7\xae\x52\x98\x7d" + , {- M = -} 10) + , ( {- key = -} "\xd7\x82\x8d\x13\xb2\xb0\xbd\xc3\x25\xa7\x62\x36\xdf\x93\xcc\x6b" + , {- iv = -} "\x00\x8d\x49\x3b\x30\xae\x8b\x3c\x96\x96\x76\x6c\xfa" + , {- hdr = -} "\x6e\x37\xa6\xef\x54\x6d\x95\x5d\x34\xab\x60\x59" + , {- in = -} "\xab\xf2\x1c\x0b\x02\xfe\xb8\x8f\x85\x6d\xf4\xa3\x73\x81\xbc\xe3\xcc\x12\x85\x17\xd4" + , {- out = -} "\x6e\x37\xa6\xef\x54\x6d\x95\x5d\x34\xab\x60\x59\xf3\x29\x05\xb8\x8a\x64\x1b\x04\xb9\xc9\xff\xb5\x8c\xc3\x90\x90\x0f\x3d\xa1\x2a\xb1\x6d\xce\x9e\x82\xef\xa1\x6d\xa6\x20\x59" + , {- M = -} 10) + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_AES/KATGCM.hs b/tests/KAT_AES/KATGCM.hs --- a/tests/KAT_AES/KATGCM.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_AES/KATGCM.hs @@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ , {-out = -}"\xe4\x42\xf8\xc4\xc6\x67\x84\x86\x4a\x5a\x6e\xc7\xe0\xca\x68\xac\x16\xbc\x5b\xbf\xf7\xd5\xf3\xfa\xf3\xb2\xcb\xb0\xa2\x14\xa1" , {-taglen = -}16 , {-tag = -}"\x94\xd1\x47\xc3\xa2\xca\x93\xe9\x66\x93\x1e\x3b\xb3\xbb\x67\x01") + -- vector 6 tests 32-bit counter wrapping + , ( {-key = -}"\x01\x02\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , {-iv = -}"\xe8\x38\x84\x1d\x75\xae\x33\xb5\x4b\x51\x57\x89\xc9\x5f\xbe\x65" + , {-aad = -}"\x54\x68\x65\x20\x66\x69\x76\x65\x20\x62\x6f\x78\x69\x6e\x67\x20\x77\x69\x7a\x61\x72\x64\x73\x20\x6a\x75\x6d\x70\x20\x71\x75\x69\x63\x6b\x6c\x79\x2e" + , {-input = -}"\x54\x68\x65\x20\x71\x75\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x62\x72\x6f\x77\x6e\x20\x66\x6f\x78\x20\x6a\x75\x6d\x70\x73\x20\x6f\x76\x65\x72\x20\x74\x68\x65\x20\x6c\x61\x7a\x79\x20\x64\x6f\x67" + , {-out = -}"\x82\x31\x9e\x5a\x6a\x7f\x43\xd0\x42\x8c\xf1\x01\xcf\x0c\x75\xf1\x5d\xda\x4f\xa1\x28\x95\xcd\xd7\x7b\xd5\x42\x68\x2f\xcd\x10\x1b\x0c\x75\x05\x54\xf4\x2f\x2b\xf6\x69\x96\x29" + , {-taglen = -}16 + , {-tag = -}"\x9a\xfa\xf4\xea\xae\x2e\x6f\x40\x00\xf4\x89\x77\xd0\x1e\xd5\x14") ] vectors_aes256_enc :: [KATGCM] diff --git a/tests/KAT_AESGCMSIV.hs b/tests/KAT_AESGCMSIV.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_AESGCMSIV.hs @@ -0,0 +1,494 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE Rank2Types #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} +module KAT_AESGCMSIV (tests) where + +import Imports + +import Data.Proxy +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B + +import Crypto.Cipher.AES +import Crypto.Cipher.AESGCMSIV +import Crypto.Cipher.Types +import Crypto.Error + +data Vector c = Vector + { vecPlaintext :: ByteString + , vecAAD :: ByteString + , vecKey :: ByteString + , vecNonce :: ByteString + , vecTag :: ByteString + , vecCiphertext :: ByteString + } + +vecCipher :: Cipher c => Vector c -> c +vecCipher = throwCryptoError . cipherInit . vecKey + +vectors128 :: [Vector AES128] +vectors128 = + [ Vector + { vecPlaintext = "" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xdc\x20\xe2\xd8\x3f\x25\x70\x5b\xb4\x9e\x43\x9e\xca\x56\xde\x25" + , vecCiphertext = "" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x57\x87\x82\xff\xf6\x01\x3b\x81\x5b\x28\x7c\x22\x49\x3a\x36\x4c" + , vecCiphertext = "\xb5\xd8\x39\x33\x0a\xc7\xb7\x86" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xa4\x97\x8d\xb3\x57\x39\x1a\x0b\xc4\xfd\xec\x8b\x0d\x10\x66\x39" + , vecCiphertext = "\x73\x23\xea\x61\xd0\x59\x32\x26\x00\x47\xd9\x42" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x30\x3a\xaf\x90\xf6\xfe\x21\x19\x9c\x60\x68\x57\x74\x37\xa0\xc4" + , vecCiphertext = "\x74\x3f\x7c\x80\x77\xab\x25\xf8\x62\x4e\x2e\x94\x85\x79\xcf\x77" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x1a\x8e\x45\xdc\xd4\x57\x8c\x66\x7c\xd8\x68\x47\xbf\x61\x55\xff" + , vecCiphertext = "\x84\xe0\x7e\x62\xba\x83\xa6\x58\x54\x17\x24\x5d\x7e\xc4\x13\xa9\xfe\x42\x7d\x63\x15\xc0\x9b\x57\xce\x45\xf2\xe3\x93\x6a\x94\x45" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x5e\x6e\x31\x1d\xbf\x39\x5d\x35\xb0\xfe\x39\xc2\x71\x43\x88\xf8" + , vecCiphertext = "\x3f\xd2\x4c\xe1\xf5\xa6\x7b\x75\xbf\x23\x51\xf1\x81\xa4\x75\xc7\xb8\x00\xa5\xb4\xd3\xdc\xf7\x01\x06\xb1\xee\xa8\x2f\xa1\xd6\x4d\xf4\x2b\xf7\x22\x61\x22\xfa\x92\xe1\x7a\x40\xee\xaa\xc1\x20\x1b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x8a\x26\x3d\xd3\x17\xaa\x88\xd5\x6b\xdf\x39\x36\xdb\xa7\x5b\xb8" + , vecCiphertext = "\x24\x33\x66\x8f\x10\x58\x19\x0f\x6d\x43\xe3\x60\xf4\xf3\x5c\xd8\xe4\x75\x12\x7c\xfc\xa7\x02\x8e\xa8\xab\x5c\x20\xf7\xab\x2a\xf0\x25\x16\xa2\xbd\xcb\xc0\x8d\x52\x1b\xe3\x7f\xf2\x8c\x15\x2b\xba\x36\x69\x7f\x25\xb4\xcd\x16\x9c\x65\x90\xd1\xdd\x39\x56\x6d\x3f" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x3b\x0a\x1a\x25\x60\x96\x9c\xdf\x79\x0d\x99\x75\x9a\xbd\x15\x08" + , vecCiphertext = "\x1e\x6d\xab\xa3\x56\x69\xf4\x27" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x08\x29\x9c\x51\x02\x74\x5a\xaa\x3a\x0c\x46\x9f\xad\x9e\x07\x5a" + , vecCiphertext = "\x29\x6c\x78\x89\xfd\x99\xf4\x19\x17\xf4\x46\x20" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x8f\x89\x36\xec\x03\x9e\x4e\x4b\xb9\x7e\xbd\x8c\x44\x57\x44\x1f" + , vecCiphertext = "\xe2\xb0\xc5\xda\x79\xa9\x01\xc1\x74\x5f\x70\x05\x25\xcb\x33\x5b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xe6\xaf\x6a\x7f\x87\x28\x7d\xa0\x59\xa7\x16\x84\xed\x34\x98\xe1" + , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x00\x48\xef\x3c\x1e\x73\xe5\x7e\x02\xbb\x85\x62\xc4\x16\xa3\x19\xe7\x3e\x4c\xaa\xc8\xe9\x6a\x1e\xcb\x29\x33\x14\x5a\x1d\x71" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x6a\x8c\xc3\x86\x5f\x76\x89\x7c\x2e\x4b\x24\x5c\xf3\x1c\x51\xf2" + , vecCiphertext = "\x50\xc8\x30\x3e\xa9\x39\x25\xd6\x40\x90\xd0\x7b\xd1\x09\xdf\xd9\x51\x5a\x5a\x33\x43\x10\x19\xc1\x7d\x93\x46\x59\x99\xa8\xb0\x05\x32\x01\xd7\x23\x12\x0a\x85\x62\xb8\x38\xcd\xff\x25\xbf\x9d\x1e" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xcd\xc4\x6a\xe4\x75\x56\x3d\xe0\x37\x00\x1e\xf8\x4a\xe2\x17\x44" + , vecCiphertext = "\x2f\x5c\x64\x05\x9d\xb5\x5e\xe0\xfb\x84\x7e\xd5\x13\x00\x37\x46\xac\xa4\xe6\x1c\x71\x1b\x5d\xe2\xe7\xa7\x7f\xfd\x02\xda\x42\xfe\xec\x60\x19\x10\xd3\x46\x7b\xb8\xb3\x6e\xbb\xae\xbc\xe5\xfb\xa3\x0d\x36\xc9\x5f\x48\xa3\xe7\x98\x0f\x0e\x7a\xc2\x99\x33\x2a\x80" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x07\xeb\x1f\x84\xfb\x28\xf8\xcb\x73\xde\x8e\x99\xe2\xf4\x8a\x14" + , vecCiphertext = "\xa8\xfe\x3e\x87" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x24\xaf\xc9\x80\x5e\x97\x6f\x45\x1e\x6d\x87\xf6\xfe\x10\x65\x14" + , vecCiphertext = "\x6b\xb0\xfe\xcf\x5d\xed\x9b\x77\xf9\x02\xc7\xd5\xda\x23\x6a\x43\x91\xdd\x02\x97" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xbf\xf9\xb2\xef\x00\xfb\x47\x92\x0c\xc7\x2a\x0c\x0f\x13\xb9\xfd" + , vecCiphertext = "\x44\xd0\xaa\xf6\xfb\x2f\x1f\x34\xad\xd5\xe8\x06\x4e\x83\xe1\x2a\x2a\xda" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\xe6\x60\x21\xd5\xeb\x8e\x4f\x40\x66\xd4\xad\xb9\xc3\x35\x60\xe4" + , vecNonce = "\xf4\x6e\x44\xbb\x3d\xa0\x01\x5c\x94\xf7\x08\x87" + , vecTag = "\xa4\x19\x4b\x79\x07\x1b\x01\xa8\x7d\x65\xf7\x06\xe3\x94\x95\x78" + , vecCiphertext = "" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x7a\x80\x6c" + , vecAAD = "\x46\xbb\x91\xc3\xc5" + , vecKey = "\x36\x86\x42\x00\xe0\xea\xf5\x28\x4d\x88\x4a\x0e\x77\xd3\x16\x46" + , vecNonce = "\xba\xe8\xe3\x7f\xc8\x34\x41\xb1\x60\x34\x56\x6b" + , vecTag = "\x71\x1b\xd8\x5b\xc1\xe4\xd3\xe0\xa4\x62\xe0\x74\xee\xa4\x28\xa8" + , vecCiphertext = "\xaf\x60\xeb" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xbd\xc6\x6f\x14\x65\x45" + , vecAAD = "\xfc\x88\x0c\x94\xa9\x51\x98\x87\x42\x96" + , vecKey = "\xae\xdb\x64\xa6\xc5\x90\xbc\x84\xd1\xa5\xe2\x69\xe4\xb4\x78\x01" + , vecNonce = "\xaf\xc0\x57\x7e\x34\x69\x9b\x9e\x67\x1f\xdd\x4f" + , vecTag = "\xd6\xa9\xc4\x55\x45\xcf\xc1\x1f\x03\xad\x74\x3d\xba\x20\xf9\x66" + , vecCiphertext = "\xbb\x93\xa3\xe3\x4d\x3c" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x11\x77\x44\x1f\x19\x54\x95\x86\x0f" + , vecAAD = "\x04\x67\x87\xf3\xea\x22\xc1\x27\xaa\xf1\x95\xd1\x89\x47\x28" + , vecKey = "\xd5\xcc\x1f\xd1\x61\x32\x0b\x69\x20\xce\x07\x78\x7f\x86\x74\x3b" + , vecNonce = "\x27\x5d\x1a\xb3\x2f\x6d\x1f\x04\x34\xd8\x84\x8c" + , vecTag = "\x1d\x02\xfd\x0c\xd1\x74\xc8\x4f\xc5\xda\xe2\xf6\x0f\x52\xfd\x2b" + , vecCiphertext = "\x4f\x37\x28\x1f\x7a\xd1\x29\x49\xd0" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x9f\x57\x2c\x61\x4b\x47\x45\x91\x44\x74\xe7\xc7" + , vecAAD = "\xc9\x88\x2e\x53\x86\xfd\x9f\x92\xec\x48\x9c\x8f\xde\x2b\xe2\xcf\x97\xe7\x4e\x93" + , vecKey = "\xb3\xfe\xd1\x47\x3c\x52\x8b\x84\x26\xa5\x82\x99\x59\x29\xa1\x49" + , vecNonce = "\x9e\x9a\xd8\x78\x0c\x8d\x63\xd0\xab\x41\x49\xc0" + , vecTag = "\xc1\xdc\x2f\x87\x1f\xb7\x56\x1d\xa1\x28\x6e\x65\x5e\x24\xb7\xb0" + , vecCiphertext = "\xf5\x46\x73\xc5\xdd\xf7\x10\xc7\x45\x64\x1c\x8b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x0d\x8c\x84\x51\x17\x80\x82\x35\x5c\x9e\x94\x0f\xea\x2f\x58" + , vecAAD = "\x29\x50\xa7\x0d\x5a\x1d\xb2\x31\x6f\xd5\x68\x37\x8d\xa1\x07\xb5\x2b\x0d\xa5\x52\x10\xcc\x1c\x1b\x0a" + , vecKey = "\x2d\x4e\xd8\x7d\xa4\x41\x02\x95\x2e\xf9\x4b\x02\xb8\x05\x24\x9b" + , vecNonce = "\xac\x80\xe6\xf6\x14\x55\xbf\xac\x83\x08\xa2\xd4" + , vecTag = "\x83\xb3\x44\x9b\x9f\x39\x55\x2d\xe9\x9d\xc2\x14\xa1\x19\x0b\x0b" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc9\xff\x54\x5e\x07\xb8\x8a\x01\x5f\x05\xb2\x74\x54\x0a\xa1" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x6b\x3d\xb4\xda\x3d\x57\xaa\x94\x84\x2b\x98\x03\xa9\x6e\x07\xfb\x6d\xe7" + , vecAAD = "\x18\x60\xf7\x62\xeb\xfb\xd0\x82\x84\xe4\x21\x70\x2d\xe0\xde\x18\xba\xa9\xc9\x59\x62\x91\xb0\x84\x66\xf3\x7d\xe2\x1c\x7f" + , vecKey = "\xbd\xe3\xb2\xf2\x04\xd1\xe9\xf8\xb0\x6b\xc4\x7f\x97\x45\xb3\xd1" + , vecNonce = "\xae\x06\x55\x6f\xb6\xaa\x78\x90\xbe\xbc\x18\xfe" + , vecTag = "\x3e\x37\x70\x94\xf0\x47\x09\xf6\x4d\x7b\x98\x53\x10\xa4\xdb\x84" + , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x98\xb2\x96\xe2\x4e\x8c\xc3\x5d\xce\x0b\xed\x48\x4b\x7f\x30\xd5\x80" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xe4\x2a\x3c\x02\xc2\x5b\x64\x86\x9e\x14\x6d\x7b\x23\x39\x87\xbd\xdf\xc2\x40\x87\x1d" + , vecAAD = "\x75\x76\xf7\x02\x8e\xc6\xeb\x5e\xa7\xe2\x98\x34\x2a\x94\xd4\xb2\x02\xb3\x70\xef\x97\x68\xec\x65\x61\xc4\xfe\x6b\x7e\x72\x96\xfa\x85\x9c\x21" + , vecKey = "\xf9\x01\xcf\xe8\xa6\x96\x15\xa9\x3f\xdf\x7a\x98\xca\xd4\x81\x79" + , vecNonce = "\x62\x45\x70\x9f\xb1\x88\x53\xf6\x8d\x83\x36\x40" + , vecTag = "\x2d\x15\x50\x6c\x84\xa9\xed\xd6\x5e\x13\xe9\xd2\x4a\x2a\x6e\x70" + , vecCiphertext = "\x39\x1c\xc3\x28\xd4\x84\xa4\xf4\x64\x06\x18\x1b\xcd\x62\xef\xd9\xb3\xee\x19\x7d\x05" + } + ] + +vectors256 :: [Vector AES256] +vectors256 = + [ Vector + { vecPlaintext = "" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x07\xf5\xf4\x16\x9b\xbf\x55\xa8\x40\x0c\xd4\x7e\xa6\xfd\x40\x0f" + , vecCiphertext = "" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x84\x31\x22\x13\x0f\x73\x64\xb7\x61\xe0\xb9\x74\x27\xe3\xdf\x28" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc2\xef\x32\x8e\x5c\x71\xc8\x3b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x8c\xa5\x0d\xa9\xae\x65\x59\xe4\x8f\xd1\x0f\x6e\x5c\x9c\xa1\x7e" + , vecCiphertext = "\x9a\xab\x2a\xeb\x3f\xaa\x0a\x34\xae\xa8\xe2\xb1" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xc9\xea\xc6\xfa\x70\x09\x42\x70\x2e\x90\x86\x23\x83\xc6\xc3\x66" + , vecCiphertext = "\x85\xa0\x1b\x63\x02\x5b\xa1\x9b\x7f\xd3\xdd\xfc\x03\x3b\x3e\x76" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xe8\x19\xe6\x3a\xbc\xd0\x20\xb0\x06\xa9\x76\x39\x76\x32\xeb\x5d" + , vecCiphertext = "\x4a\x6a\x9d\xb4\xc8\xc6\x54\x92\x01\xb9\xed\xb5\x30\x06\xcb\xa8\x21\xec\x9c\xf8\x50\x94\x8a\x7c\x86\xc6\x8a\xc7\x53\x9d\x02\x7f" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x79\x0b\xc9\x68\x80\xa9\x9b\xa8\x04\xbd\x12\xc0\xe6\xa2\x2c\xc4" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc0\x0d\x12\x18\x93\xa9\xfa\x60\x3f\x48\xcc\xc1\xca\x3c\x57\xce\x74\x99\x24\x5e\xa0\x04\x6d\xb1\x6c\x53\xc7\xc6\x6f\xe7\x17\xe3\x9c\xf6\xc7\x48\x83\x7b\x61\xf6\xee\x3a\xdc\xee\x17\x53\x4e\xd5" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x11\x28\x64\xc2\x69\xfc\x0d\x9d\x88\xc6\x1f\xa4\x7e\x39\xaa\x08" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc2\xd5\x16\x0a\x1f\x86\x83\x83\x49\x10\xac\xda\xfc\x41\xfb\xb1\x63\x2d\x4a\x35\x3e\x8b\x90\x5e\xc9\xa5\x49\x9a\xc3\x4f\x96\xc7\xe1\x04\x9e\xb0\x80\x88\x38\x91\xa4\xdb\x8c\xaa\xa1\xf9\x9d\xd0\x04\xd8\x04\x87\x54\x07\x35\x23\x4e\x37\x44\x51\x2c\x6f\x90\xce" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x91\x21\x3f\x26\x7e\x3b\x45\x2f\x02\xd0\x1a\xe3\x3e\x4e\xc8\x54" + , vecCiphertext = "\x1d\xe2\x29\x67\x23\x7a\x81\x32" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xc1\xa4\xa1\x9a\xe8\x00\x94\x1c\xcd\xc5\x7c\xc8\x41\x3c\x27\x7f" + , vecCiphertext = "\x16\x3d\x6f\x9c\xc1\xb3\x46\xcd\x45\x3a\x2e\x4c" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xb2\x92\xd2\x8f\xf6\x11\x89\xe8\xe4\x9f\x38\x75\xef\x91\xaf\xf7" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc9\x15\x45\x82\x3c\xc2\x4f\x17\xdb\xb0\xe9\xe8\x07\xd5\xec\x17" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xae\xa1\xba\xd1\x27\x02\xe1\x96\x56\x04\x37\x4a\xab\x96\xdb\xbc" + , vecCiphertext = "\x07\xda\xd3\x64\xbf\xc2\xb9\xda\x89\x11\x6d\x7b\xef\x6d\xaa\xaf\x6f\x25\x55\x10\xaa\x65\x4f\x92\x0a\xc8\x1b\x94\xe8\xba\xd3\x65" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x03\x33\x27\x42\xb2\x28\xc6\x47\x17\x36\x16\xcf\xd4\x4c\x54\xeb" + , vecCiphertext = "\xc6\x7a\x1f\x0f\x56\x7a\x51\x98\xaa\x1f\xcc\x8e\x3f\x21\x31\x43\x36\xf7\xf5\x1c\xa8\xb1\xaf\x61\xfe\xac\x35\xa8\x64\x16\xfa\x47\xfb\xca\x3b\x5f\x74\x9c\xdf\x56\x45\x27\xf2\x31\x4f\x42\xfe\x25" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x5b\xde\x02\x85\x03\x7c\x5d\xe8\x1e\x5b\x57\x0a\x04\x9b\x62\xa0" + , vecCiphertext = "\x67\xfd\x45\xe1\x26\xbf\xb9\xa7\x99\x30\xc4\x3a\xad\x2d\x36\x96\x7d\x3f\x0e\x4d\x21\x7c\x1e\x55\x1f\x59\x72\x78\x70\xbe\xef\xc9\x8c\xb9\x33\xa8\xfc\xe9\xde\x88\x7b\x1e\x40\x79\x99\x88\xdb\x1f\xc3\xf9\x18\x80\xed\x40\x5b\x2d\xd2\x98\x31\x88\x58\x46\x7c\x89" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x02\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\x18\x35\xe5\x17\x74\x1d\xfd\xdc\xcf\xa0\x7f\xa4\x66\x1b\x74\xcf" + , vecCiphertext = "\x22\xb3\xf4\xcd" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xb8\x79\xad\x97\x6d\x82\x42\xac\xc1\x88\xab\x59\xca\xbf\xe3\x07" + , vecCiphertext = "\x43\xdd\x01\x63\xcd\xb4\x8f\x9f\xe3\x21\x2b\xf6\x1b\x20\x19\x76\x06\x7f\x34\x2b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00" + , vecAAD = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00" + , vecKey = "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xcf\xcd\xf5\x04\x21\x12\xaa\x29\x68\x5c\x91\x2f\xc2\x05\x65\x43" + , vecCiphertext = "\x46\x24\x01\x72\x4b\x5c\xe6\x58\x8d\x5a\x54\xaa\xe5\x37\x55\x13\xa0\x75" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\xe6\x60\x21\xd5\xeb\x8e\x4f\x40\x66\xd4\xad\xb9\xc3\x35\x60\xe4\xf4\x6e\x44\xbb\x3d\xa0\x01\x5c\x94\xf7\x08\x87\x36\x86\x42\x00" + , vecNonce = "\xe0\xea\xf5\x28\x4d\x88\x4a\x0e\x77\xd3\x16\x46" + , vecTag = "\x16\x9f\xbb\x2f\xbf\x38\x9a\x99\x5f\x63\x90\xaf\x22\x22\x8a\x62" + , vecCiphertext = "" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x67\x1f\xdd" + , vecAAD = "\x4f\xbd\xc6\x6f\x14" + , vecKey = "\xba\xe8\xe3\x7f\xc8\x34\x41\xb1\x60\x34\x56\x6b\x7a\x80\x6c\x46\xbb\x91\xc3\xc5\xae\xdb\x64\xa6\xc5\x90\xbc\x84\xd1\xa5\xe2\x69" + , vecNonce = "\xe4\xb4\x78\x01\xaf\xc0\x57\x7e\x34\x69\x9b\x9e" + , vecTag = "\x93\xda\x9b\xb8\x13\x33\xae\xe0\xc7\x85\xb2\x40\xd3\x19\x71\x9d" + , vecCiphertext = "\x0e\xac\xcb" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x19\x54\x95\x86\x0f\x04" + , vecAAD = "\x67\x87\xf3\xea\x22\xc1\x27\xaa\xf1\x95" + , vecKey = "\x65\x45\xfc\x88\x0c\x94\xa9\x51\x98\x87\x42\x96\xd5\xcc\x1f\xd1\x61\x32\x0b\x69\x20\xce\x07\x78\x7f\x86\x74\x3b\x27\x5d\x1a\xb3" + , vecNonce = "\x2f\x6d\x1f\x04\x34\xd8\x84\x8c\x11\x77\x44\x1f" + , vecTag = "\x6b\x62\xb8\x4d\xc4\x0c\x84\x63\x6a\x5e\xc1\x20\x20\xec\x8c\x2c" + , vecCiphertext = "\xa2\x54\xda\xd4\xf3\xf9" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xc9\x88\x2e\x53\x86\xfd\x9f\x92\xec" + , vecAAD = "\x48\x9c\x8f\xde\x2b\xe2\xcf\x97\xe7\x4e\x93\x2d\x4e\xd8\x7d" + , vecKey = "\xd1\x89\x47\x28\xb3\xfe\xd1\x47\x3c\x52\x8b\x84\x26\xa5\x82\x99\x59\x29\xa1\x49\x9e\x9a\xd8\x78\x0c\x8d\x63\xd0\xab\x41\x49\xc0" + , vecNonce = "\x9f\x57\x2c\x61\x4b\x47\x45\x91\x44\x74\xe7\xc7" + , vecTag = "\xc0\xfd\x3d\xc6\x62\x8d\xfe\x55\xeb\xb0\xb9\xfb\x22\x95\xc8\xc2" + , vecCiphertext = "\x0d\xf9\xe3\x08\x67\x82\x44\xc4\x4b" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x1d\xb2\x31\x6f\xd5\x68\x37\x8d\xa1\x07\xb5\x2b" + , vecAAD = "\x0d\xa5\x52\x10\xcc\x1c\x1b\x0a\xbd\xe3\xb2\xf2\x04\xd1\xe9\xf8\xb0\x6b\xc4\x7f" + , vecKey = "\xa4\x41\x02\x95\x2e\xf9\x4b\x02\xb8\x05\x24\x9b\xac\x80\xe6\xf6\x14\x55\xbf\xac\x83\x08\xa2\xd4\x0d\x8c\x84\x51\x17\x80\x82\x35" + , vecNonce = "\x5c\x9e\x94\x0f\xea\x2f\x58\x29\x50\xa7\x0d\x5a" + , vecTag = "\x40\x40\x99\xc2\x58\x7f\x64\x97\x9f\x21\x82\x67\x06\xd4\x97\xd5" + , vecCiphertext = "\x8d\xbe\xb9\xf7\x25\x5b\xf5\x76\x9d\xd5\x66\x92" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x21\x70\x2d\xe0\xde\x18\xba\xa9\xc9\x59\x62\x91\xb0\x84\x66" + , vecAAD = "\xf3\x7d\xe2\x1c\x7f\xf9\x01\xcf\xe8\xa6\x96\x15\xa9\x3f\xdf\x7a\x98\xca\xd4\x81\x79\x62\x45\x70\x9f" + , vecKey = "\x97\x45\xb3\xd1\xae\x06\x55\x6f\xb6\xaa\x78\x90\xbe\xbc\x18\xfe\x6b\x3d\xb4\xda\x3d\x57\xaa\x94\x84\x2b\x98\x03\xa9\x6e\x07\xfb" + , vecNonce = "\x6d\xe7\x18\x60\xf7\x62\xeb\xfb\xd0\x82\x84\xe4" + , vecTag = "\xb3\x08\x0d\x28\xf6\xeb\xb5\xd3\x64\x8c\xe9\x7b\xd5\xba\x67\xfd" + , vecCiphertext = "\x79\x35\x76\xdf\xa5\xc0\xf8\x87\x29\xa7\xed\x3c\x2f\x1b\xff" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xb2\x02\xb3\x70\xef\x97\x68\xec\x65\x61\xc4\xfe\x6b\x7e\x72\x96\xfa\x85" + , vecAAD = "\x9c\x21\x59\x05\x8b\x1f\x0f\xe9\x14\x33\xa5\xbd\xc2\x0e\x21\x4e\xab\x7f\xec\xef\x44\x54\xa1\x0e\xf0\x65\x7d\xf2\x1a\xc7" + , vecKey = "\xb1\x88\x53\xf6\x8d\x83\x36\x40\xe4\x2a\x3c\x02\xc2\x5b\x64\x86\x9e\x14\x6d\x7b\x23\x39\x87\xbd\xdf\xc2\x40\x87\x1d\x75\x76\xf7" + , vecNonce = "\x02\x8e\xc6\xeb\x5e\xa7\xe2\x98\x34\x2a\x94\xd4" + , vecTag = "\x45\x4f\xc2\xa1\x54\xfe\xa9\x1f\x83\x63\xa3\x9f\xec\x7d\x0a\x49" + , vecCiphertext = "\x85\x7e\x16\xa6\x49\x15\xa7\x87\x63\x76\x87\xdb\x4a\x95\x19\x63\x5c\xdd" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xce\xd5\x32\xce\x41\x59\xb0\x35\x27\x7d\x4d\xfb\xb7\xdb\x62\x96\x8b\x13\xcd\x4e\xec" + , vecAAD = "\x73\x43\x20\xcc\xc9\xd9\xbb\xbb\x19\xcb\x81\xb2\xaf\x4e\xcb\xc3\xe7\x28\x34\x32\x1f\x7a\xa0\xf7\x0b\x72\x82\xb4\xf3\x3d\xf2\x3f\x16\x75\x41" + , vecKey = "\x3c\x53\x5d\xe1\x92\xea\xed\x38\x22\xa2\xfb\xbe\x2c\xa9\xdf\xc8\x82\x55\xe1\x4a\x66\x1b\x8a\xa8\x2c\xc5\x42\x36\x09\x3b\xbc\x23" + , vecNonce = "\x68\x80\x89\xe5\x55\x40\xdb\x18\x72\x50\x4e\x1c" + , vecTag = "\x9d\x6c\x70\x29\x67\x5b\x89\xea\xf4\xba\x1d\xed\x1a\x28\x65\x94" + , vecCiphertext = "\x62\x66\x60\xc2\x6e\xa6\x61\x2f\xb1\x7a\xd9\x1e\x8e\x76\x76\x39\xed\xd6\xc9\xfa\xee" + } + ] + +vectorsWrap256 :: [Vector AES256] +vectorsWrap256 = + [ Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x4d\xb9\x23\xdc\x79\x3e\xe6\x49\x7c\x76\xdc\xc0\x3a\x98\xe1\x08" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecCiphertext = "\xf3\xf8\x0f\x2c\xf0\xcb\x2d\xd9\xc5\x98\x4f\xcd\xa9\x08\x45\x6c\xc5\x37\x70\x3b\x5b\xa7\x03\x24\xa6\x79\x3a\x7b\xf2\x18\xd3\xea" + } + , Vector + { vecPlaintext = "\xeb\x36\x40\x27\x7c\x7f\xfd\x13\x03\xc7\xa5\x42\xd0\x2d\x3e\x4c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecAAD = "" + , vecKey = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecNonce = "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecTag = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + , vecCiphertext = "\x18\xce\x4f\x0b\x8c\xb4\xd0\xca\xc6\x5f\xea\x8f\x79\x25\x7b\x20\x88\x8e\x53\xe7\x22\x99\xe5\x6d" + } + ] + +makeEncryptionTest :: BlockCipher128 aes => Int -> Vector aes -> TestTree +makeEncryptionTest i vec@Vector{..} = + testCase (show i) $ + (t, vecCiphertext) @=? encrypt (vecCipher vec) n vecAAD vecPlaintext + where t = AuthTag (B.convert vecTag) + n = throwCryptoError (nonce vecNonce) + +makeDecryptionTest :: BlockCipher128 aes => Int -> Vector aes -> TestTree +makeDecryptionTest i vec@Vector{..} = + testCase (show i) $ + Just vecPlaintext @=? decrypt (vecCipher vec) n vecAAD vecCiphertext t + where t = AuthTag (B.convert vecTag) + n = throwCryptoError (nonce vecNonce) + +katTests :: TestName + -> (forall c . BlockCipher128 c => Int -> Vector c -> TestTree) + -> TestTree +katTests name makeTest = testGroup name + [ testGroup "AES128" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectors128 + , testGroup "AES256" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectors256 + , testGroup "CounterWrap" $ zipWith makeTest [1..] vectorsWrap256 + ] + +newtype Key c = Key ByteString + deriving (Show,Eq) + +instance Arbitrary (Key AES128) where + arbitrary = Key <$> arbitraryBS 16 + +instance Arbitrary (Key AES256) where + arbitrary = Key <$> arbitraryBS 32 + +instance Arbitrary Nonce where + arbitrary = throwCryptoError . nonce <$> arbitraryBS 12 + +encDecTest :: BlockCipher128 c + => Proxy c -> Key c -> Nonce + -> ArbitraryBS0_2901 -> ArbitraryBS0_2901 -> Property +encDecTest prx (Key key) iv (ArbitraryBS0_2901 aad) (ArbitraryBS0_2901 input) = + let c = throwCryptoError (cipherInit key) `asProxyTypeOf` prx + (tag, ciphertext) = encrypt c iv aad input + in decrypt c iv aad ciphertext tag === Just input + +tests :: TestTree +tests = testGroup "AES-GCM-SIV" + [ testGroup "KATs" + [ katTests "encrypt" makeEncryptionTest + , katTests "decrypt" makeDecryptionTest + ] + , testGroup "properties" + [ testProperty "AES128" $ encDecTest (Proxy :: Proxy AES128) + , testProperty "AES256" $ encDecTest (Proxy :: Proxy AES256) + ] + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_AFIS.hs b/tests/KAT_AFIS.hs --- a/tests/KAT_AFIS.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_AFIS.hs @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ ) ] -mergeKATs = map toProp $ zip mergeVec [(0 :: Int)..] - where toProp ((nbExpands, hashAlg, expected, dat), i) = +mergeKATs = zipWith toProp mergeVec [(0 :: Int)..] + where toProp (nbExpands, hashAlg, expected, dat) i = testCase ("merge " ++ show i) (expected @=? AFIS.merge hashAlg nbExpands dat) data AFISParams = AFISParams B.ByteString Int SHA1 ChaChaDRG diff --git a/tests/KAT_Argon2.hs b/tests/KAT_Argon2.hs --- a/tests/KAT_Argon2.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_Argon2.hs @@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ ] kdfTests :: [TestTree] -kdfTests = map toKDFTest $ zip is vectors +kdfTests = zipWith toKDFTest is vectors where - toKDFTest (i, v) = + toKDFTest i v = testCase (show i) (CryptoPassed (kdfResult v) @=? Argon2.hash (kdfOptions v) (kdfPass v) (kdfSalt v) (B.length $ kdfResult v)) diff --git a/tests/KAT_CAST5.hs b/tests/KAT_CAST5.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_CAST5.hs @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module KAT_CAST5 (tests) where + +import BlockCipher +import qualified Crypto.Cipher.CAST5 as CAST5 + +vectors_ecb = -- key plaintext ciphertext + [ KAT_ECB "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x12\x34\x56\x78\x23\x45\x67\x89\x34\x56\x78\x9A" "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF" "\x23\x8B\x4F\xE5\x84\x7E\x44\xB2" + , KAT_ECB "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x12\x34\x56\x78\x23\x45" "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF" "\xEB\x6A\x71\x1A\x2C\x02\x27\x1B" + , KAT_ECB "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x12" "\x01\x23\x45\x67\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF" "\x7A\xC8\x16\xD1\x6E\x9B\x30\x2E" + ] + +kats = defaultKATs { kat_ECB = vectors_ecb } + +tests = testBlockCipher kats (undefined :: CAST5.CAST5) diff --git a/tests/KAT_Curve25519.hs b/tests/KAT_Curve25519.hs --- a/tests/KAT_Curve25519.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_Curve25519.hs @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ katTests = [ testCase "0" (aliceMultBob @=? B.convert (Curve25519.dh alicePublic bobPrivate)) , testCase "1" (aliceMultBob @=? B.convert (Curve25519.dh bobPublic alicePrivate)) + , testCase "2" (alicePublic @=? Curve25519.toPublic alicePrivate) + , testCase "3" (bobPublic @=? Curve25519.toPublic bobPrivate) ] tests = testGroup "Curve25519" diff --git a/tests/KAT_Ed25519.hs b/tests/KAT_Ed25519.hs --- a/tests/KAT_Ed25519.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_Ed25519.hs @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} {-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} -{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} module KAT_Ed25519 ( tests ) where import Crypto.Error @@ -13,26 +13,60 @@ , vecSig :: ByteString } deriving (Show,Eq) -vec1 = Vec - { vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb" - , vecPub = "\x3d\x40\x17\xc3\xe8\x43\x89\x5a\x92\xb7\x0a\xa7\x4d\x1b\x7e\xbc\x9c\x98\x2c\xcf\x2e\xc4\x96\x8c\xc0\xcd\x55\xf1\x2a\xf4\x66\x0c" - , vecMsg = "\x72" - , vecSig = "\x92\xa0\x09\xa9\xf0\xd4\xca\xb8\x72\x0e\x82\x0b\x5f\x64\x25\x40\xa2\xb2\x7b\x54\x16\x50\x3f\x8f\xb3\x76\x22\x23\xeb\xdb\x69\xda\x08\x5a\xc1\xe4\x3e\x15\x99\x6e\x45\x8f\x36\x13\xd0\xf1\x1d\x8c\x38\x7b\x2e\xae\xb4\x30\x2a\xee\xb0\x0d\x29\x16\x12\xbb\x0c\x00" - } - -testVec :: String -> Vec -> [TestTree] -testVec s vec = - [ testCase (s ++ " gen publickey") (pub @=? Ed25519.toPublic sec) - , testCase (s ++ " gen signature") (sig @=? Ed25519.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec)) +vectors = + [ Vec + { vecSec = "\x9d\x61\xb1\x9d\xef\xfd\x5a\x60\xba\x84\x4a\xf4\x92\xec\x2c\xc4\x44\x49\xc5\x69\x7b\x32\x69\x19\x70\x3b\xac\x03\x1c\xae\x7f\x60" + , vecPub = "\xd7\x5a\x98\x01\x82\xb1\x0a\xb7\xd5\x4b\xfe\xd3\xc9\x64\x07\x3a\x0e\xe1\x72\xf3\xda\xa6\x23\x25\xaf\x02\x1a\x68\xf7\x07\x51\x1a" + , vecMsg = "" + , vecSig = "\xe5\x56\x43\x00\xc3\x60\xac\x72\x90\x86\xe2\xcc\x80\x6e\x82\x8a\x84\x87\x7f\x1e\xb8\xe5\xd9\x74\xd8\x73\xe0\x65\x22\x49\x01\x55\x5f\xb8\x82\x15\x90\xa3\x3b\xac\xc6\x1e\x39\x70\x1c\xf9\xb4\x6b\xd2\x5b\xf5\xf0\x59\x5b\xbe\x24\x65\x51\x41\x43\x8e\x7a\x10\x0b" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb" + , vecPub = "\x3d\x40\x17\xc3\xe8\x43\x89\x5a\x92\xb7\x0a\xa7\x4d\x1b\x7e\xbc\x9c\x98\x2c\xcf\x2e\xc4\x96\x8c\xc0\xcd\x55\xf1\x2a\xf4\x66\x0c" + , vecMsg = "\x72" + , vecSig = "\x92\xa0\x09\xa9\xf0\xd4\xca\xb8\x72\x0e\x82\x0b\x5f\x64\x25\x40\xa2\xb2\x7b\x54\x16\x50\x3f\x8f\xb3\x76\x22\x23\xeb\xdb\x69\xda\x08\x5a\xc1\xe4\x3e\x15\x99\x6e\x45\x8f\x36\x13\xd0\xf1\x1d\x8c\x38\x7b\x2e\xae\xb4\x30\x2a\xee\xb0\x0d\x29\x16\x12\xbb\x0c\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\xc5\xaa\x8d\xf4\x3f\x9f\x83\x7b\xed\xb7\x44\x2f\x31\xdc\xb7\xb1\x66\xd3\x85\x35\x07\x6f\x09\x4b\x85\xce\x3a\x2e\x0b\x44\x58\xf7" + , vecPub = "\xfc\x51\xcd\x8e\x62\x18\xa1\xa3\x8d\xa4\x7e\xd0\x02\x30\xf0\x58\x08\x16\xed\x13\xba\x33\x03\xac\x5d\xeb\x91\x15\x48\x90\x80\x25" + , vecMsg = "\xaf\x82" + , vecSig = "\x62\x91\xd6\x57\xde\xec\x24\x02\x48\x27\xe6\x9c\x3a\xbe\x01\xa3\x0c\xe5\x48\xa2\x84\x74\x3a\x44\x5e\x36\x80\xd7\xdb\x5a\xc3\xac\x18\xff\x9b\x53\x8d\x16\xf2\x90\xae\x67\xf7\x60\x98\x4d\xc6\x59\x4a\x7c\x15\xe9\x71\x6e\xd2\x8d\xc0\x27\xbe\xce\xea\x1e\xc4\x0a" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\xf5\xe5\x76\x7c\xf1\x53\x31\x95\x17\x63\x0f\x22\x68\x76\xb8\x6c\x81\x60\xcc\x58\x3b\xc0\x13\x74\x4c\x6b\xf2\x55\xf5\xcc\x0e\xe5" + , vecPub = "\x27\x81\x17\xfc\x14\x4c\x72\x34\x0f\x67\xd0\xf2\x31\x6e\x83\x86\xce\xff\xbf\x2b\x24\x28\xc9\xc5\x1f\xef\x7c\x59\x7f\x1d\x42\x6e" + , vecMsg = 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+ , vecSig = "\x0a\xab\x4c\x90\x05\x01\xb3\xe2\x4d\x7c\xdf\x46\x63\x32\x6a\x3a\x87\xdf\x5e\x48\x43\xb2\xcb\xdb\x67\xcb\xf6\xe4\x60\xfe\xc3\x50\xaa\x53\x71\xb1\x50\x8f\x9f\x45\x28\xec\xea\x23\xc4\x36\xd9\x4b\x5e\x8f\xcd\x4f\x68\x1e\x30\xa6\xac\x00\xa9\x70\x4a\x18\x8a\x03" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x83\x3f\xe6\x24\x09\x23\x7b\x9d\x62\xec\x77\x58\x75\x20\x91\x1e\x9a\x75\x9c\xec\x1d\x19\x75\x5b\x7d\xa9\x01\xb9\x6d\xca\x3d\x42" + , vecPub = "\xec\x17\x2b\x93\xad\x5e\x56\x3b\xf4\x93\x2c\x70\xe1\x24\x50\x34\xc3\x54\x67\xef\x2e\xfd\x4d\x64\xeb\xf8\x19\x68\x34\x67\xe2\xbf" + , vecMsg = "\xdd\xaf\x35\xa1\x93\x61\x7a\xba\xcc\x41\x73\x49\xae\x20\x41\x31\x12\xe6\xfa\x4e\x89\xa9\x7e\xa2\x0a\x9e\xee\xe6\x4b\x55\xd3\x9a\x21\x92\x99\x2a\x27\x4f\xc1\xa8\x36\xba\x3c\x23\xa3\xfe\xeb\xbd\x45\x4d\x44\x23\x64\x3c\xe8\x0e\x2a\x9a\xc9\x4f\xa5\x4c\xa4\x9f" + , vecSig = "\xdc\x2a\x44\x59\xe7\x36\x96\x33\xa5\x2b\x1b\xf2\x77\x83\x9a\x00\x20\x10\x09\xa3\xef\xbf\x3e\xcb\x69\xbe\xa2\x18\x6c\x26\xb5\x89\x09\x35\x1f\xc9\xac\x90\xb3\xec\xfd\xfb\xc7\xc6\x64\x31\xe0\x30\x3d\xca\x17\x9c\x13\x8a\xc1\x7a\xd9\xbe\xf1\x17\x73\x31\xa7\x04" + } ] + + +doPublicKeyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed25519.toPublic sec) where + !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec) + !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.secretKey (vecSec vec) + +doSignatureTest i vec = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed25519.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec)) + where !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.signature (vecSig vec) !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec) !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.secretKey (vecSec vec) -katTests :: [TestTree] -katTests = testVec "vec 1" vec1 +doVerifyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed25519.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig) + where + !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.signature (vecSig vec) + !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed25519.publicKey (vecPub vec) + tests = testGroup "Ed25519" - [ testGroup "KATs" katTests + [ testCase "gen secretkey" (Ed25519.generateSecretKey *> pure ()) + , testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_Ed448.hs b/tests/KAT_Ed448.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_Ed448.hs @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +module KAT_Ed448 ( tests ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 +import Imports + +data Vec = Vec + { vecSec :: ByteString + , vecPub :: ByteString + , vecMsg :: ByteString + , vecSig :: ByteString + } deriving (Show,Eq) + +vectors = + [ Vec + { vecSec = "\x6c\x82\xa5\x62\xcb\x80\x8d\x10\xd6\x32\xbe\x89\xc8\x51\x3e\xbf\x6c\x92\x9f\x34\xdd\xfa\x8c\x9f\x63\xc9\x96\x0e\xf6\xe3\x48\xa3\x52\x8c\x8a\x3f\xcc\x2f\x04\x4e\x39\xa3\xfc\x5b\x94\x49\x2f\x8f\x03\x2e\x75\x49\xa2\x00\x98\xf9\x5b" + , vecPub = "\x5f\xd7\x44\x9b\x59\xb4\x61\xfd\x2c\xe7\x87\xec\x61\x6a\xd4\x6a\x1d\xa1\x34\x24\x85\xa7\x0e\x1f\x8a\x0e\xa7\x5d\x80\xe9\x67\x78\xed\xf1\x24\x76\x9b\x46\xc7\x06\x1b\xd6\x78\x3d\xf1\xe5\x0f\x6c\xd1\xfa\x1a\xbe\xaf\xe8\x25\x61\x80" + , vecMsg = "" + , vecSig = "\x53\x3a\x37\xf6\xbb\xe4\x57\x25\x1f\x02\x3c\x0d\x88\xf9\x76\xae\x2d\xfb\x50\x4a\x84\x3e\x34\xd2\x07\x4f\xd8\x23\xd4\x1a\x59\x1f\x2b\x23\x3f\x03\x4f\x62\x82\x81\xf2\xfd\x7a\x22\xdd\xd4\x7d\x78\x28\xc5\x9b\xd0\xa2\x1b\xfd\x39\x80\xff\x0d\x20\x28\xd4\xb1\x8a\x9d\xf6\x3e\x00\x6c\x5d\x1c\x2d\x34\x5b\x92\x5d\x8d\xc0\x0b\x41\x04\x85\x2d\xb9\x9a\xc5\xc7\xcd\xda\x85\x30\xa1\x13\xa0\xf4\xdb\xb6\x11\x49\xf0\x5a\x73\x63\x26\x8c\x71\xd9\x58\x08\xff\x2e\x65\x26\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\xc4\xea\xb0\x5d\x35\x70\x07\xc6\x32\xf3\xdb\xb4\x84\x89\x92\x4d\x55\x2b\x08\xfe\x0c\x35\x3a\x0d\x4a\x1f\x00\xac\xda\x2c\x46\x3a\xfb\xea\x67\xc5\xe8\xd2\x87\x7c\x5e\x3b\xc3\x97\xa6\x59\x94\x9e\xf8\x02\x1e\x95\x4e\x0a\x12\x27\x4e" + , vecPub = "\x43\xba\x28\xf4\x30\xcd\xff\x45\x6a\xe5\x31\x54\x5f\x7e\xcd\x0a\xc8\x34\xa5\x5d\x93\x58\xc0\x37\x2b\xfa\x0c\x6c\x67\x98\xc0\x86\x6a\xea\x01\xeb\x00\x74\x28\x02\xb8\x43\x8e\xa4\xcb\x82\x16\x9c\x23\x51\x60\x62\x7b\x4c\x3a\x94\x80" + , vecMsg = "\x03" + , vecSig = "\x26\xb8\xf9\x17\x27\xbd\x62\x89\x7a\xf1\x5e\x41\xeb\x43\xc3\x77\xef\xb9\xc6\x10\xd4\x8f\x23\x35\xcb\x0b\xd0\x08\x78\x10\xf4\x35\x25\x41\xb1\x43\xc4\xb9\x81\xb7\xe1\x8f\x62\xde\x8c\xcd\xf6\x33\xfc\x1b\xf0\x37\xab\x7c\xd7\x79\x80\x5e\x0d\xbc\xc0\xaa\xe1\xcb\xce\xe1\xaf\xb2\xe0\x27\xdf\x36\xbc\x04\xdc\xec\xbf\x15\x43\x36\xc1\x9f\x0a\xf7\xe0\xa6\x47\x29\x05\xe7\x99\xf1\x95\x3d\x2a\x0f\xf3\x34\x8a\xb2\x1a\xa4\xad\xaf\xd1\xd2\x34\x44\x1c\xf8\x07\xc0\x3a\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\xcd\x23\xd2\x4f\x71\x42\x74\xe7\x44\x34\x32\x37\xb9\x32\x90\xf5\x11\xf6\x42\x5f\x98\xe6\x44\x59\xff\x20\x3e\x89\x85\x08\x3f\xfd\xf6\x05\x00\x55\x3a\xbc\x0e\x05\xcd\x02\x18\x4b\xdb\x89\xc4\xcc\xd6\x7e\x18\x79\x51\x26\x7e\xb3\x28" + , vecPub = "\xdc\xea\x9e\x78\xf3\x5a\x1b\xf3\x49\x9a\x83\x1b\x10\xb8\x6c\x90\xaa\xc0\x1c\xd8\x4b\x67\xa0\x10\x9b\x55\xa3\x6e\x93\x28\xb1\xe3\x65\xfc\xe1\x61\xd7\x1c\xe7\x13\x1a\x54\x3e\xa4\xcb\x5f\x7e\x9f\x1d\x8b\x00\x69\x64\x47\x00\x14\x00" + , vecMsg = "\x0c\x3e\x54\x40\x74\xec\x63\xb0\x26\x5e\x0c" + , vecSig = "\x1f\x0a\x88\x88\xce\x25\xe8\xd4\x58\xa2\x11\x30\x87\x9b\x84\x0a\x90\x89\xd9\x99\xaa\xba\x03\x9e\xaf\x3e\x3a\xfa\x09\x0a\x09\xd3\x89\xdb\xa8\x2c\x4f\xf2\xae\x8a\xc5\xcd\xfb\x7c\x55\xe9\x4d\x5d\x96\x1a\x29\xfe\x01\x09\x94\x1e\x00\xb8\xdb\xde\xea\x6d\x3b\x05\x10\x68\xdf\x72\x54\xc0\xcd\xc1\x29\xcb\xe6\x2d\xb2\xdc\x95\x7d\xbb\x47\xb5\x1f\xd3\xf2\x13\xfb\x86\x98\xf0\x64\x77\x42\x50\xa5\x02\x89\x61\xc9\xbf\x8f\xfd\x97\x3f\xe5\xd5\xc2\x06\x49\x2b\x14\x0e\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x25\x8c\xdd\x4a\xda\x32\xed\x9c\x9f\xf5\x4e\x63\x75\x6a\xe5\x82\xfb\x8f\xab\x2a\xc7\x21\xf2\xc8\xe6\x76\xa7\x27\x68\x51\x3d\x93\x9f\x63\xdd\xdb\x55\x60\x91\x33\xf2\x9a\xdf\x86\xec\x99\x29\xdc\xcb\x52\xc1\xc5\xfd\x2f\xf7\xe2\x1b" + , vecPub = "\x3b\xa1\x6d\xa0\xc6\xf2\xcc\x1f\x30\x18\x77\x40\x75\x6f\x5e\x79\x8d\x6b\xc5\xfc\x01\x5d\x7c\x63\xcc\x95\x10\xee\x3f\xd4\x4a\xdc\x24\xd8\xe9\x68\xb6\xe4\x6e\x6f\x94\xd1\x9b\x94\x53\x61\x72\x6b\xd7\x5e\x14\x9e\xf0\x98\x17\xf5\x80" + , vecMsg = "\x64\xa6\x5f\x3c\xde\xdc\xdd\x66\x81\x1e\x29\x15" + , vecSig = "\x7e\xee\xab\x7c\x4e\x50\xfb\x79\x9b\x41\x8e\xe5\xe3\x19\x7f\xf6\xbf\x15\xd4\x3a\x14\xc3\x43\x89\xb5\x9d\xd1\xa7\xb1\xb8\x5b\x4a\xe9\x04\x38\xac\xa6\x34\xbe\xa4\x5e\x3a\x26\x95\xf1\x27\x0f\x07\xfd\xcd\xf7\xc6\x2b\x8e\xfe\xaf\x00\xb4\x5c\x2c\x96\xba\x45\x7e\xb1\xa8\xbf\x07\x5a\x3d\xb2\x8e\x5c\x24\xf6\xb9\x23\xed\x4a\xd7\x47\xc3\xc9\xe0\x3c\x70\x79\xef\xb8\x7c\xb1\x10\xd3\xa9\x98\x61\xe7\x20\x03\xcb\xae\x6d\x6b\x8b\x82\x7e\x4e\x6c\x14\x30\x64\xff\x3c\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x7e\xf4\xe8\x45\x44\x23\x67\x52\xfb\xb5\x6b\x8f\x31\xa2\x3a\x10\xe4\x28\x14\xf5\xf5\x5c\xa0\x37\xcd\xcc\x11\xc6\x4c\x9a\x3b\x29\x49\xc1\xbb\x60\x70\x03\x14\x61\x17\x32\xa6\xc2\xfe\xa9\x8e\xeb\xc0\x26\x6a\x11\xa9\x39\x70\x10\x0e" + , vecPub = "\xb3\xda\x07\x9b\x0a\xa4\x93\xa5\x77\x20\x29\xf0\x46\x7b\xae\xbe\xe5\xa8\x11\x2d\x9d\x3a\x22\x53\x23\x61\xda\x29\x4f\x7b\xb3\x81\x5c\x5d\xc5\x9e\x17\x6b\x4d\x9f\x38\x1c\xa0\x93\x8e\x13\xc6\xc0\x7b\x17\x4b\xe6\x5d\xfa\x57\x8e\x80" + , vecMsg = "\x64\xa6\x5f\x3c\xde\xdc\xdd\x66\x81\x1e\x29\x15\xe7" + , vecSig = "\x6a\x12\x06\x6f\x55\x33\x1b\x6c\x22\xac\xd5\xd5\xbf\xc5\xd7\x12\x28\xfb\xda\x80\xae\x8d\xec\x26\xbd\xd3\x06\x74\x3c\x50\x27\xcb\x48\x90\x81\x0c\x16\x2c\x02\x74\x68\x67\x5e\xcf\x64\x5a\x83\x17\x6c\x0d\x73\x23\xa2\xcc\xde\x2d\x80\xef\xe5\xa1\x26\x8e\x8a\xca\x1d\x6f\xbc\x19\x4d\x3f\x77\xc4\x49\x86\xeb\x4a\xb4\x17\x79\x19\xad\x8b\xec\x33\xeb\x47\xbb\xb5\xfc\x6e\x28\x19\x6f\xd1\xca\xf5\x6b\x4e\x7e\x0b\xa5\x51\x92\x34\xd0\x47\x15\x5a\xc7\x27\xa1\x05\x31\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\xd6\x5d\xf3\x41\xad\x13\xe0\x08\x56\x76\x88\xba\xed\xda\x8e\x9d\xcd\xc1\x7d\xc0\x24\x97\x4e\xa5\xb4\x22\x7b\x65\x30\xe3\x39\xbf\xf2\x1f\x99\xe6\x8c\xa6\x96\x8f\x3c\xca\x6d\xfe\x0f\xb9\xf4\xfa\xb4\xfa\x13\x5d\x55\x42\xea\x3f\x01" + , vecPub = "\xdf\x97\x05\xf5\x8e\xdb\xab\x80\x2c\x7f\x83\x63\xcf\xe5\x56\x0a\xb1\xc6\x13\x2c\x20\xa9\xf1\xdd\x16\x34\x83\xa2\x6f\x8a\xc5\x3a\x39\xd6\x80\x8b\xf4\xa1\xdf\xbd\x26\x1b\x09\x9b\xb0\x3b\x3f\xb5\x09\x06\xcb\x28\xbd\x8a\x08\x1f\x00" + , vecMsg = "\xbd\x0f\x6a\x37\x47\xcd\x56\x1b\xdd\xdf\x46\x40\xa3\x32\x46\x1a\x4a\x30\xa1\x2a\x43\x4c\xd0\xbf\x40\xd7\x66\xd9\xc6\xd4\x58\xe5\x51\x22\x04\xa3\x0c\x17\xd1\xf5\x0b\x50\x79\x63\x1f\x64\xeb\x31\x12\x18\x2d\xa3\x00\x58\x35\x46\x11\x13\x71\x8d\x1a\x5e\xf9\x44" + , vecSig = "\x55\x4b\xc2\x48\x08\x60\xb4\x9e\xab\x85\x32\xd2\xa5\x33\xb7\xd5\x78\xef\x47\x3e\xeb\x58\xc9\x8b\xb2\xd0\xe1\xce\x48\x8a\x98\xb1\x8d\xfd\xe9\xb9\xb9\x07\x75\xe6\x7f\x47\xd4\xa1\xc3\x48\x20\x58\xef\xc9\xf4\x0d\x2c\xa0\x33\xa0\x80\x1b\x63\xd4\x5b\x3b\x72\x2e\xf5\x52\xba\xd3\xb4\xcc\xb6\x67\xda\x35\x01\x92\xb6\x1c\x50\x8c\xf7\xb6\xb5\xad\xad\xc2\xc8\xd9\xa4\x46\xef\x00\x3f\xb0\x5c\xba\x5f\x30\xe8\x8e\x36\xec\x27\x03\xb3\x49\xca\x22\x9c\x26\x70\x83\x39\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x2e\xc5\xfe\x3c\x17\x04\x5a\xbd\xb1\x36\xa5\xe6\xa9\x13\xe3\x2a\xb7\x5a\xe6\x8b\x53\xd2\xfc\x14\x9b\x77\xe5\x04\x13\x2d\x37\x56\x9b\x7e\x76\x6b\xa7\x4a\x19\xbd\x61\x62\x34\x3a\x21\xc8\x59\x0a\xa9\xce\xbc\xa9\x01\x4c\x63\x6d\xf5" + , vecPub = "\x79\x75\x6f\x01\x4d\xcf\xe2\x07\x9f\x5d\xd9\xe7\x18\xbe\x41\x71\xe2\xef\x24\x86\xa0\x8f\x25\x18\x6f\x6b\xff\x43\xa9\x93\x6b\x9b\xfe\x12\x40\x2b\x08\xae\x65\x79\x8a\x3d\x81\xe2\x2e\x9e\xc8\x0e\x76\x90\x86\x2e\xf3\xd4\xed\x3a\x00" + , vecMsg = "\x15\x77\x75\x32\xb0\xbd\xd0\xd1\x38\x9f\x63\x6c\x5f\x6b\x9b\xa7\x34\xc9\x0a\xf5\x72\x87\x7e\x2d\x27\x2d\xd0\x78\xaa\x1e\x56\x7c\xfa\x80\xe1\x29\x28\xbb\x54\x23\x30\xe8\x40\x9f\x31\x74\x50\x41\x07\xec\xd5\xef\xac\x61\xae\x75\x04\xda\xbe\x2a\x60\x2e\xde\x89\xe5\xcc\xa6\x25\x7a\x7c\x77\xe2\x7a\x70\x2b\x3a\xe3\x9f\xc7\x69\xfc\x54\xf2\x39\x5a\xe6\xa1\x17\x8c\xab\x47\x38\xe5\x43\x07\x2f\xc1\xc1\x77\xfe\x71\xe9\x2e\x25\xbf\x03\xe4\xec\xb7\x2f\x47\xb6\x4d\x04\x65\xaa\xea\x4c\x7f\xad\x37\x25\x36\xc8\xba\x51\x6a\x60\x39\xc3\xc2\xa3\x9f\x0e\x4d\x83\x2b\xe4\x32\xdf\xa9\xa7\x06\xa6\xe5\xc7\xe1\x9f\x39\x79\x64\xca\x42\x58\x00\x2f\x7c\x05\x41\xb5\x90\x31\x6d\xbc\x56\x22\xb6\xb2\xa6\xfe\x7a\x4a\xbf\xfd\x96\x10\x5e\xca\x76\xea\x7b\x98\x81\x6a\xf0\x74\x8c\x10\xdf\x04\x8c\xe0\x12\xd9\x01\x01\x5a\x51\xf1\x89\xf3\x88\x81\x45\xc0\x36\x50\xaa\x23\xce\x89\x4c\x3b\xd8\x89\xe0\x30\xd5\x65\x07\x1c\x59\xf4\x09\xa9\x98\x1b\x51\x87\x8f\xd6\xfc\x11\x06\x24\xdc\xbc\xde\x0b\xf7\xa6\x9c\xcc\xe3\x8f\xab\xdf\x86\xf3\xbe\xf6\x04\x48\x19\xde\x11" + , vecSig = "\xc6\x50\xdd\xbb\x06\x01\xc1\x9c\xa1\x14\x39\xe1\x64\x0d\xd9\x31\xf4\x3c\x51\x8e\xa5\xbe\xa7\x0d\x3d\xcd\xe5\xf4\x19\x1f\xe5\x3f\x00\xcf\x96\x65\x46\xb7\x2b\xcc\x7d\x58\xbe\x2b\x9b\xad\xef\x28\x74\x39\x54\xe3\xa4\x4a\x23\xf8\x80\xe8\xd4\xf1\xcf\xce\x2d\x7a\x61\x45\x2d\x26\xda\x05\x89\x6f\x0a\x50\xda\x66\xa2\x39\xa8\xa1\x88\xb6\xd8\x25\xb3\x30\x5a\xd7\x7b\x73\xfb\xac\x08\x36\xec\xc6\x09\x87\xfd\x08\x52\x7c\x1a\x8e\x80\xd5\x82\x3e\x65\xca\xfe\x2a\x3d\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecSec = "\x87\x2d\x09\x37\x80\xf5\xd3\x73\x0d\xf7\xc2\x12\x66\x4b\x37\xb8\xa0\xf2\x4f\x56\x81\x0d\xaa\x83\x82\xcd\x4f\xa3\xf7\x76\x34\xec\x44\xdc\x54\xf1\xc2\xed\x9b\xea\x86\xfa\xfb\x76\x32\xd8\xbe\x19\x9e\xa1\x65\xf5\xad\x55\xdd\x9c\xe8" + , vecPub = "\xa8\x1b\x2e\x8a\x70\xa5\xac\x94\xff\xdb\xcc\x9b\xad\xfc\x3f\xeb\x08\x01\xf2\x58\x57\x8b\xb1\x14\xad\x44\xec\xe1\xec\x0e\x79\x9d\xa0\x8e\xff\xb8\x1c\x5d\x68\x5c\x0c\x56\xf6\x4e\xec\xae\xf8\xcd\xf1\x1c\xc3\x87\x37\x83\x8c\xf4\x00" + , vecMsg = 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+ , vecSig = "\xe3\x01\x34\x5a\x41\xa3\x9a\x4d\x72\xff\xf8\xdf\x69\xc9\x80\x75\xa0\xcc\x08\x2b\x80\x2f\xc9\xb2\xb6\xbc\x50\x3f\x92\x6b\x65\xbd\xdf\x7f\x4c\x8f\x1c\xb4\x9f\x63\x96\xaf\xc8\xa7\x0a\xbe\x6d\x8a\xef\x0d\xb4\x78\xd4\xc6\xb2\x97\x00\x76\xc6\xa0\x48\x4f\xe7\x6d\x76\xb3\xa9\x76\x25\xd7\x9f\x1c\xe2\x40\xe7\xc5\x76\x75\x0d\x29\x55\x28\x28\x6f\x71\x9b\x41\x3d\xe9\xad\xa3\xe8\xeb\x78\xed\x57\x36\x03\xce\x30\xd8\xbb\x76\x17\x85\xdc\x30\xdb\xc3\x20\x86\x9e\x1a\x00" + } + ] + + +doPublicKeyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (pub @=? Ed448.toPublic sec) + where + !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec) + !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.secretKey (vecSec vec) + +doSignatureTest i vec = testCase (show i) (sig @=? Ed448.sign sec pub (vecMsg vec)) + where + !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.signature (vecSig vec) + !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec) + !sec = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.secretKey (vecSec vec) + +doVerifyTest i vec = testCase (show i) (True @=? Ed448.verify pub (vecMsg vec) sig) + where + !sig = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.signature (vecSig vec) + !pub = throwCryptoError $ Ed448.publicKey (vecPub vec) + + +tests = testGroup "Ed448" + [ testCase "gen secretkey" (Ed448.generateSecretKey *> pure ()) + , testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_EdDSA.hs b/tests/KAT_EdDSA.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_EdDSA.hs @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE BangPatterns #-} +{-# LANGUAGE ExistentialQuantification #-} +{-# LANGUAGE GADTs #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} +module KAT_EdDSA ( tests ) where + +import Crypto.Error +import Crypto.ECC +import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms +import Crypto.Hash.IO +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.EdDSA as EdDSA +import Imports + +data Vec = forall curve hash . + ( EdDSA.EllipticCurveEdDSA curve + , HashAlgorithm hash + , HashDigestSize hash ~ EdDSA.CurveDigestSize curve + ) => Vec + { vecPrx :: Maybe curve + , vecAlg :: hash + , vecSec :: ByteString + , vecPub :: ByteString + , vecMsg :: ByteString + , vecSig :: ByteString + } + +vectors = + [ Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = SHA512 + , vecSec = "\x9d\x61\xb1\x9d\xef\xfd\x5a\x60\xba\x84\x4a\xf4\x92\xec\x2c\xc4\x44\x49\xc5\x69\x7b\x32\x69\x19\x70\x3b\xac\x03\x1c\xae\x7f\x60" + , vecPub = "\xd7\x5a\x98\x01\x82\xb1\x0a\xb7\xd5\x4b\xfe\xd3\xc9\x64\x07\x3a\x0e\xe1\x72\xf3\xda\xa6\x23\x25\xaf\x02\x1a\x68\xf7\x07\x51\x1a" + , vecMsg = "" + , vecSig = "\xe5\x56\x43\x00\xc3\x60\xac\x72\x90\x86\xe2\xcc\x80\x6e\x82\x8a\x84\x87\x7f\x1e\xb8\xe5\xd9\x74\xd8\x73\xe0\x65\x22\x49\x01\x55\x5f\xb8\x82\x15\x90\xa3\x3b\xac\xc6\x1e\x39\x70\x1c\xf9\xb4\x6b\xd2\x5b\xf5\xf0\x59\x5b\xbe\x24\x65\x51\x41\x43\x8e\x7a\x10\x0b" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = SHA512 + , vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb" + , vecPub = "\x3d\x40\x17\xc3\xe8\x43\x89\x5a\x92\xb7\x0a\xa7\x4d\x1b\x7e\xbc\x9c\x98\x2c\xcf\x2e\xc4\x96\x8c\xc0\xcd\x55\xf1\x2a\xf4\x66\x0c" + , vecMsg = "\x72" + , vecSig = "\x92\xa0\x09\xa9\xf0\xd4\xca\xb8\x72\x0e\x82\x0b\x5f\x64\x25\x40\xa2\xb2\x7b\x54\x16\x50\x3f\x8f\xb3\x76\x22\x23\xeb\xdb\x69\xda\x08\x5a\xc1\xe4\x3e\x15\x99\x6e\x45\x8f\x36\x13\xd0\xf1\x1d\x8c\x38\x7b\x2e\xae\xb4\x30\x2a\xee\xb0\x0d\x29\x16\x12\xbb\x0c\x00" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = SHA512 + , vecSec = "\xc5\xaa\x8d\xf4\x3f\x9f\x83\x7b\xed\xb7\x44\x2f\x31\xdc\xb7\xb1\x66\xd3\x85\x35\x07\x6f\x09\x4b\x85\xce\x3a\x2e\x0b\x44\x58\xf7" + , vecPub = "\xfc\x51\xcd\x8e\x62\x18\xa1\xa3\x8d\xa4\x7e\xd0\x02\x30\xf0\x58\x08\x16\xed\x13\xba\x33\x03\xac\x5d\xeb\x91\x15\x48\x90\x80\x25" + , vecMsg = "\xaf\x82" + , vecSig = "\x62\x91\xd6\x57\xde\xec\x24\x02\x48\x27\xe6\x9c\x3a\xbe\x01\xa3\x0c\xe5\x48\xa2\x84\x74\x3a\x44\x5e\x36\x80\xd7\xdb\x5a\xc3\xac\x18\xff\x9b\x53\x8d\x16\xf2\x90\xae\x67\xf7\x60\x98\x4d\xc6\x59\x4a\x7c\x15\xe9\x71\x6e\xd2\x8d\xc0\x27\xbe\xce\xea\x1e\xc4\x0a" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = SHA512 + , vecSec = "\xf5\xe5\x76\x7c\xf1\x53\x31\x95\x17\x63\x0f\x22\x68\x76\xb8\x6c\x81\x60\xcc\x58\x3b\xc0\x13\x74\x4c\x6b\xf2\x55\xf5\xcc\x0e\xe5" + , vecPub = "\x27\x81\x17\xfc\x14\x4c\x72\x34\x0f\x67\xd0\xf2\x31\x6e\x83\x86\xce\xff\xbf\x2b\x24\x28\xc9\xc5\x1f\xef\x7c\x59\x7f\x1d\x42\x6e" + , vecMsg = 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+ , vecSig = "\x0a\xab\x4c\x90\x05\x01\xb3\xe2\x4d\x7c\xdf\x46\x63\x32\x6a\x3a\x87\xdf\x5e\x48\x43\xb2\xcb\xdb\x67\xcb\xf6\xe4\x60\xfe\xc3\x50\xaa\x53\x71\xb1\x50\x8f\x9f\x45\x28\xec\xea\x23\xc4\x36\xd9\x4b\x5e\x8f\xcd\x4f\x68\x1e\x30\xa6\xac\x00\xa9\x70\x4a\x18\x8a\x03" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = SHA512 + , vecSec = "\x83\x3f\xe6\x24\x09\x23\x7b\x9d\x62\xec\x77\x58\x75\x20\x91\x1e\x9a\x75\x9c\xec\x1d\x19\x75\x5b\x7d\xa9\x01\xb9\x6d\xca\x3d\x42" + , vecPub = "\xec\x17\x2b\x93\xad\x5e\x56\x3b\xf4\x93\x2c\x70\xe1\x24\x50\x34\xc3\x54\x67\xef\x2e\xfd\x4d\x64\xeb\xf8\x19\x68\x34\x67\xe2\xbf" + , vecMsg = "\xdd\xaf\x35\xa1\x93\x61\x7a\xba\xcc\x41\x73\x49\xae\x20\x41\x31\x12\xe6\xfa\x4e\x89\xa9\x7e\xa2\x0a\x9e\xee\xe6\x4b\x55\xd3\x9a\x21\x92\x99\x2a\x27\x4f\xc1\xa8\x36\xba\x3c\x23\xa3\xfe\xeb\xbd\x45\x4d\x44\x23\x64\x3c\xe8\x0e\x2a\x9a\xc9\x4f\xa5\x4c\xa4\x9f" + , vecSig = "\xdc\x2a\x44\x59\xe7\x36\x96\x33\xa5\x2b\x1b\xf2\x77\x83\x9a\x00\x20\x10\x09\xa3\xef\xbf\x3e\xcb\x69\xbe\xa2\x18\x6c\x26\xb5\x89\x09\x35\x1f\xc9\xac\x90\xb3\xec\xfd\xfb\xc7\xc6\x64\x31\xe0\x30\x3d\xca\x17\x9c\x13\x8a\xc1\x7a\xd9\xbe\xf1\x17\x73\x31\xa7\x04" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = Blake2b_512 + , vecSec = "\x9d\x61\xb1\x9d\xef\xfd\x5a\x60\xba\x84\x4a\xf4\x92\xec\x2c\xc4\x44\x49\xc5\x69\x7b\x32\x69\x19\x70\x3b\xac\x03\x1c\xae\x7f\x60" + , vecPub = "\x78\xe6\x5b\xf3\x0f\x89\x3d\x32\xfc\x57\xef\x05\x1c\x34\x1b\xde\xde\x24\x25\x44\xfc\x2a\x21\x12\xf0\xfa\x2c\x7a\xfd\xeb\xc0\x2f" + , vecMsg = "" + , vecSig = "\x99\xa5\x23\xbd\x46\x16\xc8\x16\x11\x44\xd6\xa9\x9d\x3c\x32\x40\x0c\xb4\xa3\x26\xf4\xd7\x9e\x30\x73\x40\xf6\xaf\xa1\x17\x50\xa0\x08\x5d\x7d\x84\x62\x6b\xc9\xe4\xb1\x53\xfc\x0e\x39\x6d\x15\xce\x44\xc3\x9b\xae\x45\x33\x80\x4d\xb1\xfe\x5b\x52\xf2\xb1\xb8\x05" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = Blake2b_512 + , vecSec = "\x4c\xcd\x08\x9b\x28\xff\x96\xda\x9d\xb6\xc3\x46\xec\x11\x4e\x0f\x5b\x8a\x31\x9f\x35\xab\xa6\x24\xda\x8c\xf6\xed\x4f\xb8\xa6\xfb" + , vecPub = "\x5e\x71\x39\x2d\x91\xe6\xa5\x8f\xed\xeb\x08\x50\x36\x4f\x56\xcd\x15\x8a\x60\x44\x75\x57\xd7\x89\x03\x89\xc9\xb3\xd4\x57\x6d\x4d" + , vecMsg = "\x72" + , vecSig = "\x6d\xa7\x5e\x15\xb5\x70\x7f\x4d\xe5\xa1\x53\xc4\x8a\x5d\x83\x9f\xb8\x50\x74\xc3\x8a\xeb\x62\x85\x97\x7f\x03\xa1\x39\x77\x59\x7f\x97\x60\x69\xfd\xb9\x03\xf1\x83\x47\x4a\xaa\x5e\xd0\xcf\xe8\x78\xba\x8e\xf8\x68\xc5\xe4\x7c\xa3\xf9\x6c\xcf\xb3\xa8\x9b\x2a\x06" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = Blake2b_512 + , vecSec = "\xc5\xaa\x8d\xf4\x3f\x9f\x83\x7b\xed\xb7\x44\x2f\x31\xdc\xb7\xb1\x66\xd3\x85\x35\x07\x6f\x09\x4b\x85\xce\x3a\x2e\x0b\x44\x58\xf7" + , vecPub = "\x8d\x53\xca\x70\xf0\xea\xb2\x3b\x91\x78\x34\x57\x85\xfc\xdb\x69\xed\x67\x23\xf8\x14\x8f\x7e\x33\x9e\x88\x65\x37\x00\xb7\x18\xda" + , vecMsg = "\xaf\x82" + , vecSig = "\x7c\xc3\xc1\x38\x52\xbd\x12\xab\xf3\xce\x4c\xa8\xca\x28\x36\xcb\xf8\x6d\xa9\x6c\x46\x34\xc5\x0d\xf3\xfb\x80\xdc\x80\x9e\x29\xdb\x0e\x10\x9c\x36\x13\x53\x40\x7c\x12\x36\xa9\x04\xf6\x36\x86\x8a\xa3\x39\x77\xa9\x9d\x3f\x84\x45\x98\xdb\x15\x38\xb4\x29\x52\x03" + } + , Vec + { vecPrx = Just Curve_Edwards25519 + , vecAlg = Blake2b_512 + , vecSec = "\xf5\xe5\x76\x7c\xf1\x53\x31\x95\x17\x63\x0f\x22\x68\x76\xb8\x6c\x81\x60\xcc\x58\x3b\xc0\x13\x74\x4c\x6b\xf2\x55\xf5\xcc\x0e\xe5" + , vecPub = "\x9e\x3c\xa4\x9b\xb2\xd9\xe3\x6b\x8f\x0c\x94\x4a\x7b\x1c\x29\x26\x45\xda\x87\xce\x6f\xa6\xb4\x28\x86\xe5\xd7\xc8\x68\x33\xa7\x14" + , vecMsg = 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+ , vecSig = "\xd0\x39\x65\xac\x31\x6a\x20\xf5\xa4\x7a\xb2\xd6\x18\x5e\xb3\xf0\xae\xea\x9c\x2e\xb8\xab\xe9\x22\xe9\x6d\x31\x7b\x3b\xd0\xef\x02\xe8\xd4\x7f\xd9\x23\x84\xe2\x86\x15\xeb\x33\x14\xad\xbc\x71\xc4\x67\x59\x96\x09\x9e\x48\x4c\xeb\x16\x28\x47\xc4\x0c\x32\x44\x0e" + } + ] + + +doPublicKeyTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree +doPublicKeyTest i Vec{..} = + testCase (show i) (pub @=? EdDSA.toPublic vecPrx vecAlg sec) + where + !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub + !sec = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.secretKey vecPrx vecSec + +doSignatureTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree +doSignatureTest i Vec{..} = + testCase (show i) (sig @=? EdDSA.sign vecPrx sec pub vecMsg) + where + !sig = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.signature vecPrx vecAlg vecSig + !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub + !sec = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.secretKey vecPrx vecSec + +doVerifyTest :: Int -> Vec -> TestTree +doVerifyTest i Vec{..} = + testCase (show i) (True @=? EdDSA.verify vecPrx pub vecMsg sig) + where + !sig = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.signature vecPrx vecAlg vecSig + !pub = throwCryptoError $ EdDSA.publicKey vecPrx vecAlg vecPub + + +tests = testGroup "EdDSA" + [ testGroup "gen publickey" $ zipWith doPublicKeyTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "gen signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectors + , testGroup "verify sig" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] vectors + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_HKDF.hs b/tests/KAT_HKDF.hs --- a/tests/KAT_HKDF.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_HKDF.hs @@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ module KAT_HKDF (tests) where import qualified Crypto.KDF.HKDF as HKDF -import Crypto.Hash (MD5(..), SHA1(..), SHA256(..) - , Keccak_224(..), Keccak_256(..), Keccak_384(..), Keccak_512(..) - , SHA3_224(..), SHA3_256(..), SHA3_384(..), SHA3_512(..) - , HashAlgorithm, digestFromByteString) +import Crypto.Hash (SHA256(..), HashAlgorithm) import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Imports diff --git a/tests/KAT_HMAC.hs b/tests/KAT_HMAC.hs --- a/tests/KAT_HMAC.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_HMAC.hs @@ -132,17 +132,17 @@ macIncrementalTests :: [TestTree] macIncrementalTests = - [ testProperties MD5 - , testProperties SHA1 - , testProperties SHA256 - , testProperties SHA3_224 - , testProperties SHA3_256 - , testProperties SHA3_384 - , testProperties SHA3_512 + [ testIncrProperties MD5 + , testIncrProperties SHA1 + , testIncrProperties SHA256 + , testIncrProperties SHA3_224 + , testIncrProperties SHA3_256 + , testIncrProperties SHA3_384 + , testIncrProperties SHA3_512 ] where - --testProperties :: HashAlgorithm a => a -> [Property] - testProperties a = testGroup (show a) + --testIncrProperties :: HashAlgorithm a => a -> [Property] + testIncrProperties a = testGroup (show a) [ testProperty "list-one" (prop_inc0 a) , testProperty "list-multi" (prop_inc1 a) ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_KMAC.hs b/tests/KAT_KMAC.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_KMAC.hs @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE DataKinds #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleContexts #-} +{-# LANGUAGE FlexibleInstances #-} +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +{-# LANGUAGE RecordWildCards #-} +module KAT_KMAC (tests) where + +import Crypto.Hash (SHAKE128(..), SHAKE256(..), + HashAlgorithm, digestFromByteString) +import qualified Crypto.MAC.KMAC as KMAC + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Imports + +data MACVector hash = MACVector + { macString :: ByteString + , macKey :: ByteString + , macSecret :: ByteString + , macResult :: KMAC.KMAC hash + } + +instance Show (KMAC.KMAC a) where + show (KMAC.KMAC d) = show d + +digest :: HashAlgorithm hash => ByteString -> KMAC.KMAC hash +digest = maybe (error "cannot get digest") KMAC.KMAC . digestFromByteString + +vectors128 :: [MACVector (SHAKE128 256)] +vectors128 = + [ MACVector + { macString = "" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ] + , macResult = digest "\xe5\x78\x0b\x0d\x3e\xa6\xf7\xd3\xa4\x29\xc5\x70\x6a\xa4\x3a\x00\xfa\xdb\xd7\xd4\x96\x28\x83\x9e\x31\x87\x24\x3f\x45\x6e\xe1\x4e" + } + , MACVector + { macString = "My Tagged Application" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ] + , macResult = digest "\x3b\x1f\xba\x96\x3c\xd8\xb0\xb5\x9e\x8c\x1a\x6d\x71\x88\x8b\x71\x43\x65\x1a\xf8\xba\x0a\x70\x70\xc0\x97\x9e\x28\x11\x32\x4a\xa5" + } + , MACVector + { macString = "My Tagged Application" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ] + , macResult = digest "\x1f\x5b\x4e\x6c\xca\x02\x20\x9e\x0d\xcb\x5c\xa6\x35\xb8\x9a\x15\xe2\x71\xec\xc7\x60\x07\x1d\xfd\x80\x5f\xaa\x38\xf9\x72\x92\x30" + } + ] + +vectors256 :: [MACVector (SHAKE256 512)] +vectors256 = + [ MACVector + { macString = "My Tagged Application" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0x03 ] + , macResult = digest "\x20\xc5\x70\xc3\x13\x46\xf7\x03\xc9\xac\x36\xc6\x1c\x03\xcb\x64\xc3\x97\x0d\x0c\xfc\x78\x7e\x9b\x79\x59\x9d\x27\x3a\x68\xd2\xf7\xf6\x9d\x4c\xc3\xde\x9d\x10\x4a\x35\x16\x89\xf2\x7c\xf6\xf5\x95\x1f\x01\x03\xf3\x3f\x4f\x24\x87\x10\x24\xd9\xc2\x77\x73\xa8\xdd" + } + , MACVector + { macString = "" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ] + , macResult = digest "\x75\x35\x8c\xf3\x9e\x41\x49\x4e\x94\x97\x07\x92\x7c\xee\x0a\xf2\x0a\x3f\xf5\x53\x90\x4c\x86\xb0\x8f\x21\xcc\x41\x4b\xcf\xd6\x91\x58\x9d\x27\xcf\x5e\x15\x36\x9c\xbb\xff\x8b\x9a\x4c\x2e\xb1\x78\x00\x85\x5d\x02\x35\xff\x63\x5d\xa8\x25\x33\xec\x6b\x75\x9b\x69" + } + , MACVector + { macString = "My Tagged Application" + , macKey = B.pack [ 0x40 .. 0x5f ] + , macSecret = B.pack [ 0x00 .. 0xc7 ] + , macResult = digest "\xb5\x86\x18\xf7\x1f\x92\xe1\xd5\x6c\x1b\x8c\x55\xdd\xd7\xcd\x18\x8b\x97\xb4\xca\x4d\x99\x83\x1e\xb2\x69\x9a\x83\x7d\xa2\xe4\xd9\x70\xfb\xac\xfd\xe5\x00\x33\xae\xa5\x85\xf1\xa2\x70\x85\x10\xc3\x2d\x07\x88\x08\x01\xbd\x18\x28\x98\xfe\x47\x68\x76\xfc\x89\x65" + } + ] + +macTests :: [TestTree] +macTests = + [ testGroup "SHAKE128" (concatMap toMACTest $ zip is vectors128) + , testGroup "SHAKE256" (concatMap toMACTest $ zip is vectors256) + ] + where toMACTest (i, MACVector{..}) = + [ testCase (show i) (macResult @=? KMAC.kmac macString macKey macSecret) + , testCase ("incr-" ++ show i) (macResult @=? + KMAC.finalize (KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize macString macKey) macSecret)) + ] + is :: [Int] + is = [1..] + +data MacIncremental a = MacIncremental ByteString ByteString ByteString (KMAC.KMAC a) + deriving (Show,Eq) + +instance KMAC.HashSHAKE a => Arbitrary (MacIncremental a) where + arbitrary = do + str <- arbitraryBSof 0 49 + key <- arbitraryBSof 1 89 + msg <- arbitraryBSof 1 99 + return $ MacIncremental str key msg (KMAC.kmac str key msg) + +data MacIncrementalList a = MacIncrementalList ByteString ByteString [ByteString] (KMAC.KMAC a) + deriving (Show,Eq) + +instance KMAC.HashSHAKE a => Arbitrary (MacIncrementalList a) where + arbitrary = do + str <- arbitraryBSof 0 49 + key <- arbitraryBSof 1 89 + msgs <- choose (1,20) >>= \n -> replicateM n (arbitraryBSof 1 99) + return $ MacIncrementalList str key msgs (KMAC.kmac str key (B.concat msgs)) + +macIncrementalTests :: [TestTree] +macIncrementalTests = + [ testIncrProperties "SHAKE128_256" (SHAKE128 :: SHAKE128 256) + , testIncrProperties "SHAKE256_512" (SHAKE256 :: SHAKE256 512) + ] + where + testIncrProperties :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => TestName -> a -> TestTree + testIncrProperties name a = testGroup name + [ testProperty "list-one" (prop_inc0 a) + , testProperty "list-multi" (prop_inc1 a) + ] + + prop_inc0 :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => a -> MacIncremental a -> Bool + prop_inc0 _ (MacIncremental str secret msg result) = + result `assertEq` KMAC.finalize (KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize str secret) msg) + + prop_inc1 :: KMAC.HashSHAKE a => a -> MacIncrementalList a -> Bool + prop_inc1 _ (MacIncrementalList str secret msgs result) = + result `assertEq` KMAC.finalize (foldl' KMAC.update (KMAC.initialize str secret) msgs) + +tests = testGroup "KMAC" + [ testGroup "KATs" macTests + , testGroup "properties" macIncrementalTests + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel.hs b/tests/KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel.hs --- a/tests/KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel.hs @@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import Imports -import Data.Char (digitToInt) import qualified Data.ByteString.Char8 as B8 import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Data.ByteArray.Encoding (Base (Base16), convertFromBase) diff --git a/tests/KAT_OTP.hs b/tests/KAT_OTP.hs --- a/tests/KAT_OTP.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_OTP.hs @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import Crypto.Hash.Algorithms (SHA1(..), SHA256(..), SHA512(..)) import Crypto.OTP -import Data.ByteString (ByteString) import Imports -- | Test values from Appendix D of http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4226 @@ -94,9 +93,9 @@ ] , testGroup "TOTP" [ testGroup "KATs" - [ testGroup "SHA1" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA1Params otpKey . fromIntegral) totpSHA1Expected) - , testGroup "SHA256" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA256Params totpSHA256Key . fromIntegral) totpSHA256Expected) - , testGroup "SHA512" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA512Params totpSHA512Key . fromIntegral) totpSHA512Expected) + [ testGroup "SHA1" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA1Params otpKey) totpSHA1Expected) + , testGroup "SHA256" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA256Params totpSHA256Key) totpSHA256Expected) + , testGroup "SHA512" (makeKATs (totp totpSHA512Params totpSHA512Key) totpSHA512Expected) ] ] ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PBKDF2.hs b/tests/KAT_PBKDF2.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PBKDF2.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PBKDF2.hs @@ -67,21 +67,21 @@ , testGroup "KATs-HMAC-SHA512" (katTests (PBKDF2.prfHMAC SHA512) vectors_hmac_sha512) , testGroup "KATs-HMAC-SHA512 (fast)" (katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 vectors_hmac_sha512) ] - where katTests prf vects = map (toKatTest prf) $ zip is vects + where katTests prf = zipWith (toKatTest prf) is - toKatTest prf (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) = + toKatTest prf i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) = testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.generate prf (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) - katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 . zip is - toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) = + katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 is + toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA1 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) = testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA1 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) - katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 . zip is - toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) = + katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 is + toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA256 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) = testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA256 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) - katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 = map toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 . zip is - toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 (i, ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output)) = + katTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 = zipWith toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 is + toKatTestFastPBKDF2_SHA512 i ((pass, salt, iter, dkLen), output) = testCase (show i) (output @=? PBKDF2.fastPBKDF2_SHA512 (PBKDF2.Parameters iter dkLen) pass salt) diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey.hs @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import KAT_PubKey.DSA import KAT_PubKey.ECC import KAT_PubKey.ECDSA +import KAT_PubKey.RSA +import KAT_PubKey.Rabin import Utils import qualified KAT_PubKey.P256 as P256 @@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ , dbMask :: ByteString } -doMGFTest (i, vmgf) = testCase (show i) (dbMask vmgf @=? actual) +doMGFTest i vmgf = testCase (show i) (dbMask vmgf @=? actual) where actual = mgf1 SHA1 (seed vmgf) (B.length $ dbMask vmgf) vectorsMGF = @@ -34,13 +36,15 @@ ] tests = testGroup "PubKey" - [ testGroup "MGF1" $ map doMGFTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsMGF) + [ testGroup "MGF1" $ zipWith doMGFTest [katZero..] vectorsMGF + , rsaTests , pssTests , oaepTests , dsaTests , eccTests , ecdsaTests , P256.tests + , rabinTests ] --newKats = [ eccKatTests ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/DSA.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/DSA.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/DSA.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/DSA.hs @@ -106,7 +106,43 @@ , r = 0x8c2fab489c34672140415d41a65cef1e70192e23 , s = 0x3df86a9e2efe944a1c7ea9c30cac331d00599a0e , pgq = dsaParams - } + } + , VectorDSA -- 1024-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1 + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x7BDB6B0FF756E1BB5D53583EF979082F9AD5BD5B + , r = 0x2E1A0C2562B2912CAAF89186FB0F42001585DA55 + , s = 0x29EFB6B0AFF2D7A68EB70CA313022253B9A88DF5 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA -- 1024-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1 + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x5C842DF4F9E344EE09F056838B42C7A17F4A6433 + , r = 0x42AB2052FD43E123F0607F115052A67DCD9C5C77 + , s = 0x183916B0230D45B9931491D4C6B0BD2FB4AAF088 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA -- 2048-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1 + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 0x667098C654426C78D7F8201EAC6C203EF030D43605032C2F1FA937E5237DBD949F34A0A2564FE126DC8B715C5141802CE0979C8246463C40E6B6BDAA2513FA611728716C2E4FD53BC95B89E69949D96512E873B9C8F8DFD499CC312882561ADECB31F658E934C0C197F2C4D96B05CBAD67381E7B768891E4DA3843D24D94CDFB5126E9B8BF21E8358EE0E0A30EF13FD6A664C0DCE3731F7FB49A4845A4FD8254687972A2D382599C9BAC4E0ED7998193078913032558134976410B89D2C171D123AC35FD977219597AA7D15C1A9A428E59194F75C721EBCBCFAE44696A499AFA74E04299F132026601638CB87AB79190D4A0986315DA8EEC6561C938996BEADF + , k = 0x888FA6F7738A41BDC9846466ABDB8174C0338250AE50CE955CA16230F9CBD53E + , r = 0x3A1B2DBD7489D6ED7E608FD036C83AF396E290DBD602408E8677DAABD6E7445A + , s = 0xD26FCBA19FA3E3058FFC02CA1596CDBB6E0D20CB37B06054F7E36DED0CDBBCCF + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + , VectorDSA -- 2048-bit example from RFC 6979 with SHA-1 + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 0x667098C654426C78D7F8201EAC6C203EF030D43605032C2F1FA937E5237DBD949F34A0A2564FE126DC8B715C5141802CE0979C8246463C40E6B6BDAA2513FA611728716C2E4FD53BC95B89E69949D96512E873B9C8F8DFD499CC312882561ADECB31F658E934C0C197F2C4D96B05CBAD67381E7B768891E4DA3843D24D94CDFB5126E9B8BF21E8358EE0E0A30EF13FD6A664C0DCE3731F7FB49A4845A4FD8254687972A2D382599C9BAC4E0ED7998193078913032558134976410B89D2C171D123AC35FD977219597AA7D15C1A9A428E59194F75C721EBCBCFAE44696A499AFA74E04299F132026601638CB87AB79190D4A0986315DA8EEC6561C938996BEADF + , k = 0x6EEA486F9D41A037B2C640BC5645694FF8FF4B98D066A25F76BE641CCB24BA4F + , r = 0xC18270A93CFC6063F57A4DFA86024F700D980E4CF4E2CB65A504397273D98EA0 + , s = 0x414F22E5F31A8B6D33295C7539C1C1BA3A6160D7D68D50AC0D3A5BEAC2884FAA + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } ] where -- (p,g,q) dsaParams = DSA.Params @@ -115,6 +151,174 @@ , DSA.params_q = 0xf85f0f83ac4df7ea0cdf8f469bfeeaea14156495 } +vectorsSHA224 = + [ VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x562097C06782D60C3037BA7BE104774344687649 + , r = 0x4BC3B686AEA70145856814A6F1BB53346F02101E + , s = 0x410697B92295D994D21EDD2F4ADA85566F6F94C1 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x4598B8EFC1A53BC8AECD58D1ABBB0C0C71E67297 + , r = 0x6868E9964E36C1689F6037F91F28D5F2C30610F2 + , s = 0x49CEC3ACDC83018C5BD2674ECAAD35B8CD22940F + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 0x667098C654426C78D7F8201EAC6C203EF030D43605032C2F1FA937E5237DBD949F34A0A2564FE126DC8B715C5141802CE0979C8246463C40E6B6BDAA2513FA611728716C2E4FD53BC95B89E69949D96512E873B9C8F8DFD499CC312882561ADECB31F658E934C0C197F2C4D96B05CBAD67381E7B768891E4DA3843D24D94CDFB5126E9B8BF21E8358EE0E0A30EF13FD6A664C0DCE3731F7FB49A4845A4FD8254687972A2D382599C9BAC4E0ED7998193078913032558134976410B89D2C171D123AC35FD977219597AA7D15C1A9A428E59194F75C721EBCBCFAE44696A499AFA74E04299F132026601638CB87AB79190D4A0986315DA8EEC6561C938996BEADF + , k = 0xBC372967702082E1AA4FCE892209F71AE4AD25A6DFD869334E6F153BD0C4D806 + , r = 0xDC9F4DEADA8D8FF588E98FED0AB690FFCE858DC8C79376450EB6B76C24537E2C + , s = 0xA65A9C3BC7BABE286B195D5DA68616DA8D47FA0097F36DD19F517327DC848CEC + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0x06BD4C05ED74719106223BE33F2D95DA6B3B541DAD7BFBD7AC508213B6DA6670 + , r = 0x272ABA31572F6CC55E30BF616B7A265312018DD325BE031BE0CC82AA17870EA3 + , s = 0xE9CC286A52CCE201586722D36D1E917EB96A4EBDB47932F9576AC645B3A60806 + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + ] + +vectorsSHA256 = + [ VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x519BA0546D0C39202A7D34D7DFA5E760B318BCFB + , r = 0x81F2F5850BE5BC123C43F71A3033E9384611C545 + , s = 0x4CDD914B65EB6C66A8AAAD27299BEE6B035F5E89 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x5A67592E8128E03A417B0484410FB72C0B630E1A + , r = 0x22518C127299B0F6FDC9872B282B9E70D0790812 + , s = 0x6837EC18F150D55DE95B5E29BE7AF5D01E4FE160 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0x8926A27C40484216F052F4427CFD5647338B7B3939BC6573AF4333569D597C52 + , r = 0xEACE8BDBBE353C432A795D9EC556C6D021F7A03F42C36E9BC87E4AC7932CC809 + , s = 0x7081E175455F9247B812B74583E9E94F9EA79BD640DC962533B0680793A38D53 + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0x1D6CE6DDA1C5D37307839CD03AB0A5CBB18E60D800937D67DFB4479AAC8DEAD7 + , r = 0x8190012A1969F9957D56FCCAAD223186F423398D58EF5B3CEFD5A4146A4476F0 + , s = 0x7452A53F7075D417B4B013B278D1BB8BBD21863F5E7B1CEE679CF2188E1AB19E + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + ] + +vectorsSHA384 = + [ VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x95897CD7BBB944AA932DBC579C1C09EB6FCFC595 + , r = 0x07F2108557EE0E3921BC1774F1CA9B410B4CE65A + , s = 0x54DF70456C86FAC10FAB47C1949AB83F2C6F7595 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x220156B761F6CA5E6C9F1B9CF9C24BE25F98CD89 + , r = 0x854CF929B58D73C3CBFDC421E8D5430CD6DB5E66 + , s = 0x91D0E0F53E22F898D158380676A871A157CDA622 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0xC345D5AB3DA0A5BCB7EC8F8FB7A7E96069E03B206371EF7D83E39068EC564920 + , r = 0xB2DA945E91858834FD9BF616EBAC151EDBC4B45D27D0DD4A7F6A22739F45C00B + , s = 0x19048B63D9FD6BCA1D9BAE3664E1BCB97F7276C306130969F63F38FA8319021B + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0x206E61F73DBE1B2DC8BE736B22B079E9DACD974DB00EEBBC5B64CAD39CF9F91C + , r = 0x239E66DDBE8F8C230A3D071D601B6FFBDFB5901F94D444C6AF56F732BEB954BE + , s = 0x6BD737513D5E72FE85D1C750E0F73921FE299B945AAD1C802F15C26A43D34961 + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + ] + +vectorsSHA512 = + [ VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x09ECE7CA27D0F5A4DD4E556C9DF1D21D28104F8B + , r = 0x16C3491F9B8C3FBBDD5E7A7B667057F0D8EE8E1B + , s = 0x02C36A127A7B89EDBB72E4FFBC71DABC7D4FC69C + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x411602CB19A6CCC34494D79D98EF1E7ED5AF25F7 + , y = 0x5DF5E01DED31D0297E274E1691C192FE5868FEF9E19A84776454B100CF16F65392195A38B90523E2542EE61871C0440CB87C322FC4B4D2EC5E1E7EC766E1BE8D4CE935437DC11C3C8FD426338933EBFE739CB3465F4D3668C5E473508253B1E682F65CBDC4FAE93C2EA212390E54905A86E2223170B44EAA7DA5DD9FFCFB7F3B + , k = 0x65D2C2EEB175E370F28C75BFCDC028D22C7DBE9C + , r = 0x8EA47E475BA8AC6F2D821DA3BD212D11A3DEB9A0 + , s = 0x7C670C7AD72B6C050C109E1790008097125433E8 + , pgq = rfc6979Params1024 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "sample" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0x5A12994431785485B3F5F067221517791B85A597B7A9436995C89ED0374668FC + , r = 0x2016ED092DC5FB669B8EFB3D1F31A91EECB199879BE0CF78F02BA062CB4C942E + , s = 0xD0C76F84B5F091E141572A639A4FB8C230807EEA7D55C8A154A224400AFF2351 + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + , VectorDSA + { msg = "test" + , x = 0x69C7548C21D0DFEA6B9A51C9EAD4E27C33D3B3F180316E5BCAB92C933F0E4DBC + , y = 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k = 0xAFF1651E4CD6036D57AA8B2A05CCF1A9D5A40166340ECBBDC55BE10B568AA0AA + , r = 0x89EC4BB1400ECCFF8E7D9AA515CD1DE7803F2DAFF09693EE7FD1353E90A68307 + , s = 0xC9F0BDABCC0D880BB137A994CC7F3980CE91CC10FAF529FC46565B15CEA854E1 + , pgq = rfc6979Params2048 + } + ] + +rfc6979Params1024 = DSA.Params + { DSA.params_p = 0x86F5CA03DCFEB225063FF830A0C769B9DD9D6153AD91D7CE27F787C43278B447E6533B86B18BED6E8A48B784A14C252C5BE0DBF60B86D6385BD2F12FB763ED8873ABFD3F5BA2E0A8C0A59082EAC056935E529DAF7C610467899C77ADEDFC846C881870B7B19B2B58F9BE0521A17002E3BDD6B86685EE90B3D9A1B02B782B1779 + , DSA.params_g = 0x07B0F92546150B62514BB771E2A0C0CE387F03BDA6C56B505209FF25FD3C133D89BBCD97E904E09114D9A7DEFDEADFC9078EA544D2E401AEECC40BB9FBBF78FD87995A10A1C27CB7789B594BA7EFB5C4326A9FE59A070E136DB77175464ADCA417BE5DCE2F40D10A46A3A3943F26AB7FD9C0398FF8C76EE0A56826A8A88F1DBD + , DSA.params_q = 0x996F967F6C8E388D9E28D01E205FBA957A5698B1 + } + +rfc6979Params2048 = DSA.Params + { DSA.params_p = 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params_g = 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params_q = 0xF2C3119374CE76C9356990B465374A17F23F9ED35089BD969F61C6DDE9998C1F + } + vectorToPrivate :: VectorDSA -> DSA.PrivateKey vectorToPrivate vector = DSA.PrivateKey { DSA.private_x = x vector @@ -127,16 +331,32 @@ , DSA.public_params = pgq vector } -doSignatureTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual) +doSignatureTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual) where expected = Just $ DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector) - actual = DSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) SHA1 (msg vector) + actual = DSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) hashAlg (msg vector) -doVerifyTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) - where actual = DSA.verify SHA1 (vectorToPublic vector) (DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector) +doVerifyTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) + where actual = DSA.verify hashAlg (vectorToPublic vector) (DSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector) dsaTests = testGroup "DSA" [ testGroup "SHA1" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map doSignatureTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1) - , testGroup "verify" $ map doVerifyTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1 + ] + , testGroup "SHA224" + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA224) [katZero..] vectorsSHA224 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA224) [katZero..] vectorsSHA224 + ] + , testGroup "SHA256" + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA256) [katZero..] vectorsSHA256 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA256) [katZero..] vectorsSHA256 + ] + , testGroup "SHA384" + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA384) [katZero..] vectorsSHA384 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA384) [katZero..] vectorsSHA384 + ] + , testGroup "SHA512" + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA512) [katZero..] vectorsSHA512 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA512) [katZero..] vectorsSHA512 ] ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECC.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECC.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECC.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECC.hs @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ } ] -doPointValidTest (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (valid vector @=? ECC.isPointValid (curve vector) (ECC.Point (x vector) (y vector))) +doPointValidTest i vector = testCase (show i) (valid vector @=? ECC.isPointValid (curve vector) (ECC.Point (x vector) (y vector))) arbitraryPoint :: ECC.Curve -> Gen ECC.Point arbitraryPoint aCurve = @@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ pointGen = ECC.pointBaseMul aCurve <$> choose (1, n - 1) eccTests = testGroup "ECC" - [ testGroup "valid-point" $ map doPointValidTest (zip [katZero..] vectorsPoint) - , testGroup "property" + [ testGroup "valid-point" $ zipWith doPointValidTest [katZero..] vectorsPoint + , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ testGroup "property" [ testProperty "point-add" $ \aCurve (QAInteger r1) (QAInteger r2) -> let curveN = ECC.ecc_n . ECC.common_curve $ aCurve curveGen = ECC.ecc_g . ECC.common_curve $ aCurve @@ -155,14 +155,19 @@ p2 = ECC.pointMul aCurve r2 curveGen pR = ECC.pointMul aCurve ((r1 + r2) `mod` curveN) curveGen in pR `propertyEq` ECC.pointAdd aCurve p1 p2 - , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ - testProperty "point-mul-mul" $ \aCurve (QAInteger n1) (QAInteger n2) -> do + , testProperty "point-negate-add" $ \aCurve -> do p <- arbitraryPoint aCurve + let o = ECC.pointAdd aCurve p (ECC.pointNegate aCurve p) + return $ ECC.PointO `propertyEq` o + , testProperty "point-negate-negate" $ \aCurve -> do + p <- arbitraryPoint aCurve + return $ p `propertyEq` ECC.pointNegate aCurve (ECC.pointNegate aCurve p) + , testProperty "point-mul-mul" $ \aCurve (QAInteger n1) (QAInteger n2) -> do + p <- arbitraryPoint aCurve let pRes = ECC.pointMul aCurve (n1 * n2) p let pDef = ECC.pointMul aCurve n1 (ECC.pointMul aCurve n2 p) return $ pRes `propertyEq` pDef - , localOption (QuickCheckTests 20) $ - testProperty "double-scalar-mult" $ \aCurve (QAInteger n1) (QAInteger n2) -> do + , testProperty "double-scalar-mult" $ \aCurve (QAInteger n1) (QAInteger n2) -> do p1 <- arbitraryPoint aCurve p2 <- arbitraryPoint aCurve let pRes = ECC.pointAddTwoMuls aCurve n1 p1 n2 p2 diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECDSA.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECDSA.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECDSA.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/ECDSA.hs @@ -490,32 +490,32 @@ vectorToPublic :: VectorECDSA -> ECDSA.PublicKey vectorToPublic vector = ECDSA.PublicKey (curve vector) (q vector) -doSignatureTest hashAlg (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual) +doSignatureTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual) where expected = Just $ ECDSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector) actual = ECDSA.signWith (k vector) (vectorToPrivate vector) hashAlg (msg vector) -doVerifyTest hashAlg (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) +doVerifyTest hashAlg i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) where actual = ECDSA.verify hashAlg (vectorToPublic vector) (ECDSA.Signature (r vector) (s vector)) (msg vector) ecdsaTests = testGroup "ECDSA" [ testGroup "SHA1" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1) - , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsSHA1) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA1) [katZero..] vectorsSHA1 ] , testGroup "SHA224" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA224) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224) - , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA224) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA224) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA224) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA224 ] , testGroup "SHA256" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA256) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256) - , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA256) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA256) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA256) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA256 ] , testGroup "SHA384" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA384) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384) - , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA384) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA384) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA384) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA384 ] , testGroup "SHA512" - [ testGroup "signature" $ map (doSignatureTest SHA512) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512) - , testGroup "verify" $ map (doVerifyTest SHA512) (zip [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512) + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith (doSignatureTest SHA512) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest SHA512) [katZero..] rfc6979_vectorsSHA512 ] ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/OAEP.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/OAEP.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/OAEP.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/OAEP.hs @@ -81,17 +81,17 @@ } ] -doEncryptionTest key (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vec) @=? actual) - where actual = OAEP.encryptWithSeed (seed vec) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (message vec) +doEncryptionTest key i vec = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vec) @=? actual) + where actual = OAEP.encryptWithSeed (seed vec) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (message vec) -doDecryptionTest key (i, vec) = testCase (show i) (Right (message vec) @=? actual) +doDecryptionTest key i vec = testCase (show i) (Right (message vec) @=? actual) where actual = OAEP.decrypt Nothing (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vec) oaepTests = testGroup "RSA-OAEP" [ testGroup "internal" - [ doEncryptionTest (private_pub rsaKeyInt) (0 :: Int, vectorInt) - , doDecryptionTest rsaKeyInt (0 :: Int, vectorInt) + [ doEncryptionTest (private_pub rsaKeyInt) (0 :: Int) vectorInt + , doDecryptionTest rsaKeyInt (0 :: Int) vectorInt ] - , testGroup "encryption key 1024 bits" $ map (doEncryptionTest $ private_pub rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1) - , testGroup "decryption key 1024 bits" $ map (doDecryptionTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1) + , testGroup "encryption key 1024 bits" $ zipWith (doEncryptionTest $ private_pub rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1 + , testGroup "decryption key 1024 bits" $ zipWith (doDecryptionTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1 ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/P256.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/P256.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/P256.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/P256.hs @@ -17,7 +17,19 @@ deriving (Show,Eq,Ord) instance Arbitrary P256Scalar where - arbitrary = P256Scalar . getQAInteger <$> arbitrary + -- Cover the full range up to 2^256-1 except 0 and curveN. To test edge + -- cases with arithmetic functions, some values close to 0, curveN and + -- 2^256 are given higher frequency. + arbitrary = P256Scalar <$> oneof + [ choose (1, w) + , choose (w + 1, curveN - w - 1) + , choose (curveN - w, curveN - 1) + , choose (curveN + 1, curveN + w) + , choose (curveN + w + 1, high - w - 1) + , choose (high - w, high - 1) + ] + where high = 2^(256 :: Int) + w = 100 curve = ECC.getCurveByName ECC.SEC_p256r1 curveN = ECC.ecc_n . ECC.common_curve $ curve @@ -26,23 +38,25 @@ pointP256ToECC :: P256.Point -> ECC.Point pointP256ToECC = uncurry ECC.Point . P256.pointToIntegers +i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes +i2ospScalar i = + case i2ospOf 32 i of + Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar" + Just b -> b + unP256Scalar :: P256Scalar -> P256.Scalar -unP256Scalar (P256Scalar r') = - let r = if r' == 0 then 0x2901 else (r' `mod` curveN) - rBytes = i2ospScalar r +unP256Scalar (P256Scalar r) = + let rBytes = i2ospScalar r in case P256.scalarFromBinary rBytes of CryptoFailed err -> error ("cannot convert scalar: " ++ show err) CryptoPassed scalar -> scalar - where - i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes - i2ospScalar i = - case i2ospOf 32 i of - Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar" - Just b -> b unP256 :: P256Scalar -> Integer -unP256 (P256Scalar r') = if r' == 0 then 0x2901 else (r' `mod` curveN) +unP256 (P256Scalar r) = r +modP256Scalar :: P256Scalar -> P256Scalar +modP256Scalar (P256Scalar r) = P256Scalar (r `mod` curveN) + p256ScalarToInteger :: P256.Scalar -> Integer p256ScalarToInteger s = os2ip (P256.scalarToBinary s :: Bytes) @@ -55,9 +69,8 @@ tests = testGroup "P256" [ testGroup "scalar" - [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \(QAInteger r') -> - let r = r' `mod` curveN - rBytes = i2ospScalar r + [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \(QAInteger r) -> + let rBytes = i2ospScalar r in case P256.scalarFromBinary rBytes of CryptoFailed err -> error (show err) CryptoPassed scalar -> rBytes `propertyEq` P256.scalarToBinary scalar @@ -66,14 +79,9 @@ r' = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2) in r `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger r' , testProperty "add0" $ \r -> - let v = unP256 r + let v = unP256 r `mod` curveN v' = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r) P256.scalarZero in v `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v' - , testProperty "add-n-1" $ \r -> - let nm1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger (curveN - 1) - v = unP256 r - v' = P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r) nm1 - in (((curveN - 1) + v) `mod` curveN) `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v' , testProperty "sub" $ \r1 r2 -> let r = (unP256 r1 - unP256 r2) `mod` curveN r' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2) @@ -83,21 +91,38 @@ [ eqTest "r1-r2" r (p256ScalarToInteger r') , eqTest "r2-r1" v (p256ScalarToInteger v') ] - , testProperty "sub-n-1" $ \r -> - let nm1 = throwCryptoError $ P256.scalarFromInteger (curveN - 1) - v = unP256 r - v' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r) nm1 - in ((v - (curveN - 1)) `mod` curveN) `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v' + , testProperty "sub0" $ \r -> + let v = unP256 r `mod` curveN + v' = P256.scalarSub (unP256Scalar r) P256.scalarZero + in v `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger v' + , testProperty "mul" $ \r1 r2 -> + let r = (unP256 r1 * unP256 r2) `mod` curveN + r' = P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2) + in r `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger r' , testProperty "inv" $ \r' -> let inv = inverseCoprimes (unP256 r') curveN inv' = P256.scalarInv (unP256Scalar r') - in if unP256 r' == 0 then True else inv `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger inv' + in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> inv `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger inv' + , testProperty "inv-safe" $ \r' -> + let inv = P256.scalarInv (unP256Scalar r') + inv' = P256.scalarInvSafe (unP256Scalar r') + in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> inv `propertyEq` inv' + , testProperty "inv-safe-mul" $ \r' -> + let inv = P256.scalarInvSafe (unP256Scalar r') + res = P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar r') inv + in unP256 r' /= 0 ==> 1 `propertyEq` p256ScalarToInteger res + , testProperty "inv-safe-zero" $ + let inv0 = P256.scalarInvSafe P256.scalarZero + invN = P256.scalarInvSafe P256.scalarN + in propertyHold [ eqTest "scalarZero" P256.scalarZero inv0 + , eqTest "scalarN" P256.scalarZero invN + ] ] , testGroup "point" [ testProperty "marshalling" $ \rx ry -> let p = P256.pointFromIntegers (unP256 rx, unP256 ry) b = P256.pointToBinary p :: Bytes - p' = P256.pointFromBinary b + p' = P256.unsafePointFromBinary b in propertyHold [ eqTest "point" (CryptoPassed p) p' ] , testProperty "marshalling-integer" $ \rx ry -> let p = P256.pointFromIntegers (unP256 rx, unP256 ry) @@ -111,8 +136,16 @@ t = P256.pointFromIntegers (xT, yT) r = P256.pointFromIntegers (xR, yR) in r @=? P256.pointAdd s t - , testProperty "lift-to-curve" $ propertyLiftToCurve - , testProperty "point-add" $ propertyPointAdd + , testProperty "lift-to-curve" propertyLiftToCurve + , testProperty "point-add" propertyPointAdd + , testProperty "point-negate" propertyPointNegate + , testProperty "point-mul" propertyPointMul + , testProperty "infinity" $ + let gN = P256.toPoint P256.scalarN + g1 = P256.pointBase + in propertyHold [ eqTest "zero" True (P256.pointIsAtInfinity gN) + , eqTest "base" False (P256.pointIsAtInfinity g1) + ] ] ] where @@ -132,12 +165,24 @@ pe2 = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r2) curveGen pR = P256.toPoint (P256.scalarAdd (unP256Scalar r1) (unP256Scalar r2)) peR = ECC.pointAdd curve pe1 pe2 - in propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointAdd p1 p2) + in (unP256 r1 + unP256 r2) `mod` curveN /= 0 ==> + propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointAdd p1 p2) , eqTest "ecc" peR (pointP256ToECC pR) ] - i2ospScalar :: Integer -> Bytes - i2ospScalar i = - case i2ospOf 32 i of - Nothing -> error "invalid size of P256 scalar" - Just b -> b + propertyPointNegate r = + let p = P256.toPoint (unP256Scalar r) + pe = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r) curveGen + pR = P256.pointNegate p + in ECC.pointNegate curve pe `propertyEq` pointP256ToECC pR + + propertyPointMul s' r' = + let s = modP256Scalar s' + r = modP256Scalar r' + p = P256.toPoint (unP256Scalar r) + pe = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 r) curveGen + pR = P256.toPoint (P256.scalarMul (unP256Scalar s) (unP256Scalar r)) + peR = ECC.pointMul curve (unP256 s) pe + in propertyHold [ eqTest "p256" pR (P256.pointMul (unP256Scalar s) p) + , eqTest "ecc" peR (pointP256ToECC pR) + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/PSS.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/PSS.hs --- a/tests/KAT_PubKey/PSS.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/PSS.hs @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ import Imports +-- Module contains one vector generated by the implementation itself and other +-- vectors from + data VectorPSS = VectorPSS { message :: ByteString , salt :: ByteString , signature :: ByteString @@ -149,325 +152,197 @@ } ] -{- -# =================================== -# Example 10: A 2048-bit RSA Key Pair -# =================================== - -# ------------------------------ -# Components of the RSA Key Pair -# ------------------------------ - -# RSA modulus n: -a5 dd 86 7a c4 cb 02 f9 0b 94 57 d4 8c 14 a7 70 -ef 99 1c 56 c3 9c 0e c6 5f d1 1a fa 89 37 ce a5 -7b 9b e7 ac 73 b4 5c 00 17 61 5b 82 d6 22 e3 18 -75 3b 60 27 c0 fd 15 7b e1 2f 80 90 fe e2 a7 ad -cd 0e ef 75 9f 88 ba 49 97 c7 a4 2d 58 c9 aa 12 -cb 99 ae 00 1f e5 21 c1 3b b5 43 14 45 a8 d5 ae -4f 5e 4c 7e 94 8a c2 27 d3 60 40 71 f2 0e 57 7e -90 5f be b1 5d fa f0 6d 1d e5 ae 62 53 d6 3a 6a -21 20 b3 1a 5d a5 da bc 95 50 60 0e 20 f2 7d 37 -39 e2 62 79 25 fe a3 cc 50 9f 21 df f0 4e 6e ea -45 49 c5 40 d6 80 9f f9 30 7e ed e9 1f ff 58 73 -3d 83 85 a2 37 d6 d3 70 5a 33 e3 91 90 09 92 07 -0d f7 ad f1 35 7c f7 e3 70 0c e3 66 7d e8 3f 17 -b8 df 17 78 db 38 1d ce 09 cb 4a d0 58 a5 11 00 -1a 73 81 98 ee 27 cf 55 a1 3b 75 45 39 90 65 82 -ec 8b 17 4b d5 8d 5d 1f 3d 76 7c 61 37 21 ae 05 - -# RSA public exponent e: -01 00 01 - -# RSA private exponent d: -2d 2f f5 67 b3 fe 74 e0 61 91 b7 fd ed 6d e1 12 -29 0c 67 06 92 43 0d 59 69 18 40 47 da 23 4c 96 -93 de ed 16 73 ed 42 95 39 c9 69 d3 72 c0 4d 6b -47 e0 f5 b8 ce e0 84 3e 5c 22 83 5d bd 3b 05 a0 -99 79 84 ae 60 58 b1 1b c4 90 7c bf 67 ed 84 fa -9a e2 52 df b0 d0 cd 49 e6 18 e3 5d fd fe 59 bc -a3 dd d6 6c 33 ce bb c7 7a d4 41 aa 69 5e 13 e3 -24 b5 18 f0 1c 60 f5 a8 5c 99 4a d1 79 f2 a6 b5 -fb e9 34 02 b1 17 67 be 01 bf 07 34 44 d6 ba 1d -d2 bc a5 bd 07 4d 4a 5f ae 35 31 ad 13 03 d8 4b -30 d8 97 31 8c bb ba 04 e0 3c 2e 66 de 6d 91 f8 -2f 96 ea 1d 4b b5 4a 5a ae 10 2d 59 46 57 f5 c9 -78 95 53 51 2b 29 6d ea 29 d8 02 31 96 35 7e 3e -3a 6e 95 8f 39 e3 c2 34 40 38 ea 60 4b 31 ed c6 -f0 f7 ff 6e 71 81 a5 7c 92 82 6a 26 8f 86 76 8e -96 f8 78 56 2f c7 1d 85 d6 9e 44 86 12 f7 04 8f - -# Prime p: -cf d5 02 83 fe ee b9 7f 6f 08 d7 3c bc 7b 38 36 -f8 2b bc d4 99 47 9f 5e 6f 76 fd fc b8 b3 8c 4f -71 dc 9e 88 bd 6a 6f 76 37 1a fd 65 d2 af 18 62 -b3 2a fb 34 a9 5f 71 b8 b1 32 04 3f fe be 3a 95 -2b af 75 92 44 81 48 c0 3f 9c 69 b1 d6 8e 4c e5 -cf 32 c8 6b af 46 fe d3 01 ca 1a b4 03 06 9b 32 -f4 56 b9 1f 71 89 8a b0 81 cd 8c 42 52 ef 52 71 -91 5c 97 94 b8 f2 95 85 1d a7 51 0f 99 cb 73 eb - -# Prime q: -cc 4e 90 d2 a1 b3 a0 65 d3 b2 d1 f5 a8 fc e3 1b -54 44 75 66 4e ab 56 1d 29 71 b9 9f b7 be f8 44 -e8 ec 1f 36 0b 8c 2a c8 35 96 92 97 1e a6 a3 8f -72 3f cc 21 1f 5d bc b1 77 a0 fd ac 51 64 a1 d4 -ff 7f bb 4e 82 99 86 35 3c b9 83 65 9a 14 8c dd -42 0c 7d 31 ba 38 22 ea 90 a3 2b e4 6c 03 0e 8c -17 e1 fa 0a d3 78 59 e0 6b 0a a6 fa 3b 21 6d 9c -be 6c 0e 22 33 97 69 c0 a6 15 91 3e 5d a7 19 cf - -# p's CRT exponent dP: -1c 2d 1f c3 2f 6b c4 00 4f d8 5d fd e0 fb bf 9a -4c 38 f9 c7 c4 e4 1d ea 1a a8 82 34 a2 01 cd 92 -f3 b7 da 52 65 83 a9 8a d8 5b b3 60 fb 98 3b 71 -1e 23 44 9d 56 1d 17 78 d7 a5 15 48 6b cb f4 7b -46 c9 e9 e1 a3 a1 f7 70 00 ef be b0 9a 8a fe 47 -e5 b8 57 cd a9 9c b1 6d 7f ff 9b 71 2e 3b d6 0c -a9 6d 9c 79 73 d6 16 d4 69 34 a9 c0 50 28 1c 00 -43 99 ce ff 1d b7 dd a7 87 66 a8 a9 b9 cb 08 73 - -# q's CRT exponent dQ: -cb 3b 3c 04 ca a5 8c 60 be 7d 9b 2d eb b3 e3 96 -43 f4 f5 73 97 be 08 23 6a 1e 9e af aa 70 65 36 -e7 1c 3a cf e0 1c c6 51 f2 3c 9e 05 85 8f ee 13 -bb 6a 8a fc 47 df 4e dc 9a 4b a3 0b ce cb 73 d0 -15 78 52 32 7e e7 89 01 5c 2e 8d ee 7b 9f 05 a0 -f3 1a c9 4e b6 17 31 64 74 0c 5c 95 14 7c d5 f3 -b5 ae 2c b4 a8 37 87 f0 1d 8a b3 1f 27 c2 d0 ee -a2 dd 8a 11 ab 90 6a ba 20 7c 43 c6 ee 12 53 31 - -# CRT coefficient qInv: -12 f6 b2 cf 13 74 a7 36 fa d0 56 16 05 0f 96 ab -4b 61 d1 17 7c 7f 9d 52 5a 29 f3 d1 80 e7 76 67 -e9 9d 99 ab f0 52 5d 07 58 66 0f 37 52 65 5b 0f -25 b8 df 84 31 d9 a8 ff 77 c1 6c 12 a0 a5 12 2a -9f 0b f7 cf d5 a2 66 a3 5c 15 9f 99 12 08 b9 03 -16 ff 44 4f 3e 0b 6b d0 e9 3b 8a 7a 24 48 e9 57 -e3 dd a6 cf cf 22 66 b1 06 01 3a c4 68 08 d3 b3 -88 7b 3b 00 34 4b aa c9 53 0b 4c e7 08 fc 32 b6 - -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.1 -# --------------------------------- - -# Message to be signed: -88 31 77 e5 12 6b 9b e2 d9 a9 68 03 27 d5 37 0c -6f 26 86 1f 58 20 c4 3d a6 7a 3a d6 09 - -# Salt: -04 e2 15 ee 6f f9 34 b9 da 70 d7 73 0c 87 34 ab -fc ec de 89 - -# Signature: -82 c2 b1 60 09 3b 8a a3 c0 f7 52 2b 19 f8 73 54 -06 6c 77 84 7a bf 2a 9f ce 54 2d 0e 84 e9 20 c5 -af b4 9f fd fd ac e1 65 60 ee 94 a1 36 96 01 14 -8e ba d7 a0 e1 51 cf 16 33 17 91 a5 72 7d 05 f2 -1e 74 e7 eb 81 14 40 20 69 35 d7 44 76 5a 15 e7 -9f 01 5c b6 6c 53 2c 87 a6 a0 59 61 c8 bf ad 74 -1a 9a 66 57 02 28 94 39 3e 72 23 73 97 96 c0 2a -77 45 5d 0f 55 5b 0e c0 1d df 25 9b 62 07 fd 0f -d5 76 14 ce f1 a5 57 3b aa ff 4e c0 00 69 95 16 -59 b8 5f 24 30 0a 25 16 0c a8 52 2d c6 e6 72 7e -57 d0 19 d7 e6 36 29 b8 fe 5e 89 e2 5c c1 5b eb -3a 64 75 77 55 92 99 28 0b 9b 28 f7 9b 04 09 00 -0b e2 5b bd 96 40 8b a3 b4 3c c4 86 18 4d d1 c8 -e6 25 53 fa 1a f4 04 0f 60 66 3d e7 f5 e4 9c 04 -38 8e 25 7f 1c e8 9c 95 da b4 8a 31 5d 9b 66 b1 -b7 62 82 33 87 6f f2 38 52 30 d0 70 d0 7e 16 66 - -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.2 -# --------------------------------- - -# Message to be signed: -dd 67 0a 01 46 58 68 ad c9 3f 26 13 19 57 a5 0c -52 fb 77 7c db aa 30 89 2c 9e 12 36 11 64 ec 13 -97 9d 43 04 81 18 e4 44 5d b8 7b ee 58 dd 98 7b -34 25 d0 20 71 d8 db ae 80 70 8b 03 9d bb 64 db -d1 de 56 57 d9 fe d0 c1 18 a5 41 43 74 2e 0f f3 -c8 7f 74 e4 58 57 64 7a f3 f7 9e b0 a1 4c 9d 75 -ea 9a 1a 04 b7 cf 47 8a 89 7a 70 8f d9 88 f4 8e -80 1e db 0b 70 39 df 8c 23 bb 3c 56 f4 e8 21 ac - -# Salt: -8b 2b dd 4b 40 fa f5 45 c7 78 dd f9 bc 1a 49 cb -57 f9 b7 1b - -# Signature: -14 ae 35 d9 dd 06 ba 92 f7 f3 b8 97 97 8a ed 7c -d4 bf 5f f0 b5 85 a4 0b d4 6c e1 b4 2c d2 70 30 -53 bb 90 44 d6 4e 81 3d 8f 96 db 2d d7 00 7d 10 -11 8f 6f 8f 84 96 09 7a d7 5e 1f f6 92 34 1b 28 -92 ad 55 a6 33 a1 c5 5e 7f 0a 0a d5 9a 0e 20 3a -5b 82 78 ae c5 4d d8 62 2e 28 31 d8 71 74 f8 ca -ff 43 ee 6c 46 44 53 45 d8 4a 59 65 9b fb 92 ec -d4 c8 18 66 86 95 f3 47 06 f6 68 28 a8 99 59 63 -7f 2b f3 e3 25 1c 24 bd ba 4d 4b 76 49 da 00 22 -21 8b 11 9c 84 e7 9a 65 27 ec 5b 8a 5f 86 1c 15 -99 52 e2 3e c0 5e 1e 71 73 46 fa ef e8 b1 68 68 -25 bd 2b 26 2f b2 53 10 66 c0 de 09 ac de 2e 42 -31 69 07 28 b5 d8 5e 11 5a 2f 6b 92 b7 9c 25 ab -c9 bd 93 99 ff 8b cf 82 5a 52 ea 1f 56 ea 76 dd -26 f4 3b aa fa 18 bf a9 2a 50 4c bd 35 69 9e 26 -d1 dc c5 a2 88 73 85 f3 c6 32 32 f0 6f 32 44 c3 - -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.3 -# --------------------------------- - -# Message to be signed: -48 b2 b6 a5 7a 63 c8 4c ea 85 9d 65 c6 68 28 4b -08 d9 6b dc aa be 25 2d b0 e4 a9 6c b1 ba c6 01 -93 41 db 6f be fb 8d 10 6b 0e 90 ed a6 bc c6 c6 -26 2f 37 e7 ea 9c 7e 5d 22 6b d7 df 85 ec 5e 71 -ef ff 2f 54 c5 db 57 7f f7 29 ff 91 b8 42 49 1d -e2 74 1d 0c 63 16 07 df 58 6b 90 5b 23 b9 1a f1 -3d a1 23 04 bf 83 ec a8 a7 3e 87 1f f9 db - -# Salt: -4e 96 fc 1b 39 8f 92 b4 46 71 01 0c 0d c3 ef d6 -e2 0c 2d 73 - -# Signature: -6e 3e 4d 7b 6b 15 d2 fb 46 01 3b 89 00 aa 5b bb -39 39 cf 2c 09 57 17 98 70 42 02 6e e6 2c 74 c5 -4c ff d5 d7 d5 7e fb bf 95 0a 0f 5c 57 4f a0 9d -3f c1 c9 f5 13 b0 5b 4f f5 0d d8 df 7e df a2 01 -02 85 4c 35 e5 92 18 01 19 a7 0c e5 b0 85 18 2a -a0 2d 9e a2 aa 90 d1 df 03 f2 da ae 88 5b a2 f5 -d0 5a fd ac 97 47 6f 06 b9 3b 5b c9 4a 1a 80 aa -91 16 c4 d6 15 f3 33 b0 98 89 2b 25 ff ac e2 66 -f5 db 5a 5a 3b cc 10 a8 24 ed 55 aa d3 5b 72 78 -34 fb 8c 07 da 28 fc f4 16 a5 d9 b2 22 4f 1f 8b -44 2b 36 f9 1e 45 6f de a2 d7 cf e3 36 72 68 de -03 07 a4 c7 4e 92 41 59 ed 33 39 3d 5e 06 55 53 -1c 77 32 7b 89 82 1b de df 88 01 61 c7 8c d4 19 -6b 54 19 f7 ac c3 f1 3e 5e bf 16 1b 6e 7c 67 24 -71 6c a3 3b 85 c2 e2 56 40 19 2a c2 85 96 51 d5 -0b de 7e b9 76 e5 1c ec 82 8b 98 b6 56 3b 86 bb - -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.4 -# --------------------------------- - -# Message to be signed: -0b 87 77 c7 f8 39 ba f0 a6 4b bb db c5 ce 79 75 -5c 57 a2 05 b8 45 c1 74 e2 d2 e9 05 46 a0 89 c4 -e6 ec 8a df fa 23 a7 ea 97 ba e6 b6 5d 78 2b 82 -db 5d 2b 5a 56 d2 2a 29 a0 5e 7c 44 33 e2 b8 2a -62 1a bb a9 0a dd 05 ce 39 3f c4 8a 84 05 42 45 -1a - -# Salt: -c7 cd 69 8d 84 b6 51 28 d8 83 5e 3a 8b 1e b0 e0 -1c b5 41 ec - -# Signature: -34 04 7f f9 6c 4d c0 dc 90 b2 d4 ff 59 a1 a3 61 -a4 75 4b 25 5d 2e e0 af 7d 8b f8 7c 9b c9 e7 dd -ee de 33 93 4c 63 ca 1c 0e 3d 26 2c b1 45 ef 93 -2a 1f 2c 0a 99 7a a6 a3 4f 8e ae e7 47 7d 82 cc -f0 90 95 a6 b8 ac ad 38 d4 ee c9 fb 7e ab 7a d0 -2d a1 d1 1d 8e 54 c1 82 5e 55 bf 58 c2 a2 32 34 -b9 02 be 12 4f 9e 90 38 a8 f6 8f a4 5d ab 72 f6 -6e 09 45 bf 1d 8b ac c9 04 4c 6f 07 09 8c 9f ce -c5 8a 3a ab 10 0c 80 51 78 15 5f 03 0a 12 4c 45 -0e 5a cb da 47 d0 e4 f1 0b 80 a2 3f 80 3e 77 4d -02 3b 00 15 c2 0b 9f 9b be 7c 91 29 63 38 d5 ec -b4 71 ca fb 03 20 07 b6 7a 60 be 5f 69 50 4a 9f -01 ab b3 cb 46 7b 26 0e 2b ce 86 0b e8 d9 5b f9 -2c 0c 8e 14 96 ed 1e 52 85 93 a4 ab b6 df 46 2d -de 8a 09 68 df fe 46 83 11 68 57 a2 32 f5 eb f6 -c8 5b e2 38 74 5a d0 f3 8f 76 7a 5f db f4 86 fb - -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.5 -# --------------------------------- +-- ================================== +-- Example 2: A 1025-bit RSA Key Pair +-- ================================== -# Message to be signed: -f1 03 6e 00 8e 71 e9 64 da dc 92 19 ed 30 e1 7f -06 b4 b6 8a 95 5c 16 b3 12 b1 ed df 02 8b 74 97 -6b ed 6b 3f 6a 63 d4 e7 78 59 24 3c 9c cc dc 98 -01 65 23 ab b0 24 83 b3 55 91 c3 3a ad 81 21 3b -b7 c7 bb 1a 47 0a ab c1 0d 44 25 6c 4d 45 59 d9 -16 +rsaKey2 = PrivateKey + { private_pub = PublicKey + { public_n = 0x01d40c1bcf97a68ae7cdbd8a7bf3e34fa19dcca4ef75a47454375f94514d88fed006fb829f8419ff87d6315da68a1ff3a0938e9abb3464011c303ad99199cf0c7c7a8b477dce829e8844f625b115e5e9c4a59cf8f8113b6834336a2fd2689b472cbb5e5cabe674350c59b6c17e176874fb42f8fc3d176a017edc61fd326c4b33c9 + , public_e = 0x010001 + , public_size = 129 + } + , private_d = 0x027d147e4673057377fd1ea201565772176a7dc38358d376045685a2e787c23c15576bc16b9f444402d6bfc5d98a3e88ea13ef67c353eca0c0ddba9255bd7b8bb50a644afdfd1dd51695b252d22e7318d1b6687a1c10ff75545f3db0fe602d5f2b7f294e3601eab7b9d1cecd767f64692e3e536ca2846cb0c2dd486a39fa75b1 + , private_p = 0x016601e926a0f8c9e26ecab769ea65a5e7c52cc9e080ef519457c644da6891c5a104d3ea7955929a22e7c68a7af9fcad777c3ccc2b9e3d3650bce404399b7e59d1 + , private_q = 0x014eafa1d4d0184da7e31f877d1281ddda625664869e8379e67ad3b75eae74a580e9827abd6eb7a002cb5411f5266797768fb8e95ae40e3e8a01f35ff89e56c079 + , private_dP = 0xe247cce504939b8f0a36090de200938755e2444b29539a7da7a902f6056835c0db7b52559497cfe2c61a8086d0213c472c78851800b171f6401de2e9c2756f31 + , private_dQ = 0xb12fba757855e586e46f64c38a70c68b3f548d93d787b399999d4c8f0bbd2581c21e19ed0018a6d5d3df86424b3abcad40199d31495b61309f27c1bf55d487c1 + , private_qinv = 0x564b1e1fa003bda91e89090425aac05b91da9ee25061e7628d5f51304a84992fdc33762bd378a59f030a334d532bd0dae8f298ea9ed844636ad5fb8cbdc03cad + } -# Salt: -ef a8 bf f9 62 12 b2 f4 a3 f3 71 a1 0d 57 41 52 -65 5f 5d fb +vectorsKey2 = + [ + -- Example 2.1 + VectorPSS + { message = "\xda\xba\x03\x20\x66\x26\x3f\xae\xdb\x65\x98\x48\x11\x52\x78\xa5\x2c\x44\xfa\xa3\xa7\x6f\x37\x51\x5e\xd3\x36\x32\x10\x72\xc4\x0a\x9d\x9b\x53\xbc\x05\x01\x40\x78\xad\xf5\x20\x87\x51\x46\xaa\xe7\x0f\xf0\x60\x22\x6d\xcb\x7b\x1f\x1f\xc2\x7e\x93\x60" + , salt = "\x57\xbf\x16\x0b\xcb\x02\xbb\x1d\xc7\x28\x0c\xf0\x45\x85\x30\xb7\xd2\x83\x2f\xf7" + , signature = "\x01\x4c\x5b\xa5\x33\x83\x28\xcc\xc6\xe7\xa9\x0b\xf1\xc0\xab\x3f\xd6\x06\xff\x47\x96\xd3\xc1\x2e\x4b\x63\x9e\xd9\x13\x6a\x5f\xec\x6c\x16\xd8\x88\x4b\xdd\x99\xcf\xdc\x52\x14\x56\xb0\x74\x2b\x73\x68\x68\xcf\x90\xde\x09\x9a\xdb\x8d\x5f\xfd\x1d\xef\xf3\x9b\xa4\x00\x7a\xb7\x46\xce\xfd\xb2\x2d\x7d\xf0\xe2\x25\xf5\x46\x27\xdc\x65\x46\x61\x31\x72\x1b\x90\xaf\x44\x53\x63\xa8\x35\x8b\x9f\x60\x76\x42\xf7\x8f\xab\x0a\xb0\xf4\x3b\x71\x68\xd6\x4b\xae\x70\xd8\x82\x78\x48\xd8\xef\x1e\x42\x1c\x57\x54\xdd\xf4\x2c\x25\x89\xb5\xb3" + } + -- Example 2.2 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xe4\xf8\x60\x1a\x8a\x6d\xa1\xbe\x34\x44\x7c\x09\x59\xc0\x58\x57\x0c\x36\x68\xcf\xd5\x1d\xd5\xf9\xcc\xd6\xad\x44\x11\xfe\x82\x13\x48\x6d\x78\xa6\xc4\x9f\x93\xef\xc2\xca\x22\x88\xce\xbc\x2b\x9b\x60\xbd\x04\xb1\xe2\x20\xd8\x6e\x3d\x48\x48\xd7\x09\xd0\x32\xd1\xe8\xc6\xa0\x70\xc6\xaf\x9a\x49\x9f\xcf\x95\x35\x4b\x14\xba\x61\x27\xc7\x39\xde\x1b\xb0\xfd\x16\x43\x1e\x46\x93\x8a\xec\x0c\xf8\xad\x9e\xb7\x2e\x83\x2a\x70\x35\xde\x9b\x78\x07\xbd\xc0\xed\x8b\x68\xeb\x0f\x5a\xc2\x21\x6b\xe4\x0c\xe9\x20\xc0\xdb\x0e\xdd\xd3\x86\x0e\xd7\x88\xef\xac\xca\xca\x50\x2d\x8f\x2b\xd6\xd1\xa7\xc1\xf4\x1f\xf4\x6f\x16\x81\xc8\xf1\xf8\x18\xe9\xc4\xf6\xd9\x1a\x0c\x78\x03\xcc\xc6\x3d\x76\xa6\x54\x4d\x84\x3e\x08\x4e\x36\x3b\x8a\xcc\x55\xaa\x53\x17\x33\xed\xb5\xde\xe5\xb5\x19\x6e\x9f\x03\xe8\xb7\x31\xb3\x77\x64\x28\xd9\xe4\x57\xfe\x3f\xbc\xb3\xdb\x72\x74\x44\x2d\x78\x58\x90\xe9\xcb\x08\x54\xb6\x44\x4d\xac\xe7\x91\xd7\x27\x3d\xe1\x88\x97\x19\x33\x8a\x77\xfe" + , salt = "\x7f\x6d\xd3\x59\xe6\x04\xe6\x08\x70\xe8\x98\xe4\x7b\x19\xbf\x2e\x5a\x7b\x2a\x90" + , signature = "\x01\x09\x91\x65\x6c\xca\x18\x2b\x7f\x29\xd2\xdb\xc0\x07\xe7\xae\x0f\xec\x15\x8e\xb6\x75\x9c\xb9\xc4\x5c\x5f\xf8\x7c\x76\x35\xdd\x46\xd1\x50\x88\x2f\x4d\xe1\xe9\xae\x65\xe7\xf7\xd9\x01\x8f\x68\x36\x95\x4a\x47\xc0\xa8\x1a\x8a\x6b\x6f\x83\xf2\x94\x4d\x60\x81\xb1\xaa\x7c\x75\x9b\x25\x4b\x2c\x34\xb6\x91\xda\x67\xcc\x02\x26\xe2\x0b\x2f\x18\xb4\x22\x12\x76\x1d\xcd\x4b\x90\x8a\x62\xb3\x71\xb5\x91\x8c\x57\x42\xaf\x4b\x53\x7e\x29\x69\x17\x67\x4f\xb9\x14\x19\x47\x61\x62\x1c\xc1\x9a\x41\xf6\xfb\x95\x3f\xbc\xbb\x64\x9d\xea" + } + -- Example 2.3 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x52\xa1\xd9\x6c\x8a\xc3\x9e\x41\xe4\x55\x80\x98\x01\xb9\x27\xa5\xb4\x45\xc1\x0d\x90\x2a\x0d\xcd\x38\x50\xd2\x2a\x66\xd2\xbb\x07\x03\xe6\x7d\x58\x67\x11\x45\x95\xaa\xbf\x5a\x7a\xeb\x5a\x8f\x87\x03\x4b\xbb\x30\xe1\x3c\xfd\x48\x17\xa9\xbe\x76\x23\x00\x23\x60\x6d\x02\x86\xa3\xfa\xf8\xa4\xd2\x2b\x72\x8e\xc5\x18\x07\x9f\x9e\x64\x52\x6e\x3a\x0c\xc7\x94\x1a\xa3\x38\xc4\x37\x99\x7c\x68\x0c\xca\xc6\x7c\x66\xbf\xa1" + , salt = "\xfc\xa8\x62\x06\x8b\xce\x22\x46\x72\x4b\x70\x8a\x05\x19\xda\x17\xe6\x48\x68\x8c" + , signature = "\x00\x7f\x00\x30\x01\x8f\x53\xcd\xc7\x1f\x23\xd0\x36\x59\xfd\xe5\x4d\x42\x41\xf7\x58\xa7\x50\xb4\x2f\x18\x5f\x87\x57\x85\x20\xc3\x07\x42\xaf\xd8\x43\x59\xb6\xe6\xe8\xd3\xed\x95\x9d\xc6\xfe\x48\x6b\xed\xc8\xe2\xcf\x00\x1f\x63\xa7\xab\xe1\x62\x56\xa1\xb8\x4d\xf0\xd2\x49\xfc\x05\xd3\x19\x4c\xe5\xf0\x91\x27\x42\xdb\xbf\x80\xdd\x17\x4f\x6c\x51\xf6\xba\xd7\xf1\x6c\xf3\x36\x4e\xba\x09\x5a\x06\x26\x7d\xc3\x79\x38\x03\xac\x75\x26\xae\xbe\x0a\x47\x5d\x38\xb8\xc2\x24\x7a\xb5\x1c\x48\x98\xdf\x70\x47\xdc\x6a\xdf\x52\xc6\xc4" + } + -- Example 2.4 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xa7\x18\x2c\x83\xac\x18\xbe\x65\x70\xa1\x06\xaa\x9d\x5c\x4e\x3d\xbb\xd4\xaf\xae\xb0\xc6\x0c\x4a\x23\xe1\x96\x9d\x79\xff" + , salt = "\x80\x70\xef\x2d\xe9\x45\xc0\x23\x87\x68\x4b\xa0\xd3\x30\x96\x73\x22\x35\xd4\x40" + , signature = "\x00\x9c\xd2\xf4\xed\xbe\x23\xe1\x23\x46\xae\x8c\x76\xdd\x9a\xd3\x23\x0a\x62\x07\x61\x41\xf1\x6c\x15\x2b\xa1\x85\x13\xa4\x8e\xf6\xf0\x10\xe0\xe3\x7f\xd3\xdf\x10\xa1\xec\x62\x9a\x0c\xb5\xa3\xb5\xd2\x89\x30\x07\x29\x8c\x30\x93\x6a\x95\x90\x3b\x6b\xa8\x55\x55\xd9\xec\x36\x73\xa0\x61\x08\xfd\x62\xa2\xfd\xa5\x6d\x1c\xe2\xe8\x5c\x4d\xb6\xb2\x4a\x81\xca\x3b\x49\x6c\x36\xd4\xfd\x06\xeb\x7c\x91\x66\xd8\xe9\x48\x77\xc4\x2b\xea\x62\x2b\x3b\xfe\x92\x51\xfd\xc2\x1d\x8d\x53\x71\xba\xda\xd7\x8a\x48\x82\x14\x79\x63\x35\xb4\x0b" + } + -- Example 2.5 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x86\xa8\x3d\x4a\x72\xee\x93\x2a\x4f\x56\x30\xaf\x65\x79\xa3\x86\xb7\x8f\xe8\x89\x99\xe0\xab\xd2\xd4\x90\x34\xa4\xbf\xc8\x54\xdd\x94\xf1\x09\x4e\x2e\x8c\xd7\xa1\x79\xd1\x95\x88\xe4\xae\xfc\x1b\x1b\xd2\x5e\x95\xe3\xdd\x46\x1f" + , salt = "\x17\x63\x9a\x4e\x88\xd7\x22\xc4\xfc\xa2\x4d\x07\x9a\x8b\x29\xc3\x24\x33\xb0\xc9" + , signature = "\x00\xec\x43\x08\x24\x93\x1e\xbd\x3b\xaa\x43\x03\x4d\xae\x98\xba\x64\x6b\x8c\x36\x01\x3d\x16\x71\xc3\xcf\x1c\xf8\x26\x0c\x37\x4b\x19\xf8\xe1\xcc\x8d\x96\x50\x12\x40\x5e\x7e\x9b\xf7\x37\x86\x12\xdf\xcc\x85\xfc\xe1\x2c\xda\x11\xf9\x50\xbd\x0b\xa8\x87\x67\x40\x43\x6c\x1d\x25\x95\xa6\x4a\x1b\x32\xef\xcf\xb7\x4a\x21\xc8\x73\xb3\xcc\x33\xaa\xf4\xe3\xdc\x39\x53\xde\x67\xf0\x67\x4c\x04\x53\xb4\xfd\x9f\x60\x44\x06\xd4\x41\xb8\x16\x09\x8c\xb1\x06\xfe\x34\x72\xbc\x25\x1f\x81\x5f\x59\xdb\x2e\x43\x78\xa3\xad\xdc\x18\x1e\xcf" + } + -- Example 2.6 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x04\x9f\x91\x54\xd8\x71\xac\x4a\x7c\x7a\xb4\x53\x25\xba\x75\x45\xa1\xed\x08\xf7\x05\x25\xb2\x66\x7c\xf1" + , salt = "\x37\x81\x0d\xef\x10\x55\xed\x92\x2b\x06\x3d\xf7\x98\xde\x5d\x0a\xab\xf8\x86\xee" + , signature = "\x00\x47\x5b\x16\x48\xf8\x14\xa8\xdc\x0a\xbd\xc3\x7b\x55\x27\xf5\x43\xb6\x66\xbb\x6e\x39\xd3\x0e\x5b\x49\xd3\xb8\x76\xdc\xcc\x58\xea\xc1\x4e\x32\xa2\xd5\x5c\x26\x16\x01\x44\x56\xad\x2f\x24\x6f\xc8\xe3\xd5\x60\xda\x3d\xdf\x37\x9a\x1c\x0b\xd2\x00\xf1\x02\x21\xdf\x07\x8c\x21\x9a\x15\x1b\xc8\xd4\xec\x9d\x2f\xc2\x56\x44\x67\x81\x10\x14\xef\x15\xd8\xea\x01\xc2\xeb\xbf\xf8\xc2\xc8\xef\xab\x38\x09\x6e\x55\xfc\xbe\x32\x85\xc7\xaa\x55\x88\x51\x25\x4f\xaf\xfa\x92\xc1\xc7\x2b\x78\x75\x86\x63\xef\x45\x82\x84\x31\x39\xd7\xa6" + } + ] -# Signature: -7e 09 35 ea 18 f4 d6 c1 d1 7c e8 2e b2 b3 83 6c -55 b3 84 58 9c e1 9d fe 74 33 63 ac 99 48 d1 f3 -46 b7 bf dd fe 92 ef d7 8a db 21 fa ef c8 9a de -42 b1 0f 37 40 03 fe 12 2e 67 42 9a 1c b8 cb d1 -f8 d9 01 45 64 c4 4d 12 01 16 f4 99 0f 1a 6e 38 -77 4c 19 4b d1 b8 21 32 86 b0 77 b0 49 9d 2e 7b -3f 43 4a b1 22 89 c5 56 68 4d ee d7 81 31 93 4b -b3 dd 65 37 23 6f 7c 6f 3d cb 09 d4 76 be 07 72 -1e 37 e1 ce ed 9b 2f 7b 40 68 87 bd 53 15 73 05 -e1 c8 b4 f8 4d 73 3b c1 e1 86 fe 06 cc 59 b6 ed -b8 f4 bd 7f fe fd f4 f7 ba 9c fb 9d 57 06 89 b5 -a1 a4 10 9a 74 6a 69 08 93 db 37 99 25 5a 0c b9 -21 5d 2d 1c d4 90 59 0e 95 2e 8c 87 86 aa 00 11 -26 52 52 47 0c 04 1d fb c3 ee c7 c3 cb f7 1c 24 -86 9d 11 5c 0c b4 a9 56 f5 6d 53 0b 80 ab 58 9a -cf ef c6 90 75 1d df 36 e8 d3 83 f8 3c ed d2 cc +-- ================================== +-- Example 3: A 1026-bit RSA Key Pair +-- ================================== -# --------------------------------- -# RSASSA-PSS Signature Example 10.6 -# --------------------------------- +rsaKey3 = PrivateKey + { private_pub = PublicKey + { public_n = 0x02f246ef451ed3eebb9a310200cc25859c048e4be798302991112eb68ce6db674e280da21feded1ae74880ca522b18db249385012827c515f0e466a1ffa691d98170574e9d0eadb087586ca48933da3cc953d95bd0ed50de10ddcb6736107d6c831c7f663e833ca4c097e700ce0fb945f88fb85fe8e5a773172565b914a471a443 + , public_e = 0x010001 + , public_size = 129 + } + , private_d = 0x651451733b56de5ac0a689a4aeb6e6894a69014e076c88dd7a667eab3232bbccd2fc44ba2fa9c31db46f21edd1fdb23c5c128a5da5bab91e7f952b67759c7cff705415ac9fa0907c7ca6178f668fb948d869da4cc3b7356f4008dfd5449d32ee02d9a477eb69fc29266e5d9070512375a50fbbcc27e238ad98425f6ebbf88991 + , private_p = 0x01bd36e18ece4b0fdb2e9c9d548bd1a7d6e2c21c6fdc35074a1d05b1c6c8b3d558ea2639c9a9a421680169317252558bd148ad215aac550e2dcf12a82d0ebfe853 + , private_q = 0x01b1b656ad86d8e19d5dc86292b3a192fdf6e0dd37877bad14822fa00190cab265f90d3f02057b6f54d6ecb14491e5adeacebc48bf0ebd2a2ad26d402e54f61651 + , private_dP = 0x1f2779fd2e3e5e6bae05539518fba0cd0ead1aa4513a7cba18f1cf10e3f68195693d278a0f0ee72f89f9bc760d80e2f9d0261d516501c6ae39f14a476ce2ccf5 + , private_dQ = 0x011a0d36794b04a854aab4b2462d439a5046c91d940b2bc6f75b62956fef35a2a6e63c5309817f307bbff9d59e7e331bd363f6d66849b18346adea169f0ae9aec1 + , private_qinv = 0x0b30f0ecf558752fb3a6ce4ba2b8c675f659eba6c376585a1b39712d038ae3d2b46fcb418ae15d0905da6440e1513a30b9b7d6668fbc5e88e5ab7a175e73ba35 + } -# Message to be signed: -25 f1 08 95 a8 77 16 c1 37 45 0b b9 51 9d fa a1 -f2 07 fa a9 42 ea 88 ab f7 1e 9c 17 98 00 85 b5 -55 ae ba b7 62 64 ae 2a 3a b9 3c 2d 12 98 11 91 -dd ac 6f b5 94 9e b3 6a ee 3c 5d a9 40 f0 07 52 -c9 16 d9 46 08 fa 7d 97 ba 6a 29 15 b6 88 f2 03 -23 d4 e9 d9 68 01 d8 9a 72 ab 58 92 dc 21 17 c0 -74 34 fc f9 72 e0 58 cf 8c 41 ca 4b 4f f5 54 f7 -d5 06 8a d3 15 5f ce d0 f3 12 5b c0 4f 91 93 37 -8a 8f 5c 4c 3b 8c b4 dd 6d 1c c6 9d 30 ec ca 6e -aa 51 e3 6a 05 73 0e 9e 34 2e 85 5b af 09 9d ef -b8 af d7 +vectorsKey3 = + [ + -- Example 3.1 + VectorPSS + { message = "\x59\x4b\x37\x33\x3b\xbb\x2c\x84\x52\x4a\x87\xc1\xa0\x1f\x75\xfc\xec\x0e\x32\x56\xf1\x08\xe3\x8d\xca\x36\xd7\x0d\x00\x57" + , salt = "\xf3\x1a\xd6\xc8\xcf\x89\xdf\x78\xed\x77\xfe\xac\xbc\xc2\xf8\xb0\xa8\xe4\xcf\xaa" + , signature = "\x00\x88\xb1\x35\xfb\x17\x94\xb6\xb9\x6c\x4a\x3e\x67\x81\x97\xf8\xca\xc5\x2b\x64\xb2\xfe\x90\x7d\x6f\x27\xde\x76\x11\x24\x96\x4a\x99\xa0\x1a\x88\x27\x40\xec\xfa\xed\x6c\x01\xa4\x74\x64\xbb\x05\x18\x23\x13\xc0\x13\x38\xa8\xcd\x09\x72\x14\xcd\x68\xca\x10\x3b\xd5\x7d\x3b\xc9\xe8\x16\x21\x3e\x61\xd7\x84\xf1\x82\x46\x7a\xbf\x8a\x01\xcf\x25\x3e\x99\xa1\x56\xea\xa8\xe3\xe1\xf9\x0e\x3c\x6e\x4e\x3a\xa2\xd8\x3e\xd0\x34\x5b\x89\xfa\xfc\x9c\x26\x07\x7c\x14\xb6\xac\x51\x45\x4f\xa2\x6e\x44\x6e\x3a\x2f\x15\x3b\x2b\x16\x79\x7f" + } + -- Example 3.2 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x8b\x76\x95\x28\x88\x4a\x0d\x1f\xfd\x09\x0c\xf1\x02\x99\x3e\x79\x6d\xad\xcf\xbd\xdd\x38\xe4\x4f\xf6\x32\x4c\xa4\x51" + , salt = "\xfc\xf9\xf0\xe1\xf1\x99\xa3\xd1\xd0\xda\x68\x1c\x5b\x86\x06\xfc\x64\x29\x39\xf7" + , signature = "\x02\xa5\xf0\xa8\x58\xa0\x86\x4a\x4f\x65\x01\x7a\x7d\x69\x45\x4f\x3f\x97\x3a\x29\x99\x83\x9b\x7b\xbc\x48\xbf\x78\x64\x11\x69\x17\x95\x56\xf5\x95\xfa\x41\xf6\xff\x18\xe2\x86\xc2\x78\x30\x79\xbc\x09\x10\xee\x9c\xc3\x4f\x49\xba\x68\x11\x24\xf9\x23\xdf\xa8\x8f\x42\x61\x41\xa3\x68\xa5\xf5\xa9\x30\xc6\x28\xc2\xc3\xc2\x00\xe1\x8a\x76\x44\x72\x1a\x0c\xbe\xc6\xdd\x3f\x62\x79\xbd\xe3\xe8\xf2\xbe\x5e\x2d\x4e\xe5\x6f\x97\xe7\xce\xaf\x33\x05\x4b\xe7\x04\x2b\xd9\x1a\x63\xbb\x09\xf8\x97\xbd\x41\xe8\x11\x97\xde\xe9\x9b\x11\xaf" + } + -- Example 3.3 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x1a\xbd\xba\x48\x9c\x5a\xda\x2f\x99\x5e\xd1\x6f\x19\xd5\xa9\x4d\x9e\x6e\xc3\x4a\x8d\x84\xf8\x45\x57\xd2\x6e\x5e\xf9\xb0\x2b\x22\x88\x7e\x3f\x9a\x4b\x69\x0a\xd1\x14\x92\x09\xc2\x0c\x61\x43\x1f\x0c\x01\x7c\x36\xc2\x65\x7b\x35\xd7\xb0\x7d\x3f\x5a\xd8\x70\x85\x07\xa9\xc1\xb8\x31\xdf\x83\x5a\x56\xf8\x31\x07\x18\x14\xea\x5d\x3d\x8d\x8f\x6a\xde\x40\xcb\xa3\x8b\x42\xdb\x7a\x2d\x3d\x7a\x29\xc8\xf0\xa7\x9a\x78\x38\xcf\x58\xa9\x75\x7f\xa2\xfe\x4c\x40\xdf\x9b\xaa\x19\x3b\xfc\x6f\x92\xb1\x23\xad\x57\xb0\x7a\xce\x3e\x6a\xc0\x68\xc9\xf1\x06\xaf\xd9\xee\xb0\x3b\x4f\x37\xc2\x5d\xbf\xbc\xfb\x30\x71\xf6\xf9\x77\x17\x66\xd0\x72\xf3\xbb\x07\x0a\xf6\x60\x55\x32\x97\x3a\xe2\x50\x51" + , salt = "\x98\x6e\x7c\x43\xdb\xb6\x71\xbd\x41\xb9\xa7\xf4\xb6\xaf\xc8\x0e\x80\x5f\x24\x23" + , signature = "\x02\x44\xbc\xd1\xc8\xc1\x69\x55\x73\x6c\x80\x3b\xe4\x01\x27\x2e\x18\xcb\x99\x08\x11\xb1\x4f\x72\xdb\x96\x41\x24\xd5\xfa\x76\x06\x49\xcb\xb5\x7a\xfb\x87\x55\xdb\xb6\x2b\xf5\x1f\x46\x6c\xf2\x3a\x0a\x16\x07\x57\x6e\x98\x3d\x77\x8f\xce\xff\xa9\x2d\xf7\x54\x8a\xea\x8e\xa4\xec\xad\x2c\x29\xdd\x9f\x95\xbc\x07\xfe\x91\xec\xf8\xbe\xe2\x55\xbf\xe8\x76\x2f\xd7\x69\x0a\xa9\xbf\xa4\xfa\x08\x49\xef\x72\x8c\x2c\x42\xc4\x53\x23\x64\x52\x2d\xf2\xab\x7f\x9f\x8a\x03\xb6\x3f\x7a\x49\x91\x75\x82\x86\x68\xf5\xef\x5a\x29\xe3\x80\x2c" + } + -- Example 3.4 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x8f\xb4\x31\xf5\xee\x79\x2b\x6c\x2a\xc7\xdb\x53\xcc\x42\x86\x55\xae\xb3\x2d\x03\xf4\xe8\x89\xc5\xc2\x5d\xe6\x83\xc4\x61\xb5\x3a\xcf\x89\xf9\xf8\xd3\xaa\xbd\xf6\xb9\xf0\xc2\xa1\xde\x12\xe1\x5b\x49\xed\xb3\x91\x9a\x65\x2f\xe9\x49\x1c\x25\xa7\xfc\xe1\xf7\x22\xc2\x54\x36\x08\xb6\x9d\xc3\x75\xec" + , salt = "\xf8\x31\x2d\x9c\x8e\xea\x13\xec\x0a\x4c\x7b\x98\x12\x0c\x87\x50\x90\x87\xc4\x78" + , signature = "\x01\x96\xf1\x2a\x00\x5b\x98\x12\x9c\x8d\xf1\x3c\x4c\xb1\x6f\x8a\xa8\x87\xd3\xc4\x0d\x96\xdf\x3a\x88\xe7\x53\x2e\xf3\x9c\xd9\x92\xf2\x73\xab\xc3\x70\xbc\x1b\xe6\xf0\x97\xcf\xeb\xbf\x01\x18\xfd\x9e\xf4\xb9\x27\x15\x5f\x3d\xf2\x2b\x90\x4d\x90\x70\x2d\x1f\x7b\xa7\xa5\x2b\xed\x8b\x89\x42\xf4\x12\xcd\x7b\xd6\x76\xc9\xd1\x8e\x17\x03\x91\xdc\xd3\x45\xc0\x6a\x73\x09\x64\xb3\xf3\x0b\xcc\xe0\xbb\x20\xba\x10\x6f\x9a\xb0\xee\xb3\x9c\xf8\xa6\x60\x7f\x75\xc0\x34\x7f\x0a\xf7\x9f\x16\xaf\xa0\x81\xd2\xc9\x2d\x1e\xe6\xf8\x36\xb8" + } + -- Example 3.5 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xfe\xf4\x16\x1d\xfa\xaf\x9c\x52\x95\x05\x1d\xfc\x1f\xf3\x81\x0c\x8c\x9e\xc2\xe8\x66\xf7\x07\x54\x22\xc8\xec\x42\x16\xa9\xc4\xff\x49\x42\x7d\x48\x3c\xae\x10\xc8\x53\x4a\x41\xb2\xfd\x15\xfe\xe0\x69\x60\xec\x6f\xb3\xf7\xa7\xe9\x4a\x2f\x8a\x2e\x3e\x43\xdc\x4a\x40\x57\x6c\x30\x97\xac\x95\x3b\x1d\xe8\x6f\x0b\x4e\xd3\x6d\x64\x4f\x23\xae\x14\x42\x55\x29\x62\x24\x64\xca\x0c\xbf\x0b\x17\x41\x34\x72\x38\x15\x7f\xab\x59\xe4\xde\x55\x24\x09\x6d\x62\xba\xec\x63\xac\x64" + , salt = "\x50\x32\x7e\xfe\xc6\x29\x2f\x98\x01\x9f\xc6\x7a\x2a\x66\x38\x56\x3e\x9b\x6e\x2d" + , signature = "\x02\x1e\xca\x3a\xb4\x89\x22\x64\xec\x22\x41\x1a\x75\x2d\x92\x22\x10\x76\xd4\xe0\x1c\x0e\x6f\x0d\xde\x9a\xfd\x26\xba\x5a\xcf\x6d\x73\x9e\xf9\x87\x54\x5d\x16\x68\x3e\x56\x74\xc9\xe7\x0f\x1d\xe6\x49\xd7\xe6\x1d\x48\xd0\xca\xeb\x4f\xb4\xd8\xb2\x4f\xba\x84\xa6\xe3\x10\x8f\xee\x7d\x07\x05\x97\x32\x66\xac\x52\x4b\x4a\xd2\x80\xf7\xae\x17\xdc\x59\xd9\x6d\x33\x51\x58\x6b\x5a\x3b\xdb\x89\x5d\x1e\x1f\x78\x20\xac\x61\x35\xd8\x75\x34\x80\x99\x83\x82\xba\x32\xb7\x34\x95\x59\x60\x8c\x38\x74\x52\x90\xa8\x5e\xf4\xe9\xf9\xbd\x83" + } + -- Example 3.6 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xef\xd2\x37\xbb\x09\x8a\x44\x3a\xee\xb2\xbf\x6c\x3f\x8c\x81\xb8\xc0\x1b\x7f\xcb\x3f\xeb" + , salt = "\xb0\xde\x3f\xc2\x5b\x65\xf5\xaf\x96\xb1\xd5\xcc\x3b\x27\xd0\xc6\x05\x30\x87\xb3" + , signature = "\x01\x2f\xaf\xec\x86\x2f\x56\xe9\xe9\x2f\x60\xab\x0c\x77\x82\x4f\x42\x99\xa0\xca\x73\x4e\xd2\x6e\x06\x44\xd5\xd2\x22\xc7\xf0\xbd\xe0\x39\x64\xf8\xe7\x0a\x5c\xb6\x5e\xd4\x4e\x44\xd5\x6a\xe0\xed\xf1\xff\x86\xca\x03\x2c\xc5\xdd\x44\x04\xdb\xb7\x6a\xb8\x54\x58\x6c\x44\xee\xd8\x33\x6d\x08\xd4\x57\xce\x6c\x03\x69\x3b\x45\xc0\xf1\xef\xef\x93\x62\x4b\x95\xb8\xec\x16\x9c\x61\x6d\x20\xe5\x53\x8e\xbc\x0b\x67\x37\xa6\xf8\x2b\x4b\xc0\x57\x09\x24\xfc\x6b\x35\x75\x9a\x33\x48\x42\x62\x79\xf8\xb3\xd7\x74\x4e\x2d\x22\x24\x26\xce" + } + ] -# Salt: -ad 8b 15 23 70 36 46 22 4b 66 0b 55 08 85 91 7c -a2 d1 df 28 +-- ================================== +-- Example 8: A 1031-bit RSA Key Pair +-- ================================== -# Signature: -6d 3b 5b 87 f6 7e a6 57 af 21 f7 54 41 97 7d 21 -80 f9 1b 2c 5f 69 2d e8 29 55 69 6a 68 67 30 d9 -b9 77 8d 97 07 58 cc b2 60 71 c2 20 9f fb d6 12 -5b e2 e9 6e a8 1b 67 cb 9b 93 08 23 9f da 17 f7 -b2 b6 4e cd a0 96 b6 b9 35 64 0a 5a 1c b4 2a 91 -55 b1 c9 ef 7a 63 3a 02 c5 9f 0d 6e e5 9b 85 2c -43 b3 50 29 e7 3c 94 0f f0 41 0e 8f 11 4e ed 46 -bb d0 fa e1 65 e4 2b e2 52 8a 40 1c 3b 28 fd 81 -8e f3 23 2d ca 9f 4d 2a 0f 51 66 ec 59 c4 23 96 -d6 c1 1d bc 12 15 a5 6f a1 71 69 db 95 75 34 3e -f3 4f 9d e3 2a 49 cd c3 17 49 22 f2 29 c2 3e 18 -e4 5d f9 35 31 19 ec 43 19 ce dc e7 a1 7c 64 08 -8c 1f 6f 52 be 29 63 41 00 b3 91 9d 38 f3 d1 ed -94 e6 89 1e 66 a7 3b 8f b8 49 f5 87 4d f5 94 59 -e2 98 c7 bb ce 2e ee 78 2a 19 5a a6 6f e2 d0 73 -2b 25 e5 95 f5 7d 3e 06 1b 1f c3 e4 06 3b f9 8f +rsaKey8 = PrivateKey + { private_pub = PublicKey + { public_n = 0x495370a1fb18543c16d3631e3163255df62be6eee890d5f25509e4f778a8ea6fbbbcdf85dff64e0d972003ab3681fbba6dd41fd541829b2e582de9f2a4a4e0a2d0900bef4753db3cee0ee06c7dfae8b1d53b5953218f9cceea695b08668edeaadced9463b1d790d5ebf27e9115b46cad4d9a2b8efab0561b0810344739ada0733f + , public_e = 0x010001 + , public_size = 129 + } + , private_d = 0x6c66ffe98980c38fcdeab5159898836165f4b4b817c4f6a8d486ee4ea9130fe9b9092bd136d184f95f504a607eac565846d2fdd6597a8967c7396ef95a6eeebb4578a643966dca4d8ee3de842de63279c618159c1ab54a89437b6a6120e4930afb52a4ba6ced8a4947ac64b30a3497cbe701c2d6266d517219ad0ec6d347dbe9 + , private_p = 0x08dad7f11363faa623d5d6d5e8a319328d82190d7127d2846c439b0ab72619b0a43a95320e4ec34fc3a9cea876422305bd76c5ba7be9e2f410c8060645a1d29edb + , private_q = 0x0847e732376fc7900f898ea82eb2b0fc418565fdae62f7d9ec4ce2217b97990dd272db157f99f63c0dcbb9fbacdbd4c4dadb6df67756358ca4174825b48f49706d + , private_dP = 0x05c2a83c124b3621a2aa57ea2c3efe035eff4560f33ddebb7adab81fce69a0c8c2edc16520dda83d59a23be867963ac65f2cc710bbcfb96ee103deb771d105fd85 + , private_dQ = 0x04cae8aa0d9faa165c87b682ec140b8ed3b50b24594b7a3b2c220b3669bb819f984f55310a1ae7823651d4a02e99447972595139363434e5e30a7e7d241551e1b9 + , private_qinv = 0x07d3e47bf686600b11ac283ce88dbb3f6051e8efd04680e44c171ef531b80b2b7c39fc766320e2cf15d8d99820e96ff30dc69691839c4b40d7b06e45307dc91f3f + } --} +vectorsKey8 = + [ + -- Example 8.1 + VectorPSS + { message = "\x81\x33\x2f\x4b\xe6\x29\x48\x41\x5e\xa1\xd8\x99\x79\x2e\xea\xcf\x6c\x6e\x1d\xb1\xda\x8b\xe1\x3b\x5c\xea\x41\xdb\x2f\xed\x46\x70\x92\xe1\xff\x39\x89\x14\xc7\x14\x25\x97\x75\xf5\x95\xf8\x54\x7f\x73\x56\x92\xa5\x75\xe6\x92\x3a\xf7\x8f\x22\xc6\x99\x7d\xdb\x90\xfb\x6f\x72\xd7\xbb\x0d\xd5\x74\x4a\x31\xde\xcd\x3d\xc3\x68\x58\x49\x83\x6e\xd3\x4a\xec\x59\x63\x04\xad\x11\x84\x3c\x4f\x88\x48\x9f\x20\x97\x35\xf5\xfb\x7f\xda\xf7\xce\xc8\xad\xdc\x58\x18\x16\x8f\x88\x0a\xcb\xf4\x90\xd5\x10\x05\xb7\xa8\xe8\x4e\x43\xe5\x42\x87\x97\x75\x71\xdd\x99\xee\xa4\xb1\x61\xeb\x2d\xf1\xf5\x10\x8f\x12\xa4\x14\x2a\x83\x32\x2e\xdb\x05\xa7\x54\x87\xa3\x43\x5c\x9a\x78\xce\x53\xed\x93\xbc\x55\x08\x57\xd7\xa9\xfb" + , salt = "\x1d\x65\x49\x1d\x79\xc8\x64\xb3\x73\x00\x9b\xe6\xf6\xf2\x46\x7b\xac\x4c\x78\xfa" + , signature = "\x02\x62\xac\x25\x4b\xfa\x77\xf3\xc1\xac\xa2\x2c\x51\x79\xf8\xf0\x40\x42\x2b\x3c\x5b\xaf\xd4\x0a\x8f\x21\xcf\x0f\xa5\xa6\x67\xcc\xd5\x99\x3d\x42\xdb\xaf\xb4\x09\xc5\x20\xe2\x5f\xce\x2b\x1e\xe1\xe7\x16\x57\x7f\x1e\xfa\x17\xf3\xda\x28\x05\x2f\x40\xf0\x41\x9b\x23\x10\x6d\x78\x45\xaa\xf0\x11\x25\xb6\x98\xe7\xa4\xdf\xe9\x2d\x39\x67\xbb\x00\xc4\xd0\xd3\x5b\xa3\x55\x2a\xb9\xa8\xb3\xee\xf0\x7c\x7f\xec\xdb\xc5\x42\x4a\xc4\xdb\x1e\x20\xcb\x37\xd0\xb2\x74\x47\x69\x94\x0e\xa9\x07\xe1\x7f\xbb\xca\x67\x3b\x20\x52\x23\x80\xc5" + } + -- Example 8.2 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xe2\xf9\x6e\xaf\x0e\x05\xe7\xba\x32\x6e\xcc\xa0\xba\x7f\xd2\xf7\xc0\x23\x56\xf3\xce\xde\x9d\x0f\xaa\xbf\x4f\xcc\x8e\x60\xa9\x73\xe5\x59\x5f\xd9\xea\x08" + , salt = "\x43\x5c\x09\x8a\xa9\x90\x9e\xb2\x37\x7f\x12\x48\xb0\x91\xb6\x89\x87\xff\x18\x38" + , signature = "\x27\x07\xb9\xad\x51\x15\xc5\x8c\x94\xe9\x32\xe8\xec\x0a\x28\x0f\x56\x33\x9e\x44\xa1\xb5\x8d\x4d\xdc\xff\x2f\x31\x2e\x5f\x34\xdc\xfe\x39\xe8\x9c\x6a\x94\xdc\xee\x86\xdb\xbd\xae\x5b\x79\xba\x4e\x08\x19\xa9\xe7\xbf\xd9\xd9\x82\xe7\xee\x6c\x86\xee\x68\x39\x6e\x8b\x3a\x14\xc9\xc8\xf3\x4b\x17\x8e\xb7\x41\xf9\xd3\xf1\x21\x10\x9b\xf5\xc8\x17\x2f\xad\xa2\xe7\x68\xf9\xea\x14\x33\x03\x2c\x00\x4a\x8a\xa0\x7e\xb9\x90\x00\x0a\x48\xdc\x94\xc8\xba\xc8\xaa\xbe\x2b\x09\xb1\xaa\x46\xc0\xa2\xaa\x0e\x12\xf6\x3f\xbb\xa7\x75\xba\x7e" + } + -- Example 8.3 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xe3\x5c\x6e\xd9\x8f\x64\xa6\xd5\xa6\x48\xfc\xab\x8a\xdb\x16\x33\x1d\xb3\x2e\x5d\x15\xc7\x4a\x40\xed\xf9\x4c\x3d\xc4\xa4\xde\x79\x2d\x19\x08\x89\xf2\x0f\x1e\x24\xed\x12\x05\x4a\x6b\x28\x79\x8f\xcb\x42\xd1\xc5\x48\x76\x9b\x73\x4c\x96\x37\x31\x42\x09\x2a\xed\x27\x76\x03\xf4\x73\x8d\xf4\xdc\x14\x46\x58\x6d\x0e\xc6\x4d\xa4\xfb\x60\x53\x6d\xb2\xae\x17\xfc\x7e\x3c\x04\xbb\xfb\xbb\xd9\x07\xbf\x11\x7c\x08\x63\x6f\xa1\x6f\x95\xf5\x1a\x62\x16\x93\x4d\x3e\x34\xf8\x50\x30\xf1\x7b\xbb\xc5\xba\x69\x14\x40\x58\xaf\xf0\x81\xe0\xb1\x9c\xf0\x3c\x17\x19\x5c\x5e\x88\x8b\xa5\x8f\x6f\xe0\xa0\x2e\x5c\x3b\xda\x97\x19\xa7" + , salt = "\xc6\xeb\xbe\x76\xdf\x0c\x4a\xea\x32\xc4\x74\x17\x5b\x2f\x13\x68\x62\xd0\x45\x29" + , signature = "\x2a\xd2\x05\x09\xd7\x8c\xf2\x6d\x1b\x6c\x40\x61\x46\x08\x6e\x4b\x0c\x91\xa9\x1c\x2b\xd1\x64\xc8\x7b\x96\x6b\x8f\xaa\x42\xaa\x0c\xa4\x46\x02\x23\x23\xba\x4b\x1a\x1b\x89\x70\x6d\x7f\x4c\x3b\xe5\x7d\x7b\x69\x70\x2d\x16\x8a\xb5\x95\x5e\xe2\x90\x35\x6b\x8c\x4a\x29\xed\x46\x7d\x54\x7e\xc2\x3c\xba\xdf\x28\x6c\xcb\x58\x63\xc6\x67\x9d\xa4\x67\xfc\x93\x24\xa1\x51\xc7\xec\x55\xaa\xc6\xdb\x40\x84\xf8\x27\x26\x82\x5c\xfe\x1a\xa4\x21\xbc\x64\x04\x9f\xb4\x2f\x23\x14\x8f\x9c\x25\xb2\xdc\x30\x04\x37\xc3\x8d\x42\x8a\xa7\x5f\x96" + } + -- Example 8.4 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\xdb\xc5\xf7\x50\xa7\xa1\x4b\xe2\xb9\x3e\x83\x8d\x18\xd1\x4a\x86\x95\xe5\x2e\x8a\xdd\x9c\x0a\xc7\x33\xb8\xf5\x6d\x27\x47\xe5\x29\xa0\xcc\xa5\x32\xdd\x49\xb9\x02\xae\xfe\xd5\x14\x44\x7f\x9e\x81\xd1\x61\x95\xc2\x85\x38\x68\xcb\x9b\x30\xf7\xd0\xd4\x95\xc6\x9d\x01\xb5\xc5\xd5\x0b\x27\x04\x5d\xb3\x86\x6c\x23\x24\xa4\x4a\x11\x0b\x17\x17\x74\x6d\xe4\x57\xd1\xc8\xc4\x5c\x3c\xd2\xa9\x29\x70\xc3\xd5\x96\x32\x05\x5d\x4c\x98\xa4\x1d\x6e\x99\xe2\xa3\xdd\xd5\xf7\xf9\x97\x9a\xb3\xcd\x18\xf3\x75\x05\xd2\x51\x41\xde\x2a\x1b\xff\x17\xb3\xa7\xdc\xe9\x41\x9e\xcc\x38\x5c\xf1\x1d\x72\x84\x0f\x19\x95\x3f\xd0\x50\x92\x51\xf6\xca\xfd\xe2\x89\x3d\x0e\x75\xc7\x81\xba\x7a\x50\x12\xca\x40\x1a\x4f\xa9\x9e\x04\xb3\xc3\x24\x9f\x92\x6d\x5a\xfe\x82\xcc\x87\xda\xb2\x2c\x3c\x1b\x10\x5d\xe4\x8e\x34\xac\xe9\xc9\x12\x4e\x59\x59\x7a\xc7\xeb\xf8" + , salt = "\x02\x1f\xdc\xc6\xeb\xb5\xe1\x9b\x1c\xb1\x6e\x9c\x67\xf2\x76\x81\x65\x7f\xe2\x0a" + , signature = "\x1e\x24\xe6\xe5\x86\x28\xe5\x17\x50\x44\xa9\xeb\x6d\x83\x7d\x48\xaf\x12\x60\xb0\x52\x0e\x87\x32\x7d\xe7\x89\x7e\xe4\xd5\xb9\xf0\xdf\x0b\xe3\xe0\x9e\xd4\xde\xa8\xc1\x45\x4f\xf3\x42\x3b\xb0\x8e\x17\x93\x24\x5a\x9d\xf8\xbf\x6a\xb3\x96\x8c\x8e\xdd\xc3\xb5\x32\x85\x71\xc7\x7f\x09\x1c\xc5\x78\x57\x69\x12\xdf\xeb\xd1\x64\xb9\xde\x54\x54\xfe\x0b\xe1\xc1\xf6\x38\x5b\x32\x83\x60\xce\x67\xec\x7a\x05\xf6\xe3\x0e\xb4\x5c\x17\xc4\x8a\xc7\x00\x41\xd2\xca\xb6\x7f\x0a\x2a\xe7\xaa\xfd\xcc\x8d\x24\x5e\xa3\x44\x2a\x63\x00\xcc\xc7" + } + -- Example 8.5 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x04\xdc\x25\x1b\xe7\x2e\x88\xe5\x72\x34\x85\xb6\x38\x3a\x63\x7e\x2f\xef\xe0\x76\x60\xc5\x19\xa5\x60\xb8\xbc\x18\xbd\xed\xb8\x6e\xae\x23\x64\xea\x53\xba\x9d\xca\x6e\xb3\xd2\xe7\xd6\xb8\x06\xaf\x42\xb3\xe8\x7f\x29\x1b\x4a\x88\x81\xd5\xbf\x57\x2c\xc9\xa8\x5e\x19\xc8\x6a\xcb\x28\xf0\x98\xf9\xda\x03\x83\xc5\x66\xd3\xc0\xf5\x8c\xfd\x8f\x39\x5d\xcf\x60\x2e\x5c\xd4\x0e\x8c\x71\x83\xf7\x14\x99\x6e\x22\x97\xef" + , salt = "\xc5\x58\xd7\x16\x7c\xbb\x45\x08\xad\xa0\x42\x97\x1e\x71\xb1\x37\x7e\xea\x42\x69" + , signature = "\x33\x34\x1b\xa3\x57\x6a\x13\x0a\x50\xe2\xa5\xcf\x86\x79\x22\x43\x88\xd5\x69\x3f\x5a\xcc\xc2\x35\xac\x95\xad\xd6\x8e\x5e\xb1\xee\xc3\x16\x66\xd0\xca\x7a\x1c\xda\x6f\x70\xa1\xaa\x76\x2c\x05\x75\x2a\x51\x95\x0c\xdb\x8a\xf3\xc5\x37\x9f\x18\xcf\xe6\xb5\xbc\x55\xa4\x64\x82\x26\xa1\x5e\x91\x2e\xf1\x9a\xd7\x7a\xde\xea\x91\x1d\x67\xcf\xef\xd6\x9b\xa4\x3f\xa4\x11\x91\x35\xff\x64\x21\x17\xba\x98\x5a\x7e\x01\x00\x32\x5e\x95\x19\xf1\xca\x6a\x92\x16\xbd\xa0\x55\xb5\x78\x50\x15\x29\x11\x25\xe9\x0d\xcd\x07\xa2\xca\x96\x73\xee" + } + -- Example 8.6 + , VectorPSS + { message = "\x0e\xa3\x7d\xf9\xa6\xfe\xa4\xa8\xb6\x10\x37\x3c\x24\xcf\x39\x0c\x20\xfa\x6e\x21\x35\xc4\x00\xc8\xa3\x4f\x5c\x18\x3a\x7e\x8e\xa4\xc9\xae\x09\x0e\xd3\x17\x59\xf4\x2d\xc7\x77\x19\xcc\xa4\x00\xec\xdc\xc5\x17\xac\xfc\x7a\xc6\x90\x26\x75\xb2\xef\x30\xc5\x09\x66\x5f\x33\x21\x48\x2f\xc6\x9a\x9f\xb5\x70\xd1\x5e\x01\xc8\x45\xd0\xd8\xe5\x0d\x2a\x24\xcb\xf1\xcf\x0e\x71\x49\x75\xa5\xdb\x7b\x18\xd9\xe9\xe9\xcb\x91\xb5\xcb\x16\x86\x90\x60\xed\x18\xb7\xb5\x62\x45\x50\x3f\x0c\xaf\x90\x35\x2b\x8d\xe8\x1c\xb5\xa1\xd9\xc6\x33\x60\x92\xf0\xcd" + , salt = "\x76\xfd\x4e\x64\xfd\xc9\x8e\xb9\x27\xa0\x40\x3e\x35\xa0\x84\xe7\x6b\xa9\xf9\x2a" + , signature = "\x1e\xd1\xd8\x48\xfb\x1e\xdb\x44\x12\x9b\xd9\xb3\x54\x79\x5a\xf9\x7a\x06\x9a\x7a\x00\xd0\x15\x10\x48\x59\x3e\x0c\x72\xc3\x51\x7f\xf9\xff\x2a\x41\xd0\xcb\x5a\x0a\xc8\x60\xd7\x36\xa1\x99\x70\x4f\x7c\xb6\xa5\x39\x86\xa8\x8b\xbd\x8a\xbc\xc0\x07\x6a\x2c\xe8\x47\x88\x00\x31\x52\x5d\x44\x9d\xa2\xac\x78\x35\x63\x74\xc5\x36\xe3\x43\xfa\xa7\xcb\xa4\x2a\x5a\xaa\x65\x06\x08\x77\x91\xc0\x6a\x8e\x98\x93\x35\xae\xd1\x9b\xfa\xb2\xd5\xe6\x7e\x27\xfb\x0c\x28\x75\xaf\x89\x6c\x21\xb6\xe8\xe7\x30\x9d\x04\xe4\xf6\x72\x7e\x69\x46\x3e" + } + ] -doSignTest key (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual) +doSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual) where actual = PSS.signWithSalt (salt vector) Nothing PSS.defaultPSSParamsSHA1 key (message vector) -doVerifyTest key (i, vector) = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) +doVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) where actual = PSS.verify PSS.defaultPSSParamsSHA1 (private_pub key) (message vector) (signature vector) pssTests = testGroup "RSA-PSS" [ testGroup "signature internal" - [ doSignTest rsaKeyInt (katZero, vectorInt) ] + [ doSignTest rsaKeyInt katZero vectorInt ] , testGroup "verify internal" - [ doVerifyTest rsaKeyInt (katZero, vectorInt) ] - , testGroup "signature key 1024" $ map (doSignTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1) - , testGroup "verify key 1024" $ map (doVerifyTest rsaKey1) (zip [katZero..] vectorsKey1) + [ doVerifyTest rsaKeyInt katZero vectorInt ] + , testGroup "signature key 1024" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1 + , testGroup "verify key 1024" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey1) [katZero..] vectorsKey1 + , testGroup "signature key 1025" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey2) [katZero..] vectorsKey2 + , testGroup "verify key 1025" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey2) [katZero..] vectorsKey2 + , testGroup "signature key 1026" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey3) [katZero..] vectorsKey3 + , testGroup "verify key 1026" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey3) [katZero..] vectorsKey3 + , testGroup "signature key 1031" $ zipWith (doSignTest rsaKey8) [katZero..] vectorsKey8 + , testGroup "verify key 1031" $ zipWith (doVerifyTest rsaKey8) [katZero..] vectorsKey8 ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/RSA.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/RSA.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/RSA.hs @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module KAT_PubKey.RSA (rsaTests) where + +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA +import Crypto.Hash + +import Imports + +import Data.Either (isRight) + +data VectorRSA = VectorRSA + { size :: Int + , msg :: ByteString + , n :: Integer + , e :: Integer + , d :: Integer + , p :: Integer + , q :: Integer + , dP :: Integer + , dQ :: Integer + , qinv :: Integer + , sig :: Either RSA.Error ByteString + } + +vectorsSHA1 = + [ VectorRSA + { size = 2048 `div` 8 + , msg = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" + , n = 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 + , e = 0x10001 + , d = 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 + , p = 0x00f85bfcfe55af59445f21f67ab1d8617d1f84360556eeb660d5c466f29e4d2228f9cc3fde4c594ea97069a19c666b68b6d905b65738ae63de6c11f9181ee9262313e5165591651bb3abec192abbc8c3694550bcffa451a2e2d1976bf3ecbc4480354f8d8646133298156aaa626b8807c5295850f93686400835466b6a5ccec61b + , q = 0x00cec28b22b1d37c6c60d25e9747cb1bebd1270f0306db56ed8533f392d6a0cfe6b3dde13789758cf89febac214ba96667e46599f89ca210dced550ca6092a854ff95dff80ea48ff1a83455f4bb93f2ececa782da03b85a789239e8be5264130628724ceab57c8f76e4c7e822bf4fbf334c7d32610bec65047433e0e3b636afe1b + , dP = 0x52fe0a50c339514f33ab19be6e67ac4c2f97f2a55e236ef674f8a89e329ffbe64d731f749d76ca7e7c7e0fef3f9a6ce78d260784a600408736fdda8b60e8f0419088612a3ee7d695f7c171b78200d8abf8e9bdfe7f5e785beb45fa610c9eed151abb76c383ef2e5cfbeb24fcb68a426e741e7b108c53d859e5d39e5970a1f839 + , dQ = 0x39ef91853b47038a6ae707d2642fa9b73e782f60adbf307085eeb4c5e496532b56234a4481a40ac870275da846c74506bf9d28b3dd501c618baf5548013185018fe2a301c0a48bb726297e367dc6129ba7685d8094ad32f0dea64295074f24fbb6dabd7e8daea686a5b09d512be89d91a09cae01eb332eb389480e3cddf2d119 + , qinv = 0x09ce1fa29008ef4b9798e5b8ec213dbdfec4fab4403ebf4b8786ad401ef33bc880c40a990b0826f72415192a206a504b27d2ba45ca555706200ea8e7a9b42d4077e9e6e0d80d4144966c53a36d23d30d987322dcc0013efe8df3b6b5914a2ceefc22cc5de6d569731794e9894f18f11d36a79558dc4c3ae5db1ce9bd05e7bf2e + , sig = Right "\x56\x66\x99\x0f\xd4\xea\x2b\xe0\x6d\x46\x3b\x10\x99\x5b\x06\x32\x5e\xec\x29\xfe\xa4\x63\x4d\x54\xf6\x31\x74\x5d\x01\x5a\x67\x09\x2e\xa7\x02\x8a\x48\x00\x3c\x0d\xef\x04\xe7\x52\x46\xe0\xfa\xb1\x42\x26\x89\xe7\xec\x25\x44\x76\xa0\x86\x33\xb0\xbe\x22\x17\x88\x9b\x18\x4d\x3e\xc2\x9b\xd4\x61\x2b\x9e\xde\x08\x56\xf8\xd5\xee\xb8\x38\xf4\x3d\xda\x9a\xbb\x34\x58\x87\x71\x1d\x1a\x7e\xc7\x3d\x46\x39\x01\x79\x29\x8b\xa4\xcd\xce\xd7\xab\xcb\x2e\x94\x5c\xfd\x54\xcc\xef\x80\x31\xfc\x5e\x8f\xc2\x4d\x76\x1e\x4c\xbc\x50\x7a\x9b\x08\xae\x85\xeb\x6a\xe0\x80\xdc\xff\x60\x13\xb0\x31\x94\x14\x9d\x8f\x9f\x48\x38\xcf\x4c\x82\x9d\x3b\x68\xc6\xe4\xe9\x5d\x94\x74\xa2\xac\x1f\xb9\x84\x41\x86\x11\xeb\x2c\x50\x64\xd7\x00\xe0\x85\x21\x5a\xd7\xae\x9b\x4c\x8e\x6a\x92\x97\xac\xcc\xb8\x38\x4f\x41\xb9\x3d\xa9\xfe\x69\x8b\x04\x81\xad\xfb\x0f\x49\x74\xfe\x26\x9c\x86\x0c\xf3\xd1\x8e\xa1\xb5\xaf\xef\x85\x3d\xfe\xd0\x7c\xcf\x18\xe4\x0f\x14\x99\xea\x93\x61\x79\x16\xbf\x38\xac\xa2\xa2\xac\xac\x2d\xae\x21\x85\x71\x94\xda\x5d\xa1\x82\xa8\x76\x82\xe5\x2f" + } + , VectorRSA + { size = 360 `div` 8 + , msg = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" + , n = 0x00bc2d7481c83c8be55da4caeaf1a30dbf9a1226ba7443c0a66213180d3eb8e29c3162401b7be067dff8f571a8eb + , e = 0x10001 + , d = 0x726fb62d82c707507a2d5055a6934136270d28ce350c3a36d89066e26fb54f5b33da0bc9a05c2084f2b39be4e1 + , p = 0x0e3ff89e1f95a461c9f5ee480fd7b13529a225f3ee07fb + , q = 0x0d349ebc89329b493c03451ad20155de9775df55c55fd1 + , dP = 0x00943adef9fb93a561967bab33f198c2c7414e777df997 + , dQ = 0x078de99ceb5392f7f327dfb97717a27ae2e4606dddaa71 + , qinv = 0x0c54d59eaa029844fb3fe33a180161590b1cb103cc668e + , sig = Left RSA.SignatureTooLong + } + , VectorRSA + { size = 368 `div` 8 + , msg = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" + , n = 0x009cff2fd20246e390d6860b48a3926e83086d1386f7147e9f195623cf8f18546ceb20d428b77e0748864c8f611cb7 + , e = 0x10001 + , d = 0x0097706cbf6624dd448c3a36ce35c27d49762a4948ca33804178d2ff826f8d336aaed622801c8d76d442be371da841 + , p = 0x00d12519f81441069ab1a86c38e0065e9578a46e655d5a17 + , q = 0x00c02b485ac3ee241d57b6b282f830d7d5bf6f4de75c1661 + , dP = 0x00a1af4611444f34f4d88d7504cf23fd711e70382c42ec07 + , dQ = 0x04226a4219a90bf9dda33e9ff6bb0649c0fea20c723cc1 + , qinv = 0x5dd87bf3c1e295dcc8602859a7cd74f05a2fe91a9d5877 + , sig = Right "\x51\xe4\xdd\x98\xee\xd5\x06\xef\x7a\xa5\x3c\xaf\x29\x33\xa4\x91\xfa\x8b\xb8\x09\xcf\x3e\xa1\x64\x92\x71\xad\x7b\x3a\x83\xb2\xa0\x77\x94\x4e\x59\xdf\x69\x58\x2e\xc8\x8d\xa0\x70\xfe\x7d" + } + ] + +vectorToPrivate :: VectorRSA -> RSA.PrivateKey +vectorToPrivate vector = RSA.PrivateKey + { RSA.private_pub = vectorToPublic vector + , RSA.private_d = d vector + , RSA.private_p = p vector + , RSA.private_q = q vector + , RSA.private_dP = dP vector + , RSA.private_dQ = dQ vector + , RSA.private_qinv = qinv vector + } + +vectorToPublic :: VectorRSA -> RSA.PublicKey +vectorToPublic vector = RSA.PublicKey + { RSA.public_size = size vector + , RSA.public_n = n vector + , RSA.public_e = e vector + } + +vectorHasSignature :: VectorRSA -> Bool +vectorHasSignature = isRight . sig + +doSignatureTest i vector = testCase (show i) (expected @=? actual) + where expected = sig vector + actual = RSA.sign Nothing (Just SHA1) (vectorToPrivate vector) (msg vector) + +doVerifyTest i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) + where actual = RSA.verify (Just SHA1) (vectorToPublic vector) (msg vector) bs + Right bs = sig vector + +rsaTests = testGroup "RSA" + [ testGroup "SHA1" + [ testGroup "signature" $ zipWith doSignatureTest [katZero..] vectorsSHA1 + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith doVerifyTest [katZero..] $ filter vectorHasSignature vectorsSHA1 + ] + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_PubKey/Rabin.hs b/tests/KAT_PubKey/Rabin.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_PubKey/Rabin.hs @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-} +module KAT_PubKey.Rabin (rabinTests) where + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B + +import Crypto.Hash +import Crypto.Number.Serialize (os2ip) +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Basic as BRabin +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.Modified as MRabin +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.OAEP as OAEP +import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Rabin.RW as RW + +import Imports + +basicRabinKey = BRabin.PrivateKey + { BRabin.private_pub = BRabin.PublicKey + { BRabin.public_n = 0xc9c4b0df9db989d93df4137fc2de2a9cee2610523f7a450ecbbf252babe98fba2f8e389c3e420c081e18f584c5746ca43f77f6af1fc79161f8bf8fbcb9564779986ecbe656dd16740cb8e399c33ff1dcc679e73c9c98a58c65a8673b7de57290a2d3191cb27e29d627f7ec6e874b1406051ffe9181e4d90d1b487b100ad30685 + , BRabin.public_size = 128 + } + , BRabin.private_p = 0xe071f231ab5912285a1f8db199795f5efdea4c32f646a3436eaec091ba853a3092216f26b539bbac1fe2ab2e4fbb20aad272a434a1e909bf6d3028aecae2a7b7 + , BRabin.private_q = 0xe6229470dc7da58bfcd962f1b3ddcf52304efbfb91d31c8ed84dbae2380c1ad2e338a523b4250863a689b3f262f949bd7a9f1a603c36634bb932dd71bf5daba3 + , BRabin.private_a = 0x65956653f711a63b776ce45862d4cd78f1ad7b1f8ed118bb8b5ea5fffd59762da5dc7c5298e236a8e45d5c93477cbc51f214b1cd1a4980eda859c1cb05e55666 + , BRabin.private_b = -0x63126dd9c5d6b5215f62012885570e1306b6a47ec1c46553f3b13ceae869149d14544438dbb976800cd62fbb52266f9a6405bc91f192a462c974bc8a6f832e03 + } + +modifiedRabinKey = MRabin.PrivateKey + { MRabin.private_pub = MRabin.PublicKey + { MRabin.public_n = 0x9461a6e7c55cb610f20fd9af5d642404a63332a8d7c4fe7aa559cbcaec691e7216eed5d9322cb6a8619c220a0241b44e0d0a7cefda01fb84e59722b4e842ab5e190d214424bbdfed6d523426fc57a28045dfbb6e8159123077c542c0278ee2daf2d8993e286bf709a10a948da6b13008441581a22233f0ad3d5ebc5858ff7be5 + , MRabin.public_size = 128 + } + , MRabin.private_p = 0xc401e0ddbe565a8797292389bebb561c35eb019116ba25cc6c865a8d3d7bc599626ddf0bc4f575c22f89144fe99fc3300dd497ec2b7acc0221e729a61756b3f3 + , MRabin.private_q = 0xc1cc0e35f23f5086691a18c755881e3fe6937581948b109f47605b45d055e7b352e19ff729dfb33fbecb1d28b115e590449e5e4e228ab1876d889d3d41d87ec7 + , MRabin.private_d = 0x128c34dcf8ab96c21e41fb35ebac848094c666551af89fcf54ab39795d8d23ce42dddabb264596d50c33844140483689c1a14f9dfb403f709cb2e4569d08556b9267e6460e84c69beda1defabd0285c4852c288b7ac27b78987bd19da337a6b1c7b123476732d9c0f656cc62a17f70e8fe34516cfa85ce6475bddeae9ffa0926 + } + +rwKey = RW.PrivateKey + { RW.private_pub = RW.PublicKey + { RW.public_n = 0x992db4c84564c68d4ee2fe0903d938b41e83bcac48dfe8f2219ccee2ccbdefda4cbeea9f1c98a515c5f39a458f5ea11bca97102aaa3d9ac69e000093024e7b968359287cdf57bdacff5df1893df3539c7e358f037d49b5c6ae7110ab8117220c73b6265987039c2c97078fccacdd3f5a560aff5076fdc3958c532db28ab9a855 + , RW.public_size = 128 + } + , RW.private_p = 0xc144dd739c45397d61868ca944a9729a7ad34cf90466c8f5c98a88f5ab5e3288bcfd31d4af1d441d23a756a60abd4cf05c3e0b0053eb150166a327ae31e9347b + , RW.private_q = 0xcae5a381f25a27ae2c359068753118fc384471cd6027e88b8b910306fb940781261089259a3c569546677aebd268704c767a071dbd4f50cb9f15fe448788856f + , RW.private_d = 0x1325b69908ac98d1a9dc5fc1207b271683d07795891bfd1e443399dc5997bdfb4997dd53e39314a2b8be7348b1ebd4237952e2055547b358d3c000126049cf729ee5d4f0ea170b902e343a8ef0831900b963ba07a3176088ab2ab095db449d0052150d6be7b5402f459f17c759f6f043b06a5da64cb86bb910d340f7fa28fdce + } + +data EncryptionVector = EncryptionVector + { seed :: ByteString + , plainText :: ByteString + , cipherText :: ByteString + } + +data SignatureVector = SignatureVector + { message :: ByteString + , padding :: ByteString + , signature :: Integer + } + +basicRabinEncryptionVectors = + [ EncryptionVector + { plainText = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5" + , seed = "\x0c\xc7\x42\xce\x4a\x9b\x7f\x32\xf9\x51\xbc\xb2\x51\xef\xd9\x25\xfe\x4f\xe3\x5f" + , cipherText = "\xaf\xc7\x03\xe3\x9d\x2f\x81\xc6\x3a\x80\x2a\xd1\x44\x26\x3f\x17\x0c\x0a\xe6\x48\x68\x98\x23\x14\x8f\x95\xd2\xce\xbb\xe7\x3f\x49\x34\x76\x1d\x99\x30\x7b\xeb\x84\xe5\x2a\x10\xd2\x1e\x11\x7e\x65\xe8\x88\x24\xc1\x12\xeb\x19\x0d\x97\xcd\x12\x25\x6b\x1f\x9b\x0c\x40\x40\xa3\x47\x00\xb7\x11\xf8\x50\x08\x51\x79\xe8\x1b\xd1\x77\xe0\x99\xa7\xe1\x5c\x63\xda\x29\xc7\xde\x28\x5d\x60\xed\x8e\xb2\x12\xd4\xfe\xb8\x1a\x5d\x17\x65\x80\x62\x6e\x65\x5c\x37\x07\x1c\xfa\xff\xe6\x21\xa5\x9f\xcd\x6a\x6a\xce\xa6\x96\xb2\xc5\x08\xe6" + } + ] + +basicRabinSignatureVectors = + [ SignatureVector + { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5" + , padding = "\xe9\x87\x17\x15\xa2\xe4\x30\x15" + , signature = 0xac95807bdd03ca975690151d39d23d75e5db2731c4ba30b83c3f3ea74709e4d4e340d7dab952356a76c9b8705b214e28d59f5bdc7c7fdff4e104569e30359b5c65c2dcd5b94db58505cd8b188267121700beebd7edbee492e374514646471b5c3fa252a2580dc7343f455683815d6d7c590dd3bcaa7df41d8b08197ccb183408 + } + ] + +modifiedRabinSignatureVectors = + [ SignatureVector + { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5" + , padding = B.empty -- not used + , signature = 0x278c7c269119218ab7f501ea53a97ab15a3a5a263c6daed8980abec78291e9729e0e3457731cdea8ec31a7566e93d10fc9b2615fe3e54f4533a5506ac24a3bd286e270324e538066f0ddf503f9b5e0c18e18379659834906ebd99c0d31588c66e70fc653bc8865b9239999cbd35704917d8647d1199286c533233e3e03582dd + } + ] + +rwEncryptionVectors = + [ EncryptionVector + { plainText = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5" + , seed = "\x0c\xc7\x42\xce\x4a\x9b\x7f\x32\xf9\x51\xbc\xb2\x51\xef\xd9\x25\xfe\x4f\xe3\x5f" + , cipherText = "\x40\xc2\xe3\x36\xac\x46\x72\x8a\xaf\x33\x75\xe1\x27\xd0\x38\x40\xe2\x24\x4e\x20\xa7\x5d\x85\xd3\x74\x81\x21\xfd\xc9\x40\x90\x80\x8c\xed\x2d\xd3\x5b\xc4\xb7\xc9\x7c\x80\xa5\x2f\x63\x86\x34\x4e\x8c\x92\x07\x86\x9e\xda\xfd\xf8\x11\x83\x8a\x5a\x23\xc1\xe6\x77\x37\x5d\xf9\x5c\x60\xd1\x6d\xfd\x0c\x54\xd1\x00\xe9\xab\x97\x6d\x8e\x83\x8b\x6e\x1a\x38\x73\x43\xe2\x24\xc2\xe2\x4e\x74\x3f\xe4\x4d\xdd\x27\xed\xc7\x72\x88\xd3\x0f\x93\xb3\xdb\xa2\xb7\xaf\x6d\xe9\xab\x76\x53\x63\xf9\x62\xd7\x52\x44\x61\x60\x5d\x2e\x9b\xf7" + } + ] + +rwSignatureVectors = + [ SignatureVector + { message = "\x75\x0c\x40\x47\xf5\x47\xe8\xe4\x14\x11\x85\x65\x23\x29\x8a\xc9\xba\xe2\x45\xef\xaf\x13\x97\xfb\xe5\x6f\x9d\xd5" + , padding = B.empty -- not used + , signature = 0x1e57b554a8e83aacd9d4067f9535991e7db47803250cded5cc8af5458a6bb11fea852139e0afe143f9339dd94a518e354e702134d1ae222460127829d92e8bf6441336f5ae7044ec7b6c3ad8b9aeeb1ea02a49798e020cb5b558120bbb51f060eb1608ba68f90cac7edb1051c177d3bdbb99d1ad92e8d75d6f72f1d06f1d25be + } + ] + +doBasicRabinEncryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vector) @=? actual) + where actual = BRabin.encryptWithSeed (seed vector) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (plainText vector) + +doBasicRabinDecryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Just (plainText vector) @=? actual) + where actual = BRabin.decrypt (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vector) + +doBasicRabinSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (BRabin.Signature ((os2ip $ padding vector), (signature vector))) @=? actual) + where actual = BRabin.signWith (padding vector) key SHA1 (message vector) + +doBasicRabinVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) + where actual = BRabin.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (BRabin.Signature ((os2ip $ padding vector), (signature vector))) + +doModifiedRabinSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual) + where actual = MRabin.sign key SHA1 (message vector) + +doModifiedRabinVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) + where actual = MRabin.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (signature vector) + +doRwEncryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (cipherText vector) @=? actual) + where actual = RW.encryptWithSeed (seed vector) (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (plainText vector) + +doRwDecryptTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Just (plainText vector) @=? actual) + where actual = RW.decrypt (OAEP.defaultOAEPParams SHA1) key (cipherText vector) + +doRwSignTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (Right (signature vector) @=? actual) + where actual = RW.sign key SHA1 (message vector) + +doRwVerifyTest key i vector = testCase (show i) (True @=? actual) + where actual = RW.verify key SHA1 (message vector) (signature vector) + +rabinTests = testGroup "Rabin" + [ testGroup "Basic" + [ testGroup "encrypt" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinEncryptTest $ BRabin.private_pub basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinEncryptionVectors + , testGroup "decrypt" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinDecryptTest basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinEncryptionVectors + , testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinSignTest basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinSignatureVectors + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doBasicRabinVerifyTest $ BRabin.private_pub basicRabinKey) [katZero..] basicRabinSignatureVectors + ] + , testGroup "Modified" + [ testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doModifiedRabinSignTest modifiedRabinKey) [katZero..] modifiedRabinSignatureVectors + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doModifiedRabinVerifyTest $ MRabin.private_pub modifiedRabinKey) [katZero..] modifiedRabinSignatureVectors + ] + , testGroup "RW" + [ testGroup "encrypt" $ zipWith (doRwEncryptTest $ RW.private_pub rwKey) [katZero..] rwEncryptionVectors + , testGroup "decrypt" $ zipWith (doRwDecryptTest rwKey) [katZero..] rwEncryptionVectors + , testGroup "sign" $ zipWith (doRwSignTest rwKey) [katZero..] rwSignatureVectors + , testGroup "verify" $ zipWith (doRwVerifyTest $ RW.private_pub rwKey) [katZero..] rwSignatureVectors + ] + ] diff --git a/tests/KAT_RC4.hs b/tests/KAT_RC4.hs --- a/tests/KAT_RC4.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_RC4.hs @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ ] tests = testGroup "RC4" - $ map toKatTest $ zip is vectors - where toKatTest (i, (key, plainText, cipherText)) = + $ zipWith toKatTest is vectors + where toKatTest i (key, plainText, cipherText) = testCase (show i) (cipherText @=? snd (RC4.combine (RC4.initialize key) plainText)) is :: [Int] is = [1..] diff --git a/tests/KAT_Scrypt.hs b/tests/KAT_Scrypt.hs --- a/tests/KAT_Scrypt.hs +++ b/tests/KAT_Scrypt.hs @@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ ] tests = testGroup "Scrypt" - $ map toCase $ zip [(1::Int)..] vectors - where toCase (i, ((pass,salt,n,r,p,dklen), output)) = + $ zipWith toCase [(1::Int)..] vectors + where toCase i ((pass,salt,n,r,p,dklen), output) = testCase (show i) (output @=? Scrypt.generate (Scrypt.Parameters n r p dklen) pass salt) diff --git a/tests/KAT_Twofish.hs b/tests/KAT_Twofish.hs new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/KAT_Twofish.hs @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +module KAT_Twofish (tests) where + +import Imports +import BlockCipher + +import qualified Data.ByteString as B +import Crypto.Cipher.Twofish + + +vectors_twofish128 = + [ KAT_ECB (B.replicate 16 0x00) (B.replicate 16 0x00) (B.pack [0x9F,0x58,0x9F,0x5C,0xF6,0x12,0x2C,0x32,0xB6,0xBF,0xEC,0x2F,0x2A,0xE8,0xC3,0x5A]) + , KAT_ECB (B.pack [0x9F,0x58,0x9F,0x5C,0xF6,0x12,0x2C,0x32,0xB6,0xBF,0xEC,0x2F,0x2A,0xE8,0xC3,0x5A]) + (B.pack [0xD4, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x16, 0xE7, 0xB1, 0xC3, 0x9E, 0x86, 0xCB, 0x08, 0x6B, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x54, 0x19]) + (B.pack [0x01, 0x9F, 0x98, 0x09, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x11, 0x85, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xC3, 0xA3, 0xBA, 0x20, 0xFB, 0xC3]) + ] + +vectors_twofish192 = + [ KAT_ECB (B.pack [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77]) + (B.pack [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]) + (B.pack [0xCF, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0xE5, 0xA9, 0xBE, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x50, 0x1F, 0x13, 0xB8, 0x92, 0xBD, 0x22, 0x48]) + , KAT_ECB (B.pack [0x88, 0xB2, 0xB2, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x10, 0x5E, 0x36, 0xB4, 0x46, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x1A, 0x1E, 0x88, + 0xEF, 0xA7, 0x1F, 0x78, 0x89, 0x65, 0xBD, 0x44]) + (B.pack [0x39, 0xDA, 0x69, 0xD6, 0xBA, 0x49, 0x97, 0xD5, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xDC, 0x07, 0x3C, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xB2]) + (B.pack [0x18, 0x2B, 0x02, 0xD8, 0x14, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x45, 0xF9, 0xDA, 0xAC, 0xDC, 0x29, 0x19, 0x3A, 0x65])] + +vectors_twofish256 = + [ KAT_ECB (B.pack [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF]) + (B.pack [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]) + (B.pack [0x37, 0x52, 0x7B, 0xE0, 0x05, 0x23, 0x34, 0xB8, 0x9F, 0x0C, 0xFC, 0xCA, 0xE8, 0x7C, 0xFA, 0x20]) + , KAT_ECB (B.pack [0xD4, 0x3B, 0xB7, 0x55, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x46, 0xF2, 0xA2, 0x82, 0xB7, 0xD4, 0x5B, 0x4E, 0x0D, + 0x57, 0xFF, 0x73, 0x9D, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x2C, 0x1B, 0xD7, 0xFC, 0x01, 0x70, 0x0C, 0xC8, 0x21, 0x6F]) + (B.pack [0x90, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0x88, 0x54, 0x4F, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xDC, 0x23, 0x9B, 0x26, 0x35, 0xE6]) + (B.pack [0x6C, 0xB4, 0x56, 0x1C, 0x40, 0xBF, 0x0A, 0x97, 0x05, 0x93, 0x1C, 0xB6, 0xD4, 0x08, 0xE7, 0xFA])] + +kats128 = defaultKATs { kat_ECB = vectors_twofish128 } +kats192 = defaultKATs { kat_ECB = vectors_twofish192 } +kats256 = defaultKATs { kat_ECB = vectors_twofish256 } + +tests = testGroup "Twofish" + [ testBlockCipher kats128 (undefined :: Twofish128) + , testBlockCipher kats192 (undefined :: Twofish192) + , testBlockCipher kats256 (undefined :: Twofish256) ] + diff --git a/tests/Number.hs b/tests/Number.hs --- a/tests/Number.hs +++ b/tests/Number.hs @@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ import Imports import Data.ByteArray (Bytes) +import qualified Data.ByteArray as B import Crypto.Number.Basic import Crypto.Number.Generate -import Crypto.Number.Serialize +import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize as BE +import qualified Crypto.Number.Serialize.LE as LE import Crypto.Number.Prime +import Crypto.Number.ModArithmetic import Data.Bits serializationVectors :: [(Int, Integer, ByteString)] @@ -50,11 +53,35 @@ bits = 6 + baseBits prime = withTestDRG testDRG $ generateSafePrime bits in bits == numBits prime - , testProperty "marshalling" $ \qaInt -> - getQAInteger qaInt == os2ip (i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes) - , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-bytearray" $ map toSerializationKat $ zip [katZero..] serializationVectors - , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-integer" $ map toSerializationKatInteger $ zip [katZero..] serializationVectors + , testProperty "as-power-of-2-and-odd" $ \n -> + let (e, a1) = asPowerOf2AndOdd n + in n == (2^e)*a1 + , testProperty "squareRoot" $ \testDRG (Int0_2901 baseBits') -> do + let baseBits = baseBits' `mod` 500 + bits = 5 + baseBits -- generating lower than 5 bits causes an error .. + p = withTestDRG testDRG $ generatePrime bits + g <- choose (1, p - 1) + let square x = (x * x) `mod` p + r = square <$> squareRoot p g + case jacobi g p of + Just 1 -> return $ Just g `assertEq` r + Just (-1) -> return $ Nothing `assertEq` r + _ -> error "invalid jacobi result" + , testProperty "marshalling-be" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (BE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes) + , testProperty "marshalling-le" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (LE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes) + , testProperty "be-rev-le" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (B.reverse (BE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)) + , testProperty "be-rev-le-40" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == LE.os2ip (B.reverse (BE.i2ospOf_ 40 (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)) + , testProperty "le-rev-be" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (B.reverse (LE.i2osp (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)) + , testProperty "le-rev-be-40" $ \qaInt -> + getQAInteger qaInt == BE.os2ip (B.reverse (LE.i2ospOf_ 40 (getQAInteger qaInt) :: Bytes)) + , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-bytearray" $ zipWith toSerializationKat [katZero..] serializationVectors + , testGroup "marshalling-kat-to-integer" $ zipWith toSerializationKatInteger [katZero..] serializationVectors ] where - toSerializationKat (i, (sz, n, ba)) = testCase (show i) (ba @=? i2ospOf_ sz n) - toSerializationKatInteger (i, (_, n, ba)) = testCase (show i) (n @=? os2ip ba) + toSerializationKat i (sz, n, ba) = testCase (show i) (ba @=? BE.i2ospOf_ sz n) + toSerializationKatInteger i (_, n, ba) = testCase (show i) (n @=? BE.os2ip ba) diff --git a/tests/Number/F2m.hs b/tests/Number/F2m.hs --- a/tests/Number/F2m.hs +++ b/tests/Number/F2m.hs @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import Imports hiding ((.&.)) import Data.Bits +import Data.Maybe import Crypto.Number.Basic (log2) import Crypto.Number.F2m @@ -52,8 +53,34 @@ squareTests = testGroup "squareF2m" [ testProperty "sqr(a) == a * a" $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> mulF2m m a a == squareF2m m a + -- disabled because we require @m@ to be a suitable modulus and there is no + -- way to guarantee this + -- , testProperty "sqrt(a) * sqrt(a) = a" + -- $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative aa) -> let a = sqrtF2m m aa in mulF2m m a a == modF2m m aa + , testProperty "sqrt(a) * sqrt(a) = a in GF(2^16)" + $ let m = 65581 :: Integer -- x^16 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + 1 + nums = [0 .. 65535 :: Integer] + in nums == [let y = sqrtF2m m x in squareF2m m y | x <- nums] ] +powTests = testGroup "powF2m" + [ testProperty "2 is square" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 2 == squareF2m m a + , testProperty "1 is identity" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 1 == modF2m m a + , testProperty "0 is annihilator" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) -> powF2m m a 0 == modF2m m 1 + , testProperty "(a * b) ^ c == (a ^ c) * (b ^ c)" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c) + -> powF2m m (mulF2m m a b) c == mulF2m m (powF2m m a c) (powF2m m b c) + , testProperty "a ^ (b + c) == (a ^ b) * (a ^ c)" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c) + -> powF2m m a (b + c) == mulF2m m (powF2m m a b) (powF2m m a c) + , testProperty "a ^ (b * c) == (a ^ b) ^ c" + $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) (NonNegative c) + -> powF2m m a (b * c) == powF2m m (powF2m m a b) c + ] + invTests = testGroup "invF2m" [ testProperty "1 / a * a == 1" $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) @@ -70,7 +97,7 @@ -> divF2m m a b == (mulF2m m a <$> invF2m m b) , testProperty "a * b / b == a" $ \(Positive m) (NonNegative a) (NonNegative b) - -> invF2m m b == Nothing || divF2m m (mulF2m m a b) b == Just (modF2m m a) + -> isNothing (invF2m m b) || divF2m m (mulF2m m a b) b == Just (modF2m m a) ] tests = testGroup "number.F2m" @@ -78,6 +105,7 @@ , modTests , mulTests , squareTests + , powTests , invTests , divTests ] diff --git a/tests/Padding.hs b/tests/Padding.hs --- a/tests/Padding.hs +++ b/tests/Padding.hs @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import qualified Data.ByteString as B import Imports -import Crypto.Error import Crypto.Data.Padding @@ -34,6 +33,6 @@ ] tests = testGroup "Padding" - [ testGroup "Cases" $ map (uncurry testPad) (zip [1..] cases) - , testGroup "ZeroCases" $ map (uncurry testZeroPad) (zip [1..] zeroCases) + [ testGroup "Cases" $ zipWith testPad [1..] cases + , testGroup "ZeroCases" $ zipWith testZeroPad [1..] zeroCases ] diff --git a/tests/Salsa.hs b/tests/Salsa.hs --- a/tests/Salsa.hs +++ b/tests/Salsa.hs @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ tests = testGroup "Salsa" [ testGroup "KAT" $ - map (\(i,f) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) f) $ zip [1..] $ map (\(r, k,i,e) -> salsaRunSimple e r k i) vectors + zipWith (\i (r,k,n,e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ salsaRunSimple e r k n) [1..] vectors , testProperty "generate-combine" salsaGenerateCombine , testProperty "chunking-generate" salsaGenerateChunks , testProperty "chunking-combine" salsaCombineChunks diff --git a/tests/Tests.hs b/tests/Tests.hs --- a/tests/Tests.hs +++ b/tests/Tests.hs @@ -3,9 +3,15 @@ import Imports +import Crypto.System.CPU + import qualified Number import qualified Number.F2m import qualified BCrypt +import qualified BCryptPBKDF +import qualified ECC +import qualified ECC.Edwards25519 +import qualified ECDSA import qualified Hash import qualified Poly1305 import qualified Salsa @@ -15,28 +21,37 @@ import qualified KAT_MiyaguchiPreneel import qualified KAT_CMAC import qualified KAT_HMAC +import qualified KAT_KMAC import qualified KAT_HKDF import qualified KAT_Argon2 import qualified KAT_PBKDF2 import qualified KAT_Curve25519 import qualified KAT_Curve448 import qualified KAT_Ed25519 +import qualified KAT_Ed448 +import qualified KAT_EdDSA import qualified KAT_OTP import qualified KAT_PubKey import qualified KAT_Scrypt -- symmetric cipher -------------------- import qualified KAT_AES +import qualified KAT_AESGCMSIV import qualified KAT_Blowfish +import qualified KAT_CAST5 import qualified KAT_Camellia import qualified KAT_DES import qualified KAT_RC4 import qualified KAT_TripleDES +import qualified KAT_Twofish -- misc -------------------------------- import qualified KAT_AFIS import qualified Padding tests = testGroup "cryptonite" - [ Number.tests + [ testGroup "runtime" + [ testCaseInfo "CPU" (return $ show processorOptions) + ] + , Number.tests , Number.F2m.tests , Hash.tests , Padding.tests @@ -47,25 +62,32 @@ [ Poly1305.tests , KAT_CMAC.tests , KAT_HMAC.tests + , KAT_KMAC.tests ] , KAT_Curve25519.tests , KAT_Curve448.tests , KAT_Ed25519.tests + , KAT_Ed448.tests + , KAT_EdDSA.tests , KAT_PubKey.tests , KAT_OTP.tests , testGroup "KDF" [ KAT_PBKDF2.tests , KAT_Scrypt.tests , BCrypt.tests + , BCryptPBKDF.tests , KAT_HKDF.tests , KAT_Argon2.tests ] , testGroup "block-cipher" [ KAT_AES.tests + , KAT_AESGCMSIV.tests , KAT_Blowfish.tests + , KAT_CAST5.tests , KAT_Camellia.tests , KAT_DES.tests , KAT_TripleDES.tests + , KAT_Twofish.tests ] , testGroup "stream-cipher" [ KAT_RC4.tests @@ -75,6 +97,9 @@ , XSalsa.tests ] , KAT_AFIS.tests + , ECC.tests + , ECC.Edwards25519.tests + , ECDSA.tests ] main = defaultMain tests diff --git a/tests/Utils.hs b/tests/Utils.hs --- a/tests/Utils.hs +++ b/tests/Utils.hs @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ module Utils where import Control.Applicative -import Control.Monad (replicateM) import Data.Char import Data.Word import Data.List @@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ deriving (Show,Eq) instance Arbitrary TestDRG where - arbitrary = TestDRG `fmap` arbitrary + arbitrary = TestDRG `fmap` arbitrary -- distribution not uniform withTestDRG (TestDRG l) f = fst $ withDRG (drgNewTest l) f @@ -28,13 +27,13 @@ deriving (Show,Eq) instance Arbitrary ChunkingLen where - arbitrary = ChunkingLen `fmap` replicateM 16 (choose (0,14)) + arbitrary = ChunkingLen `fmap` vectorOf 16 (choose (0,14)) newtype ChunkingLen0_127 = ChunkingLen0_127 [Int] deriving (Show,Eq) instance Arbitrary ChunkingLen0_127 where - arbitrary = ChunkingLen0_127 `fmap` replicateM 16 (choose (0,127)) + arbitrary = ChunkingLen0_127 `fmap` vectorOf 16 (choose (0,127)) newtype ArbitraryBS0_2901 = ArbitraryBS0_2901 ByteString @@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ arbitrary = oneof [ QAInteger . fromIntegral <$> (choose (0, 65536) :: Gen Int) -- small integer , larger <$> choose (0,4096) <*> choose (0, 65536) -- medium integer - , QAInteger . os2ip . B.pack <$> (choose (0,32) >>= \n -> replicateM n arbitrary) -- [ 0 .. 2^32 ] sized integer + , QAInteger . os2ip <$> arbitraryBSof 0 32 -- [ 0 .. 2^32 ] sized integer ] where larger :: Int -> Int -> QAInteger @@ -73,10 +72,10 @@ somePrime = 18446744073709551557 arbitraryBS :: Int -> Gen ByteString -arbitraryBS n = B.pack `fmap` replicateM n arbitrary +arbitraryBS = fmap B.pack . vector arbitraryBSof :: Int -> Int -> Gen ByteString -arbitraryBSof minSize maxSize = choose (minSize, maxSize) >>= \n -> (B.pack `fmap` replicateM n arbitrary) +arbitraryBSof minSize maxSize = choose (minSize, maxSize) >>= arbitraryBS chunkS :: ChunkingLen -> ByteString -> [ByteString] chunkS (ChunkingLen originalChunks) = loop originalChunks diff --git a/tests/XSalsa.hs b/tests/XSalsa.hs --- a/tests/XSalsa.hs +++ b/tests/XSalsa.hs @@ -98,11 +98,31 @@ , "\xB2\xB7\x95\xFE\x6C\x1D\x4C\x83\xC1\x32\x7E\x01\x5A\x67\xD4\x46\x5F\xD8\xE3\x28\x13\x57\x5C\xBA\xB2\x63\xE2\x0E\xF0\x58\x64\xD2\xDC\x17\xE0\xE4\xEB\x81\x43\x6A\xDF\xE9\xF6\x38\xDC\xC1\xC8\xD7\x8F\x6B\x03\x06\xBA\xF9\x38\xE5\xD2\xAB\x0B\x3E\x05\xE7\x35\xCC\x6F\xFF\x2D\x6E\x02\xE3\xD6\x04\x84\xBE\xA7\xC7\xA8\xE1\x3E\x23\x19\x7F\xEA\x7B\x04\xD4\x7D\x48\xF4\xA4\xE5\x94\x41\x74\x53\x94\x92\x80\x0D\x3E\xF5\x1E\x2E\xE5\xE4\xC8\xA0\xBD\xF0\x50\xC2\xDD\x3D\xD7\x4F\xCE\x5E\x7E\x5C\x37\x36\x4F\x75\x47\xA1\x14\x80\xA3\x06\x3B\x9A\x0A\x15\x7B\x15\xB1\x0A\x5A\x95\x4D\xE2\x73\x1C\xED\x05\x5A\xA2\xE2\x76\x7F\x08\x91\xD4\x32\x9C\x42\x6F\x38\x08\xEE\x86\x7B\xED\x0D\xC7\x5B\x59\x22\xB7\xCF\xB8\x95\x70\x0F\xDA\x01\x61\x05\xA4\xC7\xB7\xF0\xBB\x90\xF0\x29\xF6\xBB\xCB\x04\xAC\x36\xAC\x16") ] +-- Test vector from paper "Cryptography in NaCl" +vectorsCB :: [Vector] +vectorsCB = + [ ( 20 + , "\x4A\x5D\x9D\x5B\xA4\xCE\x2D\xE1\x72\x8E\x3B\xF4\x80\x35\x0F\x25\xE0\x7E\x21\xC9\x47\xD1\x9E\x33\x76\xF0\x9B\x3C\x1E\x16\x17\x42" + , "\x69\x69\x6E\xE9\x55\xB6\x2B\x73\xCD\x62\xBD\xA8\x75\xFC\x73\xD6\x82\x19\xE0\x03\x6B\x7A\x0B\x37" + , "\xBE\x07\x5F\xC5\x3C\x81\xF2\xD5\xCF\x14\x13\x16\xEB\xEB\x0C\x7B\x52\x28\xC5\x2A\x4C\x62\xCB\xD4\x4B\x66\x84\x9B\x64\x24\x4F\xFC\xE5\xEC\xBA\xAF\x33\xBD\x75\x1A\x1A\xC7\x28\xD4\x5E\x6C\x61\x29\x6C\xDC\x3C\x01\x23\x35\x61\xF4\x1D\xB6\x6C\xCE\x31\x4A\xDB\x31\x0E\x3B\xE8\x25\x0C\x46\xF0\x6D\xCE\xEA\x3A\x7F\xA1\x34\x80\x57\xE2\xF6\x55\x6A\xD6\xB1\x31\x8A\x02\x4A\x83\x8F\x21\xAF\x1F\xDE\x04\x89\x77\xEB\x48\xF5\x9F\xFD\x49\x24\xCA\x1C\x60\x90\x2E\x52\xF0\xA0\x89\xBC\x76\x89\x70\x40\xE0\x82\xF9\x37\x76\x38\x48\x64\x5E\x07\x05" + , "\x8E\x99\x3B\x9F\x48\x68\x12\x73\xC2\x96\x50\xBA\x32\xFC\x76\xCE\x48\x33\x2E\xA7\x16\x4D\x96\xA4\x47\x6F\xB8\xC5\x31\xA1\x18\x6A\xC0\xDF\xC1\x7C\x98\xDC\xE8\x7B\x4D\xA7\xF0\x11\xEC\x48\xC9\x72\x71\xD2\xC2\x0F\x9B\x92\x8F\xE2\x27\x0D\x6F\xB8\x63\xD5\x17\x38\xB4\x8E\xEE\xE3\x14\xA7\xCC\x8A\xB9\x32\x16\x45\x48\xE5\x26\xAE\x90\x22\x43\x68\x51\x7A\xCF\xEA\xBD\x6B\xB3\x73\x2B\xC0\xE9\xDA\x99\x83\x2B\x61\xCA\x01\xB6\xDE\x56\x24\x4A\x9E\x88\xD5\xF9\xB3\x79\x73\xF6\x22\xA4\x3D\x14\xA6\x59\x9B\x1F\x65\x4C\xB4\x5A\x74\xE3\x55\xA5") + ] + tests = testGroup "XSalsa" [ testGroup "KAT" $ - map (\(i,f) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) f) $ zip [1..] $ map (\(r, k, i, p, e) -> salsaRunSimple r k i p e) vectors + zipWith (\i (r, k, n, p, e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ salsaRunSimple r k n p e) [1..] vectors + , testGroup "crypto_box encryption" $ + zipWith (\i (r, k, n, p, e) -> testCase (show (i :: Int)) $ cryptoBoxEnc r k n p e) [1..] vectorsCB ] where salsaRunSimple rounds key nonce plain expected = let salsa = XSalsa.initialize rounds key nonce in fst (XSalsa.combine salsa plain) @?= expected + + cryptoBoxEnc rounds shared nonce plain expected = + let zero = B.replicate 16 0 + (iv0, iv1) = B.splitAt 8 nonce + salsa0 = XSalsa.initialize rounds shared (zero `B.append` iv0) + salsa1 = XSalsa.derive salsa0 iv1 + (_, salsa2) = XSalsa.generate salsa1 32 :: (B.ByteString, XSalsa.State) + in fst (XSalsa.combine salsa2 plain) @?= expected