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crypton-x509-validation 1.10.3 → 1.11.0

raw patch · 7 files changed

+252/−32 lines, 7 filesdep ~cryptondep ~crypton-x509PVP ok

version bump matches the API change (PVP)

Dependency ranges changed: crypton, crypton-x509

API changes (from Hackage documentation)

- Data.X509.Validation: ValidationChecks :: Bool -> Maybe DateTime -> Bool -> Bool -> Bool -> Bool -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag] -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose] -> Bool -> ValidationChecks
- Data.X509.Validation: ValidationHooks :: (DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool) -> (DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]) -> (HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]) -> ([FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]) -> ValidationHooks
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkAtTime] :: ValidationChecks -> Maybe DateTime
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkCAConstraints] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkExhaustive] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkFQHN] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafKeyPurpose] :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose]
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafKeyUsage] :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag]
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkLeafV3] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkStrictOrdering] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [checkTimeValidity] :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookFilterReason] :: ValidationHooks -> [FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookMatchSubjectIssuer] :: ValidationHooks -> DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookValidateName] :: ValidationHooks -> HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
- Data.X509.Validation: [hookValidateTime] :: ValidationHooks -> DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: OtherReason :: String -> FailedReason
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkAtTime :: ValidationChecks -> Maybe DateTime
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkCAConstraints :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkExhaustive :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkFQHN :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafKeyPurpose :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsagePurpose]
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafKeyUsage :: ValidationChecks -> [ExtKeyUsageFlag]
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkLeafV3 :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkRejectSHA1 :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkStrictOrdering :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: checkTimeValidity :: ValidationChecks -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookFilterReason :: ValidationHooks -> [FailedReason] -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookMatchSubjectIssuer :: ValidationHooks -> DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookValidateName :: ValidationHooks -> HostName -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]
+ Data.X509.Validation: hookValidateTime :: ValidationHooks -> DateTime -> Certificate -> [FailedReason]

Files

ChangeLog.md view
@@ -1,5 +1,27 @@ # ChangeLog for crypton-x509-validation +## 1.11.0++The constructors of `ValidationChecks` and `ValidationHooks` are hidden;+use `defaultChecks` and `defaultHooks` with record update syntax.+RSA-PSS signatures are verified with their own parameters and the+restrictions of RSASSA-PSS keys, and SHA-3 signatures are supported.++* Hide the constructors of ValidationChecks and ValidationHooks+  [#51](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/51)+* Add checkRejectSHA1 and OtherReason+  [#52](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/52)+* Keep RSA-PSS parameters+  [#53](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/53)+* Keep multi-valued RDNs+  [#54](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/54)+* Keep all GeneralName forms+  [#57](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/57)+* Support RSASSA-PSS keys+  [#61](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/61)+* Support SHA-3 signature algorithms+  [#62](https://github.com/kazu-yamamoto/crypton-certificate/pull/62)+ ## 1.10.3  MD2 and MD5 signatures are rejected, and certification paths are built
Data/X509/Validation.hs view
@@ -20,8 +20,24 @@     SignatureFailure (..),      -- * Validation configuration types-    ValidationChecks (..),-    ValidationHooks (..),++    -- the constructors are hidden so that fields can be added+    ValidationChecks,+    checkTimeValidity,+    checkAtTime,+    checkStrictOrdering,+    checkCAConstraints,+    checkExhaustive,+    checkLeafV3,+    checkLeafKeyUsage,+    checkLeafKeyPurpose,+    checkFQHN,+    checkRejectSHA1,+    ValidationHooks,+    hookMatchSubjectIssuer,+    hookValidateTime,+    hookValidateName,+    hookFilterReason,     defaultChecks,     defaultHooks, @@ -104,12 +120,14 @@       CacheSaysNo String     | -- | signature failed       InvalidSignature SignatureFailure+    | -- | a reason given by a hook, e.g. a revocation check+      OtherReason String     deriving (Show, Eq)  -- | A set of checks to activate or parametrize to perform on certificates. ----- It's recommended to use 'defaultChecks' to create the structure,--- to better cope with future changes or expansion of the structure.+-- Values are made by updating 'defaultChecks', e.g.+-- @defaultChecks{checkFQHN = False}@. data ValidationChecks = ValidationChecks     { checkTimeValidity :: Bool     -- ^ check time validity of every certificate in the chain.@@ -149,11 +167,16 @@     , checkFQHN :: Bool     -- ^ Check the top certificate names matching the fully qualified hostname (FQHN).     -- it's not recommended to turn this check off, if no other name checks are performed.+    , checkRejectSHA1 :: Bool+    -- ^ Reject certificates signed with SHA-1.  The signatures of trust+    -- anchors are not checked.  MD2 and MD5 are always rejected.     }     deriving (Show, Eq)  -- | A set of hooks to manipulate the way the verification works. --+-- Values are made by updating 'defaultHooks'.+-- -- BEWARE, it's easy to change behavior leading to compromised security. data ValidationHooks = ValidationHooks     { hookMatchSubjectIssuer :: DistinguishedName -> Certificate -> Bool@@ -188,6 +211,7 @@         , checkLeafKeyUsage = []         , checkLeafKeyPurpose = []         , checkFQHN = True+        , checkRejectSHA1 = False         }  instance Default ValidationChecks where@@ -473,6 +497,8 @@     checkSignature signedCert signingCert         | signedAlg (getSigned signedCert) /= certSignatureAlg (getCertificate signedCert) =             [InvalidSignature SignatureInvalid]+        | checkRejectSHA1 checks && isSHA1 (signedAlg (getSigned signedCert)) =+            [InvalidSignature SignatureUnimplemented]         | otherwise =             case verifySignedSignature signedCert (certPubKey $ getCertificate signingCert) of                 SignaturePass -> []@@ -490,6 +516,10 @@         -- the level counts from the leaf         spec level c = getNameConstSpec (getCertificate c) (level == 0 && checkFQHN checks) +isSHA1 :: SignatureALG -> Bool+isSHA1 (SignatureALG HashSHA1 _) = True+isSHA1 alg = maybe False ((== HashSHA1) . pssHash) $ signatureALGPSSParams alg+ -- | Whether BasicConstraints says the certificate is not a CA. notCA :: Certificate -> Bool notCA cert = case extensionGetE (certExtensions cert) of@@ -754,6 +784,11 @@     (AltNameURI n, AltNameURI c) -> maybe Unsupported (toMatch . (`hostInSubtree` c)) $ uriHost n     (AltNameXMPP _, AltNameXMPP _) -> Unsupported     (AltNameDNSSRV _, AltNameDNSSRV _) -> Unsupported+    (AltNameOther o1 _, AltNameOther o2 _)+        | o1 == o2 -> Unsupported+    (AltNameX400 _, AltNameX400 _) -> Unsupported+    (AltNameEDIParty _, AltNameEDIParty _) -> Unsupported+    (AltNameRegisteredID _, AltNameRegisteredID _) -> Unsupported     _ -> NotApplicable   where     toMatch b = if b then Matched else NotMatched@@ -814,16 +849,12 @@                 else Just host     _ -> Nothing --- | The subtree is a prefix of the name.  Attribute values are compared--- case-insensitively with whitespace folded.+-- | The subtree is a prefix of the name, comparing RDNs in the canonical+-- form. dnInSubtree :: DistinguishedName -> DistinguishedName -> Bool-dnInSubtree (DistinguishedName n) (DistinguishedName c) =-    length c <= length n && and (zipWith eq n c)+dnInSubtree n c = canon c `isPrefixOf` canon n   where-    eq (o1, v1) (o2, v2) = o1 == o2 && norm v1 == norm v2-    norm v = case safeCharacterToString v of-        Just str -> Right $ unwords $ words $ map toLower str-        Nothing -> Left v+    canon = getRDNs . canonicalDistinguishedName  -- | An IPv4 or IPv6 address against an address with a mask. ipInSubtree :: ByteString -> ByteString -> NameMatch
Data/X509/Validation/Fingerprint.hs view
@@ -40,3 +40,7 @@     mkHash HashSHA256 = convert . hashWith SHA256     mkHash HashSHA384 = convert . hashWith SHA384     mkHash HashSHA512 = convert . hashWith SHA512+    mkHash HashSHA3_224 = convert . hashWith SHA3_224+    mkHash HashSHA3_256 = convert . hashWith SHA3_256+    mkHash HashSHA3_384 = convert . hashWith SHA3_384+    mkHash HashSHA3_512 = convert . hashWith SHA3_512
Data/X509/Validation/Signature.hs view
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@+{-# LANGUAGE RankNTypes #-}+ -- | -- Module      : Data.X509.Validation.Signature -- License     : BSD-style@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed25519 as Ed25519 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.Ed448 as Ed448 import qualified Crypto.PubKey.MLDSA as MLDSA+import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction (mgf1) import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PKCS15 as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS@@ -99,8 +102,8 @@  -- | Reject key parameters that are invalid or too costly to verify with. acceptablePubKey :: PubKey -> Bool-acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSA (RSA.PublicKey _ n e)) =-    n > 1 && numBits n <= 16384 && e > 1 && numBits e <= 64+acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSA key) = acceptableRSA key+acceptablePubKey (PubKeyRSAPSS key _) = acceptableRSA key acceptablePubKey (PubKeyDSA (DSA.PublicKey (DSA.Params p g q) y)) =     p > 2         && numBits p <= 8192@@ -113,24 +116,17 @@         && y < p acceptablePubKey _ = True +acceptableRSA :: RSA.PublicKey -> Bool+acceptableRSA (RSA.PublicKey _ n e) =+    n > 1 && numBits n <= 16384 && e > 1 && numBits e <= 64+ verifySignature'     :: SignatureALG -> PubKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> SignatureVerification verifySignature' (SignatureALG_Unknown _) _ _ _ = SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented-verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG PubKeyALG_RSAPSS) pubkey cdata signature = case verifyF pubkey of-    Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented-    Just f ->-        if f cdata signature-            then SignaturePass-            else SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid-  where-    verifyF (PubKeyRSA key)-        | hashALG == HashSHA256 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA256) key-        | hashALG == HashSHA384 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA384) key-        | hashALG == HashSHA512 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA512) key-        | hashALG == HashSHA224 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA224) key-        | hashALG == HashSHA1 = Just $ PSS.verify (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA1) key-        | otherwise = Nothing-    verifyF _ = Nothing+verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG PubKeyALG_RSAPSS) pubkey cdata signature =+    verifyPSS (defaultPSSParams hashALG) pubkey cdata signature+verifySignature' (SignatureALG_RSAPSS params) pubkey cdata signature =+    verifyPSS params pubkey cdata signature verifySignature' (SignatureALG hashALG pubkeyALG) pubkey cdata signature     | pubkeyToAlg pubkey == pubkeyALG = case verifyF pubkey of         Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented@@ -168,6 +164,10 @@     rsaVerify HashSHA256 = rsaVerifyWith SHA256     rsaVerify HashSHA384 = rsaVerifyWith SHA384     rsaVerify HashSHA512 = rsaVerifyWith SHA512+    rsaVerify HashSHA3_224 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_224+    rsaVerify HashSHA3_256 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_256+    rsaVerify HashSHA3_384 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_384+    rsaVerify HashSHA3_512 = rsaVerifyWith SHA3_512     rsaVerifyWith h key msg = RSA.verifyDigest key (hashWith h msg) verifySignature' (SignatureALG_IntrinsicHash pubkeyALG) pubkey cdata signature     | pubkeyToAlg pubkey == pubkeyALG = doVerify pubkey@@ -196,6 +196,45 @@                 | otherwise -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid             CryptoFailed _ -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid +verifyPSS+    :: PSSParams -> PubKey -> ByteString -> ByteString -> SignatureVerification+verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSAPSS key mkp) cdata signature+    -- RFC 4055 3.3: the hash and MGF must match and the salt is not shorter+    | Just kp <- mkp+    , pssHash params /= pssHash kp+        || pssMGFHash params /= pssMGFHash kp+        || pssSaltLength params < pssSaltLength kp =+        SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+    | otherwise = verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSA key) cdata signature+verifyPSS params (PubKeyRSA key) cdata signature =+    case withPSSHash (pssHash params) $ \h -> withPSSHash (pssMGFHash params) $ \m ->+        Just (PSS.verify (pssParams h m) key cdata signature) of+        Nothing -> SignatureFailed SignatureUnimplemented+        Just True -> SignaturePass+        Just False -> SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid+  where+    pssParams h m =+        PSS.PSSParams+            { PSS.pssHash = h+            , PSS.pssMaskGenAlg = mgf1 m+            , PSS.pssSaltLength = pssSaltLength params+            , PSS.pssTrailerField = 0xbc+            }+verifyPSS _ _ _ _ = SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch++withPSSHash+    :: HashALG -> (forall a. HashAlgorithm a => a -> Maybe r) -> Maybe r+withPSSHash HashSHA1 f = f SHA1+withPSSHash HashSHA224 f = f SHA224+withPSSHash HashSHA256 f = f SHA256+withPSSHash HashSHA384 f = f SHA384+withPSSHash HashSHA512 f = f SHA512+withPSSHash HashSHA3_224 f = f SHA3_224+withPSSHash HashSHA3_256 f = f SHA3_256+withPSSHash HashSHA3_384 f = f SHA3_384+withPSSHash HashSHA3_512 f = f SHA3_512+withPSSHash _ _ = Nothing+ verifyECDSA :: HashALG -> PubKeyEC -> Maybe (ByteString -> ByteString -> Bool) verifyECDSA hashALG key =     ecPubKeyCurveName key >>= verifyCurve (pubkeyEC_pub key)@@ -219,3 +258,7 @@     ecdsaVerify HashSHA256 = ECDSA.verify SHA256     ecdsaVerify HashSHA384 = ECDSA.verify SHA384     ecdsaVerify HashSHA512 = ECDSA.verify SHA512+    ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_224 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_224+    ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_256 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_256+    ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_384 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_384+    ecdsaVerify HashSHA3_512 = ECDSA.verify SHA3_512
Tests/Certificate.hs view
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@     hashSHA256,     hashSHA384,     hashSHA512,+    hashSHA3_256,+    hashSHA3_384,      -- * Key and signature utilities     Alg (..),@@ -79,6 +81,11 @@ hashSHA256 = GHash HashSHA256 SHA256 hashSHA384 = GHash HashSHA384 SHA384 hashSHA512 = GHash HashSHA512 SHA512++hashSHA3_256 :: GHash SHA3_256+hashSHA3_384 :: GHash SHA3_384+hashSHA3_256 = GHash HashSHA3_256 SHA3_256+hashSHA3_384 = GHash HashSHA3_384 SHA3_384  -- | Signature and hash algorithms instantiated with parameters. data Alg pub priv where
Tests/Tests.hs view
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import qualified Crypto.PubKey.DSA as DSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.ECDSA as ECDSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.ECC.Types as ECC+import Crypto.PubKey.MaskGenFunction (mgf1) import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.PubKey.RSA.PSS as PSS @@ -833,6 +834,42 @@                 @?= SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid         ] +-- | RSA-PSS signatures are verified with their own parameters.+testPSSParams :: TestTree+testPSSParams = testCase "RSA-PSS parameters" $ do+    (pub, priv) <- RSA.generate 128 3+    let msg = BS.pack [1, 2, 3]+        params :: PSS.PSSParams SHA384 BS.ByteString BS.ByteString+        params =+            PSS.PSSParams+                { PSS.pssHash = SHA384+                , PSS.pssMaskGenAlg = mgf1 SHA256+                , PSS.pssSaltLength = 0+                , PSS.pssTrailerField = 0xbc+                }+        alg =+            rsaPSSSignatureALG $+                (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384){pssMGFHash = HashSHA256, pssSaltLength = 0}+    sig <- either (error . show) id <$> PSS.signSafer params priv msg+    verifySignature alg (PubKeyRSA pub) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+    verifySignature+        (SignatureALG HashSHA384 PubKeyALG_RSAPSS)+        (PubKeyRSA pub)+        msg+        sig+        @?= SignatureFailed SignatureInvalid+    -- RSASSA-PSS keys restrict the parameters (RFC 4055 3.3)+    let restricted p = PubKeyRSAPSS pub (Just p)+        custom = (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384){pssMGFHash = HashSHA256, pssSaltLength = 0}+    verifySignature alg (PubKeyRSAPSS pub Nothing) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+    verifySignature alg (restricted custom) msg sig @?= SignaturePass+    verifySignature alg (restricted (defaultPSSParams HashSHA384)) msg sig+        @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+    verifySignature alg (restricted custom{pssMGFHash = HashSHA384}) msg sig+        @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+    verifySignature (SignatureALG HashSHA384 PubKeyALG_RSA) (PubKeyRSAPSS pub Nothing) msg sig+        @?= SignatureFailed SignaturePubkeyMismatch+ -- | Validity period around the current date. currentValidity :: IO (DateTime, DateTime) currentValidity = do@@ -1040,6 +1077,53 @@     actual <- validateExample (mkStore [rootPair]) [leaf]     actual @?= [] +-- | SHA-1 signatures are accepted by default and rejected on request.+testRejectSHA1 :: TestTree+testRejectSHA1 = testCase "SHA-1 signature" $ do+    validity <- currentValidity+    keys <- generateKeys (AlgRSA 1024 hashSHA1)+    rootPair <- mkCA 1 "SHA1 Root" validity (Just bc) Nothing Self keys+    leaf <- mkCertificate 2 2 (mkDn "leaf") validity [exampleSAN] (CA rootPair) keys+    let run checks =+            validate+                HashSHA256+                defaultHooks+                checks+                (mkStore [rootPair])+                defaultValidationCache+                ("www.example.com", fromString ":443")+                (CertificateChain [pairSignedCert leaf])+    accepted <- run defaultChecks+    accepted @?= []+    rejected <- run defaultChecks{checkRejectSHA1 = True}+    rejected @?= [InvalidSignature SignatureUnimplemented]+  where+    bc = ExtBasicConstraints True Nothing++-- | A hook can return its own reason.+testOtherReason :: IO (RData pub priv) -> TestTree+testOtherReason res = testWithRes res "other reason" $ \rd -> do+    leaf <-+        mkCertificate+            2+            53+            (mkDn "leaf")+            (present rd)+            [exampleSAN]+            (CA (root rd))+            (keys1 rd)+    let hooks = defaultHooks{hookValidateName = \_ _ -> [OtherReason "revoked"]}+    actual <-+        validate+            HashSHA256+            hooks+            defaultChecks+            (rootStore rd)+            defaultValidationCache+            ("www.example.com", fromString ":443")+            (CertificateChain [pairSignedCert leaf])+    actual @?= [OtherReason "revoked"]+ -- | Regression tests that do not depend on the signature algorithm. treeRegression :: TestTree treeRegression = withResource (initData AlgEd25519) freeData $ \res ->@@ -1050,6 +1134,8 @@             [ testNonCAAnchor res             , testSignatureAlgMismatch             , testWeakHash+            , testRejectSHA1+            , testOtherReason res             ]         , testGroup             "path building"@@ -1143,6 +1229,24 @@                 False             , testNameConstraints                 res+                "excluded otherName"+                [nameConstraints [] [upn "a@example.com"]]+                Nothing+                leafDN+                [sanExt [dns "www.example.com", upn "b@example.com"]]+                "www.example.com"+                False+            , testNameConstraints+                res+                "otherName under DNS constraints"+                [nameConstraints [dns "example.com"] []]+                Nothing+                leafDN+                [sanExt [dns "www.example.com", upn "b@example.com"]]+                "www.example.com"+                True+            , testNameConstraints+                res                 "excluded by wildcard"                 [nameConstraints [] [dns "www.example.com"]]                 Nothing@@ -1324,10 +1428,16 @@             , testLongChain res "too long" 25 False             ]         , testBadKeys+        , testPSSParams         ]   where     dns = AltNameDNS     ip = AltNameIP . BS.pack+    -- Microsoft UPN otherName+    upn u =+        AltNameOther+            [1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 311, 20, 2, 3]+            (encodeASN1' DER [ASN1String $ asn1CharacterString UTF8 u])     leafDN = mkDn "leaf"     ncEx = nameConstraints [dns "example.com"] []     raw oid asn1 = ExtensionRaw oid True (encodeASN1' DER asn1)@@ -1792,6 +1902,9 @@             , treeWithAlg "RSAPSS" (AlgRSAPSS 2048 pssParams hashSHA224)             , treeWithAlg "DSA" (AlgDSA dsaParams hashSHA1)             , treeWithAlg "ECDSA" (AlgEC curveName hashSHA512)+            , treeWithAlg "RSA SHA3" (AlgRSA 2048 hashSHA3_256)+            , treeWithAlg "RSAPSS SHA3" (AlgRSAPSS 2048 (PSS.defaultPSSParams SHA3_256) hashSHA3_256)+            , treeWithAlg "ECDSA SHA3" (AlgEC curveName hashSHA3_384)             , treeWithAlg "Ed25519" AlgEd25519             , treeWithAlg "Ed448" AlgEd448             , treeWithAlg "ML-DSA-44" AlgMLDSA44
crypton-x509-validation.cabal view
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ cabal-version:      >=1.10 name:               crypton-x509-validation-version:            1.10.3+version:            1.11.0 license:            BSD3 license-file:       LICENSE copyright:          Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org>@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@         base >=3 && <5,         bytestring,         containers,-        crypton >=2.2.0 && <2.3,+        crypton >=2.2.0 && <2.4,         crypton-asn1-types >=0.4.1 && <0.5,         crypton-asn1-encoding >=0.10.0 && <0.11,         crypton-pem >=0.2.4 && <0.4,-        crypton-x509 >=1.10.3 && <1.11,+        crypton-x509 >=1.11 && <1.12,         crypton-x509-store >=1.10.1 && <1.11,         data-default,         iproute >=1.2.2,