crypton-x509-validation 1.10.3 → 1.11.0
raw patch · 7 files changed
+252/−32 lines, 7 filesdep ~cryptondep ~crypton-x509PVP ok
version bump matches the API change (PVP)
Dependency ranges changed: crypton, crypton-x509
API changes (from Hackage documentation)
- Data.X509.Validation: ValidationChecks :: Bool -> Maybe DateTime -> Bool -> Bool -> Bool -> Bool -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose] -> Bool -> ValidationChecks
- Data.X509.Validation: ValidationHooks :: (DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool) -> (DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]) -> (HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]) -> ([FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]) -> ValidationHooks
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkAtTime] :: ValidationChecks -> Maybe DateTime
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkCAConstraints] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkExhaustive] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkFQHN] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafKeyPurpose] :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose]
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafKeyUsage] :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag]
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafV3] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkStrictOrdering] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkTimeValidity] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookFilterReason] :: ValidationHooks -> [FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookMatchSubjectIssuer] :: ValidationHooks -> DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookValidateName] :: ValidationHooks -> HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookValidateTime] :: ValidationHooks -> DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: OtherReason :: String -> FailedReason
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkAtTime :: ValidationChecks -> Maybe DateTime
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkCAConstraints :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkExhaustive :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkFQHN :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafKeyPurpose :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose]
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafKeyUsage :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag]
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafV3 :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkRejectSHA1 :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkStrictOrdering :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkTimeValidity :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookFilterReason :: ValidationHooks -> [FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookMatchSubjectIssuer :: ValidationHooks -> DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookValidateName :: ValidationHooks -> HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookValidateTime :: ValidationHooks -> DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
Files
- ChangeLog.md +22/−0
- Data/X509/Validation.hs +43/−12
- Data/X509/Validation/Fingerprint.hs +4/−0
- Data/X509/Validation/Signature.hs +60/−17
- Tests/Certificate.hs +7/−0
- Tests/Tests.hs +113/−0
- crypton-x509-validation.cabal +3/−3
ChangeLog.md view
@@ -1,5 +1,27 @@ # ChangeLog for crypton-x509-validation +## 1.11.0++The constructors of `ValidationChecks` and `ValidationHooks` are hidden;+use `defaultChecks` and `defaultHooks` with record update syntax.+RSA-PSS signatures are verified with their own parameters and the+restrictions of RSASSA-PSS keys, and SHA-3 signatures are supported.++* Hide the constructors of ValidationChecks and ValidationHooks+ [#51](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/51)+* Add checkRejectSHA1 and OtherReason+ [#52](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/52)+* Keep RSA-PSS parameters+ [#53](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/53)+* Keep multi-valued RDNs+ [#54](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/54)+* Keep all GeneralName forms+ [#57](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/57)+* Support RSASSA-PSS keys+ [#61](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/61)+* Support SHA-3 signature algorithms+ [#62](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/62)+ ## 1.10.3 MD2 and MD5 signatures are rejected, and certification paths are built
Data/X509/Validation.hs view
@@ -20,8 +20,24 @@ SignatureFailure (..), -- * Validation configuration types- ValidationChecks (..),- ValidationHooks (..),++ -- the constructors are hidden so that fields can be added+ ValidationChecks,+ checkTimeValidity,+ checkAtTime,+ checkStrictOrdering,+ checkCAConstraints,+ checkExhaustive,+ checkLeafV3,+ checkLeafKeyUsage,+ checkLeafKeyPurpose,+ checkFQHN,+ checkRejectSHA1,+ ValidationHooks,+ hookMatchSubjectIssuer,+ hookValidateTime,+ hookValidateName,+ hookFilterReason, defaultChecks, defaultHooks, @@ -104,12 +120,14 @@ CacheSaysNo String | -- | signature failed InvalidSignature SignatureFailure+ | -- | a reason given by a hook, e.g. a revocation check+ OtherReason String deriving (Show, Eq) -- | A set of checks to activate or parametrize to perform on certificates. ----- It's recommended to use 'defaultChecks' to create the structure,--- to better cope with future changes or expansion of the structure.+-- Values are made by updating 'defaultChecks', e.g.+-- @defaultChecks{checkFQHN = False}@. data ValidationChecks = ValidationChecks { checkTimeValidity :: Bool -- ^ check time validity of every certificate in the chain.@@ -149,11 +167,16 @@ , checkFQHN :: Bool -- ^ Check the top certificate names matching the fully qualified hostname (FQHN). -- it's not recommended to turn this check off, if no other name checks are performed.+ , checkRejectSHA1 :: Bool+ -- ^ Reject certificates signed with SHA-1. The signatures of trust+ -- anchors are not checked. MD2 and MD5 are always rejected. } deriving (Show, Eq) -- | A set of hooks to manipulate the way the verification works. --+-- Values are made by updating 'defaultHooks'.+-- -- BEWARE, it's easy to change behavior leading to compromised security. data ValidationHooks = ValidationHooks { hookMatchSubjectIssuer :: DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool@@ -188,6 +211,7 @@ , checkLeafKeyUsage = [] , checkLeafKeyPurpose = [] , checkFQHN = True+ , checkRejectSHA1 = False } instance Default ValidationChecks where@@ -473,6 +497,8 @@ checkSignature signedCert signingCert | signedAlg (getSigned signedCert) /= certSignatureAlg (getCertificate signedCert) = [InvalidSignature SignatureInvalid]+ | checkRejectSHA1 checks && isSHA1 (signedAlg (getSigned signedCert)) =+ [InvalidSignature SignatureUnimplemented] | otherwise = case verifySignedSignature signedCert (certPubKey $ getCertificate signingCert) of SignaturePass -> []@@ -490,6 +516,10 @@ -- the level counts from the leaf spec level c = getNameConstSpec (getCertificate c) (level == 0 && checkFQHN checks) +isSHA1 :: SignatureALG -> Bool+isSHA1 (SignatureALG HashSHA1 _) = True+isSHA1 alg = maybe False ((== HashSHA1) . pssHash) $ signatureALGPSSParams alg+ -- | Whether BasicConstraints says the certificate is not a CA. notCA :: Certificate -> Bool notCA cert = case extensionGetE (certExtensions cert) of@@ -754,6 +784,11 @@ (AltNameURI n, AltNameURI c) -> maybe Unsupported (toMatch . (`hostInSubtree` c)) $ uriHost n (AltNameXMPP _, AltNameXMPP _) -> Unsupported (AltNameDNSSRV _, AltNameDNSSRV _) -> Unsupported+ (AltNameOther o1 _, AltNameOther o2 _)+ | o1 == o2 -> Unsupported+ (AltNameX400 _, AltNameX400 _) -> Unsupported+ (AltNameEDIParty _, AltNameEDIParty _) -> Unsupported+ (AltNameRegisteredID _, AltNameRegisteredID _) -> Unsupported _ -> NotApplicable where toMatch b = if b then Matched else NotMatched@@ -814,16 +849,12 @@ else Just host _ -> Nothing --- | The subtree is a prefix of the name. Attribute values are compared--- case-insensitively with whitespace folded.+-- | The subtree is a prefix of the name, comparing RDNs in the canonical+-- form. dnInSubtree :: DistinguishedName -> DistinguishedName -> Bool-dnInSubtree (DistinguishedName n) (DistinguishedName c) =- length c <= length n && and (zipWith eq n c)+dnInSubtree n c = canon c `isPrefixOf` canon n where- eq (o1, v1) (o2, v2) = o1 == o2 && norm v1 == norm v2- norm v = case safeCharacterToString v of- Just str -> Right $ unwords $ words $ map toLower str- Nothing -> Left v+ canon = getRDNs . canonicalDistinguishedName -- | An IPv4 or IPv6 address against an address with a mask. ipInSubtree :: ByteString -> ByteString -> NameMatch
Data/X509/Validation/Fingerprint.hs view
@@ -40,3 +40,7 @@ mkHash HashSHA256 = convert . hashWith SHA256 mkHash HashSHA384 = convert . hashWith SHA384 mkHash HashSHA512 = convert . hashWith SHA512+ mkHash HashSHA3_224 = convert . hashWith SHA3_224+ mkHash HashSHA3_256 = convert . hashWith SHA3_256+ mkHash HashSHA3_384 = convert . hashWith SHA3_384+ mkHash HashSHA3_512 = convert . hashWith SHA3_512
Data/X509/Validation/Signature.hs view
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}+ -- | -- Module : Data.X509.Validation.Signature -- License : BSD-style@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.MLDSA as MLDSA+import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction (mgf1) import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS@@ -99,8 +102,8 @@ -- | Reject key parameters that are invalid or too costly to verify with. acceptablePubKey :: PubKey -> Bool-acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSA (RSA.PublicKey _ n e)) =- n > 1 && numBits n <= 16384 && e > 1 && numBits e <= 64+acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSA key) = acceptableRSA key+acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSAPSS key _) = acceptableRSA key acceptablePubKey (PubKeyDSA (DSA.PublicKey (DSA.Params p g q) y)) = p > 2 && numBits p <= 8192@@ -113,24 +116,17 @@ && y < p acceptablePubKey _ = True +acceptableRSA :: RSA.PublicKey -> Bool+acceptableRSA (RSA.PublicKey _ n e) =+ n > 1 && numBits n <= 16384 && e > 1 && numBits e <= 64+ verifySignature' :: SignatureALG -> PubKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> SignatureVerification verifySignature' (SignatureALG_Unknown _) _ _ _ = SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented-verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG PubKeyALG_RSAPSS) pubkey cdata signature = case verifyF pubkey of- Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented- Just f ->- if f cdata signature- then SignaturePass- else SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid- where- verifyF (PubKeyRSA key)- | hashALG == HashSHA256 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA256) key- | hashALG == HashSHA384 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA384) key- | hashALG == HashSHA512 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA512) key- | hashALG == HashSHA224 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA224) key- | hashALG == HashSHA1 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA1) key- | otherwise = Nothing- verifyF _ = Nothing+verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG PubKeyALG_RSAPSS) pubkey cdata signature =+ verifyPSS (defaultPSSParams hashALG) pubkey cdata signature+verifySignature' (SignatureALG_RSAPSS params) pubkey cdata signature =+ verifyPSS params pubkey cdata signature verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG pubkeyALG) pubkey cdata signature | pubkeyToAlg pubkey == pubkeyALG = case verifyF pubkey of Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented@@ -168,6 +164,10 @@ rsaVerify HashSHA256 = rsaVerifyWith SHA256 rsaVerify HashSHA384 = rsaVerifyWith SHA384 rsaVerify HashSHA512 = rsaVerifyWith SHA512+ rsaVerify HashSHA3_224 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_224+ rsaVerify HashSHA3_256 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_256+ rsaVerify HashSHA3_384 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_384+ rsaVerify HashSHA3_512 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_512 rsaVerifyWith h key msg = RSA.verifyDigest key (hashWith h msg) verifySignature' (SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash pubkeyALG) pubkey cdata signature | pubkeyToAlg pubkey == pubkeyALG = doVerify pubkey@@ -196,6 +196,45 @@ | otherwise -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid CryptoFailed _ -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid +verifyPSS+ :: PSSParams -> PubKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> SignatureVerification+verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSAPSS key mkp) cdata signature+ -- RFC 4055 3.3: the hash and MGF must match and the salt is not shorter+ | Just kp <- mkp+ , pssHash params /= pssHash kp+ || pssMGFHash params /= pssMGFHash kp+ || pssSaltLength params < pssSaltLength kp =+ SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+ | otherwise = verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSA key) cdata signature+verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSA key) cdata signature =+ case withPSSHash (pssHash params) $ \h -> withPSSHash (pssMGFHash params) $ \m ->+ Just (PSS.verify (pssParams h m) key cdata signature) of+ Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented+ Just True -> SignaturePass+ Just False -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid+ where+ pssParams h m =+ PSS.PSSParams+ { PSS.pssHash = h+ , PSS.pssMaskGenAlg = mgf1 m+ , PSS.pssSaltLength = pssSaltLength params+ , PSS.pssTrailerField = 0xbc+ }+verifyPSS _ _ _ _ = SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch++withPSSHash+ :: HashALG -> (forall a. HashAlgorithm a => a -> Maybe r) -> Maybe r+withPSSHash HashSHA1 f = f SHA1+withPSSHash HashSHA224 f = f SHA224+withPSSHash HashSHA256 f = f SHA256+withPSSHash HashSHA384 f = f SHA384+withPSSHash HashSHA512 f = f SHA512+withPSSHash HashSHA3_224 f = f SHA3_224+withPSSHash HashSHA3_256 f = f SHA3_256+withPSSHash HashSHA3_384 f = f SHA3_384+withPSSHash HashSHA3_512 f = f SHA3_512+withPSSHash _ _ = Nothing+ verifyECDSA :: HashALG -> PubKeyEC -> Maybe (ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool) verifyECDSA hashALG key = ecPubKeyCurveName key >>= verifyCurve (pubkeyEC_pub key)@@ -219,3 +258,7 @@ ecdsaVerify HashSHA256 = ECDSA.verify SHA256 ecdsaVerify HashSHA384 = ECDSA.verify SHA384 ecdsaVerify HashSHA512 = ECDSA.verify SHA512+ ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_224 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_224+ ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_256 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_256+ ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_384 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_384+ ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_512 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_512
Tests/Certificate.hs view
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ hashSHA256, hashSHA384, hashSHA512,+ hashSHA3_256,+ hashSHA3_384, -- * Key and signature utilities Alg (..),@@ -79,6 +81,11 @@ hashSHA256 = GHash HashSHA256 SHA256 hashSHA384 = GHash HashSHA384 SHA384 hashSHA512 = GHash HashSHA512 SHA512++hashSHA3_256 :: GHash SHA3_256+hashSHA3_384 :: GHash SHA3_384+hashSHA3_256 = GHash HashSHA3_256 SHA3_256+hashSHA3_384 = GHash HashSHA3_384 SHA3_384 -- | Signature and hash algorithms instantiated with parameters. data Alg pub priv where
Tests/Tests.hs view
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DSA as DSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECDSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC+import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction (mgf1) import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS @@ -833,6 +834,42 @@ @?= SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid ] +-- | RSA-PSS signatures are verified with their own parameters.+testPSSParams :: TestTree+testPSSParams = testCase "RSA-PSS parameters" $ do+ (pub, priv) <- RSA.generate 128 3+ let msg = BS.pack [1, 2, 3]+ params :: PSS.PSSParams SHA384 BS.ByteString BS.ByteString+ params =+ PSS.PSSParams+ { PSS.pssHash = SHA384+ , PSS.pssMaskGenAlg = mgf1 SHA256+ , PSS.pssSaltLength = 0+ , PSS.pssTrailerField = 0xbc+ }+ alg =+ rsaPSSSignatureALG $+ (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384){pssMGFHash = HashSHA256, pssSaltLength = 0}+ sig <- either (error . show) id <$> PSS.signSafer params priv msg+ verifySignature alg (PubKeyRSA pub) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+ verifySignature+ (SignatureALG HashSHA384 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS)+ (PubKeyRSA pub)+ msg+ sig+ @?= SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid+ -- RSASSA-PSS keys restrict the parameters (RFC 4055 3.3)+ let restricted p = PubKeyRSAPSS pub (Just p)+ custom = (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384){pssMGFHash = HashSHA256, pssSaltLength = 0}+ verifySignature alg (PubKeyRSAPSS pub Nothing) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+ verifySignature alg (restricted custom) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+ verifySignature alg (restricted (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384)) msg sig+ @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+ verifySignature alg (restricted custom{pssMGFHash = HashSHA384}) msg sig+ @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+ verifySignature (SignatureALG HashSHA384 PubKeyALG_RSA) (PubKeyRSAPSS pub Nothing) msg sig+ @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+ -- | Validity period around the current date. currentValidity :: IO (DateTime, DateTime) currentValidity = do@@ -1040,6 +1077,53 @@ actual <- validateExample (mkStore [rootPair]) [leaf] actual @?= [] +-- | SHA-1 signatures are accepted by default and rejected on request.+testRejectSHA1 :: TestTree+testRejectSHA1 = testCase "SHA-1 signature" $ do+ validity <- currentValidity+ keys <- generateKeys (AlgRSA 1024 hashSHA1)+ rootPair <- mkCA 1 "SHA1 Root" validity (Just bc) Nothing Self keys+ leaf <- mkCertificate 2 2 (mkDn "leaf") validity [exampleSAN] (CA rootPair) keys+ let run checks =+ validate+ HashSHA256+ defaultHooks+ checks+ (mkStore [rootPair])+ defaultValidationCache+ ("www.example.com", fromString ":443")+ (CertificateChain [pairSignedCert leaf])+ accepted <- run defaultChecks+ accepted @?= []+ rejected <- run defaultChecks{checkRejectSHA1 = True}+ rejected @?= [InvalidSignature SignatureUnimplemented]+ where+ bc = ExtBasicConstraints True Nothing++-- | A hook can return its own reason.+testOtherReason :: IO (RData pub priv) -> TestTree+testOtherReason res = testWithRes res "other reason" $ \rd -> do+ leaf <-+ mkCertificate+ 2+ 53+ (mkDn "leaf")+ (present rd)+ [exampleSAN]+ (CA (root rd))+ (keys1 rd)+ let hooks = defaultHooks{hookValidateName = \_ _ -> [OtherReason "revoked"]}+ actual <-+ validate+ HashSHA256+ hooks+ defaultChecks+ (rootStore rd)+ defaultValidationCache+ ("www.example.com", fromString ":443")+ (CertificateChain [pairSignedCert leaf])+ actual @?= [OtherReason "revoked"]+ -- | Regression tests that do not depend on the signature algorithm. treeRegression :: TestTree treeRegression = withResource (initData AlgEd25519) freeData $ \res ->@@ -1050,6 +1134,8 @@ [ testNonCAAnchor res , testSignatureAlgMismatch , testWeakHash+ , testRejectSHA1+ , testOtherReason res ] , testGroup "path building"@@ -1143,6 +1229,24 @@ False , testNameConstraints res+ "excluded otherName"+ [nameConstraints [] [upn "a@example.com"]]+ Nothing+ leafDN+ [sanExt [dns "www.example.com", upn "b@example.com"]]+ "www.example.com"+ False+ , testNameConstraints+ res+ "otherName under DNS constraints"+ [nameConstraints [dns "example.com"] []]+ Nothing+ leafDN+ [sanExt [dns "www.example.com", upn "b@example.com"]]+ "www.example.com"+ True+ , testNameConstraints+ res "excluded by wildcard" [nameConstraints [] [dns "www.example.com"]] Nothing@@ -1324,10 +1428,16 @@ , testLongChain res "too long" 25 False ] , testBadKeys+ , testPSSParams ] where dns = AltNameDNS ip = AltNameIP . BS.pack+ -- Microsoft UPN otherName+ upn u =+ AltNameOther+ [1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 20, 2, 3]+ (encodeASN1' DER [ASN1String $ asn1CharacterString UTF8 u]) leafDN = mkDn "leaf" ncEx = nameConstraints [dns "example.com"] [] raw oid asn1 = ExtensionRaw oid True (encodeASN1' DER asn1)@@ -1792,6 +1902,9 @@ , treeWithAlg "RSAPSS" (AlgRSAPSS 2048 pssParams hashSHA224) , treeWithAlg "DSA" (AlgDSA dsaParams hashSHA1) , treeWithAlg "ECDSA" (AlgEC curveName hashSHA512)+ , treeWithAlg "RSA SHA3" (AlgRSA 2048 hashSHA3_256)+ , treeWithAlg "RSAPSS SHA3" (AlgRSAPSS 2048 (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA3_256) hashSHA3_256)+ , treeWithAlg "ECDSA SHA3" (AlgEC curveName hashSHA3_384) , treeWithAlg "Ed25519" AlgEd25519 , treeWithAlg "Ed448" AlgEd448 , treeWithAlg "ML-DSA-44" AlgMLDSA44
crypton-x509-validation.cabal view
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ cabal-version: >=1.10 name: crypton-x509-validation-version: 1.10.3+version: 1.11.0 license: BSD3 license-file: LICENSE copyright: Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@ base >=3 && <5, bytestring, containers,- crypton >=2.2.0 && <2.3,+ crypton >=2.2.0 && <2.4, crypton-asn1-types >=0.4.1 && <0.5, crypton-asn1-encoding >=0.10.0 && <0.11, crypton-pem >=0.2.4 && <0.4,- crypton-x509 >=1.10.3 && <1.11,+ crypton-x509 >=1.11 && <1.12, crypton-x509-store >=1.10.1 && <1.11, data-default, iproute >=1.2.2,